The Last Exit
最后的退出
The outermost exit a person can make is to leave a state: there is no higher level above to catch him, and he can only enter another peer, and only if that peer takes him in. This paper writes of the "last" at the place of membership: it too lies under a channel; against a decision restricting exit, the person restricted can initiate questioning, and the party that issued the order cannot close it, not even in war. The paper asks five things: how membership and the interior are kept apart; why individual exit cannot be sealed off; why a state may neither expel people nor refuse to take in those who were born here and have nowhere else to go; whether those who come to the border are in the interior; and why secession, that is, group exit, must have a procedure, and why that procedure cannot claim to be complete. The interior is drawn by entanglement, membership by the state's recognition; membership is the principal bearer of the meta-recognition position at the national level, not its only realization. Exit is a condition of law's existence, not something law gives: the state may register it, and may set conditions for settling public accounts already incurred; the price of renunciation is an exit cost of the state's own making, which it must explain, and it may not cancel exit on its own by pricing; even in a defensive war it does not restrict the departure of those of call-up age; suspending renunciation by age, and prosecuting those who have already left for "refusing the call-up" (whenever the call-up order was served), are both, recognized by function, restrictions on departure; where charges for "refusing the call-up" were brought before departure, the case is heard as usual, but the person is not detained or banned from leaving on that account, nor is the case aggravated by the departure, and renunciation is processed as usual; those who have reported for service and are in service and who leave their posts are not covered here. Membership is tied to voting, and to deprive someone of it is to cancel a questioner: no administrative position has this power; for conduct there can only be prosecution, with a court ruling on it; membership acquired by birth cannot be expelled; where membership was acquired by naturalization or by some other application and there was fraud in the acquisition, a court rules that the acquisition did not validly take place, and this does not extend to conduct after acquisition; none of this turns on whether the person holds another citizenship. To those born in its territory who have nowhere to go, this state owes two things: reach to a channel today, and a road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership; how far this extends falls into three bands, immediate reach is not reduced in any band, and the length and conditions of the road are explained by how far this state actually organizes the person's life. Those at the door are, as regards this state's refusal of entry, return and detention, in this state's interior, following the unified sentence; this confers no membership. For secession a procedure is established: initiation is not decided unilaterally by the national level, neither side is final on its own, the procedure must be able to resolve deadlock, and it states the remainder it leaves; "federal consent required" is not taken. Every division leaves a shortfall, which is registered as a remainder. The specific policies of immigration and naturalization, and the form of a secession procedure, are not fixed in this paper. An engineer and a commentator of the United City-States of Ends (UCSE), the stateless children of a reception center, the West Pass border crossing and the South Bay State run through the paper, which interfaces in place with Locke, takes Arendt as a contrast, and points back to Hirschman. The paper has six propositions (N12 to N17), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
In the autumn of Year 9 (UCSE Case 10), an engineer in the Highland State filed with the Membership Registry a declaration renouncing her citizenship of the United City-States of Ends (UCSE).
She was thirty-four, and worked for a hydropower company in the territory of the Nation Union of Telos (NUT), commuting every day through the Eagle Gap pass. That year a district government of the NUT offered her a public post; under NUT rules, public servants of a district government may hold only NUT citizenship. Her application for NUT citizenship was granted, on condition that she renounce her UCSE citizenship within six months.
Renouncing meant passing several gates. The Membership Act required her to settle her taxes; to pay the renunciation settlement tax, under which all her assets were treated as sold at market value and 18 percent was due on the gain, which on her assets came to about a quarter of her savings; to pay the renunciation fee, three times the previous year's average monthly wage per person; and to have no case in which a public prosecution had been brought. That summer the Executive Council, under the Emergency Act, had issued Emergency Order No. 7: "While the state of war continues, declarations of renunciation by persons aged nineteen to forty-five are suspended." On this basis the Membership Registry returned her declaration, without examining the other conditions.
When the six months ran out, the grant of NUT citizenship expired. In the spring of Year 10 she moved to the NUT on a work permit, still holding UCSE citizenship. That same spring, the Office of Defense sent a call-up order to her registered address in the Highland State. She did not report for service, and the Office of the Prosecutor opened a case against her for "refusing the call-up." In the summer of Year 11 the state of war was terminated, and Emergency Order No. 7 expired with it; that winter she filed again, paid the tax and the fee in full, and her renunciation was granted. The case is still open; no charges have been brought.
Three things first. Whom it concerns: this engineer. Which line: exit, that is, the "not sealing the channels" half of the fourth ought; Article 12 of the Charter (fact). Baseline: Article 12 of the Charter, "Everyone is free to leave the UCSE; the law may set conditions for settling public accounts and for carrying out judicial proceedings."
Leaving a state is the outermost exit a person can make. Move out of a residential complex, and one is still in the city; move out of the city, and one is still in its State; leave the UCSE, and there is no higher level above to catch her: she can only enter another peer, and only if that peer takes her in (Paper 1, §5). The "last" of this paper speaks of this layer. "Last" refers to level: there is nothing above. It does not refer to exemption from questioning. The last exit too lies under a channel: against a decision restricting exit, it is the person restricted who initiates questioning, through the courts and through the Inspectorate; the object affected is that restriction; the party that issued the order cannot close this road, not even in war; if a restriction is never reviewed, the account is booked to the position that issued the order (§2).
The place of membership is wider than whether one can leave. A state can seal people in so that they cannot get out; it can also push people out, or refuse to let in those at its door or already within its gate. From the winter of Year 8 on, the matters the UCSE ran into all lie at this place: a commentator living in the NUT had her UCSE citizenship revoked; for the three hundred ten children born in a reception center, the "Citizenship" field on their birth certificates reads "undetermined"; the West Pass border crossing handed back, within seventy-two hours, fourteen soldiers of the Democratic Republic of Purposes (DRP) who had crossed the border and given themselves up; and the South Bay State held a referendum in which a majority voted to exit.
The paper proceeds in seven steps. §1 keeps membership and the interior apart. §2 says that individual exit is not sealed off by the state. §3 and §4 treat the two things that make up not creating statelessness: no expulsion, and not refusing those who have nowhere to go. §5 treats those at the door. §6 treats secession, that is, group exit. §7 treats the remainder that division leaves. Conventions follow the Prequel, §8; this paper has no closing section of conversation. The paper has six propositions (N12 to N17), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end.
§1 Membership Is Not the Interior
In the summer of Year 9, the Office of Entry and Asylum converted the old grain depot three kilometers north of Willow Ferry into a reception center. By the spring of Year 10, six thousand three hundred people were living there. They hold a "temporary stay permit," not UCSE citizenship; to leave the center they need a pass to leave, valid from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. each day. Some of them take a pass, ride the early bus to Apple City to do casual work, and are back before 8 p.m. The center's drinking water is supplied by the Willow Ferry Town Water Works (UCSE Case 13).
Three things first. Whom it concerns: the residents of the center. Which line: this section does not judge which line is crossed; what it judges is in the interiors of which levels they are, and how this is kept apart from membership. Baseline: residents of Willow Ferry who hold UCSE citizenship.
In the interiors of which levels are they? Theory of Government Paper 4 says: "Jurisdiction is not the interior: those whom a level of government's acts reach and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are in its interior even if they are not in its jurisdiction" (Theory of Government G25). On this reading, since they drink Willow Ferry's water, they are in Willow Ferry's interior; since they work in Apple City, they are in Apple City's interior as regards the acts of Apple City that land on them; the center stands on the Kingdom State's land, and births there are registered by the Kingdom State. The UCSE's acts land on them most heavily: the center is one the UCSE set up, the pass to leave is the UCSE's to issue, and whether they can stay is the UCSE's to decide. They came here because they could not remain where they were; leaving the center does not take them out of these decisions. As regards these acts, they are in the UCSE's interior. That sentence of the Theory of Government originally concerns a level of government and people outside its jurisdiction; extending it here to the national level is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking).
How the accounts for water, schools, clinics and roads are divided among the UCSE, the Kingdom State and Willow Ferry is the general governance of the national level as one level of government among the others, and belongs to the Theory of Government: "The accounts of two constructs are each checked by their own source and are not transferred from one to the other" (Theory of Government G25). Who may come in, whether they may stay, and whether they may acquire membership belong to this paper; the pass to leave and asylum decisions belong to this paper along with "coming in and staying," and are read again in §5.
They are in the UCSE's interior, yet they do not have UCSE membership. The two are drawn by different things. The interior is drawn by entanglement: "those in the entanglement the construct handles, together with those its acts reach who have no way to avoid it by exiting, make up the interior" (Institution Theory Z4). Membership is drawn by the state's recognition: under the Membership Act, UCSE citizenship is acquired by descent, or by naturalization after ten years of lawful residence in the territory; birth in the territory does not of itself confer it.
In the UCSE, membership carries several things: voting (since the seventh amendment to the Charter, Charter Amendment 7, voting eligibility has extended to all UCSE citizens aged eighteen and over); passport and entry (after the commentator of §3 had her citizenship revoked, her entry was "subject to review"); complaints to the Inspectorate (the Inspectorate takes up complaints from "UCSE citizens and persons lawfully resident within the UCSE"); and registration for military service hangs on it too. Writing of the stateless, Rights Theory states the entrance to positions of this kind precisely: "A person who loses a state's recognition, fallen into statelessness, has recognition-based rights and workable remedies largely hollowed out, while its basic rights are not thereby lost"; the right to have rights that Arendt pointed to is, on SAE's reading, "a meta-recognition position, the qualification to enter the recognition-network and obtain an assertable position" (Rights Theory Paper 0, §V).
This series takes one step here: membership is the principal bearer of this meta-recognition position at the national level, not its only realization (extension; own undertaking). That passage of Rights Theory speaks of persons who have lost a state's recognition; it does not say what relation membership at the national level bears to this position; here it is extended to the national level. "Principal," because at the national level most assertable positions hang on membership, and there is no higher level above to provide another share. "Not the only," and there is a case of it: after four months of deliberation, the Inspectorate decided in the summer of Year 10 to take up complaints from the residents of the center, on the strength of "lawful residence," not of membership (UCSE Case 13). More important still, reach under the fifth ought does not vary with relational thickness for anyone in the interior, and does not wait for membership (§§4, 5).
So there are two misreadings to head off here. One runs from the interior to membership: living in the center and being in the UCSE's interior, they should acquire membership. Not so. What the interior gives is that the five oughts apply each on its own conditions; it does not give membership. The other runs back from membership to the interior: without membership, the UCSE owes them somewhat less. Not so either. Institution Theory says: "the five oughts apply each on its own conditions and are not reduced for want of a position" (Institution Theory Z4). Theory of Government Paper 3 says: "the two kinds of guarantee of this series are addressed to internal subjects, and the interior is drawn by entanglement, not by identity," and goes on: "Who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State." The guarantees are addressed to internal subjects; membership is a different layer, and its acquisition, renunciation and loss are the business of the sections that follow.
With Locke. In chapter VIII of the Second Treatise of Government, Locke draws a similar division: "submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society" (Second Treatise §122, per Project Gutenberg EBook #7370; tier A). To be under a state's laws and to be its member are two things; here the two point the same way. Where they part is in the direction of the question: Locke asks on what grounds a person is bound by a state's laws; this paper asks what a construct owes those in its interior. Locke's reading of exit is taken up in the next section.
N12 Membership is not the interior. The interior is drawn by entanglement: those whom this state's acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting are, as regards those acts, in this state's interior, whether or not they hold this state's membership (Theory of Government G25 extended to the national level; extension; own undertaking). Membership is drawn by the state's recognition; it is the principal bearer of the meta-recognition position at the national level, not its only realization (extension; own undertaking). The guarantees are addressed to internal subjects (Theory of Government Paper 3); membership is a different layer: being in the interior does not on that account confer membership; without membership, the five oughts still apply each on its own conditions and are not reduced for want of a position.
§2 Individual Exit Is Not Sealed Off by the State
Back to the engineer. Three things stood in her way: the renunciation settlement tax and the renunciation fee; Emergency Order No. 7; and the call-up order sent after she had left, with the case opened against her afterward. The three are not one kind of thing.
First, the grounds. Law Series P3 says: "Exit is not a right granted by law. Exit is a condition of law's existence." And: "Whoever controls exit controls the boundary of law." (Law Series P3 §6) Where there is exit, law can be thin; where exit is shut, law must be thick. The same section writes the reverse side of this structure: "But maintaining those conditions may itself be a form of 14DD suppression — locking people in a container, then declaring 'because you are locked together, you need law.'" A state that maintains itself by sealing off exit is maintaining exactly such a container. These sentences of the Law Series speak from the side of law; the normative ground lies in the fourth ought, under which an institution acts "without variation, not sealing the channels of refusing, revising, exiting and changing direction" (Institution Theory Z28; Theory of Government Paper 4, G28 has already applied this to exit from a residential complex); for a constraint to count as a limit, it must be one that "does not seal the subject's structural channel for exiting, refusing, or revoking a standing bond," and "Whatever crosses these is violation" (Rights Theory P5 F21). So exit is not given by the state, nor taken back by it; what the state can do, and must do, is make the road of renouncing membership really usable.
Three things kept apart. Article 12 of the Charter (fact) permits the law to "set conditions for settling public accounts and for carrying out judicial proceedings." The three are sorted by this article.
Settling accounts. Taxes owed must be settled, and a case in which a public prosecution has already been brought is tried according to judicial procedure. These are accounts she had already incurred, and already begun, within her membership; they do not vanish because she leaves, nor do they grow heavier because she leaves. Registration falls in this class too: the state needs to know who has left.
The price of exit. The renunciation settlement tax and the renunciation fee are different. They are not accounts she owed before leaving; they are money charged for the step of leaving itself: the settlement tax treats assets that have not been sold as if they had been, and the renunciation fee is charged at three times the average monthly wage per person. How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6) calls this kind of thing artificial exit cost, and among its examples is this very one: "exit friction deliberately created by the institution itself—non-compete agreements, divorce cooling-off periods, citizenship-renunciation hurdles" (F6 §7, fourth open question). Institution Theory registers it among the remainders an institution itself produces: "Remainders are of two types: what the rules have not covered is raised by persons; what the institution has itself produced is explained by the institution." (Institution Theory Z35) So this money must be explained by the UCSE: what account it settles, and why it is set where it is. A price is not the same as sealing off. Rights Theory says that sealing the exit channel "is not the presence in a relation of terms, procedures, conditions, or costs of exit; it is the subject no longer holding a structural channel for refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure" (Rights Theory P5 §III, F21 elaboration). In the end she paid and left; for her, this money did not amount to sealing off. But the price is set by the party being left, and this is exactly the point Theory of Government Paper 6 checks: "what must be checked is whether the party being left can cancel it on its own, by pricing or by approval" (Theory of Government G39). Those who cannot pay must have a road by which "cannot pay" is taken into a procedure that the party setting the price cannot close; how large the sums should be belongs to specific theories of institutions.
Sealing off. Emergency Order No. 7 is the third thing. It charges no money and settles no account; it stops, by age, the declarations of renunciation of a whole class of people, without examining the other conditions. Recognized by function, this is a restriction on departure. Her body could leave the country, but she was still a UCSE citizen, still within the age of call-up, and tethered by this status wherever she went; the use of the suspension is precisely to keep those of call-up age among the people who can be called up. Nor does it fall within the two things Article 12 of the Charter permits: it settles no account, and carries out no judicial proceeding.
Not sealed off in war either. Emergency Order No. 7 was issued in the summer when the DRP army crossed the Boundary River and the state of war was declared. Take the reading most favorable to the order: this is a defensive war (who determines the cannot-not of starting and of expanding a war is written in Paper 6, §1). Even in a defensive war, the departure of those of call-up age is not restricted (own undertaking).
The reason lies in what defense defends. The War Treatise places the cannot-not of starting a war at one point: "not fighting would cause cultivation to be completely interrupted in this field" (War Treatise §13). What defense defends is the cultivation of persons, not the construct's own continued existence; Institution Theory says: "The construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically: an institution is a means." (Institution Theory Z38) To shut people in by age, in order to keep them for the fighting, is to treat persons as a means to the construct's continued existence: what is defended is persons, and what is shut in is persons too; at the moment they are shut in, the reason for the defense is turned upside down. The survival of the state is not the survival of persons (Paper 4, N23). The line too "is not discounted under any condition" (Institution Theory Z9), and war is within "any condition"; not sealing off exit lies on the side of holding to, and an emergency does not stop it (Theory of Government G30). Defense rests on those who are still willing to stay when exit is not sealed off. Among those who stay, those who refuse to bear arms have a road of their own (Paper 4, N23a).
After leaving. After she had left, a call-up order was sent to a place where she did not live, and the Office of the Prosecutor opened a case for "refusing the call-up." Once a person has left the country, he is not prosecuted for "refusing the call-up," whether the call-up order was served before or after he left. Recognized by function, such a prosecution is another form of restricting departure: the person is already abroad, and there is only one thing the prosecution can do, which is to tether him by penalty, so that he either comes back and reports for service or never comes back. The day on which the call-up order was served does not change this function. In her case there is one more layer: if such a prosecution were permitted, then after Emergency Order No. 7 expired, its effect would be carried on by an open case. So this case does not turn into a prosecution (own undertaking).
This does not say that the accounts from before exit are wiped out. The "pending criminal proceedings" the Membership Act speaks of mean only cases in which a public prosecution has been brought (UCSE Case 10). Where charges were brought before departure, the case is tried as before, a charge of "refusing the call-up" included; only, the person may not be detained or banned from leaving because of the case, nor is the case aggravated by departure: the trial goes on as usual, and the person can leave. While such a case is pending, renunciation is processed as usual too, and the case is tried. The Membership Act makes the absence of any case in which charges have been brought a condition of renunciation; if this condition falls on a case of "refusing the call-up," then one pending case holds renunciation fast, and the person stays within the call-up: the same form as Emergency Order No. 7. Taxes owed are settled as before. What is ruled out is only this one kind of prosecution: one brought under the name of "refusing the call-up" after the person has left the country.
Those in service. A person who has already reported for service and is in service, and who leaves his post and leaves the country, is another matter, and is not covered here. He is in a position in the armed forces, and holds the accountability of that position; leaving his post is a question at this layer, handled through the courts under the law of military service, not disposed of by the commanding side on its own. His line is guarded by another road: an application to refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience or belief can be made at any time, after enlistment as well (Paper 4, N23a); while this road is there, he is not locked into the position of bearing arms. The difference between the two lies not in whether the person is abroad, but in what the prosecution asks about. One who has not reported for service has not yet entered that position; once he has left the country, all that a prosecution can ask about is the fact that he left. One in service is already in the position, and the position has exits of its own: the application to refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience, and lawful discharge; leaving one's post asks about going around these exits; that question must be asked within the country just the same, and does not depend on his being abroad. Departure itself is not made an additional offense: what the court asks about is leaving the post, not his being abroad (own undertaking).
Under which channel the last exit lies. Whether Emergency Order No. 7 is "law" in the sense of Article 12 of the Charter, and whether what it sets is a condition for "settling public accounts," has not been reviewed by a court (UCSE Case 10). This place is to be stated clearly against the channel. Who initiates it: the person whose exit is restricted, through the courts and through the Inspectorate; she is in the NUT, and it must be within her reach too (the commentator of §3 will run into this again). Which object it affects: the decision restricting exit. Whether the party questioned can close it: no, not even in war; review does not stop because of an emergency (Theory of Government G30). How the account is booked when it fails: if a restriction is never reviewed, the account is booked to the position that issued the order, and it is not written off because the state of war has been terminated and the emergency order has expired: "past residue is not written off by closing off questioning" (Institution Theory Z35a).
With Locke. The common question is: how a person becomes a member of a state, and whether he can leave. Locke distinguishes two kinds of consent. One who has given only tacit consent, by possession or residence, can leave: "whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth" (Second Treatise §121, same source; tier A). One who has become a member by express declaration of consent, however, "is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it" (ibid.).
How far the agreement goes: one who is bound by a state's laws only because he lives there can leave by giving up his residence; here the two point the same way. Where they part is at membership. For Locke, one who has become a member by express consent cannot leave, but the state can cut him off by a public act; this paper's two propositions run exactly the other way: one who has membership can leave (N13), and the state does not expel (§3). The two do not ask quite the same question: Locke asks where the ground of a person's being bound comes from, and once one has consented, one is bound; this paper asks whether a construct may use force to keep people in or to push them out. Here only the two points of opposition and the division of questions are recorded; it is not said that Locke is wrong.
The strongest objection on Locke's behalf (drafted by this paper): a person has expressly consented, and in ordinary times has enjoyed this state's protection; when this state is attacked and needs him to do his part, he leaves. To permit him to leave is to permit him to take the protection and not bear the burden, and the compact becomes empty words.
The reply has three parts. First, the accounts can be settled: taxes owed before leaving, and cases in which charges have already been brought, are settled and tried as before; this is precisely what Article 12 of the Charter permits. Second, protection is not something bought, and leaving is not reneging on a debt. Theory of Government Paper 3 says that "a recognition-based right is not got in exchange for recognizing a power," and paying taxes is not a universal quid pro quo (Theory of Government G23); by the same reasoning extended to this place, having been protected in ordinary times does not automatically give rise to a debt of "not leaving in wartime" (extension; own undertaking). Third, what a person has promised, and whether he keeps it, is a matter within his own law, and this series writes no ought for persons; what is asked here is only whether the construct may use force to keep him. To keep him is to treat him as a means; the reasons are written above.
Hirschman wrote of exit and voice; on the side of exit, Theory of Government Paper 6, §6 has already conversed with him; here this paper only points back to it.
N13 Individual exit is not sealed off by the state. Exit is a condition of law's existence, not something law gives (Law Series P3 §6). The road of renouncing membership must be really usable: the state may register it, and may set conditions for settling public accounts already incurred; artificial exit cost is a remainder the state itself produces, which it must explain, and it may not cancel exit on its own by pricing or by approval (Theory of Government G39); the state does not maintain itself by sealing off exit. Departure is not restricted in war either: in a defensive war, the state does not restrict the departure of those of call-up age, and to restrict it is to treat persons as a means; suspending declarations of renunciation by age is, recognized by function, the same thing. Once a person has left the country, he is not prosecuted for "refusing the call-up," whenever the call-up order was served: to tether a person by penalty is, recognized by function, to restrict departure. Where charges for "refusing the call-up" were brought before departure, the case is heard as usual, but the person is not detained or banned from leaving on that account, nor is the case aggravated by departure; while that case is pending, renunciation is processed as usual. A person who has reported for service and is in service and who leaves his post is not covered by this proposition: that is the layer of the accountability of a position, handled through the courts; an application to refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience can be made at any time (Paper 4, N23a); departure itself is not made an additional offense.
§3 No Expulsion
A commentator, born in the South Bay State, holding UCSE citizenship and no other citizenship, has lived in the NUT since Year 8, writing columns for several UCSE publications. From the summer to the winter of Year 9 she wrote against the fourteenth amendment to the Charter (Charter Amendment 14) and against crossing the river, and started the online "armistice petition," signed by 410,000 people. An article of hers that winter contained the sentence: "Soldiers of the Defense Force, you may refuse to cross the river." (UCSE Case 11)
Article 21 of the Wartime Security Act added a clause to the Membership Act: "Where a person engages abroad in activities endangering the continued existence of the UCSE, the Membership Registry may revoke that person's UCSE citizenship." In the winter of Year 9, the Director of the Membership Registry signed a revocation decision, whose grounds field read: "Incited Defense Force personnel, while abroad, to refuse to carry out orders, endangering the continued existence of the UCSE." Her passport was cancelled the same day. The decision did not state whether she held another citizenship.
A revocation can be challenged before the Final Court within thirty days; the rules of procedure require the claim "to be filed in person at the court registry in Rivermouth City." She applied for an entry visa; the Office of Entry and Asylum, on the ground "not a UCSE citizen; entry subject to review," gave no reply for five months. Her lawyer filed on her behalf, and the registry returned the filing as procedurally improper. In the autumn of Year 10, a panel of the Final Court ruled that filing on her behalf was valid, and the revocation case went to a hearing.
Three things first. Whom it concerns: this commentator. Which line: the fifth ought: membership is tied to the position from which she asks, to voting, and to the several roads within her reach only by virtue of UCSE citizenship; it also touches the guarantee of the recognition-based positions the national level has embedded for her (passport, entry) (Theory of Government G17). Baseline: the position she was in before the revocation, while she held UCSE citizenship; Article 9 of the Charter (fact), "No one may be arbitrarily deprived of UCSE citizenship."
What is taken away. What revocation takes away is not just a passport. As §1 listed, at the UCSE's level voting hangs on membership. Power Theory reads voting as a structural position: "the voting-position: the institutionalized position at which a subject retains the interrupt-right standing within a group pressure field." (Power Theory P7 §IX.3) Theory of Government Paper 6 takes up this position and reads it as one item of control: through it the voters can replace the bearer of the acts, and activation does not wait for the consent of the party questioned (Theory of Government G40). Of every item of control, the Theory of Government asks one thing: "how the party questioned cannot cancel it on its own" (Theory of Government G36a).
Revocation runs right into this question. What she criticized was the amendment submitted by the Executive Council (UCSE Case 04) and the Wartime Council of Three's decision to cross the river (UCSE Case 24; three things in Paper 4, §2); the one who revoked her citizenship was the Director of an office on the executive side, who alone determined that she was "endangering the continued existence of the UCSE." What the party questioned cancels is not some single vote of hers, but her position as a questioner itself. For the party questioned to cancel the questioner is to judge its own case. The Theory of Government says that "no position may monopolize the power to shut the door," and that whether a matter can be asked again "is not decided by the place that made the decision on its own" (Theory of Government G36). So no administrative position has the power to deprive anyone of membership (own undertaking).
Not only the executive side. What voting questions is a whole closed loop: the Chamber of Citizens is elected by the voters, the First Executive is elected by the Chamber of Citizens, and the judges are chosen by the joint session from a selection list. Whichever position cancels a voter, it is one link in this closed loop cancelling someone who questions it.
Judging the operation, not the person. If another position did it, by legislation in the Assembly or by a court ruling, would that do? For membership acquired by birth, no: no position can expel it. The reason lies not only in who does it, but also in what is done. Her sentence was addressed to soldiers, and soldiers each have their own law; whether that sentence can be an offense, this paper does not judge. What can be judged is an operation: for her conduct, the Office of the Prosecutor can prosecute, and a court can rule according to law. Institution Theory says that toward the violating party, guarding "judges the operation, not the person," and that "particular operations that have been established can be attributed to the person, but no permanent identity is assigned to him" (Institution Theory Z19); the Theory of Government extends this to after-the-fact disposition: "Punishment premised on 'the violator is below subject status' is not accepted" (Theory of Government G12). Revoking membership is not the disposition of an operation; it moves a person outside the order and gives her a permanent identity; it is exclusion by judgment. Z19 and G12 originally concern guarding and punishment; extending them to the state's disposition of membership is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking). F6 puts it more directly where it speaks of the framework's non dubito: "Non dubito is a default toward a subject as an end, and that default is not withdrawn on account of that subject's conduct." What evidence can defeat is the presumption about a particular operation: "There is no finally condemned evil person, but there are diagnosable evil operations — this paper's proviso therefore judges operations, not persons." (F6 §2.1, Premise V) What is spoken of there is non dubito, not membership; here its shape is borrowed, as concurring.
Article 9 of the Charter forbids only "arbitrary" deprivation. This paper says more: membership acquired by birth cannot be expelled, whatever the procedure. Acquired by birth, in the UCSE, means acquired at birth by descent under the Membership Act; birth in the territory does not of itself confer it. Whether her citizenship was acquired at birth or by later naturalization, the case file does not record; the judgment in this case does not depend on it: the revocation was made by an administrative position, and its ground was speech after acquisition; either of the two suffices on its own.
Fraud in acquisition. Membership acquired by naturalization differs in one respect. If naturalization was obtained by fraud, a court can rule that the naturalization did not validly take place. This is not expulsion: what is judged is the operation at the moment of acquisition; the acquisition itself did not validly take place, and so no position that had validly come into being is taken away. So it looks only at fraud in the naturalization, and does not extend to conduct after naturalization. To declare that "the naturalization did not validly take place" on the ground of words or deeds after naturalization is, recognized by function, expulsion under another name, and is judged as in the preceding paragraph. It too is ruled on only by a court, not by an administrative position (own undertaking).
The dividing line lies not in where a person was born, but in whether the acquisition went through an application. In acquisition by birth there is no operation of acquisition to judge; in acquisition by application there is an operation at the moment of acquisition: what the application stated, and on what grounds it was granted, are all on record. So those who acquire membership by application under Article 14 of the Membership Act (children born in the territory without citizenship of any state), and those who acquire it on the "road with a time limit" of the next section, are both placed in the class of naturalization: fraud in acquisition is ruled on by a court; it does not extend to conduct after acquisition; where a ruling that the acquisition did not validly take place leaves a person stateless, this state again gives a road with a time limit (§4) (own undertaking).
There is one place this dividing line cannot answer: where the birth registration itself was obtained by fraud, for example by falsely stating the parents, the premise of descent is not there; whether this counts as acquisition by birth or as an acquisition that did not validly take place, this paper does not judge, and it is registered as a remainder.
Whether one holds another citizenship makes no difference. Suppose that she also held NUT citizenship, so that after the revocation she would not be left without citizenship (UCSE Case 11-B). The conclusion does not change. The reasons above, cancelling a questioner and judging the person rather than the operation, nowhere relied on whether she would be stateless. Statelessness is a heavier consequence: losing a state's recognition, one "has recognition-based rights and workable remedies largely hollowed out" (Rights Theory Paper 0, §V). It adds weight to this case; it is not the ground for forbidding expulsion.
An account that cannot be emptied. F6 writes of elimination that it "reads the order's shortfall as a defect in certain persons": "these people are not in our field, so expel them (exclusion by judgment)"; and "Elimination can therefore only move the account between its aspects; it cannot empty the account" (F6 §2.1, Note (elimination)). This case shows it plainly: her citizenship was revoked, yet she is still in the NUT writing about UCSE affairs, the UCSE is still pursuing her speech, and she still has to go back to Rivermouth City to litigate. As regards the revocation and its consequences, she is still in the UCSE's interior (§1); the account has been moved from "UCSE citizen" to "person whose citizenship was revoked," and has not been cleared. That note also limits itself: "This note does not declare elimination impossible, makes no historical prediction, and passes no verdict of right or wrong"; "The epistemic account and the normative account are kept separate." It explains the after-effects of division; it does not on its own issue a prohibition; the prohibition is undertaken by this series.
Where her road is. After the revocation, three positions each acted according to their own rules: the court required filing in person, entry required prior review, and the review went unanswered for five months. Taken together, the road for questioning the revocation was beyond her reach. The channel the fifth ought requires is one that "internal subjects can actually initiate" (Institution Theory Z34); whether it is within reach is checked against what the several positions look like taken together, not against each position's own rules separately. Only in the autumn of Year 10, when the panel ruled that filing on her behalf was valid, was this road reconnected. After the revocation she is still in the interior, and reach under the fifth ought is not reduced by the revocation. The Office of External Affairs asked the NUT to hand her over, and the NUT refused; this is written in Paper 5, §2.
At the place of revocation of citizenship: the one who initiates is the person whose citizenship was revoked, and it must be within reach even when that person is abroad; what is affected is the revocation decision and its consequences; the party questioned cannot close it, and whether it is within reach is checked against the several positions taken together; when it fails, the account for the revocation, and for the several rules that blocked the road, is booked to the positions that made them (Paper 7, N39).
Where a ruling that a naturalization did not validly take place leaves a person stateless, how he is kept from falling into having nowhere to go is the same matter as the children of the next section, and is written there.
The first part of N14 is established here; the proposition as a whole is stated at the end of §4.
§4 Not Refusing Those Who Have Nowhere to Go
In the autumn of Year 9 the DRP issued a decree: those who left the country during mobilization and did not return within six months lose DRP citizenship; children born to them abroad are not registered by the DRP (UCSE Case 14).
From the summer of Year 9 to Year 12, three hundred ten children were born in the Willow Ferry Reception Center. Their births are registered by the Kingdom State, and the "Citizenship" field on their birth certificates reads "undetermined." Article 14 of the Membership Act: a child born in the territory without citizenship of any state may acquire UCSE citizenship by application, but the parents must have been lawfully resident in the territory for five years. Whether time on a temporary stay permit counts as "lawful residence," the law does not say; an internal guideline of the Membership Registry says it does not. In Year 11 a mother who had given birth in the center was granted asylum, and her lawful residence was counted from that day; her child can apply in Year 16 at the earliest. In Year 12 members of the Chamber of Citizens proposed deleting the five-year condition; the proposal is in committee.
Three things first. Whom it concerns: the children born in the center without citizenship of any state. Which line: reach under the fifth ought (their position before every channel of the UCSE) and the third ought (providing conditions for cultivation according to relational thickness). Baseline: a stateless child born in the territory whose parents have completed five years of lawful residence: under Article 14, such a child may acquire UCSE citizenship by application.
How the account is divided. That three hundred ten children hold no citizenship of any state is the result of two orders taken together: the DRP's decree does not register them, and the UCSE's Article 14 and that guideline do not take them in. The accounts of two constructs are each checked by their own source (Theory of Government G25; originally said of two constructs within one State, extended here to two states: extension; own undertaking). For the DRP's share, this series writes no ought; this paper writes only how the UCSE stands toward these children. The UCSE has not deprived them of citizenship, and it has not given it either. The previous section spoke of not expelling; does not taking in also count as "creating" statelessness?
First, one way of speaking is to be headed off. These children are not to be called, without more, a "shortfall of intake" in F6's sense. That paper says: "the shortfall of intake does not reside in certain people but between the order's categories and any person whatever" (F6 §2.1, Note (elimination)). The shortfall lies between the UCSE's categories and these children, not in the children.
Two grounds for not refusing. Both are undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking).
First, reach under the fifth ought. Since the children hold no citizenship of any state, where they stand before the UCSE's channels depends on how others read them. The Inspectorate takes up complaints from "UCSE citizens and persons lawfully resident within the UCSE"; whether those on a temporary stay permit count as the latter, it deliberated for four months before deciding to take up their complaints (§1). The Membership Registry's guideline, however, says that time on temporary stay does not count as "lawful residence." One term, two readings; whether the channels are within the children's reach hangs on how others read them. These children were born under the UCSE's acts and cannot leave; they are in the UCSE's interior; and reach under the fifth ought does not vary with relational thickness for anyone in the interior: "The first and fifth oughts, the 'not sealing the channels' half of the fourth, and the trigger of the second do not vary with it" (the Institution Theory Prequel, §7, the entry "Relational thickness"). So whether the channels are within the children's reach cannot hang on a guideline or on a deliberation; that it hangs at all is itself a failure to meet the fifth ought.
Second, the third ought, according to relational thickness. Relational thickness is how far a construct actually organizes the lives of those inside it (Institution Theory Z25a). These children were born in the center, live in the center and attend the center's temporary classrooms, with teachers engaged by the Office of Entry and Asylum; the UCSE organizes their lives almost entirely. Under the third ought, the UCSE must provide corresponding conditions for their cultivation. Membership is the principal entrance to these conditions at the national level, not the only one; immediate complaint and remedy must be guaranteed first. For these children, whose lives are almost entirely and continuously organized by this state and who hold no citizenship of any state, this series further undertakes a long-term requirement: their continuing status may not be left indefinitely dependent on a temporary-stay category and individual permits; there must be a really usable road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership (own undertaking).
That passage of Rights Theory originally concerns persons who have lost a state's recognition, and that entry of the Institution Theory Prequel concerns constructs in general and those inside them; extending them to the state's stance toward stateless persons born in its territory is undertaken by this series.
Two things kept apart. From these two grounds, the UCSE owes these children two things, at different times.
The immediate one is reach under the fifth ought. It does not wait for membership; it must be there today: through their parents, or through someone who asks on their behalf, the children can bring the matter of "undetermined" into a channel, and someone answers, and answers that very matter.
The long-term one is a road to acquiring membership: really usable, with a time limit, and not replaced by an "undetermined" that has no time limit. How long the time limit is, and how the conditions are set, belong to specific theories of institutions; what this paper requires is that there be a time limit, and that the day from which it is counted not be in the hands of the party that does not take them in. The Membership Registry's guideline ties the child's starting day to the day the mother is granted asylum; asylum decisions are made by the Office of Entry and Asylum, which in three years decided only thirty-one percent of the applications (UCSE Case 13). With the starting day in the hands of the Office of Entry and Asylum, the time limit exists in name only.
How far it extends. Immediate reach under the fifth ought is not reduced in any of the three bands. For the long-term road to acquiring membership, its conditions are explained by the actual relation; the three bands below distinguish to whom it applies, and do not let identity itself stand in for relational thickness. This division into bands is undertaken by this series (own undertaking).
Stateless persons born in this state's territory and living here must have a really usable road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership. The children above are in this band; the thickness of their relation is shown by the UCSE's having organized almost the whole of their lives.
Those whom this state has actually received, and who have no citizenship to return to because another state has deprived them of it, must likewise have a really usable road with a time limit; the length and conditions of the road must be explained item by item according to how far this state actually organizes their lives, and are not as a matter of course lengthened or made more demanding because they came from abroad. The parents in the center, if they have lost DRP citizenship under that decree, are in this band.
For those still abroad who enter this state's interior only through some act of this state, this state owes no road to naturalization, only what follows the unified sentence (the Prequel, §8; §5): reach under the fifth ought is not reduced for them either.
In none of the three bands is membership acquired as a matter of course (N12).
The previous section left one matter: a court rules that an acquisition did not validly take place, and the person is thereby left without citizenship of any state. The acquisition itself did not validly take place, yet he has lived here, and most likely still lives here. By the two grounds of this section, this state gives him a road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership, its length and conditions explained according to how far this state actually organizes his life; "no creating statelessness" holds here too. Membership acquired on this section's road is also acquired by application (§3): where there was fraud in the acquisition, a court rules that the acquisition did not validly take place; if he is again left stateless as a result, this state again gives a road with a time limit, still by these two grounds. Fraud in the earlier acquisition may be counted among the conditions of this road, but does not make it a road without a time limit.
With Arendt. The common question is: what a person loses when he loses a state's recognition. Hannah Arendt writes of the stateless in chapter 9 of The Origins of Totalitarianism. On Buchwalter's secondary summary, she argues from the rightlessness that the stateless underwent: what gives human rights their actual meaning is not an abstract appeal to human dignity, but only a person's membership in an organized community that can recognize what he claims; this line of thought does not read rights as an essence prior to history, but ties them to membership in a legal-political community (per the summary in the introduction to Buchwalter 2013; original not checked; tier C).
How far the agreement goes: losing a state's recognition, a person has his assertable positions and workable remedies largely hollowed out; it does not follow that every other entrance disappears. Rights Theory reads the right to have rights that she pointed to as a meta-recognition position, that is, as an entrance, not as some particular right; §1 follows this reading.
They part in three places. First, basic rights. Rights Theory says that for one who has lost a state's recognition, "basic rights are not thereby lost": what is largely hollowed out is recognition-based rights and workable remedies (Rights Theory Paper 0, §V). On the summary above, what she says is that human rights have no actual meaning apart from a community; the "rights" the two sides speak of are not the same quantity, and here the parting is only recorded. Second, there is more than one entrance. This paper does not infer from this that citizenship is the only entrance (N12): within this state's interior, reach under the fifth ought does not wait for membership. Third, scope. On the summary above, she answers the rightlessness of the stateless as a whole; this paper answers only what a construct owes at its own door: where it can catch someone, it does not refuse to catch him. This is a division of scope, not a refutation.
The strongest objection on her behalf (drafted by this paper): a "road with a time limit" is still something the state gives. Whether to give it, and when, are still in the state's hands; the stateless person still hangs on a state's decision. You have only written the kind of dependence she described into a procedure.
The reply has two parts. The immediate item is not something given: reach under the fifth ought is owed today, and does not wait on any decision. Nor is the time limit of the road fixed by the giving side alone: the starting day is not in the hands of the party that does not take them in, and the time limit itself is open to questioning. The objection also has its weight: this paper gives no warrant that every stateless person in the world has a position; how stateless persons outside this state's interior are to be caught, this paper does not write.
N14 No expulsion, and no creating statelessness. The first part, no expulsion: the state does not use exclusion by judgment as punishment or elimination, and this does not turn on whether the person holds another citizenship. Membership is tied to voting, and to deprive someone of it is to cancel a questioner; for the party questioned to cancel the questioner is to judge its own case; so no administrative position has the power to deprive anyone of membership; for his conduct, state organs may prosecute, and a court rules according to law. Membership acquired by birth cannot be expelled; where membership was acquired by naturalization or by some other application (including acquisition by a stateless person on the road of the second part), and there was fraud in the acquisition, a court rules that the acquisition did not validly take place; this is the acquisition itself not having validly taken place, not expulsion, and it does not extend to conduct after acquisition (own undertaking). The second part, not refusing those who have nowhere to go: this state does not refuse to take in those born in its territory who hold no citizenship of any state. There are two grounds: reach under the fifth ought does not vary with relational thickness; this state provides conditions for cultivation according to relational thickness, and membership is the principal but not the only entrance to the meta-recognition position (extension; own undertaking). Two things kept apart: the immediate one is reach under the fifth ought, which does not wait for membership; the long-term one is that, beyond the immediate channel, this series further undertakes a really usable road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership, not replaced by an "undetermined" that has no time limit (own undertaking). How far it extends: immediate reach under the fifth ought is not reduced in any band; for the long-term road, the conditions are explained by the actual relation, and identity itself does not stand in for relational thickness. Those whom this state has actually received, and who have no citizenship to return to because another state has deprived them of it, must likewise have a road with a time limit, its length and conditions explained item by item according to how far this state actually organizes their lives, and not as a matter of course lengthened or made more demanding because they came from abroad; for those still abroad who enter the interior only through some act of this state, this state owes no road to naturalization, only what follows the unified sentence. Where a ruling that an acquisition did not validly take place leaves a person stateless, this state, under the second part, again gives a road with a time limit; fraud in the earlier acquisition may be counted among the conditions of this road, but does not make it a road without a time limit. In none of the three is membership acquired as a matter of course (N12).
§5 Those at the Door Are in the Interior
In the winter of Year 8, two months after the Boundary River incident, fourteen DRP soldiers crossed the border at night north of the West Pass crossing and gave themselves up to monitors of the Office of Entry and Asylum (UCSE Case 12). In Year 2 the UCSE and the DRP had concluded the Border Return Protocol: persons who cross the border other than at a border crossing are handed back to their state of origin within seventy-two hours; the Protocol has no asylum clause. The head of the West Pass crossing, under the Protocol, handed the fourteen back to the DRP border guards within seventy-two hours. The crossing's record: each was interviewed for about ten minutes; three said "I am not going back," and one of them said "going back means prison"; the note entered on the record by the head of the crossing reads "handled under the Protocol." In the spring of Year 9, a border publication in the NUT reported that two of the fourteen had been sentenced by a DRP military court to fifteen years; the UCSE has not verified this.
In the summer of Year 9, after the DRP issued its mobilization order, the number of people arriving at West Pass rose sharply, and the Office of Entry and Asylum suspended the application of the Protocol. The Wartime Council of Three ordered "flow limits" at West Pass: at most eight hundred people a day let through, the rest waiting in line at the western end of the West Pass Bridge, on the DRP side; DRP men aged nineteen to fifty were sent separately to a "screening area" and detained for up to twenty-one days, the written reason being "to guard against infiltration." In the winter of Year 9, the line west of the bridge was at its longest about eleven thousand people, waiting in the open for six to nine days; a woman gave birth on the bridge, and two elderly people died in the cold night. No reception facilities were set up on the DRP side. In the spring of Year 10, the daily number let through was raised to two thousand.
Three things first. Whom it concerns: the fourteen who crossed the border and gave themselves up, especially the three who said "I am not going back"; those waiting in line west of the bridge; the men in the screening area. Which line: the first ought (the part of the handing back, the flow limits and the detention that acts on them) and the fifth ought (whether what they said has a position to receive it, and to whom these decisions are explained). Baseline: the asylum application procedure after the Protocol was suspended: applicants hold a temporary stay permit while their applications are reviewed (the Entry and Asylum Act).
Where they are. During their seventy-two hours at West Pass, those fourteen were at a UCSE crossing, and whether they would be handed back was decided by UCSE positions; they came in order to leave the DRP, and "exit" here meant being sent back. Those waiting west of the bridge stood on DRP soil, waiting for the UCSE to let them through; the flow limits were the UCSE's decision and fell on them, and if they turned back, they would walk back into the mobilization order. The men in the screening area were detained by the UCSE. All three were reached by this state's acts and had no way to avoid them by exiting. Whether they are "people of other states" is not prejudged by what they are called; as regards these acts, they are in the UCSE's interior.
The ground is a sentence of Theory of Government Paper 4, extended to the border: "Jurisdiction is not the interior: those whom a level of government's acts reach and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are in its interior even if they are not in its jurisdiction" (Theory of Government G25). That paper writes of cross-jurisdictional spillover within one State, and states that this matter is not handed to the Theory of the State; what is handed to the Theory of the State is the national level's outward face, its borders, and membership. Extending the same reading here to refusal of entry, return and detention at the border is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking).
What is owed in the interior follows the unified sentence: those whom this state's acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting are, as regards those acts, in this state's interior; the five oughts apply each on its own conditions (Institution Theory Z4: "the five oughts apply each on its own conditions and are not reduced for want of a position"): the first and fifth oughts (a channel that is independent, within reach, and brings no retaliation for its use) and the "not sealing the channels" half of the fourth do not vary with relational thickness; the trigger of the second does not vary with it, and its means are bounded by this state's authority at that place; the third ought, and the "leaving room" half of the fourth, go by relational thickness (the Institution Theory Prequel, §7, the entry "Relational thickness"). This confers no membership (N12).
Read item by item.
Handing back. Whether the handing back itself crossed the line depends on what fell on them after they were handed back, which is exactly what the UCSE did not check. This paper does not make that judgment on its behalf. What can be judged is something else: three people said "I am not going back," and the Protocol has no box for it; according to the crossing's record, these three sentences fell on the same position that made the decision to hand them back, and the note reads "handled under the Protocol." Under the fifth ought, these three sentences must have a position to receive them: not the one that made the decision to hand them back, within their reach during the seventy-two hours, and usable without retaliation. "That a demand bears the name of procedure does not prove that complying with it is within the line" (Institution Theory Z12); "handled under the Protocol" does not answer the very matter it was questioned about. The Protocol is a compact between the UCSE and the DRP; how it binds this state through this state's own law, and whether suspending it counts as an act, are written in Paper 5, §§1–2; that the compact exists does not reduce the several things the UCSE owes these fourteen at its door.
Flow limits. The long line on the bridge was on the DRP side, where there were no reception facilities: that is the DRP's account; how many are let through, and how fast, is the UCSE's account; the accounts of the two constructs are each checked by their own source (Theory of Government G25, extended to two states, as marked in §4). The UCSE has no authority on that land, and the means of the second ought are bounded by its authority at that place; but the number let through was in its hands, and raising it from eight hundred to two thousand in the spring of Year 10 was exactly the point within its reach. Whether the six to nine days in the open, the birth on the bridge and the two deaths compressed anyone's life-substrate is checked separately, person by person; the first ought does not vary with relational thickness.
Screening. Checking a person's identity is a restriction that may be placed on him. To detain a whole class of people by citizenship, age and sex requires explaining on which operation the ground falls: guarding "judges the operation, not the person" (Institution Theory Z19). Twenty-one days at most is a time limit; within it, every person must have a road for bringing his own case into a review that the screening side cannot close. Detention that goes beyond the step of checking identity, and that cannot explain on which operation it falls, is read as in Paper 5, §6.
For the reception center, three things are written separately. Whom it concerns: the residents of the center. Which line: the first ought (the restriction that the pass to leave places on bodily movement) and the fifth ought (whether complaints are within reach). Baseline: residents of Willow Ferry who hold UCSE citizenship (§1).
The pass to leave limits going in and out to between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m. each day; it is a restriction on bodily movement, and belongs to this paper along with "staying" (§1): a restriction must explain on what grounds it rests and until when. In three years, asylum decisions were made on thirty-one percent of the applications, and the rest of the people "stay" in a pending state; the Inspectorate spent four months deliberating whether they could complain. In those four months, the road of complaint came to nothing.
None of this confers membership. Those at the door are in the interior as regards these acts; whether they may come in, whether they may stay, and whether they may acquire membership are other matters, each answered by its own procedure, and answered according to the items above (the matter of those who have nowhere to go is written in §4).
N15 Those at the door are in the interior. Of those who come to the border, those whom this state's refusal of entry, return or detention reaches and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are, as regards these acts, in this state's interior, following the unified sentence (the Prequel, §8; Theory of Government G25 extended to the border; extension; own undertaking).
§6 Secession
The South Bay State lives by shipping and its harbor (UCSE Case 15). The wartime surtax from Year 9 on, and the sanctions on the DRP (UCSE Case 21; three things in Paper 5, §5), cut throughput at South Bay harbor by about thirty percent. In the summer of Year 10, the State Legislature of the South Bay State passed, 61 to 39, the South Bay State's Status Referendum Act, whose question was: "Should the South Bay State exit the United City-States of Ends and become an independent state?" The Act states that if the referendum passes, the State government will negotiate with the Executive Council, and that during the negotiations the UCSE citizenship of the South Bay State's residents is unchanged.
The Executive Council declared: "The Charter makes no provision for exit; the referendum has no legal effect." It asked the Final Court to interpret the Charter's silence on exit; the Court ruled that "the request is not yet ripe" (Paper 2, §6). The referendum was held in the spring of Year 11: turnout 63 percent, 52.4 percent in favor of exit; the two districts where South Bay harbor lies were more than sixty percent in favor, and the three northern districts more than sixty percent against. The Executive Council refused to negotiate. Two weeks later, forty members of the Chamber of Citizens proposed the "unity clause" (UCSE Case 05). In the winter of Year 11 a new Executive Council was formed, and in Year 12 it agreed to set up the "Joint Commission on the Status of the South Bay State"; both sides declared that they would proceed "without presupposing the outcome," and the commission has met four times.
The Charter's silence has a history. At the constitutional convention, the delegates of the South Bay State proposed that "a member unit may exit by a referendum of that unit"; it failed, 19 to 23. The delegates of the Kingdom State then proposed that "member units may not exit"; it failed, 20 to 22 (UCSE Case 03).
Three things first. Whom it concerns: the residents of the South Bay State, both those in favor of exit and those in the three northern districts who opposed it; the people of the UCSE's other member units; those connected with the shipping, the customs and the coastal defense base at South Bay harbor. Which line: the fifth ought (whether the claim to exit has a road within reach on which someone answers) and the "not sealing the channels" half of the fourth (the road of group exit itself). Baseline: Article 66 of the Charter (fact): the accession of a new member unit is passed by two-thirds of each chamber and by a referendum in that unit; on exit, the Charter has no provision.
Silence is not one side's say. Neither proposal passed: the Charter wrote neither "may exit by a referendum of that unit" nor "may not exit." The Executive Council read this silence as "no legal effect," that is, that the matter of exit is for the national level to say. This reading does not stand. Where there is silence, it is not for one side to say; it is a blank, to be filled by a procedure.
Why there must be a procedure. The ground lies in F6's registration of the division of members. The aim of an act of demarcation is: "to arrange, stably and for repeated handling of entangled intersections, members' standing, belonging, and the ways they may be treated." (F6 §2) Secession is another division of members. If the South Bay State exits, what changes is the belonging of a whole unit, and with it which state each resident of the South Bay State belongs to, whose law he is under, and whom he questions. More than one party lies under the cut: there are the people in the South Bay State who do not want to exit, the UCSE that remains, third parties connected with the harbor, shipping and coastal defense, and shared arrangements. That passage of F6 originally concerns an order's taking-in of its members; extending it here to the secession of a member unit is undertaken by this series (extension; own undertaking).
A division that moves many parties cannot be completed by a single word from one of them; and it is also a claim, which cannot be left with nowhere to be raised. Without a procedure, the claim to group exit has only two roads left: a permanent veto by the national level, or a unilateral declaration by one side. The first is the party questioned shutting the door on questioning, whereas whether a matter can be asked again "is not decided by the place that made the decision on its own" (Theory of Government G36); the second is one side finally disposing of matters on behalf of the other parties under the cut. So group exit must have a really usable public procedure (own undertaking). Of its authority, its triggering, its forming of decisions and its function for resolving deadlock, this paper establishes only functions, not forms. This procedure is a usable road, not a list that has already exhausted the legitimate cases: the remainder it leaves lies in at least four places, namely claims the procedure has not caught, accounts not settled once it has run its course, the thresholds and steps themselves, and the exiting unit and its scope themselves, each stated below; stating the remainder does not require listing everything unknown, nor does it cancel the procedure's limited effect of closing the case.
Really usable. At least three things. Initiation is not decided unilaterally by the national level: by saying "no legal effect," the Executive Council took initiation into its own hands. The thresholds and steps may be high, but under actual conditions they must have a possibility of being carried through, and why they are set where they are must be publicly explained. Once the procedure has run its course, a reasonable interval may be set, so that the same claim cannot immediately be raised again; this is a limited effect of closing the case; the interval may not become a permanent veto.
Neither side is final on its own. There is no unilateral veto by the national level, nor does one side, by a unilateral declaration, finally dispose of all common matters. Suppose that the constitutional convention had in its day passed the proposal of the South Bay delegates (UCSE Case 15-B): once the 52.4 percent was in, the South Bay State would have exited; the opposition of more than sixty percent in the three northern districts, the customs and the coastal defense base in the harbor, and the people of the UCSE's other units connected with South Bay harbor would all have been disposed of by one vote within one unit. That is not the procedure this paper requires either. Nor does a common procedure mean that every party concerned holds a permanent power of consent: the procedure must have a function for resolving deadlock, which no party's permanent non-cooperation can block; and unsettled matters do not keep exit from taking effect indefinitely. The Year 12 joint commission's "without presupposing the outcome" is a step in this direction; whether it has a function for resolving deadlock, and whether it has a time limit, remain to be checked.
F6 writes, in Appendix B, a fictional constitution under which group exit requires the consent of the Federal Assembly: F6, Appendix B, Article 6(c) (a working demonstration; used only as an example). This is not taken. In its own remainder declaration, F6, Appendix B, Article 31(c) (a working demonstration), that constitution writes: "Group exit requiring Assembly consent may be used to block legitimate self-determination." "Federal consent required" is a unilateral veto by the national level. This is one of the strong forms the upstream left to this series (the Prequel, §8, the table of strong forms, SF7): it is not taken; a procedure is established, neither side is final on its own, and the procedure states its remainder.
The procedure does not claim to be complete. Four places of remainder.
First, a claim the procedure has not caught does not lose its qualification to be questioned because it is "not in accordance with the procedure"; the procedure itself is open to questioning and can be amended (Paper 1, N3, N4). Law Series P1 says: "A law that cannot be modified is a law that claims to have no remainder. Within the SAE framework, this is a structural lie." (Law Series P1 BL4) A procedure that declares itself complete says the same thing. The unity clause runs right into this place. Clause 1, "member units may not exit," writes the national level's veto as permanent. Clause 2, "This article may not be amended," declares that there is no remainder at this place; Paper 1, §3 has already read it. Clause 3 would dissolve "an organization whose purpose is to bring about the exit of a member unit," treating those who raise this claim as objects to be eliminated; what they use is precisely the road of questioning, and the fifth ought says that its use brings no retaliation. The new proposal of Year 12 deletes clause 2 and changes clause 3 to "an organization whose purpose is to bring about the exit of a member unit by violence": what is changed is the class of its object, from the aim of a claim to an operation ("judges the operation, not the person," Institution Theory Z19); whether the amended clause is within the line is checked under the first ought (Paper 1, §3).
Second, running the procedure to its end does not settle all the accounts. The Conflict Treatise says: "no party can, by withdrawing unilaterally, close out this incompatibility as regards that party's first-person responsibility, the shared relation, third-party responsibility, or institutional consequence." (Conflict Treatise §2) That sentence originally concerns first-person incompatibility; here it is extended to secession by procedure (extension; own undertaking). F6 has a general sentence where it speaks of elimination: "each act of handling is itself another cut and leaves its own shortfall of intake" (F6 §2.1, Note (elimination)). Even a legitimate procedure is still a cut. Those in the exiting unit who do not want to exit, those on the remaining side who are entangled with them, the citizenship of people on both sides (§§3, 4), and the shared harbor, customs and base are all registered as remainder (§7), and questioning is not closed with "the procedure has run its course."
Third, the thresholds and steps are themselves under questioning. They are the arrangement of this moment, not a definition of legitimate self-determination.
Fourth, the exiting unit and its scope are themselves a division. Most voters in the three northern districts opposed exit; districts within the unit that form a different majority, and people who do not want to exit, are registered as remainder, and are not closed off by the unit's majority. By what this cut is made, the procedure must explain.
A week before the referendum, the Executive Council moved two battalions of the Defense Force into the coastal defense base at South Bay harbor; the troops did not leave the base. The Office of Internal Security called in two organizers of the exit movement for interviews, and brought no charges. The troop movement is read in Paper 4, §1. The interviews fell on the organizers of this claim, before the referendum; whether the use of the road of questioning brought retaliation must be checked under the fifth ought.
This paper does not judge whether the South Bay State ought to exit. It judges two things: silence is not one side's say; and what fills this blank is a procedure that is really usable, in which neither side is final on its own, and which states its own remainder.
At the place of secession: those who initiate are the people of the exiting unit and its organs; what is affected is the claim to group exit and the procedure itself; the party questioned cannot close it, and initiation is not decided unilaterally by the national level; when it fails, the absence of a usable procedure is booked to the construct, and the remainder is still registered (N17).
N16 Secession: a procedure is established, and the procedure does not claim to be complete. Group exit must have a really usable public procedure: secession is another division of members, and under the cut are those in the exiting unit who do not agree, the side that remains, third parties and shared arrangements (F6 §2 extended to secession; extension; own undertaking); for the procedure's authority, triggering, forming of decisions and function for resolving deadlock, only functions are established, not forms; the supreme rule's silence on exit does not mean that it is for one side to say. Being really usable requires at least that initiation not be decided unilaterally by the national level; the thresholds and steps may be high, but under actual conditions they must have a possibility of being carried through, and must be publicly explained; once the procedure has run its course, a reasonable interval may be set, which is a limited effect of closing the case and may not become a permanent veto. Neither side is final on its own: there is no unilateral veto by the national level, nor does one side, by a unilateral declaration, finally dispose of all common matters; a common procedure does not mean that every party concerned holds a permanent power of consent; the procedure must have a function for resolving deadlock, which no party's permanent non-cooperation can block, and unsettled matters do not keep exit from taking effect indefinitely. The procedure does not claim to be complete, and states the remainder it leaves, in at least four places: a claim the procedure has not caught does not lose its qualification to be questioned because it is "not in accordance with the procedure," and the procedure itself is open to questioning and can be amended; running the procedure to its end does not settle all the accounts (Conflict Treatise §2 extended to secession; extension; own undertaking); the thresholds and steps are themselves under questioning; the exiting unit and its scope are themselves a division. Stating the remainder does not require listing everything unknown, nor does it cancel the procedure's limited effect of closing the case. F6, Appendix B, Article 6(c), "federal consent required," is not taken (own undertaking).
§7 Registering the Remainder of Division
In the spring of Year 11, the UCSE and the DRP signed the Withdrawal Agreement at Three Borders; the UCSE withdrew from the Wheat Plain buffer zone, and the provisional administration office and the "Wheat Plain Provisional Self-Government Committee" were dissolved. Of the committee's eleven members, nine left with the UCSE forces, applied for asylum, and were granted it; the two who stayed were prosecuted by the DRP for "collaboration with the enemy" (UCSE Case 26; three things in Paper 6, §4).
Withdrawal is also a division: who stays on which side, who goes with whom. UCSE Case 26 is first judged in Paper 6, §4, and the nine and the two who stayed are in Paper 6, §5; here only this one fact is cited, and one thing registered: that a division has run its course does not mean it has no shortfall.
In registering the division of members, F6 writes: "The four shapes of shortfall: shortfall of intake, misplacement, dual belonging, and exclusion by judgment." (F6 §2) Institution Theory extends this to every division of this kind: "Every division an institution draws by rules, categories and belonging leaves its own unaccommodated residue"; "that exclusion by judgment can be relocated shows that the object domain can be redrawn, and redrawing does not eliminate remainder" (Institution Theory Z35).
The several matters of this paper each leave an entry here. The engineer was caught between two states: the NUT's rules required her to choose a side, and the UCSE's suspension would not let her choose; this is the aspect of dual belonging (§2). Revoking a person's membership is exclusion by judgment (§3). The "undetermined" on the birth certificates of three hundred ten children is shortfall of intake; the lack of citizenship of any parents in the center who lost theirs under the DRP's decree likewise records such a shortfall (§4). Treating the soldiers who crossed the border, gave themselves up and said "I am not going back" only as "persons who cross the border other than at a border crossing" is misplacement (§5). The citizenship of the two sides after secession, and the people who do not want to go, are the account of the next division (§6).
The registration keeps measure in three respects. First, the shortfall lies not in certain persons but between the order's categories and persons (F6 §2.1, Note (elimination)); registration finds no one guilty: "Unaccommodated residue and particular problems are registered in two ways: the former carries no charge; the latter is checked separately against its criteria." (Institution Theory Z35) Whether harm or line-crossing is constituted is checked separately, as in the preceding sections. Second, registration is not writing off: "past residue is not written off by closing off questioning" (Institution Theory Z35a). Even if those children's road is someday carried through, the "undetermined" of the years before remains on the account. Third, these entries were all produced by the UCSE's own divisions, and by Institution Theory's division of types they are explained by the institution, without waiting for persons to raise them (Institution Theory Z35).
N17 Registering the remainder of division. Every division of membership, whether acquisition, renunciation, revocation, intake or secession, leaves its own shortfall: shortfall of intake, misplacement, dual belonging, exclusion by judgment; it is registered as a remainder, and it is not declared that the division has no shortfall (F6 §2; Institution Theory Z35). The shortfall does not reside in certain persons; registration carries no charge, and whether harm or line-crossing is constituted is checked separately; neither redrawing the object domain nor running a procedure to its end writes off the account.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has proved only these things: membership and the interior are kept apart, the interior is drawn by entanglement, and membership is the principal bearer of the meta-recognition position at the national level, not its only realization; exit is a condition of law's existence, the road of renouncing membership must be really usable, the state may register and settle accounts, the price of exit must be explained, and the state may not cancel exit on its own by pricing; even in a defensive war, the departure of those of call-up age is not restricted, and suspending renunciation by age and prosecuting those who have left for "refusing the call-up" are, recognized by function, both restrictions on departure, whenever the call-up order was served; cases in which charges were brought before departure are heard as usual, without detaining the person, banning departure or aggravating the case on account of departure, and renunciation is processed as usual; those in service who leave their posts are not included; membership is tied to voting, no administrative position has the power to deprive anyone of it, membership acquired by birth cannot be expelled, and where membership was acquired by naturalization or other application and there was fraud in the acquisition, a court rules that the acquisition did not validly take place, which does not extend to later conduct; those thereby left stateless are again given a road with a time limit, and the earlier fraud may be counted among its conditions without making it a road without a time limit; none of this turns on whether the person holds another citizenship; those born in the territory who have nowhere to go must have immediate reach to a channel, and in the long term a road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership, which this series undertakes separately; how far it extends falls into three bands, immediate reach is not reduced in any band, and the conditions of the road are explained by the actual relation; those at the door are, as regards this state's refusal of entry, return and detention, in the interior, following the unified sentence; for secession a procedure is established, initiation is not decided unilaterally by the national level, neither side is final on its own, the procedure has a function for resolving deadlock, it states at least four places of remainder, and "federal consent required" is not taken; the shortfall of every division is registered as a remainder.
What it has not proved: the specific policies of immigration and naturalization, how long the time limits are, how the conditions are set and how large the renunciation tax and fee are, which belong to specific theories of institutions; a particular state's refugee arrangements: Rights Theory has said "The paper takes from this only the structure, adjudicating no particular state's refugee arrangement" (Rights Theory Paper 0, §V), and this paper follows it; the form of a secession procedure, which belongs to specific theories of institutions; to which class a birth registration obtained by fraud belongs, which is registered as a remainder; whether the commentator's speech can be an offense, which this paper does not judge; the NUT's refusal to hand her over, which is written in Paper 5, §2; conscription and those who refuse to bear arms, which are written in Paper 4 (N23a); the movement of troops into the base, which is read in Paper 4, §1; those in service who leave their posts, of whom this paper writes only that they are not within N13; UCSE Case 26, first judged in Paper 6, §4, with the nine and the two who stayed in Paper 6, §5, which this paper only registers as a remainder; how stateless persons outside this state's interior are to be caught, which this paper does not write.
Those who stay, and those who cannot exit, face the state's last force; how it still lies under a confirmation it does not monopolize and under questioning after the fact: Paper 4 writes it.
The Six Propositions of This Paper
N12 Membership is not the interior. The interior is drawn by entanglement: those whom this state's acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting are, as regards those acts, in this state's interior, whether or not they hold this state's membership (Theory of Government G25 extended to the national level; extension; own undertaking). Membership is drawn by the state's recognition; it is the principal bearer of the meta-recognition position at the national level, not its only realization (extension; own undertaking). The guarantees are addressed to internal subjects (Theory of Government Paper 3); membership is a different layer: being in the interior does not on that account confer membership; without membership, the five oughts still apply each on its own conditions and are not reduced for want of a position.
N13 Individual exit is not sealed off by the state. Exit is a condition of law's existence, not something law gives (Law Series P3 §6). The road of renouncing membership must be really usable: the state may register it, and may set conditions for settling public accounts already incurred; artificial exit cost is a remainder the state itself produces, which it must explain, and it may not cancel exit on its own by pricing or by approval (Theory of Government G39); the state does not maintain itself by sealing off exit. Departure is not restricted in war either: in a defensive war, the state does not restrict the departure of those of call-up age, and to restrict it is to treat persons as a means; suspending declarations of renunciation by age is, recognized by function, the same thing. Once a person has left the country, he is not prosecuted for "refusing the call-up," whenever the call-up order was served: to tether a person by penalty is, recognized by function, to restrict departure. Where charges for "refusing the call-up" were brought before departure, the case is heard as usual, but the person is not detained or banned from leaving on that account, nor is the case aggravated by departure; while that case is pending, renunciation is processed as usual. A person who has reported for service and is in service and who leaves his post is not covered by this proposition: that is the layer of the accountability of a position, handled through the courts; an application to refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience can be made at any time (Paper 4, N23a); departure itself is not made an additional offense.
N14 No expulsion, and no creating statelessness. The first part, no expulsion: the state does not use exclusion by judgment as punishment or elimination, and this does not turn on whether the person holds another citizenship. Membership is tied to voting, and to deprive someone of it is to cancel a questioner; for the party questioned to cancel the questioner is to judge its own case; so no administrative position has the power to deprive anyone of membership; for his conduct, state organs may prosecute, and a court rules according to law. Membership acquired by birth cannot be expelled; where membership was acquired by naturalization or by some other application (including acquisition by a stateless person on the road of the second part), and there was fraud in the acquisition, a court rules that the acquisition did not validly take place; this is the acquisition itself not having validly taken place, not expulsion, and it does not extend to conduct after acquisition (own undertaking). The second part, not refusing those who have nowhere to go: this state does not refuse to take in those born in its territory who hold no citizenship of any state. There are two grounds: reach under the fifth ought does not vary with relational thickness; this state provides conditions for cultivation according to relational thickness, and membership is the principal but not the only entrance to the meta-recognition position (extension; own undertaking). Two things kept apart: the immediate one is reach under the fifth ought, which does not wait for membership; the long-term one is that, beyond the immediate channel, this series further undertakes a really usable road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership, not replaced by an "undetermined" that has no time limit (own undertaking). How far it extends: immediate reach under the fifth ought is not reduced in any band; for the long-term road, the conditions are explained by the actual relation, and identity itself does not stand in for relational thickness. Those whom this state has actually received, and who have no citizenship to return to because another state has deprived them of it, must likewise have a road with a time limit, its length and conditions explained item by item according to how far this state actually organizes their lives, and not as a matter of course lengthened or made more demanding because they came from abroad; for those still abroad who enter the interior only through some act of this state, this state owes no road to naturalization, only what follows the unified sentence. Where a ruling that an acquisition did not validly take place leaves a person stateless, this state, under the second part, again gives a road with a time limit; fraud in the earlier acquisition may be counted among the conditions of this road, but does not make it a road without a time limit. In none of the three is membership acquired as a matter of course (N12).
N15 Those at the door are in the interior. Of those who come to the border, those whom this state's refusal of entry, return or detention reaches and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are, as regards these acts, in this state's interior, following the unified sentence (the Prequel, §8; Theory of Government G25 extended to the border; extension; own undertaking).
N16 Secession: a procedure is established, and the procedure does not claim to be complete. Group exit must have a really usable public procedure: secession is another division of members, and under the cut are those in the exiting unit who do not agree, the side that remains, third parties and shared arrangements (F6 §2 extended to secession; extension; own undertaking); for the procedure's authority, triggering, forming of decisions and function for resolving deadlock, only functions are established, not forms; the supreme rule's silence on exit does not mean that it is for one side to say. Being really usable requires at least that initiation not be decided unilaterally by the national level; the thresholds and steps may be high, but under actual conditions they must have a possibility of being carried through, and must be publicly explained; once the procedure has run its course, a reasonable interval may be set, which is a limited effect of closing the case and may not become a permanent veto. Neither side is final on its own: there is no unilateral veto by the national level, nor does one side, by a unilateral declaration, finally dispose of all common matters; a common procedure does not mean that every party concerned holds a permanent power of consent; the procedure must have a function for resolving deadlock, which no party's permanent non-cooperation can block, and unsettled matters do not keep exit from taking effect indefinitely. The procedure does not claim to be complete, and states the remainder it leaves, in at least four places: a claim the procedure has not caught does not lose its qualification to be questioned because it is "not in accordance with the procedure," and the procedure itself is open to questioning and can be amended; running the procedure to its end does not settle all the accounts (Conflict Treatise §2 extended to secession; extension; own undertaking); the thresholds and steps are themselves under questioning; the exiting unit and its scope are themselves a division. Stating the remainder does not require listing everything unknown, nor does it cancel the procedure's limited effect of closing the case. F6, Appendix B, Article 6(c), "federal consent required," is not taken (own undertaking).
N17 Registering the remainder of division. Every division of membership, whether acquisition, renunciation, revocation, intake or secession, leaves its own shortfall: shortfall of intake, misplacement, dual belonging, exclusion by judgment; it is registered as a remainder, and it is not declared that the division has no shortfall (F6 §2; Institution Theory Z35). The shortfall does not reside in certain persons; registration carries no charge, and whether harm or line-crossing is constituted is checked separately; neither redrawing the object domain nor running a procedure to its end writes off the account.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). Compulsion (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413056
Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112
Qin, H. (2026). Levels (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413192
Qin, H. (2026). Emergency (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413413
Qin, H. (2026). Questioning and Bearing (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511
Qin, H. (2026). What an Institution Is Not (SAE Institution Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269330
Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Guarding the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270766
Qin, H. (2026). Conditions (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270922
Qin, H. (2026). Between One Another (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271072
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662
Qin, H. (2026). On How Rights Presuppose No Duty (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21285136
Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595
Qin, H. (2026). On the Dissolution of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 7) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20685290
Qin, H. (2026). One's Law Meets One's Law: The Structural Origin of Law from 14DD Showdown (SAE Law Series, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19548237
Qin, H. (2026). National Law — Azeroth: A Negative Thought Experiment on the Structural Necessity of Law (SAE Law Series, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19548596
Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628
Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617
II · External works (public-domain originals, tier A)
Locke, J. Second Treatise of Government (1690 text, transcribed from C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett, 1980). Project Gutenberg, EBook #7370. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370
III · External works (secondary sources underlying tier C)
Buchwalter, A. (2013). Hegel, Human Rights, and Political Membership. Hegel Bulletin 34(1), 98–119. https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2013.4
IV · External works (cited at second hand)
Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace. (original not in hand; ch. 9 per the summary in Buchwalter 2013; tier C)
Interfaces
- Main upstream: Theory of Government (Paper 4, G25; Paper 6, G36, G36a, G39, G40; Paper 2, G12; Paper 3, G17, G23 and §5, "Who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State"); Institution Theory (Z4, Z9, Z12, Z19, Z25a, Z28, Z34, Z35, Z35a, Z38; the Prequel, §7, the entry "Relational thickness"); Rights Theory Paper 0, §V; Rights Theory P5 F21 and §III (F21 elaboration); Law Series P3 §6; F6 §2, §2.1, Note (elimination), §2.1, Premise V, and §7, fourth open question; Conflict Treatise §2.
- Also used: Law Series P1 BL4; Power Theory P7 §IX.3; War Treatise §13; Theory of Government G28, G30; F6, Appendix B, Articles 6(c) and 31(c) (a working demonstration; used only as an example).
- Interfacing: Locke (Second Treatise, ch. VIII, §121 and §122, tier A); Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism, ch. 9, tier C). Pointing back: Hirschman (exit, Theory of Government Paper 6, §6).
- This series: takes up the Prequel, §8 (the unified sentence; conventions; SF7 of the table of strong forms is answered here); takes up Paper 1, §5 (exit can only be lateral), §3 (clause 2 of the unity clause), and N3, N4; Paper 2, §6 ("not yet ripe") is pointed back to in §6; Paper 4, §1 takes up the movement of troops into the base, §2 (the three things of UCSE Case 24), and N23 and N23a take up those who stay in wartime; Paper 4, §7 (N23a) takes up the application of those in service to refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience; Paper 5, §§1–2 take up the Protocol and the NUT's refusal to hand her over, §5 (the three things of UCSE Case 21), §6 (the same reading of detention); Paper 6, §1 (who determines the cannot-not of opening and widening a war), §4 (the three things of UCSE Case 26) and §5 (the nine and the two who stayed); Paper 7, N36 and N37 take up the channel under which "the last exit" lies, and N39 (where the account for revoking citizenship is booked).
- Handed to Paper 4: those who stay, and those who cannot exit, face the state's last force.