Self-as-an-End
SAE The Second Enlightenment · Paper 1

Is It Worth It?
值不值

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24030395 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

The logic of "is it worth it?" can be written as two sentences. One is a scale: first weigh what a thing, a person or a stretch of time can bring back, and give only once it has been weighed. The other is a reading: whoever does anything, in the end it is all about interest. The first sentence has a proper place in post, but the scale can narrow until it accepts only reasons that can be quantified, and it can also weigh things outside the share it is in charge of. Matters in post fall into three layers, norm, rule and judgment, and above the three there is a root: a person is an end. Counting heads is not supported by the norm; a rule can at most allow it as a last resort, and cannot vouch for it. The second sentence turns every answer back into interest, whatever the answer, and so makes mind-reading into an assumption about everyone. Two hundred years and more later, the paper returns to Kant's essay of 1784: then, those who did people's thinking for them could be recognized; this time the scale has no single author, and a group of people colonize one another, and each colonizes himself.

This is an independent English rewrite, not a translation, of the Chinese final text v1.0. Terminology and framing are recomposed for an English-reading audience; the philosophical content is the same.

Introduction

At a planning meeting, the person setting priorities says: tell me the impact first. The person hiring says: tell me what you can bring. The investor says: tell me the return. These lines are often heard today.

The Prequel set a starting point: a person has no equivalent, and the share a person cannot let go of is not weighed for him on someone else's scale either. From this starting point, this paper looks back at the question "is it worth it?" It first sets out this logic as two sentences, then looks at what the first sentence does in various places and how far it reaches, then at the second sentence, and finally goes back to Kant's essay to see how, two hundred years and more later, this scale came to take the leading place.

This series belongs to the philosophical framework Self-as-an-End (SAE). "This framework," below, means that framework.

§1 Two Sentences

The logic of "is it worth it?" can be written as two sentences.

The first: put it on the scale first, and give only once it has been weighed. A thing is to be done, a person is to be kept, a stretch of time is to be spent: each is first weighed for what it is worth. To ask whether something is worth it is to ask what it can be exchanged for. This scale recognizes only uses or returns that can be got back. Not every "is it worth it?" weighs in this way: when someone looks back on his life and says "it was worth it," he is not speaking of an exchange.

The second: whoever does anything, in the end it is all about interest. Beneath the reasons others give aloud, there is always an interest left unsaid.

The first sentence is a scale; the second is a reading. They often appear together, but they are not the same thing.

This logic takes two steps off people's hands. Whether a thing is to be done, there is a scale to weigh it; why others do what they do, there is "in the end it is all about interest" to fall back on.

§2 The Scale Comes First, Everywhere

The three lines at the start are all lines spoken in post. "In post" borrows only the words "the post" from the old Chinese saying "one who does not hold the post does not plan its affairs," and not the saying's advice to keep out of what is not one's business. It means having a concrete task in hand: planning, hiring and investing have priorities to set; judges, security screening, teaching, and reviewing basic research each have something to guard that cannot be exchanged for anything else; in a sale, what is reckoned is this one sale. In each case the question reaches as far as the remit of the task. The remit is set by what the task is for, not by which kinds of reasons it accepts: planning is for deciding, in time that everyone shares, what gets done first, not for accepting only reasons that can be quantified; the return on an investment can be one of its goals, but is not its ultimate criterion (Political Economy, Paper 5, E28). The accountability that comes with a post belongs to the layer of rules (following the division in Political Economy, Prequel, §6: an institution takes the ought, a position takes accountability, a person takes his own law); it does not override the line that a person is an end, and it cannot excuse colonization. Anti-colonization runs in both directions: in post, it is also against using one's own position to colonize others. It does not look at titles, nor does it mean that those not in post may not ask; the side on which one asks oneself is not taken up here, and is left to Paper 6. Uses can be asked about, and concrete effects can be coordinated; the question reaches as far as the share it is actually dealing with.

What is to be looked at is where the scale reaches.

In post, the scale can narrow. At a planning meeting someone says that an old tool is holding things up quite a bit. Suppose this is true, only hard to measure. The answer is: can you quantify it? He says it is not easy to measure, and the meeting moves on. No one at the meeting needs to block what he said: the slots for discussion take only items that can be quantified, and a reason that can be stated but not measured finds nowhere to land.

The scale can also weigh things outside the share it is in charge of. Take the same person hiring: he asks a candidate about the choir the candidate goes to every Thursday evening. What does this have to do with the job? Suppose the job does not take up evenings. Hiring weighs ability and time; these have a price and can be weighed; what cannot be weighed is the person. How that evening is spent is not within the share hiring is there to weigh. How large that share is, is not for the asking side to settle alone, either; it is set first by what the task is for and by the arrangements both sides have already agreed. As for the question itself: asked is only asked, and at this point nothing is judged. What lies outside this share does not enter the reasons for the task, whether it would work in the candidate's favor or against him. What is to be looked at is what follows: if, because of this question, because of what he answered or whether he answered, something then turns out differently, the question has overstepped. That nothing can be seen does not mean nothing overstepped.

Not asking is better: what lies outside that share was never the task's to ask about. How the layer of rules is written, and how things are checked when questions are put, belong to the other two layers: one possible recommendation at the level of rules is to prohibit the question; another is to permit it while prohibiting the use of the answer to decide the outcome. These are only examples. How to check from outside is in Paper 3.

At home it is different: who looks after the children that evening, the family works out how to arrange; this is coordinating a concrete effect, not demanding that the singing first prove its usefulness.

There is another kind of matter in post whose very task is guarding what is not priced. A judge has to judge whether a thing is right; security screening has to stop the item that cannot be let through; a teacher has to protect the part of a student that has not yet grown. To ask first, here, whether it is worth it is to make the job no longer itself.

This does not mean nothing is reckoned here. How many checkpoints security has, how many staff a court gets, can all be reckoned; when hands are short, an emergency room has to triage, and a court has to schedule. There are three layers here, and above the three a root: a person is an end, and a person has no equivalent (for the division into three layers, see Political Economy, Prequel, §8). The top layer is the norm, which gives principles that come from this root: saving a life does not depend on who can pay; theft is wrong. A principle cannot settle who goes into the treatment room first tonight; what it cannot settle is handed to rules: the emergency room triages by condition, not by who can pay; the court schedules by the nature of the case and by time limits. Rules sit beneath the norm: a rule that ranks by ability to pay, or that leaves out the very people the task is there to protect, has gone past the norm; which side to follow is for the person handling the matter to choose, and his to bear (§4). Triage by the urgency of a condition can be written into a rule; suppose two patients are, by the rule, equally urgent, and only one bed is left: here the rule has nothing more to say. What remains falls to the person present at the time: he can only judge between these two people, whose chances are better, who can still wait; the responsibility for that reckoning is his. This one judgment does not generalize into the rule for next time; each case is different. "The numbers decided for me," like "the order decided for me," does not stand in for him. Nor do rules grow by themselves: a rule has those who set it. Writing it into a rule does not hand that moment away; it only lands on those who set the rule, and those who follow it still bear their own step of following.

Between the three layers, downward, there is guidance and testing: the norm guides and tests rules and judgment, and rules guide and test judgment. An upper layer also leaves room for the layer beneath: what the norm cannot settle is handed to rules, what rules cannot settle in full falls to the person present, and each layer takes up only the share the layer above cannot settle (the same shape as the handing down in Political Economy, Paper 2, E10). Upward, there is no supplanting. A single judgment cannot be generalized into a rule or a norm: each case is different, and what could not be helped in this case is not written as the general rule for the next. Nor can a rule alter the norm: every place where rules are set has its own background, and no background can replace the line that a person has no equivalent. To supplant the norm with a rule is to speak of an exception as if it were a principle, as though people could be weighed after all; worst of all is to supplant the norm directly with a single judgment: a person decides on his own that the person in front of him is not worth it, and treats this as the way people may simply be regarded. A written rule can still be seen and still be argued against; this one step passes over two layers and leaves nothing to compare it against.

That there is no supplanting upward does not mean judgment can only follow the rules. Above the norm, there is still a root: a person is an end. Judgment can, this once, not follow the rule: it covers only this once, does not generalize, is questioned afterward, and is his to bear.

When the rule itself oversteps the norm, declining to follow it means following the norm. The shoot-to-kill orders and practice of the East German border regime, which required border guards to fire on those fleeing, treated people as things that could be given up; a soldier who did not fire that once was not setting up another rule (§4). Conversely, a soldier who followed that order and fired: that act of judgment itself went past the root; the order could not shield him, and the act was still his.

When a rule is in keeping with the norm, it can still be done. The norm does not accept theft, and the rules punish it; neither is wrong about this. A child has gone a week without food, with no one looking after her, and she steals a loaf of bread; the judge finds her not guilty. He does not say that stealing is right, nor that stealing bread will never again count as a crime; it is only that, this once, by his own law, he cannot find this child guilty. This once he has the courage not to follow the rule, nor the principle that theft is wrong, and his ground is that a person is an end: norms and rules speak of things in general, while judgment faces cases one by one, living cases, and in them living people one by one. When questioned afterward, he answers, and is willing to bear it.

History has a case close to this. In 1898, Paul Magnaud, a judge at Château-Thierry in France, acquitted a young mother who had stolen bread; she and her mother had gone thirty-six hours without food, and she had a two-year-old child with her. The judgment said that a judge can, and ought to, interpret the rigid letter of the law humanely. The Court of Appeal at Amiens upheld the acquittal, on the different ground that the intent to steal was in doubt. Both instances of this historical case concern how the conditions of an offense are to be interpreted in a situation of hunger; it resembles the example above in the situation and in the acquittal, while the legal reasoning is not entirely the same. Questioned further, this judgment holds up; and what needs to change is neither the norm nor the rule: stealing is stealing, the law is the law. What needs to change is government: a child going a week without food, with no one looking after her, means that even the thinnest layer has not been secured; Political Economy calls this layer the Base Layer, and says that it does not rise or fall with assets and is not exchanged for achievement (Political Economy, Prequel, §7; Paper 6, E35). The baker's loss is not for the baker to swallow; the one who owes this baker compensation is the government. Beyond that, it is a matter for the institutional side.

There is one thing a rule cannot vouch for: counting heads. Saving five or saving one: what is counted is people, and that is putting people on the scale. The norm does not say counting is forbidden, but it does not accept that counting heads is right, and it does not support it; it has a direction: where counting can be avoided, there is no counting. Rules do not support it either; at most they allow it as a last resort. Rules are there to be followed, and once counting heads is written into a rule, it looks as though it were right; yet the rule cannot vouch for it. What is written in is the judgment of those who decided to make it a rule; they bear the whole of it; the rule remains under oversight, and those who set it are held to account: they are questioned, and they bear responsibility; to say "that is how the rule is written" is to supplant the norm with a rule. Philosophy's famous trolley problem (Foot 1967; Thomson 1976) stops right here. This series does not answer for anyone whether to pull the switch; it only says that a rule cannot answer for him.

This can be looked at in three stages: beforehand, prevention; in the moment, judgment; afterward, questioning. Beforehand means keeping things from reaching the point where counting begins. How many checkpoints security has, whether a crossing gets traffic lights, which stretch of a flood dyke is built first, one more bed in the emergency room: these weigh risk and cost; at this stage no one is yet standing on the scale, and no one has been designated as the one who can be given up. The "statistical life" of regulation (Schelling 1968) likewise reckons what a small reduction in risk is worth, not what any particular person is worth; but once it is settled by who can pay, a small reduction of risk in a poor place counts for less, and the scale has slid back onto people. Rules of this kind are borne by those who set them: they sign their names, write out their reasons, and can be questioned; to say "the budget decided it," like saying "the market decided it," does not stand in for them.

In the moment, when it truly comes to it, whether to count, whether to decide by heads, is left to the person present to judge. Counting heads is a last resort: only when every other road is closed is there counting. Whether other means were feasible is checked against the information available and the time at hand; a road that could have been found out earlier and was not cannot afterward be counted as ruled out with a word about "no time." This has the same structure as this framework's account of war: where war can be avoided, it is not started; war is the last resort after every earlier level has failed (SAE War Treatise, §5). If he counted and decided by heads, that act is his, and his to bear. He cannot say that counting made it right: however many more were saved, the one who was not saved is not wiped off the account.

Afterward comes questioning. The norm does not say counting heads is wrong either, so questioning does not begin by assuming he was wrong; what is asked is what he saw, whether the other roads really were closed, and how he judged. Beyond questioning there is also responsibility: the consequences of that act are his to bear, and it does not end once the questions are asked. Nor is he the only one questioned: why only one bed was left at that moment is an account for those who allocated resources and set the rules beforehand to answer, not something pushed onto the person present to carry alone.

Not every weighing reaches people, either. An emergency room triages by condition, and organs are allocated by match and condition; what is weighed is illness, the share the task itself is there to handle; whether someone is useful to society is not part of the task. But within condition there are hard cases too: a kidney, to the person expected to live longer, or to the one who has waited longer? Since 2014, kidney allocation in the United States has brought expected post-transplant survival into matching (OPTN 2014), which is a case of this kind. This is already of the trolley-problem kind, and in the end it rests on judgment alone, borne by whoever judges, and questioned afterward. Rules can advise how to judge: look at medical benefit and prognosis, not at who is useful to society, and do not rank people by age or status; but at most they advise: they do not say right, and do not say wrong; they give only a direction and leave the rest to judgment. How much a medicine may cost per additional year of healthy life before it counts as good value, which the United Kingdom's NICE assesses in quality-adjusted life years (NICE 2022), is another layer again: whether a medicine enters public payment is an arrangement of resources made in advance; to whom a life-saving resource in hand is given is a concrete application. In both places reasons have to be given and consequences borne, but they cannot be taken as judgments on the same layer merely because both use measures of health benefit. In 1962, Life magazine reported on a dialysis center in Seattle (Alexander 1962): there were not enough machines; doctors first screened people on medical criteria, and then a committee chose among those who remained, looking at who was more useful to society; people called it the "God Committee." That choosing weighed beyond the task of dialysis, and reached people.

Compensation for a death is not putting a price on the dead; it is cultivation of the living: leaving and holding up the conditions for those still alive to go on. Paying it buys nothing, and the one who caused the death still has to bear that act. When those who depended on him lose their livelihood, filling that concrete gap supports the living as they carry on; but once differences of household registration, status or income are taken as the price of this life itself, so that one and the same life is compensated differently, that is putting a price on the dead, and the scale has slid onto people. Since 2022, compensation for death in China is no longer calculated on two standards, urban and rural: that line has been taken down, while differences by region and by age remain (Supreme People's Court 2022). The United States' September 11th Victim Compensation Fund had two parts: economic loss was calculated from income, filling the livelihood the family had lost; non-economic loss was the same for everyone, 250,000 dollars for each person who died, with another 100,000 for the spouse and for each dependent. The fund was public relief, not ordinary tort compensation. The man who ran it wrote afterward, in his final report, that a better approach might have been to give every eligible claimant the same amount (Feinberg 2004, p. 82).

Once what is demanded is that a person's life, or the share he cannot let go of, first hand over an equivalent, the question no longer holds. To ask whether something is worth it is to ask what it can be exchanged for; a person has no equivalent, and to ask whether a person is worth it is a question that comes up empty. A person is treated as a person without having to prove he is useful; and what he cannot let go of is not declared by others, with some other reward, to have been exchanged already. This does not mean he need take no account of others in whatever he does: whom his doings touch can still be asked about. Someone who for the time being cannot say what he cannot let go of does not have to hand over proof first, either.

I too once set up this scale in myself. I used to be just like this: whatever I did, I first asked, "what use is this?", and my life grew narrower and narrower. The side on which one faces oneself is left to Paper 6.

§3 The Other Sentence: It's All About Interest

Another kind of remark is heard everywhere too. An acquaintance hears that you go to choir every Thursday evening and says: good, it relieves stress, and relieving stress is so you can work better. A colleague says: leaving this early every Thursday, you must be lining up a way out. Someone else says: you volunteer for your résumé, right? A comment thread says: fine words, but what's in it for him?

The acquaintance's line is the mildest. He is not stopping anyone; he only supplies the evening with a use. The other lines, too, are all supplying, on someone else's behalf, an interest that was not spoken.

A guess, answered by the other person, and withdrawn if it was wrong, is still a question; whether it is withdrawn is seen from what one says and does after hearing the answer. To go beyond the facts that can be checked and state "so he is doing it for..." as settled, for instance insisting with no evidence that "he's just doing it for his résumé," is mind-reading. There is one kind that goes further: whatever the other person answers, the answer is turned back into interest again. He says "I just like it," and liking too is renamed interest; he says "I can't let it go," and that too is renamed interest. In this way it becomes irrefutable. An irrefutable statement is not seen in the facts; it has been put there in advance, and put there for everyone: mind-reading made into an assumption about everyone. "It's all about interest" means exactly this.

There are two practices that look like mind-reading but are not. A sale looks at terms: price, goods, consideration. Smith wrote: "Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer" (Smith 1776, Book I, Chapter 2). This is the structure of a sale; only what both sides have accepted can count as the consideration for that sale; it does not look at whether the other has goodwill in his heart. Reckoning the price is a check; a transaction both sides enter freely stands on the half that says oneself is an end, which is not to say that the people trading have only this in their hearts.

Smith's sentence is followed directly by the passage on the butcher, the brewer and the baker: we "never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages." The passage shows that an offer of exchange can be made by showing the other side its advantage; it does not require ruling out all the other side's other motives. What is taken here is the structure of consideration that both sides accept. At the opening of The Theory of Moral Sentiments he also said: "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others" (Smith 1759). When Smith writes of exchange, what he writes is mostly the half that says oneself is an end: each for his own ends, and each getting what he wants in the exchange. Political Economy, Paper 0 takes up how to engage with Smith on accumulated power. Whether to show goodwill to someone at some moment is each person's own affair; a sale does not need it, and does not deny it. One party calling a marriage or a friendship a transaction does not make it one. Lines can be crossed in a sale too, by fraud for instance; whether a line was crossed is checked by the definition of violation, and belongs to Paper 2.

Audits, due diligence and investigative journalists look at track records and connections of interest that can be checked, and stop at the facts; one step further, "so he is doing it for...," is the mind-reading described above. When a person has said publicly why he did something, it is recorded as he said it; when a document lists something as a reason, it is recorded as the document has it: this is not mind-reading either.

Nor does this series supply, on anyone's behalf, a "cannot let go" that was never spoken. If the singer says himself, "I just like it," that may be the whole truth, or it may not; it is not judged for him here; nor is it judged why the colleague who said "lining up a way out" said so.

Others' questions cannot stand in for one's own. Others' questions have their place; they simply cannot stand in. What counts is whether one asks oneself, looking back, and how one answers. If for the moment one does not ask, and leaves it for now, that too is one's own affair; one's answer can also be wrong, and one can ask again.

I live in the Bay Area, and I hear both kinds of remark around me nearly every week.

To the first sentence, what this series has to offer is a not-doing: no longer asking for proof of worth first. That sentence is left to Paper 6.

§4 Two Hundred Years and More Later

In 1784 Kant answered the question "what is enlightenment?" by saying that enlightenment is a person's emergence from an immaturity he has brought on himself. Immaturity is being unable to use one's own understanding without another's guidance; it is self-incurred because what is lacking is not understanding but the resolve and courage to use it without another's guidance (Kant 1784, AA 8:35). Those who did people's thinking for them could then be recognized: a book that has understanding for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a doctor who judges my diet for me. Kant gave such a person a voice: "I need not think, so long as I can pay; others will take this tiresome business over for me." What is to be left behind is the state of having handed judgment over, not just exchanging one person who thinks for you for another. Why do so many remain in it all their lives? Laziness and cowardice, Kant said. This series does not follow him there: how someone came to be there is not judged from outside. What is taken here is only the structure he wrote down: pay, and there is no need to think for oneself.

Nor did Kant say that his was already an enlightened age, only an age of enlightenment. He divided the use of reason in two: as a scholar before the whole reading world, it is public use, and is to be free; in an office one has been entrusted with, it is private use, which may be restricted, and calls for obedience. "Private" does not mean domestic; on his account, a pastor before his congregation is also only in a domestic gathering, however large it is. His first example is an officer: given an order, to argue aloud while on duty about whether the order is fitting or useful would be harmful, and he has to obey; as a scholar, he may publicly comment on the faults of the military service (AA 8:36–38). Kant does not allow the question "is it useful?" to be asked in post; to ask it, one goes to the public place. What this series calls "in post" has the same shape as his private use, but the place of the question "is it useful?" is exactly reversed: in post, the question lies within the remit of the task; outside the remit, it cannot be used to demand that a person first prove his usefulness. Nor do the two block the same person: he blocks the officeholder from asking whether the order is useful; what is blocked here is the question reaching into the person being asked. "Does not hold," as said here, covers only demanding that a person first prove his usefulness, not asking in public: whether something is worth it can still be asked.

A post carries accountability, and its duties are to be done. But choosing that post is a person's own judgment; carrying its duties, he does not hand over his subjecthood and his judgment either. The rules of a post and the orders of superiors are all beneath the norm, beneath the line that a person has no equivalent. When a rule goes against the norm, which side the person judging follows is his own choice, and his to bear. Kant's officer, on duty, has to obey.

Two hundred years later, a court in Berlin tried a soldier who had obeyed an order. On the night of 5 February 1989, an East German border guard fired on Chris Gueffroy as he tried to get over the Berlin Wall, and killed him. Tried after reunification, the defense argued that the shooting was the execution of an order, and lawful under East German law. In January 1992, the Berlin Regional Court sentenced the soldier who fired to three and a half years; the presiding judge said in court that not everything that is lawful is right (Berlin Regional Court 1992; The New York Times, 21 January 1992). In November of the same year, the Federal Court of Justice said in another case of the same kind that a law which obviously and grossly violates the basic ideas of justice and humanity cannot be used to justify such a killing (Federal Court of Justice 1992, 5 StR 370/92). The soldier appealed, and the Federal Court of Justice said that those executing orders at the very bottom were, to a degree, also victims of this border regime; the case was sent back for retrial, and the sentence changed to two years, suspended (Federal Court of Justice 1993, 5 StR 418/92; Berlin Regional Court 1994). What was judged was that shot, not what the whole person is.

Nor were the soldiers who fired the only ones tried. East Germany's former defense minister Heinz Kessler, his deputy Fritz Streletz, and later Egon Krenz of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party were all sentenced for the deaths at the border, and not one of them had pulled a trigger. In 2001 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found unanimously that these judgments did not violate Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, no punishment without law; its reasoning was that East Germany's border practice had hollowed out its own law, and that these acts were already crimes under East German law at the time (European Court of Human Rights 2001, §§87–89). Reading this case as a rule going past the norm is this series' own reading.

Only the very last sentence of the body of Kant's essay speaks of dignity: now that a person is more than a machine, government will find it to its own advantage to treat him in keeping with his dignity (AA 8:41–42). This is said to a government: even if one weighs, what comes out of the weighing is that treating people in keeping with their dignity is better. The word "dignity" appears in that essay only here.

The next year, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he separated price from dignity: anything with a price allows an equivalent to be put in its place; dignity belongs only to what stands above all price and has no equivalent. Skill and diligence have a market price, and what suits our taste has an affective price; only morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, has dignity (Kant 1785, AA 4:434–435). The ground of dignity is autonomy: the will giving universal law for all rational beings (AA 4:431, 4:440).

The starting point of this series divides here into two layers. A person has no equivalent: this layer carries on from Kant. The share a person cannot let go of is not weighed for him on someone else's scale either: this layer parts from Kant. Both say a person is an end, but they arrive by different roads: Kant goes from the top down, with reason giving universal law for all rational beings; this framework goes from the bottom up, with the law growing out of the structure of a person's own existence, holding only for himself, and not extended outward (One's Own Law). For Kant, giving law to oneself and the law given being universal are one and the same act of legislation; this framework takes the two apart and keeps only the first. One's Own Law says that, once generalized in this way, autonomy falls back into heteronomy. What carries on from Kant is the sentence "a person has no equivalent," not its ground. The share a person cannot let go of, his pursuit of his own happiness, is just such a law of his own: it is a person's negation of not doing a certain thing, not only liking; whether to want it, and whether it is worth it, he alone can judge. To weigh it for him on someone else's scale is to supplant his judgment with someone else's. A person has no equivalent, and so the judgment on the share he cannot let go of has no stand-in either.

What that evening of singing is worth is exactly the worth of this person's own share. If he cannot-not sing, this worth issues from his own law; it is worth as an end in itself, not any kind of price; if he simply likes it, that evening still lies outside the share the hiring scale is in charge of. On Kant's division, liking has an affective price; but this scale does not recognize even affective price; it recognizes only uses or returns that can be got back. Which it is, only the singer himself can say; what he says can be wrong too, and can be looked back on again.

Two hundred years and more later, we are still in the middle of this age. Enlightenment has kept moving forward, and what moved forward was mostly the half that calculates; the other half, that a person has no equivalent, has faded. After the Second World War, "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" was written into a declaration, and "human dignity shall be inviolable" into a constitution (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1; Basic Law of Germany, Article 1), as a guard against the most extreme atrocities; yet above the floor, in the everyday of how people choose, how they treat themselves and how they question others, this half has withdrawn into the background, and what has taken the leading place is "is it worth it?" The Prequel said that what it faces this time is a distributed, implicit power. Traced down, it is scattered across every place that leaves a single slot for "is it worth it?", and it does not look like power. The whole does not exercise power; those who exercise it are the people who, step by step, make use of these slots: those who design the forms and those who screen by them, each with a step of their own; those who repeat the line spread it and amplify it.

To call it implicit is not to say that someone is hiding behind it pulling the strings. It does not announce itself; each place simply runs as usual: meetings leave slots only for reasons that can be quantified, hiring looks only at résumés that can be priced. Each place on its own can be justified; taken together, people often say "what use is this?" aloud even to themselves. The places where the share a person cannot let go of can land grow fewer and fewer. Where it is can be traced: whether a place admits only one kind of reason, what those who do not speak in that way have to pay, whether over the years such places have grown more numerous or fewer. So "no single author" is not a sentence that excuses anyone: local authors can still be named, and the whole can still be traced. Saying "the market set it" is the same: the market is not a super-subject that takes responsibility, and "the market set it" cannot answer on behalf of a position that actually made a decision (Political Economy, Prequel, §3).

With no single author, how did this scale spread? Mostly by people passing it to one another. You ask me "what use is this?", and I turn round and ask others the same, and ask myself the same. Everyone has been weighed by others, and everyone has weighed others with it, and weighed himself. This is a group of people colonizing one another, and each colonizing himself: the branch that presses from outside and the branch in which one has come to believe it oneself are tangled together here. What occupies each person's position is an end from outside (Value Theory P3, V27); it belongs to no one person; it has been handed over from others, and he too is handing it on. Some people have gained from it, and how much they gained can be found out; having gained is not the same as being its author, and that step is still theirs. Nor are they thereby spared being colonized: this scale weighs the share they themselves cannot let go of all the same.

Local moves each have their aims, while the whole they add up to has often been coordinated by no one, and its logic can still be seen: Foucault put this most clearly in the first volume of The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1976). The "aims" he speaks of are embedded in strategies, not anyone's intentions. In 1984 he also wrote an essay called "What Is Enlightenment?", responding to Kant (Foucault 1984). This series takes over his diagnosis, and parts from him in two places. One is in those who exercise power: when Foucault calls power relations "non-subjective," he is speaking of the whole, not saying that no one is acting locally; at the level where power is the action of some people upon others, this series meets him (Foucault 1982); Power Theory goes one step further: any statement that the whole is exercising power has to be traced back to the people who make use of it at the key junctures, and that step is theirs (Power Theory, Paper 2). The other is in the starting point: this series first stands on a starting point, that a person has no equivalent; Foucault's essay is a historical critique of the present, and does not set out from such a starting point. The series takes this starting point over from Kant, but its weight does not rest on that source, nor is it derived from anything lying further down: it is the postulate of this framework, which the framework's name states, declared and not proved. Nor does the series conclude from this that Foucault denies human dignity.

Following Foucault's method, three counter-questions can be drafted; they are not his words. The first: is the "share of one's own" you speak of a true self that existed whole before history and is only waiting to be let out? No. That share may not yet have grown; what comes from outside is not thereby not one's own; and one's own looking back can be wrong. The second: this scale does not only press down "cannot let go," it also produces it; "do what you love" can itself be made into a brand that can be weighed. Yes. So the criterion does not look at where something came from; it looks at whether there was a point at which one could have rejected it, yet avowed it as one's own (Paper 3); the side of "producing" is unfolded in Paper 4, which takes up Foucault on the "entrepreneur of himself." This question is put only by the person to himself, looking back; having avowed something once is not a final verdict either, and it can be asked again on looking back. The third: is the table handed to the person for looking back yet another form of confession? Not that kind: looking back here has no position that receives the answers and passes judgment; others only ask, and draw no conclusions; and the table is not taken off to read others. Looking back can also stop, and can be wrong, and hands in no answer sheet. If in someone's mind it turns into judging himself, then the scale has been set up in him again, which is exactly the branch Paper 6 speaks of.

The word "colonization" was used by Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action: the system, through its two media of money and power, intrudes into the lifeworld, which is coordinated by mutual understanding; the consequences also fall on personality, as pathologies of the person (Habermas 1981). "Is it worth it?" walking into places where it has no business is exactly this shape. The one step further that this series takes is in one place: the scale can be set up in a person himself, so that he weighs the share he cannot let go of himself; this branch only he can find, and others have no criterion (Value Theory P3). The other place is in carrying him further down. He already said that money and power coordinate people's actions without relying on mutual understanding in speech; today this scale mostly moves that way too: default options, the structure of a page, the design of incentives, the ordering an algorithm produces; talking things through alone cannot reach it (Systems, Emergence, and the Conditions of Personhood, Chapter 21).

Horkheimer and Adorno said something very heavy in Dialectic of Enlightenment: whatever does not fit the measure of the calculable and the useful is, to enlightenment, suspect. In the same chapter they also say that bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence; it reduces what is unlike to abstract quantities and makes it comparable. Once enlightenment is free of pressure from outside, nothing can stop it; even its own idea of human rights does not escape the same measure (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947, Chapter 1).

What they describe is a tendency, not a theorem: everything is turned into comparable quantities, people included. They do not endorse this outcome, and they are not against enlightenment: the preface says that freedom in society is inseparable from enlightened thought, and that the book is meant to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment. The way out they give is enlightenment reflecting on itself, remembering nature within the subject.

This series takes over their diagnosis: this scale grew out of enlightenment, and enlightenment itself is part of the cause; inside the scale, it cannot stop. From here the series pushes on: it puts the stopping place outside the scale. "A person has no equivalent" is the postulate of this framework, placed before the scale and not put on it to be weighed. Someone might say that a postulate does not escape the same measure either; but a postulate was never a thing to be weighed, and in action it is first a not-doing (for this sentence form, see Action Theory, Paper 2, D9): not putting people on the scale. The last sentence of Kant's 1784 essay uses the scale to speak for dignity: treating people in keeping with their dignity is to the government's advantage. Dignity spoken of in that way could indeed be weighed one day and found not to pay. The next year Kant himself placed dignity above all price, and that is what this series carries on. The man who wrote this down did not apply it to every person himself, either: his lectures and essays contain statements ranking the races; and the Doctrine of Right of 1797 confined active citizens, those who can vote, to people who are economically self-supporting, leaving out apprentices, servants, minors and women (Kant 1797, §46, AA 6:314–315). Some scholars also hold that his views on race changed in the 1790s (Kleingeld 2007). The line is to be kept, and even the one who wrote the line is governed by it.

Enlightenment itself is part of the cause. What is to be looked at is what a person who thinks for himself does next. Thinking for oneself is having stepped out of handing one's judgment over. When colonization comes to him again, it runs into his own law, and cannot succeed without meeting resistance (Moral Law P9, §2.5); having taken this step does not guarantee that he will never hand his judgment over again.

From here there are two roads. One goes as far as "others are ends too," any other person at all: going on to enlighten, to cultivate others. This is the road Kant wrote of in 1784: those who have thrown off immaturity themselves will spread around them the spirit of a rational valuing of one's own worth and of each person's calling to think for himself (AA 8:36). The worth here is the worth in a person himself; the next year, he called this inner worth in a person dignity, not price (AA 4:435). This was not wrong.

The other goes only as far as one's own group: only this group are recognized as ends, the members recognize one another, and those outside do not count. Such a group can think and can calculate, and its members hold one another up; it can use knowledge, science and administration to decide for those outside the group what their law is to be, and that is colonization; it can also go on to seize, to injure, to kill: at this point, by violation's own definition, it also crosses the line that may not be crossed, and one and the same act is both. A group like this can stand only by keeping those outside pressed down; in an environment that leans toward the kingdom of ends, it does not last. The kingdom of ends is Kant's term: everyone treats himself and others as ends, never merely as means (AA 4:433). It is also more dangerous than a person who harms others for himself alone: a group of people holding one another up can write a judgment into an institution and carry it out year after year, with consequences far beyond what one person could do. That essay wrote this too: a revolution may bring down a personal despotism, but does not bring a true reform in ways of thinking; new prejudices will serve, like the old ones, as the leading strings of the unthinking mass (AA 8:36). Those who are led and do as they are told: the step of doing as they are told is still their own.

Eleven years later, in Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant wrote about what happened on the other road: the civilized, and above all the commercial, states of Europe treated visiting other lands and peoples as one and the same as conquering them, an injustice that is appalling; America, the "Negro countries," the Spice Islands, the Cape and other places were, in their eyes, lands belonging to no one, because they counted the inhabitants as nothing (Kant 1795, AA 8:358).

Putting people on the scale became a science at the end of the nineteenth century: eugenics. The word was coined by the Englishman Galton in 1883 (Galton 1883); in the twentieth century it entered the laws of many countries. In the first half of the twentieth century, more than thirty American states passed compulsory sterilization laws; in 1927 the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's sterilization law by eight to one, and Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, wrote: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough." (Buck v. Bell 1927) Sweden's sterilization law was in force from 1935 to 1975, and about sixty-three thousand people were sterilized, some voluntarily, some under pressure or by force (SOU 2000:20). Japan's Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 had its eugenic provisions removed only in 1996, when it was renamed the Maternal Health Protection Law; in July 2024, the Grand Bench of Japan's Supreme Court held its compulsory sterilization provisions unconstitutional (Supreme Court of Japan 2024). All of this happened in places with elections, courts and universities. The Nazi sterilization law of 1933 drew on American precedent (Kühl 1994); the "hereditarily ill" of the posters were named in that law's own words.

The Nazis carried this to its extreme. Those who designed, organized and ran that machinery could think and could calculate; those who carried it out acted on orders and on the new prejudices. There were also times when they could have refrained, and most did as they were told (Browning 1992). The two lines met here, most clearly in the "euthanasia" program against the sick and the disabled: from 1939, doctors and medical and administrative staff used their own expertise and organizational ability first to classify people as "unworthy of life," and then to kill them. The words "life unworthy of life" had been put into the title of a book nearly twenty years earlier by a jurist and a psychiatrist (Binding & Hoche 1920). A poster from around 1938, advertising the monthly Neues Volk, read: this hereditarily ill person costs the national community sixty thousand Reichsmarks over his lifetime; fellow German, that is your money too. The sixty thousand Reichsmarks was the propaganda copy's own figure. What the weighing produced was handed to everyone who looked at the poster. Yet what a table of costs can reckon is only expense; whether a person's life is worth living is not within the share it can reckon. Some of the program's staff and its gassing methods were later transferred to the extermination camps. The murder of the Jews of Europe used another standard: race. That was no longer a scale of costs. All these acts crossed the floor, and are already outside what this series discusses: what crosses the floor is violation, judged by violation's own definition (Rights P5). What this series discusses is the everyday above the floor.

This is not to say that every "what use is this?" leads there. It is to say that there is no stopping place inside this question; where it stops depends on a line outside the scale: the question reaches as far as the share it is actually dealing with, and a person has no equivalent.

The Prequel, §2 said that "second" means pushing once more, within the same process, against this fading. Over the two hundred years and more, two other things have changed. In Kant's essay, dignity is written at the end and addressed to the government's scale: weighed, it too comes out better. The government of the time was fixed, and the one he had to persuade was a monarch. Today, in most countries, governments are elected; the scale is not only in the government's hands but also in the hands of everyone who elects it. This time there is no monarch to persuade; it can only be said to everyone. The other thing is one that Kant's time did not have: rules are being written into programs and models, and what used to be judged case by case by the person present is now written once and runs on and on; if the line that a person is an end can no longer be held, real trolley problems will multiply, and mostly with no one present (Prequel, §3; Paper 7). Dignity, then, can no longer wait for some scale to weigh it out as better; it lies at the starting point: a person does not have to wait until government, institutions, the market or others have worked out that respecting him pays before he has a place as a person. To ask whether a person is worth it is a question that does not hold.

§5 Where This Paper Stops

This paper has written only the two moves of "is it worth it?", and how far the first sentence reaches. There are several things it has not taken further.

It has not set rules for any place: how many slots a form leaves, to whom a resource is first allocated, belong to the institutional side. Nor has it judged this case for the person present: how judgment is made is handed to Action Theory.

Paper 3 takes up how far the second sentence can be seen from outside, and how to read structure without reading minds. Papers 4 and 5 take up how this scale occupies a person's own share, or keeps it from growing. Paper 2 takes up how fraud in a sale is checked. Paper 7 takes up the strongest objections to the position on counting heads.

There is also the response to the first sentence. Once this scale has been seen clearly, the next step is not to build another, more accurate scale; it is a not-doing: no longer asking for proof of worth first. That sentence is left to Paper 6.

Propositions of This Paper

  • W1 The logic of "is it worth it?" has two moves: a scale, which first weighs what a thing, a person or a stretch of time is worth and gives only once it has been weighed; and a reading, by which whoever does anything, in the end it is all about interest. The scale and the reading often appear together, and are not the same thing.
  • W2 On this scale, to ask whether something is worth it is to ask what it can be exchanged for. Uses can be asked about, and concrete effects can be coordinated; the question reaches as far as the share it is actually dealing with. How large this share is, is not for the asking side to settle alone. Asked is only asked; what lies outside this share does not enter the reasons for the task, whether it would work in the person's favor or against him. If, because of the question, something then turns out differently, the scale has weighed outside this share and overstepped; that nothing can be seen does not mean nothing overstepped.
  • W3 In post, the scale can narrow: what was wanted was reasons that can be stated, and it becomes reasons of the quantifiable kind only, so that what can be stated but not measured finds nowhere to land. There is a kind of matter in post whose very task is guarding what is not priced; to ask first, there, whether it is worth it is to make the job no longer itself. There too reckoning is possible, and priorities have to be set: above the three layers there is a root, a person is an end; the norm gives principles, what principles cannot settle is handed to rules, and what rules cannot settle in full falls to the person present at the time. Between the three layers, downward, there is guidance and testing, and room is left for the layer beneath: each layer takes up only the share the layer above cannot settle. Upward, there is no supplanting: a single judgment does not generalize into a rule or a norm, and a rule does not alter the norm; supplanting the norm with a rule, or a rule with a judgment, is overstepping; supplanting the norm with a judgment is worst. Judgment can, this once, not follow the rule; it covers only this once, is questioned afterward, and is his to bear: when a rule has gone past the norm, the norm is followed; when a rule is in keeping with the norm, he follows his own law; the ground, in both cases, is that a person is an end. Counting heads is not supported by the norm, nor does the norm say it is wrong; its direction is that where counting can be avoided, there is no counting. Rules do not support it either; at most they allow it as a last resort, and cannot vouch for it: what is written into a rule is the judgment of those who set the rule, wholly theirs to bear; the rule remains under oversight, and those who set it are held to account. Beforehand, prevention: in allocating between resources and risk, rules can be written, and those who set them sign their names and bear them. In the moment, judgment: only when every other road is closed does the person present decide by heads, and it is his to bear. Afterward, being held to account: being questioned, and bearing responsibility; he is asked, and so are those who allocated resources and set the rules beforehand.
  • W4 A person is treated as a person without having to prove he is useful; and what he cannot let go of is not declared by others, with some other reward, to have been exchanged already. This grants no permission for any concrete action, and does not cancel questions about how others are affected. Someone who for the time being cannot say what he cannot let go of does not have to hand over proof first, either.
  • W5 A guess, answered by the other person, and withdrawn if it was wrong, is a question; whether it is withdrawn is seen from what one says and does after hearing the answer. To go beyond the facts that can be checked and state "so he is doing it for..." as settled is mind-reading. To turn every answer back into interest, whatever the answer, renaming even "liking" and "cannot let go" as interest, is to make mind-reading into an irrefutable assumption about everyone. A sale looks at terms; an audit looks at track records and connections that can be checked; a person's public account of himself is recorded as he gave it, and reasons listed in a document are recorded as the document has them. All of these stop at the facts; what they look at is conduct and structure, not minds. Nor does this series supply, on anyone's behalf, a "cannot let go" that was never spoken.
  • W6 Others' questions cannot stand in for one's own; what counts is whether one asks oneself, looking back, and how one answers. If for the moment one does not ask, and leaves it for now, that too is one's own affair; one's answer can also be wrong, and one can ask again.
  • W7 What has taken the leading place this time is a scale that, as a whole, has no single author: the whole does not exercise power; those who exercise it are the people who make use of it place by place. It is implicit because it does not look like power, and does not announce itself; the rules in each place can all be public, and what is implicit is what they look like taken together. It is structural, not a conspiracy theory; where it is can be traced. "Second" means pushing once more, within the same process, against this layer.

Acknowledgments

This paper is the first paper of the Second Enlightenment series of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.

The writing and review of this paper were assisted by Anthropic's Claude, OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's Gemini, xAI's Grok and Meta's Muse. Thanks are due to these companies and to their research and engineering teams.


References

Group I lists works of this system, archived on Zenodo with Chinese and English versions under the same record, all single-authored (Han Qin); DOIs follow those listed at the head of each paper on the author's site. The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the title, the paper and the proposition number noted in parentheses at the place of use. The Prequel and Papers 2 to 7 in the text are the papers of this series. Kant's works are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition (AA). Quotations from German sources are the author's own renderings, except for the Basic Law, which is quoted in its official English translation.

I · Works of this system

Qin, H. (2026). Systems, Emergence, and the Conditions of Personhood [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18528812

Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Law: The SAE Critique of Ethics and Morality [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19037566

Qin, H. (2026). The Institutional Architecture of Mixed Reality (SAE Moral Law, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20262737

Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595

Qin, H. (2026). On the Colonization of Value (SAE Value Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21611154

Qin, H. (2026). Anti-Colonization (SAE Action Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970758

Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133

Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140

Qin, H. (2026). Growth (SAE Political Economy, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874150

Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154

Qin, H. (2026). Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power (SAE Political Economy, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874158

Qin, H. (2026). On the Morphology of Power (SAE Power Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20455221

Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617

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