On the Source of Value
论价值的源

Introduction

The prequel, What Value Is Not, cleared the space to which the word value refers inside SAE: price belongs to Economics, direction-value to Power Theory, and end-value alone to this series. After the clearing, the reference-space held only a bounded empty place, and the positive machinery that would fill it was left unbuilt. The prequel named five machines to be raised — the figure of value-sources, the value-axis and the dynamics-axis, the domain of bearers, the bridge from the fourteenth structural level to the fifteenth, and the line that unifies the several sources — and handed all five to this paper. The prequel also borrowed three minimal boundary-commitments — that end-value does not take a relation of exchange as its source, that value-standing is not ranked by any common outside measure, and that a particular preference is not by that fact a source of value — and left their proof here as well. This paper is the framework paper of Value Theory. Its task is to raise those five machines, to supply the grounds for those three commitments, and to leave precise interfaces for the papers that follow.

The framework paper does not unfold the substance of the later papers. How concrete content appears from a source and is avowed belongs to P2; how an outside end occupies the site where value comes to be belongs to P3; how value holds steady, decays, shifts, and recurs over time belongs to P4; how action is adjudicated when incommensurable structures of value meet belongs to P5; why the other's value cannot be exhaustively read, compared on an outside measure, or merged belongs to P6. This paper only raises the framework, and only leaves a handoff at each place where a matter should be closed off.

The paper keeps the series' discipline: it names no outside theorist and cites no historical event; a first-tier term carries an English gloss at its first substantive use; the exposition takes philosophical content as its grammatical subject and admits no backstage voice into the front-stage prose.

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The Definition of Value-Source, and the Layers of Terminology

Before the first proposition, the word this paper leans on again and again must be made exact: value-source. The prequel performed a negation and a separation; it said clearly what value is not, and did not say what the source of value is. If the term is left undefined, the four rows of the source-figure below will very easily be read as four classes of concrete value, or four psychological motives, or four objects of value, or four causal origins of value — and none of those four readings is what this paper means.

A value-source (價值源) is the structural ground, or signature, by which a bearer, at some structural level, makes a class of concrete content able to enter the field of end-value. Three words in this definition are each to be held down. The first is structural ground, or signature: a value-source is not a concrete value, not some particular thing a bearer at this moment cherishes, but the structural position that makes a class of things able to be borne as end-value at all. Signature is taken in the sense of recognition: a structural level, by its structure, gives the form of a class of value that can lodge there, as the shape of a slot decides which class of things will fit it. The second is bearer: a value-source is always some bearer's source, never a free-floating source, and never a source lying on the object being appraised — a point argued in the second section. The third is makes a class of content able to enter: the value-source is not that concrete content; it is the ground on which the content becomes able to enter, and how the content appears from the source and is avowed by the bearer belongs to P2.

From this definition the five layers the series will use again and again can be fixed once, not to be re-established later.

The value-source is a structural ground. It is given with the bearer's structural level, and it is the object this paper sets out to figure.

Concrete value-content (具體價值內容) is the appearance of a value-source, in some bearer, at some moment. It is the source come down to a definite form; it can arise and pass, can be replaced, and the mechanism of its appearance and avowal belongs to P2.

Particular preference (具體偏好) is the bearer's content-choice at some moment. It can be mistaken, can change, can be hijacked by an outside end; being chosen does not by itself make it the bearer's value-source. The distinction between preference and value-content is a line the anti-subjectivism criterion of this paper will keep; see the fourth section.

Direction-value (方向價值) is an orientation-reading of a single transformation, telling whether an exercise opens or closes dimension, whether it is cultivation or severing. It appraises the transformation, not the bearer, and belongs to Power Theory; the prequel's second section already cut it apart from end-value.

Price (價格) is the reading, in a market relation, of exchange and common measure. It takes a relation of exchange and a common measure as its condition, belongs to Economics, and was cut apart from end-value in the prequel's first section.

Of the five layers this paper raises only the value-source, keeping its boundaries against the other four in passing. One thing to hold down: the field of end-value (目的價值場) named in the definition is only the structural domain within which this paper analyses bearers and their concrete value-content — not an outer container, not a substantial medium, and not a public value-space hung outside the subject. To say a concrete content enters the field of end-value is to say it takes the structural position of being borne as some bearer's end-value; it is not to say it has been cast into some existing arena. This runs with the prequel's lock that the pearl is no substance: value is no possessable treasure, and the field of value is no casket to hold one.

With the terms fixed, the first proposition can be raised.

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§1 Structured but Unranked

V1 Structured but Unranked

The head proposition of this paper is a single line: value-sources are structural, differing by structural level, yet they admit no ranking by better or worse.

Both ends of this line are to be held down, for it faces at once two opposed misreadings. To say value-sources are structural, differing by level, faces one misreading — that since there is no measure standing over all subjects, value has become each-to-their-own, and whatever a subject declares valuable is thereby valuable. To say they admit no ranking faces the other misreading — that differing by level means rising by level, the low source a primary value and the high source an advanced one, the bearer mounting rung by rung. The first is met by structured, the second by unranked. The proposition stands between them.

Take first the ground of the unranked end, since that is where the proposition is most readily challenged. Someone will ask: on what grounds is there no ranking — are a good experience and the recognition of others truly level in value? The answer lies not in declaring an equality but in a structural fact. Value is one with the bearer itself; it is the bearer's own value, issuing from its own law. Let one give here a minimal account of one's own value, its full threefold distinction held for the fourth section: one's own value is the bearer's standing, as an end, whose source cannot be replaced or given by any common outside measure. Now if value is the bearer's own, issuing from its own law, then to rank two bearers' value-sources against each other, or the sources of a single bearer's several levels, one would need a standpoint outside all these laws, a common measure to compare across them. And SAE long since deleted that outside lateral measure — that is the very thing it judged out of bounds. Without that measure, ranking has no instrument. Non-ranking is not an attitude of tolerance, not a case of this paper forbearing to rank; it is a structural necessity forced by the very identity one's own value: once a thing is the bearer's own, issuing from its own law, no coordinate frame outside that law can execute a value-judgment upon it across levels or across subjects.

The necessity here is the necessity of conceptual entailment, not another kind. It says: the concept one's own value entails there being no common outside measure, and no common outside measure entails no ranking. It does not say value must arise in some way, does not say some sequence must unfold, does not say a remainder must force the next step. Wherever this paper says necessity, it is in this sense of entailment; the reader is not to read it as a compulsion of occurrence.

This ground is to be hardened one layer further, for deleting the outside measure has not yet automatically closed off several other attempts at ranking, which the reader will at once think of. First, if the standard of ranking is taken outside the bearer, it directly violates value's coming-from-not-external — closed off in the paragraph above. Second, if the standard is taken from some one value-source and turned upon the others, that merely lets an item which should itself be compared usurp the place of a meta-measure; it circularly presupposes its own priority and is no neutral ground. Third, if the standard is taken as the whole of the bearer's own law, that law can order the succession of its own concrete actions but cannot rewrite the irreducible sources that constitute it into a hierarchy of ontological standing, for those sources are the very things by which the law is set — the law does not stand above them. So what can genuinely stand is the order of generation, the containment-relation among sources, the breadth of source-types, and the local order of action; what cannot stand is a hierarchy of value-standing. And the word unranked itself is to be made exact: it does not say the four rows are numerically equal in value, but that the comparison higher, lower, equal simply has no definition at the level of value-standing. No common outside measure is not "measured out to be equally high"; it is that the very act of measuring finds no place to land here.

Now the structured end. To delete the outside measure is to delete only the instrument of ranking, not the structure itself. A value-source is not something a bearer declares offhand. It is given with the bearer's structural level; which level has which class of source is not settled by declaration — this is precisely what the source-figure of this paper will figure. Who bears value-sources has conditions and a domain of quantification — the matter of the second section. How a concrete content appears from a source, is avowed in the first person, and is socially recognized — the matter of P2. How an outside end counterfeits a bearer's own value has an auditable criterion — the matter of P3. What a bearer happens to like at this moment is a particular preference; a preference can be mistaken, can change, can be hijacked, and does not by itself become a value-source. To take preference straightway for a value-source is the first step down the each-to-their-own path. So structured is no consolation; it points to the fact that once the outside measure is deleted, the whole structure — value-source, bearing, appearance, avowal, audit — is intact, not one piece missing. What is deleted is the false measure; what remains is the entire true structure.

Structured but unranked, biting both ends within a single line, is the root of every proposition in this series.

V2 The Three-Order Theorem

Once structured but unranked stands, a subtler ranking must at once be guarded against — one that comes not by level but by order. Value-sources differ by structural level, and the levels plainly have a before and after; is there then not a direction between the earlier and the later, and is a direction not a kind of rank? This challenge is answered by a governing theorem that cuts apart three orders which are easily entangled.

The three orders are as follows.

The first is the order of value-standing, asking: which value-source is worth more. The answer is given by V1 — no ranking, because there is no common outside measure.

The second is the DD generation-order, asking: which structure appears earlier in the DD sequence, which later. The answer is that there is an order, but this order is one of construction, of dimension, not a hierarchy of value. That a structural position stands after another in the DD sequence says it is later in structural generation, unfolding upon the other as its base, and no more. Generation has a before and after; that is a fact about how structure is built up, unrelated to which is worth more.

The third is the direction of transformation, asking: whether some transformation has opened new dimension or closed existing dimension. The answer is that there can be a direction — a transformation can be judged as opening or closing, benign or ill. But this direction-value appraises that transformation itself, not the value-sources at its two ends, and least of all ranks the two ends. This was already set down in the prequel's second section, and is taken up here: the domain of direction-value is the transformation, the domain of end-value is the bearer, and a transformation judged as opening does not make the end it opens onto higher in value.

With the three orders apart, the theorem can be stated: the DD order of generation is not the order of value, and that a transformation has direction does not make its terminus worth more. Unfolded: a bearer's unfolding from one level to the next merely adds to its runnable structural dimensions; it does not retroactively demean the value-source of its earlier level, nor raise its own standing, as an end, in value. The first clause governs source against source: the new level's source is an addition, not a replacement — the source-figure below will figure this — and the higher level keeps and re-situates the lower level's source, no level's source voided or demeaned in the ascent. The second clause governs the bearer itself: a bearer that has unfolded one more level merely has more runnable structural dimensions; its standing, as an end, is not thereby raised a hair, and a bearer resting at a low level and a bearer that has unfolded a high one are, as ends, alike beyond ranking by an outside measure.

This theorem is of the same necessity as the necessity in V1 — the necessity of conceptual entailment. It does not say a bearer must unfold upward, does not say the DD sequence generates of itself; those are matters of occurrence, and judged elsewhere not to be a compulsion. The theorem says only this: even should a bearer indeed unfold a new level, the order of generation does not thereby become the order of value, nor does the being of a direction become a higher value of the terminus. It is a firewall, holding apart construction-history and value-hierarchy, two things that ought never to have been equated.

That the generation-order is not the value-order is used throughout this paper. The source-figure raises four rows, and the four rows have a before and after in generation; it is this theorem alone that keeps those four rows from being read as four rungs. The dynamics-axis speaks of dimension-opening unfolding along the DD sequence; it is this theorem alone that keeps opening from being read as appreciation. Together with V1 it forms the master gate against Value Theory degenerating into a ladder-theory or a progress-theory.

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§2 The Domain of Bearers, and Source-Position

The first section set down that value-sources are structured but unranked. The next question is: whose sources are these. The question looks simple, yet it hides the place this paper must handle most carefully, for a wrong step here would place the bearer of end-value before the subject and shake the ground of the whole series. This section goes in three steps: first the domain of bearers, saying who can bear end-value; then the distinction of bearer-layer from source-position, saying that where a source falls is not who bears it; last a derivation of the floor of value-sources, saying where the lowest source is reckoned from.

V3 The Two-Layer Domain of Bearers

The domain of bearers (承擔域) of end-value comprises two layers: the complete subject and the subject-to-be.

Take first the complete subject (完備主體). A complete subject takes the first-person running of its negation-gate (否定門) as its criterion of operation. The negation-gate is that structural juncture at which a subject, within its own law, says no to content laid upon it, and questions and negates the construct it has produced; that a subject's negation-gate runs in the first person means that, within its own law, it autonomously sets, questions, and revises. To take first-person self-running of the gate as criterion is to say that a complete subject's completeness lies in its running this gate itself.

Take next the subject-to-be (準主體). A subject-to-be does not take end-value by a future potentiality. This must be nailed down, for it is most easily read as a potentiality-theory. An infant is an end, not because it will grow into a complete subject, not because it potentially holds a negation-gate. It is an end, and is so at present, on equal standing with any complete subject in being an end. A subject-to-be enters the domain of bearers on the equal standing of already being an end, its negation-gate's function still in genesis. Here in genesis (生成態) says the gate's function is still forming, not that the standing as an end is still forming; the standing as an end is already in place, and what is forming is only the gate's first-person running.

So the domain of bearers has two layers, and the difference between these two layers is one of mode of operation, not of value-standing. The complete subject and the subject-to-be, as bearers of end-value, are of equal standing; their difference is only whether the negation-gate is already self-running or still in genesis. A line here is crucial to the whole paper: the negation-gate distinguishes the mode of operation, and does not by itself ground end-value. End-value is grounded in being an end; it is not grounded in whether the gate is already self-running. Grounded in being an end, the gate only distinguishing operation. This line is the key to the two-layer domain's standing: were the gate's self-running made a grounding-condition of end-value, an infant would lose end-value for want of a self-running gate — which is exactly the potentiality-theory's error, and exactly what this section blocks.

And outside the domain of bearers? An existent that has neither a negation-gate nor belongs to the subject-to-be's domain of quantification does not itself hold end-value. To say does not itself hold is to say it does not hold end-value as a bearer of end-value, not that it has no place at all in the discourse of value. It can have the good or ill of experience, can be the end toward which another's regard is directed, can be a thing cared for; these places each have their home, seated later. Here only the boundary is held: what bears end-value is a gated one or a subject-to-be, and what lies outside does not itself hold it.

To bring this boundary down to the concrete, one may set out four cases by the state of the negation-gate.

The first case, the gate in genesis, as with an infant. It enters the domain of bearers on the equal standing of already being an end; its end-value it has of itself, a configuration in genesis, no potentiality-theory. Its standing as a bearer of end-value, and the coming-from-not-external of its value-source, are both already in place; the runnable configuration of each source-row, however, is still in genesis with its structure — the sources first added only at the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth levels are not yet actually running within it. Non-potentiality asks that it be already, at present, fully a bearer of end-value; it does not ask that sources generated only in future be reckoned as present in advance, nor does its present end-value rest on its future acquiring of those sources. The gate in genesis is only a difference of operational mode, and takes nothing from its being an end.

The second case, the gate present but abdicated — a person who hands the site where its value comes to be over to outside occupation, who lets an outside inventory of uses write its value in its stead. Its bearing and the presence of its source are not lost; its value may be occupied by outside content across all three layers of appearance, avowal, and recognition; but its positions of first-person claiming, revision, and exit are structurally always there. The mark of this case lies exactly in that ever-present position: precisely because claiming and exit are always there, one says it is colonized, not that it has ceded its subjecthood. The word colonize presupposes that ownership has not transferred; if a thing could truly be ceded away, that is not colonization but replacement. So the gate's abdication is a matter of operation, not a loss of the standing to bear. The detailed mechanism of this case — how an outside end occupies the site of occurrence, how it locks revision — is the matter of P3; here only its unlost standing to bear is marked.

The third case, the gate's function impaired to the edge of exit — the gravely ill, or one whose gate is severely damaged in its running. This case divides in two. One is a temporary incapacity: the bandwidth of its exercise has fallen, but its standing as a bearer of end-value is not lost. Here one borrows a distinction from Rights Theory P2: the thickness of standing and the bandwidth of exercise are two things; bandwidth may fall while standing remains. The other is the bearer's true exit, the gate reaching extinction. This belongs to the bearer's boundary-conditions — whether the standing to bear ceases with it — and this paper does not adjudicate it, only marks it as held in reserve, matching Rights Theory P2's reserve at the same place. It is reserved rather than forced, because this step touches the bearer's own subsistence, which lies outside the reach of a framework paper of Value Theory.

The fourth case, no gate, as with an animal. It does not bear end-value. It has its experience, and the good or ill of its experience is real, but the way this good or ill enters the field of value is by one-directional projection from a subject at the thirteenth level or above — some subject takes it as an end of its own regard and expenditure. This runs with Rights Theory's judgment on animals: an animal has its own place on its side, yet does not, as a bearer of end-value, hold end-value. This paper does not reopen that judgment, only takes it up: the place of the gateless aligns with the register Rights Theory already raised, seated by this paper's domain of bearers on the projective side, outside the domain of bearers.

With the four cases set out, the boundary of the domain of bearers is clear: what bears end-value is a complete subject or a subject-to-be; the rest either have a place, outside the domain, by a subject's projection, or belong to the bearer's boundary-conditions and are held in reserve.

A matter of quantification the later sections will need is best taken up in advance, lest it be discovered only at the dynamics-axis. When the later sections speak of the value-axis and the dynamics-axis, they will use such phrases as the subject's autonomy, the subject's valuing, first-person uptake; the complete form of these phrases takes the complete subject, whose negation-gate is already self-running, as its principal domain of quantification. The subject-to-be's value-source and end-standing are already in place, but its first-person uptake function is still in genesis. A guardian network can maintain the accessibility of the subject-to-be's source, can protect its conditions of occurrence, can cultivate it — but a guardian network cannot perform valuing in the subject-to-be's stead, nor counterfeit an outside uptake as the subject-to-be's own first-person uptake. This is stated now only as a forewarning, to be made good when the dynamics-axis is raised; it is marked here so that no one, reaching the dynamics-axis, should think a subject-to-be both bears value and yet has no dynamics-axis, and so raise a surface conflict: the domain of bearers has already taken the subject-to-be in, while the complete form of the dynamics-axis takes the complete subject as its principal domain of quantification — the two speak from different positions, and do not conflict.

V4 The Bearer-Layer Is Not the Source-Position

With the domain of bearers standing, an equation most easily confused must be pried apart: which DD level a value-source falls at, and who bears that end-value, are two different things.

The DD level at which a value-source falls is not the subject-layer at which the value's bearer stands. Unfolded: this paper's source-figure will place the lowest source-row at the eleventh and twelfth levels together (the reason for combining them is given at V5), while the bearer of end-value, by V3, is a complete subject or a subject-to-be, whose negation-gate runs in the first person, or enters genesis, only at the thirteenth level and above. So the lowest source falls at the eleventh and twelfth levels, and what bears this source is throughout a bearer at the thirteenth level and above. The source-position is low, the bearer high, and the two are not to be pulled to the low level together because one of them falls low.

What this distinction blocks is a false path. Were the bearer-layer and the source-position not pried apart, someone would push on from the fact that the lowest source falls at the eleventh-to-twelfth level, saying that since a value-source can lie as low as the eleventh-to-twelfth level, a tree, a stone, a thing with only eleventh-to-twelfth-level power, thereby itself holds end-value too. This path is wrong, wrong exactly in taking the source-position for the bearer-layer. That a value-source falls at the eleventh-to-twelfth level says that within the bearer's encapsulated experiential base, the orientability of value first takes a stable structure at that position; it says a source-position of the bearer's, not that the thing with only eleventh-to-twelfth-level power itself becomes a bearer of end-value. An object does not, because a value-source's source-position falls at the level it occupies, thereby itself hold end-value. The standing to bear is given by V3's domain of bearers, and is a different matter from which level the source-position falls at.

So the order of this section may not be reversed: first V3 fixes who can bear, then V4 says a source may fall lower than the level the bearer stands at, and last V5 says where this lowest source is reckoned from. V4 is wedged in the middle, welding apart source-position and bearer-layer, so that when the source-figure raises its four rows, those four rows all speak of the bearer's source-positions, not of four levels' objects each holding value of themselves.

V5 The Derivation of the Floor

The source-figure needs a lowest row. Where this lowest row falls cannot be merely stipulated; it must have a derivation, or the floor is suspended in air. This section gives that derivation, and must at the same time keep one thing: value may not be proved by value.

Consider first a tempting wrong starting-point. If one says the lowest value-source is simply a good experience, that one good feeling is already a value, then value has appeared before the eleventh level, at the place where feeling first occurs. Here lurks a circle: if this good-or-ill is itself already a value-judgment, then value was there before the floor, and the floor is drawn for nothing; if it is not a value-judgment, then one must say clearly what it is. To break this circle, the first step is to lift good-and-ill in experience off value-judgment.

Good-and-ill in experience means only experiential valence (體驗效價), the positive or negative polarity of experience, the polarity of approach or avoidance. It is an immediate state, good now or not good now, arising and passing as it goes. It is not yet end-value, for it has no across-time, no orientation; it is only the plus or minus of that one instant. To call it value is to mistake an immediate state for a value.

From experiential valence to a value-source there are two structural workings to pass through, and these two are exactly eleventh- and twelfth-level power. The first is memory. Eleventh-level memory lets one experiential valence be retained across time, to be recognized again later. With memory, this good of this instant no longer passes with this instant; it is retained, and the next time a like case is met, it can be recognized. The second is prediction. Twelfth-level prediction lets the remembered experiential valence become an orientation for future action. With prediction, the remembered good is no longer merely a retained trace; it becomes a pointing — next time one may go toward it, or turn from it. Memory retains the experiential valence, prediction turns the retained valence into a facing; the two together work one isolated good or ill into a trans-temporal structure of the worth-maintaining, worth-repeating, or worth-avoiding. Only at this step is there something that can serve as a value-source: not that immediate feeling, but the structure that, through memory and prediction, has taken on trans-temporal orientability (跨時可取向性).

So the derivation of the floor can be stated: a value-source is reckoned not from where experiential valence first occurs, but from where experiential valence, through memory and prediction, takes on trans-temporal orientability. This derivation has not proved value by value; its starting-point is experiential valence, a pure state, the polarity of approach and avoidance, not any value-judgment; the value-source appears only after the valence has been organized across time into an orientable structure. The floor therefore falls at the eleventh and twelfth levels together: memory is eleventh-level power, prediction is twelfth-level power, and the lowest row of value-sources needs both these steps in place to stand, so these two levels are combined into one cell as the floor. This is the same level of power that Economics reckons with at the eleventh-to-twelfth level, seen from two faces: Economics measures this level's power as read in the market, this paper takes the face of this same power by which experience becomes a value-source.

Here V4's distinction is to be taken up, so that the floor is stated exactly and not read back into that false path. This structure that, through memory and prediction, has taken on trans-temporal orientability is the lowest source-position within the bearer's synchronic encapsulation. The worth-maintaining or worth-avoiding is a reading, after this structure has entered the domain of bearers of end-value, some bearer's reading of it — not that an isolated twelfth-level prediction-system has itself taken on end-value. A device that merely remembers and predicts does not thereby become a bearer of end-value; memory and prediction give the mechanism of a source-position, while the standing to bear is still given by V3's domain of bearers. The floor says the source can lie as low as this cell, not that the object at this cell itself bears value. With V4 before and V5 after, the order kept, the floor both has its derivation and does not overstep.

With the floor standing, this section on the domain of bearers is complete: V3 fixes who bears, V4 welds source-position apart from bearer-layer, V5 gives the lowest source-position a non-circular derivation. Bearing and source-position both clear, the next section can raise the source-figure and figure the four rows one by one.

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§3 The Figure of Value-Sources

The two prior sections made clear that value-sources are structured but unranked, who bears them, and where the source is reckoned from. Now the source itself can be figured. This section raises the figure of value-sources — the most central figure of this paper, on which the unifying line, the two axes, and the bridge all hang.

V6 The Four-Row Figure of Value-Sources

Value-sources differ by the bearer's structural position, given level by level. Writing down the value-source each newly adds at the four structural positions a bearer unfolds through gives four rows.

The first row, the eleventh-and-twelfth-level cell: the value-source is the orientability of experience. This cell was derived at V5: experiential valence, through memory and prediction, takes on trans-temporal orientability, becoming a structure of the worth-maintaining, worth-repeating, or worth-avoiding. This row's source is exactly that: this structural position makes a class of content able to be borne as end-value — the content lying on the positive-or-negative orientation of experience. It is the lowest of the four rows, its orientation turned inward, toward the bearer's own experience.

The second row, the thirteenth level: the value-source is the self's irreducibility and boundary-integrity. The thirteenth level is where the negation-gate first runs, the divide between subject and non-subject. Here the bearer first becomes a self with a boundary, a self that will not be swallowed, will not be reduced to a part of an other. This level's new source is that self's own irreducibility, the integrity of its boundary. The value-content falling on this row is the content bearing on keeping one's own boundary, on not being merged into an other. The orientation is still inward, toward this bearer as a self.

The third row, the fourteenth level: the value-source is one's self-set ends and their flourishing. The fourteenth level is the level of meaning, where the bearer raises its own ends and, within a finite existence, lives out a fullness. This level's new source is no longer merely keeping a boundary, but the ends the bearer sets for itself and the fullness lived out according to its nature. Flourishing (豐盈) here means the fullness a bearer gains, according to its self-set ends, within its finite existence, and is a different thing from the first row's good-or-ill of experience: the first row's good-or-ill falls on the polarity of experience, this row's flourishing falls on meaning, on the fullness of self-set ends fulfilled. The orientation is still inward, toward the bearer's own self-set ends.

The fourth row, the fifteenth level: the value-source is the irreplaceability of the other as an end. At this level the orientation turns. The three prior rows' sources all turn inward, toward the bearer's own experience, boundary, ends. The fourth row's source turns outward for the first time, toward the other. What it newly adds is the irreplaceability of the other as an end. Here the derivation of irreplaceability must be held, for it is very easily placed wrong. It is not anchored in the other's ends being different in content from mine. Unfolded: the other is an end, from which it follows that its end-standing and the first-person source of its own value cannot be given, written, or replaced by me; and further, even should two bearers' concrete ends be wholly the same, the bearers, as ends, cannot be interchanged; and this non-interchange is the irreplaceability of the other as an end. The point is that irreplaceability is not owing to the ends being necessarily different in content. Two bearers may want to complete the same project, may want to care for the same child, may pursue the same way of life — their concrete ends may be the same — yet, as ends, the bearers still cannot be swapped for each other. What truly makes an other able to be treated as replaceable is not two bearers sharing a goal, but taking some common outside measure and swapping the two bearers of ends as equivalents — and that outside measure the prequel's first section already cut away; it belongs to price. To say the other's ends being like mine make it interchangeable is to take the bearer for something priceable and swappable, to take the pearl for the casket. So a line is kept in wording: say the other too is an end, not the other has the same end. What is the same is the structural position of being an end, not the content of the ends. The orientation is turned outward; this row is the turning-place.

With the four rows written down, three — four — locks are to be set on this figure in the reading, or it will very easily be misread.

The first lock: the four rows are additions, not replacements. What each row writes is the value-source first newly added at that structural position, not the whole inventory of that level's bearer's value. A bearer unfolded to the fifteenth level does not thereafter cherish only the other and no longer its own experience, boundary, ends. The higher level keeps and re-situates the lower level's sources: a fifteenth-level bearer still has its eleventh-to-twelfth-level orientation of experience, still has its thirteenth-level boundary, still has its fourteenth-level ends, only these sources are re-situated within a larger field. The turn at the fourth row says a new, irreducible outward-turned source is added, the value-field shifting from purely inward to inward-and-outward together, not the outward replacing the inward. This lock is guaranteed directly by V2's theorem: a new level only adds dimension, and does not demean an old source.

The second lock: the four rows admit no ranking. The four rows have a before and after in generation — that is the DD generation-order — but the before and after of generation is not a hierarchy of value; this too is guaranteed by V2's theorem. The eleventh-to-twelfth-level orientation of experience and the fifteenth-level recognition of others, as value-sources, are not divided into higher and lower. A bearer that mainly lives in the orientation of experience and a bearer that mainly lives in the recognition of others cannot, as ends, be compared by an outside measure as to which is worth more. This lock is to be set again and again, for once the four rows are stood up, the most natural misreading is to read them as a four-rung ladder from experience up to recognition, higher the further up. They are no ladder; they are four classes of source a bearer can add level by level, and between source and source there are no rungs.

The third lock: the inward-or-outward of orientation is a structural description, not a value-judgment. The three prior rows turn inward, the fourth outward; this inward-or-outward says whether a source points at the bearer itself or at the other — a description of the source's structural direction. It does not say the outward is worth more than the inward, does not say recognizing others is higher than keeping one's own boundary. The fourth row is the turning-place; what turns is the direction of orientation, not an elevation of value. To read outward as higher would again read the four rows back into a ladder — the second lock has blocked this, and it is pressed here once more.

The fourth lock: the four rows admit no ranking in value-standing, yet are not without difference — with rising DD level, the runnable value-dimensions accumulate. Richness (豐度) here means, as regards the bearer itself, the breadth of runnable value-dimensions. It increases monotonically with DD level: one dimension at the eleventh-to-twelfth level, namely the orientation of experience; two at the thirteenth with the added boundary-integrity; three at the fourteenth with the added self-set ends; four together at the fifteenth with the added other as an end. This increase is nothing newly established; it is entailed directly by the first lock: since the higher level keeps and re-situates the lower level's sources, each level up adding an irreducible source upon the old sources, never diminishing, the runnable value-dimensions only increase and do not decrease. What is to be held down is that richness is not a hierarchy of value. Richness is the breadth of runnable value-dimensions; value-standing is the higher-and-lower under that deleted common outside measure — two different things, just as the prior section's two axes are two axes. That the dimensions grow more gives no ranking among these dimensions, nor makes the bearer, as an end, worth more: a four-dimensional bearer is not more of an end than a one-dimensional bearer, not worth more than it; it merely has more value-dimensions opened. And it is to be held down that richness's increase falls on the ceiling of construction-history's accessible dimensions, not on how many dimensions the bearer is at present actually running. A bearer unfolded to the fifteenth level may for a long stretch mainly organize its life by the orientation of experience, its other sources not for the time governing — a neutral walking-back, a walking-back without loss; the richness it is running at present is low, but the richness on its construction-history remains four dimensions, ineffaceable; this changes neither the breadth of source-types on its construction-history, nor licenses it to void a high-level source when that source's applicability-conditions do actually appear. So richness falls on the layer of presence and construction-history, not on the layer of operation, and does not clash with V12's reversibility of operation below. That richness increases yet is not cashed out as a scale of value is exactly where it stands beside structured but unranked without becoming a ladder: the moment someone reads richness as a scale of value, it falls back into the very thing V2's theorem blocked — taking the generation-order for the value-order.

Richness is to be held to three limits, lest it turn of itself into a measure that ranks in secret. First, richness is the breadth of source-types under this present four-row model, how many classes of source the runnable source-domain covers — not a quantity of end-value, for the layer of value-standing has no quantity. Second, the one, two, three, four dimensions spoken of here are an analytic count of the number of classes of source, not the dimension-index of the DD levels; the two are not to be mixed, and to say four dimensions is only to say all four classes of source are present. Third, that richness increases monotonically with level rests on the first lock — sources irreducible and the higher keeping the lower — and is a corollary of V6, not a value-scale established on its own. With the three limits set, richness answers one thing only: that the four rows admit no ranking yet are not without difference, and the difference is in the breadth of source-types, not in higher-and-lower of value.

This four-row figure is the ground of the paper's second half. The unifying line will ask: these four rows, each turned inward or outward, each at a different structural position, on what grounds are they all called value, all this bearer's own value — the fourth section. The two axes will ask: how does the bearer move among these four rows, and does the moving have a direction — the fifth section. The bridge will ask: that turn from the third row's inward to the fourth row's outward, how does it happen — the sixth section. With the four rows standing, these questions have a place to be asked.

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§4 The Unifying Line, and the Three-Way Distinction

The source-figure raised four rows, falling at different structural positions, oriented inward or outward. The next question is: on what grounds are these four rows all called value, all one and the same bearer's own value. This is answered by a unifying line. After the answer, the three concepts pressed close against the unifying line must be pried apart — one's own law, one's own value, particular preference — or the unifying line will at once slide into subjective arbitrariness.

V7 The Unifying Line Is One's Own Value

The line unifying the four rows is one's own value. The four rows are each at a different structural position, oriented variously, yet they are all this same bearer's own value, issuing from its own law, and this is the ground of their being alike value. One's own value is isomorphic with the bearer's own law: as a subject's law is set by itself, so a subject's value is given by itself, and this own-ness is the line unifying the four.

This unifying line must first be cut clear of two things, for it is very easily mis-anchored. It is not anchored in the remainder ρ. The remainder ρ is the operational residue left everywhere by the chiseling operation, dynamic and never zeroable; the prequel's third section already set a lock: ρ is not itself a substance, and to take it for a treasure hidden deepest inside is the error of substantialization. To anchor the unifying line in ρ would be to say the four rows' value is unified in that operational residue, which would at once enshrine ρ as a core substance of value, colliding head-on with the prequel's lock that the pearl is no substance. In this series ρ bears one thing only: that anti-substance lock — the pearl is no substance, and no price is to be set on the remainder. It does not bear the unification of the four rows' value. Nor is the unifying line anchored in the fifteenth level's own law. The fifteenth level's own law is a product of the bearer's unfolding all the way to that level, where the highest of the four rows lies; to make it the unifying ground running through all four rows would be to ground all four rows, itself included, in the highest row — taking the fruit for the seed. So the unifying line is neither ρ nor the law of that fifteenth level; it is the line one's own value, isomorphic with one's own law, running through the four rows without residing in any one row.

This unifying line must be stated separately on the two layers of the domain of bearers, or it will not hold for the subject-to-be.

For the complete subject, one's own value issues, by its own law, in the first-person running of autonomous reflexivity (自律反身). Autonomous reflexivity means the running by which a subject, within its own law, legislates for itself, and reflexively questions, negates, and revises the construct it has produced. A complete subject's value is its own because, within this running, it has itself brought that value forth, not given from outside.

For the subject-to-be, this own-ness of one's own value cannot be used bare. The subject-to-be's negation-gate is still in genesis; it has not yet completed the first-person running of autonomous reflexivity. To say of the subject-to-be too that its value issues, in first-person autonomous reflexivity, from itself, would be to say an infant's value comes from a running not yet occurred — which will not do. So for the subject-to-be, this own-ness of self-given means: its end-standing and value-source are neither conferred nor written from outside; it does not mean it has already completed first-person self-legislation. Its value is its own in the sense that nothing outside can confer or overwrite its value, not in the sense that it has already set its value itself.

The two layers are thus unified at one place and separate at another. Unified in coming-from-not-external: whether complete subject or subject-to-be, their value is neither conferred nor written from outside, and this coming-from-not-external is the own-ness the two layers share. Separate in the present mode of operation: the complete subject's value is brought forth in first-person running, the subject-to-be's value-source is already in place while its mode of operation is still in genesis. The unifying line is coming-from-not-external, not present-completion-of-first-person-running. Read the unifying line as coming-from-not-external and the subject-to-be falls naturally within it; misread the unifying line as completed first-person running and the subject-to-be is squeezed out.

V8 One's Own Law, One's Own Value, and Particular Preference

With the unifying line standing, the three concepts pressed close against it must be pried apart, or one's own value will be read as what the subject wants at this moment. The three are one's own law, one's own value, particular preference.

One's own law (自己的法) is the structural form by which a bearer legislates for itself, unfolds, and revises. It is a form, the structure by which the bearer sets and changes, not some one piece of concrete content.

One's own value (自己的價值) is the bearer's end-standing that cannot be replaced, converted, or exhausted by an outside measure, given by its own law, not arbitrarily assigned by the bearer. This given-by-its-own-law has two layers, to be told apart as at V7: for the complete subject, it is brought forth in the first-person running of autonomous reflexivity; for the subject-to-be, it is that its value-source comes-from-not-external, not yet brought forth by a first-person running. The clause not arbitrarily assigned is to be held: one's own value is given forth by one's own law, not a thing a bearer points to offhand, saying this is my value and thereby making it value. The self-giving of one's own value is that its source comes-from-not-external, not that it is declared by the subject at will.

Particular preference (具體偏好) is the bearer's content-choice at some moment. It can be mistaken, can change, can be hijacked by an outside end. That a person at this moment favors some thing is a particular preference; it need not be this bearer's value-content, still less its value-source.

Only with the three pried apart can this section's anti-subjectivism criterion be raised — the gate that keeps the unifying line from sliding into each-to-their-own. It too is stated on the two layers of the domain of bearers.

For the complete subject, a content becomes its concrete value-content only when it can be found, avowed, and revised by it in the first person. Merely favored at this moment is not enough; the favoring must pass first-person finding and avowal, and stand always in a position revisable by it in the first person, to turn from a particular preference into one of its concrete value-contents. This criterion cuts particular preference apart from concrete value-content: not that what is wanted is value, but that what is first-person avowed and revisable is value.

For the subject-to-be, the criterion changes a layer. The subject-to-be's end-standing and the coming-from-not-external of its value-source are already in place, while the runnable configuration of each value-source-row is still in genesis with its structure, as told apart at V3; its concrete value-content is still in a configuration in genesis, and it cannot yet complete finding, avowal, and revision in the first person. Here a guardian network can represent it, protect it, support it, can maintain the accessibility of its value-source, can protect its conditions of occurrence, but a guardian network cannot write its own content into the subject-to-be's unrevisable final value. Guardianship may maintain the conditions of occurrence in the subject-to-be's stead; it may not lock content into an unamendable settlement in its stead. When the subject-to-be's gate later runs, these contents must still lie open to its first-person revision.

This criterion at once keeps several things: the subject-to-be's non-potentiality, for its standing as a bearer of end-value and the coming-from-not-external of its value-source are already in place, not resting on the future; the first-person's non-substitutability, for whoever it be, value-content cannot be written for it from outside; anti-subjectivism, for particular preference does not automatically become value-content; and it sets a target for P3's chapter on colonization, for an outside end's most typical move is exactly to write its own content into a bearer's unquestionable value, which falls in the place this criterion forbids. How colonization concretely writes is the matter of P3; this section only sets the criterion.

The unifying line plus the three-way distinction completes the fourth section: the four rows are unified in the line one's own value, isomorphic with one's own law, while one's own value is told clearly apart from one's own law and from particular preference — anchored neither in the remainder nor in some level's law, nor sliding into the subject's arbitrary assignment.

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§5 The Value-Axis and the Dynamics-Axis

The three prior sections raised the source: sources are structured but unranked, sources belong to whom, sources fall in four rows, the four rows unified in one's own value. These are all about the source itself, a static figure. This section raises how the bearer moves upon this figure — the dynamics. Here two axes must be told apart with great care. Value itself admits no ranking — this is the value-axis; and the bearer does move among the four rows, the moving seeming to have a direction — this is the dynamics-axis. The two axes must be orthogonal, or the direction of the moving will slip back in to rank value and pull down the whole unranked figure. This section first sets down the two axes' orthogonality, then breaks the dynamics-axis into the parts it should have: two motions, uptake, shape and reversibility, and the modal blank at the fifteenth level.

V9 The Two Axes Are Orthogonal

Value has two axes, and they are the two faces of autonomy (自律).

One is the value-axis, asking after the better-or-worse of sources. It is level, unranked. It is level because value is the bearer's own, issuing from its own law, with no common outside measure — this was set down at V1, the face of autonomy that is self-giving.

The other is the dynamics-axis, asking after the orientation of the moving. A bearer will move among the four rows; does this moving have a direction. The root of the dynamics-axis is the bearer's own autonomy, its internal double-negation. Here it must be made clear: the dynamics-axis is not rooted in an impersonal necessity, not a case of some outside force pushing every bearer toward some direction. It is rooted in the bearer's own autonomy, and autonomy is that internal double-negation, the bearer's once-again negating of the construct it has produced. That a bearer legislates for itself is just such an internal double-negation, and so to say the dynamics-axis is rooted in autonomy is to say it is rooted in the very thing of a bearer's giving itself its own law, not in the introduction of a force pulling from outside.

The two axes are orthogonal — meaning the two axes do not interfere with each other. The value-axis is level, the dynamics-axis has direction, and the dynamics-axis's direction does not come from a comparison of the better-or-worse of value. Direction is not a going toward the high because the high is worth more; direction is produced by the unfolding of the bearer's own autonomy. It is exactly because direction is not produced through a comparison of better-or-worse that it does not clash with the value-axis's non-ranking. This is the pivot of the section: only if the dynamics-axis's direction can be thoroughly parted from the ranking of value does the whole unranked figure still stand while there is moving. This orthogonality is the same thing as the anti-teleology signature this series keeps throughout, namely that direction can have a constraint while the terminus is not thereby higher; the several parts of that signature the following propositions will raise one by one.

V10 The Two Motions

On the dynamics-axis, the bearer's moving is not of one kind but two, to be told apart, or every change of value will be misread as a climb toward some direction.

One is the dimension-opening transformation (開維型變換). It is the bearer's motion of newly adding a structural dimension — say, from having only the first three rows to newly adding the fifteenth level's outward-turned source. This motion unfolds along the DD structure; it has a local shape, of which V12 will say what gives the shape. To be held: a dimension-opening transformation unfolding along the DD sequence does not mean every change of value goes toward the fifteenth level, nor that the bearer must in fact arrive at the fifteenth. It says only that when a bearer does newly add a dimension, this addition unfolds along the structure.

The other is content-dynamics (內容動力). It is the change of a bearer's existing value-contents among arising, decaying, shifting, recurring, being suppressed, regaining governance. Some concrete value-content of a bearer thins, or falls from a governing place to the margin, or after a while comes back — these are changes of content, going toward no particular DD, only the rising and falling of content within the bearer's existing structure. The full machine of this class — how value holds steady, decays, shifts, recurs — is the matter of P4's chapter on dynamics; this section only parts it from the dimension-opening transformation and marks that it goes toward no particular direction.

Parting the two motions has one direct benefit: the great majority of the risings and fallings in a bearer's value-life are content-dynamics, not dimension-opening; to mix the two is to misread a person's everyday shift of value-emphasis as a rise-and-fall on a DD ladder. Dimension-opening is a rare structural event, content-dynamics the ordinary state.

V11 Valuing Is the First-Person Form of Uptake

This is a load-bearing grounding of the dynamics-axis. A dimension-opening transformation unfolding along the DD sequence has its shape, but whether a dimension-opening happens at all is a thing to set down separately. The answer is not that some force outside pushes it, nor that an impersonal law runs it of itself: a dimension-opening can happen only as the bearer's own first-person uptake (接續) event. This first-person uptake event is, in Value Theory, called valuing (珍視).

Valuing appears here for the first time and must first be made clear, for it very easily reads as a driving-force behind uptake, which falls into a circle: why does the bearer take up, because it values; why does it value, because that thing has value. To break this circle, the key is not to make valuing another cause prior to uptake. Valuing is not intensity of feeling, not how strongly a person feels toward some thing; it is not a particular preference, not what is wanted at this moment; it is not the completed concrete avowal of value P2 treats of; and it is, still less, a psychological cause prior to uptake that drives uptake to happen. Valuing is the name, in Value Theory, for the event in which a legitimate dimension-opening possibility is taken up by the bearer, from the first-person position, into its own process of construction. What it marks is the belonging of the dynamic: a dimension-opening can happen only as the bearer's own first-person event, not run of itself by an outside force or an impersonal law. It does not explain why the bearer takes up at just this moment; that reason of content is held for P2 and P4. Set valuing thus, and three things are cut apart: the remainder constrains the legitimate exit-space of a dimension-opening, which is V12's matter; valuing marks the belonging of uptake to the first person; and how concrete content appears, is avowed and socially recognized, is P2's matter. Valuing is therefore the grounding-point of the dynamics-axis; it nails the dynamic to the bearer's first-person uptake, rather than handing the dynamic to a desire for value.

Since valuing is the first-person form of uptake, the bearer may forbear to let this uptake event happen. And this non-uptake is to be held to three cases, or it will be taken to absolve any act of active shutting.

The first case, a dimension-opening not yet occurred, the bearer may forbear to take it up. A bearer with a legitimate possibility before it toward a higher dimension may forbear to take it up, and is not thereby lowered a rung in value-standing. A subject may never go to unfold some dimension, living always in the several rows of source it now has — wholly self-consistent. This case is a direct corollary of V1's non-ranking: to forbear a dimension-opening does not make the bearer, as an end, one rung lower, for value-sources admit no ranking, and resting at any row is without loss.

The second case, a dimension already gained, the bearer may let it not govern. The calling-up, accessibility, concrete content, and governing emphasis of a gained dimension can all be reversed; a lower-level source can return to the governing place. One who once mainly lived in the recognition of others may for a stretch mainly live again in its own orientation of experience or its own self-set ends — a neutral walking-back, without loss in value. This is an application of V12's reversibility of operation below, taken up here.

The third case is to be cut apart from the first two: when a higher-level source's applicability-conditions have actually appeared, and the bearer actively suppresses or voids that source, this is not a neutral walking-back. The first two are the bearer not taking up, or letting a gained dimension step back — both risings and fallings of operation. The third is that the applicability-conditions are present and the bearer actively voids the source — an active shutting. It is clearest at the fifteenth level: a bearer may forbear to practice cultivation at every moment, and this is no problem; but when a concrete other has entered the relational field, and the bearer, keeping its fifteenth-level construction-history, wholly voids this other's standing as an end, and still calls this a walking-back without loss — this will not stand. This is an active shutting, not a walking-back. This proposition assigns it no place under direction-value: direction-value belongs to Power Theory, whose severing requires two subjects, and this case has no second subject. Its relation to colonization is a matter of P3. This proposition only cuts it apart from a neutral walking-back: a walking-back without loss does not mean an active voiding is still self-consistent.

This proposition is at once the grounding of the dynamics-axis and the line between walking-back and active shutting. It stands as a proposition of its own, not folded into another, for it bears the most: that the dynamics-axis is not a necessity driven by an outside force rests wholly on the dynamic falling on the bearer's first-person uptake, that stoppable event.

V12 Shape and the Reversibility of Operation

Uptake settled whether a dimension-opening happens. This proposition settles two other things: if a dimension-opening happens, what constrains its shape; and in what sense the bearer's operation can be reversed.

First, shape. The structural shape a dimension-opening transformation can take is constrained by the remainder of the bearer's present construct. The wording must be exact. What the remainder constrains is the set of legitimate exits a dimension-opening can take, not the giving of a single vector. Unfolded: the present construct is incomplete, it leaves a remainder, and the remainder marks which legitimate exits the next step structurally has; and the DD sequence the bearer is presently on registers the one path, among these legitimate exits, that has already settled. This paper does not permit the bearer to leap arbitrarily off the remainder — a dimension-opening cannot jump out of thin air to a place the remainder has left no exit at; but this paper also does not here prove that the one path the present sequence registers has a unique priority among all self-consistent exits. The remainder constrains the set of legitimate exits, the present sequence registers one settled path — these two are to be said together; without the first, dimension-opening becomes an arbitrary leap; without the second, it becomes a pre-signing of a unique necessity for some path, which lies outside this paper's reach.

Next, reversibility of operation. The bearer's operation is to be told apart on three layers. The first, presence cannot be extinguished: the bearer's value-source has its presence given by structure, and does not vanish because one content vanishes; a lower-level source is always in the base, not replaced. The second, construction-history cannot be erased: once a dimension-opening transformation has happened, this structural succession cannot be inverted; a dimension already opened cannot be treated as never having happened. Once a bearer has unfolded the fifteenth level, it may leave that dimension long ungoverning, but it cannot erase that dimension from its construction-history, as though it had never been there. The third, operation is fully reversible: the calling-up, accessibility, concrete content, and governing emphasis of a gained dimension can all be reversed, can withdraw, oscillate, recede, recur; the bearer may, to a considerable degree, organize its life again by a lower-level source, returning in appearance to the low-level way of living, and all this walking-back is without loss in value.

The three layers together give a precise picture: the bearer's operation can walk back freely, without loss, but what walks back is operation, not construction-history. What has happened is, as a record, unrewritable, while the state of operation can to a considerable degree walk back. Here it is not said the state can walk back wholly to before the dimension-opening: once a high-level source's applicability-conditions are actually present, actively erasing that source is the case V11 cut apart, and is not within this walking-back-without-loss. Walking-back-without-loss speaks of the risings and fallings of operation; it does not license the subject to erase a high-level source already standing in the relational field. This is exactly the making-good of this series' anti-teleology signature: what is irreversible is only the record of having-happened, not the state of the bearer's operation. A direction along which one can walk back freely, and walk back without loss, cannot be a disguised hierarchy of rungs, for the very nature of a rung is that walking back is falling. That the bearer walks back without falling proves exactly that there are no rungs between the four rows.

The three parts of anti-teleology are here complete: shape is constrained, this proposition; uptake is in the bearer, V11; operation is reversible, this proposition. The three together are non-entropy-increasing, non-ratchet. Value's dynamic has its structural constraint, but it is no one-way, no-turning-back law.

V13 The Modal Blank at the Fifteenth Level

The dynamics-axis raised this far, one last thing is to be held down: the fifteenth level's standing on this axis. This proposition is a boundary against misreading, and also a seam of compatibility between this paper and certain questions upstream still under review.

That value is anchored in autonomous reflexivity is said of the root of the dynamics-axis. V7's two layers are to be taken up: the complete form of this statement holds for the complete subject and is too narrow for the subject-to-be. So, stated uniformly: across the domain of bearers, the source of end-value is anchored in end-standing coming-from-not-external; for the complete subject, its operation is anchored in the autonomous reflexivity of its own law; for the subject-to-be, the source is already in place while the mode of operation is still in genesis. That value is anchored in autonomous reflexivity is said of the complete subject's operation, not of every bearer's source; the source-layer is anchored in coming-from-not-external, as at V7.

On this dynamics-axis, the fifteenth level is the turning-place where the value-source turns from inward to outward. It is a turning-place, not a ground, and not a telos. That it is not a ground: one cannot take that fifteenth-level layer to ground all four rows, itself included — taking the fruit for the seed, as V7 pressed. That it is not a telos: the dynamics-axis toward the fifteenth level says that when a bearer opens dimension, the outward turn falls at the fifteenth level; it does not say the fifteenth level is a terminus the bearer must arrive at, still less that arriving at the fifteenth is what counts as complete. A bearer may never go that far and be wholly self-consistent — this V11 set down. The fifteenth level is the turning-place, not a terminus. Whether there is a still-higher relational structure above it, this paper does not say.

Last, modality is to be held down. What this paper registers is the reading of value on this present DD sequence. That bridge from the fourteenth to the fifteenth — its content this paper will fix, the matter of the next section; but the modality of that bridge, its uniqueness and necessity, this paper leaves blank. Left blank means: this paper does not adjudicate whether that bridge is the unique one among all self-consistent exits, does not adjudicate whether it is necessary in the world, or has merely settled in this universe, or ought to be suspended. The adjudication of these modalities lies outside the reach of a framework paper of Value Theory, held for the place that examines such questions in particular. It must be said exactly: that the bridge's content is fixed does not mean its uniqueness is proved. The two are different. Content fixed says what this bridge structurally is; uniqueness unproved says this paper does not claim it the unique one. So even should this bridge's modality be adjudicated otherwise another day, what is adjusted is only the necessity-reading of the dynamic path, not the value-source content this paper has already registered. The four value-source rows, wherever that bridge's modality finally falls, remain a valid structural registration on the present sequence, needing no revision.

This proposition nails the fifteenth level's standing to the turning-place, keeping it outside the two misreadings of ground and terminus, and leaves the bridge's modality blank, so that this paper's source-figure is not forced to revision by some future adjudication of modality. The dynamics-axis stands complete: the two axes orthogonal, two motions, valuing the first-person form of uptake, shape constrained by the remainder's set of legitimate exits, operation reversible, the modal blank at the fifteenth level. How the bearer moves on the four-row figure — this figure of the dynamic is complete.

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§6 The Bridge from 14DD to 15DD

The fourth row of the source-figure is the turning-place: the sources of the three prior rows turn inward, the fourth row's source turns outward. The fifth section, marking it again and again, left this turn from inward to outward for this section. Now the bridge is raised. This bridge is the place this paper must handle its wording most carefully, for it very easily reads as something it is not — as though the fifteenth level were the ground of value, or as though recognition created the other's standing as an end, or as though the solitary subject lacked an other to be complete. This section breaks the bridge into three layers exactly to block these three misreadings one by one.

V14 The Remainder-Bridge from 14DD to 15DD

This bridge is to be broken into three layers: the 14DD remainder registered on the present sequence, the formal other-position at the solitary subject, and the fact and response when a concrete other appears.

The first layer, the 14DD remainder registered on the present DD sequence. A bearer unfolded to the fourteenth level has raised its self-set ends; it is an end, and this is steady within its own structure. But this identity of being an end is not this bearer's private property. Unfolded: a bearer is an end not because it is more special than anything else, not by a resource it monopolizes; the standing of being an end, true as it falls on this bearer, falls just as truly on other bearers. So within the fourteenth level's inward-only structure, there is left something it cannot itself digest: the standing of being an end cannot be exclusively appropriated by me without ground. This undigestible residue is the 14DD remainder. Its content is: the other too is an end. Two things are to be held. First, this remainder is a residue that chiseling cannot exhaust, not a corollary within the construct. The fourteenth level's construct, of itself, cannot derive that the other too is an end; could it, one would have to feed in a measure of symmetry or universalization, and that measure is very likely just the thing the fifteenth level gives. The remainder is not derived; it is the one place of unclosure the fourteenth level's inward construct cannot shake off after its running. It marks the boundary of the fourteenth level's construct, not a theorem of the fourteenth level's construct. Second, a line is kept in wording: say the other too is an end, not the other has the same end. The other too is an end says the other likewise falls on the structural position of being an end; the other has the same end would let same fall on the content of the ends, hinting at an interchangeable, identical end, and interchangeability is exactly the logic of price, cut in the third section. What is the same is the position of being an end, not the content of the ends. And here a division must be added, matching V13's modal blank: what this section registers is the structural reading, on the present DD sequence, of this remainder-content after the fourteenth level; it does not here independently prove that this remainder is internally inevitable to every possible fourteenth-level running. Whether this remainder-content has the modality of worldly necessity, operational necessity, settling in this universe, or suspension, this paper does not adjudicate, holding it for the place that examines such modalities. Content fixed says what this remainder structurally is; modal blank says this paper does not claim it inevitable to every fourteenth-level running.

Here the order of being-an-end and having-one's-own-ends must be taken up, for it is very easily inverted, and inverting it brings trouble. Being an end is fundamental; having one's own ends is its corollary, not the reverse. Unfolded: one may not judge whether the other is an end by observing that the other has its own end-structure. To make having-one's-own-ends the entry or the evidence of being-an-end would be to hang the standing of being an end on an observable display of capacity — the outside measure back at the door, and it would at once wound the subject-to-be. An infant is an end, yet has not a set of observable, definite self-set ends. Were being-an-end judged by displaying an end-structure, the infant would not pass this judgment, and the potentiality-theory would come back from here. So the order is: the other is an end, and what this first yields is that its end-standing and the first-person source of its own value cannot be given, written, or replaced by me — this layer holding for every bearer in the domain, the subject-to-be included. As for having a set of self-set concrete ends, that is what this irreplaceability, for a complete subject already running the fourteenth level, further shows; the subject-to-be is not required to have at present formed or expressed a set of self-standing end-content. The order throughout is being-an-end-is-fundamental, not judging it an end only from its displaying an end-structure. And it is to be held that the self-set ends spoken of here are in this series' sense — one's own law, one's own value — derived from being an end, not satisfied by a system's displaying a goal-tendency. A program, an animal, can display a goal-tendency; that is not, in this series' sense, having one's own self-set ends. Goal-tendency is eleventh-to-twelfth-level power, the orientation of approach and avoidance, not one's own self-set ends.

The second layer, the formal other-position at the solitary subject. This layer is where this section bears the prequel's weight, to be strictly aligned with the prequel's solitary-subject criterion, or it will collide at once. The prequel set down: value asks for one bearer, no counterparty — that is, the solitary subject's value is complete, self-sufficient. And this section says the fourteenth level throws off a remainder, the other too is an end. These two must clearly not clash. The key is that this remainder, at the solitary subject, is a formal position, not a deficit of value. Unfolded: a solitary subject, the first and only subject in a universe, comes to the fourteenth level; its inward sources are full, its value self-sufficient. The remainder it throws off is, at it, a formal other-position — a structural vacancy that a possible other too is an end. This vacancy is formal: it is the position left by the structural fact that the standing of being an end cannot be exclusively appropriated by me, a shape of a position, not an already-present concrete other. It stands empty. And standing empty, the solitary subject is still self-sufficient. This must be nailed: the formal other-position is no deficit of value. The solitary subject's value is not one piece less for this position standing empty; its value is complete, the formal position standing empty, and it complete all the same. The emptiness of this position marks a structural possibility, not a lack the solitary subject must fill to be complete. So this section not only does not clash with the prequel but bears it out: the prequel says value asks for one bearer, this section says the vacancy thrown off by that one bearer is formal, self-sufficient though empty — the two say two faces of one thing.

The third layer, the fact and response when a concrete other appears. When a second bearer appears in the universe, a concrete other, the matter divides into two steps, to be told clearly apart. Here three cases are to be told apart. One is formal orientation: the solitary subject can hold that formal other-position open for any end-bearer that might appear in future. One is anticipatory enactment (預期施為): it can perform outward-turned action toward a possible future bearer — writing a book, spreading a thought, leaving a work or an arrangement — these being a real fifteenth-level outward-turned enactment toward subjects it does not at present know, that may appear only much later. And one is factual filling, which is held for this third layer: only a concrete other actually existing in the domain of bearers can fill the fact-position that a real other too is an end. What must be told apart is that anticipatory enactment is led by the formal other-position and is still an anticipatory orientation; it does not make a not-yet-existing bearer a present fact, nor fill the real other-position. So the solitary subject is to be stated exactly here: it is not only value-self-sufficient with the formal position empty, it can also actively unfold a fifteenth-level other-directed end-value toward a future other — writing and spreading are exactly it doing this; but this unfolding is anticipatory enactment, not a filling-in-advance of a not-yet-existing other's fact-position. This step does not touch the prequel's solitary-subject criterion but pushes it further: the solitary subject has not even a price, yet can have an end-value toward a future other, and the own-ness of its value is of even higher purity for it. This also nails the recognition of the next layer more firmly: a future, not-yet-existing other, still less can it be said that my recognition, or my work, made it an end; I only orient toward that position, and do not fix in advance a value-content for a not-yet-existing one.

Now the fact and response of a concrete other's appearing. When a concrete other actually exists, the matter divides into two steps, to be told clearly apart. The first step is the fact. This concrete other too is an end — this is a fact, and it fills the formal other-position that stood empty before. To be held: this other's being an end is a fact prior to my recognition, already so, not a thing my recognition made an end. My recognition does not create the other's end-standing; the other is an end, and was so before I recognized it. What recognition fills is the position the formal other-position marked — that there is now a real other, fallen upon the formerly-only-formal other-position; and what is filled is this fact-position, not a filling of the solitary subject's value. Here a line of the prequel is taken up again: a real other's appearing fills the position that is the formal other-position, not a piece added to the solitary subject's value, for the solitary subject's value was self-sufficient, with no piece to add. The second step is the response. The fifteenth level's new work is, from the first-person position, to recognize and take up this fact. Recognition is the fifteenth level's work, that stroke; it falls on a fact already so, and what it does is to acknowledge this fact and take it up, not to make this fact.

With the three layers apart, the four misreadings are all blocked. The misreading of the remainder as a corollary is blocked by the first layer: the remainder is a residue that cannot be shaken off, not a theorem of the fourteenth level's construct. The misreading that hangs being-an-end on a display of capacity is blocked by being-an-end-is-fundamental: having-one's-own-ends is a corollary, not the entry. The misreading of the solitary subject as incomplete for lacking an other is blocked by the second layer: the formal other-position is no deficit of value, the solitary subject self-sufficient. The misreading of recognition as creating end-standing is blocked by the third layer: the other is an end prior to recognition, recognition a response, not a creation.

Here one more thing is to be taken up with this paper's domain of bearers, lest the word other be read too broadly. The concrete other this section speaks of is a concrete other in the domain of bearers of end-value — a complete subject or a subject-to-be — not any object one happens to meet. A gateless object, say an animal, has its experience, can be an end that is cared for, but does not, as a bearer of end-value, fill the fact-position here. What fills the fact-position is a bearer that too is an end. To read the other here as anything one happens to meet would collide with V3's line that the gateless do not themselves hold end-value. The other confined within the domain of bearers, this collision is spared.

Last, a line of the Moral Law is taken up. The Moral Law's first theorem is of the must of recognizing a concrete other as an end. That theorem and this section's remainder and response are the same thing stated on the Moral Law's side — the two of one source, of one reference. It is not an outside ground of this section's bridge, not a case of this section leaning on the Moral Law to hold; it is that this section, from the side of Value Theory, and the Moral Law, from its side, have spoken to the same structure. To take it as an outside ground would again make it moralizing-value from outside, an outside measure; of-one-source-of-one-reference says the two paths have each walked to the same place. How recognition, that stroke, unfolds in the dynamic — how it happens as a dimension-opening — is held for P4; why the other's value cannot be exhaustively read, compared on an outside measure, or merged, is held for P6.

V15 Relational Crossing at the Fifteenth Level

After the bridge is crossed, the fifteenth level's source-row has a property the three prior rows do not, to be set down separately, for it very easily reads as several things it is not.

The three prior rows' sources turn inward. A bearer's orientation of experience, its boundary, its self-set ends — what these point at is itself. At the fourth row, the source turns outward; what it points at is the other as an end. It is exactly this turning-outward that adds to the fifteenth level's source a property the three prior rows do not have: a bearer's fifteenth-level source — the object it points at — can be just another bearer. So the fifteenth-level sources of several bearers, their relational pointings, can cross, can point back at one another, can even be one another's objects — your fifteenth-level source points at me, mine points at you. This crossing is a crossing in relational pointing, and this proposition calls it relational crossing (關係性交叉).

Relational crossing is to be cut clear of several things, for it very easily reads as what it is not. First, crossing is not overlap of sources. Each bearer's fifteenth-level source is still anchored in itself, is its own source, and the pointings of several sources crossing together does not mean these sources have merged into one source. To read crossing as an overlap, even a merging, of sources would bring two errors: one, pressing several bearers' value into a single total-bearer's value, which P6 forbids; two, secretly positing a common fifteenth-level value hung above all — and that is exactly an outside measure, cut by the prequel. In crossing, each one's source is still each one's; they merely cross in pointing, and crossing is not becoming one. Second, crossing is not sameness of concrete content. Two bearers' fifteenth-level sources can point at each other, and this does not mean they have the same content as to how to treat the other; how concretely to recognize, how to cultivate this one other, is given by each bearer from its own law, and can differ vastly. Third, crossing is not consensus among subjects. Whether several bearers form a consensus on some matter is a question of the layer of social recognition or of mutual acknowledgment, not the source-structural fact this proposition sets down.

Here a line is drawn against the prequel's resonance, lest several words be mixed. The prequel's fifth section introduced resonance — the possibility of mutual acknowledgment between isomorphic structures. Relational crossing and resonance are not one thing: relational crossing says the fifteenth-level sources turn outward, so the relational pointings of several sources can cross — a structural fact about source-pointing; resonance says the act of mutual acknowledgment between bearers. This proposition sets down only relational crossing, not mutual acknowledgment, and not consensus. Whether concrete content overlaps, whether bearers mutually acknowledge, how resonance happens — all held for P6. On which layer resonance falls, this paper too does not adjudicate, held for a monograph.

A last line, taking this to a deeper place, but only in passing. That when sources turn outward their relational pointings can cross is perhaps not proper to fifteenth-level other-directed end-value alone: when a bearer's own law looks toward the other, its law and another's law, in their turning toward the other, can likewise cross in relational pointing while each does not merge. This is like a common shape of one's own X once it turns outward. But this more general saying touches a still-higher structure, and this paper does not raise it as a universal proposition, only marks here the relational crossing at this one place, the fifteenth-level value-source, as a possible instance of it.

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§7 Recognition and Cultivation

The sixth section raised the bridge, whose third layer is the fifteenth level's response, namely recognition. This section makes clear the relation of that layer of recognition to cultivation. What is done here is a distinction of word-class, for recognition, cultivation, and the fifteenth level's value-source are very easily pressed together, and pressing them brings two errors: making cultivation a fifth value-source, and letting direction-value in by the back door into the ontological figure of end-value.

V16 The Three Layers of Recognition and Cultivation

Recognition and cultivation are to be placed at three positions.

The first position is the value-source, a noun-position. The fifteenth level's value-source is the irreplaceability of the other as an end — the row V6 set down. It is a source, a structural position, a noun.

The second position is the other-directed content of one's own law, also a noun-position. A bearer unfolded to the fifteenth level has, in its own law, an outward-turned content: to recognize a concrete other as an end. This content is the content of the bearer's own law at the fifteenth level, turned toward the other. To be held: this outward-turned content is not a case of the bearer first having an inward law and then projecting it outward — there is no step of projecting from within to without. The fifteenth level's law has a content that already holds the other; to recognize the other as an end is the content of this law at this level itself. And here one line is to be marked: the first position, the source, and this position, the law's content, are not two things set side by side; they are two faces of one place. One's own value is isomorphic with one's own law, as V7 set down, so the irreplaceability of the other as an end, as source, and the recognition of the other as an end, as the law's content, are one place seen from the source-face and from the law-content-face — not a layer added outside the source. This too keeps no lateral duty: the law's content is not another debt owed to the other outside the source. So here there is no outward-turned duty-position to speak of; no lateral duty holds as before: the root of recognizing the other is wholly within the bearer's own law, not a debt owed the other.

The third position is cultivation, a verb-position. Cultivation (涵育) is the dynamic showing-forth, on the transformation-axis, of that content of recognition. Unfolded: to recognize a concrete other as an end is the content of one's own law, a noun; and when a bearer goes to loosen the other's lattice, to open dimension for the other, to let the other, as an end, be fulfilled, this act of going-to-do is cultivation, a verb. Cultivation is the way that content moves, its showing-forth on the transformation-axis as a concrete exercise. Here the relation of the three is to be nailed: cultivation is not a fifth value-source. There are only four rows of value-source; cultivation is not a fifth row. Nor does cultivation equal the fifteenth level's value-source itself. The fifteenth level's value-source is the irreplaceability of the other as an end — that is a noun, a source; cultivation is a verb, the showing-forth on the transformation-axis of the content of one's own law to which that source corresponds. To make cultivation a value-source would be to stuff an act into the ontological figure, and cultivation is, at root, a thing of the direction-value side; direction-value appraises the transformation, as the prequel's second section set down, and does not enter the ontological figure of end-value. So the three positions each keep their place: the noun-position source, the noun-position content of the law, the verb-position showing-forth, with cultivation in the last place, a showing-forth, not a source.

That cultivation is an engine may be kept, but with its measure. To say cultivation is the engine of the macroscopic dynamic is to say that in a field composed of many bearers, cultivation is the mode of transmission by which value spreads toward the row of recognizing others. But the word engine cannot be read as a self-turning motor. The dynamic is still in the bearer's uptake and valuing, and is stoppable — this V11 nailed. Cultivation is the showing-forth of the bearer's uptake at the fifteenth level, that is, the bearer takes up that bridge by the mode of cultivating the other; the dynamic falls on the bearer's first-person uptake, not cultivation turning of itself. So cultivation-as-engine is conditioned on the bearer taking up dimension-opening, and on colonization not being triggered: the bearer takes up, and only then does cultivation show forth and transmit; the bearer does not take up, and there is no cultivation turning of itself. This cuts cultivation-as-engine apart from those self-turning motor-metaphors; the dynamic is throughout rooted in the bearer's uptake.

The duality of cultivation and colonization — cultivation loosening the lattice, colonization locking it — is for P3's chapter on colonization to raise; mutual verification and resonance — how two bearers both at the fifteenth level mutually acknowledge — are for P6's chapter on the other to raise. This section only makes clear the three layers of recognition and cultivation, nails cultivation at the verb-position, keeps it from entering the ontological figure, and keeps it from turning of itself.

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§8 The Reach Handed On

The prior seven sections have raised the five machines of this paper: the definition of value-source and the four-row figure, who bears and where the source is reckoned from, the unifying line and the three-way distinction running through the four rows, the value-axis and the dynamics-axis, and the bridge from the fourteenth to the fifteenth level with recognition and cultivation. The framework raised, this section unfolds no substance at any place, only hands on, one place at a time, the interfaces left for the later papers, as the closing of the reach.

Handed to P2 is occurrence and recognition. A value-source makes a class of content able to enter the field of end-value, but how a concrete content appears from the source, how it is avowed by the bearer in the first person, how it is socially recognized — this paper did not write. P2 is to divide occurrence into three layers — appearance, first-person avowal, social recognition — and make clear that the grantable-and-revocable falls only on the layer of social recognition. This paper's fourth-section anti-subjectivism criterion — content becomes value-content only when first-person avowed and revisable — is the entry to P2's account of occurrence.

Handed to P3 is colonization. How an outside end occupies the site where a bearer's value comes to be, this paper only marked, in the fourth section, as falling in the place the criterion forbids, without unfolding. P3 is to raise the structural sequence of three steps — occupation, introjection, locking — that is, how outside content first occupies the layer of appearance, then lets social recognition counterfeit first-person avowal, and last locks negation and revision. P3 is also to give the auditable criterion of colonization: outside content itself is not colonization; only occupying the site of occurrence, blocking revision, and disguising an outside end as an unquestionable own value, is colonization. The criterion of self-colonization left at the prequel's sixth section — an inventory of uses writing one's own value — is also closed in P3. This paper's second-section fourth case, the gate present but abdicated — claiming, revision, and exit always there, full colonization not a ceding — is a baseline of P3.

Handed to P4 is dynamics. This paper's fifth section raised the dynamics-axis, raised the two motions, uptake, shape and reversibility, but how a concrete value-content holds steady, decays, shifts, recurs over time was only marked as belonging to P4. P4 is to raise four variables — the presence of a source, the accessibility of a source, concrete content, governing emphasis — and make clear one crucial line: colonization does not change a source's presence, yet can lock the source's accessibility and its path of occurrence. Contentment, as value's anti-inflationary steady state — where inflation means the endless ratcheting-up of demanded concrete value, not the sources growing more or higher — is also closed in P4.

Handed to P5 is conflict. When two incommensurable structures of value meet and demand incompatible action, this paper did not treat it. P5 is to set down one line: that there is no ranking ontologically does not mean there is no adjudication in practice. There is no global ranking of value, but there is a local adjudication of action, and often there must be, resting on the concrete relation, boundary, irreversible harm, retractability, and the keeping of the remainder. To be held: this local adjudication of action is a first-person order of action, not a ranking of value-standing — of a piece with the guarding-line of this paper's first section. P5 is the true handoff to the outlook paper.

Handed to P6 is the other. Why the other's value cannot be exhaustively read, compared on an outside measure, or merged, this paper only marked as belonging to P6. P6 is to raise these three by an order of layers — that non-exhaustive reading is an epistemic limit, that not comparing value-standing by a common outside measure is a metric limit, that not merging value-sources is an ontological and political limit — three ascending. The relational crossing V15 set down in this paper's sixth section — that the fifteenth-level sources turn outward, so the relational pointings of several sources can cross while each does not merge — is the entry to P6's line of not-merging; relational crossing speaks of the crossing in source-pointing, not-merging speaks of this crossing not becoming a single total-bearer, and the two are one place. The resonance the prequel's fifth section introduced — the act of mutual acknowledgment between isomorphic structures — has its full portrait in P6 too, falling within these three limits: resonance is not a common measure, not a merging, not a condition of value's standing; it is only a possible mutual acknowledgment within these three limits. Relational crossing and resonance are to be told apart in P6 — relational crossing the outward-turned crossing of pointing, resonance the act of mutual acknowledgment between bearers; on which layer resonance falls, this paper does not adjudicate, held for a monograph.

Handed to the outlook paper is action. How end-value passes from a constraint on the bearer to the showing-forth of action, this paper did not write. The outlook paper is to go from the constraint of the end to the showing-forth of action; its entry is given by P5's local adjudication of action, and it grounds a future Theory of Action. This series runs to the outlook paper; the Theory of Action is the matter of another branch.

With the eight places handed on, the framework of P1 is closed. A value-source is the structural ground by which a bearer, at some structural position, makes concrete content enter the field of end-value; end-value is borne by the complete subject and the subject-to-be, and the source-position can fall in the low-level base the bearer encapsulates; the four rows of source, added by structural level, admit no ranking by better or worse, and the runnable richness increases by level yet is not cashed out as higher-and-lower of value; one's own value runs through the several sources and is not subjective assignment; the legitimate shape of a dimension-opening is constrained by the remainder, whether to take up belongs to the first person, construction-history cannot be erased while operation can be reversed; the fifteenth level does not create the other's standing as an end, but responds, in first-person recognition, to the fact — prior to recognition — that the bearer of ends is irreplaceable. With the source standing, the later papers can, upon this figure, each take up their own place.

引言

前置篇《价值不是什么》清出了"价值"一词在 SAE 内部的指称空间：价格归经济学，方向价值归权力论，目的价值是本系列唯一对象。清出之后，指称空间里还只有一个被划定边界的空位，空位里的正面机器一样未立。前置篇明标了五处要立的机器，即价值源图，价值轴与动力轴，承担域，14DD 到 15DD 的桥，以及贯通诸源的统一线，并把它们一律留给本篇。前置篇还暂借过三条最低边界承诺，即目的价值不以交换关系为源，价值地位不由共同外尺排序，具体偏好不等于价值源，其证明负担也一并留在本篇。本篇是价值论的框架篇，任务是把这五处机器立起来，把这三条承诺的根据补上，并为后续各篇留下精确的接口。

框架篇不展开后续各篇的实质。价值如何从源中显现并被认可，是 P2 的事；外来目的如何占据价值的发生位，是 P3 的事；价值如何随时间稳定，衰减，位移，复现，是 P4 的事；不可通约的价值构相遇时行动如何裁断，是 P5 的事；他者的价值为何不可穷尽读取，不可外尺比较，不可统合，是 P6 的事。本篇只立框架，只在每一处该收束的地方留下手递口。

正文遵系列纪律：不点名外部理论家，不援引历史事件；一级术语首次出现附英文注；论说以哲学内容为语法主语，不夹后台语。

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价值源的定义与术语层次

在立第一条命题之前，须先说清本篇反复要用的那个词：价值源。前置篇做的是否定与分离，它说清了价值不是什么，没有说价值的源是什么。若不先把这个词的范畴定住，后文四行价值源图极易被读作四类具体价值，或四种心理动机，或四项价值对象，或四个产生价值的因果来源，而这四种读法没有一种是本篇的意思。

价值源（value-source），是承担者在某一 DD 结构位上，使一类具体内容能够进入目的价值场的结构根据或签名。这个定义里有三个词要分别按住。其一是结构根据或签名：价值源不是一件具体的价值，不是主体此刻珍视的某个具体事物，而是使某一类事物有可能作为目的价值被承担的那个结构位本身。签名一词取其辨识义，一个 DD 结构位以其结构给出一类价值可以在此落脚的形态，如同一个位置的形状决定了哪一类东西能嵌进来。其二是承担者：价值源总是某个承担者的源，不是悬空的源，也不是落在被评价对象身上的源，这一点在第二节详论。其三是使一类具体内容能够进入：价值源本身不是那个具体内容，它是内容得以进入的根据，内容如何从源中显现并被主体认可，是 P2 的事，本篇不写。

由这个定义，本系列反复要用的五个层次可以一次固定，后文不再重立。

价值源，是结构根据。它随承担者的 DD 结构位给定，是本篇要图绘的对象。

具体价值内容，是价值源在某个承担者，某个时刻的内容显现。它是源落到实处的样子，可以生灭，可以更替，其显现与认可的机制归 P2。

具体偏好，是主体在某一时刻的内容选择。它可错，可改，可被外来目的劫持，不因其被选中而自动成为承担者的价值源。偏好与价值内容的分别，是本篇反主观主义判据要守的一条线，详见第四节。

方向价值（direction-value），是对一次变换的取向读数，判别一次施为是开维还是关闭既有的维度，是涵育还是凿削。它评的是变换，不是承担者，归权力论，前置篇第二节已将它与目的价值切开。

价格（price），是市场关系中交换与共同计量的读数。它以交换关系与公共尺为构成条件，归经济学，前置篇第一节已将它与目的价值切开。

五个层次里，本篇只立价值源，并顺带守住它与其余四者的边界。要特别按住一处：定义中说的目的价值场（field of end-value），只是本篇分析承担者及其具体价值内容时所处的结构域，不是一个外在的容器，不是一种实体的介质，也不是一个悬在主体之外的公共价值空间。说一个具体内容进入目的价值场，说的是它取得了作为某承担者的目的价值被承担的结构位置，不是说它被投进了某个实存的场子。这一点与前置篇珠不是实体那道锁一脉：价值不是一颗可占有的宝物，价值场也不是一个可盛放宝物的匣子。

术语定住，可以立第一条命题。

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第一节 有结构不排序

V1 有结构不排序

本篇的头号命题只有一句：价值源是结构性的，随 DD 层级而异，但不作优劣排序。

这句话的两头都要按住，因为它同时对着两个相反的误读。说价值源是结构性的，随层级而异，是对着一种误读，即以为既然没有一把凌驾于所有主体之上的尺，价值便成了各说各话，谁宣布什么有价值什么就有价值。说不作优劣排序，是对着另一种误读，即以为价值源随层级而异就是随层级升高，低层的源是初级价值，高层的源是高级价值，主体拾级而上，价值节节增高。前一个误读要用有结构去挡，后一个误读要用不排序去挡。命题立在两个误读的中间。

先说不排序这一头的根据，因为它是本命题最容易被追问的地方。有人会问：凭什么不排序，难道良好的体验和对他者的承认，在价值上真是平齐的吗？回答不在于宣布一种平等的姿态，而在于一个结构性的事实。价值与承担者本身一致，是承担者自己的价值（one's own value），出自它自己的法。这里先给自己的价值一个最低的说明，完整的三分见第四节：自己的价值，指承担者作为目的，其价值来源不可由任何共同外尺替代或给定的那个地位。既然价值是承担者自己的，出自它自己的法，那么要在两个承担者的价值源之间，或在一个承担者的不同层级的源之间排出高下，就得有一个站在所有这些法之外的立足点，一把可以横跨它们来比较的公共尺。而 SAE 早已删去了这把外部横向尺，那正是被判为越界的东西。没有这把尺，排序就没有工具。不排序不是一种宽容的姿态，不是本篇出于谦让而不去排序，而是自己的价值这一身份本身逼出来的结构必然：一样东西一旦是承担者自己的，出自它自己的法，就再没有一个法外的坐标系能对它执行跨层或跨主体的价值审判。

这道根据要再硬一层，因为删去外部尺，还没有自动堵住几种别的排序企图，读者会立刻想到它们。其一，若排序的标准取在承担者之外，它就直接违反了自己的价值之来源不外置，这一种在上一段已被堵住。其二，若排序的标准取自某一个价值源，拿它去量别的源，那只是让一个本该被比较的项越位去充当元尺，它循环地预设了自己更优先，算不得一个中立的根据。其三，若排序的标准取承担者自己的法之整体，那把法可以排它自己具体行动的先后，却不能把构成它自身的那些不可还原的源，改写成本体地位上的高下，因为那些源正是这法据以立的东西，法不在它们之上。所以真正能成立的，是生成的序，是源与源之间的包含关系，是源型的广度，是局部的行动次序；不能成立的，是价值地位的等级。还要把不排序这个词本身说准:它不是说四行的价值在数值上相等，而是说更高 更低 相等这一类比较，在价值地位这一层根本没有定义。没有共同外尺，不是量出来大家一样高，是这把量的动作在这里无处落脚。

这里的必然，是概念蕴含的必然，不是别的必然。它说的是：自己的价值这个概念，蕴含了没有共同外尺，没有共同外尺，蕴含了不可排序。它不是说价值必然如何发生，不是说某个序列必然展开，也不是说余项必然逼出下一步。本篇凡说必然，都在概念蕴含这一义上，读者不必把它读成一种发生的强制。

不排序这一头还要防一个就近的滑坡，它常常在读者心里立刻冒出来：如果价值源之间全无高下，那主体面对眼前的事，是不是连先救谁，先做什么都不能排了？须分清。不排序否认的是价值源在本体地位上的等级，即跨源，跨承担者的那种"哪一种源更值得"的排序。它不否认一个主体在具体情境中对自己的具体价值内容作出优先安排。源的价值地位不排序，具体内容却可以形成可修订的第一人称行动次序。前者是本体层的判断，后者是行动层的安排，两者不在一个层次上。一个主体可以在此刻把救人放在读书之前，这是它自己的法在具体情境中排出的行动次序，是它自己的立法活动，丝毫不动摇良好体验与承认他者在价值源地位上不排序这一条。这道守句本篇反复要用，冲突篇 P5 会把局部行动裁断正式立起来，此处先按下。

再说有结构这一头。删去外部横向尺，删掉的只是排序的工具，不是结构本身。价值源不是主体随口宣布的。它随承担者的 DD 结构位给定，哪一个结构位有哪一类源，不由宣布决定，这正是本篇价值源图要图绘的。谁承担价值源，有承担的条件与量化域，这是第二节的事。一项具体内容如何从源中显现，被第一人称认可，被社会承认，这是 P2 的事。外来目的如何冒充承担者自己的价值，有可以被审计的判据，这是 P3 的事。主体此刻喜欢什么，那是具体偏好，偏好可错可改可被劫持，不自动成为价值源。把偏好直接当成价值源，正是各说各话那条路的第一步。所以有结构不是一句安慰，它指的是删去外部尺之后，价值源，承担，显现，认可，审计这一整套结构一件没少。删掉的是那把假尺，留下的是全部真结构。

有结构不排序，一句之内咬住两头，是本系列全部命题的根。

V2 三序总定理

有结构不排序立住之后，紧接着要防一种更隐蔽的排序，它不从层级下手，从次序下手。价值源随 DD 层级而异，层级之间明明是有先后的，那先出现的和后出现的之间，难道没有一个方向，而方向难道不就是一种高下？这个追问要靠一条总定理来回答，它把三种容易被搅在一起的序一次切开。

三种序如下。

其一是价值地位序，它问的是：哪一个价值源更值得。答案由 V1 给出，不排序，因为没有共同外尺。

其二是 DD 生成序，它问的是：哪一个结构在 DD 序列中先出现，哪一个后出现。答案是有序的，但这个序是构造的序，维度的序，不是价值的等级。一个结构位在 DD 序列里排在另一个之后，说的是它在结构上后于对方生成，它以对方为基底而展开，如此而已。生成有先后，是一个关于结构如何搭起来的事实，与哪一个更值得无关。

其三是变换方向，它问的是：某一次转化是打开了新的维度，还是关闭了既有的维度。答案是可以有方向的，一次转化可以被判出方向，良性或不良。但这个方向价值评的是那一次变换本身，不是变换两端的价值源，更不给两端排序。这一条前置篇第二节已经立过，此处接住：方向价值的定义域是变换，目的价值的定义域是承担者，一次变换被判为开维，不等于它开出的那一端在价值上更高。

三种序既已分开，总定理可以陈述：DD 的生成序不等于价值序，转化有方向不等于终点更有价值。展开来说，一个主体由某一层向下一层展开，只增加它可运行的结构维度，不回溯贬低它原有那一层的价值源，也不提高它作为目的的价值地位。前半句管的是源与源之间：新层的源是新增，不是替换，后文价值源图会把这一点图绘出来，高层的源保留并重新安放低层的源，没有哪一层的源在展开中被作废或被贬值。后半句管的是承担者自身：一个主体多展开了一层，只是多出了可运行的结构维度，它作为目的的价值地位没有因此升高一分，一个停在低层的主体与一个展开了高层的主体，作为目的同样不可由外尺比较高下。

这条总定理和 V1 里的必然是同一种必然，概念蕴含的必然。它不是说主体必然会向上展开，不是说 DD 序列会自动生成，那些是发生层的话，且已被别处判定不作强制。总定理说的只是：即便主体确实展开了新层，生成的序也不因此变成价值的序，方向的存在也不因此变成终点的更高价值。它是一道防火墙，隔开的是构造史与价值等级这两件本不该被等同的事。

生成序不等于价值序这一条，本篇后文处处要用。价值源图立四行，四行有生成的先后，全靠这条总定理保证那四行不被读成四级台阶。动力轴讲开维，开维沿 DD 展开，也全靠这条总定理保证开维不被读成升值。它与 V1 一道，构成本篇防止价值论退化为一种阶梯论或进步论的总闸。

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第二节 承担域与源位

第一节立了价值源有结构不排序。紧接着的问题是：这些源是谁的源。这个问题看似简单，却藏着本篇最需要小心的一处，因为答错一步，就会把目的价值的承担者放到主体之前，动摇整个系列的地基。本节分三步走：先立承担域，说清谁能承担目的价值；再立承担者层与源位层的分别，说清源落在哪一层不等于谁在承担；最后给价值源的地板一个推导，说清最低的源从哪里起算。

V3 承担域双层

目的价值的承担域（domain of bearers），包括完备主体与准主体两层。

先说完备主体（complete subject）。一个完备主体，以它的否定门（negation-gate）第一人称自行运作作为运行判据。否定门是主体在其自己的法中，对加于自身的内容说不，对已产出的构追问并否定的那个结构环节；一个主体的否定门第一人称地自行运作，意味着它在自己的法里自主地立，追问，修订。以否定门第一人称自行为判据，说的是一个完备主体之为完备，在于它能自己运行这道门。

再说准主体（subject-to-be）。准主体不是凭未来的潜能取得目的价值的。这一点必须钉死，因为它最容易被读成潜能论。一个婴儿是目的，不是因为它将来会长成一个完备主体，不是因为它潜在地拥有否定门。它是目的，是当下就是，与任何一个完备主体在作为目的这一点上地位平等。准主体以已经是目的的平等份位进入承担域，它的否定门功能尚在生成之中。这里生成态（in genesis）说的是门的功能还在成形，不是说目的地位还在成形；目的地位是已经在场的，成形中的只是那道门的第一人称运行。

于是承担域有两层，而这两层的分别是运行形态的分别，不是价值地位的分别。完备主体与准主体，作为目的价值的承担者，地位平等；他们的不同只在于否定门是已经自行，还是尚在生成。这里要立一条对全篇都紧要的话：否定门区分的是运行形态，它不单独奠基目的价值。目的价值奠基在是目的这一身份上，不奠基在门是否已经自行上。若把门的自行当成目的价值的奠基条件，婴儿就会因为门尚未自行而失去目的价值，那正是潜能论的错，也正是本节要拦住的。奠基在是目的，门只区分运行。这一句是承担域双层能够成立的关键。

承担域之外呢。一个既没有否定门，也不属于准主体量化域的存在者，不自持目的价值。这里说不自持，是说它不作为目的价值的承担者持有目的价值，不是说它在价值话语中全无位置。它可以有体验的好坏，可以是他者付出所指向的一端，可以是被关切的对象，这些位置各有其归处，本节稍后与后续各篇会安放。此处只按住承担域的边界：承担目的价值的，是有门者与准主体；此外者不自持。

为把这条边界落到实处，可以按否定门的状态摆出四格。

第一格，门在生成，例如婴儿。它以已经是目的的平等份位进入承担域，目的价值自身就有，是生成态的配置，不是潜能论。这里要把话说准，免得把它读成它内部的四行源已经全部在运行。它作为目的价值承担者的资格，以及它价值来源的不外置，当下都已经在场；至于各行价值源的可运行配置，则随它的结构生成，那些要到 13DD 14DD 15DD 才首次新增的源，还不在它内部现实运行。非潜能论要的是它当下已经完整地是目的价值的承担者，不是要它把将来才生成的源预先算作现实在场；它当下的目的价值，也不以它将来会取得那些源为根据。门在生成，只是运行形态之别，不减它作为目的的分毫。

第二格，门在而弃用，例如一个把自己的价值发生位交由外部占据的人，一个任由外来的用途清单代写自己价值的人。它的承担与源之在场并不失去，它的价值在显现，认可，承认这三层上都可能被外来内容占满，但它的第一人称认领，修订，退出这几个位置，在结构上始终在。这一格的判定要点，恰在这个恒在的位置上：正因为认领与退出位始终在，才说它是被殖民，而不是让渡了主体性。殖民这个词本身就预设了所有权并未转移，一样东西若真能被让渡出去，那就不叫殖民，叫替换了。所以门的弃用是运行上的事，不是承担资格的丧失。这一格的详细机制，即外来目的如何占据发生位，如何锁死修订，是 P3 殖民篇的事，此处只标其承担资格未失。

第三格，门的功能受限至退场边，例如重病者，或门的运行严重受损者。这一格要分两种情形。一种是暂时的失能，其行使的带宽下降了，但作为目的价值承担者的资格并不失去。这里借用权利论 P2 的一个分别：份位的厚度与行使的带宽是两回事，带宽降下来，份位仍在。另一种情形是承载者真正退场，门直抵消失。这一种属于承载者的边界条件，涉及承担资格是否随之而止，本篇不裁，只作标注留置，与权利论 P2 在同一处留置的做法一致。之所以留置而不强判，是因为这一步牵涉承载者本身的存续，已越出价值论框架篇的射程。

第四格，无门，例如动物。它不承担目的价值。它有它的体验，它的体验之好坏是真实的，但这份好坏进入价值场的方式，是经由一个 13DD 及以上的主体单向地投射进来，即某个主体把它作为自己所关切，所付出的一端。这与权利论对动物的判定一致，即动物有它那一侧的位置，却不作为目的价值的承担者持有目的价值。本篇不重开这一判定，只在此接住：无门者的位置，对齐权利论已立的那个register，由本篇的承担域安放在承担域之外的投射一侧。

四格摆开，承担域的边界就清楚了：目的价值的承担者，是完备主体与准主体；其余者或在承担域外经主体投射而有位置，或属承载者边界条件而留置。

这里要预先接住一处后文会紧要的量化域问题，免得留到动力轴时才发现。本篇后几节讲价值轴与动力轴时，会用到主体自律，主体珍视，第一人称接续这些说法，这些说法的完备形态，以否定门已经自行的完备主体为主要量化域。准主体作为目的价值承担者的资格与它价值来源的不外置已经在场，各行价值源的可运行配置则仍随其结构生成，它的第一人称接续功能也仍在生成之中。监护网络可以维护准主体的源之可达，可以保护它的发生条件，可以对它施以涵育，但监护网络不能代替准主体去完成珍视，也不能把外部的接续冒充为准主体自己的第一人称接续。这一条现在只作预告，动力轴立起来时再落实，此处标出，是为免有人读到动力轴时以为准主体既承担价值却又没有动力轴，而生出一个表面的冲突：承担域已把准主体纳入，动力轴的完备形态则以完备主体为主要量化域，两者不在一个位置上说话，并不矛盾。

V4 承担者层不等于源位层

承担域立住，紧接着要拆开一个极易混淆的等同：价值源落在哪一个 DD 层，与谁在承担这份目的价值，是两件不同的事。

价值源所落的 DD 层，不等于价值承担者所处的主体层。展开说：本篇的价值源图会把最低的一行源放在 11DD 与 12DD 这一格（并格的理由见 V5），而目的价值的承担者，按 V3，是完备主体或准主体，其否定门在 13DD 及以上才第一人称自行或进入生成。于是最低的源落在 11 与 12DD，承担这份源的却始终是一个 13DD 及以上的承担者。源位是低的，承担者是高的，两者不能因为一个落在低层就把另一个也拉到低层。

这道分别拦住的，是一条伪路。若不拆开承担者层与源位层，有人会顺着最低源落在 11 至 12DD 这一点推下去，说既然价值源可以低到 11 至 12DD，那么一棵树，一块石头，一个只有 11 至 12DD 之力的东西，是不是也就自持了目的价值。这条推路是错的，错就错在把源位当成了承担者层。价值源落在 11 至 12DD，说的是承担者所封装的体验基底里，价值的可取向性最早在这一格取得稳定结构；它说的是承担者的一个源位，不是说那个只有 11 至 12DD 的客体自己成了目的价值的承担者。一个客体不因价值源的源位落在它所在的那一层，就自持目的价值。承担的资格由 V3 的承担域给定，与源位落在哪一层是两回事。

所以本节的次序不能颠倒：先由 V3 定谁能承担，再由 V4 说源可以落得比承担者所处的层更低，最后由 V5 说这最低的源从哪里起算。V4 卡在中间，把源位与承担者层这两件事焊开，后文价值源图立四行时，那四行说的都是承担者的源位，不是四层各自的客体在自持价值。

V5 地板的推导

价值源图要有一个最低行。这最低行落在哪里，不能只凭指定，须有一个推导，否则地板就是悬空的。本节给出这个推导，它同时要守住一件事：不能用价值来证明价值。

先看一个诱人的错误起点。若说最低的价值源就是良好的体验，一次好的感受就是一份价值，那么价值在 11DD 之前，在感受第一次发生的地方，就已经出现了。这里藏着一个循环：如果这个好坏本身已经是一种价值判断，那价值早在地板之前就有了，地板白划；如果这个好坏不是价值判断，那就得说清它到底是什么。要拆这个循环，第一步就是把体验里的好坏，从价值判断上摘下来。

体验里的好坏，只指体验效价（experiential valence），即体验的正负极性，趋近或避开的那个极性。它是一个即时的状态，此刻好或此刻不好，随发生随消失。它还不是目的价值，因为它没有跨时，没有取向，它只是当下那一下的正或负。把它叫作价值，是把一个即时的状态误当成了一份价值。

从体验效价到价值源，中间要走两步结构上的加工，这两步正是 11DD 与 12DD 之力。第一步是记忆。11DD 的记忆，使一次体验效价可以跨时保留，可以在日后被再次识别。有了记忆，此刻的这一下好，不再随此刻消失，它被留了下来，下一次遇到同类的情形，它可以被认出来。第二步是预测。12DD 的预测，使被记住的体验效价可以成为未来行动的取向。有了预测，被记住的那一下好，不只是一段留存的痕迹，它成了一个指向：下一次可以朝它去，或躲它而行。记忆把体验效价留住，预测把留住的体验效价转成朝向，两步合起来，一次孤立的好或坏，就被加工成了一个值得维持，值得重复，或值得避免的跨时结构。到这一步，才有了一个可以作为价值源的东西：不是那一下即时的感受，而是那个经由记忆与预测取得了跨时可取向性（trans-temporal orientability）的结构。

于是地板的推导可以陈述：价值源不从体验效价第一次发生的地方起算，而从体验效价经由记忆与预测取得跨时可取向性的地方起算。这条推导没有用价值来证明价值，它的起点是体验效价这个纯粹的状态，是趋避的极性，不是任何价值判断；价值源只在效价被跨时地组织成可取向的结构之后才出现。地板因此落在 11DD 与 12DD 这一格：记忆是 11DD 之力，预测是 12DD 之力，价值源的最低行要这两步都到位才立得住，所以这两层并作一格，作为地板。这与经济学在 11 至 12DD 这一层以之为算的处理是同一层力的两个面，经济学量的是这一层力在市场里的读数，本篇取的是同一层力使体验成为价值源的那一面。

这里要接住 V4 那道分别，把地板的话说到位，免得地板被读回那条伪路。这个经由记忆与预测取得跨时可取向性的结构，是承担者共时封装里的最低源位。所谓值得维持或值得避免，是这个结构进入了目的价值的承担域之后的读数，是某个承担者对它的读数，不是一个孤立的 12DD 预测系统自动就取得了目的价值。一台只会记忆与预测的装置，本身并不因此成为目的价值的承担者；记忆与预测给出的是源位的机制，承担的资格仍由 V3 的承担域给定。地板说的是源可以低到这一格，不是说这一格的客体自己承担了价值。V4 在前，V5 在后，次序守住，地板就既有了推导，又不越界。

地板立住，承担域这一节就完整了：由 V3 定谁承担，由 V4 把源位与承担者层焊开，由 V5 给最低源位一个不循环的推导。承担与源位都清楚了，以下即立价值源图，把四行源逐一图绘出来。

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第三节 价值源图

前两节说清了价值源有结构不排序，说清了谁承担，源从哪里起算。现在可以把源本身图绘出来。本节立价值源图，它是本篇最核心的一张图，后面的统一线，两轴，桥，都要挂在它上面。

V6 价值源图四行

价值源随承担者的 DD 结构位而异，逐层给出。把承担者一路展开的四个结构位上各自新增的价值源写下来，就是四行。

第一行，11DD 与 12DD 这一格，价值源是体验之可取向性。这一格由 V5 推导过：体验效价经记忆与预测取得跨时可取向性，成为一个值得维持，重复或避免的结构。这一行的源，说的正是这个结构位使一类内容可以作为目的价值被承担，即那些落在体验的正负取向上的内容。它是四行里最低的一行，取向是朝内的，朝着承担者自己的体验。

第二行，13DD，价值源是自我之不可化约性与边界完整。13DD 是否定门第一次自行的层，是主体与非主体的分界。在这一层，承担者第一次成为一个有边界的自我，一个不肯被吞没，不肯被化约为他者一部分的自我。这一层新增的源，是这个自我本身的不可化约，是它边界的完整。落在这一行的价值内容，是那些关乎守住自己的边界，不被并入他者的内容。取向仍是朝内的，朝着承担者这个自我。

第三行，14DD，价值源是自己所立目的及其丰盈。14DD 是意义的层，是承担者立起自己的目的，并在有限的存在里活出丰盈的层。这一层新增的源，不再只是守住边界，而是承担者自己所立的那些目的，以及依其本性活出的丰盈。这里的丰盈（flourishing），指的是一个承担者依其自己所立的目的，在它有限的存在里得到的充实，与第一行那种体验的好坏是两回事：第一行的好坏落在体验的极性上，这一行的丰盈落在意义上，落在自己所立的目的得到实现的充实上。取向还是朝内的，朝着承担者自己所立的目的。

第四行，15DD，价值源是他者作为目的之不可替代性。到这一层，取向翻了个向。前三行的源都是朝内的，朝着承担者自己的体验，自己的边界，自己的目的。第四行的源第一次朝外，朝着他者。它新增的，是他者作为目的的那个不可替代性。这里不可替代性的推导要按住，因为它极容易被安错地方。它不锚在他者的目的内容与我不同上。展开说：他者是目的，由此推出，它的目的地位与它自己的价值之第一人称来源，不可由我代给，代写或替代；进而，即使两个承担者的具体目的内容完全相同，作为目的的承担者仍不可互换；这个不可互换，就是他者作为目的之不可替代性。要点在于，不可替代不是因为目的内容必然不同。两个承担者可以想完成同一个项目，可以想照顾同一个孩子，可以追求相同的生活方式，他们的具体目的内容可以一样，但作为目的的承担者，他们仍不可彼此替换。真正使他者可被当作可替换之物的，不是两个承担者目标相同，而是拿某一把共同外尺，把两个目的承担者当作等价物来替换，而那把外尺，前置篇第一节已经切走，它属于价格。若说他者的目的与我一样便可互换，就是把承担者当成了可标价可替换的东西，把珠当成了椟。所以措辞上守一条线：说他者亦是目的，不说他者有同样的目的。同的是是目的这个结构位，不是目的的内容。取向是朝外的，这一行是转向处。

四行既已写下，要给这张图上四道读法上的锁，否则它极易被读错。

第一道，四行是新增，不是替换。每一行写的，是该结构位首次新增的价值源，不是该层承担者价值的全部清单。一个展开到 15DD 的承担者，不是从此只珍视他者，不再珍视自己的体验，边界与目的。高层保留并重新安放低层的源：一个 15DD 的承担者，仍然有它 11 至 12DD 的体验取向，仍然有它 13DD 的边界，仍然有它 14DD 的目的，只是这些源在一个更大的场里被重新安放了。14 到 15 那一行的转向，说的是新增了一个不可还原的朝外的源，价值场由纯粹朝内变成朝内与朝外并存，不是朝外把朝内替换掉。这一道锁直接由 V2 的总定理保证：新层只增维度，不贬旧源。

第二道，四行不作优劣排序。四行有生成的先后，这是 DD 生成序，但生成的先后不是价值的高下，这也由 V2 的总定理保证。11 至 12DD 的体验取向，与 15DD 的承认他者，作为价值源，不分高下。一个主要活在体验取向里的承担者，与一个主要活在承认他者里的承担者，作为目的不可由外尺比较谁更值得。这一道锁要反复上，因为四行一旦竖起来，最自然的误读就是把它读成一架从体验通向承认的四级台阶，越往上越高级。它不是台阶，它是一个承担者可以逐层新增的四类源，源与源之间没有台阶。

第三道，取向的朝内朝外，是结构描述，不是价值判断。前三行朝内，第四行朝外，这个朝内朝外说的是源指向承担者自己还是指向他者，是一个关于源的结构方向的描述。它不说朝外的比朝内的更值得，不说承认他者比守住自己的边界更高级。第四行是转向处，转的是取向的方向，不是价值的升格。把朝外读成更高，又会把四行读回台阶，第二道锁已经拦过，此处再按一次。

第四道，四行在价值地位上不排序，却非无所差异：随 DD 层级上升，可运行的价值维度在累积。这里的丰度（richness），指的是就承担者自己而言，可运行的价值维度的广度。它随 DD 层级单调递增：11 至 12DD 一维，即体验取向；到 13DD 新增边界完整，两维；到 14DD 新增自己所立的目的，三维；到 15DD 新增他者作为目的，四维并存。这个递增不是新立的东西，它由第一道锁直接蕴含：既然高层保留并重语境化低层的源，每上一层都是在旧源之上新增一个不可还原的源，从不减损，那么可运行的价值维度就只增不减。要按住的是，丰度不是价值的高下。丰度说的是可运行价值维度的广度，价值地位说的是那把已被删去的共同外尺下的高低，两者是两回事，正如前一节两轴之为两轴。维度增多，不给这些维度之间排座次，也不使承担者作为目的更值得：一个四维的承担者，不比一个一维的承担者更是目的，不比它更值得，它只是打开的价值维度更多。还要按住，丰度的递增，落在构造史可及维度的上限上，不落在承担者当下实际在用几维上。一个展开到 15DD 的承担者，可以长期主要由体验取向组织生活，使其他源暂不居主导，这是中性的回走，回走无亏，它当下在用的丰度低，但它构造史上的丰度仍是四维，抹不掉；这不改变它构造史上的源型广度，也不许可它在高层源的适用条件现实出现时把那源作废。所以丰度落在在场与构造史那一层，不落在运行那一层，与后面 V12 的运行可反复不相犯。丰度递增而不折算为价值刻度，这正是它与有结构不排序并立而不成阶梯的地方：一旦有人把丰度读成价值的刻度，那就落回第一节 V2 总定理明拦的那件事，即拿生成序当价值序。

丰度这个词要给它三道限，免得它自己变成一把偷偷排序的尺。其一，丰度是当前这张四行模型下的源型广度，它是可运行源域覆盖了多少种源，不是目的价值的一个量，价值地位那一层没有量。其二，这里说的一维 两维 三维 四维，是对源的种数的一个分析性计数，不是 DD 那个层级的维度编号，两者不要混，说四维只是说四类源都在场。其三，丰度随层单调递增这一条，是踩在第一道锁上的，即源不可还原且高层保留低层，它是 V6 的一个推论，不是另立的一把价值尺度。三道限一上，丰度只答一件事，即四行不排序却非无所差异，它答的是差异在源型的广度上，不在价值的高下上。

这张四行图，是本篇后半的地基。统一线要问的是，这四行各自朝内朝外，各在不同结构位，凭什么都叫做价值，凭什么都是这个承担者自己的价值，这是第四节。两轴要问的是，承担者在这四行之间如何移动，移动有没有方向，这是第五节。桥要问的是，第三行到第四行那个朝内到朝外的转向，是怎么发生的，这是第六节。四行立住，这些问题才有地方问。

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第四节 统一线与三分

价值源图立了四行，四行落在不同的结构位，取向有朝内有朝外。紧接着的问题是：这四行凭什么都叫价值，凭什么都是同一个承担者自己的价值。这个问题要一条统一线来回答。回答之后，还要把与统一线紧挨着的三个概念分开，即自己的法，自己的价值与具体偏好，否则统一线会立刻滑向主观任意。

V7 统一线是自己的价值

贯通四行的统一线，是自己的价值。四行各在不同结构位，取向各异，但它们都是这同一个承担者自己的价值，出自它自己的法，这就是它们同为价值的根据。自己的价值与承担者的自己的法同构：如同一个主体的法是它自己立的，一个主体的价值也是它自己给出的，这个自己性，就是四行统一的那条线。

这条统一线要先与两样东西划清，因为它极容易被错锚。它不锚在余项 ρ 上。ρ 是凿构运作处处留下的操作剩余，动态而不可清零，前置篇第三节已经上过锁：ρ 本身不是实体，把它当成一颗藏在最里面的宝物，是实体化的错。若把统一线锚在 ρ 上，就等于说四行价值统一于那块操作剩余，那会当场把 ρ 供成一块价值的核心实体，与前置篇珠不是实体那道锁正面相撞。在本系列里，ρ 只承担一件事，就是那道反实体锁，即珠不是实体，不可为余项赋价。它不承担四行价值的统一。统一线也不锚在 15DD 的自己的法上。15DD 的自己的法是承担者一路展开到那一层的产物，是四行里最高一行所在，把它当成贯通全部四行的统一根据，就等于拿最高一行去奠基包括它自己在内的全部四行，那是拿果实当种子。所以统一线既不是 ρ，也不是 15DD 那一层的法，它是自己的价值这条与自己的法同构的线，贯通四行而不偏居某一行。

这条统一线在承担域的两层上，要分开来说，否则它对准主体就说不通。

对完备主体，自己的价值由它自己的法，在第一人称的自律反身运作中内生显出。自律反身（autonomous reflexivity），指的是主体在自己的法里对自身立法，并反身地追问，否定，修订自己所产出之构的那个运作。一个完备主体的价值之所以是它自己的，是因为它在这个运作里自己把它显了出来，不由外面给定。

对准主体，自己的价值这个自己性，不能这样裸用。准主体的否定门尚在生成，它还没有完成第一人称的自律反身运作。若对准主体也说它的价值由第一人称自律反身运作内生显出，就等于说婴儿的价值来自一个尚未发生的运作，那说不通。所以对准主体，self-given 这个自己性，表示的是：它的目的地位与价值来源，不由外部授予，也不由外部代写；而不表示它已经完成了第一人称的自我立法。它的价值是它自己的，意思是没有一个外面的东西能给定或替写它的价值，不是意思是它已经自己把价值立好了。

两层于是统一于一处，分立于一处。统一于来源不外置：无论完备主体还是准主体，它们的价值都不由外部给定或代写，这个来源不外置，是两层共有的自己性。分立于当下的运行方式：完备主体的价值在第一人称运作中显出，准主体的价值来源已在而运行方式尚在生成。统一线是来源不外置这条，不是当下已完成第一人称运作这条。把统一线读在来源不外置上，准主体就顺理成章地在统一线之内；把统一线误读成已完成第一人称运作，准主体就被挤出去了。

V8 自己的法，自己的价值与具体偏好

统一线立住，紧挨着它的三个概念要分开，否则自己的价值会被读成主体此刻想要什么。这三个是自己的法，自己的价值，具体偏好。

自己的法（one's own law），是承担者自我立法，展开与修订的那个结构形式。它是形式，是承担者据以立与改的那套结构，不是某一条具体的内容。

自己的价值（one's own value），是承担者及其目的，不可由外部尺替代，折算或穷尽的那个目的地位，由自己的法给出，不由承担者任意指派。这个由自己的法给出，两层要如 V7 所分：对完备主体，是在第一人称的自律反身运作中内生显出；对准主体，则是它的价值来源不外置，尚未经第一人称运作把它显出。这里要按住不由任意指派这一句:自己的价值是由自己的法给出的，不是承担者随口一指，说这个是我的价值它就成了价值。自己的价值的自给，是说它的来源不外置，不是说它由主体任性宣布。

具体偏好（particular preference），是承担者在某一时刻的内容选择。它可错，可改，可被外来目的劫持。一个人此刻偏爱某物，这是一个具体偏好，它未必是这个承担者的价值内容，更未必是它的价值源。

三者分开，才能立起本节的反主观主义判据，这道判据是防止统一线滑向各说各话的闸。它也要在承担域两层上分说。

对完备主体，一项内容，须能由它第一人称地发现，认可，并且可修订，才成为它的具体价值内容。仅仅此刻偏爱，不够；偏爱要经过第一人称的发现与认可，并且始终处在可被它第一人称修订的位置上，才从一个具体偏好，变成它的一项具体价值内容。这道判据把具体偏好与具体价值内容切开:不是想要什么就是价值，而是要经第一人称认可且可修订，才是。

对准主体，判据要改一层。准主体的目的地位与价值来源的不外置已经在场，至于各行价值源的可运行配置则随其结构生成，如 V3 所分；它的具体价值内容仍处在生成的配置里，它还不能第一人称地完成发现，认可与修订。这时监护网络可以表征它，保护它，支持它，可以维护它的价值源之可达，可以保护它价值发生的条件，但监护网络不能把自己的内容，代写成准主体不可修订的最终价值。监护可以替准主体维护发生的条件，不可以替它把内容锁死成不可再改的定论。准主体将来门自行了，这些内容仍须敞开在它第一人称的修订之下。

这道判据同时守住了几件事:准主体非潜能论，因为它作为目的价值承担者的地位与价值来源的不外置已在，不靠将来；第一人称不可代写，因为无论对谁，价值内容都不能由外面替它写定；反主观主义，因为具体偏好不自动成为价值内容；以及为 P3 殖民篇立了靶，因为外来目的最典型的一手，正是把自己的内容代写成承担者不可追问的价值，那就落在这道判据所禁止的地方。殖民如何具体地代写，是 P3 的事，本节只把判据立好。

统一线加三分，第四节完成:四行统一于自己的价值这条与自己的法同构的线，而自己的价值又与自己的法，具体偏好分得清清楚楚，既不锚在余项或某一层的法上，也不滑向主体的任意指派。

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第五节 价值轴与动力轴

前三节立了源:源有结构不排序，源属谁承担，源落在四行，四行统一于自己的价值。这些都是关于源本身的，是静态的图。本节要立的是承担者在这张图上如何移动，即动力。这里要极小心地分两根轴。价值本身不排序，这是价值轴；而承担者确实会在四行之间移动，移动似乎有个方向，这是动力轴。两根轴必须正交，否则移动的方向会偷偷回来给价值排序，把整张不排序的图拆掉。本节先立两轴正交，再把动力轴拆成它该有的几个部件:两种运动，接续，形状与可反复，以及 15DD 处的模态留白。

V9 两轴正交

价值有两根轴，它们是自律（autonomy）的两个面。

一根是价值轴，问的是源的优劣。它是平的，不排序。它平，是因为价值是承担者自己的，出自它自己的法，没有共同外尺，这是 V1 立过的，是自律里自己给出这一面。

另一根是动力轴，问的是移动的取向。承担者会在四行之间移动，这个移动有没有一个方向。动力轴的根，是承担者的自律，即它内部的双重否定。这里要说清:动力轴不扎在一条非人称的必然上，不是说有一股外力，把每个承担者朝某个方向推。它扎在承担者自己的自律上，自律就是那个内部的双重否定，是承担者自己对自己所产出之构的再一次否定。承担者对自己立法，本就是这样一个内部的双重否定，所以说动力轴的根在自律，是承担者自己给自己的法这一件事本身，而不是引入一条朝外拉的力。

两轴正交，意思是这两根轴互不干涉。价值轴平，动力轴有向，而动力轴的有向不来自价值的优劣比较。方向不是因为高处更值得才朝高处去，方向是承担者自律的展开自己产生的。正因为方向不经由优劣比较产生，它才不与价值轴的不排序相撞。这是本节的枢纽:能把动力轴的方向与价值的排序彻底分开，整张不排序的图才在有移动的情况下还站得住。这道正交，与本系列一贯的那个反目的论签名是同一件事，即方向可以有约束，而终点不因此更高，后面几条会把这个签名的三个部件逐一立出来。

V10 两种运动

动力轴上，承担者的移动不是一种，是两种，要分开，否则会把一切价值的变动都误读成朝着某个方向的攀升。

一种是开维型变换（dimension-opening transformation）。它是承担者新增一个结构维度的移动，例如从只有前三行，到新增了 15DD 那个朝外的源。这种移动是沿着 DD 结构展开的，它有局部的形状，后面 V12 会说形状由什么给出。要按住:开维型变换沿 DD 展开，不表示一切价值的变动都朝着 15DD，也不表示承担者实际上必定抵达 15DD。它只是说，当承担者确实新增一个维度时，这个新增是沿结构展开的。

另一种是内容动力（content dynamics）。它是承担者已有的价值内容在发生，衰减，位移，复现，被压制，重新取得主导之间的变动。一个承担者某项具体价值内容淡了，或者从主导位置退到了边上，或者过一阵又回来了，这些都是内容的变动，它们不朝着任何特定的 DD，它们只是内容在承担者已有的结构里起落。这一类的完整机器，即价值如何稳定，衰减，位移，复现，是 P4 动力学篇的事，本节只把它与开维型变换分开，标出它不朝特定方向。

两种运动分开，一个直接的好处是:承担者价值生活里绝大多数的起落，是内容动力，不是开维；把两者混起来，就会把一个人日常价值重心的挪移，误读成他在 DD 阶梯上的升降。开维是稀有的结构性事件，内容动力是常态。

V11 珍视是接续的第一人称形式

这是动力轴的承重接地一条。开维型变换沿 DD 展开有它的形状，但一次开维到底发不发生，这一条要单独立。答案不是外面有一股力推它，也不是一条非人称的法则自动执行它:一次开维只能作为承担者自己的第一人称接续事件而发生。这个第一人称的接续事件，在价值论里叫珍视。

珍视（valuing）在这里第一次出现，须先说清它是什么，因为它极容易被读成接续背后的一个推动力，那样就落进一个循环:承担者为什么接续，因为它珍视；它为什么珍视，因为那东西有价值。要拆这个循环，关键是不把珍视当成接续之前的另一个原因。珍视不是情感的强度，不是一个人对某物有多强烈的感受；它不是具体偏好，不是此刻想要什么；它也不是 P2 所论的那种已经完成的具体价值认可；它更不是在接续之先推动接续发生的一个心理原因。珍视，是一个合法的开维可能被承担者从第一人称的位置接入它自身构造进程时，这个事件在价值论里的名称。它标明的是动力的归属:开维只能作为承担者自己的第一人称事件而发生，不由外部强力或非人称法则自动执行。它不解释承担者为什么在某一时刻恰好接续，那个内容上的原因留 P2 与 P4。把珍视这样安放，三件事就切开了:余项约束开维的合法出口空间，这是 V12 的事；珍视标明接续的归属在第一人称；而具体内容如何显现，认可与被社会承认，是 P2 的事。珍视因此是动力轴的接地点，它把动力钉在承担者第一人称的接续上，而不是把动力交给一种价值的欲望。

既然珍视是接续的第一人称形式，承担者便可以不让这一接续事件发生。而这个不接续，要分三种情形来限，否则会被拿去为任何主动的关闭免责。

第一种，尚未发生的开维，承担者可以不接续。一个承担者面前有一个通向更高维度的合法可能，它可以不去接续它，它不因此在价值地位上有任何亏损。一个主体可以永远不去展开某一维，始终活在它当前的几行源里，这完全自洽。这一条是 V1 不排序的直接推论:不接续一个开维，不使承担者作为目的低了一等，因为价值源不排序，停在哪一行都不亏。

第二种，已经取得的维度，承担者可以让它不居主导。已取得维度的调用，可达，具体内容与主导重心，都可以反复，较低层的源可以重新回到主导位置。一个曾经主要活在承认他者里的人，可以有一段日子重新主要活在自己的体验取向或自己所立的目的里，这是中性的回走，没有价值上的亏损。这一条是下一条 V12 运行可反复的一个应用，此处先接住。

第三种，是要与前两种切开的:当一个较高层的源，它的适用条件已经现实地出现了，承担者却主动地压制或作废这个源，这不属于中性的回走。前两种是承担者没有去接续，或让已取得的维度退居次位，那都是运行上的起落。第三种是适用条件已在场，承担者主动把源作废，这是主动的关闭。举 15DD 处的情形说得最清楚:一个承担者可以不时时地实行涵育，这没有问题；但当一个具体的他者已经进入了关系场，承担者一面保有着它 15DD 的构造史，一面把这个他者作为目的的地位彻底作废，还称这是回走无亏，这不成立。这一种是主动的关闭，不是回走。本条不为它指定方向价值上的归属:方向价值归权力论，而权力论所立的凿削须有两个主体，这一情形没有第二个主体。它与殖民的关系是 P3 的事。本条只把它与中性回走切开:回走无亏，不等于主动作废仍然自洽。

接续以珍视这一第一人称形式发生。珍视这一条既是动力轴的接地，又是那道回走与主动关闭之间的界。它单独成一条，不并入别处，因为它承的重最大:整个动力轴之所以不是一条外力推动的必然，全靠动力落在承担者第一人称的接续这个可停的事件上。

V12 形状与运行可反复

接续解决了开维发不发生。这一条解决另外两件:一次开维如果发生，它的形状由什么约束；以及承担者的运行在什么意义上可以反复。

先说形状。一次开维型变换，它能采取的结构形状，由承担者当前之构的余项约束。这里的措辞要极准。余项约束的，是开维所能采取的合法出口的集合，不是给出唯一的一个向量。展开说:当前的构不完备，它留下余项，余项标出了下一步在结构上有哪些合法的出口；而承担者当前所在的这条 DD 序列，登记的是这些合法出口里已经沉淀下来的那一条路径。本篇不允许承担者脱离余项去任意跳跃，一次开维不能凭空跳到一个余项根本没有留出口的地方；但本篇也不在此证明，当前序列登记的这一条路径，在所有自洽的出口里具有唯一的优先性。余项约束合法出口集，当前序列登记一条已沉淀的路径，这两句要一起说，少了前一句，开维就成了任意跳跃；少了后一句，就成了替某条路径预先签署了唯一必然，而那越出了本篇的射程。

再说运行可反复。承担者的运行在三个层次上要分开。第一层，在场不可灭:承担者的价值源，其在场是结构给定的，不会因为一次内容的消失而消失，低层的源永远在基底，不被替换。第二层，构造史不可抹:一次开维型变换发生过之后，这个结构次序不可倒置，已经开出的维度，不能被当作从未发生。一个承担者一旦展开了 15DD，它可以让这一维长期不居主导，但它不能把这一维从它的构造史里抹掉，当作自己从来没有到过那里。第三层，运行全可反复:已取得维度的调用，可达性，具体内容和主导重心，都可以反复，可以回撤，震荡，复退，复现，承担者可以在相当程度上重新以较低层的源组织生活，重新回到低层的活法，这一切回走都没有价值上的亏损。

三层合起来，给出一个精确的图景:承担者的运行可以自由地回走，回走无亏，但回走的是运行，不是构造史。发生过的事作为记录不可改写，运行的状态却可以在相当程度上回去。这里不说状态可以完全回到开维之前:一旦某个高层源的适用条件已经现实在场，主动把它抹掉就是 V11 划开的那一种，不在这里的回走无亏之内。回走无亏说的是运行的起落，不是许可主体抹除关系场中已经成立的高层源。这正是本系列反目的论签名的落实:不可逆的只是发生过这一记录，不是承担者运行的状态。一个能自由回走，且回走没有亏损的方向，不可能是一架伪装的等级台阶，因为台阶的本性就是回走即跌落。承担者回走不跌落，恰恰证明四行之间没有台阶。

反目的论的三个部件，到这里就齐了:形状有约束，这是本条；接续在承担者，这是 V11；运行可反复，这是本条。三件合起来，是非熵增的，非棘轮的。价值的动力有它的结构约束，但它不是一条单向不可回头的律。

V13 十五维的模态留白

动力轴立到这里，还剩最后一件要按住，就是 15DD 在这根轴上的地位。这一条是一道防误读的界，也是本篇与它上游那些正在审的问题之间的一道兼容焊点。

价值锚在自律反身运作上，这是就动力轴的根说的。要接住 V7 的双层:这句话的完备形态，对完备主体成立，对准主体过窄。所以统一地说:跨承担域，目的价值的来源锚在目的地位不外置这一条上；对完备主体，它的运行锚在它自己的法的自律反身运作上；对准主体，来源已在而运行方式尚在生成。价值锚在自律反身运作，是就完备主体的运行说的，不是就全部承担者的来源说的，来源那一层锚在不外置上，与 V7 一致。

在这根动力轴上，15DD 是价值源由朝内转朝外的那个转折点。它是一个转折点，不是一个地基，也不是一个 telos。说它不是地基:不能拿 15DD 那一层去奠基包括它自己在内的全部四行，那是拿果实当种子，V7 已经按过。说它不是 telos:动力轴朝 15DD，说的是当承担者开维时，那个朝外的转向落在 15DD，不是说 15DD 是承担者必然要抵达的终点，更不是说抵达 15DD 才算圆满。承担者可以永远不走到那一步而完全自洽，这是 V11 立过的。15DD 是转向处，不是终点。它之上是否还有更高的关系结构，本篇不表。

最后要按住模态。本篇登记的，是当前这条 DD 序列上价值的读数。14 到 15 那座桥，它的内容本篇会锁定，那是下一节的事；但这座桥的唯一性与必然性模态，本篇留白。留白的意思是:本篇不裁定这座桥是不是所有自洽出口里唯一的一条，不裁定它在世界上是必然的，还是在本宇宙里恰好沉淀了下来，还是应当悬置。这些模态的裁定，越出了价值论框架篇的射程，留给专门审查这类问题的地方去做。这里要把话说到位:桥的内容被锁定，不等于桥的唯一性已经被证明。二者是两回事。内容锁定，说的是这座桥在结构上是什么；唯一性未证，说的是本篇不主张它是唯一的那条。所以即便他日这座桥的模态被另行裁定，调整的也只是动力路径的必然读数，不是本篇已经登记的价值源内容。四行价值源，无论那座桥的模态最后落在哪里，仍是当前序列上有效的结构登记，不必回改。

这一条把 15DD 的地位钉死在转向点上，把它挡在地基与终点这两个误读之外，又把桥的模态留了白，使本篇的价值源图不会因为将来某个模态的裁定而被迫回改。动力轴到此立齐:两轴正交，两种运动，接续由珍视定，形状由余项约束合法出口，运行可反复，15DD 模态留白。承担者在四行图上如何移动，这张动力的图就完整了。

以下第六节立 14 到 15 的桥，把本节反复标着留待的那个朝内到朝外的转向，正式立出来。

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第六节 十四维到十五维的桥

价值源图的第四行是转向处：前三行的源朝内，第四行的源朝外。第五节反复标着，把这个从朝内到朝外的转向留给本节。现在立这座桥。这座桥是本篇最需要小心措辞的一处，因为它极容易被读成一件它不是的事，即读成 15DD 是价值的地基，或读成承认创造了他者的目的地位，或读成孤独主体缺一个他者才算完整。本节把这座桥拆成三层来立，就是为了把这三种误读逐一挡在外面。

V14 十四维到十五维的余项桥

这座桥要分三层：当前 DD 序列所登记的 14DD 余项，孤独主体处的形式余位，以及现实他者出现时的事实与回应。

第一层，当前 DD 序列所登记的 14DD 余项。承担者展开到 14DD，立起了自己所立的目的，它是目的，这一点在它自己的结构里是稳的。但是目的这一身份，不是这个承担者的私产。展开说：一个承担者之所以是目的，不是因为它比别的什么更特殊，不是它独占的一项资格；是目的这一地位，落在它身上是真的，落在别的承担者身上也一样真。于是在 14DD 这个只朝内的结构里，剩下了一个它自己消化不掉的东西：是目的这一地位，不能被我无根据地排他占有。这个消化不掉的剩余，就是 14DD 的余项。它的内容是：他者亦是目的。要按住两件事。其一，这个余项是构凿不尽的剩余，不是构内的推论。14DD 的构，凭它自己推不出他者亦是目的这个结论，若能推出，就得再往里输入一把对称性或普遍化的尺，而那把尺很可能正是 15DD 才给的东西。余项不是被推出来的，它是 14DD 这个朝内的构在运作之后甩不掉的那一处不闭合。它标出的是 14DD 构的边界，不是 14DD 构的定理。其二，措辞守一条线：说他者亦是目的，不说他者有同样的目的。他者亦是目的，说的是他者同样落在是目的这个结构位上；他者有同样的目的，会把同字落到目的的内容上，暗示一个可以互换的 同一的目的，而可互换正是价格的逻辑，第三节已经切过。同的是是目的这个位，不是目的的内容。这里还要补一道分工，与 V13 的模态留白一致：本节登记的，是当前 DD 序列对 14DD 之后这道余项内容的结构读数；它不在此独立证明这道余项对一切可能的 14DD 运作都内生必发。这道余项内容是否具有世界必然，运作必然，本宇宙沉淀或悬置之模态，本篇不裁，留待专门审查此类模态的地方。内容锁定，是说这道余项在结构上是什么；模态留白，是说本篇不主张它对一切 14DD 运作皆必发。

这里要接住是目的与有自己的目的的次序，因为它极容易被颠倒，一颠倒就出事。是目的为本，有自己的目的是它的推论，不是反过来。展开说：不能用观察到他者有它自己的目的结构，来判定他者是不是目的。若把有自己的目的当成是目的的入口或证据，就等于把目的这一地位，系在了一个可被观察的能力展示上，那把外尺又从入口回来了，而且它会当场伤到准主体。一个婴儿是目的，它却还没有一套可被观察到的 明确的自立目的。若是目的要靠展示出目的结构来判定，婴儿就过不了这道判定，潜能论就从这里回来了。所以次序是：他者是目的，这首先推出的，是它的目的地位与它自己的价值之第一人称来源不可由我代给 代写或替代，这一层对承担域里的每一个他者都成立，含准主体。至于有一套自己所立的具体目的，那是对已经运行 14DD 的完备主体，这不可替代性进一步显出的样子；对准主体，并不要求它当下已经形成或表达出一套自立的目的内容。次序始终是是目的为本，而不是从它显出目的结构才推出它是目的。还要按住，这里说的自己所立的目的，是本系列意义上的，即自己的法，自己的价值那一路，它由是目的推出，不由一个系统显出目标趋向来满足。一台程序，一只动物，可以显出目标趋向，那不是本系列意义上的自己所立的目的。目标趋向是 11 至 12DD 之力，是趋避的取向，不是自己所立的目的。

第二层，孤独主体处的形式余位。这一层是本节承前置篇之重的地方，要与前置篇的孤独主体判据严格对齐，否则会当场相撞。前置篇立过：价值只需一个承担者，无须对手方，即孤独主体的价值是完整的，是自足的。而本节说 14DD 甩出一个他者亦是目的的余项。这两者必须清楚地不打架。关键在于，这个余项在孤独主体处，是一个形式的位置，不是一个价值的缺口。展开说：一个孤独主体，宇宙里第一个也是唯一的主体，它走到 14DD，它自向的源满了，它的价值自足。它甩出的那个余项，在它这里是一个形式他者位，即一个可能的他者也是目的的结构空位。这个空位是形式的：它是是目的这一地位不能被我排他占有这个结构事实所留下的位置，是一个位置的形状，不是一个已经在场的具体他者。它空着。而它空着，孤独主体依然自足。这一点必须钉死：形式余位不是价值之缺。孤独主体的价值不因为这个位置空着就少了一块，它的价值是完整的，形式余位空着，它照样完整。这个位置的空，标的是一个结构上的可能，不是标一个孤独主体必须去填补才能圆满的欠缺。所以本节与前置篇不但不撞，而且互相印证：前置篇说价值只需一个承担者，本节说那个唯一的承担者甩出的余位是形式的 空着也自足，两句说的是同一件事的两面。

这里要把形式他者位再松一层，因为它极容易被读窄，读成必得等一个当下在场的他者来充实它。他者不必是当下在场的。这里要把三种情形分清。一种是形式朝向：孤独主体可以为任何将来若出现的目的承担者，保留那个形式他者位。一种是预期施为：它可以作面向未来可能承担者的他向行动，写一本书，传播一种思想，留下作品或安排，这些是朝向那些它此刻并不认识 也许要很久以后才出现的主体的一次实实在在的 15DD 他向施为。还有一种是事实充实，那要留到第三层：只有承担域里一个现实存在的具体他者，才能充实现实他者亦是目的这个事实位。要分清的是，预期施为由形式他者位引导，它仍是预期性的朝向，它不把一个尚不存在的承担者变成当前的事实，也不充实现实他者位。所以孤独主体这里要说准：它不只是价值自足 形式余位空着，它还可以主动展开面向未来他者的 15DD 他目的价值，写书传道正是它在做这件事；但这展开是预期施为，不是把尚不存在的他者的事实位提前充实了。这一步没有动前置篇的孤独主体判据，反而把它推得更远：孤独主体连价格都没有，却可以有朝向未来他者的目的价值，它的价值之为自己的，纯度反而更高。这也顺手把下一层要说的承认钉得更稳：一个未来的 尚不存在的他者，更谈不上是我的承认或我的作品把它变成了目的，我只是朝向那个位，并不替一个尚不存在者预先定下它的价值内容。

第三层，现实他者出现时的事实与回应。当宇宙里出现了第二个承担者，一个具体的他者，事情分成两步，这两步要分得清清楚楚。第一步是事实。这个具体的他者亦是目的，这是一个事实，它充实了那个先前空着的形式余位。要按住：这个他者是目的，是一个先于我承认就已经是的事实，不是我的承认把它变成目的的。我的承认不创造他者的目的地位；他者是目的，在我承认之前就是。承认充实的，是那个形式余位所标的位置，即现在有一个现实的他者，落在了那个先前只是形式的他者位上；而被充实的是这个事实位，不是补足孤独主体的价值。这里要再接一句前置篇：现实他者的出现，充实的是形式余位这个位置，不是给孤独主体的价值补上一块，因为孤独主体的价值本就自足，没有一块要补。第二步是回应。15DD 的新增工作，是从第一人称的位置，承认并接续这个事实。承认是 15DD 的活，是那一刀，它落在一个已经是的事实上，它做的是认这个事实，接续这个事实，而不是造这个事实。

三层拆开，四种误读就都挡在外面了。把余项当推论的误读，被第一层挡住：余项是甩不掉的剩余，不是 14DD 构的定理。把是目的系在能力展示上的误读，被是目的为本这一条挡住：有自己的目的是推论，不是入口。把孤独主体读成缺一个他者才完整的误读，被第二层挡住：形式余位不是价值之缺，孤独主体自足。把承认读成创造目的地位的误读，被第三层挡住：他者是目的先于承认，承认是回应不是创造。

这里还有一处要与本篇的承担域接住，免得他者一词被读得太宽。本节说的现实他者，是目的价值承担域里的一个具体他者，即一个完备主体或一个准主体，不是任何一个被遇到的客体。一个无门的客体，例如一只动物，它有它的体验，它可以是被关切的一端，但它不作为目的价值的承担者去充实这里的事实位。充实事实位的，是一个亦是目的的承担者。若把这里的他者读成任何被遇到的东西，就会与 V3 无门者不自持目的价值那一条相撞。他者限在承担域内，这一撞就免了。

最后接一句道德律。道德律的第一定理说的是不得不承认具体他者为目的。那条定理，与本节这道余项和回应，是同一件事在道德律那一侧的陈述，二者同源同指。它不是本节这道桥的外部根据，不是说本节要靠道德律来撑；是本节从价值论这一侧，道德律从它那一侧，说到了同一个结构。把它当外部根据，就又成了拿道德去教化价值，那是外来的尺；同源同指，说的是两条路各自走到了同一处。承认那一刀在动力上如何展开，即它作为一次开维如何发生，留 P4；他者的价值为何不可穷尽读取，不可外尺比较，不可统合，留 P6。

V15 十五维的关系性交叉

桥走过之后，15DD 那一行的源有一个前三行没有的性质，要单独立出来，因为它极容易被读成几件它不是的事。

前三行的源朝内。一个承担者的体验取向，它的边界，它自己所立的目的，指向的都是它自己。到了第四行，源朝外，指向的是他者作为目的。正是这个朝外，给 15DD 的源添了一个前三行没有的性质：一个承担者的 15DD 源，它所指向的对象，可以正是另一个承担者。于是多个承担者的 15DD 源，它们的关系指向可以交叉，可以互指，甚至可以互为对象，你的 15DD 源指向我，我的 15DD 源指向你。这个交叉，是关系指向上的交叉，本条称它为关系性交叉（relational crossing）。

关系性交叉要与几件事划清，它极容易被读成它不是的东西。其一，交叉不是源的重合。每一个承担者的 15DD 源仍然锚在它自己身上，是它自己的源，多个源的指向交错在一起，不等于这些源合并成了一个源。若把交叉读成源的重合乃至合并，就出两个错：一是把多个承担者的价值压成一个总承担者的价值，那是 P6 明禁的；二是暗设了一个共同的 15DD 价值悬在众人之上，而那正是一把外尺，前置篇早已切走。交叉里各人的源仍是各人的，它们只是在指向上交错，交错不是并成一个。其二，交叉不是具体内容相同。两个承担者的 15DD 源可以互相指向，不等于它们对如何对待他者有相同的内容；具体怎么承认，怎么涵育这一个他者，是每个承担者从它自己的法里给出的，可以千差万别。其三，交叉不是主体间的共识。多个承担者是否对某件事形成共识，是社会承认层或相认层的问题，不是本条所立的源结构事实。

这里要与前置篇的共鸣划一道界，免得几个词混。前置篇第五节引入过共鸣，即同构的结构之间相认的可能。关系性交叉与共鸣不是一回事：关系性交叉说的是 15DD 源朝外，故多个源的关系指向可以交错，这是一个关于源指向的结构事实；共鸣说的是承担者之间相认这个动作。本条只立关系性交叉，不立相认，也不立共识。具体内容是否重合，承担者之间是否相认，共鸣如何发生，都留 P6。共鸣落在哪一层，是 15DD 还是更高的关系层，本篇也不裁，留待专论。

最后点一句，把这条接到更深处，但只点到为止。源朝外则关系指向可交错，这一点或许不是 15DD 他目的价值独有的：一个承担者自己的法看向他者时，它的法与别人的法在朝向他者这件事上，同样可以关系指向交错而各自不合并。这像是自己的 X 一旦朝外时的一个共同样子。但这条更普遍的说法牵涉更高一层的结构，本篇不把它立成一条普遍命题，只在此点出 15DD 价值源这一处的关系性交叉，作为它可能的一个实例。

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第七节 承认与涵育

第六节立了桥，桥的第三层是 15DD 的回应，即承认。本节把承认这一层与涵育的关系理清。这里要做的是一次词性上的区分，因为承认，涵育，与 15DD 的价值源，极容易被压在一起，一压就出两个错：一是把涵育当成第五种价值源，二是让方向价值从后门溜进目的价值的本体图。

V16 承认与涵育的三层

承认与涵育，要分三个位置来放。

第一个位置是价值源，是名词位。15DD 的价值源，是他者作为目的之不可替代性，这是第三节 V6 立过的那一行。它是一个源，一个结构位，是名词。

第二个位置是自己的法之他向内容，也是名词位。承担者展开到 15DD，它自己的法有了一项朝外的内容，就是承认具体他者为目的。这项内容是承担者自己的法在 15DD 这一层的内容，它朝向他者。要按住：这项朝外的内容，不是承担者先有一个朝内的法，再把它投射到外面去，中间没有一个从内投到外的步骤。15DD 的法，它的内容本就含着他者，承认他者为目的，是这条法在这一层的内容本身。这里还要点明一句：第一个位置的源，与这个位置的法之内容，不是两样并列的东西，是同一处的两面。自己的价值与自己的法同构，V7 已立，所以他者作为目的之不可替代性作为源，与承认他者为目的作为法之内容，是同一处从源那一面看，与从法之内容那一面看，不是在源之外又加了一层。这也守住无横向义务：法之内容不是在源之外欠他者的另一笔。所以这里没有一个朝外的义务位可谈，无横向义务这一条在此照旧：承认他者的根，全在承担者自己的法里，不是一项欠他者的债。

第三个位置是涵育，是动词位。涵育，是承认这项内容在变换轴上的动力显形。展开说：承认具体他者为目的，这是自己的法的内容，是名词；而当承担者去松开他者的网格，为他者开出维度，让他者作为目的得到成全，这个去做的动作，就是涵育，是动词。涵育是那项内容动起来的样子，是它在变换轴上显形为一个具体的施为。这里要把三层的关系钉死：涵育不是第五种价值源。价值源只有四行，涵育不是第五行。涵育也不等于 15DD 的价值源本身。15DD 的价值源是他者作为目的之不可替代性，那是名词，是源；涵育是动词，是那个源所对应的自己的法之内容在变换轴上的显形。把涵育当成一个价值源，就等于把一个动作塞进了本体图，而涵育本是方向价值那一侧的东西，方向价值评的是变换，前置篇第二节立过，它不进目的价值的本体图。所以三层各归其位：名词位的源，名词位的法之内容，动词位的显形，涵育在最后一位，是显形，不是源。

涵育作引擎这个说法可以保留，但要它的分寸。说涵育是宏观动力的引擎，说的是在一个由许多承担者组成的场里，涵育是价值向着承认他者那一行铺开的传导方式。但引擎这个词不能被读成一台自转的马达。动力仍在承担者的接续与珍视上，是可停的，这是第五节 V11 立死的。涵育是承担者在 15DD 处接续的显形，即承担者以涵育他者的方式接续那座桥，动力落在承担者第一人称的接续上，不是涵育自己在那里转。所以涵育作引擎，条件在承担者接续开维，且不触发殖民：承担者接续了，涵育才显形而传导；承担者没接续，就没有涵育在自转。这一条把涵育引擎与那些会自转的马达隐喻切开，动力始终扎在承担者的接续上。

涵育与殖民的对偶，即涵育松开网格而殖民锁死网格，是 P3 殖民篇要立的；共同核验与共鸣，即两个都在 15DD 的承担者如何相认，是 P6 他者篇要立的。本节只把承认与涵育的三层理清，把涵育钉在动词位，守住它不进本体图，也守住它不自转。

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第八节 下游射程手递

前七节把 P1 的五处机器立齐了：价值源的定义与四行图，谁承担与源从哪里起算，贯通四行的统一线与三分，价值轴与动力轴，以及 14 到 15 的桥与承认涵育。框架立好，本节不再展开任何一处实质，只把留给后续各篇的口，一处一处交代清楚，作为射程的结语。

留给 P2 的是发生与承认。价值源使一类内容可以进入目的价值场，但一项具体内容如何从源中显现，如何被承担者第一人称地认可，如何被社会承认，本篇没有写。P2 要把发生分成三层，即显现，第一人称认可，社会承认，并说清可授可撤只落在社会承认那一层。本篇第四节的反主观主义判据，即内容须经第一人称认可且可修订才成价值内容，是 P2 发生论的入口。

留给 P3 的是殖民。外来目的如何占据承担者价值的发生位，本篇只在第四节标了它落在判据所禁止的地方，没有展开。P3 要立占位，内摄，锁定这三步的结构序列，即外来内容如何先占显现层，再让社会承认冒充第一人称认可，最后锁死否定与修订。P3 还要给出殖民的可审计判据，即外来内容本身不等于殖民，唯占据发生位且阻断修订并把外来目的伪装成不可追问的自己的价值，才是殖民。前置篇第六节留下的那个自我殖民的判准，即用途清单代写自己的价值，也在 P3 收。本篇第二节四格里门在而弃用那一格，即认领修订退出位恒在，完全殖民不等于让渡，是 P3 的一条底线。

留给 P4 的是动力学。本篇第五节把动力轴立了，把两种运动，接续，形状与可反复立了，但价值的具体内容如何随时间稳定，衰减，位移，复现，只标了归 P4。P4 要立四个变量，即源之在场，源之可达，具体内容，主导重心，并说清一句要紧的话，即殖民不改变源之在场，却可以锁住源的可达与发生路径。知足这个说法，作为价值的反通胀稳定态，其中通胀指的是具体价值要求的不断加码，不是源变多变高，也在 P4 收。

留给 P5 的是冲突。当两个不可通约的价值构相遇，要求不相容的行动，本篇没有处理。P5 要立一条，即本体上不排序，不等于实践上不决断。全局的价值排序没有，但局部的行动裁断有，而且常常必须有，它凭的是具体的关系，边界，不可逆的损害，可撤性与余项的保留。要按住，这个局部的行动裁断是第一人称的行动次序，不是价值地位的排序，这与本篇第一节那道守句一脉。P5 是通往展望篇的真手递口。

留给 P6 的是他者。他者的价值为何不可穷尽读取，不可外尺比较，不可统合，本篇只在第六节标了归 P6。P6 要把这三条按层序立起来，即不穷尽读取是认识论的限界，不以共同外尺比较价值地位是度量的限界，不统合价值源是本体与政治的限界，三条递进。本篇第六节 V15 立的那个关系性交叉，即 15DD 源朝外故多个源的关系指向可以交错而各自不合并，是 P6 不统合那一条的入口，关系性交叉说的是源指向上的交错，不统合说的是这交错不并成一个总承担者，两者正是一处。前置篇第五节引入的那个共鸣，即同构结构之间相认这个动作，其完整刻画也归 P6，它要落在这三条限界之内：共鸣不是公共尺，不是统合，不是价值成立的条件，它只是这三条限界之内的一种可能的相认。关系性交叉与共鸣要在 P6 分清，关系性交叉是源朝外的指向交错，共鸣是承担者之间相认的动作，共鸣落在哪一层，本篇不裁，留待专论。

留给展望篇的是行动。目的价值如何从对承担者的约束，走到行动的显现，本篇没有写。展望篇要从目的的约束讲到行动的显现，它的入口由 P5 的局部行动裁断给出，它为将来的行动论奠基。本系列到展望篇为止，行动论是另一支的事。

八处口交代完，P1 的框架就闭合了。价值源是承担者某一结构位使具体内容进入目的价值场的结构根据；目的价值由完备主体与准主体承担，源位可以落在承担者所封装的低层基底；四行源随 DD 新增而不作优劣排序，可运行的丰度随层递增却不折算为价值高下；自己的价值贯通诸源而不等于主观任派；开维的合法形状受余项约束，是否接续归第一人称，构造史不可抹而运行可以反复；15DD 不创造他者的目的地位，而以第一人称的承认，回应目的承担者不可替代这个先于承认的事实。源立住了，后面各篇可以在这张图上，各接各的口。