The Last Force
最后的强力
A state has no force at a higher level above it. Its armed forces are its last force, and the emergency it declares when its survival is at stake is its heaviest exception. "Last" refers to level: there is nothing above. It does not refer to exemption from questioning. This force stands under confirmation and termination, and its end is not determined by the party taking the measures. The example is taken from the United City-States of Ends (UCSE): a neighbor's great army is massed at the border, the First Executive declares a state of emergency and says, "Before the survival of the UCSE, there is nothing that cannot be suspended." Internal use of the armed forces requires a confirmation that the commanding side does not monopolize. Command in peacetime and command in wartime are kept apart; entry into and exit from a state of war are not monopolized by a single position, are time-limited, and are open to questioning. Survival is a derived reason, coming from the persons it protects: it gives a position a reason to judge first, and gives it no reason to monopolize shutting the door. The position that confirms and terminates must still be able to act in the exception; where none can act, measures are confined to the shortest term written down beforehand, and may not be renewed on their own; when it cannot be held, the account is not waived by the word "survival." The strong form, dismantling after the war on one's own initiative, this paper takes, and it gives the proof: the only ground of wartime structures is the cannot-not of that war, and the end of the war is precisely its dissolving, so the end of the war is a threshold of expiry; the end is recognized by function, and functions still needed in peacetime are established anew as new decisions. A state may not require the community as a whole to go to its death, nor may it, to hold a piece of land or to make a statement outward, put the safety of its internal subjects second. Those who refuse to bear arms must have a really usable road. The paper ends in conversation with Schmitt: that the extreme exception cannot be written out in full does not mean that authority has no bounds, nor that the decision is thereafter no longer questioned. The size and organization of the armed forces, specific emergency law, and the form of the confirming and substitute positions are not fixed in this paper; the determination of each war act is in Paper 6. The paper has seven propositions (N18 to N23, with N23a), listed together at the end.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
The people Paper 3 wrote of, those who stay and those who cannot exit, face the state's last force.
In the spring of Year 9, the army of the Democratic Republic of Purposes (DRP) massed on the west bank of the Boundary River; the Office of Defense put it at about one hundred ten thousand troops. The Office of Defense's assessment to the Executive Council read: "The DRP army is able to cross the Boundary River within seventy-two hours and advance to the capital of the Western Plains State." The DRP's ultimatum arrived at the same time. The First Executive of the United City-States of Ends (UCSE) declared a state of emergency under Article 55 of the Charter (fact); the box for the reason in the declaration read: "The continued existence of the UCSE is threatened by armed attack." That night he said in a speech: "Before the survival of the UCSE, there is nothing that cannot be suspended."
By the autumn of that year the Executive Council had issued nineteen emergency orders in all, among them: a curfew in the border districts and the West Flats; a permit required for assemblies of more than fifty persons; broadcast and television content touching on the military submitted for review ("wartime information coordination"); and detention without charge of "persons suspected of assisting the enemy," for at most thirty days at a time, renewable consecutively. By the spring of Year 10, six hundred forty people in all had been detained under this clause (UCSE Case 16). The articles of the Charter and the statutes cited below serve only as facts; they are not evidentiary.
The three things are in Paper 2, §1 (UCSE Case 16 is first judged there). Added in this paper: to "Whom it concerns," add those bound by the curfew, the assembly permits and "wartime information coordination"; to "Which line," add the confirmation and renewal of the state of emergency, under the fifth ought; to "Baseline," add the Emergency Act's list of what emergency orders "may not extend to" (§3).
That speech voices a common thought: when the state itself is about to be gone, what is there that cannot be stopped? This paper sets out to answer it. A state has no regulator of force at a higher level above it (the Prequel, §6). Above its armed forces there are no other armed forces; above the emergency it declares when its survival is at stake, there is no higher position to declare that emergency over. That is why this force is called the last force. "Last" refers to level: there is nothing above. It does not refer to exemption from questioning. The last force lies under a channel it cannot itself close: those who initiate this channel are the position that confirms and terminates, which the party taking the measures does not occupy, and the Final Court, which reviews emergency orders on request; what it affects is declaration, renewal and ending; the party questioned cannot close it, and the end is not determined by the party taking the measures; when it fails, the measures expire when their term runs out, the position that acted first is questioned afterward, and the account is booked to positions and persons (§§3–4).
This paper takes over two things from upstream. Theory of Government Paper 5 wrote of emergencies at every level of government (G30, G31, G32), and in two places handed the matter on to here: "The absolute exception at the level of a whole state, which concerns whether that state itself still exists, this series does not answer; it is left to the Theory of the State" (Theory of Government Paper 5, §4); "The strong form, dismantling after the war on one's own initiative, is left to the Theory of the State" (Theory of Government G31). The other is the War Treatise, cited as it stands, and its range is not altered; where its English text has no corresponding sentence, the sentence is rendered from the Chinese page. On what grounds emergency measures and the internal use of troops may compel is checked by Theory of Government Paper 2's chain; this paper issues no further permission.
Conventions follow the Prequel, §8: interfacing in place, sources in four tiers, examples from the United City-States of Ends Case File (the UCSE Case File) shared by the whole series; at its end this paper has a separate section in conversation with Schmitt. The answer runs in seven steps; the seven propositions are stated at the end of their sections and listed together at the end.
§1 Force Turned Outward Is Not Turned Inward
In the winter of Year 9, the workers at two munitions factories in the Iron Valley Special District went on strike. Under the Wartime Security Act, the Executive Council issued a "wartime labor order": strikes at munitions enterprises were "suspended," and the workers had to return to work. On the fourth day of the strike, the Wartime Council of Three, on the ground of "protecting facilities essential in wartime," ordered a regiment of the Defense Force into the two factories; the regiment took over the factory gates for six weeks. The troops set up checkpoints at the factory gates. The District Administrator had made no request beforehand, and had not been consulted; the District Council passed a resolution opposing it. The Office of the Prosecutor charged thirty-one strike organizers; one worker suffered a broken bone in a scuffle at a factory gate (UCSE Case 17).
The deployment was not submitted to the joint session for confirmation under Article 53(c) of the Charter. The Executive Council's view was that protecting the Defense Force's own supply facilities fell under the wartime charge of Article 54, not within the limits of Article 53. The Final Court later ruled, its ten judges dividing 6 to 4, that what Article 53 calls "carry out tasks" means carrying them out against residents; the part concerning the checkpoints and assisting in arrests was "outside the scope of this request." The three things for UCSE Case 17 are in Paper 2, §6; what is judged there is this interpretation, and what is used here is the deployment itself.
Armed forces are set up for what lies outward. Article 53 of the Charter writes that they may not carry out tasks within the territory of a member unit, three cases excepted. What this article guards against, the War Treatise states very directly: "14DD's internal oppression and external expansion are two sides of the same structure" (War Treatise §5). What it speaks of there is a systemic purpose that goes the way of expansion and oppression; following the Prequel, §7, judgment falls on acts, not on the names of states, so the sentence is not taken up here to label any state. Only one point is taken from it: when force turned outward goes on to oppress the interior, what comes down is precisely the other side of that structure. Nor is the defending side exempt from the check because it is the defending side: "if resisters are not vigilant, they may become another 14DD in the process of resisting 14DD." (War Treatise §5) Force turned outward being turned inward is the most direct step of this change.
What, then, must internal use of the armed forces pass? This series sets up only one antecedent: it requires a confirmation that the commanding side does not monopolize.
Why only this one. Internal use of the armed forces is an act of compulsion. On what grounds it stands, and where it stops, is checked along that chain of Theory of Government Paper 2: "normative ground -> matter and authority -> necessary and limited means -> carrying out and being questioned" (Theory of Government Paper 2, §1). The chain is the same for all compulsion: it loses no link because it is the armed forces that act, nor does it gain an additional permission. What the armed forces add is their position in the order of levels. When ordinary compulsion is used beyond authority, there is still a force above that can call a halt to it; when the armed forces turn inward, what can call a halt to them is only the step that decides whether to use them at all. So that step may not be held only in the hands of those who command them.
This step is an extension of Theory of Government G32. G32 says of an emergency: "The determination may be made by a single position"; whether the determination holds and when the emergency ends, together with the review of confirmation, prolongation and termination, are not monopolized by the party taking the measures. The determination to use troops internally has the same shape as the determination of an emergency: one position judges first, and what it judges is against whom the force in its own hands may be used this time. The party questioned is the commanding side; if the one who determines that it may use troops internally this time is that same side, then the party under review has settled for itself whether the question has an object (Theory of Government Paper 5, §4). Carrying G32 over to the internal use of the armed forces is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking).
The object of confirmation is that deployment: how many troops, where, and for how long. It is not a general authorization that "the armed forces may be used internally," nor a vote of confidence in a particular commander. Where a deployment goes beyond these three, the part that goes beyond them has no confirmation.
Who confirms: only a function is established, and no form is fixed. One case needs to be written separately: a ruling that a court makes according to law, and that must be enforced, can constitute the confirmation spoken of here, the deployment being limited to enforcing that ruling. A court is not the side that commands the armed forces, and its ruling has already stated what is to be enforced. How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6), in its Appendix B, confines internal use to one case and hands confirmation to a court: "The defense force may not be used in the Commonwealth's internal affairs, unless one member is committing armed aggression against another and this is confirmed by the Constitutional Court." (F6, Appendix B, Article 26; a working demonstration; used only as an example) That paper states of its appendices that they are "not evidentiary for this version" (F6, the introduction to the Appendices); here its list of cases is not taken, only the function "confirmation is not made by the commanding side."
One kind of troop movement does not count as internal use. In the spring of Year 11, a week before the South Bay State held its referendum on exit, the Executive Council moved two battalions of the Defense Force into the coastal defense base at South Bay harbor for "heightened vigilance"; the troops stayed inside the base and did not go out of it to carry out tasks. The Governor of the South Bay State wrote to the First Executive that the State had not been informed beforehand (UCSE Case 15; three things in Paper 3, §6). A movement that does not leave existing barracks areas and carries out no tasks against residents does not count as internal use here, and requires no confirmation. If movements of this kind also required confirmation, every rotation of garrisons would become an internal use of troops, and confirmation would become a routine signature.
Requiring no confirmation is not the same as not being questioned. The movement fell in the week before the referendum, in the very State where the referendum was held, and that State's government did not know of it beforehand; its timing and the manner in which it was made public are an act made in the name of the UCSE that lands before the eyes of the voters. For the troop movement, one item is added to the three things: to "Which line," add the fifth ought. Going to vote is a person's use of one of the most basic paths of questioning; the fifth ought requires that initiating this path bring no retaliation (Theory of Government G35), and an act that makes those who use this path worry about the consequences of using it touches exactly this item. The Executive Council must be able to explain: why that week, what was being guarded against, and why the State's government was not informed. This paper does not judge whether this movement was deterrence; it says only that the question has an object.
Back to Iron Valley. The Executive Council placed the deployment under the wartime charge of Article 54, not under Article 53; this classification was made by the commanding side itself. N18 does not look at which article a deployment is placed under; it looks at what the deployment does: a regiment left its barracks area and entered two factories, it set up checkpoints at the gates, those passing through the gates were striking workers, and the Office of the Prosecutor made arrests by way of the checkpoints. By function, this is carrying out tasks against residents; it is internal use. It passed through no confirmation by any position that the commanding side does not occupy: the Wartime Council of Three, which gave the order, is also in charge of the Defense Force (Article 54 of the Charter); the District was not consulted; nothing was submitted to the joint session. The Final Court's ruling is an after-the-fact interpretation of Article 53, not a confirmation of this deployment beforehand, and it states, too, that the checkpoint part lies outside the request. So this deployment lacks N18's antecedent.
Beyond this gap, whether things crossed the line at the factory gate, which Paper 2, §6, hands on to here, is checked segment by segment, as in Theory of Government G13. Blocking possible sabotage and protecting supply facilities is one segment: stopping grounded in risk must state which grounded risk is to be prevented (Theory of Government G10); the order says only "protecting facilities essential in wartime," and what is being guarded against must be explained, as a supplement, by the position that gave the order. Setting up checkpoints facing the workers who pass through the gates and assisting in arrests, together with a labor order requiring the workers to return to work, is another segment. A strike is workers saying "no" to a demand; compulsion may carry consequences, but may not seal off refusal: after refusal there must be a path for passing the matter into a reviewable procedure (Theory of Government G13). In this matter the paths were there: the arbitration the union accepted in the sixth week; the review by the Final Court that the government of the Iron Valley Special District requested; the courts that the thirty-one who were prosecuted went through. The latter two are not occupied by the side that gave the order. Looking at these paths, the threshold of sealing off has not been reached, and this segment is not judged to cross the line; nor is it waved through because the former segment has grounds. The gap that remains is when arbitration could open: the troops entered the factories on the fourth day, and arbitration came only in the sixth week; whether it could have opened earlier in between, and who stood in the way, the case file does not record. The broken bone from the scuffle is checked separately along the same chain. None of this makes up for the gap left by the lack of confirmation.
The channel here: those who initiate it are a confirming position that the commanding side does not occupy, or a court ruling that must be enforced; it affects the scope, place and term of that deployment; the party questioned cannot close it; when it fails, a deployment without confirmation is booked to the position and persons that gave the order (Paper 7, N39). Confirmation is an antecedent, not a permission: once confirmed, the deployment must still pass the chain of compulsion; if the confirmation is wrong, the account is booked to the confirming side too.
N18 Force turned outward is not turned inward. Internal use of the armed forces requires a confirmation that the commanding side does not monopolize (Theory of Government G32 carried over to the internal use of the armed forces; extension; own undertaking), and goes back to the chain of compulsion of Theory of Government Paper 2; of antecedents for internal use, this series sets up only this one. The object of confirmation is that deployment: its scope, place and term. A ruling that a court makes according to law, and that must be enforced, can constitute this confirmation, the deployment being limited to enforcing that ruling. A movement that does not leave existing barracks areas and carries out no tasks against residents does not count as internal use here and requires no confirmation; where its timing and the manner in which it is made public land on internal subjects' voting or assembly, it is an act, and is questioned under the fifth ought.
§2 Military Power Kept Apart
Before dawn one day in the summer of Year 9, the DRP army shelled Reedtown, and its infantry crossed the Boundary River at three points. Under clause 2 of Article 54 of the Charter, the First Executive ordered the Defense Force to "repel the enemy who crossed the border," and reported to the Assembly within forty-eight hours. On the ninth day, on the Executive Council's submission, the Chamber of Citizens by 248 to 41 and the Chamber of Member Units by 17 to 3 declared a state of war, and the Wartime Council of Three was established (UCSE Case 24).
UCSE Case 24 is first judged here. Three things first. Whom it concerns: the residents of Reedtown and the West Flats. Which line: the fifth ought, determination and being questioned: who determines that the armed forces must be used at this moment, and by whom this determination is questioned. Baseline: the Boundary River before the DRP crossed it.
This matter contains two decisions: the defense action, and the declaration of a state of war. Who determines the cannot-not of the crossing of the river after this, and of each war act, belongs to Paper 6, §1 (N30).
Why the two decisions are two. The defense action is taken first by a single position, against a border crossing under way, with a scope that is precisely "repel," and it is reported to the Assembly within forty-eight hours. Declaring a state of war changes a legal state: the Defense Force passes into the charge of the Wartime Council of Three, and the arrangement under which, in peacetime, the Executive for Defense is in charge of it and, in combat, the Chief commands it is halted (Articles 52 and 54 of the Charter); several authorizations of the Wartime Security Act and several clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the Charter (Charter Amendment 14) all hang on this state (UCSE Case 04, three things at the opening of Paper 1; UCSE Case 06, three things in Paper 1, §6). The first decision is the first half of Theory of Government G32: a single position may judge first and act first, when there is no time to wait for several places to confer. The second decision changes who holds the armed forces from then on and which channels are halted; it is not of the kind for which there is no time to wait. The ground of the defense action does not automatically extend into the ground of a state of war; and declaring a state of war does not make the determination for each war act that follows.
How Is Institution Possible, writing of what the nation-state tier has beyond the tier before it, lists one item: "explicit allocation and constraint of military authority" (F6 §3.1b). This series brings it down onto two things; the specification of these two is undertaken by this paper.
One: command in peacetime and command in wartime are kept apart. Wartime command is concentrated: three persons, by majority, are in charge of the whole armed forces. The only ground of this concentration is the war. If command were concentrated in this way in peacetime too, the armed forces would be held in the hands of the executive side, and at that time there would be no war to ground the concentration. The step that switches between the two arrangements of command is entry into and exit from the state of war. F6's Appendix B writes: "In peacetime the Chancellor has no direct command over the armed forces." (F6, Appendix B, Article 13; a working demonstration) The UCSE has a different arrangement; forms are not compared here.
The other: how the legal state that is the state of war is entered and exited: the determination of entry is not monopolized by a single position, is time-limited, and is open to questioning; exit is not decided alone by the party taking the measures.
Take these to the UCSE. Entry: the Executive Council submits, and the two chambers of the Assembly each declare by two-thirds (Article 54 of the Charter); the one submitting and the ones declaring are not the same place, and on paper this item is met. Time limit: Article 54 writes no term; once declared, a state of war lasts until the Assembly terminates it by a majority; this item is not met. F6's Appendix B requires the resolution entering a state of war to specify a time limit, and writes that "the state of war terminates automatically upon expiration" (F6, Appendix B, Article 13; a working demonstration). Why a time limit matters: a state of war without a term goes on without anyone having to judge it again, and becomes a decision that is no longer questioned. A time limit does not mean that the state of war ends when the term runs out; it means that when the term runs out it must be judged afresh, and that judgment must be open to questioning (§5). Open to questioning: after the declaration, the meetings of the Joint War Committee were not public, and the public hearings of the Defense Committee of the Chamber of Citizens were halted (UCSE Case 06). These wartime arrangements may themselves have grounds, but the conditions of being questioned are not withdrawn because of war (Theory of Government G30); the part that was halted must be explained, and some other path must take it up.
Exit. A state of war is terminated by a majority in each of the two chambers of the Assembly (Article 54 of the Charter); the terminating position is not the Wartime Council of Three, which takes the measures, and on paper there is no monopoly. What is to be checked is function: "'Independent' here is functional" (F6 §3.2). After Charter Amendment 14, so long as the state of war continues, the elections to the Chamber of Citizens are not held (UCSE Case 04): the chamber that can terminate the state of war has its own term extended along with it, and terminating or not terminating comes to bear on when it is itself questioned by the voters. After the ceasefire in the spring of Year 10, the majority of the Chamber of Citizens did not move to terminate (UCSE Case 07; three things at the opening of Paper 2); by §5, the wartime ground had by then reached its threshold. The two clauses themselves, and how they came in by constitutional amendment, are judged in Paper 1, §§3–4; the election ruling and its non-execution, in Paper 2. This section records only one thing: in the determination of exit, as in that of entry, independence is checked by function; if a position is not, on paper, the party taking the measures, but its own being questioned is postponed for as long as this state continues, then in this matter it too is a party questioned, and independence must be checked again against it (Theory of Government G35).
There is one more gap: clause 2 of Article 54 does not write what becomes of the defense action if the Assembly has not declared within fourteen days. By G32, confirmation and termination fall at the layer of efficacy: if confirmation fails, the authority to act must be able actually to stop. This time a state of war was declared on the ninth day, and no case arose of fourteen days passing without a declaration (what happens when the time runs out, §4 says); whether that defense action also went through a determination that was not monopolized is checked under Paper 6, N30; the case file does not record it.
With Locke. Theory of Government Paper 5 took up his prerogative (§7); this is another text. In chapter XII of the Second Treatise of Government, besides the legislative and the executive power he sets up the federative power, and says that it "contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth" (Second Treatise, ch. XII, §146, per Project Gutenberg EBook #7370; tier A). This power is "much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive" (§147, same source), and must be left to the prudent handling of those who hold it. He also says that, though the two are distinct in themselves, they can hardly be placed apart: "it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands" (§148, same source); to do so "would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin" (ibid.).
The common question: whether a state's force, used inwardly and used outwardly, should be held apart, and who decides how it is used.
How far the agreement goes. Two points. One: force cannot be divided among several hands not subordinate to one another; the keeping apart of military power that this series speaks of is not a splitting of the armed forces into two, and in wartime one armed force has only one command. Two: what concerns the outside can hardly be written out in full by rules made beforehand; this series establishes only functions, and the defense action may be taken first by a single position.
Where they part. What Locke guards against is two forces each obeying its own commands; what this series guards against is one and the same force being commanded from one place, and that same place also deciding whether the force is used internally this time, and whether a state of war is entered or exited. What is kept apart is not command, but command and determination. In the next chapter Locke himself makes the federative and the executive power "both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative" (ch. XIII, §153, same source): the side holding the force does not alone decide the use of that force, and the direction is the same as this series'. He says the federative power can only be left to prudence; this series says that what is left to judgment must still be open to questioning: "fallibility is precisely one of the reasons they must be open to questioning" (Theory of Government G7). Prudence is the affair of those who hold the power; being open to questioning is the affair of the construct; the one does not stand in for the other.
N19 Military power is kept apart (on the increment F6 §3.1b names; the specification below is undertaken by this paper). Command in peacetime and command in wartime are kept apart. For the legal state that is the state of war, the determination of entry is not monopolized by a single position, is time-limited, and is open to questioning; exit is not decided alone by the party taking the measures. Who determines the cannot-not of each war act (starting, expansion, crossing the boundary) belongs to Paper 6, N30.
§3 The Exception Bearing on Survival Does Not Produce a Sovereign
Back to that night's speech: "Before the survival of the UCSE, there is nothing that cannot be suspended."
The Charter gives the power to declare an emergency to the First Executive (Article 55): the declaration is confirmed by the joint session by a majority within seven days, and expires if not confirmed; it runs sixty days at a time and is renewed by the joint session by a majority; the Final Court may review emergency orders on request. On the fifth day, the joint session confirmed it by 214 to 97. The First Executive is elected by the majority of the Chamber of Citizens, and the confirming majority largely coincided with this majority (UCSE Case 16).
First, read that speech. On its account, once survival has been declared to be at stake, the line, the paths of questioning and confirmation may all be halted. The War Treatise has stripped away this grammar: "'Cannot-not' strips the war-party of sovereign grammar — it is not 'I have the right to start the war / expand / refuse questioning,' but 'I am forced by structure to this point.'" (War Treatise, the opening of the Middle Volume); of the grammars of the Kingdom of Means it says, "These grammars place the war-party in the position of sovereign" (§17). What is spoken of there is the war-party; it is cited here as it stands, and its range is not altered, and only the shared direction is taken: "there is nothing that cannot be suspended" is also a kind of "I have the right." The weight of this section does not rest on this sentence but on the three steps below. Once that grammar is stripped away, the question left is: forced to this point by what, forced as far as which step, and what, beyond that step, is still not within its right.
The UCSE's own law has already answered part of this. The Emergency Act writes that emergency orders may not extend to postponing elections, to the proceedings of the Final Court, or to the establishment of the Inspectorate. The speech says there is nothing that cannot be suspended; the law says there are three things that cannot. The speech is not an act (the Prequel, §8); it voices how the one who declared the emergency regards this power.
This series' answer goes one layer further down, in three steps.
First, where the reason of survival comes from. "The construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically" (Institution Theory Z38). A state is a means that persons have made (the Prequel, §2). The survival of the UCSE matters because what it carries matters: the line it guards, the recognition-based rights it guarantees (Theory of Government G17), the channels and the lives of the people inside it. Survival is a derived reason, coming from the persons it protects. A derived reason cannot be used to shut off the questions of the very persons from whom it derives: that would be a reason devouring its own source. Among the things survival protects, the line and the paths of questioning do not enter into exchange: the line "is not discounted under any condition" (Institution Theory Z9), and holding to does not stop in an emergency (Theory of Government G30). So survival can be a reason for many measures; it cannot be a reason to close off questioning. This step is this series' own undertaking.
Second, what survival gives. It gives the fact that there is no time to wait. The DRP army is able to cross the river within seventy-two hours; to wait for confirmation within seven days before moving would be too late; for a single position to declare first and act first has grounds. Theory of Government Paper 5, §4, took three things apart: judging whether there is an emergency, judging how to deal with it, and being thereafter no longer bound; "There being no time to wait is a reason for the first two to be done quickly by a single position; it is not a reason for the third." Survival weighs more than a flood; what weighs more is the weight and cost of the first two, not the ground for the third. Conversely, the heavier survival is, the less the third can be granted: if a judgment of survival is wrong, the cost is the suspension of everything, and that is precisely when it most needs to be questioned.
Third, no position becomes final because of survival. "Decisions can be final"; "Positions cannot be final" (Theory of Government G36). The decision declaring an emergency can take effect, and the decision confirming it can take effect; no position acquires, by uttering the word "survival," a standing in which it is thereafter no longer questioned.
Together, these three steps are the reason this series does not take the strong form "the sovereign decides on the exception" (the table of strong forms is in the Prequel, §8).
What that speech first ran into was six hundred forty detained people. Paper 2, §1, judged what the last instance decided in this matter; whether their detention crosses the line under the first ought is judged here, by configuration. Three things. One: holding to does not stop in an emergency: basic rights not being violated, and the channels of the fifth ought, do not stop because of survival (Theory of Government G30). Two: "persons suspected of assisting the enemy" is a determination grounded in risk, falling on persons who have not been determined to have crossed the line: it must state which grounded risk is to be prevented and against whom the act is directed, and must pass the burden of proof of the enforcement slot (Theory of Government G10, G11); this determination is made by the executing side, without charge, and can be renewed consecutively; by the spring of Year 10, the longest continuous detention that had occurred was one hundred fifty days. Three: compulsion itself must be a limit: the detained must have a path out that the detaining side does not occupy (Theory of Government G13: not sealing off the channels of exit, refusal and revocation; independence as in Theory of Government G35, checked against the party actually questioned). "For at most thirty days at a time" is not this path: it can be renewed consecutively, whether to renew is decided by the detaining side itself, and the term lies in the hands of the party questioned, in the same shape as the renewal on its own that §4 disallows. The Inspectorate is notified within forty-eight hours; it can call for the files, require an explanation and request review, but cannot annul, and cannot release anyone. Review under Article 43 of the Charter reviews the clause, not this one person's detention, and requires other remedies to be exhausted first (whether among them there is a case-by-case review that the detaining side does not occupy and that can release people, the case file does not record; if one is found, the matter is checked by each person's facts, as in the last sentence of this paragraph); after Charter Amendment 14 it needs eight of eleven judges, and in this matter seven held that the clause was not in conformity with the Charter, and the clause went on detaining people (Paper 2, §1). None of the three is a path by which people can get out. So, by this configuration, this clause crosses the line on every detained person, however long that person was actually detained (own undertaking). If such a review is found, that part is instead checked by each person's facts, and is registered as a remainder.
Now ask about confirmation. The confirming majority and the declaring person come, broadly, from the same majority: what does this show? "Belonging to the same party is not evidence" (Theory of Government Paper 5, §4): that confirmer and declarer come from one majority does not by itself prove that confirmation is only an extension of the declarer's will. Two things are to be checked. One, structurally: whether there is a path of confirmation or termination that the declaring side cannot block on its own (Theory of Government G32). Before Charter Amendment 14, the answer is yes: every sixty days the matter had to go back to the joint session for renewal, and the declaring side could not stop the joint session from declining to renew; and the Final Court could review emergency orders. Two, functionally: whether that majority acts only on the declarer's will (read as Theory of Government Paper 2, G16, reads it). This depends on what was seen and what was asked at confirmation: the Office of Defense's assessment is the judgment on which the declaration rested, and if the confirming side could not see it or ask about it, confirmation is only trust in the declarer. The case file does not record this item, and this paper does not judge it. After the amendment, renewal passed to the Executive Council's own decision, termination by the joint session required three-fifths, and for the Final Court to declare an emergency order not in conformity with the Charter required eight judges (UCSE Case 04); in the autumn of Year 10, the joint session voted to terminate, 176 to 142: past a majority, short of three-fifths. Where this change falls is taken up in the next section.
With Hobbes. On who judges the means of defense, Hobbes gave a very direct reason. He says that the end of instituting a commonwealth is the peace and defense of all, and "whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means" (Leviathan, ch. 18, per Project Gutenberg EBook #3207; tier A); so the sovereign has the right to judge both the means of peace and defense and their hindrances (same place, paraphrased). Of the command of the armed forces he says that "the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign" (same chapter, same source); these rights are "incommunicable, and inseparable" (same chapter, same source). The topic of the sovereign who cannot be questioned has already been taken up in Law Series Supplement §2 and Theory of Government Paper 6, §3, and is pointed back to; here is another topic from the same author.
The common question: defense being the end, in whose hands lies the right to judge the means, and is that judgment still questioned?
How far the agreement goes: someone must judge the means of defense, often quickly; one armed force can have only one command (§2).
Where they part. Two points. One: from "a right to the end" one cannot get to "the judgment of the means is not questioned." The means has grounds because it serves the end; whether it really serves the end is exactly what can be asked. If what is suspended for the sake of defense is precisely the line and the paths of questioning of those defended, the means has turned against the end. Two: whether command and determination can be kept apart. In Hobbes, commanding the armed forces itself makes a man sovereign, and the right of war and peace and the right to judge the means of defense are bound into one bundle with it. This series keeps them apart: one armed force, one command; whether it is used internally (N18), whether a state of war is entered and exited (N19), and when an emergency ends (this section and the next) are not decided alone by the commanding side. Hobbes would say that keeping them apart in this way divides sovereignty; this series says that sovereignty was never an indivisible core (the Prequel, §5). What is obtained here is a difference in how things are divided, not a refutation of him.
Schmitt gave a sharper answer; the answer at the level of the state is in this section and the next, and the conversation is at the end of the paper.
N20 The exception bearing on survival does not produce a sovereign. The determination is not monopolized by a single position; no position becomes final because of survival; "The construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically" (Institution Theory Z38). The War Treatise strips the war-party of sovereign grammar: "it is not 'I have the right to start the war / expand / refuse questioning,' but 'I am forced by structure to this point.'" (War Treatise, the opening of the Middle Volume; the shared grammar is set out in §17)
§4 Non-Monopoly in Extreme Situations, and Booking the Account When It Cannot Be Held
Suppose that the armed attack has already begun, Rivermouth City has been struck, and the joint session cannot muster a quorum within seven days (UCSE Case 16-B).
Under Article 55 of the Charter, in branch 16-B the state of emergency expires on the seventh day, unconfirmed. Rivermouth City is the seat of the UCSE-level organs, and the attack is still going on.
Who has the say now? Schmitt's answer is in §8.
First, stated positively: this moment must be prepared for beforehand. The position that confirms and terminates is there beforehand, and its continued existence, its convening and its agenda do not depend on the party taking the measures: this is what Theory of Government Paper 5, §4, calls being "put in place beforehand." At the level of the state one more step is needed: in the exception, that position must still be able to act (extension; own undertaking). A quorum is the form of ordinary times; in the exception it cannot be the only form. A substitute confirming position must be written down beforehand, and is not appointed by the party taking the measures: what a substitute appointed on the spot by the declaring side confirms is the declaring side itself. When the substitute comes into use goes by facts written down beforehand (for instance, failure to muster a quorum within so many days), and is not determined by the declaring side. Article 55 has no such layer; what 16-B shows up is this gap.
What if neither the confirming nor the substitute position can act? Measures are confined to the shortest term written down beforehand, expire when the term runs out, and the party taking the measures may not renew them on its own. What it makes at this point is a provisional decision in a position, not a final decision on the exception. Article 55's "expires if not confirmed" runs in the same direction as this proposition on this point: without confirmation, an emergency does not extend itself. In 16-B, if after the seventh day the Executive Council goes on applying the emergency orders as before, that is its decision in that position, with its own account, and it acquires no ground from the word "survival." Repelling the attack has another path, the defense action under clause 2 of Article 54 (§2): its scope is repelling, and its term goes with the attack itself; once confirmation is possible, it too must be confirmed.
When the exception ends is not determined by the party taking the measures (Theory of Government G32). In the facts as fixed, this was both lost and achieved. Clause 2 of Charter Amendment 14 handed renewal of the state of emergency, while the state of war continues, to the declaring side itself (UCSE Case 04): this is exactly the renewal on its own that this proposition blocks. Paper 1, §3, has already judged that this clause withdrew the independence of confirmation and renewal; how it came in by constitutional amendment is judged in Paper 1, §4. By the summer of Year 11 the state of war had been terminated, clause 2 no longer applied, and renewal went back to the joint session; no one moved to renew, and the state of emergency ended when its term ran out (UCSE Case 16). That ending did not depend on the declaring side declaring it: renewal had to be made by a position it did not occupy; no one moved for it; at the end of the term, it ended.
The position that acted first must be questioned afterward. When it cannot be held, the account falls on positions and persons, and is not waived by the word "survival." Two things must be stated precisely here.
One: this proposition gives no warrant that every extreme situation can be operated successfully: the confirming and the substitute positions may both be swept away; "This series gives no warrant for when questioning will happen, who will take it up, or how long it will last" (Institution Theory Z37).
The other: that a procedure is for a time broken does not mean the norm automatically expires. A decision made at that moment is booked, all the same, to the position and persons that made it; once the channel returns, it must be questioned: "past residue is not written off by closing off questioning" (Institution Theory Z35a). The minimum content of booking the account is written in Paper 7, §4 (N39).
Here this paper shares a boundary with Paper 2, §4 (N11b): in the exception, too, the executing party may not suspend the carrying out of a ruling of the final instance that is still valid. N21 permits a new provisional measure to be taken first when the confirming position cannot act; it gives no authority to suspend an existing ruling. Where the executing party objects to a ruling, it explains publicly, and the matter passes into review (Institution Theory Z12, extended); the ruling remains valid and is carried out. Provisional measures govern what lies ahead and has not yet been decided; what the final instance has already decided is not in the hands of provisional measures. The confirming position may change the rules through constitutional procedure, forward only, without changing a decision of the final instance already made. The position of the final instance itself still lies under the closed loop (Paper 2, N8).
N21 Non-monopoly in extreme situations, and booking the account when it cannot be held (own undertaking). The position that confirms and terminates is there beforehand and does not depend on the party taking the measures (an extension of Theory of Government Paper 5, §4); in the exception it must still be able to act: the ordinary quorum is not its only form; a substitute confirming position is written down beforehand and is not appointed by the party taking the measures. Where neither the confirming nor the substitute position can act, measures are confined to the shortest term written down beforehand, expire when the term runs out, and the party taking the measures may not renew them on its own; what it makes at this point is a provisional decision in a position, not a final decision on the exception. When the exception ends is not determined by the party taking the measures (Theory of Government G32). The position that acted first must be questioned afterward; when it cannot be held, the account falls on positions and persons, and is not waived by the word "survival." This gives no warrant that every extreme situation can be operated successfully; that a procedure is for a time broken does not mean the norm automatically expires. Provisional measures taken first in the exception may not suspend a ruling of the final instance that is still valid (Paper 2, N11b).
§5 Wartime Structures Are Dismantled After the War on One's Own Initiative
In the spring of Year 10, the UCSE and the DRP signed the Ceasefire Agreement at Three Borders, in the Nation Union of Telos (NUT), and both sides ceased hostilities. In the spring of Year 11 the two states signed the Withdrawal Agreement, and the UCSE withdrew from the Wheat Plain buffer zone within one hundred twenty days; in the summer of Year 11, the Assembly terminated the state of war, and the state of emergency ended in the same period (UCSE Cases 26 and 16). By Year 12, the structures built in wartime came to eleven items (UCSE Case 19): some had expired, some stayed on under new names, some were still in place.
UCSE Case 19 is first judged here. Three things first. Whom it concerns: those still under these structures: those under the speech clause and the revocation clause, those under surveillance, those paying the "West Flats reconstruction tax," the farming households of the northern stretch of the West Flats; the asset freeze freezes the assets of DRP state bodies and is an act toward the other state as a construct (Paper 5, §5), and on what grounds it still stands this section checks. Which line: the first ought, compulsion still in operation must have a present ground (Theory of Government Paper 2's chain); the fifth ought, what is established anew must be explained to a position it does not occupy. Baseline: ordinary times before the spring of Year 9.
The source. Theory of Government Paper 5 took only the weak form and handed the strong form on to here (Theory of Government G31, quoted in the Introduction). The strong form is the first of the obligations that War Treatise §18 lays down for the victorious party: "All the temporary structures built in wartime — emergency powers, mechanisms of oppression, systems of mobilization, wartime narratives — must be actively dismantled after the war ends" (War Treatise §18; rendered from the Chinese page).
The strong and the weak part at the threshold. The weak form says: a temporary structure of guarding "must be re-examined after its conditions change" (Institution Theory Z22); "The passing of time and a change of conditions are reasons for review, not a threshold of expiry" (Theory of Government G31). Institution Theory writes explicitly that, carried over to ordinary times, it takes only the weak form: "In carrying this over to ordinary times, this series takes only the weak form ... In ordinary times it does not say 'immediately vanishes.'" (Institution Theory Paper 3, §8) The strong form says: the end of the war is a threshold of expiry. Theory of Government Paper 5 has said: "The conditions of war and of ordinary times differ; the strong form is not merely the weak form with one more 'must.'" What follows proves that at this one place, the end of the war, this series takes the original form (own undertaking).
The proof. Five steps.
One: wartime structures have only one source of their ground. Powers, and arrangements of oppression and mobilization, established on wartime grounds are legitimate only because of that war. Wartime structures are part of the actions of the war: their ground is the cannot-not that the starting of the war and each expansion passed (War Treatise §§13–14); and Theorem Three further requires that they be directed toward the end of that war: every action of the war "must be directed toward the ending of war" (War Treatise, the opening of the Middle Volume; likewise §15).
Two: the end of the war is precisely the dissolving of this ground. The War Treatise defines the end thus: "The moment the 'cannot-not' that existed at the opening of war is dissolved is the moment the war ends" (§15).
Three: so when the war ends, the ground of wartime structures has not "changed"; it is gone. The weak form speaks only of review because, in ordinary times, the reasons for emergency and for guarding can change by degrees: the water went down, sixty households were still living in the school, and the reason changed from escaping the water to housing people (Theory of Government Paper 5, §3); how far it has changed, and what is left, a review must go and find out. The reason for wartime structures does not change by degrees: when the point it was directed toward is reached, the directedness is used up, and there is nothing left for a review to find. To continue, there can only be another ground. The War Treatise says: "Post-war, the legitimacy of these structures immediately vanishes"; "Every post-war action is a new action, requiring a new cannot-not to be legitimate." (§18)
Four: so the end of the war is a threshold of expiry, not a reason for review: on reaching the threshold, wartime structures expire, without waiting for a decision to dismantle them. "On one's own initiative" is still needed because what has expired in law can go on running in fact: after the war, "the command system has not automatically dissolved, emergency powers have not automatically been handed back, restrictions on dissent have not automatically been lifted" (§18). The position holding them is accountable for lifting them: annulling, handing back, ceasing to use. To wait for a decision to dismantle is to let what has expired run until someone comes to dismantle it, and the one who can initiate dismantling is often precisely the side that holds it.
Five: the direction of the burden of proof is reversed accordingly. In the weak form, a measure continues until review finds "no ground"; in the strong form, a measure stands expired until a new ground is set up. It is for the side that wants to establish anew to put that forward, not for the side that wants to dismantle to prove its case.
The antecedent of this proof is "established on wartime grounds." What is not established on wartime grounds is not under this proposition: emergency and guarding in ordinary times still follow the weak form of Institution Theory Z22 and Theory of Government G31.
The end of the war is recognized by function. By step two, the end is the moment the cannot-not that existed at the opening of the war is dissolved. To recognize it, look at what that cannot-not was. The defending side's cannot-not for starting the war is an attack under way: "If the other side's attack is really under way, it is no longer preemption; it is resistance." (War Treatise §13; rendered from the Chinese page) Once hostilities have ceased and the attacking side has withdrawn, this cannot-not is dissolved. What remains is that the other side may come again in future; the War Treatise sets this outside the reasons for starting a war: "a future threat has not made one's own cultivation fail to hold now, and so does not satisfy the second condition" (War Treatise §13; rendered from the Chinese page). It cannot sustain a wartime cannot-not; it can serve only as a reason for peacetime defense, with a peacetime ground set up anew (see the next item; the defensive line on the northern stretch of the West Flats is one example). So the facts that hostilities have ceased and that the attacking side has withdrawn, facts recognizable even by positions that do not hold the wartime structures, are exactly what the moment of step two looks like in fact. Nor does the War Treatise tie the end to the other side's surrender or acceptance of terms: "This definition does not include the common end-states of war such as 'the other side surrenders,' 'the other side is destroyed,' 'the other side accepts our terms'" (War Treatise §15; rendered from the Chinese page). A peace treaty may never come; to take it as the term is to hand the threshold over to whether the two governments sign. Who recognizes the end follows §2: it is not decided alone by the party taking the measures.
On this reading, with the ceasefire in the spring of Year 10, the defensive war had ended by function: the DRP army had been pushed back west of the Boundary River in the autumn of Year 9, and after the ceasefire hostilities ceased (UCSE Cases 24 and 26). The UCSE's remaining stationed in the Wheat Plain buffer zone after this is an expansion on this state's side that must be determined on its own, belonging to the "prolongation of time" that Theorem Two lists (War Treatise, the opening of the Middle Volume, and §14; Paper 6, N30, N33), not a continuation of the defensive war. In the year between the ceasefire and the withdrawal, the Executive Council twice renewed the state of emergency, for one hundred eighty days each time; the box for the reason in the renewal of the summer of Year 10 read "a ceasefire is not peace," and the wartime powers went on running as before (UCSE Case 16): by this section, they had no wartime ground; that the renewals were made by the Executive Council itself is another layer, already judged in Paper 1, §3. Paper 2's UCSE Case 07 also falls within this year.
Functions still needed in peacetime. Public functions that really must be undertaken in peacetime are not carried on by borrowing the wartime ground: on reaching the threshold they expire together with the wartime structures. To be undertaken in peacetime, a function must be established anew as a new decision, with a peacetime ground, authority, bounds, arrangements for being questioned and a term of its own, passing the third layer on a present reason (Theory of Government G6), not borrowing the wartime reason. Establishing anew can be done before the threshold, taking over on reaching it. It is put forward by the side that proposes to establish it anew, and explained publicly to positions that can question it and that it does not occupy: what the executing side proposes, to rule-making and checking; what the rule-making side proposes, to checking (Paper 1, §6); and it is explained to the channels of internal subjects as well. The one who proposes and the one who reviews are kept apart; a decision to establish anew whose explanation does not succeed within its term expires when the term runs out. This item too leaves a remainder: what has been explained is not thereby exempt from later questions (Theory of Government G36); expiry runs forward and does not settle the account for what has already happened in wartime; whether the prosecutions, detentions and requisitions made under the authority of the time crossed the line is checked separately, each on its own grounds (Paper 7).
Recognized by function, not by name. What is renamed, or continued through ordinary procedure, does not by itself prove that it has been lifted. When Theory of Government Paper 2 lets substitute exercise into the slot, it does so by function, not by the name of the setting (G12a); when it establishes the root of enforcement, it says: "Compulsion that cannot be retraced does not come to stand by being renamed administration" (Theory of Government G11). Carrying this reading over to whether wartime structures go or stay is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking).
Take these items to sort the eleven.
One class: what expired with a decision or a date: the emergency orders (item 1), Article 17 of the Wartime Security Act (part of item 2), the Wartime Council of Three and the Joint War Committee (item 6), the suspension of renunciation and of review for alternative service (item 7), the curfew in the West Flats (part of item 9). Their expiry rested on the Assembly's terminating the state of war in the summer of Year 11 and on no one's renewing the state of emergency. By this section, they had already reached the threshold and expired at the ceasefire in the spring of Year 10, without waiting for those two decisions: the year and more that they went on running had no wartime ground. The suspension was lifted; the account the suspension left was not lifted with it: that young man's application, given "no further review" after the war, is written of in §7.
One class: what stayed on under a new name. The speech clause originally opened with "while the state of war continues" (UCSE Case 22; three things in Paper 5, §6); the Executive Council says that it and the revocation clause are "not premised on the state of war." This view was given by the executing side that holds these two articles; whether they have passed the threshold is not decided alone by the side that argues for their continuation. With the ceasefire in the spring of Year 10, these two articles reached the threshold and expired. In Year 12, a newly elected Chamber of Citizens passed the National Security Act by 162 to 131: the speech clause became "spreading false information endangering national security," and the penalty went from one to five years to six months to three years; the revocation clause was kept in its original wording. Does what has been set up again through ordinary procedure, by a new post-war majority, count as a wartime structure? It is recognized by function. If what it does is still what those two wartime articles did, it must be established anew as a new decision under the item above, with a peacetime ground and a term of its own, and be explained on a present reason; whether the National Security Act has a term, the case file does not record. Some in the new majority had opposed the Wartime Security Act at the time: this is a decision made afresh, and it has validity at the second layer, but the third layer still has to be answered; review is conducted by the checking link, and the decision remains open to questioning through the channels of internal subjects; this paper does not judge how the check comes out. The revocation clause need not wait: no administrative position has the power to deprive anyone of membership (Paper 3, §3, N14), and the article kept in its original wording cannot pass there.
The "West Flats reconstruction tax" has the same rate as the wartime surtax; its name changed from "wartime" to "reconstruction." Renaming is not establishing anew. To be a peacetime tax, it must be established anew as a new decision: what is being reconstructed, how much is needed, and until when, following the tax's own root (Theory of Government Paper 3); without being established anew, it is the wartime surtax renamed, and expired on reaching the threshold. The same rate is a symptom to be checked, not a conclusion. The "security for the Reedtown compensation" was originally a sanction aimed at war-making capacity (UCSE Case 21; three things in Paper 5, §5); renamed as security, it serves another purpose. When the purpose changes, the ground must change too: what debt is secured, in what amount, and until when, must be established anew by the Office of Trade as a new decision, and explained to a position it does not occupy.
One class: what takes as its term a date that may never come: surveillance. Its term, "the date on which the peace treaty with the DRP is signed," is treated as having no term written, and the end of the war is still its threshold: at the ceasefire in the spring of Year 10, the surveillance authorization had already expired. That the authorization was still in place in Year 12 is a compulsion without ground continuing. The authorization is approved by the Director, without a court; those under surveillance mostly do not know they are in it, and paths of questioning are almost nonexistent; this item, all the more, cannot wait for someone to come and dismantle it. If the Office of Internal Security considers that some kind of surveillance is still needed in peacetime, it is established anew under the item above.
One class: what no one has raised: the defensive line on the northern stretch of the West Flats and the requisitioned land. In the summer of Year 9, the Office of Defense, under an emergency order, requisitioned about one thousand four hundred hectares of farmland to build a defensive line, with compensation at one third of the market price, "to be taken up after the war" (UCSE Case 09; three things in Paper 2, §5). The ground of the requisition was the emergency order, which expired on reaching the threshold. Whether the defensive line is still needed in peacetime can be a real question: the DRP's Programme of National Purposes still keeps "the return of the West Flats" (UCSE Case 26; three things in Paper 6, §4). But that is peacetime defense; it must be established anew as a new decision, proposed and explained by the Office of Defense, and must make up the part the requisition has never booked: how the loss and the remedy are booked (Theory of Government G11). "To be taken up after the war" itself states a condition: after the war. When the condition arrives, the taking up should begin; by this section, it arrived at the ceasefire in the spring of Year 10, and is not fixed otherwise by the side using the land.
The acting Inspector-General and the observation posts are each checked by the ground on which they were separately set up: the acting Inspector-General rests on the transitional clause of the Inspectorate Act, written of in Paper 1, §6; the two observation posts in the Wheat Plain were set up separately under the Withdrawal Agreement, with a term of three years of their own, and whether they amount to administering on the other side's land is checked in Paper 6, §5. The defense budget existed before the war; the yearly authorizations and grounds, and whether they include arrangements newly added on wartime grounds, the case file does not record, and the budget cannot be excluded from N22 wholesale on the strength of its proportion alone. The part established on wartime grounds falls under N22; for the rest, the present reason and the conditions of being questioned are checked, and Paper 5, §6, checks it as a symptom.
When the end of the war cannot be determined. Suppose that after the ceasefire the two states sign no agreement at all, hostilities along the Boundary River flare up and die down, and the Assembly does not terminate the state of war (UCSE Case 19-B). Then there is no recognizable endpoint. Whether hostilities have a recognizable endpoint is recognized by function, as the end of the war is, and is not decided alone by the party taking the measures (§2). At the time of authorization, one cannot tell whether this war will have a recognizable endpoint; so wartime powers have their term written at the time of authorization, confirmed by a position that the party taking the measures does not occupy, in the same direction as the time limit on the state of war in §2. Once it is determined that hostilities have no recognizable endpoint, wartime powers that have no term written, or that take as their term a date that may never come, do not satisfy "a term of its own," and must be re-established within a short period written down beforehand as a new decision with a written term and confirmed, or expire when that period runs out; how long the "short period" is, this paper does not fix, and it is registered as a remainder. When the term runs out, continuation too is a new decision: Theorem Two lists the "prolongation of time" as one kind of expansion (War Treatise, the opening of the Middle Volume, and §14), so the cannot-not is determined afresh as in Paper 6, N30, and explained to a position it does not occupy; if the explanation does not succeed, it expires. This item takes up Theorem Three from step one of the proof: when hostilities have no recognizable endpoint, a wartime power without a term is directed toward no recognizable end; structurally it is no longer an action of the war but peacetime domination (own undertaking). Take 19-B to the UCSE: the Wartime Security Act has no term clause, the state of war itself has no term (§2), and Charter Amendment 14 hangs both elections and renewal on the state of war; taken together, elections may never come, and the emergency can go on being renewed by the declaring side. This is precisely what this item blocks: these powers, and the surveillance whose term is "the date on which the peace treaty with the DRP is signed," must all be re-established within that short period, or expire when it runs out.
N22 Wartime structures are dismantled after the war on one's own initiative (own undertaking). Powers, and arrangements of oppression and mobilization, established on wartime grounds take the end of the war as their threshold of expiry: on reaching the threshold they expire, and must be lifted on one's own initiative, without waiting for a decision to dismantle them. The end of the war is recognized by function (hostilities have ceased, the attacking side has withdrawn), and is not decided alone by the party taking the measures; what takes as its term a date that may never come, such as the signing of a peace treaty, is treated as having no term written, and where the end of the war can be recognized, the end of the war is still its threshold. Public functions that really must be undertaken in peacetime are not carried on by borrowing the wartime ground, and expire together with those arrangements on reaching the threshold; to be undertaken in peacetime, a function must be established anew as a new decision, with a peacetime ground, authority, bounds, arrangements for being questioned and a term of its own, re-checked through the third layer (Theory of Government G6) on a present reason, not borrowing the wartime reason; establishing anew can be done before the threshold, taking over on reaching it; it is put forward by the side that proposes to establish it anew, and explained publicly to positions that can question it and that it does not occupy (what the executing side proposes, to rule-making and checking; what the rule-making side proposes, to checking) and to the channels of internal subjects; the one who proposes and the one who reviews are kept apart, and a decision whose explanation does not succeed within its term expires when the term runs out. Whether hostilities have a recognizable endpoint is likewise recognized by function. Wartime powers have their term written at the time of authorization, confirmed by a position that the party taking the measures does not occupy; once it is determined that hostilities have no recognizable endpoint, those that have no term written, or that take as their term a date that may never come, do not satisfy "a term of its own," and must be re-established within a short period written down beforehand as a new decision with a written term and confirmed, or expire when that period runs out. When the term runs out, continuation is a new decision and belongs to the prolongation of time that Theorem Two of the War Treatise lists; the cannot-not is determined afresh as in Paper 6, N30, and if the explanation does not succeed, it expires. What is renamed, or continued through ordinary procedure, does not by itself prove that it has been lifted: recognized by function, not by name (extension; own undertaking).
§6 The Survival of the State Is Not the Survival of Persons
In the summer of Year 9, on the second day of the DRP army's shelling of Reedtown, the Executive Defense Group issued Directive No. 3 by 2 to 1. The Defense Group consisted of three persons, the First Executive, the Executive for Defense and the Executive for External Affairs, and had been set up under authorization from a meeting of the Executive Council after the state of emergency was declared; after the state of war was declared on the ninth day, it became, under Article 54 of the Charter, the Wartime Council of Three. The directive read: "No organized evacuation of Reedtown; residents leaving on their own are not restricted; public transport runs as normal." The written reason: "An organized evacuation would signal to the DRP that the UCSE is abandoning the West Flats, and would cause panic in the Western Plains State." The Executive for External Affairs voted against. The same day, the First Executive said in a speech in the capital of the Western Plains State: "Not an inch of the West Flats will be given up. We stand with Reedtown, to the last person."
The Governor of the Western Plains State ordered the State Transport Bureau to send buses to evacuate the residents. The Office of Defense said that civilian vehicles in the combat zone needed military passes; the passes were issued three days later. In the meantime the Western Plains State organized a separate evacuation on foot by night. The DRP army entered Reedtown on the ninth day and held it for five weeks; before it entered, about sixty-one percent of the residents had left. Among those who stayed were the old and the sick, people unwilling to leave their homes, and staff on duty at the town hospital and the water station. By the count of the government of the Western Plains State, one hundred forty civilians died in Reedtown during the fighting and the DRP's control; the breakdown of causes of death and of responsibility was still under investigation in Year 12 (UCSE Case 18).
UCSE Case 18 is first judged here. Three things first. Whom it concerns: the residents of Reedtown, those who left and those who stayed; and among those who stayed, those who chose not to leave and those who could not leave. Which line: their life-substrate, being crossed by shellfire; Directive No. 3 and the passes are this state's own acts. Baseline: before the shelling, the residents each in their own homes, and public transport running as normal.
In both texts, the "West Flats" is a piece of land and a claim: the strip east of the Boundary River, and the UCSE's jurisdiction over it. The people who live there do not appear in the directive; in the speech, they appear in "to the last person."
The War Treatise has kept two things apart: "Failure: the concrete carrier of cultivation fails to hold, but cultivation itself does not terminate." (War Treatise §19) A piece of land, a formation, a capital are carriers; a carrier failing to hold is failure. In the same section it lays down a hard rule on yu-sui (honorable annihilation): "Yu-sui is structurally unqualified under SAE." (§19) For a whole to go to its death is, in no situation, a qualified form of failure.
These two sentences speak of how a war-party fails; this section speaks of a state toward the people inside it. The survival of a state means whether this one construct is still there on this land; the survival of persons is whether persons can go on living, whether they can carry on with their lives and carry on growing. The construct is a means (§3); what it guards is persons. To exchange the two is to use persons to guard the construct.
So a state may not require the community as a whole to go to its death. Nor may it, to hold a carrier, a piece of land or a formation, or to make a statement outward, put the safety of its internal subjects second. The former is a matter of the first ought: to require persons to die is the construct's act crossing persons' line, and the line is discounted under no condition (Institution Theory Z9). The latter lies on the side of guarding: the residents of Reedtown are being crossed by shellfire, and guarding them is what the second ought looks like in war. The second ought originally speaks of the line between the people inside; when the party crossing the line is outside, what is guarded is still the same line of the same people, and this step of extension is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking). Under shellfire, the means of guarding is, first of all, letting people leave.
Take these sentences to Reedtown.
Directive No. 3 did not forbid leaving. What it set aside was one means of protection, organized evacuation, and half of the reason stated in writing is a statement outward: what an evacuation would "signal to the DRP." This is exactly the kind this section speaks of: putting the safety of internal subjects second for the sake of a statement outward. This half of the reason cannot stand, whatever an evacuation would in fact have changed in the outcome; in the document itself it has the order reversed. The other half, "cause panic in the Western Plains State," is a reason that faces inward. Institution Theory says: "When protection reaches the scale of a group, it does not trade others for this group's safety" (Institution Theory Z19). If the calm of the Western Plains State was obtained in exchange for the safety of Reedtown's residents, this half does not stand either; whether it was such an exchange must be explained by the position that issued the directive, and it cannot pass together with the half about the statement outward. The Executive for External Affairs' vote against is used again in Paper 6, §2.
The passes issued three days late are another matter. The Western Plains State's buses were a means of evacuation, and for three days they could not move. How those three days came about, and on what grounds, the Office of Defense must explain, and the explanation must answer the very matter it is questioned about (Theory of Government G2).
"To the last person" is a line in a speech. Speech in itself is not an act (the Prequel, §8). That does not make it irrelevant: as that day's public explanation of the directive, it voices why the directive does not organize evacuation; read literally, what it speaks of is yu-sui, which is structurally unqualified. Where it enters the account is the burden of explanation of the First Executive's position.
Among those who stayed were some who chose not to leave. Not organizing evacuation is not the same as respecting them; organizing evacuation is not the same as having to take them away either. An arrangement for evacuation must take in both those who want to leave and those who do not: a road for those who want to leave but cannot, the old and the sick included; for those who do not want to leave, their own law holds as before, and this state's guarding of them and supply to them do not stop because they do not leave. The staff on duty at the town hospital and the water station are each in their own positions: the construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law.
What this section judges is the order of the reasons in the documents, and the matter the passes must explain; how the political and military leaders in their positions judge, and where the consequences fall, follows the Prequel, §8. How the account for the one hundred forty deaths is divided is still under investigation in Year 12, and this section does not divide it in the investigation's place. The DRP army's shelling is an act on the DRP's side; Directive No. 3 and the passes are acts on this state's side; the fighting itself is a further item. Each is booked by source, authority and the facts of conduct, and no entry settles another (Theory of Government G2; Paper 7, §4). How the two, not trading outsiders for survival and not requiring this state's own people to die, come together in war is written in Paper 6, §6.
N23 The survival of the state is not the survival of persons. "Failure: the concrete carrier of cultivation fails to hold, but cultivation itself does not terminate." "Yu-sui is structurally unqualified under SAE." (War Treatise §19) A state may not require the community as a whole to go to its death; nor may it, to hold a carrier (a piece of land, a formation) or to make a statement outward, put the safety of its internal subjects second (the second ought; when the line-crossing comes from outside, the guarding still falls under this ought; extension; own undertaking).
§7 Conscription
A young man from Levee Street in Apple City, twenty years old and a UCSE citizen, was called up in wartime under the Military Service Act in the summer of Year 9. He applied for alternative service on grounds of conscience; he has no religious affiliation. The Military Service Review Board, under Emergency Order No. 11, had suspended review; his application was received and not reviewed. Refusing the call-up is punished by two to five years' imprisonment. He reported for service, later served at an inspection point in the Wheat Plain buffer zone, and was discharged in the summer of Year 11. In the winter of Year 11, review for alternative service resumed; the Board's decision on his application was: "The applicant has completed military service; no further review." (UCSE Case 27) The Military Service Review Board belongs to the Office of Defense.
UCSE Case 27 is first judged here. Three things first. Whom it concerns: this young man, and those called up who, like him, apply for alternative service on grounds of conscience or belief. Which line: his refusing to bear arms is his own law; the call-up and the review are acts the construct makes through positions; the first ought governs that they not cross the line, and the fifth ought governs that his application have a path within reach and not occupied by the side doing the calling up. Baseline: a person applying while review for alternative service under the Military Service Act proceeds as normal.
The three-layer sentence form is clearest here: the construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law. Conscription is an act of positions upon persons: the call-up is made in the name of the UCSE, and the Military Service Review Board reviews in a position. The person called up still takes his own law. This series writes no ought for him: whether he reports for service or refuses, that is his own law. What it writes is on the side of the construct and the positions: among those called up, those who refuse to bear arms must have a really usable road.
The ground of this lies in Institution Theory Z12. That proposition speaks of the executor inside a construct: "A construct's configuration may not leave the executor both unable to refuse a demand and without any path for passing it into a reviewable procedure"; this is checked by the threshold of sealing off, and does not imply that refusal carries no consequences; if a configuration reaches this point, "it has already crossed the line on the executor, whether or not he actually complied" (Institution Theory Z12). A person called up is, in the armed forces, exactly such an executor; of the things he is to carry out, the weightiest is bearing arms. Carrying Z12 over to military service is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking). The ground for the extension lies in Z12's own skeleton: what it governs is whether there is a path, between demand and refusal, for passing the matter into review, regardless of what kind of construct the demand comes from. This extension does not hand out a veto over every order: the channel is "not an individual's immediate veto over every order" (Theory of Government G13); it requires only that refusal of bearing arms itself have a path into review.
Take Z12 to this matter. The application was received and not reviewed. With review suspended, there was, alongside refusal, no path for passing the matter into review, and refusal led nowhere but to two to five years' imprisonment. By Z12's threshold, this is not a consequence that refusal brings on; it is refusal itself being sealed off: he could not refuse, and he had no path. The configuration reached this point. He later reported for service; by Z12, that crossing of the line does not disappear because he complied.
Three things must be stated for this road.
Object: those called up. All who refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience or belief are included, with no condition of religious affiliation. This young man has no religious affiliation, and the road is not closed to him on that account. An application can be made at any time, after enlistment and while in service included.
Conditions: review checks only two things: whether the application is directed at bearing arms itself, and whether it is consistent over time. Review does not render, on the applicant's behalf, a final judgment on whether his conscience is true or false. Institution Theory has said on the side of guarding: "the institution does not render, on his behalf, a final judgment on whether this 'no' is true or false within his own law" (Institution Theory Z19). What it speaks of there is a protected person who himself does not want protection; carried over to military service, the reviewing position checks the structure of the application, not whether what is in his heart is true or false (extension; own undertaking).
Review: the reviewing position is not occupied by the side doing the calling up. The UCSE's Military Service Review Board belongs to the Office of Defense; and it was the Office of Defense, too, that sent the engineer her call-up order (UCSE Case 10). Being in the same office is a lead to be checked; it does not complete the judgment: if receiving, deciding and the onward referral after rejection are held by the Office of Defense alone, this configuration does not stand under this proposition; no form is fixed, only a function is established. While an application is pending, there is no enlistment and no prosecution: otherwise review becomes a door that opens only after he is already carrying a gun. A rejection can be brought before a court for review. Review on this road is a channel of the fifth ought, and holding to does not stop in an emergency (Theory of Government G30); what Emergency Order No. 11 suspended was precisely this. A make-up review afterward is not closed with "has completed military service."
One more word on the last item. What the make-up review must answer is not whether he still has to serve in future, but whether his application should have been granted then: whether, in those two years of war, he carried a gun within a configuration that crossed the line. "Has completed military service" answers another question; to close the case with it is to settle, with what has already happened, the account of the review not made at the time: "past residue is not written off by closing off questioning" (Institution Theory Z35a).
Alternative service is a consequence, not retaliation: it does not aim at punishment and carries no added culpability; its differences from military service (term, place, content) must have reasons that can be explained publicly, such as the burden of risk that military service carries. Using this road brings no punishment for having used it (the fifth ought; Theory of Government G35); nor does this mean exemption from consequences of conduct established on separate grounds.
This road leaves its remainder. Those who refuse only this particular war and not all bearing of arms, or who refuse some particular kind of task rather than bearing arms itself, are not within the conditions of this road. They do not thereby lose the qualification to have their matter questioned; how their case stands is registered as a remainder.
A call-up order also went to someone who no longer lived there. An engineer from the Highland State moved to the NUT in the spring of Year 10; the Office of Defense sent her call-up order to her registered address in the Highland State, and the Office of the Prosecutor opened a case against her for "refusing the call-up" (UCSE Case 10; three things at the opening of Paper 3). She had already left the country; prosecuting her for "refusing the call-up" after her departure is, by Paper 3, N13, not to be done. Someone who has reported for service, is in service, and leaves his post and the country is another matter: leaving one's post is at the layer of a position's accountability, and goes through the courts under the Military Service Act; leaving the country itself adds no offense; an application refusing to bear arms on grounds of conscience or belief can be made at any time while he is in service too, and this section's road is open to him all the same (Paper 3, §2).
N23a Conscription does not override the person's own law. Conscription is an act of positions upon persons, and the person called up still takes his own law. Those who refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience or belief must have a really usable road, alternative service for instance (Institution Theory Z12 carried over to military service; extension; own undertaking). Object: those called up, with no condition of religious affiliation; an application can be made at any time, while in service included. Conditions: review checks only whether the application is directed at bearing arms itself and whether it is consistent over time, and does not render, on the applicant's behalf, a final judgment on whether his conscience is true or false (Institution Theory Z19 carried over to military service; extension; own undertaking). Review: the reviewing position is not occupied by the side doing the calling up; while an application is pending there is no enlistment and no prosecution; a rejection can be brought before a court for review; review on this road does not stop in an emergency (Theory of Government G30); a make-up review afterward is not closed with "has completed military service." Alternative service is a consequence, not retaliation: it does not aim at punishment; its differences from military service (term, place, content) must have reasons that can be explained publicly, such as the burden of risk that military service carries; it carries no added culpability. Non-retaliation is governed by the fifth ought; non-retaliation does not mean exemption from consequences of conduct established on separate grounds.
§8 With Schmitt
Both §3 and §4 pointed here. The first sentence of the first chapter of Carl Schmitt's Political Theology (Politische Theologie) is: "Sovereign is whoever decides on the state of exception." (my translation; Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.; Politische Theologie, ch. 1, p. 13; 9th German ed., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009, per the publisher's reading sample; tier A) Theory of Government Paper 5, §4, set up one contrast with him from the opposite side, at the level of Apple City; that topic is pointed back to. Here this paper takes up the other topic that section left: whether the survival of a state gives a reason for monopoly.
The exception he means is a general concept of the doctrine of the state, not just any emergency decree (same chapter, p. 13, paraphrased). Such a case "can at most be designated as a case of extreme emergency, of danger to the existence of the state, or the like, but cannot be circumscribed by statutory elements" (my translation; pp. 13–14, same source; the original is given in the audit table). So "here both the precondition and the content of the authority are necessarily unlimited" (my translation; p. 14, same source; the original is given in the audit table). If the action is subject to no control and is not distributed among several bodies that check one another, "then it is clear without further ado who the sovereign is" (my translation; p. 14, same source; the original is given in the audit table). He goes on to say that such a sovereign judges both whether the emergency exists and how to remove it, and decides as well whether the constitution is to be suspended as a whole; the rule-of-law state seeks to do away with the sovereign in this sense; whether the exception can be removed from the world, he leaves to conviction (p. 14, summarized).
The common question. When the existence of the state is endangered and rules cannot write everything out: who judges whether there is an exception, and who judges how to deal with it; whether this judgment can be held apart, and whether it can still be questioned afterward.
Whether it is the same question. This time it is the same question: this is the level of the state, and he himself names "danger to the existence of the state." One difference remains: his sovereign decides whether the constitution is to be suspended as a whole; UCSE Case 16 is an emergency within the Charter, and 16-B goes to the edge of the Charter; it is there that the two share the question most closely.
How far the agreement goes. Two points. - The extreme exception cannot be written out in full. This series, too, does not hold that rules can write it all out in advance: rules cannot do judgment in anyone's place (Theory of Government G3); §4 says that non-monopoly gives no warrant that every extreme situation can be operated successfully. - His diagnosis: when action is subject to no control and is not distributed among bodies that check one another, who the sovereign is becomes clear without further ado. This series agrees, and treats it as the configuration to be guarded against: what §§3 and 4 require is precisely that this action be distributed among several places.
Where they part. Three points.
First, from "cannot be written out" to "unlimited." From the exception's not being circumscribable by statutory elements, he goes to the precondition and content of the authority being necessarily unlimited. This step requires keeping two kinds of bounds apart. One is writing out the cases beforehand and then listing what may be done; this kind, in the extreme exception, really cannot be written out in full. The other is the line and the paths of questioning. The line is not a statutory element of the exceptional case: "The line is the boundary between limit and violation, decided by structure, not by motive" (Institution Theory Z9); it does not need to foresee what the exception will look like in order to be there all the same. The paths of questioning do not need to foresee the exception either: they ask afterward, "On what grounds did you act then?" So the absence of a list drawn up beforehand in the exception does not mean that authority in the exception has no bounds.
Second, when the constitution is suspended as a whole, is the line suspended? On this series' account, the line is not something written in by provisions, and is not within the authority of provisions; nor are the conditions of being questioned withdrawn by constitutional amendment (Paper 1, N3); a constitution recognizes and protects rights already constitutively in being, and does not grant them (Paper 1, N6). When the constitution is suspended as a whole, what is suspended is provisions; the line is not in the provisions, and the suspension does not reach it, nor do the rights prior to the constitution cease to be there on that account. A decision made at that moment falls under the line all the same, and has its account all the same.
Third, whether the decision in the exception closes the order. For him, it is precisely this case that makes the question of the subject of sovereignty a real question (p. 14, paraphrased): the order is to be closed by a subject that decides. This series does not want this closure. A state is not a subject, and there is no "subject of sovereignty" waiting to appear in the exception (the Prequel, §1); judgments are made by persons in positions and take effect through positions; "Questioning does not need an unquestionable endpoint" (Theory of Government G36). On the class of corrections that must be realized by this state, what Paper 1 derives is implementation at this level that the position questioned cannot monopolize; checking judgment at this level and the separation of the three are undertaken separately, following the Theory of Government; on condition that the positions set up at this level are each checked by another independent position at this level, checking, followed to the end, folds back and at least forms a closed loop (Paper 1, N5). This is this series' normative choice (own undertaking); what divides the two is not a matter of fact (Theory of Government Paper 5, §4).
The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). You want a substitute confirming position, you want the facts that bring it into use written down beforehand, you want measures to expire at the end of their term when no one can act. But in a true exception, who judges that the regular positions can no longer act? Who judges that the substitute should now come into use? Who judges that this is already the case in which "no one can act"? Who makes measures whose term has run out actually stop? Every "who" is one more decision on the exception. You have only pushed the decision back one notch. At the last notch, the side holding the force has the say, and it is the sovereign.
Reply. Three points. - The facts that bring the substitute into use are written down beforehand and are not determined by the declaring side (§4); disputes about them are judged by a side other than the declaring one. This does not abolish judgment; it keeps judgment from falling wholly in one place: each time the decision is pushed back one notch, one notch fewer is decided by the same place. Nor does closure depend on a last decider: each place can make the decision for the case on the question directed at itself, and whether the matter can be asked again thereafter is not decided by it alone (Paper 2, N8). This is a structure, not a person. - At the last notch, the side holding the force may really have the say; this series gives no warrant that this will not happen. But when he calls that side "the sovereign," and says that whether the constitution is suspended as a whole is for it to decide, this is a claim about authority, not only about force. That a decision was in fact made does not give it the authority to go thereafter unquestioned: what is made at that moment is a provisional decision in a position, and the account falls on positions and persons; "past residue is not written off by closing off questioning" (Institution Theory Z35a). - He leaves to conviction whether the exception can be removed. This series does not answer on the plane of conviction, nor does it give any warrant that the exception will be removed (Institution Theory Z37); what it says is that the decision in the exception must also be booked and questioned afterward: for him, the decision makes the order stand; here, the decision itself is also an act to be questioned.
What is obtained here is where the two part, not a refutation of him: he described a configuration; this series says that a construct ought not to have this configuration, and that where it has it, the account must be booked.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has proved only these things: internal use of the armed forces requires a confirmation that the commanding side does not monopolize, and the object of confirmation is that deployment. Command in peacetime and command in wartime are kept apart; entry into and exit from a state of war are not monopolized by a single position, are time-limited, and are open to questioning. The exception bearing on survival does not produce a sovereign: survival gives a reason to judge first; it gives no reason to monopolize shutting the door; the detention clause that held the six hundred forty crosses the line by configuration. In extreme situations, the position that confirms and terminates must still be able to act; where none can act, measures are short and do not renew themselves; when it cannot be held, the account is still booked; provisional measures in the exception do not suspend rulings of the final instance that are valid. The strong form, dismantling after the war on one's own initiative, this paper takes: the end of the war is the dissolving of the cannot-not on which the wartime structures rested, and so it is a threshold of expiry; the end is recognized by function, and on the facts of the UCSE cases the ceasefire reaches the threshold. The survival of the state is not the survival of persons. Those who refuse to bear arms must have a really usable road.
What it has not proved: the size and organization of the armed forces, specific emergency law, and the form of the confirming and substitute positions belong to specific theories of institutions; who determines the cannot-not of each war act is in Paper 6 (N30); Charter Amendment 14, in Paper 1; the election ruling and its non-execution, in Paper 2; departure and renunciation, in Paper 3; the budget as a symptom, in Paper 5; the minimum content of booking the account, in Paper 7 (N39). This paper does not judge: whether the joint session, in confirming, acted only on the declarer's will; whether the troop movement to South Bay harbor was deterrence; when, in those six weeks at the factory gate, arbitration could have opened; how each person stands, if among the six hundred forty there turns out to be a case-by-case review that can release people; how the National Security Act comes out when checked; how the account for the one hundred forty in Reedtown is divided. How those who refuse only one particular war stand, and how long the "short period" in 19-B is, are registered as remainders.
The Boundary River, Reedtown and the young man from Levee Street will be used again in the papers that follow.
The Seven Propositions of This Paper
N18 Force turned outward is not turned inward. Internal use of the armed forces requires a confirmation that the commanding side does not monopolize (Theory of Government G32 carried over to the internal use of the armed forces; extension; own undertaking), and goes back to the chain of compulsion of Theory of Government Paper 2; of antecedents for internal use, this series sets up only this one. The object of confirmation is that deployment: its scope, place and term. A ruling that a court makes according to law, and that must be enforced, can constitute this confirmation, the deployment being limited to enforcing that ruling. A movement that does not leave existing barracks areas and carries out no tasks against residents does not count as internal use here and requires no confirmation; where its timing and the manner in which it is made public land on internal subjects' voting or assembly, it is an act, and is questioned under the fifth ought.
N19 Military power is kept apart (on the increment F6 §3.1b names; the specification below is undertaken by this paper). Command in peacetime and command in wartime are kept apart. For the legal state that is the state of war, the determination of entry is not monopolized by a single position, is time-limited, and is open to questioning; exit is not decided alone by the party taking the measures. Who determines the cannot-not of each war act (starting, expansion, crossing the boundary) belongs to Paper 6, N30.
N20 The exception bearing on survival does not produce a sovereign. The determination is not monopolized by a single position; no position becomes final because of survival; "The construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically" (Institution Theory Z38). The War Treatise strips the war-party of sovereign grammar: "it is not 'I have the right to start the war / expand / refuse questioning,' but 'I am forced by structure to this point.'" (War Treatise, the opening of the Middle Volume; the shared grammar is set out in §17)
N21 Non-monopoly in extreme situations, and booking the account when it cannot be held (own undertaking). The position that confirms and terminates is there beforehand and does not depend on the party taking the measures (an extension of Theory of Government Paper 5, §4); in the exception it must still be able to act: the ordinary quorum is not its only form; a substitute confirming position is written down beforehand and is not appointed by the party taking the measures. Where neither the confirming nor the substitute position can act, measures are confined to the shortest term written down beforehand, expire when the term runs out, and the party taking the measures may not renew them on its own; what it makes at this point is a provisional decision in a position, not a final decision on the exception. When the exception ends is not determined by the party taking the measures (Theory of Government G32). The position that acted first must be questioned afterward; when it cannot be held, the account falls on positions and persons, and is not waived by the word "survival." This gives no warrant that every extreme situation can be operated successfully; that a procedure is for a time broken does not mean the norm automatically expires. Provisional measures taken first in the exception may not suspend a ruling of the final instance that is still valid (Paper 2, N11b).
N22 Wartime structures are dismantled after the war on one's own initiative (own undertaking). Powers, and arrangements of oppression and mobilization, established on wartime grounds take the end of the war as their threshold of expiry: on reaching the threshold they expire, and must be lifted on one's own initiative, without waiting for a decision to dismantle them. The end of the war is recognized by function (hostilities have ceased, the attacking side has withdrawn), and is not decided alone by the party taking the measures; what takes as its term a date that may never come, such as the signing of a peace treaty, is treated as having no term written, and where the end of the war can be recognized, the end of the war is still its threshold. Public functions that really must be undertaken in peacetime are not carried on by borrowing the wartime ground, and expire together with those arrangements on reaching the threshold; to be undertaken in peacetime, a function must be established anew as a new decision, with a peacetime ground, authority, bounds, arrangements for being questioned and a term of its own, re-checked through the third layer (Theory of Government G6) on a present reason, not borrowing the wartime reason; establishing anew can be done before the threshold, taking over on reaching it; it is put forward by the side that proposes to establish it anew, and explained publicly to positions that can question it and that it does not occupy (what the executing side proposes, to rule-making and checking; what the rule-making side proposes, to checking) and to the channels of internal subjects; the one who proposes and the one who reviews are kept apart, and a decision whose explanation does not succeed within its term expires when the term runs out. Whether hostilities have a recognizable endpoint is likewise recognized by function. Wartime powers have their term written at the time of authorization, confirmed by a position that the party taking the measures does not occupy; once it is determined that hostilities have no recognizable endpoint, those that have no term written, or that take as their term a date that may never come, do not satisfy "a term of its own," and must be re-established within a short period written down beforehand as a new decision with a written term and confirmed, or expire when that period runs out. When the term runs out, continuation is a new decision and belongs to the prolongation of time that Theorem Two of the War Treatise lists; the cannot-not is determined afresh as in Paper 6, N30, and if the explanation does not succeed, it expires. What is renamed, or continued through ordinary procedure, does not by itself prove that it has been lifted: recognized by function, not by name (extension; own undertaking).
N23 The survival of the state is not the survival of persons. "Failure: the concrete carrier of cultivation fails to hold, but cultivation itself does not terminate." "Yu-sui is structurally unqualified under SAE." (War Treatise §19) A state may not require the community as a whole to go to its death; nor may it, to hold a carrier (a piece of land, a formation) or to make a statement outward, put the safety of its internal subjects second (the second ought; when the line-crossing comes from outside, the guarding still falls under this ought; extension; own undertaking).
N23a Conscription does not override the person's own law. Conscription is an act of positions upon persons, and the person called up still takes his own law. Those who refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience or belief must have a really usable road, alternative service for instance (Institution Theory Z12 carried over to military service; extension; own undertaking). Object: those called up, with no condition of religious affiliation; an application can be made at any time, while in service included. Conditions: review checks only whether the application is directed at bearing arms itself and whether it is consistent over time, and does not render, on the applicant's behalf, a final judgment on whether his conscience is true or false (Institution Theory Z19 carried over to military service; extension; own undertaking). Review: the reviewing position is not occupied by the side doing the calling up; while an application is pending there is no enlistment and no prosecution; a rejection can be brought before a court for review; review on this road does not stop in an emergency (Theory of Government G30); a make-up review afterward is not closed with "has completed military service." Alternative service is a consequence, not retaliation: it does not aim at punishment; its differences from military service (term, place, content) must have reasons that can be explained publicly, such as the burden of risk that military service carries; it carries no added culpability. Non-retaliation is governed by the fifth ought; non-retaliation does not mean exemption from consequences of conduct established on separate grounds.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). Judgment (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23412130
Qin, H. (2026). Compulsion (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413056
Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112
Qin, H. (2026). Emergency (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413413
Qin, H. (2026). Questioning and Bearing (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Guarding the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270766
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662
Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617
Qin, H. (2026). A Posterior Dialogue with Western Jurisprudence (SAE Law Series, Supplement) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19551526
II · External works (public-domain originals, tier A)
Hobbes, T. Leviathan (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651). Project Gutenberg, EBook #3207 (prepared from the Pelican Classics edition, itself prepared from the first edition). https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3207
Locke, J. Second Treatise of Government (1690 text, transcribed from C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett, 1980). Project Gutenberg, EBook #7370. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370
III · External works (original, publisher's reading sample, tier A)
Schmitt, C. (2009). Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (9th ed.; reset from the 2nd ed. of 1934; 1st ed. 1922). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. ISBN 978-3-428-08805-8. Publisher's reading sample (includes ch. 1, pp. 13–15; the sample file is named by the e-book ISBN 978-3-428-48805-6): https://www.duncker-humblot.de/_files_media/leseproben/9783428488056.pdf
Interfaces
- Main upstream: Theory of Government (Paper 5, G30, G31 (its last sentence included), G32, §§3–4; Paper 2, §1, G10, G11, G12a, G13, G16; Paper 1, G2, G3, G6, G7; Paper 3, G17; Paper 6, G35, G36); Institution Theory (Paper 2, Z9, Z12; Paper 3, Z19, Z22, §8; Paper 6, Z35a, Z37, Z38); War Treatise (§5, the opening of the Middle Volume, §13, §14, §15, §17, §18, §19; sentences its English page lacks are rendered from the Chinese page).
- Also used: How Is Institution Possible §3.1b, §3.2, the introduction to the Appendices; F6, Appendix B, Articles 13 and 26 (a working demonstration; used only as an example).
- Interfacing: Schmitt, Politische Theologie, ch. 1 (pointed to in §§3 and 4, taken up together at the end; tier A); Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 18 (§3; tier A); Locke, Second Treatise, ch. XII, §§146–148, and ch. XIII, §153 (§2; tier A). Pointing back: Schmitt, on who determines an emergency (Theory of Government Paper 5, §4); Locke, on prerogative (Theory of Government Paper 5, §7); Hobbes, on the sovereign who cannot be questioned (Law Series Supplement §2; Theory of Government Paper 6, §3).
- This series: the Prequel, §§1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8; Paper 1, N3, N6, §§3, 4 and 6; Paper 2, N8, N11b, §§1, 4, 5 and 6; Paper 3, N13, N14, §§2, 3 and 6; Paper 5, §§5 and 6; Paper 6, N30, N33, §§1, 2, 4, 5 and 6; Paper 7, N39, §4.
- Handed to Paper 5: force turned outward meets other states first.