For Oneself
为己
The "interest" of Paper 1 is the share of self-interest: reckoning whether a thing pays for oneself. This paper separates it from something else, which it calls being for oneself: a person planning for himself, protecting the share he cannot let go of, which is exactly the side on which he is an end. Self-interest is calculation; being for oneself is that share itself, and that share has no equivalent. Whether what drives a person in doing something is being for himself or self-interest, only he can see by looking back; what direction the thing carries toward others can be read from its structure, and being for oneself does not guarantee that it is not colonization. Violation is another line: crossing a person's inviolable boundary, decided by structure, not by motive and not by feeling. Not every harm is a violation; losing out in a competition is not in itself a violation, while an agreement such as a non-compete takes away a person's very choice of where to go. Being for oneself is no exemption for crossing the line.
This is an independent English rewrite, not a translation, of the Chinese final text v1.0. Terminology and framing are recomposed for an English-reading audience; the philosophical content is the same.
Introduction
A person changing jobs looks at the salary; buying a house, he works out the mortgage payments; he goes to choir on Thursday evenings because he himself wants to go. To say "everyone does things for himself" does not seem wrong, either.
Paper 1 sets out the two moves of "is it worth it?", and the second is a reading: whoever does anything, in the end it is all about interest. That paper said that this sentence makes mind-reading into an assumption about everyone, with the reasons others give all decoded as interest, and even "liking" and "cannot let go" renamed as interest (Paper 1, §3). Yet the sentence does not come from nowhere: people really do plan for themselves. So where does it go wrong?
It goes wrong in that the word "interest" gathers two things into one. The interest of Paper 1 is the share of self-interest: whether a thing pays for oneself, what can be got back from it. The other is the share a person protects when he plans for himself: what he cannot let go of, and does not put up for exchange. This paper calls the latter being for oneself, and first sets it apart from self-interest (§§1–2); it then asks from where one looks at what a person who is for himself does to others (§§3–4); and finally it takes up a line that runs parallel to colonization, called violation: being for oneself is no exemption for crossing it either (§§5–7).
§1 For Oneself, Not Self-Interest
First, self-interest. As used in this series, it means calculation for one's own advantage: does this pay for me, what can I get back from it? A person choosing between two jobs takes the one with the higher salary; buying something, he compares three shops; negotiating a deal, he presses the price down bit by bit. All of this is reckoning, reckoned clearly, and there is nothing wrong with it. Paper 1, §3 said that reckoning the price is a check; a transaction both sides enter freely stands on the half that says oneself is an end. This series is not against reckoning.
Now the other thing. A person goes to choir on Thursday evenings; ask him what he gets out of it, and he says: I just want to sing. A man who has been a carpenter for twenty years, with less and less work coming in, still sharpens his plane every day. Someone leaves a well-paid job to go home and look after a sick father; however the accounts are done it does not pay, and he goes home anyway. These too are all for oneself: the singing is what he wants to sing, the plane is his craft, his father is the one he cannot let go of. But there is no reckoning here; and even if there were, what the reckoning came out with would not be his reason for doing it.
This series calls the latter being for-oneself (weiji). Being for oneself is the side on which oneself is an end: a person planning for himself, protecting the share he cannot let go of. Self-interest is calculation; being for oneself is that share itself. The Prequel, §1 said that the share a person cannot let go of is his pursuit of his own happiness: what he holds a life well lived to be, the things he will do for it with no reward, the people and things he will stand by even when they are of no use. This share has no equivalent: whatever it is exchanged for, what comes back is no longer it. To ask whether it is worth it is to ask what it can be exchanged for, and here the question comes up empty.
The two often appear together in a single matter. The person who quits to go home also reckons before he goes: how long his savings will last, when he might find work again. This reckoning is a check done on behalf of being for oneself, not his reason for going home. Reckoning can sit inside being for oneself and help it see the road clearly; reckoning can also take its place, which is what Papers 4 and 5 will take up.
A word on terms. The everyday connotations discussed here belong to the Chinese word rendered as self-interest, liji: to call someone liji is to say that he is reckoning, perhaps even trading what is others' for what is his own. Simply redefining that word would not remove those connotations, so this series uses a different term. The Chinese term weiji, "for oneself," is an old one: the Analects (Xianwen) says, "In ancient times those who learned did so for themselves; those who learn today do so for others"; Master Cheng glossed this as follows: being for oneself is wanting to gain it in oneself, being for others is wanting to be known by others (Zhu Xi, Collected Commentaries on the Analects, Xianwen). What is used here is not quite that sense: there the subject is learning, here it is the side on which a person himself is an end. But there is one point in common: being for others is doing it for others to see, waiting for others to weigh it; being for oneself, that share lies with oneself. In English it is written for-oneself, kept apart from self-interest, the English term used in this series for the calculation described above; nor is it Sartre's "for-itself" (pour-soi) (Sartre 1943).
Nor is being for oneself a claim that in the end everyone acts only for himself; nor a doctrine that people "ought to be only for themselves." The first, as Paper 1 already said, is mind-reading; the second legislates one law for everyone, whereas in this framework a law is what a person gives himself, governing only himself (One's Own Law). Being for oneself says only this: a person himself is an end; this side is real, and this series supports it. Without the share in which oneself is an end as its ground, the recognition that "others are ends too" has nowhere to grow from; this share alone is not enough either (Paper 7).
§2 "Useful" Points Outward
"What use is this?" The answer to this question always points to something else. What use is learning this? You can get a good job. What use is a good job? You can earn money. What use is earning money? You can buy a house, and your family can live a little better. Each link waits on the next to explain it; to ask "what use is it?" is to treat the thing in front of you as a road to the next.
This chain points outward. Where does it stop? If each thing is only for the sake of the next, it cannot stop, and wherever the asking gets to, one more "what use is that?" can be asked. Aristotle said as much at the opening of the Nicomachean Ethics: if among the things we do there is an end that we want for its own sake, with everything else wanted for the sake of it, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, since that would go on without limit and make our wanting empty and vain, then this end is the good, the highest good (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a18–22). The place where the chain stops he called happiness: happiness is always chosen for its own sake, never for the sake of anything else (ibid., 1097a34–b6).
This framework also lets the chain stop, and the place where it stops is also happiness, only it stops with each person himself: the share a person cannot let go of is his pursuit of his own happiness, and what counts as a life well lived is for him to settle (Prequel, §1). Kant said that no one can compel me to be happy in the way he conceives of the welfare of others; each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him (Kant 1793, AA 8:290). Aristotle went on to ask what happiness is, and gave an answer that holds for human beings as such; this framework parts from him at this point: what that share is, each person settles for himself, and others do not write it for him.
The chain stops here because this share is no longer for the sake of anything else. Ask the choir singer what use singing is, and he answers "I just want to sing"; the chain has reached its end: singing is not a road to the next thing; it is where he is going. To go on and ask "what use is wanting to sing?" is no longer asking about this matter; it is asking him to hand over his share and turn it into the next link. The acquaintance in Paper 1 who said "it relieves stress, and relieving stress is so you can work better" did exactly this: he hooked the singing back onto the chain and made it point toward work again (Paper 1, §3). He was not stopping anyone, yet the chain was turned in another direction: what used to stop at the singing now stops at work.
So to say that one's own share has no equivalent is not only to say that it is expensive. Each link of the chain can be exchanged for something else, so long as what comes in exchange also leads to the next link; the chain of uses stops at the end the person himself has avowed. Some other reward offered by others cannot declare on his behalf that this share has been exchanged; how he chooses among several pursuits of his own is still his to judge. That it has no equivalent comes from the starting point of the Prequel (Prequel, §1); it is not derived from where the chain stops.
One more adjoining place. Not everyone can say what he cannot let go of. A person who goes to sing on Thursdays may simply like it, without its being anything he cannot let go of; it may become something he cannot let go of only slowly, after a few years of singing; it may stay a liking all along. Ordinary liking and interest are often the soil that "cannot let go" grows from (Prequel, §1). Nor do they lie within the share the scale is in charge of: liking a thing does not have to prove itself useful first, nor grow into "cannot let go" first, before it falls outside the scale. Someone who for the time being cannot say what he cannot let go of does not have to hand over proof first, either (Paper 1, §2).
§3 Drive and Direction
When a person does something, two things can be asked. One is the drive: is he for himself, or self-interested; is he protecting his own share, or reckoning whether it pays? The other is the direction: as the thing lands on others, is it headed toward putting his own ends in place of another's own law, or toward making room for the other to grow by himself, or does it carry neither? The first direction is called colonization, the second cultivation (Prequel, §4).
The drive only the person himself can see, by looking back. Whether he is for himself or self-interested lies with him, and others cannot see it; what others guess is a clue, and stated as settled, it is mind-reading (Paper 1, §3). His own looking back can be wrong too, and he can look again.
The direction can be read from outside. When an action lands on someone else, what it left him and what it took away, and whether he can still say no to it, can be seen and read from its structure; Paper 3 takes up how far it can be read from outside.
Neither question can answer for the other. From "he is for himself," it does not follow that "what he does to others is not colonization"; from "this act has the direction of colonization," it does not follow either that "in his heart he is only self-interested." The drive cannot answer the question of direction, and the direction cannot answer the question of drive.
Take an example. A man has run a noodle shop for twenty years, and the shop is the share he cannot let go of; that is stipulated in the example. He wants his son to take it over, and from the time the son was in middle school he has settled things for him: no need to sit the university exams; come to the shop early and learn. His being for himself is real, and so are the twenty years; but settling this road for his son is putting his own ends in place of his son's own law (Moral Law P9). What is looked at in this act is how it lands on the son, not how genuine he is at heart. The shop is his; where the son goes is the son's. In the act of settling the son's road for him, he did not treat the son as someone who gives law to himself.
The reverse holds too. Suppose a master takes on an apprentice in order to have another pair of hands in the shop; this is reckoning. But in teaching he lets the apprentice try for himself, make his own mistakes, find his own way; when the apprentice has learned the trade and wants to leave, he does not stop him. Here, the direction is making room for the apprentice. That he is reckoning does not change this direction, just as the noodle-shop owner's being for himself does not change his.
And there is the kind that carries neither. Two people compete for the same position, each for himself; one gets it, the other loses out. The one who got it has not settled the other's road for him: where he goes is still his own affair. This act carries no direction of colonization; whether it crosses the line, §7 takes up.
So what a person who is for himself does to others is looked at not by whether he is for himself, but by the direction in which the act lands on others, and then by whether it crosses the line (§5). The everyday phrase "harming others to benefit oneself" squeezes drive and direction into one, as if harming others were always self-interested and self-interest always harmed others; here the two are taken apart and asked about separately.
§4 Anti-Colonization, in Both Directions
This series has only one slogan: anti-colonization. The Prequel, §4 said that it runs in both directions: against others colonizing oneself, because one is an end; against oneself colonizing others, because others are ends too.
A person who is for himself is under this slogan as well. The first direction is exactly what being for oneself wants: one's own share is not weighed on someone else's scale and not settled by someone else's ends. The second direction is not carried by being for oneself as such: a person protecting his own share also holds a scale in his hand and has in mind what he takes to be good; that he is protecting his own does not mean he will not settle things for others. The noodle-shop owner settling his son's road is right here.
The reasons for the two directions differ. Against others colonizing oneself, the reason lies on one's own side: that share is mine. Against oneself colonizing others, the reason lies on the other's side: that share is his. The second is harder, for it asks for restraint of oneself: what one holds to be good, what one cannot let go of oneself, is not used to settle things for others. Settling them for him, however gentle the means and however genuine the good intentions, is still this act (Prequel, §4).
In action, this side begins as a not-doing (for this sentence form, see Action Theory, Paper 2, D9): not weighing others on one's own scale, not writing their share for them. This framework's Action Theory has written about the side that faces others in two further places: another person's share is not given by anyone else and can only be set by that person himself (Action Theory, Paper 2, D11); protecting people, reporting truthfully and the work of one's own post each have their own grounds, and are not used to draw the other person's lines for him (Action Theory, Paper 6, D35). They are not rewritten here.
This does not mean a person who is for himself may not hold views about others, may not advise, may not teach. The noodle-shop owner can say to his son: I have spent my life here; if you are willing, I will teach you. Giving one's view is one thing; settling that share for him is another (Prequel, §4). The son can decline, and having taken it on, can still leave; while these roads stay open, advice is only advice. Advice can carry the direction of colonization too: advising again and again, describing every other road as a dead end, makes the road hard to travel. Making a road hard to travel and sealing it off are not the same thing either: the latter has already crossed another line.
Anti-colonization is a matter of direction. There is another line, which looks not at direction but at whether something has been crossed: violation.
§5 Violation
Violation is crossing a person's inviolable boundary: seizing what is his, injuring him, sealing off his way out, even killing him. This line was not drawn by this series; it was drawn by this framework's Rights series, and is read along two boundaries. One surrounds the dimensions a person has already taken as his own, his judgments, beliefs and reasons, for example: on this boundary, an outside force excluding them, writing them in his place, or redrawing them for him is violation without exception. The other lies where people share a place: many people use the same space, and how far one person's exercise of a right can reach has to be marked out place by place. Here there can be constraints, called limits, so long as they stay within the line: holding his exercise within the range marked out for this place, closing none of the dimensions that have already grown into his own, not compressing the ground of his life to the point of threatening his survival, and not sealing off his ways of refusing, revoking or exiting. Whatever goes beyond any one of these is violation (Rights P5, F21).
Limits are ordinary things. When a plant takes samples, how shifts are handed over, where hard hats are worn: all of these are limits (Institution Theory, Paper 2, §1). Staying within a limit does not mean being good, either: the Rights series is clear that staying within the limit makes a constraint neither legitimate nor illegitimate (Rights P5, F21). This line says only whether it has been crossed.
Whether something is a violation is decided by structure, not by motive and not by feeling: "a constraint indignantly rejected can stay within the limit, and an action gladly received can already have crossed the line" (Rights P5, F21). To say "I am doing it for his good" leaves a crossed line crossed; to say "I am doing it for the share I myself cannot let go of" is the same. Being for oneself is no exemption for crossing the line.
Colonization and violation are two lines. Colonization looks at direction: whether an action is headed toward putting one's own ends in place of another's own law. Violation looks at whether the line was crossed. Each is judged by its own definition, and neither is derived from the other (Relation Theory P1, H9). Dividing them in this way gives four cells:
- The direction of colonization only, without crossing the line: advising and teaching within limits, making a road hard to travel.
- Crossing the line without the direction of colonization: cutting off someone's water and food.
- Both: locking a person up and sealing off his way out. When the means of colonization reach the extreme, by violation's own definition they also cross that line, and fall into this cell too: one and the same act is both (Prequel, §4).
- Neither: asking someone the way.
The two lines differ in one more respect. Whether the line was crossed looks at the act itself; once crossed, it is violation, whatever the other party later makes of it; whether the direction of colonization took hold depends on how the other party later understands and acts (Relation Theory P1, H8, H9).
The four cells are not everything. The Rights series lists one more kind, called self-closure: under long oppression, the outside hand is withdrawn, yet the sealed roads are not unsealed, and the structure itself has taken over the maintaining (Rights P5, §5). Violation also has degrees of depth, but they are not arranged on a single line from light to heavy: the Rights series sorts them along several axes, and what it gives is a partial order, with no single ranking of severity (Rights P5, F19, F20). None of this is unfolded here.
At the level of the norm, both colonization and violation are opposed: against colonization, and still more against violation. How violation is judged follows its own definition, and belongs to the Rights series; where this series meets it, it goes only this far. Which cell an action falls into, and whether it crossed the line, is for the layer of judgment to check against the facts; the level of the norm does not sort it out on that layer's behalf (Paper 1, §2).
§6 Not Every Harm Is a Violation
Harm and violation are not the same thing.
A car skids in the rain and injures someone at the roadside. This is harm; to call it an accident explains how the harm came about, but does not by that alone settle how it is classed between limit and violation. That requires further checking of the concrete workings between the driving, the running of the vehicle and the injury: if the driver knew the brakes were faulty and went out on the road anyway, the word "accident" does not answer for him. Whether there was intent cannot stand in for this checking either. Driving a car at a person is another matter: the car has become an act aimed at him, the line is crossed, and it is violation.
A natural disaster is not a violation either. If in some year a great drought dries up the ponds of the households downstream and the fish die, no plant has crossed the line: the line governs acts, not natural disasters (Institution Theory, Paper 2, §1).
Nor does violation depend on anyone's meaning to do it. The introduction of Institution Theory, Paper 2 described a plant: on a night shift, a monitor's sample exceeded the limit; under the procedure, a report could go out only once the duty supervisor had signed, and the supervisor said to wait for the morning shift's retest; by the time the retest confirmed the exceedance, the discharge had been going on for more than six hours, and the fish in the pond of the household downstream had turned belly-up. When it was looked into, no one had wanted it to happen, and each rule on its own was justifiable. Whether the line was crossed does not look at whether anyone meant it; it looks at what the plant did, through whose hands, and on which side of the line it landed. What is discharged into that river is a working on the circuit by which the households downstream draw their water; if the discharge that time reached the point of threatening people's bodies and lives, it crossed the line, without waiting for anyone to have meant it (Institution Theory, Paper 2, §§1, 4). That paper's conclusion is that a plant crossing the line does not require anyone in the plant to have meant it (Institution Theory, Paper 2, §3). Change the motive, and where it lands stays the same; the criterion never looked at motive in the first place (Rights P5, F21).
So violation turns on whether an act affecting a person crossed the line, not on whether anyone intended the harm. The plant's discharge was such an act, although no one intended the harmful result; whether the skidding car involved such an act is to be checked against the facts.
How accidental harm is reckoned and compensated, the level of the norm does not settle; it hands this to rules. Whether this case was an accident is handed to the person in post who judges it, a judge, for instance: he judges on the track record and facts that can be checked, bears what he judges, and can be questioned afterward (Paper 1, §2). This series does not judge for anyone, nor guess what the driver was thinking.
That a harm is not a violation does not mean nothing follows. Someone has been injured, and there is still compensation and treatment; how it is reckoned lies at the layer of rules. Paper 1, §2 said that compensation for a death is not putting a price on the dead, but cultivation of the living; accidental harm is the same: what is made good is the injured person's way forward from here, not a price put on his injury.
§7 Losing Out Is Not in Itself a Violation
In competition, someone always loses out. Two people apply for the same job; one gets it and one does not. Two shops open on the same street; one gets more customers and the other fewer. The one who loses out is worse off, and sometimes it hurts badly. Is this violation?
Losing out in itself is not. Look at what violation takes away. The Prequel of the Political Economy series gives an example: a non-compete is an agreement, backed by penalties, injunctions or compulsory enforcement, that forbids a person, once he has left, to go in a certain direction. That paper says that a person has the right to choose: to choose or not to choose, and why not, for instance in exchange for some other benefit, is all his own affair; what is violation is the choice no longer being there. Within the regions, trades and periods its terms cover, a non-compete writes in advance one part of where this person can go as not open to choice, and what it takes away is exactly that choice; with compensation it is the same, for compensation changes the cost, not the fact that that part has been sealed from outside (Political Economy, Prequel, §8). A separate payment made only for not competing, if it is truly over and above what he already has and he can afford to refuse it, is another matter, which the Political Economy special study divides more finely (A Way Out, a Way Forward, §6).
Losing out is different. The place he wanted to go did not take him, but where he goes is still his to choose: he can apply elsewhere, change trades, come back another time. This act has not taken away his choice. The hurt of losing out is real; but violation is decided by structure, not by feeling, and the hurt does not enter the criterion (§5). Nor does it carry the direction of colonization: the one who got the job has not settled his road for him (§3). This is said of the act of losing out itself; competition can involve other things too, such as discrimination, fraud, blocking the way, and each is checked against the definition of violation.
So a person who is for himself competes, and wins, and that is not violation. But if, to protect his own business, he has departing employees sign an agreement not to enter the trade for two years, that is no longer competing; it is sealing. The business may be the share he cannot let go of; that does not change the structure of this act. Competing and sealing part here. How non-competes are to be prohibited, how those already signed are to be transitioned, and what remedies there are, belong to rules and to the institutional side (Political Economy, Prequel, §8).
There is a line in a sale too. Doing business is a matter of being for oneself, and there is nothing wrong with it structurally; being for oneself is not a free pass either. Paper 1, §3 said that a sale looks at terms, and only what both sides have accepted can count as the consideration for that sale. Fraud is something else. If the other party has been deceived, what he accepted was the version produced by deceiving him, not this sale itself; what this act takes away has not passed through his acceptance. So fraud is already outside the structure of a sale. Whether the line was crossed, and which item on which boundary was crossed, is checked against the definition of violation (Rights P5, F21); where a particular fraud falls is handed to the layer of judgment to check against the facts, and this series does not pronounce on every kind of fraud.
§8 Where This Paper Stops
This paper stops at several places. Whether what drives a person in doing something is being for himself or self-interest, this paper does not answer for anyone; only he can see it by looking back. Paper 3 takes up how far the direction of an action can be read from outside, where it is only a clue, and where it cannot yet be judged. Papers 4 and 5 take up how reckoning takes the place of being for oneself, and how a person's own share comes to be occupied, or never has the chance to grow. How violation is judged and how its depths are sorted belong to the Rights series; whether a harm was an accident belongs to judgment in post; how non-competes are prohibited and how accidents are compensated belong to rules and to the institutional side. To go from oneself being an end to others being ends too, being for oneself alone is not enough; Paper 7 takes up that step.
Propositions of This Paper
- W8 Being for oneself is the side on which oneself is an end: a person planning for himself, protecting the share he cannot let go of. Self-interest is calculation; being for oneself is that share itself. This share has no equivalent, and to ask whether it is worth it is a question that comes up empty. Reckoning can serve being for oneself as a check, and can also take its place; this series is not against reckoning, and not against being for oneself.
- W9 "Useful" is a chain that points outward, each link waiting on the next to explain it. It stops where something is no longer for the sake of anything else, and that is the share a person cannot let go of: his pursuit of his own happiness, which he settles for himself. That it has no equivalent is the starting point, not something derived from where the chain stops; how he chooses among several pursuits is still his to judge. To hook it back onto the chain and make it point to some other use is to turn the chain in another direction. Ordinary liking and interest are the soil that "cannot let go" grows from, and they too lie outside the share the scale is in charge of; liking does not have to grow into "cannot let go" first.
- W10 Drive and direction are two questions, and neither answers for the other. Whether the drive is being for oneself or self-interest only the person himself can see by looking back; what others guess is only a clue. Whether an action, as it lands on others, is headed toward replacing their own law, or toward making room for them to grow by themselves, or carries neither, can be read from its structure. Being for oneself does not guarantee that what one does to others is not colonization; reckoning is not bound to be colonization either.
- W11 Anti-colonization runs in both directions: against others colonizing oneself, because one is an end; against oneself colonizing others, because others are ends too. The second asks for restraint of oneself, and in action begins as a not-doing. A person who is for himself is under this slogan as well. Giving one's view, advising and teaching are one thing; settling another person's share for him is another.
- W12 Violation is crossing a person's inviolable boundary: seizing what is his, injuring him, sealing off his way out, even killing him. It is decided by structure, not by motive and not by feeling; staying within a limit makes a constraint neither legitimate nor illegitimate. Colonization and violation are each judged by their own definition, and neither is derived from the other: an action can carry only the direction of colonization, can only cross the line, can do both, or neither. At the level of the norm both are opposed: against colonization, and still more against violation; how violation is judged follows its own definition. Being for oneself is no exemption for crossing the line.
- W13 Not every harm is a violation: violation turns on whether an act affecting a person crossed the line, not on whether anyone intended the harm. To call something an accident does not yet settle whether it is a violation; the workings between the driving, the running of the vehicle and the injury are to be checked against the facts. How accidental harm is reckoned is handed to rules; whether this case was an accident is handed to the person in post who judges it, judging on facts that can be checked, bearing it, and open to being questioned afterward. A harm that is not a violation still brings compensation and treatment.
- W14 Losing out is not in itself a violation. What an agreement such as a non-compete takes away is a person's very choice of where to go; in losing out in a competition, the choice is still in his hands. To seal off someone else's road to wherever he might go is no longer competing; it is sealing, and doing it to protect one's own business is no different. Fraud in a sale lies outside the structure of consideration; whether it crosses the line is checked against the definition of violation.
Acknowledgments
This paper is the second paper of the Second Enlightenment series of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.
The writing and review of this paper were assisted by Anthropic's Claude, OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's Gemini, xAI's Grok and Meta's Muse. Thanks are due to these companies and to their research and engineering teams.
References
Group I lists works of this system, archived on Zenodo with Chinese and English versions under the same record, all single-authored (Han Qin); DOIs follow those listed at the head of each paper on the author's site. The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the title or the paper noted in parentheses at the place of use. The Prequel and Papers 1 to 7 in the text are the papers of this series. Kant's works are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition (AA), and Aristotle by Bekker number. Renderings from Chinese are the author's own.
I · Works of this system
Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Law: The SAE Critique of Ethics and Morality [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19037566
Qin, H. (2026). The Institutional Architecture of Mixed Reality (SAE Moral Law, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20262737
Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595
Qin, H. (2026). Anti-Colonization (SAE Action Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970758
Qin, H. (2026). Not Legislating for Others (SAE Action Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970777
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not (SAE Relation Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047
Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133
Qin, H. (2026). A Way Out, a Way Forward (SAE Political Economy, Special Study) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24021385
II · Other works
Aristotle. (2009). The Nicomachean Ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.; L. Brown, Rev.). Oxford University Press.
Kant, I. (1793). Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. Berlinische Monatsschrift, 22, 201–284. AA 8:273–313.
Kant, I. (1900–). Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Academy edition, cited in the text as AA). Berlin: Reimer / de Gruyter.
Sartre, J.-P. (1943). L'Être et le néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique. Paris: Gallimard.
Yalishiduode 亚里士多德 [Aristotle]. (2003). Nikemakelun lunlixue 尼各马可伦理学 [Nicomachean Ethics] (Liao Shenbai 廖申白, Trans. & annot.). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan.
Zhu Xi 朱熹. (1983). Sishu zhangju jizhu 四书章句集注 [Collected Commentaries on the Four Books]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.