What the Second Enlightenment Is Not
二次启蒙不是什么
Today a thing, a person, a stretch of time is usually put to one question first: is it worth it? This series sets out from a single starting point: a person has no equivalent, and the share a person cannot let go of is not weighed for him on someone else's scale either. Whether a thing is worth it can be asked; whether a person is worth it is a question that does not hold. The "second enlightenment" carries on from Kant's 1784 essay on what enlightenment is: over two hundred years and more, the half that calculates has advanced a long way, while the half that says a person has no equivalent is thinning in everyday life. What it faces this time is a distributed, implicit power, with no single author and often with good intentions. Rules are being written into programs and models in bulk. The series has only one slogan, anti-colonization: it runs in both directions, and it opposes an act without judging the state a person is in. The series works mainly at the level of the norm, and goes as far as the door to "others are ends too."
This is an independent English rewrite, not a translation, of the Chinese final text v1.0. Terminology and framing are recomposed for an English-reading audience; the philosophical content is the same.
Introduction
Is it worth it? Whether to do a thing, whether to keep a person on, where to spend a stretch of time: today these usually go through this question first. Those who ask it usually mean no harm, and what they ask about is usually real business: money, time and opportunity are all limited, and something always has to come first.
This series sets out from a single starting point: a person has no equivalent, and the share a person cannot let go of is not weighed for him on someone else's scale either. Whether a thing is worth it can be asked; whether a person is worth it is a question that does not hold.
Kant made the first claim: that a person has no equivalent. In 1785 he separated what has a price from what has a dignity (Kant 1785, AA 4:434): for him, anything with a price allows an equivalent to be put in its place; dignity belongs only to what stands above all price and has no equivalent. The word dignity has since been written into the constitutions of many countries; Article 1 of Germany's Basic Law states that "human dignity shall be inviolable." In everyday life, though, it grows thinner and thinner, and what gets asked first, everywhere, is "is it worth it?" and "what use is it?" This series is called the second enlightenment because it carries on from Kant: within the same process, it pushes once more against this thinning.
This paper first sets a few things in place: what the starting point is, which enlightenment the "second" carries on from, what it faces this time, and why the series has only one slogan, anti-colonization. It then says what the series is not and how far it goes, and closes by listing the papers, one sentence each. The series belongs to a philosophical framework called Self-as-an-End (SAE), and it can also be read starting from here: there is no need to have read the other series first, and sources are marked in the text as they come up.
§1 The Starting Point
The starting point has two layers. The first is that a person has no equivalent: there is nothing that can be traded for a person. Money cannot, another person cannot, and neither can what he has achieved or will one day achieve. Things with a price are different. A machine, a project, a budget can each be exchanged for something else, and of each one can ask whether it is worth it; asked within the task one has in hand, that is a real question. Paying compensation weighs a loss, not the person (Paper 1, §2); the places where a person himself was given a price were called, in history, slave markets.
So to say that "whether a person is worth it is a question that does not hold" is not to lay down a rule forbidding anyone to ask it. It is to say that the question cannot find what it is looking for. To ask whether something is worth it is to ask what it can be exchanged for and how much comes back; for a person, who has no equivalent, the question has no answer to give, and whatever answer is given answers the wrong question.
The second layer is that the share a person cannot let go of is not weighed for him on someone else's scale either. The "scale" here is a practice: first weighing what a thing or a person can bring back, and giving it a place only after it has been weighed. "The share a person cannot let go of" is his pursuit of his own happiness: what he holds a life well lived to be, the things he will do for it with no reward, the people and things he will stand by even when they are of no use. It is not only liking; liking is often the soil it grows from. This framework calls it one's own law: the law a person gives himself, which governs only himself (One's Own Law). Whether to want it, and whether it is worth it, he alone can judge; what he judges for himself can also be wrong, and can be looked back on and judged again. To weigh it for him on someone else's scale is to put someone else's judgment in the place of his.
This layer parts from Kant. Both say that a person is an end, but they arrive by different roads. Kant goes from the top down: reason gives universal law for every rational being, and for him giving law to oneself and giving universal law are one and the same act of legislation (Kant 1785, AA 4:431, 4:440). This framework goes from the bottom up: the law grows out of a person's own existence, holds only for him, and is not extended outward; the single act of legislation that Kant has, it takes apart, and keeps only the giving of law to oneself. So what this series takes over from Kant is the sentence "a person has no equivalent," not the ground Kant gave it.
Where, then, is its ground? This starting point is not derived from anything lying further down, nor does it lean on Kant's name. It is the postulate of this framework: the framework's name, Self-as-an-End, states exactly this, that a person is an end. A postulate is declared, not proved. From here the series sets out to say what, seen from this standpoint, the question asked first everywhere today looks like, how far it has reached, and where it fails to stop.
With this starting point, "is it worth it?" has a place where it stops. The question reaches as far as the task in hand: which part of this project to do first, where to spend this money first, can all be weighed. Weighing that reaches a person, or the share he cannot let go of, has weighed past the line. Paper 1 sets out where this line lies and how one can tell whether it has been crossed.
§2 Why "Second"
Late in 1784, Kant answered a question in the Berlinische Monatsschrift: what is enlightenment? Enlightenment, he said, is a person's emergence from an immaturity he has brought on himself, and immaturity is being unable to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another (Kant 1784, AA 8:35). The "second enlightenment" of this series carries on from this essay, not from the several enlightenments of modern Chinese thought since May Fourth. In Chinese, "enlightenment" has a lineage of its own: the New Culture Movement around May Fourth, the New Enlightenment Movement of the 1930s, the "New Enlightenment" of the 1980s. This series does not continue that line, and does not assess it here.
"Second" does not mean going through once, finishing, and starting over. Kant himself said that his was not an enlightened age but an age of enlightenment (AA 8:40). Enlightenment is a process, and more than two hundred years on we are still inside it. "Second" means pushing once more, within the same process, against a fading.
Which half has faded? After Kant, enlightenment kept advancing. Using one's own understanding includes one capacity in particular, calculation: of costs, of efficiency, of risk and return. This half has gone a long way over two hundred years and more; science, markets, administration and statistics all have a share in it, and it is a real achievement. What advanced was the half that calculates; what faded was the other half, that a person has no equivalent. The end of it that is written into law, as a guard against the most extreme atrocities, has grown thicker since the war (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1; Basic Law of Germany, Article 1); the end of it above the floor, in everyday life, is thinning.
What the thinning looks like is not hard to recognize. A child wants to learn something and is first asked whether it will be of any use later; someone leaves a job to look after a sick father and is first asked whether it pays; someone reads a book that has nothing to do with work and is first asked what for. Asked often enough, people come to ask themselves the same way. No law forbids him to learn, to care for his father, to read; it is only that, for these things to have a place in his life, they first have to prove their usefulness. The floor holds; above it, one place after another has been handed over to the scale.
This half is what the second enlightenment pushes for. It does not overturn the half that calculates: things with a price are weighed as before, and "is it worth it?" can still be asked. What it seeks is for people to see again where this scale stops. The stopping place is not inside the scale, and the scale cannot weigh it out for itself; it lies outside the scale, in "a person has no equivalent."
§3 What It Faces This Time
In Kant's time, those who did people's thinking for them could be recognized: a book that has understanding for a person, a pastor who has a conscience for him, a doctor who judges his diet for him; the guardians had kindly taken upon themselves the oversight of it all. Statutes and formulas, the instruments of a person's misuse of his natural gifts, became the fetters of a permanent immaturity (Kant 1784, AA 8:35–36). Power then was concentrated, held in the hands of people one could point to; to leave immaturity, one first had to recognize who was doing one's thinking, and then it could be recognized.
What it faces this time is a distributed, implicit power. It has no single author; the slots are everywhere, and they are not in any one guardian's hands. A "slot" here is the place a setting leaves for reasons: an application form, an appraisal scheme, an interview that leaves a single slot for "what use is it?", where no other reason can be entered. Those who exercise this power are the people who, place after place, make use of this slot, each taking one step.
It is implicit because it does not look like power, and does not announce itself. The rules in each place can all be public: the form can be posted online, the appraisal can be written into a handbook. What is implicit is what they look like taken together, which is taken for the way things simply are. It is structural, not a conspiracy theory. There is no plotter behind it; on the contrary, with no one behind it, it keeps running all the same.
It also often comes with good intentions. The foundational paper of this framework has said that power often wears the look of benevolence, neutrality, expertise and rationality, and even says "this is for your own good" (Systems, Emergence, and the Conditions of Personhood, Preface, §1). Kant, late in life, saw this layer too. In 1793 he first said that no one can compel me to be happy in the way he conceives of the welfare of others; each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him, so long as he does not infringe on the freedom of others to pursue the same. He went on to say that a government that rules out of benevolence, as a father rules his children, treating its subjects as children who cannot tell what is truly useful or harmful to them, so that how they are to be happy must wait on the judgment of the head of state and on his kindness, is the greatest despotism that can be conceived (Kant 1793, AA 8:290–291).
He was speaking of a government. Today the same good intentions are spread everywhere: lists that set a person's priorities for him, advice that works out his returns for him, ways of talking that settle for him what counts as making something of himself. Each on its own may be well meant, and is often useful; taken together, they leave the share a person cannot let go of nowhere to stand. Calling this power is not to say that people in these places bear ill will. It is to say that the position in which a person thinks for himself and decides for himself has been occupied by a scale from elsewhere, however well that scale speaks.
"No single author" is not a sentence that excuses anyone, either. Local workings can still be named: which form leaves a slot for only one kind of reason, who set it, who made choices by it; that step is his. The whole does not exercise power; those who exercise it are always people, place by place. Paper 1, §4 sets out where this meets Foucault and where it parts from him.
Part of what makes this urgent belongs only to today: rules are being written into programs and models in bulk. Before, however an application was ranked or a person chosen, there was always someone present along the way; now the rule is written once and runs on, weighing thousands of people a day ahead of time. If what it weighs has only a price, this is efficiency; once it weighs people, there is no one present who can stop.
Philosophy has a well-known puzzle called the trolley problem (Foot 1967; Thomson 1976, 1985): a runaway trolley is heading toward five people; pull a switch and it turns onto another track and strikes one; do you pull it? What it asks about is counting heads: save five, or save one. The puzzle used to stay mostly in the classroom. Once rules are written into programs and models, it will land in reality more and more often: which way a car steers when a crash cannot be avoided, who first gets a batch of medicine too small to go round, may all be written in beforehand and followed every time after. If the line that a person has no equivalent cannot be held, real trolley problems will multiply.
What matters most is not letting things come to the point where counting begins. If they do come to it, writing head-counting into a rule does not make it right. It looks like a settled answer; in fact someone has settled a procedure in advance and set it to run in every case to come. The norm does not support counting heads; a rule can at most allow it as a last resort, and cannot vouch for it. Those who settle the procedure and put it in place bear the whole of the judgment of that deployment, not whoever wrote down the code; once it is in place, oversight continues, and those responsible continue to be held to account: they are questioned, and they bear responsibility. Paper 1, §2 and Paper 7 take this further.
§4 Anti-Colonization
Kant's essay has a motto: Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding. It speaks to people, asking them to summon their courage. Why do so many remain in immaturity all their lives? Laziness and cowardice, he said (Kant 1784, AA 8:35). This series does not follow that diagnosis: how a person came to be where he is today is not judged from outside. But Kant also wrote of the side outside the person, the guardians and the fetters of the previous section.
This time there is only one slogan: anti-colonization. It does not tell a person what he lacks; what it faces is an act, the scale reaching into a place it cannot weigh. In plain words: the share a person cannot let go of is not weighed for him by a scale, whether that scale is in someone else's hand or in his own; the one in his own hand, only he can find. Nor is the share another person cannot let go of weighed by the scale in his hand. Someone in post, weighing what falls within the remit of the task in hand, is not covered by this. This is the series' own position, not a command to the reader.
Colonization here has the meaning it has throughout this framework: putting one's own ends in place of another person's own law (Moral Law P9). It is a structural act; it needs neither force nor ill will, and however gentle the means, the act is still the same act. The broad sense is taken here; elsewhere this framework also uses a narrow sense, meaning specifically an overreach disguised as leaving room for people (Rights P6; Political Economy series).
A familiar shape: someone wants to learn to paint, and his family asks him again and again whether painting will ever put food on the table. Those who ask mostly mean well, and may even have hit on part of the truth. Being asked often is only a clue. Suppose his family makes earning money the only condition on which he may go on with painting; he explains that he wants to learn, and the explanation is not taken as a reason; he says no, and the refusal is not acknowledged. At this point what is being done is that act: using what others have decided is good to decide for him what living well is for him. Later he often asks himself the same question too. Whether, in his mind, it is a question he has weighed and avowed himself, or that scale set up inside him, others cannot see; only he can find out.
So, seen from the side of the person acted upon, colonization has two branches. The branch that presses from outside can be read by others, and can be confirmed once the evidence is complete; the branch in which he has come to believe it himself, only he can find (Value Theory P3). The two describe where it lands, not who bears the blame: that he has come to believe it does not mean he brought it on himself.
Nor does this act necessarily have a single author. People who, place after place, use the same scale together occupy the position in which a person thinks and decides for himself; that too is this act, and what occupies that position is an end from outside. A group of people can also colonize one another in this way, and each colonize himself: a "what use is it?" passes from one person to the next, and each has been weighed by it and has weighed others with it (Paper 1, §4).
The means can also be extremely heavy: seizing what is his, injuring him, sealing off his way out, even killing him. Here there is another line, called violation: crossing a person's inviolable boundary. Violation is judged by its own definition, by structure, not by motive. When the means of colonization go this far, then by violation's own definition they also cross that line: one and the same act is both. To say it is also colonization is not to make it lighter. The series is against both: against colonization, and still more against violation. How violation is judged has its own place (Rights P5; Relation Theory P1); Paper 2 meets it again, and it is not unfolded here.
The colonialism of history is the most conspicuous shape this act has taken under particular conditions: from "civilizing" to seizing land, plunder and killing, both the gentle end and the end that crossed the line are found in it. It is the most conspicuous shape, not the whole. In common usage, "anti-colonial" is bound up mostly with national liberation; what is meant here is a kind of working, not the name of that stretch of history.
Anti-colonization runs in both directions. It is against others colonizing oneself, because one is an end; and against oneself colonizing others, because others are ends too. The second is harder, for it asks for restraint of oneself. Good intentions perform this act most easily: someone who has been through it all works out the road for a young person; a parent settles for a child what counts as making something of himself; an expert settles for a layperson what is worth wanting. The scales in their hands are often accurate; an accurate scale still does not mean it can weigh the share another person cannot let go of. Giving one's view is one thing; settling that share for him is another.
So anti-colonization is first of all a not-doing. The series does not weigh the reader on its own scale, and does not write his share for him. Then, wherever a scale presses down on a person thinking and deciding for himself, it opposes it in that place: it says so, and does not do it itself. A person who holds a position is bound by this as well: not to use that position to colonize others.
Opposing here does not default to struggle. The series does not forbid struggle; it is only that if it went into struggle itself, it would be taking the road of revolution, not the road of enlightenment. Kant said that a public can reach enlightenment only slowly; a revolution may bring down a personal despotism, but never brings about a true reform in ways of thinking (Kant 1784, AA 8:36). What is said here is only that ways of thinking are not won by overthrow; no particular revolution is being assessed. Stopping violation and protecting those treated as means is another matter, which this framework's Action Theory has written about (Action Theory, Papers 7 and 9); questioning within institutions belongs to the institutional side. Neither is rewritten here.
What is opposed is what was done, not a group of people, in Kant's time and this time alike. The difference lies in the author. In Kant's time, those who did people's thinking for them could be recognized; this time, the scale as a whole has no single author. Local workings can still be named, and what is named is that working in that place, not a group of people; the series itself is among them.
Nor does the slogan judge the state a person is in. Whether someone else really has been colonized is not something it can oppose, and it does not judge it for him. Seeing others weigh things up, or use what comes from outside, does not mean they have been colonized: what comes from outside can still be material, and once he has avowed it, what came from outside is his own. What the slogan opposes is only the act.
The slogan takes only the half that is anti-colonization. The other half is cultivation: a person who thinks for himself goes on to enlighten others, to cultivate them. Cultivation is leaving room and creating conditions for a person to grow by himself, not growing in his place. Enlightenment itself is one kind of cultivation, and its result cannot be supplied by anyone else: enlightening people on their behalf is something the series cannot do. What it can hold to itself is not colonizing. The half that is cultivation is left to the side of this framework that writes about what passes between people.
§5 What the Second Enlightenment Is Not
At this point, several misreadings come most easily.
First, it is not against calculating, nor against asking whether a thing is worth it. Things with a price are weighed as before, and the task in hand still has its priorities set; the question simply has a place where it stops. Paper 1, Is It Worth It?, sets out how far the question reaches and how to see whether it has gone past.
Second, it is not against being for oneself. A person who plans for himself and protects the share he cannot let go of is showing exactly the side on which he is an end. The series calls this being for-oneself (weiji), not self-interest: self-interest is calculation, while for-oneself is that share itself. Being for oneself exempts nothing either: what a person who is for himself does to others can still be colonization, and still cannot cross the line. Paper 2, For Oneself, takes this up.
Third, it does not read minds. The sentence "in the end, it is all about interest" is itself mind-reading aimed at everyone: whatever reasons others give are all decoded as interest. The series looks only at what was done, what was said aloud, and how many slots a place leaves for reasons; it does not guess what a person thinks inside, does not judge for anyone whether he has been colonized, and does not single out any real person to judge whether the share he keeps is genuine. Not reading minds is not the same as not reading structure: what people do shows a great deal, which can be described and taken as fallible clues, only not used to close a case on a person. Paper 3, Reading Structure, Not Minds, takes this up.
Fourth, it does not enlighten people on their behalf. The result of enlightenment cannot be supplied by anyone else; pouring the "right" ideas into another person's head is, as a manner of doing it, still the direction of colonization. This binds the series as well: readers can take what it writes and use it, or leave it. Paper 3, §9 applies this to the series itself.
Fifth, it is not a guide to success. It does not teach how to get things done, and does not promise that a person who keeps the share he cannot let go of will come out ahead in the end. To say "do what you love and the rewards will follow" is to put that share back on the scale, with a future reward vouching for it. Paper 4, One's Good, Written in Advance, shows how the scale turns even "cannot let go" into something it can weigh.
Sixth, it is not a call to arms. It does not write "ought," does not tell the reader to do anything, and does not decide for the reader where he is to end up. Paper 6 sets out the planes on which "no longer asking for proof of worth first" can land; that is what can be, not what "ought" to be. How a person concretely acts is left to this framework's Action Theory.
§6 How Far It Goes
A matter under discussion can be looked at in three layers (Political Economy, Prequel, §8). At the top is the norm: a principle, a criterion used for testing, such as that people are not put on the scale. In the middle is the rule: provisions and examples followed in practice, such as the curriculum and examinations a school sets. At the bottom is judgment: what the person present does in this case, faced with the matter before him, such as this teacher, facing this student. The norm gives the two layers below their direction, and is also used to test them; the layers below cannot turn round and supplant the norm, and saying "that is how the rule is written" is supplanting the norm with a rule (Paper 1, §2). Above the three layers there is a root, the starting point from the beginning: a person is an end, and a person has no equivalent.
When this series speaks of enlightenment, it speaks mainly at the level of the norm. With a matter in front of us, the first question is what the norm says, and the next is what the root of the norm says; there is no need to begin tangled up in how the rule is to be set or how this case is to be judged. Those two layers each have their place: rules belong to the institutional side, and judgment is left to Action Theory.
This framework writes from three sides. One is a person's own side, which is this series. Another is the institutional side, where the Political Economy series has already written on accumulated power (Political Economy, Paper 0), with further papers to come. There is also the side that writes about what passes between people. The three sides support one another; it is best if they improve together, and none goes first. That people can live and be safe is the lowest layer, and belongs to the institutional side; yet without enlightenment, institutions will not improve on their own either. A person's own side cannot be cleanly separated from the institutional side; where the series touches on institutions, it hands over what it can, and keeps only the little that a person's own side needs.
What the series covers is the half that says oneself is an end. Between oneself being an end and others being ends too, there is a door; Paper 7 goes as far as the door and describes what the door looks like. Past the door, how a person treats others and how he acts are handed over to Action Theory.
What the series does is describe and diagnose: it has a starting point, a position, and one not-doing. The starting point is that a person has no equivalent, declared and not proved; the position is anti-colonization; the not-doing is not weighing the reader on its own scale. It does not ask anyone to come over to its side. A reader who stands elsewhere and has read this far sees what can be seen from this starting point; whether to accept it is up to him.
§7 The Seven Papers
Seven papers follow this one.
Paper 1, Is It Worth It?, examines the two moves of the logic of "is it worth it?": a scale, which weighs first and gives only afterward; and a reading, by which in the end everything is about interest. It also takes up how far the question reaches, and how to see whether it has gone past.
Paper 2, For Oneself, examines the difference between being for oneself and self-interest: one's own share has no equivalent. It also takes up violation: being for oneself is no exemption for crossing the line.
Paper 3, Reading Structure, Not Minds, gives criteria for reading structure: how far one can speak from outside, where something counts only as a clue, and where it cannot yet be judged; and it applies these criteria to the series itself.
Paper 4, One's Good, Written in Advance, examines a more fundamental layer: "what is good for oneself" has been written in advance, and a person's own share is occupied, or has not yet grown; the scale also produces "cannot let go."
Paper 5, Calling It Worth It, examines another layer: a person has a seriousness of his own, yet speaks of it only as interest. Translating oneself can protect oneself, and can also slip something else in one's place.
Paper 6, No Longer Asking for Proof of Worth First, carries the most important sentence of the series: no longer asking what has no equivalent for proof of its worth. It sets out the planes on which this sentence can land, including the side on which one asks oneself.
Paper 7, At the Door, examines the step from oneself being an end to others being ends too: the step is necessary, not sufficient; judgment cannot be replaced; and, once rules are written into programs and models, who bears that moment. What the door looks like is as far as the series goes.
Last, a word on where the writer stands. I live in the San Francisco Bay Area. Places that ask "what use is it?" first are especially dense here, I am among them, and the effect on me is the most direct. This series was written by me together with AI. Rules are being written into models, and this series too was written with the help of models. AI here is a tool; it cannot replace judgment, and I do not let it; every judgment written down here is mine to bear. Paper 3 turns this, too, onto the series itself.
Acknowledgments
This paper is the Prequel to the Second Enlightenment series of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.
The writing and review of this paper were assisted by Anthropic's Claude, OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's Gemini, xAI's Grok and Meta's Muse. Thanks are due to these companies and to their research and engineering teams.
References
Group I lists works of this system, archived on Zenodo with Chinese and English versions under the same record, all single-authored (Han Qin); DOIs follow those listed at the head of each paper on the author's site. The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the title or the paper noted in parentheses at the place of use. Papers 1 to 7 in the text are the papers of this series. Kant's works are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition (AA).
I · Works of this system
Qin, H. (2026). Systems, Emergence, and the Conditions of Personhood [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18528812
Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Law: The SAE Critique of Ethics and Morality [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19037566
Qin, H. (2026). The Institutional Architecture of Mixed Reality (SAE Moral Law, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20262737
Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595
Qin, H. (2026). On the Cultivation and Diachronic Unfolding of Rights (SAE Rights, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21252863
Qin, H. (2026). On the Colonization of Value (SAE Value Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21611154
Qin, H. (2026). Living by One's Law in Mixed Reality (SAE Action Theory, Paper 7) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970781
Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Share of Strength, and Guarding (SAE Action Theory, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970787
Qin, H. (2026). What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not (SAE Relation Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047
Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133
Qin, H. (2026). Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power (SAE Political Economy, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874158
II · Other works
Foot, P. (1967). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5–15.
Kant, I. (1784). Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? Berlinische Monatsschrift, 4, 481–494. AA 8:33–42.
Kant, I. (1785). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Hartknoch. AA 4:385–463.
Kant, I. (1793). Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. Berlinische Monatsschrift, 22, 201–284. AA 8:273–313.
Kant, I. (1900–). Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Academy edition, cited in the text as AA). Berlin: Reimer / de Gruyter.
Thomson, J. J. (1976). Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. The Monist, 59(2), 204–217.
Thomson, J. J. (1985). The Trolley Problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395–1415.
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1.
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany] (1949), Article 1. Quoted in the official English translation.