On the Occurrence and Recognition of Value
论价值的发生与承认

Introduction

P1 established the value-source: the structural ground by which a bearer, at some structural position, makes a class of concrete content able to enter the field of end-value. That is a synchronic figure. It says which class of content has standing to lodge where. It does not say how a particular content, in a particular bearer, comes to be that bearer's value content.

The omission cannot be left standing. With sources but no occurrence, a value theory has only a skeleton: it can say which rows of source a bearer has, and cannot say what that bearer at present holds dear, still less where those holdings came from, whether they are trustworthy, or whether someone else put them there. The real life of value lies wholly on the side of occurrence. And it is there that the questions most in need of defence arise: on what does a content's being my value rest; what place does another's recognition occupy in it; up to what point is outside influence help, and from what point is it writing in my stead.

The object of this paper is the occurrence of value — how a class of concrete content comes, in time, to be a bearer's value content — together with the social recognition that crosses it. What P1 handed down were three positions to be sorted: appearance, first-person avowal, social recognition. Their logical types are not the same. Appearance and first-person avowal constitute an axis of occurrence; social recognition is a relational axis crossing that one. This is a refinement of logical type, not a revision of the three structural items P1 registered.

The substance of the later papers is not unfolded here. How an outside end occupies the site of occurrence, how it locks revision, and by what auditable criterion this is judged; how an established value content thereafter holds steady, decays, shifts, and recurs; how action is adjudicated when incommensurable value contents meet; why another's value cannot be exhaustively read, compared by an outside measure, or merged — each belongs to a later paper. This one establishes the structure of occurrence and the position of recognition.

The paper keeps the discipline of the series: it names no outside theorist and cites no historical event; a first-tier term carries an English designation at first substantive use.

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§1 The Duality of Source and Occurrence

V17 The Duality of Source and Occurrence

The value-source is a synchronic structural ground; the occurrence of value is a diachronic process; the two are decoupled.

A value-source is given with the bearer's structure. It is a position, a standing. It does not say what this bearer at present holds dear; it says only which class of thing could come to be held dear by it. The occurrence of value is the process by which a class of concrete content comes, in time, to be the bearer's value content. It has a before and after, has steps, can be completed, and can halt midway.

A bearer that has only just unfolded the row of source turned toward others may not yet have met any concrete other, and so may have had no concrete content occur on that row at all. The source is present; occurrence has not begun. This is no defect. The two belong to different levels: a source is a synchronic cross-section, asking whether the position is there; occurrence is a stretch of time, asking how far a given content has come.

Belonging to different levels, the two differ first in stability. Within the domain in which the bearer's structure still stands, the presence of a value-source is given by structure and does not lapse because some concrete content has lapsed; as for the state of the source after the substrate that carries the bearer has genuinely exited, that belongs to boundary conditions and is not asserted here. Within that domain, concrete contents are subject to arising and perishing: a content can occur, decay, be suppressed, and recur. The presence of the source is steady; the arising and perishing of content is in motion. Confounding the two yields an absurdity: that when some particular holding of a person fades, the whole row of value-source underlying it is gone.

They differ, second, in what they give. A source gives structural possibility — which class of content can enter this bearer's field of end-value. Occurrence actualizes this particular one. The source is the slot; occurrence is the filling of it. An empty slot is still a slot.

Decoupling is not severance. Occurrence always proceeds within the possibility a source gives: a content can occur only if the bearer has the corresponding source-position; without that row of source, that class of content has nowhere to land. The source gives range, and occurrence actualizes within the range.

Nor does occurrence presuppose dimension-opening. The overwhelming majority of concrete occurrences proceed within the source-domain a bearer already has, and involve no addition of any structural dimension.

One further distinction belongs here, or the word decay will run ambiguous through what follows. What this paper establishes is the first-person constitutive position shared by avowal, revision, abandonment, and re-avowal: a content already avowed remains at that same position, and can be re-claimed, rewritten, or given up. When these changes occur in time, and how they interweave with risings and fallings of weight that come about without any first-person revision — risings and fallings that may issue from the pressure of an environing lattice or from a shift in centre of gravity as new content enters — belongs to content dynamics, the object of a later paper. This paper gives the door of change; it does not write the history of change.

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§2 Two Positions of Occurrence and One of Recognition

V18 Two Positions of Occurrence and One of Recognition

For a concrete content to become a bearer's value content, it must first take a position of appearance in the bearer's field, and then pass first-person avowal. Appearance is the candidate position; first-person avowal is the sole constitutive position. Social recognition is a relational position crossing the axis of occurrence: it can influence appearance, can support or suppress expression, and can confer a public position on a content once established, but it does not constitute that content as the bearer's own value.

To speak of three layers would suggest three homogeneous and successive steps, complete only when the third is done. That is not how it stands. Appearance and first-person avowal are two positions on one axis: appearance brings a content into candidacy, first-person avowal makes it the bearer's own value content. With avowal the occurrence is complete; from then on, though no one knows of it and no one recognizes it, it already is this bearer's value content. Social recognition adds no further station on that axis. It belongs to another: it alters the content's visibility, expressibility, support, and room to operate in a field of several subjects, and does not alter whether it is this bearer's value content. The geometry here is one axis of occurrence and one axis of recognition, not three rungs.

Nor are the three positions reducible to one another. That a content shows up in view, and that it becomes my value content, are two matters. Avowal is not seeing more clearly; it is a constitutive event. That others hold a content valuable, or hold that this content is my value, is not my having avowed it. The converse holds equally: a person who has settled some value for himself does not thereby acquire a position of expression and support in society.

With the three apart, the state of a content in a given bearer can be read off precisely. Let A stand for appearance, F for first-person avowal, and S for social recognition.

State	Structural reading
A, no F, no S	Candidate content, appearance only
A and F, no S	Already the bearer's value content, without social recognition
A and S, no F	Social script, external attribution, or content pushed at the bearer; not the bearer's own value
A and F and S	An established value content that also holds social recognition
S without A	A content present in the social environment, not yet within this bearer's field of occurrence

S in the table is to be read according to its object. In the rows without F, S can only be content-type recognition, that is, a community's holding some content valuable; subject-position recognition, the recognition that a content is one this bearer has claimed, is undefined before F, since it presupposes that the bearer already has a first-person position.

Four things follow from the table. F is the constitutive position: only at F does a content become the bearer's value content. A runs in a plastic modality and not in a modality of granting and revoking: outside forces can, by presenting, blocking, or suppressing, make a content appear in the candidate field, or vanish from it, or become hard to enter it — this is causal action on the conditions of appearance, not some relational subject's constituting candidacy by authorization or revocation. Granting and revoking, as a relational modality, fall only on S. S is an independent relational position: it can exist before F and can be added after F, and its presence or absence does not alter whether F holds. A and S do not counterfeit F: a content pushed at a person and held valuable by the community is still not this bearer's value content so long as the bearer has not avowed it; that row is the one most readily counterfeited. And the solitary subject's A and F stand entirely: in a universe with no second subject, recognition has no object, the S column stands empty throughout, and A with F goes through all the same, that one bearer having its own value content. What the prequel established — that value asks for one bearer and no counterparty — takes this form at the layer of occurrence.

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§3 Appearance and First-Person Avowal

V19 Appearance Is Necessary and Not Sufficient

A content must first appear in the bearer's field to be avowable; but appearance is not avowal.

Appearance is a content's taking a candidate position in the bearer's field. It does not ask where the content came from.

There are two routes. One is exogenous: a way of living, a craft, a person, handed over by the world, heard of, met with, shown. What a person has never encountered cannot become his value content, because it has not yet appeared in his field. The other is endogenous: a content surfaces from the bearer's own experience and activity. A person sings, and in the singing the thing shows its weight; he finds that he cares about it. No one handed singing to him saying that this is worth holding dear; he met it himself, in the doing.

Endogenous appearance is to be distinguished from two things. It is not a value-source: a source is a structural position, giving which class of content can lodge there, whereas endogenous appearance is a particular content surfacing from within that range. Nor is it experiential valence itself: the pleasantness of that moment of singing is valence, while what takes the candidate position is the singing, not the pleasantness.

Endogenous appearance is likewise only candidacy. What surfaces from within is not, by being from within, already the bearer's value content. A person may notice that he enjoys wounding others in an argument; the noticing is an endogenous appearance, and he may entirely refuse to claim it. The distinction between appearance and avowal holds on this route as well, and is most easily effaced precisely here, because what surfaces from within looks as though it were natively mine.

Both routes are needed. If only the exogenous were admitted, the solitary subject would have no candidate content at all, though its value content stands, as the preceding section established. Endogenous appearance is where the candidates there come from. Both routes can also be acted on from outside: the exogenous can be pushed and can be blocked; the endogenous can be pressed down until it never surfaces, so that a person never notices what he cares about. What is meant by pressing down here is that the conditions of appearance are locked, not that avowal is written in the bearer's stead; writing-in-stead is another matter, and falls elsewhere. How these actions are to be distinguished from help is the object of later papers.

Much takes a candidate position, and the overwhelming majority of it will never be anyone's value content. That a content has appeared says only that it is now a candidate, standing there awaiting a first-person disposition. That disposition may be avowal, may be refusal, and may be a long suspension.

The place of particular preference is most readily mislaid here. A preference can be the first appearance of a candidate content — a person taking a first liking to some way of living, which is indeed still at the layer of appearance. But a preference can equally be the present enactment of a value content already established: a person who has long held the care of his family dear, and who therefore chooses to be home early today, makes a particular choice which is the showing-forth of an existing value content, not some new candidate appearing. Preference is therefore not locked to a single layer.

At whichever layer it falls, preference does not constitute avowal. Not everything wanted is a value. The preference of this moment suffices neither to establish that a content already is a value content, nor to establish that it is not: a preference at the layer of appearance does not become value content by being intense, and a preference at the layer of action is not disqualified as the showing-forth of a value content by being merely one choice.

I like singing and singing has value for me are two sentences. The first reports a state, and the state may be nothing more than a passing feeling; the second says that this content already stands among my value contents. Between the first and the second lies the position of first-person avowal.

V20 First-Person Avowal as the Constitutive Position

First-person avowal is the constitutive event in which a content that has already taken a candidate position in some legitimate value-source-domain of the bearer acquires, in the running of the bearer's own law, the standing to be called upon, restated, and revised in the first person. This is the sole position on the axis of occurrence that constitutes value content.

The word avowal is used here in a stipulated sense, and one common connotation must be set aside at once: it does not mean an open declaration. Avowal here names the claiming of a content as one's own, and requires no utterance whatever.

The restriction in the first clause of the definition cannot be dropped: avowal does not manufacture value from nothing. It operates only on a content that has already taken a candidate position in some value-source-domain, and cannot turn whatever is announced into value content. A bearer's announcing as its value something bearing on none of its value-sources does not land.

To acquire the standing to be called upon in the first person is to say that this content can thereafter be drawn upon by the bearer itself in its self-interpretation, its choices, its revisions, and its local ordering of action. This does not require that it produce action at once, and does not make action a condition of its constitution; it says that the content has entered the network which the bearer's own law can handle, rather than remaining in view.

Avowal is not a verbal profession: it does not require the bearer to say I avow this, does not require it to give complete reasons, does not require a single explicit declaration. Many value contents are embodied and tacit: the bearer keeps them within the space of its own reflexive running, and keeps for them, throughout, a first-person position of revision and exit, without necessarily being able to articulate them. This does not prevent their being its value contents. Nor need avowal be instantaneous: some avowals happen in a moment, some form gradually and settle only after years. To call it a constitutive event is to say what it completes structurally, not that it must occur at a point in time.

Still less is it verification. The bearer is not ascertaining an already existing fact, not determining whether it really does care about something; it is claiming that thing as its own in the running of its own law. Avowal is therefore not a test of the durability of a feeling. A liking that has persisted thirty years without ever being claimed remains a persistent preference; a content claimed today is this bearer's value content today, even if it is revised hereafter. Duration does not adjudicate the matter. People do often need to live with something a while before it settles; what happens in that while is not the gathering of evidence but the gradual forming of the avowal itself. And to find later that this was not what one cared about is a revision, not the discovery that the original avowal was false.

Two things hold at once in avowal. The first is claiming: the candidate content is taken into the bearer's own value contents, becoming its own rather than an option set before it. One's own law is the structural form by which a bearer legislates for itself, unfolds, and revises — a form, not a content — so this content does not become a part of one's own law, as though the law were a vessel for contents; precisely put, the bearer, in the running of its own law, claims this content as its own value content. The second is the maintenance of the position of revision: the content stands throughout at a position revisable by the bearer in the first person. If, once claimed, a content can never again be questioned, altered, or given up, then it is not there in the manner of a value content but in some other manner, and that other manner is the object of the paper on colonization.

Avowal is also not a rubber stamp on the content that appeared. In avowing, the bearer may negate, restate, split, or recontextualize the candidate that has shown up. What society hands over is often a whole script, and what the bearer claims may be one small piece of it, or a version it has rewritten, or something it has assembled anew from halves of two unrelated sources. What is avowed need not keep the shape in which it first appeared. That a person has accepted some content coming from society therefore does not by itself mean he has been occupied by that script: he may already have taken it apart and kept only the part he claimed himself. What an audit of writing-in-stead must look at is precisely whether that position of reconstruction is still there.

Nor can any other exhaustively verify, from a third-person position, whether an avowal has truly occurred. What is externally auditable is whether the candidate position has been occupied and whether the bearer's room for reconstruction and revision is still there; what is not auditable is any adjudication, on the bearer's behalf, of what it truly avows. This boundary must hold, or a regulator need only claim to see what you really avow in order to occupy that position once again.

The position runs differently on the two layers of the domain of bearers. For a complete subject, first-person avowal is performed by itself. For a subject-to-be the case differs: it stands wholly within the domain of bearers of end-value, while its function of first-person avowal is still in genesis, and that genesis is domain-wise. Where the function has come to run of itself in some content-domain, contents in that domain can be avowed; where it has not, the guardian network still holds the candidate position and the future position of revision. What is gradual, then, is the bandwidth and the reach of self-running across domains; what is not gradual is whether any given content, at this moment, has been avowed or has not. The guardian network can maintain the accessibility of candidate contents, maintain their expression, maintain their future revisability; it cannot fix any candidate configuration as a first-person value content the subject-to-be has already completed. All such maintenance presupposes that the subject-to-be's position of first-person avowal stands throughout — it is precisely that position, to be used by the subject-to-be itself hereafter, that is being maintained.

A value content already avowed does not vanish on the instant through sleep, anaesthesia, unconsciousness, or other temporary incapacity. What persists is not the act of avowal, which need not run continuously; what persists is the first-person belonging and that position of revision. A person asleep does not have his value contents fall back into candidacy for those hours.

First-person avowal and valuing are two things, and there is no universal precedence between them. Valuing is the name, in this series, for the event in which a legitimate possibility of dimension-opening is taken up by a bearer from its first-person position into its own process of construction; it answers the question of whom the dynamic belongs to. First-person avowal answers another: whether a particular content has become the bearer's value content. Their relation depends on the case. In an ordinary occurrence of content within an existing source-domain, a content appears among the bearer's existing value-sources and is avowed, and the matter is complete without valuing being called upon at any point and without any dimension-opening. In the case of a structural opening the order reverses: the bearer takes up a bridge by valuing, acquires a new source-position, and only thereafter do concrete contents on that new position come to appear and to be avowed. Neither precedes the other in general. As for how an avowed content is thereafter maintained, invested in, allowed to decay, or brought back to prominence, that is content dynamics, and is not gathered under the word valuing.

Why a content is avowed at this moment rather than another, in its content-level reasons; and how an outside end counterfeits first-person avowal — both belong to later papers.

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§4 Social Recognition

The axis of occurrence completes at first-person avowal. The axis crossing it is social recognition.

V21 First-Person Avowal Cannot Be Granted or Revoked from Outside

First-person avowal can be neither conferred by another nor revoked by another.

Not conferred: no external authorization, naming, or proclamation makes a content some bearer's value content. A community may declare a thing valuable, may declare that someone ought to take it as his value; these declarations fall elsewhere and cannot reach this position. For a content to become this bearer's value content, only its own claiming, in the running of its own law, will do.

What irrevocability says is a modal matter. Outside forces can do a great deal: they can suppress the expression of a value content, can block its accessibility, can distort a bearer's memory, can make a content decay in actual operation until it hardly bears on anything. All of this really happens, and is serious. None of it, however, completes a revocation within the modality of avowal. External relations hold no constitutive authority to declare that a first-person avowal no longer belongs to this bearer. Causal interference and modal revocation are two matters: a person's value content suppressed to the point of being unliveable is still his value content, and this is exactly why suppression is suppression and not transfer.

That the outside cannot complete a revocation by a relational proclamation does not mean that outside action cannot causally destroy a content's memory, accessibility, and operating conditions, even to the point where it disappears in the sense studied by content dynamics. That is a fact about interference, not the outside's acquiring a first-person power of revocation. Three things are therefore to be held apart: a community's revoking a content's public position; outside action's causally destroying a content's operation; and the bearer's own withdrawal of a content's belonging. The first is common, the second grave, and the third only the bearer itself can perform.

Non-grantability and irrevocability bear on the outside alone. The bearer itself may of course revise, abandon, and re-avow; that the position is revisable throughout says exactly that it stands open to the bearer itself. It does not require the bearer to be willing to change at every moment, nor does it forbid its treating some content as a commitment for life. A person may hold something as what he will keep to the end, unaltered, and this does not conflict with revisability: revisability says the position is open, not that it must be used.

V22 Social Recognition Is Grantable and Revocable, and Its Objects Divide

Social recognition is the sole position at which grantability and revocability come to rest. A community may confer recognition and may withdraw it.

Social recognition has at least two distinct objects. The first is content-type recognition: a community's holding that a class of content has value-standing within it. This is directed at no particular bearer; it consists in the evaluations, ideals, and identity-scripts already current in a community. It may perfectly well precede any bearer's first-person avowal, and it is often just through it that a content comes to appear in a bearer's field at all. In that respect content-type recognition falls on the side of appearance, and is one of the forces that shape the exogenous route of appearance; the endogenous route is not supplied by it, though it may be overridden by it. The second is subject-position recognition: a community's recognizing that a content is one this bearer has claimed, and conferring on it a public position. This presupposes that the bearer already has a first-person position; if the bearer has not avowed, what the community does is not to recognize its value but to attribute a value to it.

Grantability and revocability hold for both objects, but what revocation removes differs. Revoking content-type recognition removes the evaluative standing of a class of content within the community. Revoking subject-position recognition removes the public position and support that this bearer's value content had within the community: it may no longer be held legitimate, no longer be given occasions of expression, no longer receive practical facilitation. What is removed is social position and support, not this bearer's own value content.

The case of the subject-to-be cannot be assimilated to subject-position recognition. Where a subject-to-be has not yet formed a first-person avowal, a social network may still recognize and protect its standing as a bearer, its candidate configuration, and its future position of revision. These protections are real and necessary; but they are not subject-position recognition, and still less a completion, on its behalf, of the belonging of a content. Any claim, before first-person avowal, that some determinate content already is this subject-to-be's final value is an external attribution, or a recognition by fiction.

V23 Social Recognition Does Not Constitute Value Content

Social recognition is real, and has a structure and an efficacy of its own; it does not constitute value content.

A content can be a bearer's value content with no social recognition whatever: unknown, unendorsed, opposed by the whole world, it remains this bearer's value content. The solitary subject shows this most plainly: in a universe with one subject, recognition has no object at all, and its value content stands regardless.

Conversely, social recognition does not thereby yield value content. That others hold a content valuable is content-type recognition, and bears not at all on whether I have avowed it; that others hold a content to be my value is subject-position recognition, and if in fact I have not avowed it, what that recognition recognizes does not exist — it is merely an external attribution. Others' avowing is not my avowing.

Social recognition is therefore an independent relational axis, crossing the axis of occurrence without merging into it. Where they cross it truly acts: it influences appearance, supports or suppresses expression, confers or withdraws public position. It does not cross the one step of first-person constitution.

V24 The Modal Asymmetry of the Three Positions

The three positions lie across two axes, and their modalities differ. Appearance is plastic: outside forces can influence what appears in a bearer's field and what does not, what appears sharply and what dimly. First-person avowal is constitutive and cannot be granted or revoked from outside: it is the sole position at which a content becomes value content, and that position the outside cannot enter. Social recognition is grantable and revocable and non-constitutive: it can be conferred, maintained, weakened, and withdrawn, and none of these motions makes a content become, or cease to be, the bearer's value content.

This asymmetry is no accidental arrangement. Precisely because the modalities differ, an influence has a determinate reading according to the position on which it falls. Legitimate external action and colonization both occur across these three positions; the difference lies not in whether there is external action but in whether that action tampers across positions with modality. The form colonization takes is exactly this: to use the grantable and revocable character of social recognition to force the constitution belonging to first-person avowal, and thereafter to lock the position of revision. What is grantable and revocable never had constitutive authority, and the step therefore does not go through. How it succeeds in practice, how it occupies, introjects, and locks, and by what auditable criterion this is judged, belongs to the paper on colonization.

The row of the table with appearance and recognition but no avowal is the most readily counterfeited for the same reason: it is the state in which external action is complete while the first-person constitutive position stands empty, and what colonization does is to read that row as the row with all three, and to have the bearer read it so as well.

How two bearers acknowledge one another at the layer of recognition is left to a later paper.

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§5 Shaping: Cultivation and Evocation

A person's value does not occur in a vacuum. What others do, the books they write, the institutions they raise, all bear on which contents can appear in his field, on whether he can say aloud what he cares about, and on whether he can go back and alter it. This class of external action falls on the conditions of occurrence.

V25 Shaping as Release-ward Modulation of the Conditions of Occurrence

Shaping is external release-ward modulation of a bearer's conditions of value-occurrence: it enlarges the range of appearance for candidate contents, their accessibility, and the room for their expression and revision.

Shaping ordinarily falls at the layer of content. More candidates come to appear; what could not be expressed becomes expressible; what could not be altered becomes alterable. This is not structural dimension-opening. Dimension-opening is a bearer's adding a structural dimension, and is a rare event; what shaping enlarges is mostly room to move within an existing source-domain. In a few cases a shaping does prepare the conditions for an opening, but that is a special case of it, not its definition. To identify the two is to read every clarification, every demonstration, every conversation that emboldens someone to speak, as an ascent of structural level.

What shaping can reach ends at conditions. Whether a concrete content becomes the bearer's value content completes at its first-person avowal; whether a structural opening occurs completes at its valuing. The outside can bring the bridge up to the foot; whether it is walked is the bearer's own. These two completions are not two stages of one thing but the completions proper to two different results.

The character of an external action is judged in two steps.

The first step excludes locking: whether the bearer's positions of interruption, refusal, revision, and first-person standing have been cancelled. Where they are cancelled the action is locking, and such an action is not shaping. The agent's motive and goodwill do not enter this judgment: to cancel another's position of revision out of good intentions is still locking, while an action that offends, that is discourteous, even that humiliates, has not yet fallen to locking so long as those positions remain.

Suppression of appearance or expression is not automatically the cancellation of the positions of refusal and revision. Not to see some candidate may mean only that this one has not appeared, or that the range of candidates has been narrowed; not to be able to say something aloud does not of itself cancel internal restatement and revision, and a person may be unable to speak and still, in himself, refuse a thing and rewrite it. Suppression must reach a structural threshold to fall to locking: a content-domain systematically excluded to the point where the relevant candidates cannot enter the bearer's space of reflection, restatement, and revision; or the bearer's refusal, reconstruction, and revision in that domain pre-voided within the relational structure. At that point, though no one has laid a hand on his position of revision, that position has already failed. An evaluation no one deliberately promotes, an atmosphere for which no one is answerable, if it presses a person's appearance in some domain to that degree, so that he neither thinks of the thing nor can say it nor has any way to revise it, falls on the side of locking; compressions and narrowings short of that do not fall to locking, and have their own place.

That the positions remain says only that this action has not become locking; it does not yet say that it is shaping. Shaping requires the positive effect: that the bearer's appearance, accessibility, expression, revision, or bridging space is indeed maintained, restored, or enlarged. An external action that neither locks nor produces such a release is a non-shaping action; it may be no more than noise, friction, offence, or an interference without structural consequence. An action that fills up another's time so that his candidates dwindle greatly, while never touching his position of revision, falls in this class: it has narrowed the space without reaching locking, and is therefore not shaping, still less release.

The second step is taken only within the release branch, and judges the type of the relation. Where opening the value-occurrence space of some identifiable receiving end is the constitutive orientation of the relation, this is cultivation: a teacher clearing a way for this one student, a person making room for another beside him to speak, the orientation falling determinately on that end. The receiving end need not be a single person; it may be an identifiable group. Nor need the acting source be a person: an institution, an arrangement of relations, so long as it is oriented toward opening space for appearance and revision for its members, is cultivation — indeed this is the earliest use of the term, which was first raised precisely as the converse of the colonization of subjects by institutions and relations. Where the acting source merely expresses, exists, or occurs, without taking the constitution of some receiving end's value-occurrence as the purpose of the relation, this is evocation.

Subjective intent judges neither direction nor type. An acting source may express deliberately, may even wish to be seen and to be understood, and this is still evocation; what divides the two is whether opening some receiving end's space of occurrence is the orientation of the relation. An author writes a book, hoping for readers and for understanding, yet arranges no particular reader's value-occurrence: evocation. Nor is deliberateness or goodwill the differentia of cultivation: a man who keeps his workshop open while he works, glad if others take a craft from it, yet teaching no one, is clear-eyed and well-meaning, and his orientation still falls on no identifiable receiving end — evocation. The same source changes type with a change of relation: should he begin teaching one of them, clearing a way for this one person, that is cultivation.

The occasion-end of evocation lies in the acting source's expression, manner of existence, or features as an event. The source need not be a subject: a work, an institution, an occurrence, a landscape can all be the occasion of a bearer's value-occurrence. Nor need it be opening dimension. Whether an acting source can bring a content into a bearer's candidate field depends on whether that content appears for the bearer; whether it can further become the bearer's value content depends on the bearer's first-person avowal. These two questions are not one.

Evocation and endogenous appearance divide by the provenance of the trigger. In evocation there is an identifiable external expression, event, work, or environmental feature that supplies the trigger or the content-source for this candidate. In endogenous appearance there is no external trigger carrying this content, and the candidate forms out of the bearer's own sustained experience, practice, or self-reorganization. Between them lies a mixed route in which external trigger and internal practice both take part: a person has heard singing elsewhere, and later sings himself, and only in the singing finds that this has weight for him. That route need not be forced into the dichotomy. What must be held is that evocation and endogeny are an analysis of provenance, not two ontologies of the candidate position: every candidate takes its position only in the bearer's own field of occurrence, without exception.

The unintended is not automatically benign. An action for which no one is answerable can fall on the side of locking just as well, as the case of the atmosphere above shows. That the judgment of direction does not ask after intent is precisely for this.

The use of the criterion accordingly differs. For cultivation, its exercise can be judged directly: whether this exercise releases or locks. For evocation, where there is no discernible act of an agent at all, no reading in terms of an agent need be forced; only the signature its result leaves is read, namely whether the bearer's positions of revision, interruption, and refusal remain.

Shaping is not a necessary condition of value-occurrence. A solitary subject has no external action to receive, and its appearance and avowal complete all the same. What shaping alters are the conditions of occurrence, not the constitution of occurrence itself.

The word cultivation is not coined here; it is inherited from upstream, and its scope must be stated. When first raised, it named exactly the converse of the colonization of subjects by institutions and relations; it was later given a finer characterization between one person and another; and the theory of power supplies its criterion of direction. This paper keeps the same extension and does not narrow it: cultivation has always been an exercise with a receiving end, and an exercise falls toward some identifiable receiving end, so orientation was always its implicit condition and is here only made explicit. Evocation is not a piece carved out of cultivation; it is newly opened ground. Works, institutional texts, events, landscapes encountered and found illuminating were never under the name of cultivation, because they are not exercises directed at anyone at all. The instances judged upstream by the criterion of direction therefore require no re-indexing on account of this paper.

As for shaping, it is this theory's general name for release-ward results at the layer of occurrence. It stands alongside the theory of power's classification of operations, neither beneath it nor as its higher name. The division of criteria follows: for an exercise such as cultivation, direction can be judged directly; for evocation, with no discernible agent, only the result-signature of that criterion is borrowed. What each judges differs — the one an exercise, the other an effect.

Institutional cultivation does not elevate an institution into a subject. Institutions and arrangements of relations can carry a cultivating exercise, can distribute it, and can keep it running stably; but they have no law of their own and make no first-person recognition. The root at the enacting end of such cultivation must therefore remain traceable to the subjects who design, maintain, or operate the arrangement, and to their law as turned toward the receiving end. Where an arrangement merely stands open without any attributable enacting end, it can constitute conditions for release-ward shaping, yet does not independently acquire the full double-root structure set out below.

V25a Same Event, Distinct Roots, and the Forking of Completion

A cultivating exercise, at the enacting end, is rooted in that enactor's own law as turned toward another: it recognizes this concrete other as an end, and takes up that content in the manner of clearing a way. At the receiving end the case is different.

If the bearer's space of appearance, expression, revision, or bridging is indeed released, the exercise has already succeeded at the level of conditions. It cannot yet be said that the double root is complete, since the receiving end has not taken its own step.

That step has two landings. Where the result falls on the occurrence of concrete content, the completion at the receiving end is its first-person avowal. Where the result falls on structural opening, the completion at the receiving end is its valuing. These are the completions proper to two different results, not a first and a second level: to arrange them as a ladder would once again suggest a universal precedence between avowal and valuing, and there is none.

Only when the completion at the receiving end actually occurs does the cultivation acquire the full double-root structure. The two roots never transfer and never merge. The enactor cannot transmit its own law into the other's value; what the receiving end avows is throughout what it has itself avowed. The receiving end's self-completion does not, by cultivation itself, automatically generate a corresponding lateral duty: the enactor took part in forming the conditions, and holds no constitutive share in the receiving end's first-person completion.

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§6 The Cross-Series Local Modal Parallel with Rights Theory

The structure established here has a shape close to one in the theory of rights, and the resemblance is worth stating and worth bounding.

The resemblance lies in the distribution of modality. Value theory distinguishes the value-source from social recognition: the source is given with the bearer's structure and is not constituted by social relations, while social recognition can be conferred, maintained, and withdrawn. The theory of rights distinguishes basic rights from recognition-based rights: basic rights are likewise not constituted by social relations, while recognition-based rights have their candidate position established at the source by constitutive recognition, and stand, lapse, or are withdrawn with changes in that constitutive source and in operational support. Variability, as a modality, falls in both on the relational layer and not on the structural layer. Entitlement is a third grid in the theory of rights, anchored at the granting end's expenditure, and does not enter this comparison.

V26 A Local Parallel, Not an Isomorphism

The resemblance stops there. Value theory's social recognition constitutes only public positions of expression, support, and practice, and does not constitute the bearer's first-person value content; the theory of rights' constitutive recognition does establish, at the source, the candidate position of a recognition-based right. On one side the relational layer is not a constituter, on the other it is precisely the constituter, and the two function-signatures are opposed. This is therefore a local parallel of modality, not an isomorphism.

Nor does first-person avowal have a strict counterpart. It is a diachronic constitutive event bearing on a particular content; the core in the theory of rights is an incompressible structural condition running across the layers of thickness. The two are of different types, and are not to be translated into each other.

The ground on which social recognition fails to constitute value content is likewise not that the one recognized holds no position. He holds one: subject-position recognition confers exactly that position — occasions of expression, practical support, public legitimacy, all of them real. The ground is a difference of logical type: a social position and a first-person value content are not things of one kind, and no thickness of external relation crosses that one constitutive position of the first person. A person may be recognized in earnest by an entire community, and the content still not be his value content, so long as he has not claimed it.

This holds independently, and presupposes the wording of no chapter in the theory of rights. As for the gateless, they do not enter the domain of bearers of end-value, and can be the object toward which some concrete value content of a bearer is directed; in the theory of rights they can stand at the directed end of an entitlement, which is anchored at the granting end and not held by them. These are two positions belonging to two series, and are not to be translated into each other.

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§7 The Reach Handed On

How an outside end occupies the site of value-occurrence is the object of the paper on colonization. It has at least three points of entry. The layer of appearance can be occupied: whole scripts can be pushed, and the endogenous route can be pressed down until it never surfaces, so that a person never notices what he cares about. Social recognition can counterfeit first-person avowal: a community's evaluation of some content can be presented as a value this bearer has already claimed, or a passing liking can be presented straightway as his value. The position of revision can be locked, so that a content once claimed can never again be questioned, altered, or given up. Each of the three requires a criterion, and the baseline of that criterion has been given here. Outside content is not itself colonization; a person's taking some content from society and claiming it is the ordinary case of occurrence. Colonization is tampering across positions: using what is grantable and revocable to accomplish constitution, and locking the position that ought to stand open. The modal asymmetry of the three positions, together with the fact that avowal may restructure its candidate, is where that criterion can be built. An inventory of uses writing a person's own value in his stead is one particular form of this mechanism, and closes there as well.

How an established value content changes thereafter is the object of the paper on dynamics. It has to handle the presence and accessibility of a source, its content, and its governing emphasis, along with one matter directly adjoining this paper: colonization does not alter the presence of a source; what it locks is the source's accessibility and the path of occurrence. Why a content is avowed at this moment and not another, in its content-level reasons, belongs there too.

How adjudication proceeds when a person holds several avowed value contents which, in a concrete situation, demand incompatible actions, is the object of the paper on conflict. That there is no ranking ontologically does not conflict with the necessity of deciding in practice: what adjudication yields is a first-person ordering of action, not a hierarchy of value-standing.

How two bearers acknowledge one another at the layer of recognition, and why another's value cannot be exhaustively read, compared by a common outside measure, or merged, is the object of the paper on the other.

How an avowed value content moves toward action is the entry of the outlook paper.

The side of occurrence now has a structure. The value-source gives possibility; a concrete content passes, in time, through appearance and first-person avowal, and becomes the bearer's own value content; appearance has an exogenous and an endogenous route; avowal is claiming and not verifying, and is no test of the durability of a feeling; social recognition forms another axis alongside, grantable and revocable, able to confer a position and able to take one back, and alone unable to claim in another's stead. External action can release these conditions, whether out of an orientation toward some one person, or as an occasion with no such orientation at all, the source expressing deliberately while arranging no one's value-occurrence; and in either case the last step remains with the bearer itself.

引言

P1 立了价值源，即承担者在某一结构位上使一类具体内容能够进入目的价值场的结构根据。那是一张共时的图：它给出结构上的可能，说明哪一类内容有资格在何处落脚。至于一项具体的内容，在一个具体的承担者那里，究竟如何成为它的价值内容，那张图不曾回答。

这一步不能省。只有源而无发生，价值论便只剩一副骨架：说得清一个承担者有哪几行源，说不清它此刻究竟珍重着什么，更说不清那些珍重从何而来，可不可靠，是不是别人塞给它的。价值的真实生活全在发生这一侧。也正是在这一侧，最需要防守的问题才出现：一项内容成为我的价值，凭的是什么；他人的承认在其中占什么位置；外来的影响到哪一步为止是帮助，从哪一步起是代写。

本篇的对象是价值的发生（occurrence），即一类具体内容如何在时间中成为承担者的价值内容，以及与之相交的社会承认。P1 交下来的是三个待分的位置：显现，第一人称认可，社会承认。这三个位置的逻辑类型并不相同。显现与第一人称认可构成一条发生轴，社会承认则是与这条轴相交的关系轴。此为逻辑类型上的精化，不改 P1 所登记的三个结构件。

外来目的如何占据发生的位置，如何锁死修订，其可审计的判据；已经成立的价值内容如何随时间稳定，衰减，位移，复现；不可通约的价值内容相遇时行动如何裁断；他者的价值为何不可穷尽读取，不可外尺比较，不可统合，这些都在后续各篇。本篇立发生的结构与承认的位置。

正文遵系列纪律：不点名外部理论家，不援引历史事件；一级术语首次出现附英文注。

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第一节 源与发生的对偶

V17 源与发生的对偶

价值源是共时的结构根据，价值的发生是历时的过程，二者解耦。

价值源随承担者的结构给定，是一个位置，一种资格。它不说这个承担者此刻珍重着什么，只说哪一类东西有可能成为它珍重的。价值的发生（occurrence），是一类具体内容在时间中成为承担者价值内容的那个过程。它有先后，有步骤，可以完成，也可以停在半途。

一个刚展开出朝向他者那一行源的承担者，可能还没有遇到任何具体的他者，因而在那一行上还没有任何具体内容发生。源在，发生未起。这不是缺陷，是两件事本就分属两个层次：源是共时的切面，问的是有没有这个位置；发生是时间中的一段过程，问的是某一项内容走到了哪一步。

分属两个层次，带来的第一个结果是二者的稳定性不同。在承担者结构仍在的范围内，价值源的在场由结构给定，不因一项具体内容的消失而消失；至于承载者真正退场之后源的状态，属于边界条件，此处不作断言。而在这个范围内，具体内容是可生可灭的：一项内容可以发生，可以衰减，可以被压制，可以再度复现。源的在场是稳的，内容的生灭是动的。若把两者混作一件事，就会得出一个荒谬的推论：一个人某项具体的珍重淡去了，他的那一整行价值源也就没了。

第二个结果是二者所给的东西不同。源给出的是结构上的可能，即哪一类内容可以进入这个承担者的目的价值场；发生落实的是具体的这一项。源是格，发生是填格的那一次。一个格空着，格还是格。

解耦不是割裂。发生始终在源所给的可能之内进行：一项内容能够发生，前提是承担者有相应的源位；没有那一行源，那一类内容就没有可落脚的地方。源给范围，发生在范围之内落实。

发生也不以开维为前提。绝大多数具体内容的发生，都在承担者已有的源域之内进行，不涉及任何结构维度的新增。

发生这一侧还有一层区分要先立起来，否则后文的衰字会含混。本篇所立的，是认可，修订，放弃与重新认可所共用的那个第一人称构成位置：已经认可的内容仍留在同一位置上，可以被重新认领，被改写，被放弃。至于这些变化在时间中何时发生，如何与不经第一人称修订而来的权重起落交织，那些起落又如何来自环境网格的挤压或新内容进场造成的重心位移，属于内容动力学，是另一篇的对象。本篇给变换之门，不写变换之历程。

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第二节 发生二位与承认一位

V18 发生二位与承认一位

一项具体内容成为承担者的价值内容，须先在承担者的场中取得显现，继而经第一人称认可。显现是候选位，第一人称认可是唯一构成位。社会承认是与这条发生轴相交的关系位：它可以影响显现，可以支持或压制表达，也可以在内容成立之后给予它公共的位置，但它不构成该内容作为承担者自己的价值。

三层这个说法，暗示三个同质同序的步骤，走完第三步才算完成。事情不是这样。显现与第一人称认可是同一条轴上的两个位置：显现把一项内容送进候选，第一人称认可使它成为承担者自己的价值内容。到认可为止，这项内容的发生已经完成，此后即便无人知晓，无人承认，它也已经是这个承担者的价值内容。社会承认不在这条轴上再加一站，它是另一根轴上的事：它改变这项内容在多主体场中的可见，表达，支持与运行位置，而不改变它是不是这个承担者的价值内容。这里的几何是一条发生轴加一条承认轴，不是三级台阶。

三位也不可互相化约。一项内容出现在视野里，与它成为我的价值内容，是两回事；认可不是看得更清楚，它是一个构成事件；他人认这项内容有价值，或者认这项内容是我的价值，都不等于我认可了它。反过来同样：一个人自己认定了某项价值，并不因此取得社会中的表达位与支持位。

三位既已分开，一项内容在某个承担者那里的状态就可以被精确读出。设 A 表显现，F 表第一人称认可，S 表社会承认。

状态	结构读数
A 无 F 无 S	候选内容，仅显现
A 加 F 无 S	已成为承担者的价值内容，无社会承认
A 加 S 无 F	社会脚本，外部归属或被推送的内容，不是承担者自己的价值
A 加 F 加 S	已成立且获得社会承认的价值内容
S 而无 A	某内容存在于社会环境中，尚未进入该承担者的发生场

表中的 S 依其对象而有别。在没有 F 的行里，S 只能是内容型的承认，即社群承认某内容有价值；主体位的承认，即承认某内容是这个承担者已认领的价值内容，在 F 之前尚未定义，因为它以承担者已有第一人称位为前提。

这张表读出四件事。F 是构成位：只有走到 F，一项内容才成为承担者的价值内容。A 以可塑的模态运行，不以授撤的模态运行：外部可以通过呈现，遮断或压制，使某项内容出现在候选场中，或消失，或难以进入，这是对显现条件的因果作用，不是某个关系主体以授权或撤销构成了候选资格。可授可撤作为一种关系模态，只落在 S 上。S 是独立的关系位：它可以在 F 之前存在，也可以在 F 之后加上，它的有无不改变 F 的成立。A 加 S 不冒充 F：一项内容被社会推到面前，且被社群认作有价值，只要承担者自己没有认可它，它就还不是这个承担者的价值内容。这一行是发生场中最易被顶替的一行。孤独主体的 A 加 F 完全成立：一个没有第二主体的宇宙里，承认没有对象，S 一栏永远空着，而 A 加 F 照样走得通，那个唯一的承担者照样有它自己的价值内容。前置篇立过价值只需一个承担者，无须对手方，此处即是那一条在发生层的显形。

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第三节 显现与第一人称认可

V19 显现为必要而非充分

一项内容须先在承担者的场中显现，才可能被认可；但显现不是认可。

显现（appearance）是一项内容在承担者的场中取得候选位置。它不问这项内容从哪里来。

来路有两条。一条是外来的：一种生活方式，一门技艺，一个人，由世界递到面前，被听说，被遇见，被示范。一个人从未接触过的东西不可能成为他的价值内容，因为它还没有在他的场中出现。另一条是内生的：一项内容从承担者自己的体验与施为里浮上来。一个人唱歌，唱着唱着，唱歌这件事显出了它的分量，他发现自己在乎它。没有谁把唱歌递到他面前并说这值得珍重，是他在做的过程里自己遇见了它。

内生显现（endogenous appearance）要与两样东西分清。它不是价值源：源是结构上的位置，给出哪一类内容可以在此落脚，而内生显现是这个范围之内某一项具体内容自内浮现。它也不是体验效价（experiential valence）本身：唱歌时那一下的舒服是效价，取得候选位置的是唱歌这件事，不是那一下的舒服。

内生显现同样只是候选。从内浮上来的东西，不因为来自内部就已经是承担者的价值内容。一个人可能察觉自己在争论中享受伤人，这察觉是一次内生显现，而他完全可以拒绝认领它。显现与认可的分别在这一路上同样成立，且正是在这一路上最容易被抹平，因为从内浮现的东西看起来天然就是我的。

两条来路缺一不可。若只承认外来一路，孤独主体便不会有任何候选内容，而它的价值内容照样成立，前一节已经立过。内生显现正是那里的候选之所从来。两条来路也都可以被外部作用：外来一路可以被推送，被遮断；内生一路可以被压得浮不上来，使一个人始终注意不到自己在乎什么。这里所说的压，指的是显现的条件被锁住，不是认可被人代写；代写是另一回事，落在别处。这两种作用如何区分于帮助，是后续各篇的对象。

取得候选位置的东西多得很，其中绝大多数不会成为任何人的价值内容。一项内容显现了，只说明它现在是一个候选，排在那里等一个第一人称的处置。这个处置可能是认可，可能是否弃，也可能是长久的悬置。

具体偏好的位置在此处最易被安错。偏好可以是一项候选内容的初次显现，一个人第一次对某种生活方式生出好感，这确实还只在显现层；但偏好也可以是一项已经成立的价值内容在当下的行动表达，一个人长久珍重着照护家人，今天因此选择早些回家，这个选择是一个具体偏好，却是既有价值内容的显形，不是什么新的候选在显现。偏好因此不锁在单一层。

无论落在哪一层，偏好都不构成认可。不是想要什么就是价值。此刻的偏好，既不足以判定一项内容已经是价值内容，也不足以判定它还不是：落在显现层的偏好不因其强烈而成为价值内容，落在行动层的偏好也不因其只是一次选择而不是价值内容的显形。

我喜欢唱歌，与唱歌对我有价值，是两句话。前一句报告一个状态，这状态可能只是一时的感觉；后一句说的是这项内容已在我的价值内容之列。从前一句到后一句，中间隔着第一人称认可这一位。

V20 第一人称认可为构成位

第一人称认可（first-person avowal），是一项已在承担者某一合法价值源域中取得候选位置的内容，在承担者自己的法之运作中，取得第一人称可调用，可重述与可修订地位的构成事件。这是发生轴上唯一构成价值内容的位置。

定义里的第一句限制不可略去：认可不能凭空制造价值。它只作用于已经在某一价值源域中取得候选位置的内容，而不能把任意宣布出来的东西变成价值内容。承担者宣布一件与它任何价值源都不相干的事为自己的价值，这个宣布落不到实处。

所谓取得第一人称可调用的地位，是说这项内容此后可以在承担者的自我解释，选择，修订与局部的行动排序中被它自己调用。这不要求它立刻产生什么行动，也不以行动为构成条件；它说的是这项内容已经进入自己的法所能处理的那张网，而不再停在视野里。

它不是言语表态：不要求承担者说出我认可这句话，不要求它能给出完整的理由，不要求一次明确的声明。许多价值内容是具身的，默会的（tacit），承担者在自己反身运作的空间里守着它，并始终为它留着第一人称的修订与退出位，却未必能把它说清楚，这不妨碍它是它的价值内容。它也不必在一瞬间完成：有的认可发生于一瞬，有的渐次成形，经年才定。构成事件说的是它在结构上完成了什么，不是说它必须发生在一个时间点上。

它更不是核实。承担者不是在查明一项已经存在的事实，不是在确定自己究竟是不是真的在乎某物，而是在自己的法之运作中把它认领下来。由此，认可也不是对感觉持久性的检验。一种喜欢持续了三十年而始终未被认领，它仍只是一种持久的偏好；一项内容今天被认领，它今天就是这个承担者的价值内容，哪怕日后被修订。时间的长短不判这件事。人确实常要试着活一段时间才定得下来，那段时间里发生的不是取证，是认可本身在渐次成形。而日后觉得那并非自己所在乎的，那是修订，不是发现当初的认可原来是假的。

它有两件事同时成立。其一是认领：候选内容被承担者纳入自己的价值内容之列，成为它的，而不再只是摆在面前的一个选项。自己的法是承担者自我立法，展开与修订的结构形式，是形式而不是内容，所以这项内容并非变成了自己的法的一部分，仿佛法是一个装内容的容器；准确地说，是承担者在它自己的法之运作中，把这项内容认领为自己的价值内容。其二是可修订位的保持：这项内容始终处在承担者第一人称可修订的位置上。若一项内容被认领之后，承担者再也不能追问它，修改它，放弃它，那它就不是以价值内容的方式在那里，而是以另一种方式在那里，那种方式属于殖民篇的对象。

第一人称认可也不是对显现内容的原样盖章。承担者在认可的同时，可以否定，重述，拆分，或者重新语境化那项显现出来的候选。社会递到面前的常是一个成套的脚本，承担者认领下来的，可能只是其中一小块，或者是被它改写过的版本，或者是它从两个不相干的来源各取一半重新拼成的东西。被认可的内容不必与最初显现的形态保持同一。一个人接受了某个来自社会的内容，因而并不当然意味着他被那套脚本占据了：他可能已经把它拆过一遍，只留下他自己认领的那部分。审计代写时要看的，正是这个重构的位置还在不在。

他者也不能从第三人称的位置穷尽核验一项认可是否真的发生。外部可以审计的，是候选位有没有被占据，承担者的重构与修订空间还在不在；不能审计的，是替承担者判定他真正认可的究竟是什么。这道界要立住，否则一个调节者只要宣称我看得出你真正认可的是什么，就又一次占了那个位置。

这一位在承担域的两层上有别。对完备主体，第一人称认可由它自己完成。对准主体，情形不同：它已经完整地处在目的价值的承担域中，而它第一人称认可的功能仍在生成，且这生成是分域的。某一个内容域上的认可功能已经自行，那个域里的内容就可以取得认可；尚未自行的域，仍只由监护网络守着候选位与将来的修订位。所以渐变的是各域运行的带宽与自行的范围，不渐变的是每一项内容在此刻究竟已经取得认可还是尚未取得。监护网络能做的，是维护候选内容的可达，维护它的表达，维护它未来的可修订性；不能做的，是把任何候选配置定格为准主体已经完成的第一人称价值内容。监护的一切维护，都以准主体第一人称认可位恒在为前提，维护的正是那个位置将来能被它自己使用。

已经被认可的价值内容，不因睡眠，麻醉，昏迷或其他暂时的失能而即时消失。持续的不是认可这个动作，认可不需要连续执行；持续的是第一人称的归属与那个修订位。一个人睡着了，他的价值内容不会在他睡着的几个小时里退回候选状态。

第一人称认可与珍视是两件事，二者也没有普遍的先后。珍视是一个合法的开维可能被承担者从第一人称位置接入其自身构造进程时，这个事件在价值论里的名称，它回答的是动力属于谁。第一人称认可回答的是另一个问题：一项具体内容是否成为了承担者的价值内容。在既有源域之内的普通内容发生里，一项内容在承担者已有的价值源里显现，被认可，事情就完成了，全程不必调用珍视，也没有任何开维发生。在结构开维的情形里，次序反过来：承担者以珍视接续了一座桥，取得新的源位，此后那个新源位上的具体内容才谈得上显现与认可。至于已认可的内容此后如何被维持，投入，衰减，重新取得主导，那是内容的动力学，不以珍视这个词统称。

一项内容为什么在此刻被认可而不在别的时刻，其内容上的原因；外来目的如何冒充第一人称认可，这两者都在后续各篇。

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第四节 社会承认

发生轴到第一人称认可即完成。与它相交的那根轴是社会承认。

V21 第一人称认可不可由外部授撤

第一人称认可不能由他者授予，也不能由他者撤销。

不可授予：没有任何外部的授权，命名或宣告，能使一项内容成为某个承担者的价值内容。社群可以宣布某物有价值，可以宣布某人应当以某物为价值，这些宣布都落在别处，落不到这个位置上。要使一项内容成为这个承担者的价值内容，只有它自己在它自己的法之运作中认领。

不可撤销所说的，是一件模态上的事。外部当然能做很多：可以压制一项价值内容的表达，可以遮断它的可达，可以扭曲承担者的记忆，可以使一项内容在实际运行中衰减到几乎不起作用。这些都真实发生，也都严重，它们各有其归处。但它们没有一件是在认可这个模态里完成了撤销。外部关系没有构成性的权限，宣告一项第一人称认可不再属于这个承担者。因果上的侵扰与模态上的撤销是两回事：一个人的价值内容被压制到无法实行，它仍然是他的价值内容，这正是压制之所以是压制，而不是转让。

外部无权以一次关系性的宣告完成撤销，这不等于外部作用不能因果地破坏一项内容的记忆，可达与运行条件，乃至使它在动力学的意义上消失。那是侵扰的事实，不是外部取得了第一人称的撤销权。三件事因此要分开：社群撤销一项内容的公共位置，外部作用因果地破坏一项内容的运行，承担者自己撤回一项内容的归属。第一件常见，第二件严重，第三件只有承担者自己做得到。

不可授撤只针对外部。承担者自己当然可以修订，可以放弃，可以重新认可；始终可修订说的正是这个位置在结构上始终对它自己开放。它不要求承担者时刻愿意改变，也不禁止它把某项内容视为终身的承诺。一个人可以认定某事为其一生所守，至死不改，这与可修订并不冲突：可修订说的是那个位置开着，不是说它必须被使用。

V22 社会承认可授可撤，及其对象之分

社会承认（social recognition）是可授可撤（grantable and revocable）落脚的唯一位置。一个社群可以给出承认，也可以收回承认。

社会承认至少有两个不同的对象。其一是内容型承认：社群承认某一类内容在这个社群中具有价值地位。这一种不针对任何特定的承担者，它是社群里现成的评价，理想，身份脚本；它完全可以先于某个承担者的第一人称认可而存在，许多内容正是通过它才在承担者的场中取得候选位置。就此而言，内容型承认落在显现这一侧，是塑形外来那一路显现的一种力量；内生的那一路不由它给出，却可能被它压过去。其二是主体位承认：社群承认某一项内容是这个承担者已经认领的价值内容，并给予它公共的位置。这一种以承担者已有第一人称位为前提；若承担者尚未认可，社群所做的便不是承认它的价值，而是替它归属一项价值。

可授可撤在两个对象上都成立，但撤销所撤掉的东西不同。撤销内容型承认，撤掉的是某类内容在社群中的评价地位。撤销主体位承认，撤掉的是这个承担者的这项价值内容在社群中的公共位置与支持：它可能不再被认作正当，不再被给予表达的场合，不再获得实践上的便利。撤掉的是社会位置与支持，不是这个承担者自己的价值内容。

准主体的情形不能套用主体位承认。准主体尚未形成第一人称认可时，社会网络仍然可以承认并保护它的承担地位，它的候选配置，以及它未来的修订位置。这些保护是真实的，也是必要的，但它们不是主体位承认，更不是替它完成了内容的归属。任何在第一人称认可之前就宣称某项确定的内容已经是这个准主体的最终价值的说法，只是外部的归属，或者一种拟制的承认。

V23 社会承认不构成价值内容

社会承认是真实的，有它自己的结构与效力，但它不构成价值内容。

一项内容可以是承担者的价值内容而完全没有社会承认：无人知晓，无人赞同，甚至举世反对，它仍是这个承担者的价值内容。孤独主体那里最清楚：宇宙里只有一个主体，承认根本没有对象，而它的价值内容照样成立。

反过来，有社会承认也不因此就有价值内容。他人认某项内容有价值，是内容型承认，与我是否认可它无关；他人认某项内容是我的价值，是主体位承认，若我实际上并未认可，那这个承认所承认的东西并不存在，它只是一次外部归属。他人认了，不等于我认了。

社会承认因此是一根独立的关系轴，与发生轴相交而不并入。相交之处它真实地起作用：影响显现，支持或压制表达，给予或收回公共位置。它跨不过第一人称构成位那一步。

V24 三位模态的不对称

三位分居两轴，模态也各不相同。显现是可塑的：外部可以影响什么在承担者的场中显现，什么不显现，什么显得清晰，什么显得模糊。第一人称认可是构成的，且不可由外部授撤：它是唯一使内容成为价值内容的位置，而这个位置外部进不去。社会承认是可授可撤的，且不构成：它可以被给予，被维持，被削弱，被收回，而这一切变动都不使一项内容成为或不再是承担者的价值内容。

这个不对称不是偶然的排列。正因为三位的模态各异，一项影响落在哪一位上就有了确定的读数。合法的外部作用与殖民都发生在这三位上，区别不在于有没有外部作用，而在于外部作用有没有跨位篡改模态。殖民的形态，正是用社会承认那一位可授可撤的方式，去强行完成第一人称认可那一位的构成，并进而锁死它的可修订位。可授可撤的东西本来就没有构成的权限，这一步因此不成立。它具体如何得手，如何占位，如何内摄，如何锁定，其可审计的判据在殖民篇。

发生状态表里 A 加 S 无 F 那一行之所以最易被顶替，道理也在这里：那一行恰恰是外部作用已经齐备而第一人称构成位尚空的状态，殖民要做的就是把这一行读成 A 加 F 加 S 那一行，并让承担者自己也这样读。

两个承担者如何在承认这一层彼此相认，留待后篇。

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第五节 塑形：涵育与感发

一个人的价值发生不在真空里进行。别人做的事，写下的书，立起的制度，都在影响哪些内容能在他的场中显现，他能不能把在乎的东西说出口，能不能回头把它改掉。这一类外部作用，落在发生的条件上。

V25 塑形为发生条件的释放向调节

塑形（shaping）是外部对承担者价值发生条件的释放向调节：它扩大候选内容的显现范围，可达，表达与修订的空间。

塑形通常落在内容这一层。更多候选得以显现，原本无从表达的得以表达，原本改不动的得以改动。这不等于结构上的开维。开维是承担者新增一个结构维度，是稀有的事；塑形所扩大的，多半是既有源域之内的活动空间。少数情形下，一次塑形确实为一场开维备好了条件，但那是它的一个特例，不是它的定义。把两者等同，会把日常里一次澄清，一次示范，一次让人敢于说出口的对话，都读成结构层级的跃迁。

塑形所能达到的，止于条件。一项具体内容是否成为承担者的价值内容，完成在它的第一人称认可；一次结构上的开维是否发生，完成在它的珍视接续。外部可以把桥搭到眼前，走不走由承担者自己。这两种完成不是同一件事的两个阶段，而是两种不同结果各自的完成处。

一次外部作用的性质，分两步来判。

第一步先排除锁定：看承担者的打断，拒绝，修订与第一人称位是否被取消。取消者是锁定，这样的作用不属于塑形。作用者的动机与善意都不进这一判：出于好意而取消对方修订位的，仍然是锁定，而一次冒犯的，不客气的，甚至让人难堪的作用，只要那些位置还在，就还没有落到锁定这一侧。

显现或表达受压，并不自动等于拒绝位与修订位被取消。看不见某一项候选，可能只是这一项没有显现，或候选的范围被收窄；不能公开说出，也不当然取消内部的重述与修订，一个人可以说不出口而仍能在自己那里拒绝它，改写它。压制要达到一个结构上的阈值，才落进锁定：某一内容域被系统地排除到相关候选无法进入承担者可反思，可重述，可修订的空间，或者承担者对这一域的拒绝，重构与修订在关系结构中被预先作废。到了这一步，即便没有谁伸手动过他的修订位，那个位置也已经失效。一套无人有意推行的评价，一种无人为之负责的风气，若把一个人在某一域里的显现压到这个地步，使他既想不到也说不出更无从修订，它就落在锁定一侧；未到这一步的压缩与收窄，则不落锁定，另有其位。

位置还在，只说明这次作用尚未成为锁定，还不足以说它是塑形。塑形要的是正面的效果：承担者的显现，可达，表达，修订或桥接空间确实被维持，被恢复，或被扩大。既没有锁定，也没有产生这种释放效果的外部作用，是非塑形的作用，它可能只是噪声，摩擦，冒犯，或者一次没有结构后果的干扰。一次占满他人时间因而使候选大为减少却从未碰过其修订位的作用，就落在这一类里：它收窄了空间而未至锁定，因而不是塑形，更不是释放。

第二步只在释放这一侧进行，判的是关系的类型。若开放某一个可指认的承受端的价值发生空间，是这段关系的构成性指向，这是涵育（cultivation）：一位老师为这一个学生开路，一个人为身边的另一个人腾出说话的余地，指向明确地落在那一端上。承受端不必是单个人，也可以是一个可指认的群体；作用源同样不必是人，一项制度，一套关系安排，只要它以为其成员开出显现与修订的空间为指向，就是涵育，这本是这个词最早的用法，它当初正是作为制度与关系对主体之殖民的反面被提出来的。若作用源只是表达，存在或发生，并不以构成某个承受端的价值发生为这段关系的目的，这是感发（evocation）。

主观意图既不判方向，也不单独判类型。一个作用源可以有意表达，甚至希望被人看见，希望被理解，这仍然是感发；分野在于它有没有以开放某个承受端的发生空间为这段关系的指向。一位作者写书，盼着有人读，盼着被读懂，却并不为某一个读者安排其价值发生，这是感发。自觉与善意也不是涵育的差异所在：一个人把自己的作坊敞开着做工，乐见有人从中学去手艺，却不教任何人，他清醒，也怀着善意，指向的却不是某一个可指认的承受端，这仍是感发。同一个作用源换一种关系形态就换了类型：他若开始教其中一个人，为这一个人开路，那就成了涵育。

感发的机缘端在作用源的表达，存在方式或事件特征。作用源不必是主体：一部作品，一项制度，一场事件，一片风景，都可以成为承受者价值发生的机缘。它也不必正在开维。作用源能否使某项内容进入承受者的候选场，取决于该内容是否在承受者处显现；它能否进一步成为承受者的价值内容，取决于承受者的第一人称认可。这两问不可并作一问。

感发与内生显现的分界，在触发的来处。感发里，有一个可识别的外部表达，事件，作品或环境特征，为这项候选的出现提供了触发或内容的来源。内生显现里，没有承担这一内容的外部触发，候选从承担者自己持续的体验，实践或自我重组中形成。两者之间还有混合的一路：外部的触发与内部的实践共同参与，一个人先在别处听过歌，后来自己唱，唱着唱着才发现这件事对他有分量，这一路不必强行二分。要按住的是，感发与内生是来路的分析，不是候选位置的两种本体：一切候选都只在承担者自己的发生场中取得位置，这一点没有例外。

无意不自动良性。没有谁为之负责的作用，同样可以落在锁定一侧，前面那个风气的例子就是。方向那一判不问意图，正是为此。

判据的用法因此有别。对涵育，可以直接判其施为：这一次施为是释放还是锁定。对感发，若根本没有可辨认的施为者动作，就不必强套一个施为者的读法，只看它留下的结果签名：承受者的修订，打断与拒绝位是否被保留。

塑形不是价值发生的必要条件。孤独主体没有任何外部作用可受，它的显现与认可照样完成。塑形改变的是发生的条件，不是发生本身的构成。

涵育这个词不是本篇新造的，它由上游承接而来，此处须交代它的辖域。它最早被提出时，指的正是制度与关系对主体之殖民的反面；后来在人与人之间得到更细的刻画；权力论则给了它方向上的判据。本篇沿用同一外延，不作收窄：涵育始终是一次有承受端的施为，而一次施为本就落向某个可指认的承受端，所以指向这一条一直是它的隐含条件，本篇只是把它写明。感发不是从涵育里分出去的一块，它是新开的一片地：作品，制度文本，事件，风景被人遇见而受启发，这些从来就不在涵育的名下，因为它们根本不是朝着谁的施为。所以上游按方向判据处理过的涵育实例，不因本篇而需要重新索引。

至于塑形，它是价值发生论对释放向结果的总称，与权力论的操作分类并列，不坐在它之下，也不是它的上位名。判据的分工也由此而来：对涵育这样的施为，可以直接判其方向；对没有可辨认施为者的感发，只借方向判据的结果签名。两者所判的东西不同，一个是施为，一个是效果。

V25a 同事异根与完成的分叉

制度性的涵育不把制度本身抬为主体。制度与关系安排可以承载一项涵育施为，可以把它分布开来，也可以让它稳定地运行下去，但它们没有自己的法，也不作第一人称的承认。所以这一类涵育的施为端之根，仍须可追溯到设计，维持或运行这一安排的那些主体，以及他们朝向承受端的法。若一个安排只是客观上敞着，并没有一个可归属的施为端，那么它可以构成释放性塑形的条件，却不独立取得下面所说的完整双根结构。

一次涵育性的施为，在施为者这一端，根在它自己的法之他向显形：它承认这个具体的他者是目的，并以为其开路的方式接续这项内容。在承受者那一端，情形不同。

若承受者的显现，表达，修订或桥接空间确实被释放了，这次施为在条件上就已经成功。此时还不能说双根已经完成，因为承受端尚未走出它自己的那一步。

那一步有两种落法。结果落在具体内容的发生上，承受端的完成在它的第一人称认可。结果落在结构的开维上，承受端的完成在它的珍视接续。这是两种不同结果各自的完成处，不是一级与二级：把它们排成阶梯，就会重新暗示认可与珍视之间存在普遍的先后，而那是没有的。

唯当承受端的完成实际发生，这次涵育才取得完整的双根结构。两根始终不转移，不合并。施为者不能把自己的法输送成对方的价值；承受者所认可的内容，始终是它自己认可的。承受端的自行完成，不因涵育本身而自动生成一项对应的横向义务：施为者参与了条件的形成，却不持有承受端第一人称完成的构成份额。

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第六节 与权利论的跨系列局部同位

本篇所立的这套结构，与权利论那边有一处形状相近，值得说明，也值得设限。

相近之处在模态的分布。价值论区分价值源与社会承认：源随承担者的结构给定，不由社会关系构成；社会承认可以给出，维持，也可以收回。权利论区分基础权利与承认性权利：基础权利同样不由社会关系构成；承认性权利则由构成式承认在来源上建立起候选位置，并随构成来源与运行支持的变化而成立，失效或被撤回。可变这个模态，在两边都落在关系性的那一层，不落在结构性的那一层。权益是权利论的第三格，锚在授予端的付出，不参与此处的对照。

V26 局部同位而非同构

相近止于此。价值论的社会承认只构成公共的表达，支持与实践位置，不构成承担者的第一人称价值内容；权利论的构成式承认，恰恰在来源上建立承认性权利的候选位置。一边的关系层不是构成者，另一边的关系层正是构成者，两者的功能签名相反。因此这只是一处局部的模态同位，不是同构。

第一人称认可也没有严格的对应物。它是历时的构成事件，发生在一项具体内容上；权利论的核是横贯诸层的不可压缩的结构条件。两者所处的类型不同，不宜互相翻译。

社会承认之所以不构成价值内容，理由也不在被承认者没有位置。他有位置：主体位承认给出的正是这个位置，表达的场合，实践的支持，公共的正当，都是真实的东西。理由在于逻辑类型的不同：社会位置与第一人称价值内容不是同一类东西，外部关系再厚也跨不过第一人称那一道构成位。一个人可以被整个社群郑重承认，而那项内容仍不是他的价值内容，只要他自己不曾认领。

这一条独立成立，不以任何权利论篇章的措辞为前提。至于无门者，它不进入目的价值的承担域，却可以成为承担者某项具体价值内容的指向对象；在权利论那边，它可以处在权益的指向端，而权益锚在授予端，不由它持有。这是分属两个系列的两个位置，不互相翻译。

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第七节 下游的射程

外来目的如何占据价值发生的位置，是殖民篇的对象。它至少有三处入手。显现这一层可以被占据：既可以推送成套的脚本，也可以把内生的那一路压得浮不上来，让一个人始终注意不到自己在乎什么。社会承认可以冒充第一人称认可：把社群对某内容的评价，说成这个承担者已经认领的价值，或者把一时的喜欢直接说成他的价值。修订位可以被锁死：使一项内容被认领之后再不能被追问，被改动，被放弃。这三处都需要判据，而判据的底线在此已经给出。外来的内容本身不是殖民，一个人从社会那里接过某项内容并认领了它，这是发生的常态。殖民是跨位的篡改：拿可授可撤的东西去完成构成，并锁住那个本该开着的位置。三位模态的不对称，以及认可可以重构候选这一条，是那套判据能够立起来的地方。用途的清单代写一个人自己的价值，是这套机制的一个特殊形态，也在那里收。

已经成立的价值内容此后如何变化，是动力学篇的对象。那里要处理源的在场与可达，内容与主导重心这几个变量，以及一件与本篇直接相接的事：殖民不改变源的在场，它锁的是源的可达与发生的路径。一项内容为什么在此刻而不是彼刻被认可，其内容上的原因也在那里。

一个人有多项已认可的价值内容，而它们在具体情境中要求不相容的行动，如何裁断，是冲突篇的对象。本体上不排序，与实践上必须决断，两者并不冲突：裁断给出的是第一人称的行动次序，不是价值地位的高下。

两个承担者如何在承认这一层彼此相认，他者的价值为何不可穷尽读取，不可以外尺比较，不可统合，是他者篇的对象。

已经认可的价值内容如何走向行动，是展望篇的入口。

发生这一侧至此有了结构。价值源给出可能，一项具体内容在时间中走过显现与第一人称认可两位，成为承担者自己的价值内容；显现有外来与内生两条来路，认可是认领而不是核实，也不是对感觉持久性的检验；社会承认在旁边另成一轴，可授可撤，能给出位置，也能收回位置，唯独不能替人认领。外部作用可以释放这些条件，可以出于对某一个人的指向，也可以只是一次非他向定向的机缘，作用源有意表达而并不替谁安排其价值发生，而无论哪一种，最后那一步都留在承担者自己那里。