Self-as-an-End
SAE Cooperation Theory · Paper 0

The Place of Cooperation Theory
合作论的位置

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24029128 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

This paper is Paper 0 of Cooperation Theory: written last, placed first. It lays down no propositions; it only does a few things for those who read this series: it states this series' place in SAE, sets out how far it reads and what its main line is, gives the method and the shared words the papers have in common, interfaces as a whole with several traditions, says once, all together, the directions of colonization read in the papers, sets side by side the two faces that the moment of two-way 15DD shows in Love Theory and in this series, lists together the thirty-eight propositions of the whole series, and registers the remainders that are left over and not closed out.

Cooperation Theory is the third branch downstream of SAE Relation Theory, following Love Theory and Marriage Theory, and parallel to Marriage Theory: at the normative layer the two do not conflict; at the rule layer they can differ, because the kinds of relation differ. This series does not define all cooperation; the cooperation it reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction, that is, that at least one party recognizes the other as an end too in this undertaking; the direction is a premise, not a component, nor a sufficient condition for entering scope. Under this premise, two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share; neither party holds the purpose and adjudication of this undertaking alone, nor does it automatically produce, above the two, a "we" that legislates for both. The main line, put plainly: You for yours, I for mine, and we do this one thing together. For direction one party is enough; for participation both are needed; in judgment each uses his own. The seven papers read, in order: Doing Together; Each for Their Own Ends; Division of Labor; "We"; One Side; Each Bears a Share; The Process.

This paper interfaces as a whole with Hobbes, Kropotkin and Mozi; Rawls and Tomasello are placed only as neighbors, and Kant's perpetual peace is pointed back to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation. The directions of colonization read in the papers borrow things that are, or may come to be, in a cooperation: avowal; names; division of labor; procedure; giving, reciprocal exchange and contribution; friendship; the name of cultivation, and dependency; exit, and what is said out loud on exiting; and the premise, regarding a third person, of an arrangement the two jointly maintain. These things carry no direction in themselves; the direction is read on the one effect in which they are taken up to do something; each has its own antecedents to be checked first. This paper proves no proposition at the object layer.

Introduction

The seven papers that follow each read one thing. Paper 1, Doing Together, reads what the cooperation this series speaks of looks like: the premise; the structure; the three things, direction, participation and judgment; the object layer and the operation layer; the three kinds commonly met outside scope; last, it looks once at the prisoner's dilemma, at how the step that rules can derive and the step where judgment falls are kept apart. Paper 2, Each for Their Own Ends, reads each of the two people's purposes: each is each one's own, and neither examines the other's; several shapes of giving and getting; the two readings of "exchange"; the same purpose still being two shares. Paper 3, Division of Labor, reads how division of labor is set, how it is changed, and how it slides into a fixed requirement aimed at the other; how organizations, contracts and positions are registered as conditions; and what is handed over to a procedure the two have recognized beforehand. Paper 4, "We", reads which branch "we" is when it is said in a cooperation; judging one party's law for him in the name of the team, the project or the company; guarding coming back to the individual; mutual recognition borrowed as adjudication; several people, and little circles. Paper 5, One Side, reads cooperation in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction and one leans toward 14DD: stance; the setting of cultivation; the measure of outcomes; what can be seen and what cannot be certified; not being used, and not calculating in return; and the case in which, in this end's judgment, the other is reduced to calculation. Paper 6, Each Bears a Share, reads the judgment layer: each judges his own, each answers for his own; what has been done is not acknowledged by someone else in one's place; contribution is not used to possess; breach of faith is entered apart and entered on the books; one wrong result is not on its own entered as non-fulfillment of what was promised. Paper 7, The Process, reads what the thing done together sediments into over time: the process is read, not the settlement; completion and looking back are entered apart; withdrawing; after it is done; and that moment.

Written this way, several things are left that no single paper takes care of: why this series is here, and how far it reads; how the main line strings the seven papers together; the method the papers share, and what the same word means in which paper; several traditions whose questions concern the whole series; what the directions of colonization read in the papers look like when set side by side; and which face of the moment of two-way 15DD this series and Love Theory each take up. This paper takes care of these.

Method as in the papers: the conclusions of upstream papers are said in plain words, and sources and extensions go in the notes. This paper lays down no propositions, and alters no sentence of the papers that follow. How the pieces upstream handed to this series are placed is for readers who want to check against upstream, and goes in the appendix at the end.

§1 Place: The Third Branch Downstream of the Relational Side

SAE has three sides: the subject side, the relational side and the institutional side. The relational side is unfolded by Relation Theory; once Relation Theory is written, there are several branches downstream: Love Theory, Marriage Theory, Parent-Child Theory and Cooperation Theory; friendship is not given a branch of its own, and serves as a running example through all the branches.1 Love Theory and Marriage Theory come first; this series is the third branch, written before Parent-Child Theory.

The division of labor between the two layers Relation Theory has written out: Relation Theory in the abstract establishes only what all relations have; what holds only in one kind of relation is handed to the series on that kind of relation to argue.2 Whatever has already been laid down at the layer of relation, this series uses directly and does not rewrite: the minimal condition of a relation, the two directions of cultivation and colonization, expectation, commitment, the sediment of dealings and ending are all read by Relation Theory. Of what Relation Theory handed to this series, three things it gave first itself: no third bearer is generated; a shared goal is not a shared ultimate value; what doing things together sediments into over time (Appendix).

With Marriage Theory: parallel. Marriage Theory, in its scope, hands over this boundary: doing things together in general belongs to Cooperation Theory, and Marriage Theory reads only doing things together within marriage.3 This series is not downstream of Marriage Theory; the two series are parallel. Where the two read differently, it is first seen whether the difference can be traced to the kind of relation: where it can, it falls at the rule layer, and the two can differ; where it cannot, it falls at the normative layer, and the two do not conflict. Where a real conflict is found, it is judged by Relation Theory, and the two series do not judge each other; what Relation Theory has not decided is registered as a remainder of Relation Theory. The words "this is the rule layer" are not, in themselves, a reason: it has to be said which difference in the kind of relation makes the readings differ.

The two differences read so far both trace to one and the same distinction: marriage has the love between the two as one thing it cannot do without; cooperation does not require love. One is scope: Marriage Theory takes both parties headed in the 15DD direction, this series at least one; the case outside Marriage Theory's scope, one end headed in this direction and one leaning toward 14DD, is here a proper object (Paper 5). The other is exchange: in marriage a moment of reciprocal exchange is read as falling back; in cooperation an arrangement of reciprocal exchange both parties avow does not make this undertaking exit scope, nor is it read as falling back (Paper 2). Tracing this point to love takes one step in between. The ground Marriage Theory gives for falling back is that at that moment there was no operation in the direction of recognizing the other as an end too; in marriage that direction is the direction in which the love between the two lies, and Love Theory has written that loving each other is not exchange. In cooperation, recognizing the other as an end too does not need love, nor does it rule out the two agreeing within C on how to exchange. This reading is this series' own undertaking (Paper 2).4 Some things do not change with the kind of relation: writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is read in cooperation, at the layer between person and person, just as it is read in marriage (Paper 2); division of labor is a present arrangement the two have avowed together, whose binding force passes separately through each one's own law, and which, when it slides into a fixed requirement aimed at the other, has a tendency toward colonization; the two series have the same form at this point, and each reads by this form (Paper 3).

With Action Theory: one person, and two together. Relation Theory has written out its division of labor with upstream: Action Theory reads a single drawing of the line; Relation Theory reads what the effects between the parties sediment into in dealings and over time.5 How one person does things together with another, Action Theory Paper 8 has established: one person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C; C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone.6 The two series overlap here: Action Theory reads the individual's side, this series reads the two together; at the overlap this series calls on that proposition, gives its number, and does not establish it again. Applying this structure of arrangement to an object whose premise is that at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction is a step this series takes on as its own undertaking (Paper 1).

With Love Theory: mutual recognition, and the thing done together. Relation Theory divides "we" into two branches, doing things together and mutual recognition; which branch occurs is checked case by case.7 In Love Theory, the mutual recognition of that moment belongs to the branch of mutual recognition; this series reads chiefly the branch of doing things together. Mutual recognition happens in cooperation too, and can be real; only it is not borrowed to pass final judgment on a thing done together (Paper 4). The two series take up the moment of two-way 15DD from two faces; §7 sets them side by side.

With Parent-Child Theory. Of a thing parents and their adult children do together, the face of doing it together is here; what lies between parents and child belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

With the institutional side. The part made up of organizations, contracts, employment and positions belongs to the institutional side; this series reads only the part of what passes between persons that the institution does not provide for, or that goes beyond its provisions. The provisions themselves are acknowledged but not judged, and are registered as conditions of the effect.8 What lies between state and state, between construct and construct, belongs to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation; in Chinese the two series use different words, that series 协作 and this series 合作, and this series does not use the former as a term.9 Institutional relations between company and company, and between states and companies, this series does not take up either (§8).

With Political Economy: five points. The range of Political Economy is: "how the capital, fame, status and qualifications that people accumulate in the Emergence Layer become, in others' decisions, power acting on others".10 The two series meet at five points, each on its own side.

First, exchange. Exchange in two people's doing things together is one shape of cooperation, and is read here (Paper 2); how exchange in the Emergence Layer accumulates, and how it is converted into power acting on others, belongs to Political Economy. That series says that outside the gates exchange is left open as usual, and also says that not running into those two gates does not certify a transaction as warranted in every respect; when it is cited, the two sentences are brought along together.11

Second, reputation and fame. They are used apart, as in the Political Economy Prequel: fame concerns how many people know of someone and how he is talked about; reputation is the state that recognition relations naturally show within a community.12 Breaking a commitment is entered on the books between person and person, and is read here; reputation, or a score taken as standing for it, being used by a position as a condition of a chokepoint decision, together with records and scores, belongs to Political Economy (Paper 6).

Third, non-compete agreements. An agreement made within a cooperation, backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement, that forbids one party, after leaving, to go in a certain direction is read by Political Economy; a conditional payment is read differently, and the criteria are brought along with their full antecedents. The other party to the cooperation is himself the party that sets the agreement: if what the agreement protects is his own share, it is not among those "set to protect others" (Paper 3).13

Fourth, registered partners. Within a construct a registered partner is in a position, and accountability is said to him; this belongs to the institutional side; the side between the two that the institution does not provide for, or that goes beyond its provisions, belongs here.14 The construct the two have registered is the address of attribution, not a third bearer (Paper 3, Paper 4).

Fifth, the judgment layer. Political Economy's judgment layer is the particular case, handed to judgment in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons;15 this series' judgment layer falls on each person himself (§3). Political Economy takes "judge the operation, not the person" as a convention of the whole series; it runs the same way as this series' saying that stances are not labels, and each stands on its own side.

§2 Scope and Main Line

Scope. There are six items.

First, it does not define all cooperation. Some call a balance that two parties reach by calculating against each other, each getting what he is after, cooperation as well; this series does not object to the usage, it only does not read it. To say that a case is not within the cooperation this series reads is not to say that it is not cooperation (Paper 1, CO1, CO5).

Second, at least one party headed in the 15DD direction. In SAE's levels, the layer at which the other is recognized as an end too is written 15DD. 15DD is non dubito: "it is not only I who am an end; the other, too, is an end in itself."16 The cooperation this series reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction, and this is said of this one undertaking. The direction is a premise, not a component of cooperation, nor a sufficient condition for entering scope; entering scope is checked on three further things: both avow this undertaking and actually take part, each having a share of his own; the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation; the arrangement the two jointly avow and actually maintain does not carry the direction of colonization toward a third person, and does not cross his basic rights (Paper 1). Leaning toward 14DD and being reduced to calculation are not one thing: in this undertaking, the end that leans toward 14DD and is within scope at least structurally acknowledges that the other has purposes of his own; to be reduced to calculation is to treat the other only as a strategy set.17 Here and throughout, this series writes "acknowledge" for this structural grade, so that it is not taken for recognizing the other as an end too; a quoted page keeps its own words, which may differ.

Third, stances, not labels. 15DD and 14DD here speak of the stance of one operation; they are read by the current relational condition, not by persons;18 a layer records one operation; it does not record a person, nor a stretch of cooperation; people are all mixed, and falling back is read as it occurs, and does not overturn the direction. The object layer and the operation layer are kept apart: the object layer reads the cooperation within scope; at the operation layer each party can confirm only his own end, and cannot on that basis declare on the other end's behalf that it avows; the other end's taking part and arrangements are described by words and deeds and checkable conditions, and their inner grounds are not certified (Paper 1, CO4). If it is later confirmed that the object did not obtain, this series exits this case, and does not turn and judge the other end; this is entered by period, and the shared process that has already happened is not erased backward.

Fourth, what is not read, in three groups. The three kinds commonly met outside scope are each read differently: that in which neither party is headed in the 15DD direction, whose ideal type is the case in which both parties treat each other only as a strategy set and reach a balance by mutual calculation; that of being passively helped, which is an act of help, read as one-way dealings per Relation Theory; and the stretch in which the arrangement the two jointly avow and actually maintain carries the direction of colonization toward a third person or crosses his basic rights. In the last kind, in collusion premised on "a third person is merely a means," the arrangement itself decides who counts as an end by whether someone is one of our own. What 15DD recognizes is that the other, too, is an end in itself; it does not recognize him on the strength of who he is or what he has. The third person is a person too, yet in this arrangement he is treated merely as a means; then the recognition between the two does not rest on the other's being a person, or else the third person would be included too; it rests on some other item; which item is not decided; what can be decided is only that, on the strength of this item, people are ranked high and low; in this undertaking, neither end is headed in the 15DD direction. Recognition of this kind carries with it the item it rests on; this speaks of structure; it does not predict how long such an arrangement lasts, nor does it say that once that item changes the recognition is bound to be withdrawn. This reads only the premise of that arrangement, not persons, and a single falling back is not among these; it goes one step further than what Relation Theory reads from the same dependency condition, and this step is this series' own undertaking (Paper 1, CO5).19 Beyond the three kinds, where one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation, another of the conditions of scope is not met, and Paper 5 reads this: where, in this end's own fallible judgment, this condition of scope is no longer met, he from then on no longer does this undertaking as the cooperation this series reads; what this series reads is this judgment of his and his side from then on, and it does not on this basis certify that the other is reduced to calculation (Paper 5, CO27). Within cooperation inside scope there are several aspects that are not read: the institutional side of contracts, organizations and employment, acknowledged but not judged, and only registered; settlement, that is, how credit, authorship and proceeds are divided (Paper 7). Boundaries this series does not handle: between humans and animals, and between humans and AI; this is a choice of range, not a determination of whether they hold the position of a bearer.

Fifth, the upper bound. The C this series reads is, as in Action Theory Paper 8, doing something together, and does not require both ends to be headed in the 15DD direction. When two one-way 15DDs meet at a moment of doing this undertaking together, that is the moment of two-way 15DD, and this series takes up only that moment; it does not touch 16DD itself; mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place it does not take up, and only registers, without proving that it does not exist; nor does it take up the change in the individual at that moment (Paper 7, CO38; §7).20

Sixth, the boundaries with neighboring series: see §1.

Main line. In plain prose it is one sentence: You for yours, I for mine, and we do this one thing together.

Put technically, as the main text and the abstracts of the papers use it: two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share; neither party holds the purpose and adjudication of this undertaking alone, nor does it automatically produce, above the two, a "we" that legislates for both. The first half is what Paper 2 reads as each for their own ends: the two people's purposes are each one's own, neither examines the other's, and where what they want is in one place it is still two shares. The second half is Paper 1's structure and Paper 4's "we": each has a share, and neither holds it alone; the ordinary plural holds as usual, only no position is set up that legislates for both.

At the core of the passage on scope in Paper 1 is the one sentence that states scope: at least one person, when doing things together, does not treat the other merely as a means. This sentence sums up the entrance; it is not an equivalent substitute for all the conditions of scope. It points to the direction premise, and is wider than the direction premise: where both ends lean toward 14DD and neither is reduced to calculation, this sentence takes the case in, and scope does not (Paper 1, CO5).

What also strings the seven papers together is the division into three things. Direction: one party is enough, and it is the direction premise; participation: both are needed, and it is cooperation itself; judgment: each party uses his own judgment and answers for his own share, and it is where the remainder that neither norms nor rules cover falls. Judgment is not the 15DD direction, so "for direction one party is enough" and "in judgment both are needed" do not conflict (Paper 1, CO3). The kind in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction and one leans toward 14DD (Paper 5), each bearing a share (Paper 6), and the process (Paper 7) are all read under these three things.

§3 Method

The whole series is written by the following rules.

Three layers. What this series reads is spoken of in three layers. The normative layer is the lines of structure and direction that Relation Theory and the series further upstream have already laid down; the rule layer is readings and arrangements that hold only in one kind of relation, and concrete rules serve only as examples; the judgment layer is the remainder that neither norms nor rules cover, which falls on each person's own judgment, and it is on the account of the one who judges. The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation and Political Economy also speak in three layers; there the ought is said to constructs, and the judgment layer is handed to those in positions: "The judgment layer is how a particular act is judged under the rules; this layer is left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons."21 That is the institutional side. This series issues no ought; between two people there is no one in a position to judge for them, and the judgment layer falls on each person himself. To speak of bearing responsibility is to speak of the account falling on the one who judges, facing inward: the subject's answerability to its own law.22

A layer records one operation; stances, not labels. Neither party is said to be lower; the stances of the two ends are not inferred backward from the direction of one effect. Where an arrangement the two jointly avow and maintain is premised on "a third person is merely a means," it is read by the arrangement's premise, and this does not count as inferring backward from an effect.

Speak of structure, not of good and bad; issue no ought. Cooperation is not ranked by length, by gain and loss, or by whether it got done; whether to go on or to withdraw, whether to cooperate or not, is the judgment of those concerned.

Do not read minds; do not predict. Inference goes by structure, or by the original sentences of upstream; how a person thinks is, from outside, only clues. Where an example lacks conditions, it is left undetermined, and not filled in with an inner narrative added afterward.

Only the layer between person and person. The authority that contracts, organizations, employment and positions bring is acknowledged but not judged, and registered as a condition of the effect. Acknowledging but not judging draws the range this series reads: registering an authority is not endorsing its legitimacy on its behalf, nor is it saying that the effects within the institution have all become unproblematic; how that side is to be evaluated belongs to the institutional side (Paper 4). The obligations a contract gives belong to the institutional side; at the layer between person and person, commitment does not turn into a duty to the other party, and the other's response is material, not a settling of the account.23 Where workplace examples are used, a factual record of the relevant provisions is given first, and what is not given is recorded as not checked.

Read only the process, not the settlement. Endings are not classified; how credit, authorship and proceeds are divided is not read; how causation, fault and remedy are allocated is not unfolded in this series (Paper 6, Paper 7).

Cultivation and colonization in the broad sense. They name the direction of one effect, not labels stuck on persons or on a stretch of cooperation: cultivation goes toward making space; colonization goes toward pouring in and occupying; the two are not the two extremes of one scale; the same act can carry both directions, and can also carry no direction at all; the direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action. Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights.24 Saying out loud a characterization that fixes for the other what something means to him slides in the direction of colonization; making something unchangeable for the other in running, or making his path to saying no hard to travel, carries the direction of colonization. "Tendency" and "slides" are not read as having already taken hold.

Exchange is not calculation; division of labor is consensus. Calculation names only one stance: treating the other only as a strategy set. Looking out for one's own concerns is not calculation, and neither is keeping clear accounts. "Exchange" is read in two ways; see §4.

Examples. Only adult characters are used; made-up examples are used only to see structure, and each paper has its own set of people; two people's words and deeds are only clues, and do not certify who is at which layer. One sentence can take on different effects in different arrangements, and the examples are often written as forking examples. Friendship serves as a running example: Yu Ping and He Shan mending a fence in Paper 1, Ke Yuan and Liang Dong running the repair corner in Paper 2, Wei An and Jing He running a secondhand bookshop together in Paper 3, and Xia Chi and Kuang Ming running a woodworking class together in Paper 4 are all cooperation between friends; the face of mutual recognition between friends is read by Relation Theory, and this series reads only the thing they do together.25 Historical examples are read for structure and direction only by the words and deeds in the historical sources; only the deceased, whose records are public, are used, and at which layer those two people were is not judged; Paper 2 reads Guan Zhong and Bao Shuya, and Engels and Marx.

Interfacing with tradition. The papers each interface with figures by question, and this paper interfaces as a whole. The papers keep to one rule: no one is cast in advance as the opposing side; first it is written faithfully what that figure asks, why he looks, and what he sees; where a passage of the original quoted really runs against this series, it is written at the original's strength, and then where they meet and where they part; where there is no real opposition, only how they shed light on each other and how the questions divide the work are written; a counter-proposition that is not in the original is not invented for it. The steps the papers take are not all the same: Paper 1 writes the common question, where they shed light on each other, and where they part; Papers 2, 3 and 4 first write why that figure looks and what he sees, write out the opposition where there really is one, and then where they meet and where they part, and where there is none, write only how they shed light on each other, or at which scale the question lies; Paper 5 writes the common question and where they differ; Paper 6 goes in four steps: the common question, whether it is the same thing, where they shed light on each other and where they part, how far agreement goes; Paper 7 writes what was seen, where they shed light on each other, and how the questions divide the work. The interfacing as a whole in this paper writes the common question, where they shed light on each other, and where they part. What has already been interfaced at the layer of relation and in neighboring series is pointed back to; when it is pointed back to, the restrictions of that place come along.

Sources and extensions. The conclusions of upstream papers are said in plain words in the main text; sources, original sentences and the proposition numbers of other papers go in the notes; what is carried beyond its original place is stated to be an extension, this series' own undertaking.

§4 Shared Words

Several words are shared across the papers, and their senses have to be kept apart.

Cooperation: 合作 and 协作. The "cooperation" this series speaks of refers only to the kind it reads, and does not define all cooperation. The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation reads cooperation between state and state, between construct and construct; in Chinese the two series use different words, that series 协作 and this series 合作, and the former is not used here as a term. The "cooperative game" of the Games of Judgment series is one kind of game: the partner's next step is his, and is also part of what the two want together;26 it can be borrowed to look at one aspect of doing things together, and is not the same as the cooperation this series reads. The prisoner's dilemma example Paper 1 adopts labels the one action of not betraying the other "cooperation"; that label and the cooperation this series reads are not one word, nor does this series define the word for game theory as a whole (Paper 1).

The normative layer, the rule layer, the judgment layer; rules. This series' three layers: see §3; the three layers of the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation and of Political Economy speak to constructs, and hand the judgment layer to those in positions. The "rules" of the rule layer are readings and arrangements that hold only in one kind of relation; when Relation Theory and Marriage Theory say that "the provisions themselves are acknowledged but not judged," what they speak of are the rules of institutions. The two are not mixed.

Calculation, exchange, giving. Calculation is a stance: treating the other only as a strategy set (Paper 1). "Exchange" is of two kinds: an arrangement of reciprocal exchange the two have avowed, you cover for me this week and I cover for you next week, does not make this undertaking exit scope, and in cooperation is not read as falling back either; writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is another matter, and it does not change with the kind of relation (Paper 2). Exchange in the Emergence Layer, as Political Economy speaks of it, is a third usage, on the institutional side (§1). Giving and getting speak of the time, effort, money and things each puts into this undertaking, and of what each gets from the other; to say that neither got anything is to say plainly that nothing was got, and no invisible gain is added afterward (Paper 2).

Leaning toward 14DD, and being reduced to calculation. In this undertaking, the end that leans toward 14DD and is within scope at least structurally acknowledges that the other has purposes of his own; to be reduced to calculation is to treat the other only as a strategy set. Learning IV places what it calls recognizing the other's independent 14DD on the bridge from 14DD to 15DD; the end that leans toward 14DD and is within scope is, in this undertaking, at least already at this step. The 14DD world Economics P2 speaks of, in which the person across from you is a strategy set, falls in this series on the side of being reduced to calculation. Reading the two places against each other in this way is this series' own undertaking (Paper 5; §8, the thirteenth remainder).27

Purpose and end. In the Chinese of this series these are one word. In the shape of doing things together, A and B are each one's purposes, and C is the thing done together (Paper 2). The end in "recognizing the other as an end too" is at 15DD: the other has his own cannot-not.

Doing things together, a shared goal, a shared ultimate value. Doing things together is two people doing one thing together, not a shared law. Where what the two want is in one place, that is a shared goal; each one's value belongings stay as they were, and it is not a shared ultimate value (Paper 2).

Law and arrangement; division of labor. Law is the layer a person bears in the first person and by which he goes on organizing his action; arrangement is how time, resources, roles, procedures and the conditions of action are laid out. Division of labor lies at the layer of arrangement; it is a present arrangement the two have avowed together, and it is consensus, not calculation: division of labor is an arrangement, calculation is a stance, and the two are not in one place. Two people who treat each other only as a strategy set can also each avow a very detailed division of labor; this kind is not within scope on the ground of scope's premise, not on the ground that they have not avowed it (Paper 3).

Procedure and process. "Procedure" refers only to the method the two have recognized beforehand, to which a certain class of matters is handed to decide, and to external mechanisms that have authority by law, or legitimate authority for protecting basic rights; what is called a "workflow" in everyday speech is part of the division of labor, and is not in this sense (Paper 3). "Process" speaks of what the thing done together looks like over time (Paper 7). The two words are not mixed.

"We." Everyday speech has three uses of it. One is speaking of things together, putting what several people have each done into one sentence; the second is one of the branches Relation Theory divides, doing things together; the third is the other branch, mutual recognition. Neither of the latter two branches is a "we" that stands above the several people and makes decisions for them (Paper 4).

Construct; bearer and the address of attribution. "Construct" has two uses. When Relation Theory says "A relation is a construct," it takes the broad sense: the construct left when the effect of one side enters the conditions of occurrence of the other side, which does not legislate and bears nothing.28 The construct Political Economy speaks of is an arrangement with institutional status: a company, a foundation and a level of government are all constructs; it "is the address of attribution, not the subject of the act".29 A bearer, as in Relation Theory, is the one at one end of a relation: "The other side of a relation must be a bearer".30 The address of attribution is the construct taken as the place where the account falls first. Where two friends register their small shop as a company, the company is the address of attribution, not a third bearer (Paper 3, Paper 4).

Going in together. In everyday speech, two friends going in together to open a shop means doing this thing together; a "registered partner" or "shareholder" after registration is a position the institution gives (Paper 3).

Answering for; accountability; liability and responsibility; duty. Answering for, as this series speaks of it, faces inward: judgment and what has been done cannot be acknowledged by someone else in one's place, the account falls on the one who judges, and the subject answers to its own law; this stands together with commitment's not turning into a duty to the other party, and is not owing the other party a duty.31 "Accountability" and "liability" take the sense of On Accountability: accountability is a demand standing at a position and awaiting an answer, and what it binds is the position; liability is the bearing of that position itself, and is not conditioned on fault; both cells are on the institutional side (Paper 6). When the Conflict Treatise says that "first-person responsibility cannot be borne by proxy," it uses the word in its everyday sense, and what it says is exactly that what has been done is not acknowledged by someone else in one's place.32

Reputation and fame. They are used apart, as in the Political Economy Prequel (§1). The word "reputation," in the Moral Law series, stands on the scope of the pure 15DD community.33 When this series writes of breach of faith being entered on the books, it does not borrow "reputation": the layer between the two, and between pairs, is entered as it is; how many people know of it once it has spread, and how it is talked about, is fame; the side on which reputation, or a score taken as standing for it, is used by a position as a condition of a chokepoint decision belongs to Political Economy (Paper 6).

Judge the operation, not the person; stances, not labels. The former is a convention of the whole Political Economy series; the latter is the way this series reads 15DD and 14DD; the two run the same way, each on its own side.34

Non-compete agreements and conditional payments. As used in Political Economy Paper 2. The former is backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement, and forbids a person, after leaving, to go in a certain direction; the latter forbids nothing, but only ties an additional payment to a choice. Which side a particular agreement falls on is checked by its three criteria taken together, and is not decided by any one alone (Paper 3).35

Completion and settlement. "Completion" has two uses: the standard of completion the two have avowed beforehand, and the completion of cultivation, which is not in the enactor's hands; when Paper 7 speaks of completion, it means the former. "Settlement" means how credit, authorship and proceeds are divided, who owes whom how much, worked out to a total; this series does not read it (Paper 7).

Withdrawing, exit and walking away. Withdrawing one's own side, no longer putting in effort, is exit; it faces inward, and does not carry the direction of colonization, even if the other party's cost rises as a result.36 "One's own side" means the share that is still one's own once the items have been separated: deliveries already avowed and other matters still standing are checked separately, item by item, as they were; whether an act is on one's own side is not decided by the person's calling it a boundary (Paper 5). Where one first monopolizes, or first induces dependency, and then withdraws, violation is checked separately at the layer of basic rights per Relation Theory; actual dependency alone does not on its own yield the conclusion of violation.37 Walking away is only an external act, and takes no technical identity by itself (Paper 5, Paper 7).

Cultivation; discernment. Cultivation is taken in the broad sense: it is the direction of one effect, not a project, nor anyone's identity. Discernment speaks of what the end headed in the 15DD direction reads from the situation in his own judgment; it is a fallible judgment, not a certification (Paper 5).

Collusion. Two people jointly maintain an arrangement premised on "a third person is merely a means"; what is read is the premise of that arrangement, not the persons (§2, the fourth item of scope). This series follows the usage of the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation and of Power Theory, and uses "collusion" (Paper 1).38

The 16DD cooperative imperative, and D47. Action Theory says that the form of its D47, one person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C, has been set down elsewhere in this system; this refers to the 16DD cooperative imperative listed in Reason Cannot Not, I.3: I for purpose A, the other for purpose B, we cannot not do C; that place states further that the complete definition of the cooperative imperative is given in another paper. Action Theory borrows it to read doing things together.39 In III.4 of Reason Cannot Not, the C of the cooperative imperative carries a further condition: C, as the emergence after the meeting of two purposes, requires both subjects to expose themselves to the other's interrogation. The C this series reads follows Action Theory: it is doing something together, does not carry this condition, and does not require both ends to be headed in the 15DD direction; getting one thing done together is not automatically the moment of two-way 15DD (Paper 1, Paper 7; §7).

§5 Interfacing as a Whole

The papers each interfaced with figures by question. Paper 1 interfaced with the prisoner's dilemma example, Axelrod, Hume on two men rowing a boat, Rousseau on the stag hunt, and Hobbes; Paper 2 with Smith on our dinner and self-love, Aristotle on friendship for usefulness, Kropotkin on mutual aid, and the Analects on harmony without sameness (和而不同); Paper 3 with Plato on one man, one thing, Durkheim on organic solidarity, and Smith's pin manufactory; Paper 4 with Rousseau's general will, Searle's collective intentionality, and the Analects on being sociable but not partisan (群而不党); Paper 5 with the Analects on repaying resentment with uprightness (以直报怨) and Kant's unsocial sociability; Paper 6 with Weber's ethic of responsibility, Arendt on guilt and collective responsibility, and the Analects on being heavy on oneself (躬自厚); Paper 7 with Aristotle on how a friendship of usefulness is dissolved, Arendt on the irreversibility and unpredictability of action, and the hexagrams Jiji and Weiji (既济, 未济), already across and not yet across, in the Book of Changes. Gilbert's joint commitment and plural subject Relation Theory has already interfaced with, and the papers point back to it. Several figures ask about the whole series, and are placed here.

Competition and mutual aid (Hobbes, Kropotkin). Each of the two has an overall reading of people's doing things together. In Chapter 17 of Leviathan, Hobbes writes that covenants without the sword are only words, and have no power at all to keep anyone safe; his answer lies in a common power.40 In the Introduction to Mutual Aid, Kropotkin takes up an idea of the zoologist Kessler: that in Nature there is, besides a law of mutual struggle, a law of mutual aid; he says that his book treats mutual aid as one of the main factors of evolution, without covering all the factors and how much each counts; where the instinct of mutual aid comes from in Nature he leaves to later research.41 The common question: what keeps people's doing things together going, and what part it plays among people. One of the two lands on force, the other on mutual aid; this series casts neither in advance as the opposing side, nor does it decide between the two.

They shed light on each other at two points. First, Hobbes asks what makes a covenant bind, and answers with a common power at the level of the commonwealth; that level lies between persons and constructs, belongs to the institutional side, and this series does not judge it (Paper 1). At the level between two people, the binding this series reads does not rest on the sword: commitment binds a person, on my side by where I stand, and on the other party's side by the effects already left; breaking it is entered on the books (Paper 1, Paper 6). The two are not reading the same level. Second, Kropotkin saw that giving to one another and helping one another happen in fact, just as competition does; this series too reads giving that is not conditioned on getting a return from the other (Paper 2). What he reads is the part mutual aid plays in species and in evolution; the part mutual aid plays for a group or a species is not the same as the return the one who gives gets on this occasion, nor the same as what he gave for; the two can stand together, and need not refute each other. This series does not add an invisible gain to the kind in which no one benefits (Paper 2).

They part over what is asked. Each of the two gives an overall reading: Hobbes reads how covenants come to have force, Kropotkin reads what part mutual aid plays in evolution; this series does not read where cooperation comes from, nor what part it plays in evolution, and reads only what structure the thing done together has. Its scope is a premise, not a theory of human nature: that at least one party recognizes the other as an end too in this undertaking does not yield that everyone does so, nor that no one does.

Inclusive love for one another, exchange of benefit with one another (Mozi). Relation Theory has already interfaced with Mozi, reading him on inclusive love for one another and exchange of benefit with one another (兼相爱,交相利), and on its feasibility; the restriction of that place is that the several figures all bring into view persisting practices beyond one-sided acts, and cannot, on these sentences alone, be taken as one and the same theory of a duty to return.42 Here only one sentence points back, and brings that restriction along: exchange of benefit with one another is close, among the shapes this series reads, to reciprocal exchange, and this series does not derive from it a duty to return; inclusive love for one another is not this series' premise; this series requires only that at least one party recognize the other as an end too in this undertaking, and does not require love.

A fair system of cooperation (Rawls). Rawls reads society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next, and asks by what principles the basic structure of such a system is to be ordered.43 That is a question of the institutional side, and this series places him only as a neighbor: it reads the thing two people do together, not the basic structure of society, nor does it argue for principles of distribution.

Shared intentionality (Tomasello). Tomasello reads shared intentionality in human cooperation from developmental and comparative research, and asks where the capacity to cooperate comes from; this series does not read where the capacity comes from, and places him only as a neighbor (Paper 1).

Perpetual peace (Kant). In Perpetual Peace Kant says that a league between states need not be a state of nations; the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation has already interfaced with him.44 Cooperation between states belongs to that series; it is pointed back to here, and not rewritten.

§6 The Directions of Colonization Read in the Papers, Said Once Together

How the directions of colonization the papers have found are read lies in each paper; here only one layer is said together: what they borrow are things that are, or may come to be, in a cooperation. These things carry no direction in themselves; whether they carry one is seen from the antecedents of that one effect, not from the name of the act:

  • Avowal: declaring an avowal on the other's behalf slides in the direction of colonization; a faithful report is not among these (Paper 1).
  • Names ("we," the team, the project, the company, or the undertaking itself): when taken up to take in and replace one party's direction, they carry the direction of colonization; making a request, or proposing an arrangement within authority that has been checked, is not of this kind merely because a name was used, and registering the authority does not endorse its legitimacy either (Paper 2, Paper 4).
  • Division of labor: when it is turned against the other, treated as something he may not change, hung on who he is, or swapped out within habit, it has a tendency toward colonization; not avowing a new division of labor is not, on that alone, sealing off a path; only where a change already avowed is held down by way of a link in its execution is this checked separately (Paper 3).
  • Procedure: where it is called a third party, yet in running the party questioned still controls the review, the adjudication and the delivery, it is the same thing going on under another name; unilateral nomination, and its having once been recognized, are both only clues (Paper 3).
  • Giving, reciprocal exchange and contribution: when the other is treated merely as the condition for getting something, when settlement is extended to the person, when giving is written as an account to be repaid, when giving or contribution is used to possess the other, to take his share of judgment in exchange, to complete his step for him, or to record his share as one's own (Paper 2, Paper 6).
  • Friendship: when it is borrowed to pass final judgment on a thing done together (Paper 4).
  • The name of cultivation, and dependency: when the other's direction is decided for him in the name of cultivation; when dependency has been made and has locked the path to saying no and to changing over, which cannot be read from exclusive use alone, nor ruled out by an initial nod alone; incomplete cultivation is not colonization (Paper 2, Paper 5).
  • Exit: withdrawing the side that is still one's own once the items have been separated faces inward, and does not carry it; saying for the other what this exit amounts to, or fixing his path from then on, slides toward it; acting in a way directed at him that raises his cost, after withdrawing, carries it (Paper 5, Paper 7).
  • An arrangement's premise regarding a third person: the stretch that carries the direction of colonization toward a third person or crosses his basic rights is not within scope, and where it is premised on a third person's being merely a means, it is collusion; mere coincidence in time, competition that makes someone lose out, and one person's addition kept from his partner are not among these (Paper 1, Paper 4).

One and the same sentence, "For this project, everyone has to come in this weekend," is a request in one arrangement, the authority of a position in another, and only in a third the borrowing of a name to take in and replace; one and the same money for parts can be only a piece of giving, and can also be spoken of as an account; one and the same withdrawal is exit, not acting in a way directed at the other. The direction is read on the one effect in which they are taken up to do something; whether it took hold is seen in how the other afterward understands and acts.

Not heading toward colonization in doing things together is not easy: the things done together are many, and each is a place that can be taken up to do something else. So relations are all mixed: mixing is the normal state, and a pure 15DD community is only an ideal type.45 What this series reads is direction; a single sliding is read on that one occasion, and it is not on that basis judged that a stretch of cooperation has exited scope. Exit from scope is read by Paper 1's three kinds commonly met outside scope; where, in one end's own fallible judgment, the other is already reduced to calculation in this undertaking, this end from then on no longer does this undertaking as the cooperation this series reads, and this is read by Paper 5; this series does not on that basis certify that the other is reduced to calculation. This series does not on this account say that cooperation is dangerous, nor does it on this account urge people to cooperate or not to cooperate; it only reads.

§7 The Moment of Two-Way 15DD: Two Faces

In SAE's levels, 16DD is mutual non dubito: two subjects "mutually acknowledge each other as ends in themselves, mutually chisel, mutually do not doubt."46 This series does not touch 16DD itself: what it reads is only two one-way 15DDs meeting at a moment, recorded as the moment of two-way 15DD; what that moment has to do with 16DD, this series does not judge. Relation Theory reads this moment as something that happens on an occasion, not a grade that a person or a relation is in; it takes up only that moment; it does not touch 16DD itself, nor does it take up mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place, nor the change in the individual at that moment.47 Love Theory and this series both take up only that moment, and they take up two faces of it.

Love Theory takes it up from the face of mutual recognition. The moment it reads is two one-way loves meeting, each recognizing the other as an end too, without waiting for the other to recognize first; loving each other is not exchange, and "I love you, so you ought to love me" writes love as exchange.48 The mutual recognition of that moment belongs to the branch of mutual recognition.

This series takes it up from the face of the thing done together. The moment it reads is two one-way 15DDs meeting at a moment of doing this undertaking together (Paper 7, CO38). In Paper 7's example, two researchers argued all night over the tone of one character, each asking after the other's grounds, and in the end decided on a notation neither of them had thought of before; these are what actually happened that night, not the criterion of that moment, and that moment is not conditioned on having argued all night, or on having arrived at a new way of doing things. The C this series reads follows Action Theory: it is doing something together; the further condition Reason Cannot Not, III.4, attaches to the C of the cooperative imperative, that it "requires both subjects to expose themselves to the other's interrogation", this series does not carry (§4).49 Reason Cannot Not has one more sentence, which is only registered here, and not touched: "The cooperative imperative ('we cannot not do C') is the produce of 16DD's operation — C is the third term emerging from two autonomous subjects' mutual interrogation."50

The two faces are the same at four points. First, both take up only the moment: it is something that happens on an occasion, not a grade that a love or a stretch of cooperation is in. Second, it does not make later dealings mutual automatically, nor does it let one party afterward demand mutuality of the other.51 Third, from outside only clues can be seen: a pair of lovers looking at each other, a night's argument and a new notation, are none of them criteria. Fourth, mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place neither series takes up; each only registers it, and does not prove that it does not exist.52

The two faces differ in where the moment lies: on the face of mutual recognition, that moment is two people recognizing each other; on the face of the thing done together, that moment falls on this thing the two do together, two one-way 15DDs meeting while doing this undertaking; whether a new way of doing things came out of that moment is not its criterion. Two further points are written out. First, this series' scope requires only that at least one party be headed in the 15DD direction, but that moment requires both ends to be; in this series, the upper bound and the premise of scope are not one and the same condition. Getting one thing done together is not automatically that moment; on the great majority of days, the cooperation this series reads is not that moment (Paper 7). Second, the two faces can share one occasion: when two people who love each other do one thing together, and that moment both is their recognizing each other and falls on this thing they do together, which branch occurs is checked case by case, and is not assigned in advance by the kind of relation.

§8 Remainders

Several things this series registers, and does not close out.

First, carrying "each has a share" in the thing done together over to several people, and carrying Relation Theory's little circle of two over to a little circle of several people: these two steps are this series' own undertaking, and are written only where they are used (Paper 4).

Second, whether a team or a project can separately be established as a bearer. Relation Theory establishes only that a little circle of two does not form a third bearer; Relation Theory does not touch the question of when a community has become a collective subject, and this series does not touch it either (Paper 4).

Third, 16DD itself is not touched; mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place is not taken up, nor is the change in the individual at that moment (§7).

Fourth, between humans and animals, and between humans and AI: a choice of range, not a determination about ontology; the quasi-subjecthood of AI is taken up separately in SAE's AI series.

Fifth, whether a relation in which both know is more stable. Relation Theory registered this sentence as handed downstream to be argued, which each branch, if it wants to use it, argues for itself;53 the papers of this series have not used it, and it is only registered, not argued.

Sixth, the stretch in which, when one cannot get out, institutions take over. Economics P2 reads as far as this; it belongs to the institutional side, and this series only registers it.54

Seventh, how causation, fault and remedy are allocated within cooperation; what Action Theory handed over, what others each bear and who institutionally is in charge of what: checked separately by On Accountability, and not unfolded in this series (Paper 6).

Eighth, institutional relations between company and company, and between states and companies. The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation states that it does not take them up, and Political Economy registers them as objects adjacent to its jurisdiction; this series does not take them up either.55

Ninth, how it is read when several undertakings between two people are tangled together. This series reads by the undertaking, entering it item by item and stretch by stretch, and gives no overall reading for a person; with the same two people, the end that operates in the 15DD direction in one undertaking may lean toward 14DD in another. Of the kind in which several undertakings are tangled together, Paper 5 confines its analysis here to a single undertaking.

Tenth, whether an undertaking has been done, where the two go on reading it differently to the end. This series stops at entering the readings apart, and gives it no position of adjudication (Paper 7).

Eleventh, Gilbert's joint commitment. Paper 1 points back to where Relation Theory interfaces with her: at the layer of qualification, when a party withdraws his own side, it is withdrawn, only it does not clear the books on the other party's side. After interfacing with her, Relation Theory wrote: "this shows what it keeps, and does not amount to having already explained all of Gilbert's normative features".56 This restriction comes along to the layer of doing things together, and this series has not made it good.

Twelfth, doing things together in which both ends lean toward 14DD and neither is reduced to calculation, yet neither recognizes the other as an end too in this undertaking. It lacks the direction premise, is not within scope, and this series does not read it; from outside it cannot be told apart from the ideal type of the first kind outside scope, and since what both lack is the direction premise, there is no need to tell them apart. Where one end later comes to be headed in this direction, this is entered by period, and from then on it is checked against scope anew (Paper 1).

Thirteenth, how leaning toward 14DD and the 14DD world Economics P2 speaks of are read against each other. This series places that world on the side of being reduced to calculation, and places the end that leans toward 14DD and is within scope on this step of the bridge Learning IV speaks of; this reading against each other is this series' own undertaking; the scope of that sentence of Economics P2 itself this series does not decide for it, and only registers here (§4; Paper 5).

§9 The Propositions of the Whole Series

The propositions of the papers are listed together in the very words of each paper's propositions, with only a full stop added at the end; argument and qualification are in each paper.

Paper 1, Doing Together

CO1 This series does not define all cooperation. The cooperation it reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction; the 15DD direction is a premise, not a component of cooperation, nor a sufficient condition for entering scope. 15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels for persons; they are read by the current relational condition, not by persons; falling back is read as it occurs, and does not overturn the direction.

CO2 Under this premise, the cooperation this series reads is this: two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share; neither party holds the purpose and adjudication of this undertaking alone. Each one's share can consist in taking up his own part according to the other's arrangement; it can consist in saying what he wants and deciding for himself how it is to be done. Merely having the qualification to refuse or to call a halt is not on that account having done a share; whether a choice, an indication, a correction or a pause actually made is a share depends on how it enters the shared way of doing it: pausing the whole operation in order to correct the shared way of doing it can still be one's own share; only where calling a halt is withdrawing one's own side, that of going on taking part, is it read as exit; the two are not told apart by how much is halted. Merely ceasing to go on being helped does not on that account become cooperation.

CO3 Direction, participation and judgment govern different things: for direction, one party is enough, and it is the direction premise; for participation, both are needed, and it is cooperation itself; in judgment, each party uses his own judgment and answers for his own share. Judgment is not the 15DD direction.

CO4 The object layer and the operation layer are kept apart: what the object layer reads is cooperation that has as its direction premise that at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction, and that is checked further for both parties' avowing and actually taking part, for not being reduced to calculation, and for not colonizing a third person. At the operation layer each party confirms only his own end, and cannot on that basis declare on the other end's behalf that it avows; the other end's taking part and arrangements are described by words and deeds and checkable conditions, and their inner grounds are not certified. If it is later confirmed that the object did not obtain, this series exits this case, and does not turn and judge the other end.

CO5 Three kinds are commonly met outside scope; each is read differently, and all are written as "not within the cooperation this series reads": that in which neither party is headed in the 15DD direction, whose ideal type is the case in which both parties treat each other only as a strategy set and reach a balance by mutual calculation; that of being passively helped, which is an act of help, read as one-way dealings per Relation Theory; and the stretch in which the arrangement the two jointly avow and actually maintain carries the direction of colonization toward a third person or crosses his basic rights. One person's later addition, or a use kept from the partner, is no ground, merely because it bears the same project's name, for inferring backward that the other avowed it too; that competition makes a third person lose out is not the same as colonizing him. If the arrangement the two jointly maintain is premised on "a third person is merely a means," the arrangement itself decides who counts as an end by whether someone is one of our own, and the recognition between the two does not rest on the other's being a person either; in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction. One who was at first passively helped, once he avows this undertaking and takes up his own share, and the other conditions are met, is within scope from then on. Where one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation, another of the conditions of scope is not met; Paper 5 reads this (CO27).

CO6 Between the balance of mutual calculation and the cooperation this series reads, the markers of the boundary look at three structural clues: whether not holding alone is having recognized that the other's share is the other's, or only that neither can hold it alone; whether the other's share is still borne by him himself; whether the existing arrangement makes room for his refusal and revision. The clues say only where the boundary lies; they do not certify inner recognition, nor prove that that kind is not cooperation. What the three clues tell apart is whether or not one is reduced to calculation; whether at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction only that end itself can confirm (CO4), and the clues do not certify it on its behalf.

Paper 2, Each for Their Own Ends

CO7 The two people's purposes are each one's own, and neither examines the other's; what a given person's purpose is, only his own end can confirm. A person's being willing to support the other's purpose can become a share he himself avows, but the word "willing" alone does not prove that it has reached his own cannot-not; a purpose is not avowed by the other on one's behalf, and not examining purposes does not mean that the action a purpose calls for, its grounds and its effects on others are from then on beyond questioning.

CO8 Cooperation can rest on exchange, but need not. There can be an arrangement of reciprocal exchange; it can be that one end mainly gives conditions, not on condition that the other gives anything back; it can be that both parties give, not on condition of obtaining a return from the other, and neither gets anything. The three are shapes this paper has picked out; they can interweave, and are not an exhaustive classification of purposes and dealings; the kind in which in fact no one benefits is not made over into one that must carry a hidden gain. Cooperation looks at the thing done together, not at what each gets from the other.

CO9 "Exchange" is read in two ways. An arrangement of reciprocal exchange that both parties avow does not make this undertaking exit scope; what exits scope is treating the other merely as a means. That Marriage Theory reads a moment of reciprocal exchange as falling back comes from marriage's having love as one thing it cannot do without, and belongs to the rule layer: this difference can be traced to the kind of relation. Writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is another matter: it lies at the normative layer and does not change with the kind of relation; in marriage it is read by Marriage Theory and Relation Theory, and in cooperation it is read the same way at the layer between persons, and is not exempted because the relation is called cooperation; settlement in a contract belongs, separately, to the side of the institution. The moment of reciprocal exchange marked as falling back in marriage and the direction of colonization are not one question. Nor is exchange calculation: calculation is the stance of treating the other only as a strategy set.

CO10 Where what the two want lies in one place, there are still two shares: each one's value belongings stay as they were, while the arrangement of action falls in one place; a shared goal is not a shared ultimate value.

CO11 The directions of colonization commonly met on these shapes: in reciprocal exchange, treating the other merely as the condition for getting something, or extending settlement from the side of the contract onto the person; writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay; where one end gives conditions, using one's giving to possess the other, completing the other's step for him, or making him dependent to the point where he cannot say no; where both give, the undertaking itself being raised into a legislator, and one party's law being judged for him under "for the sake of this undertaking" or "for everyone's sake".

Paper 3, Division of Labor

CO12 Division of labor in cooperation is an arrangement the two have avowed together; it is consensus, not calculation; its binding force passes separately through each party's own law, or comes from a procedure both parties have already recognized.

CO13 Division of labor is a present arrangement; it can be avowed anew, and it can be changed. A change into a new shared division of labor must be avowed by both parties separately, or be made by a procedure both have recognized and that applies; this does not make either party the approver of the other's own revision and exit. Unilateral withdrawal does not impose a new arrangement on the other party, nor does it erase the effects already left.

CO14 Where division of labor slides into a fixed requirement aimed at the other, by being treated as something the other may not change, by being hung on who the other is, or by being swapped out within habit, there is a tendency toward colonization: saying out loud a characterization of the division of labor slides in the direction of colonization; making it unchangeable for the other in running carries the direction of colonization. One party's own treating the division of labor as unchangeable is his self-relation; structurally it has no outward direction.

CO15 Organizations, contracts, employment, superiors and subordinates: the provisions, and the authority that comes with positions, are acknowledged but not judged, and are registered as conditions of effects; Cooperation Theory reads only the side the institution does not provide for, or that goes beyond its provisions: what passes between persons. Within a construct, a registered partner is in a position, and belongs to the institutional side; an agreement backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement that forbids one party, after leaving, to go in a certain direction, that is, a non-compete agreement, is read by Political Economy Paper 2, E12a, and a conditional payment is read differently, also by E12a; the other party to the cooperation is himself the party that sets the agreement, and if what the agreement protects is his own share, it is not among those "set to protect others." The obligations a contract gives belong to the institutional side; at the layer between persons, commitment does not turn into a duty to the other party, and the other party's response is material, not a settling of the account.

CO16 A procedure both have recognized beforehand is handing this one matter over, not a position that legislates for the two; a judgment made by a procedure both have recognized and that applies governs how this one matter is ordered, is valid for the action arrangement, and does not turn every outcome into something that needs consent obtained anew. Whether a procedure has already been recognized by both parties, or has some other fit ground, is checked apart from whether, in running, it is still controlled by the party questioned. A third party selected unilaterally by the stronger side may be only an extension of that side's power: unilateral nomination is a clue to be checked, and does not by itself prove unfitness; nor does having once been recognized, or having been set up by law, by itself prove that this dispute has been removed from the original control. If the party questioned can still, on its own, seal off review of itself, or controls the related adjudication and its delivery, it cannot be held, on the strength of "handed to a third party" alone, that the dispute has been removed; that is the same thing continuing under another name. Ordinary dissatisfaction does not directly prove that the procedure has been captured.

Paper 4, "We"

CO17 Doing things together does not automatically produce a position that legislates each side's own law for them. When "we" is said in cooperation, it is checked first which branch it is: doing things together, or mutual recognition; which branch occurs is checked case by case, and is not assigned in advance by the kind of relation. The ordinary plural "we" holds as usual.

CO18 Judging one party's law for him in the name of "for the team," "for the project" or "for the company," that is, using the name of "we" or of a construct to take in and replace one party's direction, has the same form as judging one party's law for her in the name of "this household" or "for our sake," which Marriage Theory has read, and carries the direction of colonization. That the one who takes the lead puts forward a request concerning an arrangement is not, in itself, of this kind; whether it is, is checked first against the existing authority and commitments.

CO19 Guarding comes back to the individual: not handing over one's judgment under "we decided together," not possessing others under "I have contributed," not cancelling recognition of concrete people for the sake of a shared ideal.

CO20 Mutual recognition occurs in cooperation too; not borrowing mutual recognition as adjudication: "We're friends, so you have to agree" has the same form as "We love each other, so you have to agree," and borrows the branch of mutual recognition to pass final judgment on something done together.

CO21 When several people do one thing together, it is read by pairwise accounting; passing through a third person does not release the instigator from his part; a little circle of several people does not form a third bearer; where a little circle maintains an arrangement premised on "outsiders are merely means," it is read by Paper 1's reading of collusion. Formal organizations and their staffing structures belong to the institutional side. "Each has a share," in something done together, is carried to several people and read in the same way.

Paper 5, One Side

CO22 15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels for persons: they are read by the current relational condition, not by persons. What is spoken of is the end that operates in the 15DD direction in this undertaking, and the leaning toward 14DD; neither party is said to be lower.

CO23 Cooperation in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction and one leans toward 14DD is within scope; such cooperation can be the setting in which cultivation happens, not the source of cultivation. If the person himself chooses to make a cultivative intervention, and the relevant boundaries hold, the first step is helping the other stand more firmly on the things he himself cannot set down; the intervention cannot compress the other's authority, channels or practical possibility of refusing, interrupting, revising, exiting and restating himself. Cultivation is not instruction, not remaking, and not the general opening move of such cooperation; the completion of cultivation is not in the enactor's hands.

CO24 The direction is read on that one effect, and whether it took hold is looked at separately, in the other party's later understanding and action; whether the other's capacity has increased is a measure of outcomes, and is not used to judge direction.

CO25 The end headed in the 15DD direction can see more clues, and can discern whether the other is making use of him; clues are still only clues, and long-run relational fact can shift the weight of judgment but cannot complete a certification. Whether to go on or to withdraw is his own judgment, on his own account. There is also a bias in the opposite direction: over-cultivation, reading the other's strategic performance as awakening.

CO26 Not being used, and not calculating in return: withdrawing one's own side is inward, is exit, and does not carry the direction of colonization, even if the other party's cost rises as a result; acting in a way directed at him that raises his cost is outward, and carries the direction of colonization.

CO27 If, in this end's own fallible judgment, the existing relation no longer meets the condition of scope "the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation," this end from then on no longer does this undertaking as the cooperation this series reads; what this series reads is his judgment and his own side from then on, and it does not on that basis certify that the other is reduced to calculation; exit at the object layer still goes by CO4. The other may still be doing the existing division of labor; the participation, facts and effects already left are entered as they stand, and are not erased wholesale by this judgment. The direction premise is not thereby lost automatically, nor does this judgment turn and judge the other's inner grounds. Nor is it that one qualifies to withdraw only after first certifying that the other is purely calculating: this end can stop cooperating on the strength of the current conditions. From then on, things are divided by the matters that actually remain: merely no longer doing this one thing together does not on that account become conflict as the Conflict Treatise reads it; where it already is conflict as the Conflict Treatise reads it and the reciprocal condition is currently unavailable, the unilateral path is read by its safety check and stop gates, and the unilateral path includes arrangements on one's own side, protection of boundaries, ceasing to apply, suspension and removal, and is not the same as going on cultivating the other; walking away is only an external act, and takes no technical identity by itself; the shared matters that leaving does not close out, and the institutional dispositions, are each registered by their source.

Paper 6, Each Bears a Share

CO28 The judgment layer in cooperation has two shares: each judges his own share and answers for his own share; neither party holds alone the adjudication of how this undertaking is done, and neither can declare agreement in the other's place.

CO29 Answering for, as this paper means it, is this: each one's judgments and what he has done cannot be acknowledged by someone else in his place, and the account falls on the one who judges; it faces inward: the subject answers to its own law. This stands alongside commitment's not turning into a duty to the other party, and is not owing the other party a duty. Existing institutional accountability is registered as background; how causation, fault and remedy are allocated is not given by this, and is not unfolded in this series.

CO30 What a person has done himself cannot be acknowledged by someone else in his place; a thing done was done by the one who did it: how it is told can change; the one who did it cannot. Doing things together does not let what one has done oneself turn into something "we" did, something no one did. This sentence says only who did it; it does not on its own judge who is at fault, or which consequences are borne by whom; what others each bear, and who is in charge of what within institutions, are checked separately per On Accountability, and are not closed out in this paper.

CO31 Others are not possessed under "I have contributed"; recording the other's share as one's own carries the direction of colonization; writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is read as in Paper 2. What these read is one effect within the process; how credit and authorship are reckoned is a separate account, and this series does not settle it.

CO32 Breaking a commitment is entered on the books at the layer between person and person: breach of faith is entered apart; it enters the other party's later conditions of occurrence, and expectation changes accordingly; the stretch that spreads through third parties is entered by pairwise accounting. Being entered on the books is not the same as having caused some visible loss; the face in which reputation, or a score taken as standing for it, is used by a position as a condition of a chokepoint decision belongs to Political Economy Paper 1, and records and scores belong to its Paper 4.

Paper 7, The Process

CO33 Cooperation is a process; this series reads the process, not the settlement. Ending is read only within the process, and endings are not classified: how a thing continues, pauses or stops; the agreed thing being done, the conditions disappearing, the thing not getting done: these are all possibilities of the process; where unilateral withdrawal occurs among them, it is entered apart.

CO34 What is done together sediments between two people, in time: how division of labor is set and how it changes, how expectation grows out of dealings, how an agreed arrangement continues to be borne, and is asked about again and changed when needed; avowing anew each time is not required. Stability is read party by party, and carries no evaluation: the question is, for each end, whether his staying in this undertaking has grounds in his own law.

CO35 The standard of completion, the facts that have already happened, the judgments made by a procedure both parties have already recognized, and each one's looking back on this process are entered separately. The two may disagree about completion, and one party cannot declare an avowal on the other's behalf; existing facts or a valid procedure do not lapse automatically because evaluations still differ. Each one's attribution of meaning remains each one's own, and this series does not borrow completion to clear the books on other accounts for them.

CO36 One party's withdrawing his own side is his exit; shared matters that remain after parting are not settled by unilateral exit; leaving shared matters room for natural development when one exits points in the direction of cultivation; saying, on exiting, something like "Nothing is lost by walking away like this" says for the other party what this exit amounts to, and slides in the direction of colonization.

CO37 After it is done, no "we" is left behind to legislate for the two: when it is done, neither has become the other. This sentence is limited to their not forming one bearer; the two may each change through the cooperation, and the relation, effects and commitments thereafter do not vanish automatically because it is done.

CO38 When two one-way 15DDs meet at a moment of doing this undertaking together, that is the moment of two-way 15DD; this series takes up only that moment: it is something that happens on an occasion, not a grade that a stretch of cooperation is in, and it does not make later dealings mutual automatically; this series does not touch 16DD itself, nor does it take up mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place, nor the change in the individual at that moment.

§10 Drawing Together

This paper lays down no propositions, and proves no proposition at the object layer. What it says is this: Cooperation Theory lies downstream on the relational side, following Love Theory and Marriage Theory and parallel to Marriage Theory, and reads, in two people's doing things together, the part that holds only in cooperation; doing things together in general belongs here; it does not define all cooperation, and reads cooperation whose premise is that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction; the direction is a premise, not a component, and is not enough to enter scope; under this premise, two people, each for his own purpose, do together one thing that both avow and in which each has a share, whose purpose and adjudication neither party holds alone, and which does not automatically produce a "we" that legislates for both; the main line is You for yours, I for mine, and we do this one thing together; for direction one party is enough, for participation both are needed, in judgment each uses his own. The directions of colonization read in the papers borrow things that are, or may come to be, in a cooperation; the direction is read on the one effect in which they are taken up to do something, and each thing's antecedents are checked first; people are all mixed, and a single sliding is read on that one occasion. Of the moment of two-way 15DD, Love Theory takes up the face of mutual recognition, and this series the face of the thing done together; both take up only that moment.

Appendix: Pieces Handed Down from Upstream

Relation Theory's passage for Cooperation Theory reads: "Cooperation Theory: F6 §3.1(d)(e); Action Theory Paper 8, D47, D48 and the first half of D49, and Action Theory Paper 9, D56; Value Theory P5 V71; Conflict Treatise §20, §21 and §27. What Relation Theory gives first: no third bearer is generated; a shared goal is not a shared ultimate value; what doing things together sediments into over time. The organizational part belongs to the institutional side; within an organization, the part of what passes between persons that the institution does not provide for, or that goes beyond its provisions, belongs to Relation Theory."57 Marriage Theory, in its scope, hands over: "doing things together in general belongs to Cooperation Theory, and Marriage Theory reads only doing things together within marriage".58 Each piece is placed as follows. This table is for readers who want to check against upstream; to read this series itself, it can be skipped.

Piece Source Placed in Cooperation Theory
How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6), §3.1(d), the company, and (e), the early-stage startup Relation Theory Paper 0, §16 Paper 3, CO15, registered as conditions; of F6's Appendix C, only what lies at the normative layer is cited
Action Theory D47 Same Paper 1, CO2; the skeleton of the whole series
Action Theory D48 Same Paper 4, CO17; Paper 7, CO37
The first half of Action Theory D49 Same Paper 6, CO30; the second half registered (§8, the seventh remainder)
Action Theory D56 Same Paper 4, CO19; Paper 6, CO31
Value Theory P5 V71 Same Paper 2, CO10
Conflict Treatise §20 Same Paper 3 (as the example of a disagreement with a superior); Paper 5, CO23
Conflict Treatise §21 Same Paper 3, CO15, role authority settled separately
Conflict Treatise §27 Same Paper 3, CO16
No third bearer is generated Same (given first by Relation Theory) Paper 4, CO17, CO21; Paper 7, CO37
A shared goal is not a shared ultimate value Same Paper 2, CO10
What doing things together sediments into over time Same Paper 7, CO34
The organizational part belongs to the institutional side; the side between persons within an organization Same Paper 3, CO15; Paper 4, CO18
Whether a relation in which both know is more stable Relation Theory Paper 0, §16 (handed downstream to be argued) Argued only where used; the papers have not used it, and it is only registered (§8, the fifth remainder)
Mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place Same Not taken up (§7)
Friendship as a running example Same The made-up examples of Papers 1 to 4 (§3)
Doing things together in general Marriage Theory Paper 0, §2 The whole series; parallel to Marriage Theory (§1)

When pointing back, the restrictions of that place come along.

Acknowledgments

This paper is signed by Han Qin alone; the author decided every argument and choice and bears sole responsibility for the text. In drafting, the author used AI models from various developers as tools. The English edition is an independent rewrite of the Chinese text, not a translation; where the two differ, the Chinese governs.

Notes

  1. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16: "Once Relation Theory is written, Love Theory, Marriage Theory, Parent-Child Theory and Cooperation Theory are to be unfolded. Friendship is not given a series of its own but serves as a running example (Paper 3)." In the quotation, "Paper 3" is Relation Theory Paper 3. ↩︎
  2. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16: "Relation Theory in the abstract establishes only what all relations have; a proposition that holds only in one kind of relation is handed to the series on that kind of relation to argue." ↩︎
  3. Marriage Theory Paper 0, §2, the sixth item of scope: "doing things together in general belongs to Cooperation Theory, and Marriage Theory reads only doing things together within marriage". ↩︎
  4. Marriage Theory Paper 4, under MA25: "at that moment there was no operation in the direction of recognizing the other as an end too; it fell back to the reckoning of you give me this, I give you that". That in marriage that direction is the direction in which the love between the two lies rests on Marriage Theory MA1 and MA3; that loving each other is not exchange is Love Theory L42, see note 48. This reading is unfolded in Paper 2, note 20. ↩︎
  5. Relation Theory Paper 0, §1: "Action Theory reads a single drawing of the line; the Conflict Treatise brings to a close an incompatibility that has passed both gates; Meaning Theory reads what a person carries forward, that is, attribution and orientation; Relation Theory reads what the effects between the parties (between one person and another, or between yesterday, today and tomorrow) sediment into in dealings and over time". ↩︎
  6. Action Theory Paper 8, D47: "One person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C: C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone; it is doing something together, not a shared law." ↩︎
  7. Relation Theory Paper 0, §7, reads the two branches of "we"; §16, in the passage written for Love Theory: "the two branches of 'we', which branch occurs being checked case by case". ↩︎
  8. Relation Theory H11: "the provisions themselves are acknowledged but not judged". ↩︎
  9. What Cooperation Is Not (the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation), Abstract: the range of that series is how states that cannot exit from one another, and that neither have a superior with force above them nor set one up, cooperate through consensus, checks and reputation. That series' English name is SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation; this series' English name is SAE Cooperation Theory; the two are kept apart. ↩︎
  10. Political Economy Prequel, Abstract. ↩︎
  11. Political Economy Paper 4, E24: "Outside the gates, exchange in the Emergence Layer is left open as usual. Fame bringing opportunities, capital bringing more capital, qualifications bringing posts", "are not, in themselves, the problem"; the last sentence of the same proposition: "not running into the two gates does not certify a transaction as warranted in every respect". ↩︎
  12. Political Economy Prequel, §1: "So fame and reputation are used apart. Fame is a medium on the 14DD side; it concerns how many people know of someone and how he is talked about. Reputation is the state that recognition relations naturally show within a community." Political Economy Paper 1, E5: "Where fame works in others' several choices and no one uses it as a chokepoint, it is exchange in the Emergence Layer." Records and scores, once reputation has been turned into indicators, belong to Political Economy Paper 4, E22. ↩︎
  13. Political Economy Paper 2, E12a: "A non-compete agreement violates Fork Rights; a conditional payment is read differently"; "A constraint set to protect others is not among non-compete agreements"; "What it protects is a third party's rights or the public's channels for questioning, not the contracting party's own advantage". On the side of conditional payments, "the three are used together, and that the backing is only no longer paying is not yet enough to recognize that the choice is actually there"; on the side of constraints protecting others, it is to be stated "which exercise it limits, whom it protects, why nothing less will do, and how wide its scope is". ↩︎
  14. Political Economy Prequel, §6: "The construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law"; "Directors, trustees, partners and reviewers are in positions, and accountability is said to them." ↩︎
  15. Political Economy Prequel, §8: "The judgment layer is the particular case; it is handed to judgment in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons." The same section takes "judge the operation, not the person" as a convention of the whole series. ↩︎
  16. Laughter IV, Abstract: "15DD is non dubito: it is not only I who am an end; the other, too, is an end in itself. This acknowledgment is unidirectional: it is one subject's not doubting that the other is an end in itself (Methodological Overview, §1.7)". Paper 1, note 1, likewise. The notation of layers follows the Revision Notes of From Self-Awareness to Non Dubito, which splits "10D into 15DD law of unilateral non dubito + 16DD law of bilateral non dubito" (cited at second hand, by way of Love Theory Paper 0, note 3). ↩︎
  17. Learning IV, Abstract: "recognizing the other's independent 14DD is structural, not moral — it does not require assuming the other is benevolent, and includes detecting when the other's purpose is adverse to you". Economics P2, §4.0: "In the 14DD world, the person across from you is a strategy set"; the original sentence speaks of the 14DD world; this series places it on the side of being reduced to calculation, kept apart from leaning toward 14DD; reading it in this way against Learning IV is this series' own undertaking (Paper 5; in §4, the entry on leaning toward 14DD among the shared words). ↩︎
  18. Conflict Treatise §7: "The division of paths goes by the current relational condition, not by persons." ↩︎
  19. Relation Theory Paper 4, under H40 ("The false glance"): "A moment between two people, if it can hold only by treating a third person as material, does not count as the moment of two-way 15DD"; what is read from this dependency condition is only that that moment does not count as the moment of two-way 15DD. Paper 1 reads that in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction, and its ground is the premise of that arrangement, not the two people's inner lives; this step is this series' own undertaking (Paper 1, §5). ↩︎
  20. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16: "whether and how mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place appears in a given kind of relation, which that branch argues for itself". ↩︎
  21. The Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, §11. The same section, following Institution Theory: "The construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law." The Political Economy Prequel, §8, likewise speaks in three layers. ↩︎
  22. Rights Theory P0, Abstract (M1): "SAE Rights Theory has no concept of a duty toward others; it has only one inward duty, the subject's answerability to its own law". ↩︎
  23. Relation Theory H27, H33. ↩︎
  24. Relation Theory H8, H9. ↩︎
  25. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16, see note 1; on the two branches of "we", see note 7. ↩︎
  26. Exercises and Games of Judgment III, §1.2: "in the cooperative game, his step is part of what we want together. This game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine." ↩︎
  27. Learning IV, Abstract: what that paper treats is "the bridge from 14DD to 15DD: learning to recognize that the other has a purpose independent of yours". Economics P2, §4.0, see note 17. Paper 5, §1, reads the two against each other in the same way. ↩︎
  28. Relation Theory H3: "A relation is a construct: the construct left when the effect of one side enters the conditions of occurrence of the other side; it does not legislate, bears nothing, and does not pass final judgment on either party's own law on their behalf". ↩︎
  29. Political Economy Prequel, Introduction: a construct is an arrangement with institutional status, and a company, a foundation and a level of government are all constructs; it "is the address of attribution, not the subject of the act". The same paper, §6: "A construct does not hold a recognition-based right in its own name; the power-face shown by the terms, permits or positions a construct holds is borrowed from the right held by those who invoke it, and the construct is the address of attribution (On Accountability F42)". ↩︎
  30. Relation Theory H2: "The other side of a relation must be a bearer; between a subject and a stone there is no relation". Relation Theory H12: "a little circle of two does not form a third bearer". That a company is the address of attribution and not a third bearer is read from H3 and H12 together with the Political Economy Prequel, §6; this is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  31. Rights Theory P0, M1, see note 22; Relation Theory H27. ↩︎
  32. Conflict Treatise §10: "First, first-person responsibility cannot be borne by proxy." ↩︎
  33. Moral Law P3, §0.6: "Paper 3's primary scope is the pure 15DD community — an idealized case in which all members are 15DD legislative subjects". ↩︎
  34. Political Economy Prequel, §8; Conflict Treatise §7, see note 18. ↩︎
  35. Political Economy Paper 2, E12a, see note 13. ↩︎
  36. Relation Theory H56: "Withdrawing one's own side is exit and does not carry the direction of colonization, even if the other party's cost rises as a result". ↩︎
  37. Relation Theory Paper 5, H47: "where one first monopolizes, or first induces dependency, and then withdraws, violation is checked at the layer of basic rights by F20"; the same section: "actual dependency alone, or factual irreplaceability, does not on its own yield the conclusion of violation". F20 is a proposition of Rights Theory P5. Paper 5, §5, and Paper 7, §4, read accordingly. ↩︎
  38. The Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, §4: "Cooperation and collusion can grow to look the same at the layer of recognition." Power Theory P3 §VII.2 (the same section of the Prequel cites it too): apparatuses cooperating by registering one another forward is, "in a severing context, collusion". ↩︎
  39. Action Theory Paper 8, §5, says that this form of sentence "has been set down elsewhere in this system", referring to Reason Cannot Not, I.3; I.3: "The 16DD cooperative imperative (defined complete in metaphysics-satz: I for purpose A, the other for purpose B, we cannot not do C)". The condition the cooperative imperative carries is in Reason Cannot Not, III.4; see §7. Action Theory D47, see note 6. Paper 1, note 16, and Paper 7, §6, read accordingly. ↩︎
  40. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 17; paraphrased after the 1651 text (as transcribed in Project Gutenberg #3207) checked in Paper 1, note 47. ↩︎
  41. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902), Introduction; paraphrased after the marxists.org transcription checked in Paper 2, note 53: Kessler's idea, mutual aid as one of the chief factors of evolution and not all its factors, and the origin of the mutual aid instinct left to later research are all three in the Introduction. ↩︎
  42. Relation Theory Paper 0, §12: "Mozi argues for inclusive love for one another and exchange of benefit with one another, and for its feasibility"; the same section: "All three bring into view persisting practices beyond one-sided acts; one cannot, on these sentences alone, take them as one and the same theory of a duty to return." The English renderings of 兼相爱,交相利 are as in Relation Theory Paper 0. ↩︎
  43. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), pp. 6, 10 (paraphrased after the pages as cited by Gilabert, "Fundamental Ideas"; the original book has not been checked). ↩︎
  44. The Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, §1, after the Second Definitive Article in the Second Section of Perpetual Peace. ↩︎
  45. Moral Law P6 §1: "mixed reality is the normal state, pure 15DD community is only an ideal type"; Marriage Theory Paper 0, note 28, cites the same sentence. The original sentence speaks of the form of community; carrying it to two people doing things together is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  46. Methodological Overview §1.7: "16DD Mutual non dubito. Two subjects mutually acknowledge each other as ends in themselves, mutually chisel, mutually do not doubt." The section under H39 in Relation Theory Paper 4 and Laughter IV §7.1 cite the same definition. That 16DD itself is not touched has its upstream ground in Information Theory XIV, Abstract: "From the standpoint of any single individual, the mutual non-doubt of 16DD is the thing-in-itself; here the paper holds to via negativa and sets it out only as a horizon." ↩︎
  47. Relation Theory H39: "The moment of two-way 15DD is something that happens on an occasion, not a grade that a person or a relation is in: two one-way 15DDs meet at that moment. This series takes up that moment; it does not touch 16DD itself, nor does it take up mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place, nor the change in the individual at that moment". ↩︎
  48. Love Theory Paper 0, §11, in the list of propositions, L42: "The moment this paper reads is two one-way loves at 15DD meeting; loving each other is not exchange, and 'I love you, so you ought to love me' writes love as exchange." ↩︎
  49. Reason Cannot Not, III.4. Paper 1, note 16, and Paper 7, §6, read accordingly. ↩︎
  50. Reason Cannot Not, V.3. ↩︎
  51. Relation Theory H41: "it does not make later dealings mutual automatically, nor does it let one party afterward demand mutuality of the other". ↩︎
  52. Love Theory Paper 0, L48: "This series takes up only the moment of two-way 15DD; it does not touch 16DD itself, nor does it take up the kind that holds at any time and in any place." This series' answer is the same; the wording follows Relation Theory H39, "nor does it take up mutual non dubito that can hold at any time and in any place", and brings along the second half, "nor the change in the individual at that moment" (Paper 7, CO38). ↩︎
  53. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16: "that a relation in which both know is of course more stable, which each branch, if it wants to use it, argues for itself". ↩︎
  54. Economics P2, §5. ↩︎
  55. Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 8, XZ56; Political Economy Paper 0, §9, objects adjacent to the jurisdiction (that series' Paper 3, E20). ↩︎
  56. Relation Theory Paper 0, §7. ↩︎
  57. Relation Theory Paper 0, §16. ↩︎
  58. Marriage Theory Paper 0, §2, the sixth item of scope. ↩︎

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version; the DOIs of the papers of Cooperation Theory are added on publication. Quotations are checked item by item in the accompanying audit table.

I · This series

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 1: Doing Together [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029132

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 2: Each for Their Own Ends [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029135

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 3: Division of Labor [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029139

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 4: "We" [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029143

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 5: One Side [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029145

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 6: Each Bears a Share [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029149

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 7: The Process [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029151

II · SAE works directly cited in this paper

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 0: The Place of Relation Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545115

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 1: What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 3: Commitment [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545023

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 4: Dealings and Expectation [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545057

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 5: The Sediment of Dealings [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545076

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 6: Asymmetry, Divergence and Ending [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545087

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Love Theory Paper 0: The Place of Love Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23627790

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Marriage Theory Paper 0: The Place of Marriage Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23819201

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Marriage Theory Paper 1: Joined [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23819212

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Marriage Theory Paper 4: The Years [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23819238

Qin, H. (2026). Finding One Another (SAE Action Theory, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970783

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation · Prequel: What Cooperation Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815735

Qin, H. (2026). The Close (SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815796

Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133

Qin, H. (2026). Accumulation (SAE Political Economy, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874138

Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140

Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146

Qin, H. (2026). Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power (SAE Political Economy, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874158

Qin, H. (2026). Reason Cannot Not: An SAE Refinement of Kant's Four Formulations of the Categorical Imperative [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19751512

Qin, H. (2026). Self-as-an-End: A Methodological Overview — The Chisel-Construct Cycle: Derivation, Method, Application, and AI Interface [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18842449

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Information Theory XIV (Closing Paper): 15DD Information, the Other as an End [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20581957

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Laughter · IV: The Laughter of Despair and the Knowing Smile [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23287669

Qin, H. (2026). Learning to Recognize the Other's Purpose (Introduction to SAE Learning, Part Four: The Bridge from 14DD to 15DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19491926

Qin, H. (2026). The Other End of the Bridge: Economic Rationality When 15DD Faces a Party Who Does Not Enter 15DD (SAE Economics, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · III: The Cooperative Game (15DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23609864

Qin, H. (2026). The Reputation Economy · Dao (SAE Moral Law, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20046168

Qin, H. (2026). Mixed Reality — The Intermediate State of 14DD Growing toward 15DD (SAE Moral Law, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20108658

Qin, H. (2026). On How Rights Presuppose No Duty (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21285136

Qin, H. (2026). On Accountability · Wei (SAE Rights Theory, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853810

Qin, H. (2026). On the Recognition of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20480134

III · External works

Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan, ch. 17. (per the Project Gutenberg #3207 text checked in Paper 1, the 1651 Andrew Crooke edition)

Kropotkin, P. (1902). Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, Introduction. (per the marxists.org transcription checked in Paper 2)

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (as a neighbor only; paraphrased after Gilabert's lexicon entry; the original book has not been checked)

Tomasello, M. (2009). Why We Cooperate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (as a neighbor only; the original book has not been checked)

Kant, I. (1795). Zum ewigen Frieden. (pointed back to, as checked in the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, §1)

Mozi 墨子. (pointed back to, as checked in Relation Theory Paper 0, §12)

IV · Secondary literature

Gilabert, P. (2015). "Fundamental Ideas". In J. Mandle & D. A. Reidy (Eds.), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon. Cambridge University Press. (PhilArchive copy)

Interfaces

  • Main upstream: Relation Theory Paper 0 (§1, §7, §12, §16); Marriage Theory Paper 0 (§2, the sixth item of scope); Action Theory Paper 8 (D47; §5).
  • Also used: Relation Theory Paper 1 (H2, H3, H8, H9, H11, H12), Paper 3 (H27), Paper 4 (H33, H39, H40, H41), Paper 5 (H47), Paper 6 (H56); Love Theory Paper 0 (L42, L48); the Revision Notes of From Self-Awareness to Non Dubito (by way of Love Theory Paper 0, note 3); Marriage Theory Paper 1 (MA1, MA3), Paper 4 (MA25); the Conflict Treatise (§7, §10); Reason Cannot Not (I.3, III.4, V.3); Methodological Overview §1.7; Laughter IV (Abstract, §7.1); Information Theory XIV (Abstract); Learning IV; Economics P2 (§4.0, §5); Exercises and Games of Judgment III (§1.2); Moral Law P3 (§0.6), P6 §1; Rights Theory P0, Abstract (M1); Rights Theory P5, F20 (by way of Relation Theory Paper 5, H47); the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation (Abstract, §1, §4, §11), Paper 8, XZ56; Institution Theory (by way of the Prequel to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, §11); the Political Economy Prequel (Abstract, Introduction, §1, §6, §8), Paper 1, E5, Paper 2, E12a, Paper 4, E22, E24, Paper 0, §9; Political Economy Paper 3, E20 (by way of Political Economy Paper 0, §9); Power Theory P3 §VII.2.
  • This series: Papers 1 to 7; this paper lists together the propositions of the whole series (§9), the shared words (§4), the directions of colonization said together (§6), the two faces of the moment of two-way 15DD (§7) and the remainders (§8).