Self-as-an-End
SAE Cooperation Theory · Paper 1

Doing Together
一起做

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24029132 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

This paper reads what the cooperation this series speaks of looks like. This series does not define all cooperation; the cooperation it reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction, that is, that at least one party recognizes the other as an end too in this undertaking. This direction is a premise, not a component of cooperation, nor a sufficient condition for entering scope. 15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels for persons; they are read by the current relational condition, not by persons; falling back is read as it occurs, and does not overturn the direction. Entering scope is checked on three further things: both avow this undertaking and actually take part, each having a share of his own; the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation; the arrangement the two jointly avow and maintain does not carry the direction of colonization toward a third person.

Under this premise, the cooperation this series reads is this: two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share; neither party holds the purpose and adjudication of this undertaking alone, nor does it automatically produce, above the two, a "we" that legislates for both. Each one's share can consist in taking up his own part according to the other's arrangement; it can also consist in saying what he wants and deciding for himself how it is to be done. Merely having the qualification to refuse or to call a halt is not on that account having done a share; pausing the whole operation in order to correct the shared way of doing it can still be one's own share; only withdrawing one's own side, that of going on taking part, is read as exit. Direction, participation and judgment govern different things: for direction one party is enough; for participation both are needed; in judgment each party uses his own. The object layer and the operation layer are kept apart: each party can confirm only his own end, and does not declare on the other end's behalf that it avows.

Three kinds are commonly met outside scope, and each is read differently: that in which neither party is headed in the 15DD direction, whose ideal type is the case in which both parties treat each other only as a strategy set and reach a balance by mutual calculation; that of being passively helped; that in which the arrangement the two jointly maintain carries the direction of colonization toward a third person. Where one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation, another of the conditions of scope is not met; Paper 5 reads this. Collusion premised on "a third person is merely a means" decides who counts as an end by whether someone is one of our own; the recognition between the two does not rest on the other's being a person, and in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction. In the prisoner's dilemma, the conclusion that both confess rests on given payoffs and choice assumptions; the computation does not take in the subject's examination of these premises, and the judgment this series asks after here falls on whether one recognizes the other prisoner as an end too. This paper interfaces with Hume, Rousseau, Hobbes and Axelrod. It does not prove that what others call cooperation is not cooperation, does not prove that cooperation in the 15DD direction is better than other cooperation, and does not prove that people ought to cooperate.

Introduction

Yu Ping and He Shan have been neighbors for more than ten years, and are friends as well. A bamboo fence runs between their two back gardens; last winter a heavy snow pressed seven or eight meters of it flat. When spring came, the two stood on either side of the gap and agreed to mend it together: Yu Ping would supply the labor, since a few years earlier he had built a grape trellis himself and had the knack for this kind of work; He Shan would supply the materials, since a batch of fir strips was left over from renovating his kitchen and lay piled in his shed.

In mending the fence, each had his own concern. Once the fence was down, Yu Ping's old dog got into the He family's vegetable plot every day to dig, and every evening he had to go over and fetch it back; what he wanted was the gap filled. He Shan wanted something else: his mother had planted a row of honeysuckle in the garden, and he wanted the new fence to be sturdy, so that the vines could climb it.

This is how the fence got mended. On the first day, each said his own piece. He Shan said to nail up a close row of fir strips, a meter and a half high; Yu Ping said close was fine, but at the end near the house a small gate should be left: when he came over to borrow a ladder or bring some vegetables, he did not want to go round by the street in front. At first He Shan said a gate would cost material and labor, and then that the dog would squeeze through the gaps around the gate. On the second day, He Shan measured the place for the gate himself, dug two more thick pieces of wood out of his shed for the gate frame, and said: "The gate's what you wanted, so we'll keep it; we'll put the latch high, where the dog can't reach." On the third day of the work, He Shan found that the soil under several of the posts Yu Ping had sunk was loose, and said they should stop for a moment, pull this stretch up and sink it again half a foot further in; Yu Ping crouched down to look, agreed, and the two worked an extra afternoon. On the day the fence was finished, the honeysuckle had not yet climbed onto it; the gate was where Yu Ping had said, and the latch was a good bit higher than he had first thought.

Ordinarily this is simply called cooperation. Yet a great many things are packed under the word "cooperation": a deal in business, a truce between two rivals, one person's helping another move house, a project a group of people completes together, the cell in a game-theory textbook where two prisoners do not betray each other. What this paper asks is this: what the cooperation this series reads looks like; in the mending of the fence, what puts it within the cooperation this series reads; what its premise is, which kinds are not within it, and on what grounds each of them is read as such.

What this paper reads. This series does not define all cooperation. Some call a balance that two parties reach by calculating against each other, each getting what he is after, cooperation as well; this series does not object to the usage, it only does not read it. What it reads is cooperation whose premise is that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction. In SAE's levels, the layer at which the other is recognized as an end too is written 15DD. 15DD is non dubito: "it is not only I who am an end; the other, too, is an end in itself."1 A layer records one operation; it does not record a person, nor a stretch of cooperation.2

This paper reads five things. First, the premise: why at least one party, why the direction is a premise and not a component, and why the direction alone is not enough. Second, the structure of the cooperation this series reads: two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share. Third, what direction, participation and judgment each govern. Fourth, the object layer and the operation layer: what each party can confirm, and what he cannot. Fifth, the three kinds outside scope, and on what grounds each is read as such. Last, it looks once at the prisoner's dilemma: how the step that rules can derive and the step where judgment falls are kept apart.

On each of these, the direction of colonization can be read. Colonization, in this series, names the direction of one effect: toward pouring in and occupying; the other direction is cultivation, toward making space. The two are not the two extremes of one scale; the same act can carry both directions, and can also carry no direction at all; the direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action.3 Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights.4

Shared words. The word "cooperation" is used elsewhere in SAE as well, and refers to other things. The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation reads cooperation between state and state, between construct and construct; this series reads what lies between person and person. In Chinese the two series use different words, that series 协作 and this series 合作; the former is not a term of this series.5 The "cooperative game" of the Games of Judgment series is one kind of game: the partner's next step is his, and is also part of what the two want together; it can be borrowed to look at one aspect of doing things together, and is not the same as the cooperation this series reads.6 The prisoner's dilemma example labels the one action of not betraying each other "cooperation"; §6 makes clear that this label and the cooperation this series reads are not one word.

"Direction" has two senses in this paper. To speak of the 15DD direction is to speak of the place one is headed toward and has not yet reached; to speak of the two directions of cultivation and colonization is to speak of where one effect is headed.

"Calculation" in this paper names only one stance: treating the other only as a strategy set. Looking out for one's own concerns is not calculation, and neither is keeping clear accounts: two people can remember perfectly well what each has put in, and at the same time recognize that the other's share is the other's. How exchange is read within cooperation is read in Paper 2.

Method. As in Marriage Theory: the conclusions of upstream papers are said in plain words; sources, the proposition numbers of other papers, and the places where upstream words are carried beyond their original place all go in the notes, and where something is extended, this series takes it on as its own undertaking. What has already been said at the relational layer is used here directly, not rewritten; how one person does things together with another has been established in Action Theory Paper 8, and is called on here, not established again.7 This paper speaks only of structure, not of good and bad, and issues no ought.

The mending of the fence by Yu Ping and He Shan runs through the whole paper. The two are friends, and there is more in a friendship than this; this series reads only this one thing they do together. This is a made-up example, used only to see structure; from outside, the two people's words and deeds are only clues, and do not certify who is at which layer.

§1 The Premise

CO1 This series does not define all cooperation. The cooperation it reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction; the 15DD direction is a premise, not a component of cooperation, nor a sufficient condition for entering scope. 15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels for persons; they are read by the current relational condition, not by persons; falling back is read as it occurs, and does not overturn the direction

This proposition marks out what this series reads. It says four things: it does not define all cooperation; at least one party; the direction is a premise, not a component, and is not enough to enter scope; stances, not labels.

Not Defining All Cooperation

Cooperation is an everyday word, used by many people in many ways. The cooperation businesspeople speak of, teamwork on a playing field, collaboration between two countries, cooperation between two groups in a laboratory, two neighboring households mending a fence together: each has its own look. This series does not adjudicate among these usages which one is true cooperation; it delimits a range, and reads only one of them.

So when this series says that something is not within the cooperation it reads, it does not say that the thing is not cooperation. Two shops, each doing its own sums, sign a contract, deliver as contracted, and each gets what it is after; in everyday speech this too is called cooperation; this series does not read it, and does not judge it either. To say "is not within the cooperation this series reads" is to speak of this series' scope; to say "is not cooperation" would be to define the word. The first this series says; the second it does not.

At Least One Party

The cooperation this series reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction. Two things in this sentence need to be made clear: why one party, and why a direction.

Why one party. The marriage Marriage Theory reads has as its premise that both parties are headed in this direction; Cooperation Theory takes only one. This difference of a single word lies in the kind of relation: marriage has the love between the two as one thing it cannot do without; cooperation does not require love.8 When two people do one thing together, one can recognize the other as an end too while the other is still looking out for his own concerns, and the thing gets done together all the same. The kind that lies outside Marriage Theory's scope, one party headed in this direction and one leaning toward 14DD, is in Cooperation Theory a proper object, and Paper 5 reads it on its own.

At least one party is also a lower limit. Where neither party is headed in the 15DD direction, it is not within the cooperation this series reads; its ideal type is the case in which both parties treat each other only as a strategy set and reach a balance by mutual calculation (CO5).

A Premise, Not a Component

Counting the 15DD direction as one item in the make-up of cooperation would look tidier: both avow, each has a share, neither holds it alone, and one more item, the direction. This series does not count it that way. It first delimits which kind of cooperation it reads, and then, within that range, reads what structure this kind of cooperation has.

The direction determines how those items are read. At the end headed in the 15DD direction, of which there is at least one, "each has a share" is read as: the other's share is the other's, not as: neither can snatch the other's away; "not holding alone" is read as: having recognized that the other too has his adjudication, not as: the two sides are evenly matched in strength, and neither can hold it alone. The end that leans toward 14DD and is within scope at least structurally acknowledges that the other has purposes of his own; in him this does not necessarily go as far as recognizing the other as an end too. Here and throughout, this series writes "acknowledge" for this structural grade, so that it is not taken for recognizing the other as an end too; a quoted page keeps its own words, which may differ. The direction lies beneath those items; it does not stand alongside them. So this series does not argue that all cooperation is headed in this direction, nor that cooperation ought to be headed in this direction; what it says is what the thing done together looks like, and how it works, when at least one person is headed in this direction.

The Direction Is Not Enough

The direction is a premise, yet it is not enough to bring a thing within scope. Yu Ping's recognizing He Shan as an end too in this undertaking does not by that fact make it cooperation: if He Shan knew nothing of the matter at all, and the fence was mended by Yu Ping alone, then Yu Ping did one thing by himself, or helped He Shan once. Entering scope is checked on three further things:

  • both avow this undertaking and actually take part, each having a share of his own;
  • the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation;
  • the arrangement the two jointly avow and actually maintain does not carry the direction of colonization toward a third person, and does not cross his basic rights.

The first is read in §2; the latter two in §5.

One sentence at the entrance. Taken together, the entrance to the cooperation this series reads can be put in one plain sentence: at least one person, when doing things together, does not treat the other merely as a means. This sentence sums up the entrance; it is not an equivalent substitute for all the conditions of scope. It points to the direction premise, and is wider than the direction premise: where both ends lean toward 14DD and neither is reduced to calculation, this sentence takes the case in, and scope does not (CO5); both avowing, actually taking part and each having a share, the other's not being reduced to calculation, the arrangement's not going toward a third person: these three are checked separately, and are not brought in by this sentence.

Stances, Not Labels

15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels stuck on persons. To say that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction is to say in which direction this one person operates in this one undertaking, not that he is a 15DD person. Where the Conflict Treatise divides its paths, it writes: "The division of paths goes by the current relational condition, not by persons."9 This series reads accordingly: the end that operates in the 15DD direction in this undertaking, and the leaning toward 14DD, are both spoken of by the current relational condition, and neither party is said to be lower.

A direction, not a state. 15DD is the place one is headed toward; a state is at most a stance at some moment, and reality is bound to be mixed. People are all mixed; a layer records one operation, and falling back is read as it occurs.10 On the first day of mending the fence, when Yu Ping heard He Shan say that a gate would cost material, his heart sank: how can the man reckon like that. He said himself later that at that moment he was thinking only that he had been slighted, and his mind was not on He Shan's share. The example here takes it that this moment was just so: it was a falling back, read as such at his own end; the sinking of his heart, in itself, does not prove a falling back. Early the next morning he again first asked He Shan how wide the gaps should be for the honeysuckle to climb well, and only then went to look at the posts. Falling back is read as it occurs, and does not overturn the direction; Yu Ping's direction in this undertaking is a stipulation of this example, and the question he asked on the second day does not testify for it.

Leaning toward 14DD is not the same as being reduced to calculation either. The Learning series has written that "recognizing the other's independent 14DD is structural, not moral — it does not require assuming the other is benevolent, and includes detecting when the other's purpose is adverse to you".11 A person who leans toward 14DD in some undertaking looks out for his own concerns, and at the same time at least structurally acknowledges that the other has purposes of his own; to be reduced to calculation is to treat the other only as a strategy set, so that the person opposite is, for him, only a set of calculable responses.12 The former is within this series' scope; the latter is not. When He Shan said that a gate would cost material, he was looking out for his own concerns; the example takes it that he is not reduced to calculation in this undertaking; and from this one remark alone it cannot be read, either, that he treats Yu Ping only as a set of calculable responses.

Nor is a person's stance inferred backward from the direction of one effect. The Conflict Treatise has written that what admits of diagnosis is this operation on this occasion, not this person.13 He Shan's remark "a gate costs material" is read here for its effect in this one undertaking; He Shan the person is not read.

§2 The Undertaking Done Together

CO2 Under this premise, the cooperation this series reads is this: two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share; neither party holds the purpose and adjudication of this undertaking alone. Each one's share can consist in taking up his own part according to the other's arrangement; it can consist in saying what he wants and deciding for himself how it is to be done. Merely having the qualification to refuse or to call a halt is not on that account having done a share; whether a choice, an indication, a correction or a pause actually made is a share depends on how it enters the shared way of doing it: pausing the whole operation in order to correct the shared way of doing it can still be one's own share; only where calling a halt is withdrawing one's own side, that of going on taking part, is it read as exit; the two are not told apart by how much is halted. Merely ceasing to go on being helped does not on that account become cooperation

This proposition reads the structure of the cooperation this series speaks of. First, where the skeleton comes from; then how it is applied to this series' object; then each having a share, not holding alone, qualification and what is actually done; last, the boundary between help and cooperation.

The Skeleton

How one person does things together with another, Action Theory Paper 8 has established: "One person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C: C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone; it is doing something together, not a shared law."14 The same paper says that C belongs neither to A nor to B: "it is the course of action forced into being once two separate purposes meet"; as for "both are able to do", "they mean that each side has a share it can do itself, and only when these are put together can the thing be done".15 This series takes up this proposition in its full wording, and does not establish it again.

The fence is read by this sentence. Yu Ping is for A: that the dog no longer gets into the He family's vegetable plot, and that he need not go looking for it every evening. He Shan is for B: that his mother's honeysuckle has a fence it can climb. The C the two cannot not do is that stretch of fence: how close, how high, where the gate goes, how high the latch, where the posts are sunk. C does not belong to Yu Ping's A, nor to He Shan's B. The gap was filled, and the vines had somewhere to climb; but how the fence itself was to be mended was decided only after the two concerns had met: the gate was what Yu Ping wanted; the height of the latch was set for Yu Ping's dog; the wood was He Shan's; moving the posts half a foot in was a change made after He Shan called a halt. Not one of these can be said to have been decided by one person alone.

Applied to This Series' Object

What Action Theory's proposition describes is how two people who each live by their own law do things together. The object this series reads has different conditions: at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction, and the other end may lean toward 14DD. Applying the structure of that proposition, each side avowing, each having a share, neither holding the purpose and adjudication alone, to an object of this kind is a step this series takes on as its own undertaking.16

Applied here, two things do not come along with it. One is that the other end, by actually taking part, has not thereby been certified as headed in the 15DD direction: his having avowed this undertaking, done his share, even accepted what the other wanted, is not the same as his having recognized the other as an end too. The other is that two people's getting one thing done together does not thereby give them an identity at a higher layer. When two one-way 15DDs meet at a moment of doing this undertaking together, that is the moment of two-way 15DD, something that happens on an occasion, read in Paper 7; a stretch of fence being finished is not on that account that moment.

Whether this step connects rests on the words, deeds and arrangements in the example, not on names. Suppose that on the first day of mending the fence the situation at the two ends is not symmetrical. At Yu Ping's end, the example takes it that he is headed in the 15DD direction in this undertaking: from the start he keeps He Shan's concern in mind, and asks how high a fence the honeysuckle needs and how wide the gaps between the strips should be for the vines to climb well. At He Shan's end, only his words and deeds are written here: on the first day, what he says and what he reckons all concern his own business, the gap filled, the vegetable plot left in peace, somewhere for his mother's flowers to climb; when it comes to the gate Yu Ping wants, what he says is that it costs material and labor. This is one end taking part for its own purpose. On the second day, He Shan goes himself to measure the place for the gate, digs out two more pieces of wood for the gate frame, and says "The gate's what you wanted, so we'll keep it": within the shared way of doing it he has taken in the gate Yu Ping wanted, and Yu Ping's purpose has entered C. This is accepting what the other wants, not the same as recognizing the other as an end too; what it can confirm is that the arrangement has changed, and it does not by itself certify how, on his inner grounds, he regards Yu Ping. The latch was made a good bit higher, as he himself said, so that the dog could not reach it. The two formed one and the same way of doing it, each keeping his own step: Yu Ping saw to sinking the posts and nailing the strips, He Shan to the wood and to setting the latch.

This passage does not need the two to recognize each other in the same way from the start. What it needs is that this undertaking take shape between the two in this way: both have avowed it, each has a share, and how it is done is not for one party alone to decide. Whether, and when, He Shan recognizes Yu Ping as an end too in this undertaking cannot be read from outside; what can be read is that he measured the place for the gate, kept the gate, and changed the latch. These are clues, not a certification of his inner life. Nor can it go the other way round: one cannot, because "You supply the labor, I'll supply the materials" was once said between the two, judge it a deal; nor, because Yu Ping put in work on He Shan's behalf, judge it an act of help. Names do not certify structure.

Each Has a Share

Each one's share can look very different.

It can consist in taking up one's own part according to the other's arrangement. Yu Ping says how deep the posts go and how far apart the strips are; He Shan, following this, passes the strips and steadies the posts: this is He Shan's share. Doing as arranged is not handing one's own share over. Marriage Theory, reading what two people do together, has written: "If one party is willing to do things according to the other's arrangement, it does not count as holding alone, so long as his way to take part, adjust and withdraw is there."17 For one who does things according to the other's arrangement, so long as his own way to adjust and to withdraw is there, the share is still his.

It can also consist in saying what one wants and deciding for oneself how it is to be done. He Shan says the fence must take climbing vines and the latch must be high: this too is his share; Yu Ping says a gate must be left: this is Yu Ping's.

"Each has a share" is not a guarantee of results. What it speaks of is taking part and a feasible division of what is to be done: the two judged and tried; if that stretch of fence was later blown crooked again by a high wind, or the honeysuckle never did climb it, it cannot on that basis be concluded after the fact that this undertaking was never done together. Whether it got done is another account; that it was done together has already happened.

Not Holding Alone

Not holding alone has two layers: purpose, and adjudication.

Purpose not being held alone means that C is not anyone's A borrowing another person's hands: in the fence there is the gate Yu Ping wanted, and also the close fence He Shan wanted; what both wanted has entered C; it is not something made with another person's hands that belongs to one person only.

Adjudication not being held alone means that how this undertaking is done is not for one party alone to decide. Whether there is a gate and where it goes, whether the posts are to be sunk again, are all decided between the two; if any one of these were decided by one party, the other having no way to say no, to change it or to exit, that one would have become something one party holds alone.

Not holding alone, in this series, has one layer more: having recognized that the other's share is the other's, not merely that neither can hold it alone. Two people evenly matched in strength, neither able to snatch the other's share away, are also not holding alone, seen from outside. Where the boundary between these two lies is read in §5.

Qualification and What Is Actually Done

That a person is qualified to say no and to call a halt is not the same as his having done a share. If He Shan had only stood to one side from beginning to end, letting Yu Ping mend it however he would, with the thought of calling a halt if he was not satisfied, that qualification would be there, yet it would not yet be his share. Qualification is the place from which he can come in at any time; a choice, an indication, a correction or a pause actually made is his having come in.

Whether a step actually taken is a share depends on how it enters the shared way of doing it. On the third day of the work, He Shan said the soil under the posts was loose, that they should stop for a moment, and that this stretch should be pulled up and sunk again. What he halted was the whole current operation, but he did not withdraw himself; what he wanted was to go on mending it another way. This halt entered the shared way of doing it: from then on the posts were sunk where he pointed. This is his share.

Calling a halt can also be another thing. Suppose He Shan had said that day: "Forget it, I'm not mending this fence; you see to it yourself." What he halted would again be the whole thing, but this time what he withdrew would be his own side, that of going on taking part, and it is read as exit. The two are not told apart by how much is halted: the first time it was the whole stretch that stopped, and the second time it was the whole stretch too; what tells them apart is whether, after stopping, he is still in this undertaking. How the effects already left are entered after exit is read in Paper 7; the Conflict Treatise has written: "Departure can happen; departure does not by itself close those accounts."18

Help, and Ceasing to Be Helped

Cooperation has a common neighbor: help. One person helps another do something, and the latter only receives it: this is an act of help. Relation Theory says of dealings that "one-way dealings count too"; help is one-way dealings, which this series has already read.19 Help can be a great deal, and can weigh a great deal, and it is still not within the cooperation this series reads: the one helped has not avowed a thing the two do together, and has no share of his own.

Conversely, one who is helped and no longer wants help does not on that account become a party to cooperation. He has only stopped.

This point is seen with another example. Qi Boyong, in his seventies, is moving from the old house he has lived in for decades to a small flat near his daughter's home. He asks his neighbor Tong Xin to help, and they agree that everything is to be left to her: what to pack, what to give away, where things go in the new home, he will see to none of it; he will only wait to one side. Tong Xin calls a van, sorts things into boxes, and carries them out one by one. Through these days, Qi Boyong is the one being helped.

At the new home, Tong Xin pushes the bookcase toward the window, and Qi Boyong says: "The bookcase goes against this wall." And then: "Don't have the bed facing the door; turn it round." The next day he changes things once more, moving an old table from the bedroom to the living room. From this point on, where things go begins to be pointed out, and changed, by him.

What has to be made clear is which stretch, and which step. Whether to move, where to move to, whom to ask for help, leaving it to her to arrange: these Qi Boyong decided himself; handing this undertaking over is also an act of his, and is not wiped out because he did not carry things himself or direct each item. What is read here is the carrying out of the packing and placing. In this stretch, at first, of the choices that make up this undertaking, what to keep, what to give away, where things go, Qi Boyong bore not one: he had handed them to Tong Xin. On the day at the new home, the choice of where things go began to be borne by him. From that step on, he had a share of his own; the move, in its stretch of where things go, became something the two did together. Asking someone for help and handing a matter over do not in themselves make this act of help already cooperation.

Two things are not read here. One is his heart: why at first he left everything alone, whether he was tired, whether he trusted Tong Xin, or something else, this paper does not fill in. The other is effort: he did not carry a single box, and he had a share all the same; this series does not set a threshold for taking part by how much effort was put in or how much was said.

§3 Three Things

CO3 Direction, participation and judgment govern different things: for direction, one party is enough, and it is the direction premise; for participation, both are needed, and it is cooperation itself; in judgment, each party uses his own judgment and answers for his own share. Judgment is not the 15DD direction

Taken together, the first two sections let three things be told apart: direction, participation, judgment. The three are often spoken of as one; this proposition separates them.

Direction: One Party Is Enough

Direction is the direction premise (CO1). One party headed in the 15DD direction is enough; the cooperation this series reads is just cooperation in which there is at least one such person.

Participation: Both Are Needed

Participation is cooperation itself. Both avow this undertaking, actually take part, and each has a share; with one party missing, there is no thing done together. If Yu Ping alone is headed in the 15DD direction and He Shan takes no part at all, there is only a fence Yu Ping mended by himself. So "for direction one party is enough" and "for participation both are needed" do not conflict: one speaks of the premise, the other of the thing itself.

Judgment: Each Uses His Own

In doing things together there are always places that neither rules nor arrangements cover. How close the fence is to be was said beforehand; whether the soil under this post is loose, whether that strip has a hidden crack, which way the honeysuckle will climb next year: no arrangement agreed in advance decides these for them. The Games of Judgment series has said that the step the rules have not fixed, the partner's next step, what he wants, are where the remainder shows itself.20 Where the remainder falls has to be judged by people themselves.

In judgment, each party uses his own judgment and answers for his own share. He Shan judges that the soil under the posts is loose: this is his judgment; if he judged wrongly, that judgment is on his own account. Yu Ping's agreeing, after looking, to sink them again is Yu Ping's own judgment, on Yu Ping's own account. Who called the halt can be recorded; recording it does not directly decide who bears the extra afternoon's work: that belongs to the accounts of causation and fault, which this series does not unfold (Paper 6). The two people's judgments can fit together, and can also fail to; when they do not, how a shared arrangement is set is read in Paper 3.

Answering for, as meant here, faces inward: the account falls on the one who judges, and the subject answers to its own law. It is not a duty owed to the other party. How answering for falls within something done together, who acknowledges what has been done, and how causation, fault and remedy are entered separately, are read in Paper 6.

Judgment Is Not the 15DD Direction

The end that leans toward 14DD uses its own judgment all the same. He Shan's judging whether a gate costs material, whether the posts are steady, is all his own judging. The 15DD direction speaks of whether, in this undertaking, he recognizes the other as an end too; judgment speaks of whether, where the rules have fixed nothing, that judgment was made by him.

So "for direction one party is enough" and "in judgment both are needed" do not conflict either. A person can be headed in the 15DD direction and judge poorly in a concrete matter; a person can lean toward 14DD and judge very well. Getting one thing done together needs both people's judgment, and needs each of the two to answer for his own part; neither of these can the 15DD direction stand in for.

§4 The Object Layer and the Operation Layer

CO4 The object layer and the operation layer are kept apart: what the object layer reads is cooperation that has as its direction premise that at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction, and that is checked further for both parties' avowing and actually taking part, for not being reduced to calculation, and for not colonizing a third person. At the operation layer each party confirms only his own end, and cannot on that basis declare on the other end's behalf that it avows; the other end's taking part and arrangements are described by words and deeds and checkable conditions, and their inner grounds are not certified. If it is later confirmed that the object did not obtain, this series exits this case, and does not turn and judge the other end

To say that at least one party is headed in this direction, to say that both avow: who says these things, and to whom?

Two Layers

When the Conflict Treatise handles two laws colliding, it keeps two layers apart. The object layer: the object under discussion really is two independently formed laws. The operation layer: "I can confirm only my own end. The other end enters as a requirement that the other bears in the first person and by which the other goes on organizing their action."21 Marriage Theory reads the direction in marriage by this division.22 This series reads cooperation by it.

The object layer: what this series reads is cooperation that has as its direction premise that at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction, and that has been checked on the three further things. The operation layer: Yu Ping can confirm only his own end: in which direction he operates in this undertaking, whether he has avowed it, what his share is. He Shan's end appears before Yu Ping as He Shan's own words and deeds: what he said, what he did, how he treated the gate.

Not Declaring Avowal on the Other End's Behalf

So "both avow" is a sentence of the object layer, not something one party can say on the other's behalf. Action Theory has written: "neither side can declare agreement in the other's place".23 In the data group of the same paper, a manager asks a member of the group whether the head of the other team also agrees to extend the pilot to every department, and he answers: "You'll have to ask her."24

After the fence is finished, Yu Ping says to someone who has dropped by: "The gate's here, and He Shan says that's fine too." If this only reports the words He Shan did say, "The gate's what you wanted, so we'll keep it", it is a report, and can be checked. If He Shan never said any such thing, Yu Ping's remark declares an avowal on He Shan's behalf, and slides in the direction of colonization.25

Described by Words and Deeds and Checkable Conditions

The other end's taking part and arrangements are described by words and deeds and checkable conditions. He Shan measured the place for the gate, brought two more pieces of wood, changed the height of the latch, called a halt once: these can be checked, and can be written down. Whether in his heart he recognized Yu Ping as an end too, this paper does not certify, nor does it say, because this cannot be certified, that he did not.

Exiting This Case, Not Turning to Judge

If it is later confirmed that the object did not obtain, for instance if it later becomes clear from words, deeds and records that the arrangement was directed at a third person from the start, or that the share under the other person's name was done for him by someone else from beginning to end and he only lent his name, this series exits this case, and does not turn and judge the other end. Whether the other is reduced to calculation lies only in this end's own judgment (Paper 5, CO27). The Conflict Treatise says at the same place: "Exiting says: this case does not belong here. Turning to judge says: the other end does not qualify. The first is about scope; the second is about a person, and the second is not within the powers exercised here."26

Exiting this case is also entered by period. A cooperation that later loses its premise does not erase, backward, the shared process that has already happened; a moment carrying the direction of colonization has its effects entered item by item, and is not rewritten as the whole cooperation's never having been within scope.

§5 Three Kinds Outside Scope

CO5 Three kinds are commonly met outside scope; each is read differently, and all are written as "not within the cooperation this series reads": that in which neither party is headed in the 15DD direction, whose ideal type is the case in which both parties treat each other only as a strategy set and reach a balance by mutual calculation; that of being passively helped, which is an act of help, read as one-way dealings per Relation Theory; and the stretch in which the arrangement the two jointly avow and actually maintain carries the direction of colonization toward a third person or crosses his basic rights. One person's later addition, or a use kept from the partner, is no ground, merely because it bears the same project's name, for inferring backward that the other avowed it too; that competition makes a third person lose out is not the same as colonizing him. If the arrangement the two jointly maintain is premised on "a third person is merely a means," the arrangement itself decides who counts as an end by whether someone is one of our own, and the recognition between the two does not rest on the other's being a person either; in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction. One who was at first passively helped, once he avows this undertaking and takes up his own share, and the other conditions are met, is within scope from then on. Where one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation, another of the conditions of scope is not met; Paper 5 reads this (CO27)

The three kinds commonly met outside scope each lack something different: the first lacks the direction premise; the second lacks participation; in the third it is the arrangement itself that goes toward a third person. All three are written as "not within the cooperation this series reads," not as "not cooperation" (CO1). There is one more kind that is not among these three: one end headed in the 15DD direction, and the other, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation. What it lacks is another of the conditions of scope (that the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation), and it belongs to Paper 5 (CO27).

Where Neither Party Is Headed in This Direction

The first kind is that in which neither party operates in the 15DD direction in this undertaking. Its ideal type is this: each of the two works out exactly how the other will move, and chooses the step most profitable to himself; the other's step is, for each, only a set of calculable responses; as a result both sides keep to the agreement, and each gets what he is after. In everyday speech this too is called cooperation.

This series does not read it, and the reason lies in the direction premise: in this undertaking both parties treat each other only as a strategy set, and neither is headed in the 15DD direction. In this series it is spoken of only as an ideal type. From outside, the two keeping to the agreement, delivering as agreed and keeping an eye on each other are all only clues; the visible words and deeds can be exactly the same as in a cooperation in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction. So this kind is said only conditionally: if in this undertaking both parties treat each other only as a strategy set, this undertaking is not within the cooperation this series reads. Marriage Theory reads the purely transactional marriage with the same way of writing.27 What the markers of the boundary look at is read in CO6.

Where both look out for their own concerns, and both structurally acknowledge that the other has purposes of his own, yet neither recognizes the other as an end too in this undertaking: this too lacks the direction premise. In this kind neither is reduced to calculation, and it is still not within the cooperation this series reads. From outside, one cannot tell whether two shops each doing their own sums, signing contracts and delivering, fall in this kind or in the ideal type above; what both kinds lack is the direction premise, and there is no need to tell them apart.

Being Passively Helped

Being passively helped is an act of help, read as one-way dealings per Relation Theory (CO2). The one who helps may be headed in the 15DD direction, and this undertaking is still not within the cooperation this series reads: what is lacking is not the direction, but participation at the end of the one helped.

One who was at first passively helped, once he avows this undertaking and takes up his own share, and the other conditions are met, is within scope from then on. When Qi Boyong, at the new home, says "The bookcase goes against this wall," from that step on the stretch of where things go is something the two do together. The days before that are read as help; from then on, as cooperation. The earlier stretch is not rewritten because it later became cooperation, and the later stretch does not fail to count because at first it was help.

The Stretch That Goes Toward a Third Person

The third kind is that in which the arrangement the two jointly avow and actually maintain carries the direction of colonization toward a third person, or crosses his basic rights. The boundary is drawn by that matter itself: what exits scope is that stretch, not everything the two have done together before or after.

Suppose that while mending the fence Yu Ping and He Shan agree to move the fence back a meter, taking in a length of the narrow lane behind; from then on the few households in the lane have to go round, and one household's car can no longer get in at its gate. This arrangement both have avowed, and both maintain together: Yu Ping drives the posts, He Shan supplies the material, and when someone comes to ask, the two say the same thing. This stretch carries the direction of colonization toward those households; if what it crosses is their basic rights, it is judged separately as violation.28 It is not within the cooperation this series reads.

There are two things here from which nothing is inferred backward.

One is one person's later addition. If it is only Yu Ping who later, on his own and keeping it from He Shan, runs a line of wire outside the fence and blocks the mouth of the lane, this wire is no ground, merely because it hangs on the same stretch of fence, for inferring backward that He Shan avowed it too. Its effect on the households in the lane is entered by Relation Theory's pairwise accounting, on Yu Ping's account with them.29

The other is competition. Two friends go in together to compete for a market stall, and several others do not get one. Others' losing out is the outcome of competition, not the same as colonizing them. The Games of Judgment series, reading the competitive game, has written: "Taking the opponent as an end is the player's stance, not the structure of the game."30 The structure of competition, on its own, decides neither the stance nor the direction.

Collusion

Within the third kind, one case needs to be read on its own: two people jointly avow and maintain an arrangement premised on "a third person is merely a means." This case this series calls collusion.

Only the arrangement is read, not the persons. Such an arrangement decides who counts as an end by "whether someone is one of our own": the two recognize each other; those outside the two are merely means. This reading goes in several steps.

First, look at what 15DD recognizes. The Introduction has said that 15DD is non dubito: it is not only I who am an end; the other, too, is an end in itself. What it recognizes is that the other, too, is an end in itself: it does not recognize him on the strength of who he is or what he has.

Next, look at this arrangement. In this arrangement, the third person is a person too, yet is treated merely as a means; the partner counts as an end, and he does not. Then the partner's being recognized as an end here does not rest on "he is a person," or else the third person would be included too; it rests on some other item: whether one is inside, whether one is useful, whether one is close, and so on.

Which item it rests on, this passage does not decide, nor does it decide it for the two from outside. What can be decided is only this: on the strength of this item, people are ranked high and low, oneself at the top, and others laid out along this item toward the side of means. If someone counts as an end only on the strength of some item, then what is being counted is not that the other, too, is an end in itself. Recognition of this kind is not in the direction of recognizing the other as an end too; so in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction. This stretch exits scope on two grounds: the direction premise is not met, and the arrangement itself carries the direction of colonization toward a third person.

Recognition of this kind carries with it the item it rests on: if that item changes, the ground of this recognition changes with it. This sentence speaks of structure; it does not predict how long such an arrangement lasts, nor does it say that once that item changes the recognition is bound to be withdrawn. After one of them exits that arrangement, it is also possible that the other still acknowledges that the one who exited has purposes of his own; in what direction the recognition after that lies is read separately, by period.

The boundaries must be written out in full, or this passage will be read too widely.

  • A single falling back is not among these. People are all mixed; where a person crosses the line toward a third person in some undertaking, it is read by the effect of this one occasion, and it cannot be inferred that his recognition of his partner is not in this direction. What this passage speaks of is only an arrangement premised on "a third person is merely a means" and maintained by the two jointly.
  • Merely having an effect on a third person is not among these: the two mend a fence together, and the people in the back lane can no longer see into their garden; this is an effect, not the premise of the arrangement. A third person's losing out in competition, and one person's addition kept from his partner, are not among these either.
  • What is read is the structure of that arrangement; it does not certify the two people's inner lives, nor does it say which pair in reality is like this.

Seen from outside, collusion and the cooperation this series reads can look the same between the two. The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation has written, at the layer of constructs: "Cooperation and collusion can grow to look the same at the layer of recognition."31 The recognition between the two cannot be told apart from outside; what can be told apart is the arrangement's premise regarding a third person.

The structure this passage reads, Laughter IV has also written. In its abstract it writes 15DD as non dubito,32 and, explaining this layer after Psychoanalysis IV, it writes: "a 'non dubito' that can be maintained only by denying the other's independence is not non dubito but forced construct-closure. Confirming the other as an independent end is the structural test condition of non dubito."33 Collusion falls exactly here. If the recognition between the two can be maintained only by treating a third person merely as a means, what it confirms is not the other as an independent end; that ring of recognition has been forcibly closed by whether someone is one of our own. The "only by" here joins up with the steps above: what is read is the premise of that arrangement, not the two people's inner lives; that arrangement is premised on a third person's being merely a means, and the recognition between the two is maintained on this premise. The original sentence speaks of one subject's non dubito; applying it here to an arrangement two people jointly maintain is an extension, this series' own undertaking.

When Relation Theory reads the same sentence, it takes it apart by pairwise accounting: the glance between the two is entered only as one collision, and no layer is assigned to it; each of the two people's effects on the third person is read separately for the direction of colonization and for violation.34 This passage does not change that reading. What it reads is not one collision, but an arrangement the two jointly avow and maintain; what it reads is the direction in this undertaking, and it assigns no layer to either person; the several effects on the third person are read separately by pairwise accounting. When Relation Theory reads a moment between two people, it also gives a dependency condition: "A moment between two people, if it can hold only by treating a third person as material, does not count as the moment of two-way 15DD"; and at the same place it writes: "if at the same moment someone else is hurt, it does not follow from the coincidence in time that this moment is false."35 This passage reads by the same condition: only when that arrangement is premised on a third person's being merely a means is it among these; merely coinciding in time with a third person's being harmed does not put it among these. What Relation Theory reads from this dependency condition is only that that moment does not count as the moment of two-way 15DD; this passage reads that neither end is headed in the 15DD direction in this undertaking, which goes one step further; its ground is the premise of that arrangement, and this step is this series' own undertaking.

CO6 Between the balance of mutual calculation and the cooperation this series reads, the markers of the boundary look at three structural clues: whether not holding alone is having recognized that the other's share is the other's, or only that neither can hold it alone; whether the other's share is still borne by him himself; whether the existing arrangement makes room for his refusal and revision. The clues say only where the boundary lies; they do not certify inner recognition, nor prove that that kind is not cooperation. What the three clues tell apart is whether or not one is reduced to calculation; whether at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction only that end itself can confirm (CO4), and the clues do not certify it on its behalf

The ideal type of CO5's first kind, a balance reached by mutual calculation, can be exactly the same, from outside, as the cooperation this series reads. This proposition says what the markers of the boundary look at.

The Same from Outside

The Games of Judgment series, reading the cooperative game, has written: "in the cooperative game, his step is part of what we want together. This game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine." It also writes that this kind of game "newly opens 15DD, but does not guarantee it: the partner can also be merely someone who helps me reach my purpose".36 What doing things together looks like invites recognizing the other as an end too, but does not guarantee it.

Two people mending a stretch of fence together, two shops doing a piece of business together, two rivals joining hands for a while for each one's advantage: seen from outside, each is a matter of each putting in a share and acting as agreed. The boundary lies not in what was done, but in the structure of those ways of doing it.

Three Clues

The first: whether not holding alone is having recognized that the other's share is the other's, or only that neither can hold it alone. Two people evenly matched in strength, neither able to swallow the other, end up with neither holding it alone; this not holding alone rests on strength, and once the strength shifts it can turn into holding alone. Where the other's share has been recognized as the other's, not holding alone does not rest on strength: Yu Ping has the knack for this work, and how deep the posts go and how far apart the strips are could have been decided by him alone; he still first asks He Shan how wide the gaps should be for the honeysuckle to climb well. On He Shan's side there is a clue too: he holds all the wood, and could have decided alone what the fence would be like; he still kept the gate Yu Ping wanted. This is at least structurally acknowledging that Yu Ping has purposes of his own; whether he therefore recognizes Yu Ping as an end too cannot be read from outside (CO4).

The second: whether the other's share is still borne by him himself. Each having a share is that share's still being in his hands: Yu Ping sinks the posts, and how deep they go he decides himself; when He Shan called a halt, what he changed was the way of doing it, not taking Yu Ping's share into his own hands. If one party's share has in fact already been decided for him and done for him by the other, and is still called his only in name, that share is no longer borne by him himself.

The third: whether the existing arrangement makes room for his refusal and revision. Where the gate goes, where the posts are sunk: either of the two can say no, and what he says counts, and the arrangement can change accordingly. What has to be checked here is whether refusal and revision can really be put forward, and whether, once put forward, they are forced back down; not whether the cooperation can be kept going after any change whatever. When the two no longer agree on one way of doing it, they can end their doing this undertaking together at that point; stopping does not by itself certify that the arrangement before or after carries the direction of colonization. This holds alike at both ends: the one who says no can be the one who proposes a change, and can also be the one who does not accept the change.

Clues Are Only Clues

All three are structural clues: they say roughly where the boundary lies; they do not certify inner recognition, nor prove that that kind is not cooperation. The Games of Judgment series says that what something looks like in behavior is not recognition itself; in its own words, "acknowledgment the game can only invite".37 A person's keeping a gate can be having recognized the other's purpose, and can also be only a wish to avoid a quarrel; an arrangement's making room for refusal can be having recognized the other's adjudication, and can also be only that there is no better way for the time being.

What the three clues tell apart is whether or not one is reduced to calculation. Where both ends lean toward 14DD and neither is reduced to calculation, yet neither recognizes the other as an end too in this undertaking, the case can look the same as the cooperation this series reads on these three clues as well. Whether at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction only that end itself can confirm (CO4), and the clues do not certify it on its behalf.

Clues can accumulate. Over long years of doing things together, these clues fall one time after another, and the weight of judgment changes; the Conflict Treatise has written: "Long-run relational fact may shift the weight of my judgment; it cannot complete a certification."38 Which side the clues fall on is each end's own judgment, on his own account; this series says only where the markers of the boundary lie, and makes this judgment for neither end.

§6 The Prisoner's Dilemma: What Can Be Derived, and What Cannot

For the ideal type of CO5's first kind, a balance reached by mutual calculation, the picture most often brought out is the prisoner's dilemma. This section looks at it once: how the step that rules can derive and the step where judgment falls are kept apart. What this section reads is reasoning; it judges no one in reality.

That Derivation

The example this paper adopts is this: two people are arrested over the same case and held apart; they have made no agreement beforehand, and cannot now get word to each other. Each can confess, or not. For instance: if neither confesses, each gets one year; if one confesses and the other does not, the one who confesses goes free on the spot, and the one who does not gets ten years; if both confess, each gets five years. The payoff counts only each person's own sentence.

The reasoning runs like this. For one of them: if the other does not confess, confessing sets him free and not confessing gets him one year, so confessing pays better; if the other confesses, confessing gets him five years and not confessing ten, so confessing pays better too. Whatever the other does, confessing pays better: by the given payoffs, confessing strictly dominates for him. The same holds on the other's side. So it is derived that both confess and each gets five years; whereas neither confessing, each getting one year, would by these very payoffs have been better for both.

This derivation rests on given strategy sets, an ordering of payoffs and the corresponding assumptions about choice; it has no need to know who is opposite. The person opposite is written in the reasoning as a strategy set: confess, or not. The Economics series has written: "In the 14DD world, the person across from you is a strategy set".39

So merely knowing the other better leaves the derivation standing. Even if one knew for certain that the other would not confess, by these payoffs confessing would still be the step that pays better; the same if one knew for certain that he would. Strict dominance says just this: whatever the other does, it pays better; however much more one knows about the other, this derivation does not change.

The Step the Computation Does Not Take In

Judgment is not a rule; what it looks at is the step the rules have not fixed. The Games of Judgment series writes of the competitive game: "The competitive game adds a layer: his next move, which the rules have not fixed and which I cannot fix either; his watching, too, how I will move; and my watching, in turn, how he thinks I will move."40 The Economics series writes of when a person in an asymmetric relation switches to another way of acting: "this judgment is structurally non-algorithmizable"; "this is reflective judgment: judgment without a pre-given rule".41

The computation of the prisoner's dilemma does not itself take in how the subject examines these premises. A person held in custody can judge whether these few numbers are enough to represent his own situation, and whether he accepts them as the ground of his own action; this judgment the computation cannot make for him. While the premises are still maintained, the original derivation does not automatically disappear because more is known; where the premises are revised, or are no longer avowed, the original model cannot give in advance a result for the new situation either.

Where Judgment Falls

Here, the judgment this series chiefly asks after falls on this: whether one recognizes the other prisoner as an end too, and not merely as a means to the best outcome one seeks for oneself. This is not the only judgment that can be made here; the end that leans toward 14DD uses its own judgment all the same (CO3); this section asks after this judgment only.

In the example this paper adopts, the payoff counts only each person's own sentence; the other appears in it only as a condition of one's own outcome. Once a person recognizes the other as an end too, the other's situation enters his own weighing, and the given ordering of payoffs no longer decides for him. Writing the other's sentence into one's own payoff as well still gives a matrix, only with a different set of numbers; this judgment is not a weight in the matrix, but not taking this table for the whole of the other. What one knows of him works by way of this judgment, not as one more item of information in the matrix.

This sentence says only where the judgment falls; it does not give in advance which action it leads to, nor does it say who in reality has made this judgment. A person who recognizes the other as an end too can confess, and can also not confess; how he moves comes from his own judgment, on his own account. §3 has said that getting one thing done together needs both people's judgment: in the derivation of the prisoner's dilemma, neither side has this judgment.

Taking the Strategy Table for the Whole of the Partner

What can be derived by external rules does not need the subject's judgment. This does not say that whoever uses a model treats people as means. Using a model to study the behavior available does not in itself amount to treating people merely as means; a "strategy set" lists possible moves, and does not amount to the other's next step having been written in stone either.

The crossing of the line falls on one kind of use: one party takes a strategy table he can compute for himself as the whole of his partner, and deletes along with it the partner's place for re-explaining, refusing and revising his own purposes. In this use, the model takes over the subject's place, and falls exactly on the side of mutual calculation (CO5). That this use crosses the line is explained by this antecedent, and is not proved by the form of using a matrix on its own.

Reading Only the Reasoning, Judging No One

What this section reads is the reasoning that derives that conclusion, not a judgment on any person in reality in a similar situation. A person in reality may have used judgment. Then the ground of his action is not something the matrix can avow for him; if, having examined the premises, he still adopts the same ones, the model may still describe or derive the same choice. This does not make his examining and his bearing part of the computation, nor does it make the model exhaust this person on that account.

The Label "Cooperation"

What the example labels "cooperation" is the one action of not betraying the other. It and the cooperation this series reads are not one word; nor does this paper define the word for game theory as a whole.

In the example the two are kept apart, have made no prior agreement, and cannot communicate: in this example, there is no way to avow a shared undertaking on the spot. The payoff matrix itself does not write down whether some shared undertaking has already been avowed before; being unable to communicate for a time does not automatically revoke an earlier avowal either.

§7 Interfacing with Tradition

Interfacing goes only as far as where the work divides. First the common question is written, then where they part; no one is cast in advance as the opposing side.

The prisoner's dilemma (Flood, Dresher, Tucker). The puzzle of this structure is usually attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, who ran an experiment on it at the RAND Corporation in early 1950; the prisoner story with sentences as payoffs is due to Albert Tucker; the name "prisoner's dilemma" is also usually credited to him, while the earliest use of it in print is in Luce and Raiffa's book of 1957.42 The common question: why two people, each looking out for himself, cannot derive the step that is better for both. §6 has read it: that derivation rests on given payoffs and choice assumptions, and the judgment this series asks after falls on whether one recognizes the other prisoner as an end too. This paper reads only the reasoning in the example, and passes no judgment on that model's usefulness in its own field.

Axelrod. Robert Axelrod ran computer tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma: he invited people who study game theory to submit strategy programs, had them play one another in pairs, and compared what patterns of behavior the various rules produced in repeated play; the highest scorer in the first tournament was Tit for Tat: cooperate on the first move, and thereafter do whatever the other did on the move before.43 The common question: with no authority in the middle, how mutual non-betrayal between two people each looking out for himself arises, and how it is sustained. Tit for Tat is itself a rule; the mutual non-betrayal obtained from it can be read against the ideal type of CO5's first kind. Following a rule does not on that alone certify that the people in reality who act by it are reduced to calculation: a person acting by Tit for Tat may be only calculating, and may also be judging, in this undertaking, that doing so is best. Where they part lies in the question itself: Axelrod asks how mutual non-betrayal grows out of each looking out for himself; this series does not ask where cooperation comes from, and reads only what the thing done together looks like when at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction.

Hume: two men rowing a boat. In Book 3, Part 2, Section 2 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume speaks of the convention by which people leave alone what others possess. He says that this kind of convention is not of the order of promising, only a general sense of common interest that people express to one another; and he gives the example of two men rowing a boat: they bring their oars together by a convention, though neither has ever promised the other anything.44 The common question: what keeps the things people do together connected. A point where they shed light on each other: doing a thing together does not first require a promise; avowing this undertaking and each having a share can take shape in the course of the doing, and the gate in the fence was not decided on until the second day of the work. A point where they part: Hume reads how convention forms from common interest; this series reads each of the two people's avowing and each one's having a share, and does not derive them from common interest; when at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction, each having a share is read as: the other's share is the other's. Hume on promises has already been taken up in Relation Theory Paper 0, §11, and is pointed back to here.45

Rousseau: the stag hunt. In Part Two of the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau writes: if a deer was to be taken, everyone understood that he had to hold his place; but if a hare ran past one of them, he would go after it without a second thought, and once he had his own prey he would not blame himself for leaving his companions empty-handed.46 The common question: where a shared activity can break off. This series reads the scene as a shared undertaking; it does not judge whether those hunters are within its scope, and reads only the effects: the one who goes after the hare withdraws his own side, that of going on taking part, and this is read as exit (CO2); that his companions are left empty-handed is an effect this exit has already left, and it is not left unentered because he said nothing and did not blame himself; Paper 7 reads this. Rousseau uses the scene to show how short-sighted people were at that time; this series does not judge the man who went after the hare, and reads only how this shared undertaking broke off.

Hobbes. In Chapter 17 of Leviathan, Hobbes writes that covenants without the sword are only words, and have no power at all to keep anyone safe.47 The common question: what makes an agreement to do things together binding. Hobbes's answer lies in the commonwealth: a common power. His answer at the level of the commonwealth this series does not judge; that level lies between persons and constructs, and belongs to the institutional side. At the level between two people, the binding this series reads does not rest on the sword: commitment binds a person, on my side by where I stand,48 and on the other party's side by the effects already left; breaking it is entered on the books, read in Paper 6. The two are not reading the same level.

Neighbors. Michael Tomasello reads shared intentionality in human cooperation from developmental and comparative research, and asks where the capacity to cooperate comes from; this series does not read where cooperation comes from, and places him only as a neighbor. Michael Bratman reads shared intention and acting together by a planning theory; this series gives no norms of planning rationality, and places him only as a neighbor. Margaret Gilbert's joint commitment has already been taken up in Relation Theory Paper 0, §7: at the layer of qualification this series says the opposite of her: when a party withdraws his own side, it is withdrawn, only it does not clear the books on the other party's side; it is pointed back to here.49

§8 Drawing Together and Downstream

This paper has set out six propositions. Taken together, they say: this series does not define all cooperation; the cooperation it reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction; the direction is a premise, not a component, and is not enough to enter scope; entering scope is checked on three further things; 15DD and 14DD are stances, not labels, read by the current relational condition, and falling back is read as it occurs. Under this premise, two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share, whose purpose and adjudication neither party holds alone; each one's share takes different shapes; mere qualification is not a share; pausing in order to correct the way of doing it can be a share; only withdrawing one's own side, that of going on taking part, is exit; ceasing to be helped does not become cooperation. For direction one party is enough, for participation both are needed, in judgment each uses his own; judgment is not the 15DD direction. The object layer and the operation layer are kept apart; each party confirms only his own end and does not declare on the other end's behalf that it avows; exiting this case is not turning to judge. Three kinds are commonly met outside scope, and each lacks something different; where one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation, another of the conditions of scope is lacking, read in Paper 5. In collusion premised on "a third person is merely a means," the recognition between the two does not rest on the other's being a person, and in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction; this recognition carries with it the item it rests on. Between the balance of mutual calculation and the cooperation this series reads, the boundary looks at three structural clues; what the clues tell apart is whether or not one is reduced to calculation; they do not certify recognition, nor do they certify for either end that it is headed in the 15DD direction. The derivation of the prisoner's dilemma rests on given payoffs and choice assumptions; the judgment the computation does not take in, and that this series asks after here, falls on whether one recognizes the other prisoner as an end too.

This paper does not prove that what others call cooperation is not cooperation, does not prove that cooperation in the 15DD direction is better than other cooperation, and does not prove that people ought to cooperate.

Questions left open. On the day they mended the fence, what the two said was: you supply the labor, I'll supply the materials. Does this count as an exchange? If He Shan had supplied not a single strip of wood, and had only watched Yu Ping mend it and said what he wanted, would this still count as doing it together? And if both put in effort and in the end neither got anything? After the fence was finished, Yu Ping said to people, "the fence we mended": what is the "we" in this sentence? This paper has said only that each of the two is for his own purpose and has a share; it has not said what each of the two wants, nor has it said "we."

Downstream. What this paper has set out, the later papers use as follows. The premise, the structure, the three things, the object layer and the operation layer are the scope of the whole series; the way of writing the three kinds outside scope is used throughout the series. Each one's purpose, several arrangements of giving and getting, and the case where purposes are the same and are still two shares, are read in Paper 2. How division of labor is set and how it is changed, and how a shared arrangement is set when the two people's judgments do not fit together, are read in Paper 3. "We" is read in Paper 4; where a little circle of several people maintains an arrangement premised on "outsiders are merely means," Paper 4 reads it by this paper's reading. Cooperation in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction and one leans toward 14DD, and what follows once, in this end's judgment, the other is reduced to calculation, are read in Paper 5. Each one's judgment and answering for it, and who acknowledges what has been done, are read in Paper 6. Exit, completion, the effects already left, and the instant at which two one-way 15DDs meet at a moment of doing this undertaking together, that is, the moment of two-way 15DD, are read in Paper 7.

Acknowledgments

This paper is signed by Han Qin alone; the author decided every argument and choice and bears sole responsibility for the text. In drafting, the author used AI models from various developers as tools.

Notes

  1. Laughter IV, Abstract: "15DD is non dubito: it is not only I who am an end; the other, too, is an end in itself. This acknowledgment is unidirectional: it is one subject's not doubting that the other is an end in itself (Methodological Overview, §1.7)". ↩︎
  2. Love Theory Paper 0, §4: "A layer records one operation. It does not record a person, nor a love." Accordingly, it does not record a stretch of cooperation either. ↩︎
  3. Relation Theory Paper 1, Abstract and H8: "Cultivation and colonization are two directions: cultivation goes toward making space; colonization goes toward pouring in and occupying. The direction is read on this one effect; whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action. The two are not the two extremes of one scale: the same act can carry both directions, and it can also carry no direction at all; they are directions, not labels." ↩︎
  4. Relation Theory H9: "Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights; it and the direction of colonization are two lines". ↩︎
  5. The SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation stands on the institutional side, and reads between state and state, between construct and construct; its prequel is What Cooperation Is Not. This series' English name is SAE Cooperation Theory; the two are kept apart. ↩︎
  6. Exercises and Games of Judgment III, §1.2: "in the cooperative game, his step is part of what we want together. This game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine." ↩︎
  7. Action Theory Paper 8, D45 to D49. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16, lists the upstream pieces handed to Cooperation Theory: "Action Theory Paper 8, D47, D48 and the first half of D49, and Action Theory Paper 9, D56; Value Theory P5 V71; Conflict Treatise §20, §21 and §27"; Marriage Theory Paper 0, §2, the sixth item of scope: "doing things together in general belongs to Cooperation Theory, and Marriage Theory reads only doing things together within marriage". ↩︎
  8. Marriage Theory Paper 1, MA1, MA3. How the love between the two works belongs to Love Theory. The difference in reading at this point can be traced to the kind of relation: marriage has love as one thing it cannot do without; cooperation does not have love as something it cannot do without. ↩︎
  9. Conflict Treatise §7. In the same section: "Both definitions speak only of conditions, not of persons. Conditions are current, revisable, and shown by what has already happened in this relation." ↩︎
  10. Marriage Theory Paper 1, MA2: "The 15DD direction is a direction, not a state. People are all mixed; a layer records one operation, and falling back is read as it occurs." Love Theory Paper 0, §4: "falling back is very likely". ↩︎
  11. Learning IV, Abstract. In the same abstract: "those whose 14DD is not yet established are most vulnerable to being absorbed by another's strong 14DD, and the precondition for detecting this absorption is precisely recognizing that the other's 14DD is the other's own." ↩︎
  12. Economics P2, §2, writes how the 14DD party reads the 15DD party: "The 14DD party reads the 15DD party as a strategy set — preferences, constraints, optimal response functions — but not as an independent purposive subject." The structure of this sentence is borrowed here and carried to the end that, in doing things together, is reduced to calculation; this is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  13. Conflict Treatise §1: "Accordingly, what admits of diagnosis is this operation on this occasion, not this person." ↩︎
  14. Action Theory Paper 8, D47. ↩︎
  15. Action Theory Paper 8, §5. The same section says that this form of sentence "has been set down elsewhere in this system", referring to Reason Cannot Not, I.3. ↩︎
  16. What Action Theory Paper 8, §5, reads is people who each live by their own law; D47 is a proposition in that context. Cooperation Theory's applying it to an object in which at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other may lean toward 14DD is an extension, this series' own undertaking. This form of sentence, which Action Theory says has been set down elsewhere in this system, refers to the 16DD cooperative imperative listed in Reason Cannot Not, I.3; that place states further that the complete definition of the cooperative imperative is given in another paper (metaphysics-satz). Action Theory borrows it to read doing things together. In III.4 of Reason Cannot Not, the C of the cooperative imperative carries a further condition: C, as the emergence after the meeting of two purposes, "requires both subjects to expose themselves to the other's interrogation". The C this series reads follows Action Theory, and does not carry this condition; what the moment of two-way 15DD has to do with 16DD, this series does not judge (Paper 7). ↩︎
  17. Marriage Theory Paper 5, MA30. The two series are parallel, and this sentence has the same form at the normative layer; Cooperation Theory writes it accordingly, and does not derive it from there. ↩︎
  18. Conflict Treatise §2. In the same section: "Written this way it holds intimate relations, shared child-rearing, organizational role and public responsibility, and it does not conflict with the Final Volume's allowance that both sides may each depart." ↩︎
  19. Relation Theory Paper 1, under H1: "When this series speaks of dealings, one-way dealings count too: there need not be both a going and a coming". ↩︎
  20. Exercises and Games of Judgment II, §1.1: "In the solo game, the remainder shows itself in the move the rules have not fixed and in how the material responds." III, §1.1: "The remainder of the cooperative game can show itself in the partner's next step and in what he wants". ↩︎
  21. Conflict Treatise §2. ↩︎
  22. Marriage Theory Paper 1, under MA2. ↩︎
  23. Action Theory Paper 8, D45. ↩︎
  24. Action Theory Paper 8, §3. ↩︎
  25. Marriage Theory Paper 5, MA30: "One party avowing on the other's behalf, or saying out loud a characterization of the other's changing his mind, slides in the direction of colonization". Saying it out loud so as to avow on the other's behalf has, at the normative layer, the same form in cooperation. ↩︎
  26. Conflict Treatise §2. ↩︎
  27. Marriage Theory Paper 1, MA9: the purely transactional marriage, in which "both parties treat the other only as a means: this is an ideal type; from outside only clues can be seen; it is said only conditionally". ↩︎
  28. Relation Theory H9. What counts as the content of basic rights is not judged here; it is checked separately by Rights Theory. ↩︎
  29. Relation Theory H12: "Where three or more are involved, dealings that do not pass through an institution are broken down into effects between pairs and entered on separate accounts; passing through a third person does not release the instigator from his part; a little circle of two does not form a third bearer". ↩︎
  30. Exercises and Games of Judgment II, §5.1. ↩︎
  31. What Cooperation Is Not (the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation), §4. The same section cites Power Theory P3 §VII.2: apparatuses cooperating by registering one another forward is, "in a severing context, collusion" (cited at second hand, by way of the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation). That is the layer of constructs, and serves here only as a reference of the same form; collusion between two people is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  32. Laughter IV, Abstract; the full sentence is in note 1. ↩︎
  33. Laughter IV, §1.1, reporting Psychoanalysis IV (§1.2); the original of Psychoanalysis IV has not been separately checked for this paper. In §7.2 of the same paper, where looking at each other and laughing is told apart from tacit understanding, this sentence is used again: "Knowing each other does not yield not doubting each other". ↩︎
  34. Relation Theory Paper 1, under H12, reading the case from Laughter IV §7.2, writes: "Read by pairwise accounting, there are three relations here"; the glance between the two is entered only as one collision and assigned no layer, on the ground of the Second Critique, Rules of the House, Eleven: "A level records one operation, by moment and by domain; it does not record a person". ↩︎
  35. Relation Theory Paper 4, §5, under H40 ("The false glance"). At the same place: "'If it can hold only by' is a dependency condition". ↩︎
  36. Exercises and Games of Judgment III, §1.2; Abstract: "This kind of game newly opens 15DD, but does not guarantee it: the partner can also be merely someone who helps me reach my purpose." ↩︎
  37. Exercises and Games of Judgment III, §1.2: "But what it looks like in behaviour is not acknowledgment itself; acknowledgment the game can only invite." ↩︎
  38. Conflict Treatise §7. ↩︎
  39. Economics P2, §4.0. What is spoken of there is the perception lost in falling back to 14DD: "you cannot tell whether sincerity is genuine or performed". It is borrowed here to say what the person opposite is written as in the reasoning. ↩︎
  40. Exercises and Games of Judgment II, §1.1. ↩︎
  41. Economics P2, §4.4. The original speaks of the judgment of switching between cultivation and recognizing non-cultivability; it is borrowed here to speak of the difference between judgment and rules. ↩︎
  42. Per the current version of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Prisoner's Dilemma" (by Steven Kuhn; first published 1997, substantive revision 24 October 2025): "The ‘discovery’ of the prisoner’s dilemma is usually attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher." The two were employed by the RAND Corporation, and "In early 1950, they conducted an experiment"; "The illustrative story with prison sentences as payoffs is due to Albert Tucker"; the name is often credited to Tucker, "but Guerra-Pujol and Martinez-Garcia note that the earliest use of this label in print is Luce and Raiffa 1957." The same entry explains that, by the given payoffs, D strictly dominates for both parties. The figures for the sentences in this paper's example are made up for it. ↩︎
  43. Per the current version of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Prisoner's Dilemma", §14.1, "Axelrod and Tit for Tat": "Axelrod invited professional game theorists to submit computer programs for playing IPDs." The highest scorer in the first tournament was Tit for Tat, which "simply cooperates on the first round and imitates its opponent’s previous move thereafter." The earliest report of the tournament is Axelrod (1980), Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(1); its bibliographic details and abstract were checked as recorded by RePEc, and the text itself has not been checked; The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) has not been checked in the original. ↩︎
  44. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3.2.2, per the Project Gutenberg #4705 text. That passage speaks of the convention to abstain from the possessions of others: "This convention is not of the nature of a promise", "It is only a general sense of common interest"; it then gives the example: "Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other". ↩︎
  45. Relation Theory Paper 0, §11, reads Hume, Kant and Scanlon on where the binding of a promise comes from. ↩︎
  46. Rousseau, A Discourse upon the Origin and the Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind, Part Two, per the English translation in Project Gutenberg #11136 (transcribed from the Harvard Classics, vol. 34, 1910; translator not named). The sentence just before this scene is "for as to foresight they were utter strangers to it": "Was a deer to be taken? Every one saw that to succeed he must faithfully stand to his post; but suppose a hare to have slipped by within reach of any one of them, it is not to be doubted but he pursued it without scruple, and when he had seized his prey never reproached himself with having made his companions miss theirs." ↩︎
  47. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 17, per the 1651 text as transcribed in Project Gutenberg #3207: "And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all". ↩︎
  48. "Where one stands" is taken from Relation Theory Paper 3, H23: commitment binds a person in two places, "on my side, it rests on where I stand; on the other party's side, on the effects already left"; the Abstract of the same paper: "as long as I still stand where I promised, there are things I cannot cancel". Where one stands, in that paper, is taken from the Second Critique, Chapter Five, §2. H27 writes further that commitment binds a person "by where I myself stand and by the effects already left, not by my owing the other party something". ↩︎
  49. Relation Theory Paper 0, §7, reads Gilbert, reporting her after the SEP entries "Collective Intentionality," §3.3, and "Shared Agency," §4. Marriage Theory Paper 1, §6, has taken up this exchange at the layer of marriage. The two places on Tomasello and Bratman serve only to place them as neighbors; the original books have not been checked. ↩︎

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. Quotations are checked item by item in the accompanying audit table.

I · SAE works directly cited in this paper

Qin, H. (2026). Finding One Another (SAE Action Theory, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970783

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 0: The Place of Relation Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545115

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 1: What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 3: Commitment [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545023

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 4: Dealings and Expectation [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545057

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Laughter · IV: The Laughter of Despair and the Knowing Smile [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23287669

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Love Theory Paper 0: The Place of Love Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23627790

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Marriage Theory Paper 1: Joined [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23819212

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Marriage Theory Paper 5: For One Not Yet Here [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23819245

Qin, H. (2026). Learning to Recognize the Other's Purpose (Introduction to SAE Learning, Part Four: The Bridge from 14DD to 15DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19491926

Qin, H. (2026). The Other End of the Bridge: Economic Rationality When 15DD Faces a Party Who Does Not Enter 15DD (SAE Economics, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · II: The Competitive Game (14DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23609854

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · III: The Cooperative Game (15DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23609864

Qin, H. (2026). Reason Cannot Not: An SAE Refinement of Kant's Four Formulations of the Categorical Imperative [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19751512

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation · Prequel: What Cooperation Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815735

II · External works

Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3–25. (bibliographic details and abstract checked as recorded by RePEc; the text has not been checked)

Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. (the original has not been checked)

Bratman, M. E. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford University Press. (as a neighbor only; the original has not been checked)

Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. Project Gutenberg #3207 text (the 1651 Andrew Crooke edition).

Hume, D. (1739–1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. Project Gutenberg #4705 text.

Kuhn, S. (1997; substantive revision 2025). Prisoner's Dilemma. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (current version, substantive revision 24 October 2025). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/

Rousseau, J.-J. (1755). A Discourse upon the Origin and the Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind. English translation in Project Gutenberg #11136 (transcribed from the Harvard Classics, vol. 34, 1910; translator not named).

Tomasello, M. (2009). Why We Cooperate. MIT Press. (as a neighbor only; the original has not been checked)

Interfaces

  • Main upstream: Action Theory Paper 8 (D45, D47, D48; §3, §5); the Conflict Treatise (§1, §2, §7); Marriage Theory Paper 1 (MA1 to MA3, MA9; §6), Paper 5 (MA30).
  • Also used: Relation Theory Paper 1 (Abstract, H1, H8, H9, H12), Paper 3 (Abstract, H23, H27), Paper 4 (§5, H40), Paper 0 (§7, §11, §16); Laughter IV (Abstract, §1.1, §7.2); Love Theory Paper 0 (§4); Learning IV (Abstract); Economics P2 (§2, §4.0, §4.4); Exercises and Games of Judgment II (Abstract, §1.1, §5.1), III (Abstract, §1.1, §1.2); Reason Cannot Not (I.3, III.4); the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation (§4); Power Theory P3 §VII.2 (by way of the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, §4); Psychoanalysis IV §1.2 (by way of Laughter IV, §1.1); the Second Critique, Rules of the House, Eleven (by way of Relation Theory Paper 1, under H12), and Chapter Five, §2 (by way of Relation Theory Paper 3).
  • This series: Paper 2 takes up each one's purpose, several arrangements of giving and getting, and the difference between exchange and calculation; Paper 3 takes up division of labor, and how a shared arrangement is set when judgments do not fit together; Paper 4 takes up "we" and little circles; Paper 5 takes up cooperation in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction and one leans toward 14DD, and what follows once a condition of scope is no longer met; Paper 6 takes up judgment and answering for it, and who acknowledges what has been done; Paper 7 takes up exit, completion, the effects already left, and the moment of two-way 15DD.