A Way Out, a Way Forward
离得开,有的选
Several running debates in contemporary political economy have stalled, although every side's arguments carry weight: whether being subject to a master who never interferes still counts as domination; whether extreme wealth should be capped; whether money in politics answers to liberty or to equality; when non-compete clauses may be used; whether platforms should be broken up; whether relief should carry conditions. They stall in two ways. Some stall on "better for whom," and the criterion moves with the standpoint; others stall between two principles. This paper takes the grounds this series has already laid and tries them at these deadlocks, reading both kinds of stalling by structure. What is compared is not who said a thing first, but whether a judgment can be given where things have stalled; where none can be given, the paper says so; where it judges differently from others only because of one of this series' undertakings, it states the undertaking and its cost. Structurally there are two hinges: a way out, being able to leave, is exit in the Base Layer; a way forward, having a choice, is the fork in the Emergence Layer; both are needed, and the ground is that a human being is an end. The normative layer lays down only direction and floor; the lines the rule layer must draw are left to the rule layer. Read from there: a person's own affairs are decided neither by another person nor by a construct; to decide a person's own affairs for him when he can decide them himself is, from a person, the relation of master, and from a construct, a construct's act crossing the line, and the word "master" is not extended to constructs; the normative layer admits that it has a remainder, situations this proposition does not reach are handed to the rule layer, and guardianship is one of them; the remainder yields no permission, and the normative layer's three requirements on such rules (a ground of their own, a scope drawn by the institution, openness to questioning) are necessary but not sufficient. Checks are set beforehand and questioning examines afterward, whatever the intent and whatever the size; no overall cap is set on wealth as such: an institution does not aim at reducing accumulation, the total of wealth is not a state an institution is to sign off as achieved, and what is looked at is how wealth is used. The largest difference from limitarianism lies in which layer equality falls on: this series recognizes equality only in the Base Layer; the Emergence Layer does not seek equality and is not leveled. Those who review do not depend in substance on those they review; how widely "the party reviewed" is drawn depends on how large its power-face is and how bad the actual situation is. A non-compete clause that forbids a direction is allowed no exception; an extra payment beyond what a person already has, which he can actually afford to refuse, is not judged a violation at the normative layer. Whether to break up platforms this paper does not decide; it lays down only four things that any rule must meet, one of them set as a proposition; breakup is the rule layer's last resort. Whether relief carries conditions: whether it can be given without them depends on actual fiscal and administrative capacity, and thickness alone cannot decide it; where conditions are attached, the institution is not judged wrong for the mere fact of having attached them, and whether people were held up is examined by actual effect; meeting the conditions is taken in the wide sense, and caring for family and work in the community should count. The several places that overlap with contemporary literature are registered as they are in §9, with no claim to novelty. The paper has six propositions (E40 to E44, with E41a), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
The records of the Kingdom State contain three sentences.
The first is the Crossways Group's answer to its sellers: "Rates are set by the market. A seller who is not satisfied can choose not to sell here." The second is written into Article 14 of the labor contract of Bluekiln Porcelain Works: "Where an advance has not been repaid, leaving employment requires the company's consent." The third comes from the Qiao Foundation's New Bluekiln Program: the program gives participants three years of living allowance, and the program document says that participants, from the day the living allowance is first drawn, "may not work for any other porcelain enterprise for three years." Whether this term still holds for someone who withdraws partway, the program document does not say.
All three sentences speak of leaving, and of where one goes after leaving. The first says one may go; the second says going needs someone's nod; the third says that once the money is taken, there is a kind of place one may not go. The first eight papers of this series have each read them in their own place: whether sellers can get away was read under chokepoints and checks (Paper 2, E7; Paper 3); locking in departure with advances was read under Gate One (Paper 4, E21); the Foundation's term was read at the boundary between the two layers of support (Paper 6, E35, E37).
Arrangements of the same structure each have, in the real world, a debate going on about them. Should a platform that is both the market and a seller in the market be broken up; should non-compete clauses be banned, and how far; should relief after unemployment be conditional on looking for work; should money in politics be limited, and how; should wealth past a certain level be capped; does a person who is free to resign thereby stand free of domination. These debates are all lively, and all have places where they have stalled: every side's arguments carry weight, and no one persuades anyone.
This paper takes the grounds this series has already laid and tries them at these deadlocks. What is compared is not who said a thing first, but whether a judgment can be given where things have stalled. Where one can be given, it is written into the sections; where the paper judges differently from others only because of one of this series' undertakings, it states that this is an undertaking and what it costs, and does not write it as though the other side had nothing to answer; where the trial yields nothing, it says so; where contemporary literature said a thing long ago, it is registered as an overlap, with no claim to novelty (§9).
Let me state this paper's claim first. These debates stall in two ways. Some stall on "better for whom": with "better" as the criterion, the conclusion moves with "for whom," and every side makes sense; the non-compete debate is like this, and so is the effects-minded camp in the platform debate. Others stall between two principles: the benevolent master, extreme wealth, money in politics, the conditions of relief; each side has its own ground. This series reads both kinds by structure: for the first, it changes the criterion, asking not about benefits and harms but about structure; for the second, it does not pick between the two principles, but looks first at structure. Structurally there are two hinges. Whether one can leave is exit in the Base Layer; whether one has a choice is the fork in the Emergence Layer. The title is these two phrases: a way out, a way forward.
The paper proceeds in nine steps. §1 says what this series judges, and separates it item by item from what the contemporary schools judge. §2 gives the method: structure, not benefits and harms; the two hinges; the normative layer gives direction and floor, and the lines the rule layer must draw are left to the rule layer. §3 to §8 enter the six deadlocks one by one: the benevolent master (§3), extreme wealth (§4), money in politics (§5), non-compete clauses (§6), whether to break up platforms (§7), whether relief carries conditions (§8). §9 registers the overlaps.
The reading follows the Prequel: constructs are spoken of with ought, positions with accountability, persons with their own law; the division into normative layer, rule layer and judgment layer also follows the Prequel. Of the contemporary literature cited, whatever is in quotation marks has been verified against the original, with the edition and page given in parentheses; what rests only on an abstract or on secondary material is paraphrased, not quoted. Real-world statutes and bodies serve only to give the background of a debate; this paper's examples are all ones this series has set, and new situations begin with "Suppose that."
§1 What This Series Judges
When a debate stalls, it is often not because one side has miscalculated, but because the two sides are not judging the same thing. First, let us set out what each of several contemporary schools judges.
Republicanism judges a situation: whether one stands under another's power of interference. Pettit puts it this way in a recent manuscript: on the republican understanding, a person is free "to the extent that they can exercise their basic liberties without being subject to another’s power of interference: without being dominated by them" (Pettit, "Employment without Domination," author's manuscript, p. 1). What is looked at is the power, not whether it has been used.
Limitarianism judges holdings. The first reason Robeyns gives for limitarianism is that extreme wealth undermines political equality: "Thus, we have a first pro tanto argument for why we should not be superrich—because it undermines political equality." (Robeyns 2019, p. 256) What is looked at is how much.
In antitrust, one camp judges concentration and gatekeeping. Lina Khan says of these platform firms: "By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity." (Khan 2019, p. 973) Another camp judges effects. Speaking of platforms favoring their own goods, Katz says: "Given the varying effects of self-preferencing, a blanket prohibition is unwarranted." (Katz 2025, abstract)
The line of work on the structural power of business judges dependence. Culpepper proposes understanding structural power as "a set of mutual dependencies between holders of capital and the administratively superordinate authority – most often, but not always, a state" (Culpepper 2015, p. 398). Braun sees the form of this power changing: "Macroeconomic developments and financial innovations have reduced financial actors’ exit options, thus diminishing exit-based structural power." (Braun 2022, abstract) With equity concentrating in the hands of large asset managers, control-based power is rising (paraphrased from the same abstract).
The debate over whom a company should be run for judges purpose. That debate is handed to the theory of the corporation; this paper does not enter it.
What this series judges is something else: the decision position that can mobilize accumulation (Paper 1, E2); whom it actually converges, and down to which dimension, where what shows a power-face is exercise, not holding (Paper 1, E3); how close it is to a chokepoint, and whether others can get around it (Paper 2, E7); whether it has passed through the two gates, converting accumulation into domination over people's Base Layer or into control over questioning (Paper 4, E21, E22); and whether the arrangements that check it can themselves be questioned (Paper 3, E16).
So where republicanism looks at the power, this series looks at whether that power has already been set into other people's road, for instance whether a person's going or staying needs its nod; an idle power not set into anyone's road is examined by exercise (§3). It does not judge how much is held, but where accumulation is put to use (§4); it does not judge concentration as such, but whether others can get around it and whether the power to shut the door is monopolized (§7); it does not judge effects in general, but whether people can still leave and still have a choice (§2); it does not judge the name of a purpose, but operations (Paper 5, E27).
Some schools cut close to the way this series cuts. Ciepley holds that the corporation is neither purely public nor purely private, and should be placed in a category of its own (paraphrased from the abstract of Ciepley 2013). This series does not cut by public and private either; it cuts by source: the granted and the accumulated (the Prequel, §5; Paper 3, E15). The mutual dependence Culpepper speaks of was read in this series under the exit of the strong: where structural dependence is present, exit shows a power-face (Paper 3, E20). The control-based power Braun sees, held by asset managers with large holdings, is close to this series' reading that nominal holding and mobilizing are separate (Paper 1, E2). These places are registered in §9.
That the things judged differ does not show that others have judged wrongly. The power republicanism asks about and the holdings limitarianism asks about are both real questions; this paper asks only whether, when the thing judged is changed, the places that have stalled can be loosened.
§2 Method: Structure, Not Benefits and Harms
First, let us look at where deadlocks often stall.
A non-compete clause: whom does it benefit? For the company that sets it, it protects an investment; for some employees, it is said, it makes the employer willing to pay higher wages and to teach more of the craft; for other employees, it blocks a better place to go; for the next company that wants to open, it blocks people. Relief with or without conditions: whom does it benefit? To those who pay taxes, conditions seem fair; for those who receive relief, conditions may force a person into an unsuitable job, and may also give a person a push. With "better" as the criterion, every side is telling the truth, yet the conclusion moves with "for whom." In the end, what is argued over is often whose side one stands on. This is one kind of stalling this paper tests; not every argument from effects is like this: the two sides may also have real disagreements about long-run consequences and causal evidence. A structural criterion will also meet factual disagreements, and has this series' own normative starting point; this does not prevent it from being used steadily, only it cannot be said that disagreement vanishes of itself once structure comes into view.
This is not to say that benefits and harms do not matter. At the rule layer they must be reckoned item by item: where a check changes a configuration, its effect, cost and the alternatives available are to be stated as they are (Paper 3, E17). The normative layer asks something else: what this arrangement does to people in its structure.
Other debates do not stall on benefits and harms, but between two principles: republicanism and its opponents, political equality and feasibility, liberty and equality, reciprocity and the freedom to say no (§3, §4, §5, §8). There too this series does not pick between the two principles; it looks first at structure: whether an arrangement leaves people their leaving and their fork, and whether checks and questioning are present.
Structurally, this paper looks only at two hinges.
The first is whether one can leave: a way out. This is exit in the Base Layer: whether the structural channel for leaving, refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure is still in the person's own hands (Paper 4, E21). That a relation has terms, conditions, procedures or exit costs does not mean that exit has been sealed off; sealing off means that the person no longer holds this structural channel (ibid.). Exit must be passable in terms of livelihood, not merely exist on paper (Paper 2, E12, E13).
The second is whether one has a choice: a way forward. After leaving there are places to choose among; how many there are is a matter for the Emergence Layer. The right to choose is guarded in Fork Rights: Fork Rights says that a person has the right to choose; whether to choose or not, and why not, is his own affair; only where this choice is gone is there violation (Paper 2, E12a). That the direction of choosing is not sealed off from outside has basic weight (ibid.); so taking this choice away is not one good fewer in the Emergence Layer; it is violation.
Both are needed, and the ground is that a human being is an end. A human being is an end, so an institution has no standing to seal off a person's leaving (Paper 4, E21). If it does not secure his Base Layer, or does not give him room in the Emergence Layer, the institution has no reason to require him to stay: without the Base Layer secured, a person cannot live; without room in the Emergence Layer, a person cannot pursue his own happiness; happiness is the subject's own cannot-not (Paper 6, E35), and an institution can give conditions but cannot decide for a person what that happiness is. Where either is missing, people will tend to leave it, and have reason to leave it. So an institution that keeps people by restricting their leaving is not in the direction of the Kingdom of Ends; this paper judges arrangements of this kind precisely by this direction. The Kingdom of Ends here is a direction: "The Kingdom of Ends is a direction; it is not an ought, nor a state to be signed off as achieved." (Institution Theory Z39)
The two hinges are not two unrelated matters. Where the Base Layer is guarded well, people dare to leave and dare to try, and the room in the Emergence Layer is large; where the Emergence Layer develops well and the economy is active, it can in turn hold up the Base Layer. The two layers holding each other up is the reasonable state in this direction. This sentence is written as a direction, not as a guarantee: it can fall back, and falling back is recognized by what has happened (written the same way as Paper 6, E32). Paper 6 has already said that neither layer can be missing: "without the Emergence Layer, people have no choice; without the Base Layer, talk of having a choice is empty." (Paper 6, E36) This paper sets these two layers down as two hinges, and uses them to read an arrangement.
Why does this criterion not move with "for whom"? Because what it asks is not how much benefit an arrangement brings to whom, but whether the arrangement leaves people those two things. A non-compete clause, however much benefit it brings to whomever, takes away the person's choice after leaving; an unemployment benefit that designates no direction, however unfair anyone finds it, does not take away that choice. The criterion falls on structure, and does not move with which side each party stands on. The empirical inputs the reading needs may still be disputed: whether exit is passable in terms of livelihood, whether refusing a payment amounts to being unable to live, what counts as what a person already has, all must be examined item by item, at the judgment layer.
There is one more layer. The normative layer gives only direction and floor, and does not draw in principle the line the rule layer must draw: terms, amounts, breadth. The several places this paper uses have the same shape:
| Direction (normative layer) | Line (rule layer) |
|---|---|
| The closer to a chokepoint, the stronger the checks and questioning, and the more likely the use of means such as breakup | Whether to break up, and how |
| The larger the power-face of the party reviewed and the worse the actual situation, the more widely "the party reviewed" is drawn | How wide |
| The thicker the Base Layer is held up, the more conditions can be dispensed with | Whether to attach conditions, which, and how far |
The floor does not move with these calibrations: a person who can decide for himself does not have his own affairs decided by another (§3); the choice at the moment of the fork is not taken away; refusing a condition that designates a direction does not bring a loss into the Base Layer; those who check are themselves questioned (Paper 3, E16).
This is a balance, not a ratio (Paper 6, §4). It is not that the thinner the holding up, the more may be required; nor that the closer to a chokepoint, the more certainly breakup must follow. The direction says which way to adjust; where the line is drawn is handed to the rule layer, and the individual case to the judgment layer.
Many contemporary deadlocks stall on the line: how long a non-compete term counts as reasonable, where the cap on donations is set, how far the conditions of relief go. A principle that tried to draw this line itself would have to answer "why here and not there," and in principle this question cannot be answered to the end. This series lays down in principle only direction and floor, so it is not caught by this question. Conversely, this also means that where a debate was about the line in the first place, this series hands it to the rule layer, and that does not count as a judgment it has given. Handing to the rule layer is not handing off and being done with it either: how the rule layer draws is still constrained by these floors and this direction.
E40 A way out, a way forward (own undertaking). In reading an arrangement, the normative layer first asks two things: whether there is a way out, and whether there is a way forward. A way out is exit in the Base Layer: the structural channel for leaving, refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure is still in the person's own hands (Paper 4, E21; Paper 2, E13). A way forward is the fork in the Emergence Layer: after leaving there are places to choose among, and how many there are is a matter for the Emergence Layer; the right to choose, and the direction of choosing not being sealed off from outside, carry basic weight (Paper 2, E12a). Both are needed, and the ground is that a human being is an end: an institution has no standing to seal off a person's leaving; an institution that does not secure his Base Layer, or does not give him room in the Emergence Layer, has no reason to require him to stay. An institution that keeps people by restricting their leaving is not in the direction of the Kingdom of Ends: "The Kingdom of Ends is a direction; it is not an ought, nor a state to be signed off as achieved." (Institution Theory Z39) The two layers holding each other up is the reasonable state in this direction; it is written as a direction, not as a guarantee, and it can fall back (written the same way as Paper 6, E32). The criterion does not move with "better for whom"; the empirical inputs a reading needs are examined at the judgment layer. The normative layer lays down only the direction and floor of these two things, and does not draw in principle the line the rule layer must draw (terms, amounts, breadth): the line lies at the rule layer, the individual case at the judgment layer.
§3 The Benevolent Master
Article 14 of Bluekiln Porcelain Works' labor contract has been used on the veteran kiln worker: he had four months of advances not yet repaid, and the company did not consent to his leaving (Paper 2, §7). Suppose that another company has exactly the same article in its contract, but has never refused anyone: whoever asks to leave, advances repaid or not, gets a nod.
Must this article still be questioned?
Contemporary republicanism says it must, and the reason is the sentence quoted in §1: freedom lies in not being subject to another's power of interference, and what is looked at is the power, not whether it has been used. There is a familiar example in this tradition, the benevolent master: a master who never interferes is still a master, and those under him are still unfree. The opposing side says: if he never interferes, where is the harm? A power never used has landed on no one. Both sides carry weight. The first grasps something real: where one can go only on another's nod, a person will first watch that other's face. The second also grasps something real: if every "power" counts, an employee who can resign has a superior, a civil servant has a superior too, and nearly every relation falls in. To this second point republicanism has its own answer: power that is controlled and not arbitrary is not domination; the "pushback" Pettit asks for below is one kind of such control.
This series stands with republicanism on one point: what the opposing side cares about is the words "never interferes"; what this series looks at is structure, and it does not wait for interference (own undertaking). They part in two respects. One lies in how a line-crossing structure is recognized, and is separated out below. The other lies in the word "master": it speaks of one person over another. This series' reading is that constructs are spoken of with ought, positions with accountability, persons with their own law (the Prequel); a construct is not a subject, has no law of its own, and is no one's master. Article 14, written into a company's contract, is a construct's act; this section reads it as a construct's act, and the word "master" is not extended to constructs.
First, look at what Article 14 does. Whether a person is to leave this company is his own affair. This article puts that affair in the company's hands, in the hands of a construct: as the article is written, a sum of money in the company's hands is converted into a decision over whether he leaves (Paper 4, §1). It is not that he cannot decide for himself in this matter; it is that this article decides for him.
This is not mere holding. Rights Theory says that where the position-holder, by a position, sets a path and others' action-space is thereby converged, the position shows a power-face (Rights Theory P4 F15); setting a path is also a kind of exercise, and need not wait for enforcement; where no enforcement is seen, it is read neither as converged nor as not converged, and the actual effect is examined separately (Paper 5, E26). In Article 14 this examination does yield a result: the road of leaving must pass through the company's consent; one must ask and wait for its nod; nodding, too, is enforcing this article. This convergence lies not in the moment it refuses, but in the road "requires consent" itself; whether it refuses or never refuses, a person who wants to go must take this road; never refusing does not make it read as not converging (Paper 5, E26). This is exactly what separates it from a position that is ordinarily not visible: Crossways Pay settles for sellers, and on ordinary days this power does not show; it showed only in the three days when settlement was delayed (Paper 1, §6). As for whether exit has already been sealed off, that must be examined together with Paper 2: taking Article 14 alone, there is still a road of repaying the money (Paper 2, §7; Paper 2, E12).
So a company that never refuses changes only how it has used this position so far, not what the position is. A construct deciding for a person who can decide for himself his own affairs is a construct's act crossing the line: the first ought of Institution Theory is that a construct's acts cross no line against any internal subject, and "it does not vary with relational thickness and is not discounted under any condition." (Institution Theory Z9) The position within the company that invokes this article is examined by accountability; the person who invokes it, as Paper 1 says, does not have his responsibility on independent grounds obscured by the construct's name (Paper 1, E2). What this act runs into is Gate One: money, housing or the manner of paying wages is not to be used to lock up people's leaving, refusing and revoking (Paper 4, E21). Suppose that this company also says: "We never stop anyone; the advances are to help everyone get by." The sentence may be true, and getting by may really have helped people. But an arrangement that decides for people whether they leave, dressed up as helping them and giving them conditions, is exactly colonization in the narrow sense this series takes: "Colonization is a boundary-crossing act disguised as cultivation" (Rights Theory P6 F26). Constructs can cross the line in this way too; when Institution Theory holds to anti-colonization toward internal subjects, it is speaking precisely of constructs.
Now look at a structure that appears similar. Southwindow Care Homes renovated the rooms in nine homes and set up two new dementia care units (Paper 5). Suppose that there the care workers decide for the elderly residents: what time to get up, how to take medicine, whether one may go out alone at night. These too are the residents' own affairs, and they too are being decided by others. Is this also crossing the line? What follows speaks only of structure, and does not answer for Southwindow's actual case.
Not necessarily, if it is guardianship. That a person's own affairs are not decided by others is said of a person who can decide for himself; in those matters where he cannot decide for himself, the antecedent of this proposition is absent. The normative layer admits that it has a remainder: situations this proposition does not reach are handed to the rule layer to set rules, and guardianship is one of them; these rules do not permit crossing the line: where a person can decide his own affairs for himself, no rule decides them for him. The normative layer requires three things of these rules; the three are necessary, and having them is not enough; the care worker is in a position, and is read by accountability.
First, a ground. A care worker may decide these matters for an elderly resident on the ground that the resident is unable to decide them for himself, temporarily or over the long term. This is where guardianship comes from; without this source, deciding a person's own affairs for him has no ground. The source must be recognized item by item: suppose that it has been determined separately that a certain resident cannot decide for himself in these few matters; only then is it read as guardianship; living in a dementia care unit does not, by the name itself, give this conclusion. Whether the "cannot" is still there must be open to being determined again, and the determination can also be questioned.
Second, a scope. The scope of guardianship is just as far as this "cannot" reaches, and no wider; it is drawn by the institution, not by Southwindow itself. Suppose that the State Health Agency's regulations, the law of guardianship and the statutory terms of care contracts have drawn it; Southwindow can act only within this scope, and in the matters where a resident can still decide for himself, he decides.
Third, openness to questioning. Decisions within this scope can be questioned: suppose that family members can complain, and the State Health Agency will come to inspect. In the records, the inspection of Year 23 found that falls had increased, and two homes were warned for exceeding response times on night calls (Paper 5). Complaints and inspections are among the materials of questioning; they do not by themselves prove that the scope can already be effectively corrected.
A term is one form of scope, not a necessary condition. The care of elderly people with dementia often has no term, and does not end because a certain day has arrived; guardianship without a term likewise needs checks before the fact, supervision in ordinary times, and questioning afterward.
It may be said that the problem lies not in scope but in substitute decision itself. The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in its General Comment No. 1, holds that "perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity must not be used as justification for denying legal capacity"; that States parties are to abolish substitute decision-making regimes and develop the various forms of supported decision-making; and that where, after significant efforts, it is not practicable to determine a person's will and preferences, the best interpretation of will and preferences is to replace "best interests" determinations (CRPD/C/GC/1, paras. 13, 21, 26–28). Determining "cannot" matter by matter and then deciding for him on that basis is exactly the approach it rejects (para. 15). There is a real disagreement here. This series permits at the normative layer that, in those matters where a person truly cannot decide for himself, others handle them on his behalf, because the antecedent of this proposition is absent; the Committee does not agree. This is this series' undertaking (own undertaking). How handling on his behalf is to be done is a matter for the rule layer; this paper gives only one suggestion: read by his own law, and set down in rules, the nearest wording is the best interpretation of his will and preferences, not what others take to be "good for him"; deciding for him by what others take to be good easily becomes a boundary-crossing dressed up as cultivation (Rights Theory P6 F26); holding off third parties' line-crossing against him is guarding him, not deciding for him; where his will truly cannot be made out, his Base Layer is guarded, and no direction is set for him in the Emergence Layer. The first half of this suggestion runs in the same direction as the Committee's paragraph 21; the disagreement lies only in whether the normative layer permits handling on his behalf. This suggestion sometimes has to bear costs, and sometimes cannot give an answer; how it is done in detail is left to the rule layer. The United Kingdom's Mental Capacity Act 2005 is another way of writing it at the rule layer: a person is first presumed to have capacity (section 1(2)); only when all practicable help has been tried without success is he treated as unable to make a particular decision (section 1(3)); a decision made for him must be in his best interests (section 1(5)), and one must first ask whether there is a less restrictive way (section 1(6)). At best interests it differs from the Committee; it is used here only for comparison, not as evidence that this disagreement has been resolved.
In this way, several things can be separated. A person's own affairs, such as leaving, refusing, where to go, dissolving a standing bond, are decided neither by another person nor by a construct; which affairs are his own is derived from his own law, not drawn by an outside position (Rights Theory P5 F21). To decide a person's own affairs for him when he can decide them himself is, from one person over another, the relation of master, and the benevolent master of republicanism lies here; from a construct, it is a construct's act crossing the line. The affairs he shares with others, such as how work is arranged, are decided by a superior matter by matter; the scope of the authority is drawn by the institution, and can be questioned through channels such as complaints and labor arbitration; whether the line is crossed is examined by exercise and actual convergence (Paper 1, E3). Situations this proposition does not reach are handed to the rule layer, and guardianship is one of them. Terms and notice do not decide for him, and are read under Paper 4, E21; cooling-off periods and the like are read under Paper 2, E12a: none of them stands by way of an exception.
There is a place here that is easy to slide past. Suppose that a state's law wrote out the scope of a clause like Article 14, and allowed complaints as well; would it thereby become a legitimate position? No. Leaving is his own affair, and in this matter he can decide for himself; however clearly the scope is drawn, it is still not he who decides on leaving. The level of institution that permits it, draws its scope and enforces it is itself acting in permitting it, and is likewise examined under Institution Theory Z9: as Paper 2 said, "A company's writing a non-compete clause into an employment contract is its act as a construct; a state's permitting it, and its courts' enforcing it, are likewise acts of that level of institution." (Paper 2, §8) So permission does not change the reading; whether it is lawful lies at the rule layer, and what the normative layer must judge is precisely that law (§4). The same holds for non-compete clauses: when a state sets their term and territory, what they decide for a person is still where he goes after leaving (Paper 2, E12a). The criterion "who draws the scope" governs situations this proposition does not reach and authority in shared affairs; in a person's own affairs, what is asked first is whether he can decide for himself.
Republicanism separates legitimate authority by "controlled, not arbitrary"; this series separates first by "is it his own affair," and then looks at who draws the scope and whether it can be questioned. In many places the two ways of separating land on the same reading; they part in two places: an authority that is very well controlled, if it governs a person's own affairs where he can decide them for himself, is still read by this series as crossing the line; where it comes from a construct, this series reads it as a construct's act, and does not call it a master.
Contemporary literature comes very close to this series here; let us first write that out as it is.
That exit is not enough to escape domination, several have said. González-Ricoy sums up what his paper has shown: "First, it has shown that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets." (González-Ricoy 2014, p. 253) Bryan says he will explain what it is to have reasonable alternatives in the labor market, and shows that holding such options is not enough: "I clarify what it is to have reasonable alternatives in the labor market but show that holding such options is insufficient to avoid structural domination." (Bryan 2023, p. 692) Breen says: "However, it is a mistake to think the right of exit an adequate protection against arbitrary interference" (Breen 2015, author's accepted manuscript, p. 12). Pettit says: "The right to enter or refuse employment, and particularly the right to leave or remain in employment, can help to guard against managerial domination only in a limited degree." (Pettit, author's manuscript, p. 1) This series agrees on this point: a way out is only one of the two hinges, not all (§2); that exit exists on paper does not mean it is passable in terms of livelihood either (Paper 2, E12). This point is registered as an overlap (§9).
Where they part is in where to go once exit is not enough.
González-Ricoy's paper also shows: "Second, it has shown that comprehensive workplace regulation is neither possible nor desirable." (González-Ricoy 2014, p. 253) Exit is not enough, and regulation cannot be complete; from this he moves to workplace democracy. The weight of this inference lies in this: an employment contract truly cannot write out every future circumstance, and management must always keep discretion. This series does not need comprehensive regulation, because at the normative layer it does not draw every line to begin with: the normative layer lays down only direction and floor, and what it requires is these few things: a person's own affairs are not decided by others, the scope of legitimate authority is drawn by the institution, decisions can be questioned, and exit is real in its structure; how the lines are drawn is handed to the rule layer (§2). Workplace democracy is one form the rule layer can choose; so are trade unions, labor arbitration and statutory complaint channels; how authority is divided inside a company is handed to the theory of the corporation. So this series does not oppose workplace democracy, nor does it derive it from the normative layer.
What Pettit wants is a legally backed arrangement under which employees can have "the sort of pushback against their owners and/or managers that the citizens of a decent republic would enjoy against their rulers" (Pettit, author's manuscript, p. 1). This is very close to this series' questioning: whether those acted on by an economic position have actual control over its relevant decisions is examined by three questions: who can activate it, what actual efficacy it has, and how the party questioned cannot cancel it on its own (Paper 3, E16). Beyond pushback, this series asks for one more thing: where a person can decide his own affairs for himself, others are not allowed to decide them for him in the first place; for legitimate authority, the scope is drawn by the institution.
E41 Look first at structure, then at exercise (own undertaking). A person's own affairs (leaving, refusing, where to go, dissolving a standing bond) are decided neither by another person nor by a construct; which affairs are his own is derived from his own law, not drawn by an outside position (Rights Theory P5 F21). To decide a person's own affairs for him when he can decide them himself is, from a person, the relation of master; from a construct, a construct's act crossing the line (Institution Theory Z9), and "master" is not extended to constructs. Requiring consent is itself exercise: everyone who wants to go must ask and wait for its nod, and never refusing does not make it read as not converging (Paper 5, E26); where an institution permits it, the permitting is also an act, likewise examined under Z9, and does not change the reading (Paper 2, §8). It runs into Gate One (Paper 4, E21); what decides a person's direction for him is read as violation (Paper 2, E12a); what is dressed up as cultivation is colonization in the narrow sense (Rights Theory P6 F26). In the affairs he shares with others, such as the arrangement of work, the scope of authority is drawn by the institution and can be questioned, and whether the line is crossed is examined by exercise (Paper 1, E3). This proposition, as a construct, cannot close either; the remainder is always there ("remainder is the part the construct cannot enclose," Methodology 00, §6); the normative layer admits that it has a remainder, and that is why a rule layer is needed (the original speaks of the working of chisel and construct; here it is extended to norms and rules; own undertaking). Situations this proposition does not reach are handed to the rule layer to set rules, and guardianship is one of them. The remainder yields no permission: guardianship can decide for a person because in those matters he cannot decide for himself, and the antecedent of this proposition is absent; where a person can decide his own affairs for himself, no rule decides them for him. What the rule layer sets is also a construct, and the remainder is still there, so it must be open to questioning; the normative layer's requirements on it are: a ground of its own, a scope drawn by the institution and not fixed by the holding party itself, and openness to questioning; the three are necessary, and having them is not enough.
§4 Extreme Wealth
Suppose that the Kingdom State has such a person. His wealth is enough to pay the campaign funds of half the State Legislature, enough to buy several of Apple City's newspapers; but he lives in the mountains, involves himself in no company, and has no intention of doing so.
What is to be done about him?
Robeyns's answer is to set a cap on wealth. Her argument has several strands; the one relevant here is the democratic one. Extreme wealth turns into political influence, and so the rich and the non-rich are no longer equal in politics. She does not deny the institutional means of preventing money from influencing politics; she says that they are necessary, and that they are not enough: "While some of these institutional measures are unquestionably necessary for a healthy democracy, none of the solutions will restore political equality between rich and non-rich citizens." (Robeyns 2019, p. 256) "Imposing formal institutional mechanisms to minimise the impact of money on politics is only to a limited extent feasible." (ibid.) From this she draws the first pro tanto reason for not being superrich (ibid.; quoted in §1). The same argument appears earlier in a chapter of hers from 2017, reprinted in 2023 in a volume she edited (Robeyns 2023 [2017]). Paper 3, paraphrasing her book from an interview, left a question open: whether institutional measures and a cap are, for her, substitutes or parallel (Paper 3, §1). By the original text of this passage, they are parallel: institutional measures are necessary, and the cap is added on top. Her 2024 book Limitarianism (Robeyns 2024) unfolds this argument more fully; this paper has not read it, and rests only on the 2019 article and that chapter.
This line of argument is still unfolding. Timmer points out that within limitarianism there are different views of how to regard resources beyond the limit, "But both views hold that there is an upper limit to how many resources people can permissibly have." (Timmer 2024, p. 851) Neuhäuser sets up another reason: "limitarianism is needed to protect the social basis of self-respect" (Neuhäuser 2023, introduction). Criticism also comes from within egalitarianism. Halldenius examines the wealth threshold, the role of flourishing in the theory, and the power that wealth brings, and concludes: "I find that the arguments offered for limitarianism indeed provide strong reasons for redistribution from the rich, but not to favour limitarianism over alternative redistributive schemes." (Halldenius 2022, p. 780) Her criticism is egalitarian, and does not support this series.
Where does it stall? Both sides grant that extreme wealth turns into political influence, and both grant that institutional measures are necessary; the disagreement is whether, beyond the measures, a cap should also be set on holding itself.
Whether to set a cap is a question for the normative layer. This series' answer is not to set one: an institution does not aim at reducing accumulation; the reason for acting falls on use, not on amount (the Prequel, §4). On accumulation, the two gates this series lays down draw where it cannot be used: it is not converted into domination over people's Base Layer, nor into control over questioning (Paper 4, E21, E22); money does not buy that share of political power which reviews and questions it (Paper 4, E23). What is not set is an overall cap on wealth as such; a quantitative limit on a certain kind of use, such as a cap on donations, is a tool of the rule layer, and states under Paper 3, E17 which item it addresses; a particular use that seals off a road can be contracted (the Prequel, §4; Paper 3, E18).
When wealth grows to a certain size, does it become impossible to check? This series' answer has three layers. First, no position is exempt from checks because it is large: "the direction is 'the larger, the stronger,' not 'the larger, the more exempt.'" (Paper 3, §1) That is a sentence of the normative layer; this series has a further judgment: no position is so large that it cannot be checked (own undertaking). Look at the most concentrated public power. The head of a state's executive holds more power than any private fortune; constitutional government does not let it off for that reason, but defines its powers, with the scope drawn by the constitution and not by the incumbent; lets other positions check it; and, where it cannot be stopped, holds it to account afterward. This analogy says only one thing: size does not buy exemption. It has two edges. Granted powers are enumerated, and what lies outside the enumeration may not be done; the uses of accumulation are open everywhere outside the forbidden zones, and the two gates draw forbidden zones, not powers (the Prequel, §5). What checks the head of the executive is other granted power; a large fortune may precisely buy that power. Second, so when accumulation grows to a certain size, the checks on its use may themselves be bought; Paper 3 does not avoid this side, and what it derives from it is the second gate, making those who check themselves questioned, and the contraction of the particular use that seals off a road (Paper 3, §1), not a cap. Third, what cannot be stopped beforehand is taken up afterward through questioning and holding to account; this speaks of two tasks, and does not guarantee that every loss can be made good afterward.
It may be said that this does not answer Robeyns. The weight of this objection is that the political inequality she worries about mostly does not come from obvious line-crossing, but from what can be done under current law: donations within the limits, running newspapers, funding research and lobbying bodies.
Here one thing must first be put back on the layer where it belongs. Whether something is lawful is a matter for the rule layer; the normative layer does not use it as a criterion, because what the normative layer must judge is precisely the rules and the law themselves (own undertaking). Paper 4 also said: a lawful donation does not prove, by being lawful, that nothing was bought (Paper 4, E23). So these uses are read at the normative layer not by whether they are lawful but by structure. If a donation, a newspaper or a lobbying body has actually bought the road by which it would be reviewed and questioned, it is examined under Paper 4, E22, E23, even if current law permits it, and then what should change is that law; if it has become, on others' roads, a chokepoint that cannot be got around, it enters further review under Paper 2, E7, and its boundaries, checks and securing are examined by actual effect; that a chokepoint exists does not by itself prove that the line has been crossed. If neither, and it is only that one person's voice carries far and another's carries near, that is a difference in the Emergence Layer, and is left open as usual (Paper 4, E24).
Robeyns's criterion is political equality; "institutional measures cannot do it" is her premise for adding a cap. Here one can put a question to her (own undertaking): the cap is itself an institution, to be set by legislation and upheld by enforcement that are just as open to the influence of wealth; if institutional measures cannot hold wealth in check, why should a cap be able to? How she would respond, the passage this paper has read does not take up, and this paper does not answer for her. The same question can be put to this series: the two gates too must be set by legislation open to the influence of wealth. This series' answer is that it does not sign off on itself by the restoration of some state: "The Kingdom of Ends is a direction; it is not an ought, nor a state to be signed off as achieved." (Institution Theory Z39) Its criterion is structure that can be examined item by item: whether a use has bought the road of questioning, whether it has become a chokepoint, whether those who check are themselves questioned; where one place fails, that place is questioned and held to account. Where the two sides part is not in whose tool is sure to hold, but in what is used as the criterion.
Why not list a cap on holdings as one more preventive tool? This series' answer is in the Prequel, §4: an institution does not aim at reducing accumulation; the reason for acting falls on use, not on amount. Nor is the total of wealth a state an institution is to sign off as achieved (Institution Theory Z39; the original speaks of the Kingdom of Ends; here it is extended to the total of wealth; own undertaking). However much a person's wealth grows, it does not become a problem because of the growth itself; for instance, if he always uses it for charity or for running schools. This is only an example, not a claim that uses of this kind are free of problems as a class; how it is actually used is still examined against the two gates and the chokepoints, and the several libraries of §5 are examined here. What is looked at is how it is used, not how much, and no one reads what the user has in mind (own undertaking). Where the two gates are in place, money cannot buy that share of power which reviews and questions it, nor domination over people's Base Layer (Paper 4, E21, E22, E23). This is this series' undertaking, and its cost is written as it is: responses aimed at use may come a step late.
In this way the disagreement can be stated more precisely. When this series speaks of equality and justice, it speaks first of oneself: a person goes by his own law. One's Own Law: The SAE Critique of Ethics and Morality (hereafter A16) says: "When a subject is aligned with their own law, that is moral; when they deviate, that is immoral. This law is valid only for oneself and cannot be extrapolated"; and also that "morality is not about relations between people." (A16 §I) The original speaks of morality; here it is extended to the starting point for speaking of equality and justice (own undertaking); requirements between persons are not derived from it. Between persons, this series does not set up a separate ideal of equality; it lays down only lines: no crossing of the boundary, openness to questioning (Paper 4, E21, E22; Paper 2, E12a); the Base Layer held up alike for everyone (Paper 6, E35). With the Base Layer held up, people have more room to care about equality and justice outside themselves (own undertaking).
If one insists on speaking of equality between persons, this series does not hold that there is absolute equality: that everyone's political influence should be the same cannot be done. Where people trust a certain philosopher's judgment more, that philosopher's influence on public affairs is somewhat larger; where people trust a certain rich person's judgment more, his influence is somewhat larger too. This trust is given by others, and money cannot buy it: "Money can buy badges and records; it cannot buy reputation" (Paper 4, E24; Paper 1, E4). How much influence one has is a difference in the Emergence Layer (Paper 1, E4). For the influence that reputation brings, there is even less of a cap to set: one can hardly rule that a person may be trusted by at most so many people. So how much influence there is, in itself, is not something the normative layer is to measure, whether it comes from reputation or from money (own undertaking). What money can buy is distribution: column space, advertising, attention. Those who sell it sell it willingly, and whether those who hear believe it is still for them to judge; so bought distribution is in itself an exchange in the Emergence Layer, left open as usual (Paper 4, E24). If it buys the road of questioning, or takes all the channels of distribution into its hands and becomes a chokepoint others cannot get around, it is examined against the two gates and the chokepoints (Paper 2, E7; Paper 3, E18); if it actually erodes the share the Base Layer secures, such as the qualification to vote, it is no longer a difference in the Emergence Layer. What this series looks at is structure: whether this influence has checks, supervision and questioning.
Equality this series recognizes only in the Base Layer: the Base Layer does not rise or fall with assets, is not exchanged for achievement, and is held up alike for everyone (Paper 6, E35); the qualification to vote is also in the Base Layer, is to be secured, and does not change with standing in the Emergence Layer (Paper 0, §3). The largest difference from Robeyns lies in which layer equality falls on. She uses the requirement of political equality to set a cap on wealth in the Emergence Layer. This series recognizes equality only in the Base Layer; the Emergence Layer does not seek equality and is not leveled. What this series supports is the conditions for differences to grow in the Emergence Layer (Paper 6): people grow in different directions by their own law, and the differences that grow out are precisely emergence, with how much influence one has among them (own undertaking). The disagreement can be stated precisely from here: Robeyns holds that the part which has not crossed the lines above still undermines political equality; this series does not treat that part as a question for the normative layer. She would not accept this division, and this paper writes it as it is. How she handles uses within the cap, the passage this paper has read does not take up specifically, and this paper does not answer for her.
This reading has two close neighbors, written out first as they are. Walzer's complex equality allows inequalities within each sphere; what it guards against is one good being distributed to someone merely on the strength of another, such as money buying what it should not buy (Walzer 1983, paraphrased from Arneson 1990); this is nearly the same form as the two gates: it asks not how much is accumulated, but what it is converted into. Dworkin distinguishes a person's impact as a voter from his influence in persuading others (Dworkin 2000, p. 191, paraphrased from Rosenkrantz), keeping the two apart, and on this point he is close to the above; in his chapter on campaign finance he also holds that the rich are not to be allowed to overwhelm others by their wealth (Dworkin 2000, p. 358, paraphrased from Foley 2001), and on this point he stands on Robeyns's side. Both places are registered in §9.
Robeyns's argument has another strand that does not rest on power: some people's urgent needs go unmet, and surplus wealth could have met them. This series takes up this strand through the securing of the Base Layer: the Base Layer does not rise or fall with assets, is not exchanged for achievement, and is to be secured (Paper 6, E35); where the money comes from, the rule layer has taxes. Taking up this strand does not need a cap either.
Back to the person in the mountains. He does not need a cap. What he needs is the same as anyone who holds accumulation: checks beforehand, limiting how his wealth can be used, even if he does not intend to use it that way; disclosure and records for the uses by which his wealth reaches toward others, private consumption not among them; and questioning when there is an action that needs questioning. That he does not intend to act does not withdraw the checks beforehand; nor does his goodwill vouch that his wealth is used warrantably (Paper 5, E26; the original speaks of whether something actually becomes cultivation, which is not vouched for by goodwill; here it is extended to whether a use is warranted; own undertaking). "Whatever the size" means not exempt for being small, and not exempt for being large; the strength of checks goes with the power-face (Paper 3, E14). This is the same reasoning as in §3: what is to be looked at is not only whether he uses it, but what structure his wealth falls into.
One more division of labor must be written clearly here, which the first eight papers did not state outright. Before and after are two tasks that cannot replace each other, not two time slots that do not overlap; supervision in the course of things and inquiry beforehand are not excluded. Beforehand, checks are set according to the range a position could reach once it is exercised, without waiting for it to act (own undertaking); scale and power-face affect the form and strength of checks, and do not decide from what moment the line must be kept and questioning faced (Paper 3, E14). Afterward, which exercise counts as an act of power, and which matter questioning pursues, is examined by exercise and actual convergence (Paper 1, E3). In the person in the mountains, the half that comes beforehand is already there; the half that comes afterward waits until he has an action that needs questioning.
E42 Checks beforehand, questioning afterward, whatever the intent, whatever the size (own undertaking). Checks beforehand and questioning afterward are two tasks that cannot replace each other, and do not exclude supervision in the course of things or inquiry beforehand. Checks are not set only once a position acts: they are set in advance according to the range this position could reach once it is exercised, and scale and power-face affect their form and strength (Paper 3, E14); which exercise counts as an act of power, and which matter questioning pursues, is examined afterward by exercise and actual convergence (Paper 1, E3). Intent buys no exemption: not intending to act does not withdraw the checks beforehand; nor does goodwill vouch that a use is warranted (Paper 5, E26; the original speaks of whether something becomes cultivation; here it is extended to use; own undertaking). "the direction is 'the larger, the stronger,' not 'the larger, the more exempt.'" (Paper 3, §1): no position is exempt from checks because it is large, and none because it is small. When accumulation grows to a certain size, the checks themselves may be bought; what this danger yields is the second gate, those who check being questioned, and the contraction of the particular use that seals off a road (Paper 3, §1), not a cap; what cannot be stopped beforehand is taken up afterward through questioning and holding to account, and this is a task, not a guarantee. On accumulation, the two gates draw where it cannot be used (Paper 4, E21, E22), not how much there is; no overall cap is set on wealth as such, and reduction is not the aim; a quantitative limit on a certain kind of use is a tool of the rule layer, and states under Paper 3, E17 which item it addresses (the Prequel, §4; Paper 3, E17, E18). The total of wealth is not a state an institution is to sign off as achieved (Institution Theory Z39; the original speaks of the Kingdom of Ends; here it is extended to the total of wealth; own undertaking). How to monitor, how to disclose and how to hold to account lie at the rule layer; disclosure governs the uses that reach toward others, and does not extend to private consumption.
§5 Money in Politics
Paper 4 told of an event in the State Legislature. The draft Online Marketplaces Act lay before the Economic Committee of the State Legislature of the Kingdom State, which has fifteen members; from Year 23 to Year 24, the Crossways Group and its executives gave campaign donations to nine of them, all within the limits of the Campaign Finance Act; the Qiao Foundation donated and built libraries for schools in the districts of four committee members. In the autumn of Year 24, the committee, by eight votes to seven, struck out the clause requesting the initiation of a breakup. That winter, the division head who had led the competition review of Crossways left office, and four months later became a vice president of the Crossways Group. Paper 4's reading is: money does not buy that share of political power which reviews and questions it, and decisions made in a position are not cashed in, either, as wealth later obtained; what must be examined is whether the road by which it would be questioned has been bought, and the judgment lies in structure and sequence (Paper 4, E23). The records point only that far: whether the nine who received donations and the eight who voted in favor are the same people, and whether there were promises beforehand, is not recorded (Paper 4, §3).
Carried into contemporary debate, this event belongs to an old debate. Dawood, in a review, puts it like this: "the classic scholarly debate that animates campaign finance law is whether liberty or equality is the touchstone value that ought to guide the law" (Dawood 2024, author's manuscript, pp. 4–5).
One side takes liberty as the touchstone. Smith holds that limits on campaign contributions should be abolished altogether (paraphrased from the publisher's description of Smith 2001); Dawood paraphrases one layer of his reasoning: limits may shift political power into a smaller circle of elites (Dawood 2024, author's manuscript, p. 7, paraphrasing Smith 1996). The other side takes equality as the touchstone. Christiano distinguishes four mechanisms by which money influences the political system: money in exchange for (decision-makers') votes, money as gatekeeper, money as a means of influencing the opinions of the public and of legislators, and money as independent political power (paraphrased from the abstract of Christiano 2012). Birch states her premise outright: "My argument against private political donations assumes political equality to be fundamental to democracy." (Birch 2022, p. 493)
Two touchstones, each giving its own verdict. By liberty, a donation is expression, and limiting it is limiting speech; by equality, a donation carries the inequality of wealth into politics, and limiting it is guarding equality. It stalls on which touchstone to choose.
There is also a line that goes around both touchstones and argues from dependence. Lessig says that the way we raise money for elections creates a dependence that conflicts with the dependence the Constitution intended; "That conflict is a corruption." (Lessig 2014, p. 5) He says outright that this "dependence corruption" is distinct from equality (Lessig 2014, p. 12). Before him, Thompson had already read as institutional corruption a kind of conduct that under certain conditions belongs to a legislator's legitimate duties, such as fundraising (paraphrased from the publisher's description of Thompson 1995).
This series does not choose between the two touchstones, and also takes the road of dependence (own undertaking). It has two things: the one that comes afterward is already in Paper 4, where particular donations and employments are examined one by one by structure and sequence (Paper 4, E23); this section supplies the one that comes beforehand.
The one beforehand is a criterion about a relation: those who review do not depend in substance on those they review. A position that reviews an economic position, makes rules for it, adjudicates it or questions it does not depend in substance on the party reviewed for its income, its term, its promotion or its later prospects. Said from the side of those who review, this proposition steps from this series into the territory of the theory of government: the reviewer's position is granted, and how it keeps from falling into such dependence is properly the use of granted power (own undertaking). The two sides need not be cut apart in the first place; Paper 4 said that the two places point to each other (Paper 4, §3). Standing on the reviewer's side, what is judged is still structure: capture is judged by structure, and relations such as nomination or membership of the same party do not automatically prove capture (Theory of Government G38, as cited in Paper 4, E23). Seen from the side of accumulation, the same criterion says: the party reviewed does not use its accumulation to create such dependence.
The ground is the independence of Institution Theory: the channel of questioning must be "independent of the party questioned," and independence is functional, regardless of the name of the body or where it is set (Institution Theory Z34; Paper 4, E22). The original speaks of the independence of an institution's own channels of questioning; here it is extended to the level of public power: between the positions of legislating, adjudicating and reviewing, and the economic positions they review (own undertaking).
"Dependence" must be stated precisely. What is meant here is dependence formed through payments from the party reviewed: campaign funds, income in office, posts after leaving office; money spent on the reviewer's reelection without passing through his hands, if it actually sustains his term, is also examined by actual dependence. A state's tax base and employment resting on local capital is another kind of dependence, a structural one, read under Paper 3, E20, and is not within this proposition. Whether dependence is substantial is a matter of function: whether the payment can be withdrawn at any time, whether the reviewer has alternative support, whether his term and later career rest on it. A payment does not mean that capture has occurred.
This criterion has three advantages.
First, it needs neither political equality nor freedom of speech as a premise. It does not ask whether money should speak; it asks only whether those who review lean on those they review. Lessig has already taken this step (above); where this series parts from him is in scope and in the meaning of independence: this proposition governs only review relations formed through payments from the party reviewed, and independence is taken in the functional sense (below).
Second, the restriction falls on a relation, not on an amount, nor on who gives the money. A small donation within the limits, on which the reviewer does not lean, is not within it; a large fund within the limits, on which the reviewer's reelection rests, is within it. Paper 4 said: a lawful donation does not prove, by being lawful, that nothing was bought, and a donation does not by that fact prove that something has been bought (Paper 4, E23). This criterion likewise judges not from whether there are donations, but from dependence.
Third, it can sort the four mechanisms Christiano distinguishes into different places in this series. The table below is this paper's mapping, not Christiano's own division; he says in the abstract that the four mechanisms correspond roughly to four stages of the democratic process, and then discusses corruption, inefficiency, the distortion of deliberation and political inequality together; this paper does not write them as one-to-one correspondences.
| Mechanism (per the abstract) | Place in this series |
|---|---|
| Money in exchange for (decision-makers') votes | Where it concerns review of oneself, adjudication or correction, it belongs to Paper 4, E23; buying access or other decisions is examined separately by the position and effect involved (chokepoints under Paper 2, E7) |
| Money as gatekeeper (in the abstract, corresponding to the setting of the decision agenda) | The agenda is an entrance to public decision that cannot be got around, and is read as a chokepoint; the original speaks of chokepoints on people's way to sustaining their lives and unfolding their own paths; here it is extended to the agenda of public decision (Paper 2, E7; own undertaking). Money occupying the position that sets the agenda is read as control over the channels of questioning only when the roads of questioning it actually closes are written out one by one (Paper 4, E22); buying exposure or influencing the agenda is not in itself control |
| Money as a means of influencing the opinions of the public and of legislators | Exchange in the Emergence Layer, left open as usual; not running into the two gates does not mean that all the other norms have been passed (Paper 4, E24); monopolizing the channels of questioning belongs to Paper 3, E18 and Paper 4, E22 |
| Money as independent political power | In one of its forms: the power-face that shows under structural dependence (Paper 3, E20) |
A close neighbor must be written out here as it is. Birch opposes private election funding on two grounds: it risks creating political inequality among citizens, and "it threatens the judgmental autonomy of elected representatives and those who would seek election to representative bodies" (Birch 2022, p. 493). She says that the standard of assessment should be "the potential impact such behavior could have on the legislative process and the opportunity to skew judgmental autonomy, by analogy with the institutional approach to vote-buying" (ibid., p. 497); she goes on to point out that an attempt to buy votes is usually illegal even if it changes no vote and involves no exchange, and prosecutors need not prove that voters were actually influenced (ibid., pp. 497–498, paraphrased). Her second ground is very close to the criterion here: neither side waits for an actual purchase; both look at structure. This point is registered as an overlap (§9).
Where they part is in the way out of the problem. Birch's conclusion is that "the only legitimate role of money in elections is through systems of public funding (possibly distributed via vouchers) and flat party membership/supporter fees" (ibid., p. 503). This series does not ban private donations at the normative layer. The normative floor is only that those who review do not depend in substance on those they review, with particular donations and employments examined one by one afterward; donations that form no dependence remain, as usual, in the Emergence Layer (Paper 4, E24). Taking private funding out of elections altogether is a choice the rule layer can make in certain circumstances; it is not in itself a general rule of the normative layer.
How widely "the party reviewed" is drawn is where this criterion must be calibrated. Read narrowly, only the party specifically under review counts: for the members reviewing the Online Marketplaces Act, the party reviewed is Crossways, at which the Act is aimed. Read widely, every economic position bound by the laws these people make counts as a party reviewed. The breadth depends on two things. One is how large the power-face of the party reviewed is: whom it converges, how deeply and how widely, not its assets (Paper 3, E14); the power-face is a structural quantity that can be examined, not an abstract possibility; the larger it is, the more widely the line is drawn, without waiting for a conversion to occur. The other is how bad the actual situation is: how common conversion actually is, whether the independent channels of questioning work, whether there is a specific, examinable risk, such as a newly concentrated funding relation that can be withdrawn at any time; the worse it is, the more widely the line is drawn. Conversely, in both cases, the narrower (the second row of the table in §2). An abstract "may be converted" does not by itself widen it: Paper 4 said that exchange in the Emergence Layer is not sealed off on the ground that it "may be converted" (Paper 4, E24). Widening is a precaution of the rule layer, falling on the reviewer's side, and does not judge any particular exchange improper: "risk can make rules need prevention, but does not serve as a final verdict that capture has already occurred" (Paper 3, E16); that dependence is present does not mean that capture has occurred either.
In the real world one state bans corporate donations altogether. That is one choice of the rule layer; to support a general ban of this kind within this paper's framework, one must also state the scope of application, the reasons for the precaution and its costs, and cannot infer back from the existence of the ban that every donation already constitutes substantial dependence. Research on that ban also reminds us that each choice of the rule layer has its gains and losses. Cagé and colleagues studied campaigns after France banned corporate donations in 1995: after the ban, candidates put less emphasis on local presence and economic issues (paraphrased from the abstract of the 2022 working paper); on average, campaign discourse was not pushed to the left or the right, "but it does push candidates from niche parties to use more extreme rhetoric in their campaigning" (Cagé, Le Pennec & Mougin, 2022 working paper, p. 38); campaign messages became "more national and more extreme but also better-aligned with candidates’ party platforms" (ibid., p. 37); in legislative activity after election, no similar effect was found (ibid., conclusion). This is evidence from one state, and is not extended to other institutions; what it shows is only that the wide reading has costs and also gains, and the choice lies at the rule layer.
The same criterion also looks forward in time. The division head's employment after leaving office falls under "later prospects": if a person who has reviewed a company can expect later to obtain a post from that company, his judgment in his present office faces an examinable entanglement of interest (Paper 4, §3); this is a risk, not a deal that has already taken place. The checks beforehand are arrangements such as cooling-off periods and recusal; what they limit is where a person goes after leaving office, and, as Paper 4 said, they stand on the same reasoning as constraints set to protect others, and whether they hold is examined by structure: it must be possible to say which exercise is limited, whom it protects, why lesser limits cannot protect them, and how wide the scope is (Paper 4, §3; Paper 2, E12a). How long cooling-off periods are, and which posts they cover, lies at the rule layer.
E43 Those who review do not depend in substance on those they review (own undertaking). A position that reviews an economic position, makes rules for it, adjudicates it or questions it does not depend in substance on the party reviewed for its income, its term, its promotion or its later prospects; this is a check beforehand. Said from the reviewer's side, this proposition is extended into the territory of the theory of government: the reviewer's position is granted; capture is judged by structure, and relations such as nomination or membership of the same party do not automatically prove capture (Theory of Government G38, as cited in Paper 4, E23; the two places point to each other; own undertaking); said from the side of accumulation, the party reviewed does not use its accumulation to create such dependence. Dependence means dependence formed through payments from the party reviewed, including spending that does not pass through the reviewer's hands but actually sustains his term; whether it is substantial depends on whether the payment can be withdrawn at any time, whether the reviewer has alternative support, and whether his term and later career rest on it; that dependence is present does not mean that capture has occurred; a state's structural dependence on capital is read under Paper 3, E20. Independence is examined as "independent of the party questioned," in the functional sense (Institution Theory Z34; Paper 4, E22); the original speaks of the independence of an institution's own channels of questioning; here it is extended to reviewers at the level of public power and the economic positions they review (own undertaking). Particular donations and employments are examined afterward, one by one, by structure and sequence (Paper 4, E23). The restriction falls on the relation, not on the amount or on who gives the money; neither political equality nor freedom of speech is taken as the touchstone. How widely "the party reviewed" is drawn depends on two things: how large the power-face of the party reviewed is (Paper 3, E14; a structural quantity that can be examined, not an abstract possibility), and how bad the actual situation is (how common conversion actually is, whether the independent channels of questioning work, whether there is a specific, examinable risk); the larger and the worse, the more widely it is drawn, without waiting for a conversion to occur; conversely, the narrower; an abstract "may be converted" does not by itself widen it (Paper 4, E24). Widening is a precaution of the rule layer, falling on the reviewer's side, and does not judge any particular exchange improper: "risk can make rules need prevention, but does not serve as a final verdict that capture has already occurred" (Paper 3, E16). How wide, and how caps, publicity, recusal and cooling-off periods are set, lies at the rule layer; the individual case lies at the judgment layer.
§6 Non-Compete Clauses
Article 19 of Bluekiln Porcelain Works' labor contract was read on its own in Paper 2: for two years after leaving, the employee may not engage in porcelain-making, or work for a porcelain enterprise, anywhere in the Kingdom State, and violation incurs payment of twelve months' wages. In the spring of Year 23, Elmseed Capital's long-term partnership put up the money and negotiated terms with the company for the veteran kiln worker: six months' wages paid as liquidated damages, and the company waived in writing the application of this article to him; only then did he get out; two colleagues had no such backing, and stayed with the company (Paper 2, §7, §8). Paper 2's reading is: a non-compete agreement violates Fork Rights, and with compensation it is the same; a conditional payment is read differently (Paper 2, E12a).
This section looks at how the contemporary debate stalls, and where this reading falls.
First, the background. In 2024 the United States Federal Trade Commission issued a rule banning non-compete clauses almost entirely; in August of the same year a federal district court set it aside before it took effect; in September 2025 the Commission withdrew its appeal and accepted the setting aside; in February 2026 the rule was removed from the Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Trade Commission 2024; Federal Register 91: 6507, 2026). The rule is gone; the debate goes on.
In the philosophical literature there has been an exchange. Frye says of the argument that non-competes harm employees because they restrict exit: "it neglects the economist Thomas Schelling's insight that limiting exit options can be beneficial for a person" (Frye 2020, p. 229). His conclusion is: "For those who weigh heavily the interests of employees, the question is not whether NCCs, but when." (ibid.) Ween takes this up, summarizing Frye's claim as being that non-competes can serve employees by "acting as a clear, costly signal" (Ween 2026, p. 505), then points out their various negative effects, and says: "Because of these negative effects, I extend Frye's account to argue that NCCs should be used only as targeted interventions under exceptional conditions, if they are used at all." (ibid.)
Empirical research is filling in the question "when." Cowgill and colleagues, in a field experiment, sent out about fourteen thousand job offers, randomly removing or keeping the non-compete clause; paraphrased from the abstract of their working paper: once non-compete clauses were removed, people's mobility to competing employers increased and workers' total earnings increased; no evidence was found of trade secrets leaking; no evidence was found that workers chose jobs with the clause for higher pay; and many workers learned that their contract had such a clause only after leaving, when the employer got in touch (paraphrased from the abstract of the Cowgill, Freiberg & Starr 2026 working paper). The antitrust line, for its part, looks at non-competes within buyer power in labor markets (Naidu, Posner & Weyl 2018).
Where it stalls, Frye has said himself: not whether, but when. Frye and Ween both judge on "when is it more beneficial"; Ween narrows "when" very far, and is also doubtful about using them at all; empirical research adds evidence on "when." With "more beneficial" as the criterion, the reading moves with "for whom," and with the facts of each market.
This series' criterion does not lie there (§2). It asks only one thing: at the moment of the fork, does the person still have a choice?
By this question, a non-compete clause, that is, a clause backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement that forbids a person, after leaving, to go in a certain direction, takes away his choice after leaving; with compensation it is the same: compensation changes the cost, and does not change the fact that the choice is taken away (Paper 2, E12a). Having signed is the same too: the criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness (Rights Theory P5 §III). The finding of Cowgill and colleagues is useful here: many people learn of the clause they signed only after leaving; a consent unknown even to the person himself is even less able to hold up the claim that "he chose it himself." This series' reading does not look at consent in the first place; this sentence only answers the other side's premise. This series' suggestion to the rule layer is that, in principle, no opening is made to permit non-compete clauses (Paper 2, E12a). So the difference from Ween lies not in strictness. The bit of room Ween leaves looks at whether it is beneficial under exceptional conditions; this series leaves no exception for forbidding a direction, because its reading does not look at whether it is beneficial.
But this series does not thereby reject the real thing Frye has grasped. Schelling's insight is right: a person's limiting his own options is sometimes good for him; for a commitment to be credible, it often must carry a cost. What this series separates is who does the limiting, and by what means. A person may choose for himself not to compete, in exchange for an extra payment. A backing that only stops a payment differs in form from continuing to forbid; whether it is really extra, and whether refusing it can actually be borne, must also be examined together; only when all three are met is it read as a conditional payment: the normative layer does not judge it a strict violation, and the rule layer may permit it or not (Paper 2, E12a). Part of the credible commitment Frye wants can be made this way; there is no guarantee that every transaction's function is equivalent or can still be done, and the cost of what cannot be done is borne as it is (below). Using prohibition and compulsory enforcement to decide for a person where he goes after leaving: for this, no opening is made.
There is a boundary here that must be stated precisely. "Pay X if you compete" and "get X more if you do not compete" can be exactly the same in their incentives on paper: between going and not going, the difference is X either way. But in structure they are entirely different. "Pay X if you compete" lays the penalty on something he already has; it uses what is already his to block his direction; "soft" describes only its form; it goes back to the side of prohibition, and is read as violation under Paper 2, E12a. "Get X more if you do not compete" puts the money outside what he already has; not taking it takes nothing he already has away from him: this is the first condition of being optional (own undertaking). Paper 2 laid down three criteria for conditional payments, and this is precisely the second of them: is what is tied to "not going" an extra payment, or wages already earned, deferred pay, money already paid and then clawed back; if the latter, "the choice is false, and it goes back to the side of prohibition" (Paper 2, §8; Paper 2, E12a).
How to tell whether something is already his or extra is, in its details, a matter for the rule layer. This series gives only a suggestion (own undertaking), and the order is to examine entitlement independently first, and compare consequences second. First look at what has been earned: what is due for work done, and what has had its conditions met, is already his, such as equity that has vested; this step is not decided by the agreement under examination itself. Then take leaving itself as the comparison: setting this agreement aside, what would leaving alone lose? That is used to recognize what consequences this agreement adds. Where something already established is clawed back or forfeited, it is examined as what is already his, and goes back to the side of prohibition; a payment that is truly new, not yet acquired, and actually affordable to refuse is still examined under the three criteria of Paper 2, E12a together, and is not taken as removing what is already his merely because "if you compete you get somewhat less." If an agreement on leaving itself already takes away what has been earned, that is another matter, examined under Gate One (Paper 4, E21). What cannot be told apart is handed to the rule layer and the judgment layer.
Two objections may be raised against this distinction. The first is that the prohibition is paternalistic: a worker without means might prefer to pledge future liquidated damages in exchange for a job with training; banning "pay X" also takes away the commitment he was willing to make; and switching to extra payments requires the employer to pay an additional sum, so some transactions that would have benefited workers will not be made. The second concerns the baseline: an employer could first lower wages by X, then rename this X "an extra payment for not competing," and so the boundary between what is already his and what is extra is changed by a label. Both objections carry weight. To the first, this series bears a cost as it is: some transactions will not be made. Its answer is that the criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness (Rights Theory P5 §III): a person may pledge what is his, but cannot pledge where he goes after leaving. This is this series' undertaking (Paper 2, E12a), and it is precisely on this point that Frye's side disagrees. Debates of this kind have well-known texts: Mill, discussing selling oneself into slavery, says "It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom." (Mill 1859, chapter V); Radin treats what is inalienable in the market (Radin 1987). To the second, what is already his is recognized by what has been earned, not by label: lowering wages already agreed by a portion and renaming that portion "an extra payment for not competing" leaves it still his, since it was due to him for the work done; where, combined with other constraints or under deep dependence, refusing a payment amounts to being unable to live, the choice is not recognized as actually present even if the backing is only to stop paying (Paper 2, E12a, third criterion). What cannot be made out is handed to the rule layer and the judgment layer.
For the things non-compete clauses are often used to protect, this series also has tools that do not take away the choice. Formulas and customer information with a legitimate ground for confidentiality are protected by confidentiality; the customers themselves and their choices, and general occupational skills, are not the company's property. The investment in training an apprentice can be arranged through a service term and its threshold of exit (Paper 2, §8). Confidentiality and service terms must also have their actual scope examined; the name of the tool does not prove that it does not limit direction. Where the rights of third parties, or the road by which the public questions, truly must be protected, that is a constraint set to protect others, and is not among non-compete clauses; it must be able to say which exercise it limits, whom it protects, why nothing else will do, and how wide the scope is; the part beyond what protecting others requires is still violation (Paper 2, E12a).
At the rule layer, there are also those who draw the line elsewhere. In 2024 the Delaware Supreme Court extended the "employee choice doctrine" to arrangements beyond limited partnerships: a clause under which a payment is forfeited upon competing is generally not reviewed under the reasonableness standard for restrictive covenants, so long as the employee left voluntarily; ordinary contract defenses remain; whether reasonableness review applies where a clawback is so extreme in duration and financial burden that it eliminates real choice, the case expressly reserved (LKQ Corp. v. Rutledge 2024, discussing Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie 2024). This series' difference from it falls on the criteria of what is already his, the backing, and actual refusability. The United States Federal Trade Commission's 2024 rule counted as a non-compete clause any term that "prohibits a worker from, penalizes a worker for, or functions to prevent a worker from" competing after leaving (16 CFR §910.1; Federal Trade Commission 2024, p. 38342); the rule's explanation gives, as examples of a term that "penalizes" a worker, a clause forfeiting a payment upon competing and severance paid only if the worker refrains from competing (ibid., p. 38364). On the "pay X" kind, it is close to this series; on the "get X more only if you do not compete" kind, it is stricter than this series: for a payment that is truly extra and actually affordable to refuse, this series does not judge it a violation at the normative layer. This rule was later removed (above), and is used here only as a historical comparison. Both places are ways of writing at the rule layer, and are registered in §9.
So this series' place in this debate is: for forbidding a direction, no exception is left; for an extra payment beyond what a person already has, if all three criteria are met, the normative layer does not judge it a violation, and the rule layer may permit it or not. The criterion does not look at whether a thing is beneficial, and this is what separates it from the two authors. For the transactions Frye wants, and for the things non-compete clauses are often used to protect, there are tools that do not take away the choice, with no guarantee that their functions are all equivalent.
This section sets no new proposition. The criterion is already in Paper 2, E12a; here it is only shown how it falls on this contemporary debate, and a suggestion is given to the rule layer on how to tell what is already his from what is extra.
§7 Should Platforms Be Broken Up
The matter of Crossways Market was told in Paper 3. It is both the marketplace and a seller in the marketplace: a statistician in Apple City took a sample and found that, for goods of the same kind with similar prices and ratings, Crossways' own brand appeared on the first page at three times the rate of other sellers; only sellers who ship through Crossways logistics can enter the "Express" section; of the seven members of the Seller Appeals Committee, five are appointed by management. After the Competition Review Division's investigation, its report in the spring of Year 24 recommended separating the marketplace from Crossways' own retail (Paper 4, §3). The Economic Committee of the State Legislature, by eight votes to seven, struck out the clause requesting the initiation of a breakup, and kept the two clauses on publishing ranking rules and on setting up an independent appeals body (ibid.). In Year 25, the board chaired by the third generation of the Qiao family changed the two members of the Appeals Committee elected by Gold Sellers from among themselves to appointment by management (Paper 5).
In the contemporary debate, this is exactly one of the places where things have stalled: should platforms be broken up?
Lina Khan argues for separating platforms from the lines of business in the markets they host, on the ground that these firms structure access to markets and keep the gate for a great deal of economic activity (Khan 2019, p. 973; quoted in §1); she also cites a report commissioned by the European Commission saying that dominant platforms today "function as regulators" (Khan 2019, p. 976, citing Crémer et al. 2019). Katz speaks of the practice of platforms favoring their own goods: since its effects vary, a blanket prohibition is unwarranted (quoted in §1); moreover, "Unfortunately, the common criteria for fairness and merit do not reliably identify the direction of self-preferencing’s competitive effects." (Katz 2025, abstract) What he wants is to look at actual competitive effects case by case. Rahman brings disputes of this kind back to a fundamental question: how law and public policy should operate to prevent "the arbitrary and unaccountable control over basic infrastructure" (Rahman 2018, p. 911). His approach is not to decide first whether to break up: it first identifies infrastructure by scale, necessity and vulnerability, then fits a set of tools among regulation, structural separation of the "firewall" kind and public options, and requires that the regulation of this infrastructure itself be more democratically accountable (Rahman 2018, pp. 911–912, 926–931).
Where does it stall? One side judges structure, the other effects: Khan's ground is itself structural, the platform structuring access to markets while also operating within them; Katz wants actual competitive effects looked at case by case. Set down in rules, it becomes a dispute of legal design over "a uniform rule or a case-by-case standard" (Kaplow 1992), and both sides have their reasons.
Whether to break up, this series does not decide. Whether to break up and how is a matter for the rule layer and the judgment layer; what the normative layer says is that there must be checks and there must be questioning. Checks beforehand, questioning afterward (§4). What this paper can say at this point is four things that any rule must meet, and one leaning it actually has in this debate.
First, how close to a chokepoint. Whether sellers can get around it depends on what is actual, not on whether there is nominally another road (Paper 2, E7). The sentence "A seller who is not satisfied can choose not to sell here" is not false, but the workshop that left was, a year later, left with thirty percent of its turnover; this sentence does not necessarily answer the thing that was asked (Paper 3, Introduction). The closer to a chokepoint, the stronger the checks and questioning; farther off, they are less needed, but not unneeded.
Second, the power to shut the door is not monopolized. No economic position may monopolize the power to shut the door (Paper 3, E18).
Third, decisions to shut the door can be questioned, and the channel of questioning is functionally independent of the party questioned. Whether those acted on have actual control is examined by three questions: who can activate it, what actual efficacy it has, and how the party questioned cannot cancel it on its own (Paper 3, E16); whether the party questioned can, on its own, close off review, cancel necessary effects or retaliate against those who activate it. Relations such as appointment, removal, information and funding are examined by actual control, and no judgment is reached on the source of appointment alone: an appeals committee five of whose members are appointed by management must be examined against the party actually questioned (ibid.).
Fourth, the scope of rule-making is drawn by the institution. When sellers cannot get around it, the platform's rules fall on many people's way of unfolding their own paths: which page one is ranked on, whether one can enter "Express," when accounts are settled. The platform is then making rules for many people; if the scope of its rule-making is fixed and changed entirely by itself, without a scope drawn by the institution, it is making rules for many people without being bound by scope (own undertaking; see E41a at the end of this section). This is how the "function as regulators" Lina Khan cites is read in this series. This series' response to it is not, in the first place, breakup, but two things: the scope of its rule-making is drawn by the institution; the rules it makes can be questioned.
Look back at the matter in the State Legislature by these four things. The striking out of breakup as a tool cannot by itself establish a dereliction; whether to break up lies at the rule layer to begin with. But where removing a tool makes the necessary keeping of the line and facing of questioning actually impossible to achieve, it must still be examined. The two clauses kept, publishing ranking rules and setting up an independent appeals body, are one arrangement at the rule layer of those requirements: the former lets rankings be questioned, the latter makes the channel of questioning functionally independent of the party questioned; that the text exists does not mean the requirements have been met, and whether the two clauses are enough lies at the judgment layer. Whether the eight votes that struck out the clause were bought is examined under Paper 4 (Paper 4, E23; §5, E43). The third generation's changing the two elected members to appointees is the party questioned changing the rules of the channel by which it is questioned. Paper 5 has already said: control arrangements can be changed, but the channel for revising them is not held by the party being revised on its own, and the three conditions of independence, the possibility of initiation, and initiation not being retaliated against must actually be met somewhere (Paper 5, E30).
What the normative layer lays down is these four things; how to bring them about, with which tool, lies at the rule layer and the judgment layer, and the normative layer does not rank the tools. Breakup is one of the means of keeping a position from being final (Paper 3, E18), and at the rule layer it is the last resort (own undertaking): it is used only when means that change the structure less are not enough, or there are sufficient grounds that they cannot achieve these four things; when it is used, it must state which effect of sealing off a road, or of being beyond questioning, it addresses, what it costs, and whether there is an alternative arrangement (Paper 3, E17). It can be a means of making these four things actually hold; it does not presuppose that the four have already been achieved, nor need it first wait for another harm. The closer to a chokepoint, the more likely it is to be used; the farther, the less likely.
Now the leaning. In timing, these four things lean toward before the fact: what they want is that before the door is shut, the power to shut it is not monopolized, someone draws the scope of rule-making, and the rules made can be questioned; in form, they lean toward a kind of regulation: drawing the scope of rule-making and making the rules made open to questioning. This is somewhat farther from the line that looks at effects case by case after the fact, and somewhat closer to the line of regulation before the fact. Narechania and Sitaraman, discussing antitrust for artificial intelligence, argue that ex ante tools of competition regulation are more likely to be effective than ex post antitrust enforcement (paraphrased from the abstract of Narechania & Sitaraman 2024); Rahman's set of tools is also set before harm occurs. This closeness is registered in §9. The leaning does not amount to advocating breakup: regulation before the fact has many forms, and breakup is only the heaviest of them. Nor does the leaning conflict with breakup as the last resort at the rule layer: what leans toward before the fact is these four requirements; breakup is a tool the rule layer uses only when lighter means are not enough. At the rule layer, the closest to this leaning is the European Union's Digital Markets Act: it sets obligations beforehand on platforms designated as gatekeepers, one of which is that a gatekeeper shall not treat its own services and products more favorably in ranking (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Article 6(5)).
It may be said that this amounts to pushing the hard problem onto the rule layer. The weight of this objection is that what the disputants want is precisely an answer of "break up or not." The response is: at this point, this paper says as it is that its trial yields nothing (Introduction). What the normative layer gives the rule layer is not a blank: it tells the rule layer which four things to examine, which way to adjust, and which floors do not move with calibration; whether the rule layer in the end breaks up or not, these things must hold. It has not decided "break up" on the rule layer's behalf; that is its boundary.
In contemporary literature there are also those who treat breakup as a conditional means. Schinkel and van Oosten say: "If there are going to be structural remedies against network companies, we propose they better be 'smart cuts': targeted interventions to insulate core platform functions with minimal damage to positive network effects." (Schinkel & van Oosten 2025, p. 237) Their argument lies in the design of remedies, which is the rule layer's work; it is compatible with this series' reading that "at the rule layer, breakup is the last resort, and must state its effect and cost."
This section does not decide whether to break up; what it sets is the fourth thing:
E41a The rules made by a position that cannot be got around have their scope drawn by the institution (own undertaking). A position others cannot get around (Paper 2, E7) makes rules for many people: how ranking, access, settlement and appeals are handled falls on their way to sustaining their lives or unfolding their own paths. The scope of these rules is drawn by the institution, not fixed and changed by the rule-making party on its own; that the scope is drawn by the institution means on what kinds of matters rules may be made and to what limit, not that every rule must be submitted for approval. The rules made can be questioned, and the channel of questioning is functionally independent of the rule-making position: that position cannot on its own close off review, cancel necessary effects or retaliate against those who activate the channel; relations such as appointment are examined by actual control (Paper 3, E14, E16, E18). This requirement has the same form as E41's requirement on authority in shared affairs: the scope is drawn by the institution and can be questioned; here it is extended, through the chokepoint, to the rules one position makes for many people (own undertaking). The closer to a chokepoint, the stronger this requirement. How it is achieved lies at the rule layer and the judgment layer; at the rule layer, breakup is the last resort: used only when lighter means are not enough, stating its effect, cost and alternatives when used, and not presupposing that this requirement has already been achieved (Paper 3, E17, E18; "last" is an own undertaking). How the scope of rule-making is drawn, and by which level of institution, lies at the rule layer.
§8 Should Relief Carry Conditions
In the spring of Year 25, Bluekiln Porcelain Works shut down two kiln lines and laid off nine hundred people. There were two forms of support (Paper 6). The State Labor Agency's: twelve months of unemployment benefit, a tuition subsidy for any one course of vocational training, a relocation subsidy, and a small start-up loan; applicants are not asked where they will go, nor required to take part in any particular item. The Qiao Foundation's: three years of full living allowance, about ninety percent of former wages; on condition of entering the design park the Foundation has newly built, choosing one of three paths the Foundation has set for training, and not working for any other porcelain enterprise for three years. Paper 6 read these two: the Base Layer must have a footing outside the Foundation, and this footing is on the state's side; the state gave another form of support, though whether it actually held people up, the amounts and individual cases have still not been given in full (Paper 6, §4); the Foundation's conditions may be attached, so far as refusing them does not lose anything of the Base Layer (Paper 6, §4).
The contemporary debate here is another old one: whether relief should carry conditions.
On one side is reciprocity. White's reciprocity is a reciprocity of "fair dues": where the institutions of economic life are sufficiently fair in their opportunities for contribution and its rewards, citizens who claim a share of the social product should make a comparable contribution (paraphrased from the abstract of chapter 3 of White 2003); this duty of contribution he reads as a basic work expectation, adjusted for specific responsibilities of care (paraphrased from the abstract of chapter 5 of the same book). On the other side is unconditionality. Van Parijs and Vanderborght argue for a basic income paid periodically, individually, without a means test and without a work requirement (paraphrased from Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017); the subtitle of Widerquist's book defines freedom as the power to say no (Widerquist 2013). Howard asks: "Is the power to say no among the benefits of a sustainable UBI? My answer is a qualified yes." (Howard 2026, section "Challenges to the exit thesis")
There is also traffic between the two sides. Lister proposes that reciprocity be seen not as a duty but as "a limiting condition on other duties" (Lister 2020, author's final version, p. 3). Neves says: "Thus, we should look at a UBI not as a mechanism that allows us to evade our obligations to our fellow citizens, but as a mechanism that enables and encourages citizens to contribute to their families, friends, and communities." (Neves 2024, p. 129) Molander and Torsvik examine the paternalism that defends conditions, reading welfare conditionality as an arrangement that binds offer and threat together ('throffer paternalism'), and conclude: "We argue that hard but non-perfectionistic paternalism provides the most promising defense for mandatory activation but conclude that it does not give a convincing justification for this type of welfare policy." (Molander & Torsvik 2022, p. 191)
Where does it stall? Both sides argue on principle: one says those who receive relief have a duty to give back, the other says people have the freedom to say no. Principle against principle, each with its own ground.
This series' reading was largely laid down in Paper 6 (Paper 6, E35). Whether to attach conditions is a balance between the two layers, not a ratio: where the Base Layer is held up thickly enough, requirements can be dispensed with, and a person who does not go looking for "work" but goes to do what he likes still has his basic livelihood; that is what a thick Base Layer looks like there; where the holding up is not thick enough, the rule layer may have certain requirements, such as registering as a job seeker, accepting a comparable job, or being in study or in training, with which trade to take up and which thing to learn chosen by the person himself (Paper 6, §4). Thickness does not by itself decide whether conditions can be dispensed with, still less how many are attached: it is not that the thinner the holding up, the more may be required (ibid.). The floor does not move with thickness: the securing of the Base Layer is not conditional on a person's taking a particular road; if what is lost by refusing a condition that designates a direction is something of the Base Layer, that is exchanging the Base Layer for a restriction in the Emergence Layer, and is not allowed (Paper 6, E35). A general condition that asks only whether one is looking, working or learning, and designates none of them, is not of this kind; but where only one road is left at hand, and refusing it means losing all securing, that is already deciding for a person where he goes (Paper 6, §4).
Here this paper makes Paper 6's "may" clear by one more layer (own undertaking). Whether conditions can be dispensed with under the present configuration depends on actual fiscal and administrative capacity and the particular arrangements; the thickness of the Base Layer cannot complete this judgment alone. If the finances can manage without conditions, so much the better; if they cannot and conditions are attached, then if, under these constraints, the conditions really improve securing and do not cross the line, the institution is not judged wrong for the mere fact of having attached them. This is a matter of feasibility, not of ought: the normative layer does not require conditions. The thinner the holding up, the more often conditions cannot be dispensed with: this is an observation of this paper, not set as a law, nor used to support the sentence above. How conditions let a limited share hold up more people is an empirical question for the judgment layer. One account in economics treats work requirements as a screening mechanism for identifying those genuinely in need under a limited budget (Besley & Coate 1992, p. 249). The part of the cost of screening that falls on those still in need is examined by actual effect; those squeezed out must still be held up by the Base Layer; what the rules have not caught is handed to the judgment layer. Whether it can be done is examined by actual fiscal and administrative capacity, not vouched for by a single "it cannot be done" (the same form as Paper 6, E34); where conditions are attached, whether they really let the limited share hold up those who should be held up is also examined by actual effect: squeezing people still in need off the list saves money on the books, and does not count as holding them up. So conditions when the holding up is thin are a concession, not a goal; the direction is still that the thicker the holding up, the more conditions can be dispensed with, and Paper 6's person who does not go looking for "work" but goes to do what he likes and still has his basic livelihood is what this direction looks like. Feasibility and not crossing the line are examined apart (Paper 6, §4): not being able to dispense with conditions does not let the conditions attached cross the line. How much the conditions ask is not decided by thickness, nor does it let the institution choose for a person which road to take.
This reading takes one thing from each side. From the unconditional side it takes: where the holding up is thick enough, requirements can be dispensed with, and the power to say no is what a thick Base Layer looks like there. From the reciprocity side it grants only that conditions may exist; the source of the conditions is different: it is not that those who receive owe someone a return first, but an arrangement made for a feasibility difficulty that has been stated; whether it really eases the difficulty, and whether it crosses the line, are examined separately. The binding together of offer and threat that Molander and Torsvik discuss, this series recognizes by a structural criterion: if what is lost by refusing a condition that designates a direction is something of the Base Layer, that is a threat, and is not allowed; if what is lost is only the extra share, and refusing is actually affordable, that is an option (Paper 6, E35; Paper 2, E12a). So this series does not choose "reciprocity" or "unconditionality" in principle; in principle it lays down only direction and floor.
White's view is relevant here, but its direction must be looked at closely. What he speaks of is a duty of contribution under institutions that are fair enough; what this series speaks of is whether conditions can be dispensed with when the holding up is thin. The "thin" the two sides speak of is not necessarily the same thing: one speaks of whether the background institutions are fair, the other of how much the Base Layer can hold up. White later also holds that those caught in severe structural injustice do not bear the so-called work obligation; the argument that opposes their receiving on grounds of exploitation loses its ground for these people (paraphrased from the abstract of chapter 5 of White 2025). The abstract does not say how eligibility for receiving should be set or determined, and this paper does not arrange it for him. This series' conditions are not a duty of return in the first place, and the kind of work obligation White addresses is not here. This series keeps the normative layer and the rule layer apart: the normative layer gives only direction and suggestion, and how eligibility for receiving is set and determined is left to the rule layer. Its direction is: not to exempt in advance, on the generalization "being in structural injustice" alone, all conditions that can actually be met and do not cross the line; where a condition is entirely out of reach for a class of people, under Paper 6, E34 the condition has not been given, and the rule must change; individual situations the rules cannot catch are the rules' remainder, handed to the judgment layer to be dealt with one by one, and attaching conditions is no reason to stop caring for his Base Layer (own undertaking). That the individual case is handed to the judgment layer does not mean that gaps the rules themselves create are also handed to these people to bear one by one: "what the rules have not covered is raised by persons; what the institution has itself produced is explained by the institution." (Institution Theory Z35) Where the condition itself has already crossed the line, it can no longer be required to be met. The part of structural injustice that is boundary-crossing is corrected separately by this series' lines. This paper rests only on the abstract of his book, and does not supply arguments for him.
What this section must add is another matter: what counts as meeting the conditions.
Paper 6 says that the conditions the rule layer sets on receiving ask whether a person is doing something toward his own way onward: looking, working or learning (Paper 6, §4). Suppose that among the nine hundred laid off, one has a mother with dementia, and he stays in town to care for her; suppose that the state's support provides that after twelve months, continued receipt of the subsidy requires registering as a job seeker or being in study or in training. He is neither looking for work nor studying. Has he met the conditions?
By the existing list, he has not; this list leaves out care that should be recognized. This series' answer is that the rules should count it among the ways of meeting the conditions (own undertaking). The ground has two layers.
First, caring for his mother is a road onward he has chosen himself, a kind of "working"; whether it is paid does not matter. Work in the community is the same. What Paper 6 asks is whether he is doing something toward his own way onward, not whether he has an employment contract.
Second, what he does is exactly the care the Base Layer is meant to do: sustaining the life and dignity of a person with dementia. Conditions are attached when the holding up is thin so that a limited share can hold people up; he holds up a person on this share's behalf, and is doing exactly what it is meant to do. On this point, this case most deserves to count. This layer has a very close neighbor, near in content, apart in ground. Lister, paraphrasing White: where the community bears a responsibility of care, those who take on that responsibility are making a contribution (paraphrased from Lister 2020, author's final version, p. 5, citing White 2003, pp. 111, 170); Lister himself also says that "paid employment is not the only form of productive contribution" (Lister 2020, author's final version, p. 5). Their ground is making a contribution; the ground of this layer is that the conditions are there to hold people up.
These kinds of work, whether caring for family or work in the community, create conditions for others' cultivation. This is a description of this work, not a ground for receiving: conditions are not a return owed by those who receive, and still ask only whether a person is doing something toward his own way onward.
This reading does not look at whether the thing is paid. Contemporary national accounting often does not count unpaid care and housework. Waring points out that national accounts record unpaid labor such as housework as having no economic value (paraphrased at second hand from Waring 1988); Folbre and Wagman estimate unpaid housework in the United States from 1800 to 1860, and point out that counting it changes the picture of economic growth in that period (paraphrased from the abstract of Folbre & Wagman 1993). This series holds that this work should be counted as economic contribution; how the accounting is done is not in this paper. What Neves says about contributing to families, friends and communities connects exactly here.
This reading also has an early neighbor. Atkinson proposed a "participation income," originally a compromise made to win political support: conceding nothing on the two principles of no means test and independence, conceding only on unconditional payment (Atkinson 1996, p. 68). He says outright that participation is "not limited to labour market participation" (ibid.): the qualifying cases include employment or self-employment, absence through sickness or injury, inability to work through disability, being unemployed but available for work, and also approved forms of education or training, caring for young, elderly or disabled dependants, and approved forms of voluntary work; he calls this "a wider definition of social contribution" (ibid., p. 69). Whether care counts, he answered long ago; that sickness, injury and disability qualify in themselves also runs the same way as "conditions ask only of those who can" below. He also grants that conditions of participation bring difficulties of determination that unconditional schemes do not have (ibid., p. 69). The distinction lies in two places. One is the ground: he recognizes these forms on the ground of social contribution; this series does not take contribution as the ground of conditions, and recognizes whether a person is doing something toward his own way onward. The other is approval: he writes "approved" forms; needing some approval does not thereby conflict with this series, but the scope of what can be approved, whether it can actually be done, and whether it can be disputed must all be examined, and nominally having several options left is not taken as qualifying; narrowing down to only one road is still less allowed (Paper 6, §4). This paper's view on feasibility is its own undertaking. This point is registered in §9.
Conditions ask only of those who can: those who are sick, disabled, or for a time unable to do anything are still held up by the Base Layer. How to recognize and examine this lies at the rule layer: how much care was given, how work in the community is recorded, how inability is recognized, how disputes are reviewed. Whether the conditions are actually given is examined by actual effect; that a condition is written widely does not by itself prove that it reaches people (Paper 6, E34).
E44 The ways of meeting conditions are taken in the wide sense (own undertaking). Where the Base Layer is not held up thickly enough, the rule layer may set conditions on receiving (Paper 6, E35). Whether conditions can be dispensed with under the present configuration depends on actual fiscal and administrative capacity and the particular arrangements, and thickness cannot decide it alone; if they can be dispensed with, so much the better; if they cannot and conditions are attached, then if the conditions really improve securing and do not cross the line, the institution is not judged wrong for the mere fact of having attached them: this is a concession of feasibility, not a requirement of the norm; the direction is still that the thicker the holding up, the more conditions can be dispensed with (Paper 6, §4; own undertaking). Whether it can be done is examined against the actual situation, not vouched for by a single "it cannot be done"; where conditions are attached, whether they really let the limited share hold up those who should be held up is also examined by actual effect, and squeezing people still in need off the list does not count as holding them up (Paper 6, E34); feasibility and not crossing the line are examined apart. Conditions ask only of those who can: those who are sick, disabled or for a time unable are still held up by the Base Layer; where a condition is entirely out of reach for a class of people, the condition has not been given (Paper 6, E34); individual situations the rules have not secured are handed to the judgment layer; gaps the institution itself creates are explained and corrected by the institution (Institution Theory Z35). The conditions ask whether a person is doing something toward his own way onward: looking, working or learning (Paper 6, §4); caring for family and work in the community are roads onward he has chosen himself, kinds of "working," paid or not; and the care undertaken is exactly what the Base Layer is meant to do, the conditions being there to hold people up, so this case most deserves to count. If the existing list leaves them out, the rules should count them among the ways of meeting the conditions. This work creates conditions for others' cultivation, and should be counted as economic contribution; this is a description, not a return, and the conditions of receiving do not come from it; how the accounting is done is not in this paper. It is not that the thinner the holding up, the more may be required (Paper 6, §4). Whether the conditions are actually given is examined by actual effect; how to recognize and examine this lies at the rule layer.
§9 Registering Overlaps
This paper said at the outset: where contemporary literature said a thing long ago, it is registered as an overlap, with no claim to novelty. Below are the places, in the literature this paper has verified, that lie strongly near this series. The tiers follow the groupings of the references.
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Exit is not enough to escape domination. González-Ricoy, Bryan, Breen and Pettit have all shown this (§3). This series has nothing new to say on this point.
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Leaving a bond without bearing excessive, undue costs is a right. Rouméas defines "freedom of dissociation as the right to end an association without excessive and undue costs" (Rouméas 2023, abstract), and calls it the "right to a fair exit" (ibid.). Widerquist's power to say no, and Howard's qualified yes to it, also lie on this side (§8). Taylor treats exit-oriented state intervention as one road of republicanism: helping people exit relations of domination in markets, marriage, labor and residence (paraphrased from the abstract of Taylor 2017). This is a neighbor of the first hinge, a way out.
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Having reasonable alternatives in the labor market. This is exactly what Bryan discusses, and he looks at it together with exit (§3). This is a neighbor of the second hinge, a way forward.
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The distinction between legitimate authority and domination. Republicanism separates legitimate authority by "controlled, not arbitrary"; Pettit wants employees to have "pushback" against managers (§3). This is very close to §3's distinction between guardianship and boundary-crossing, and to this series' questioning; where they part is the place stated at the end of §3. On guardianship, the UK Mental Capacity Act assesses capacity matter by matter and at the time, and requires the less restrictive way; the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in its General Comment No. 1, goes further: it calls for the abolition of substitute decision-making regimes and their replacement with supported decision-making; on this point it differs from this series, and this paper writes it as an undertaking. The first half of this paper's suggestion to the rule layer runs in the same direction as the Committee's paragraph 21; the disagreement lies only in whether the normative layer permits handling on a person's behalf (§3).
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Arguing from dependence, going around liberty versus equality. Lessig's dependence corruption (Lessig 2014; see also Lessig 2011), Thompson's earlier institutional corruption (Thompson 1995); Birch says donations threaten representatives' judgmental autonomy, looking at structure and not waiting for an actual purchase (§5). This road is not one this paper is first to take. The literature on preventing regulatory capture is earlier and wider: Stigler's theory of regulation (Stigler 1971); Preventing Regulatory Capture, edited by Carpenter and Moss (Carpenter & Moss 2013); Dal Bó's review, which includes evidence on the revolving door (Dal Bó 2006). Where they part: this proposition governs only review relations formed through payments from the party reviewed, independence is taken in the functional sense, and the breadth depends on the power-face of the party reviewed and the actual situation; from Birch it parts further in the way out.
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Platform gatekeeping and the control of infrastructure, and regulation before the fact. Lina Khan; Narechania and Sitaraman; Rahman first identifies infrastructure by scale, necessity and vulnerability, then fits a set of tools, and wants regulators themselves to be questioned, which is substantively close to the four things of §7 and to E41a, not merely a shared use of the word "infrastructure" (§7). The nearest place at the rule layer is the European Union Digital Markets Act's obligations before the fact on gatekeepers.
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The structural power of business as a set of mutual dependencies. Culpepper; this series reads structural dependence under the exit of the strong (§1; Paper 3, E20).
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Control-based power held by asset managers with large holdings. Braun (§1; Paper 1, E2).
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The several mechanisms by which money influences politics. Christiano, Birch (§5).
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Care and work in the community counted as participation. Atkinson's participation income counts care, approved voluntary work, and education and training as participation (§8); Lister, paraphrasing White, says that where the community bears a responsibility of care, those who take it on are making a contribution, which is very close to the second layer of ground in §8, near in content, apart in ground; Neves is close in direction; feminist economics' accounting of unpaid care is close on "what counts as contribution" (§8).
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Complex equality and blocked exchanges. Walzer allows inequality within spheres, and guards against conversion across spheres (Walzer 1983, paraphrased from Arneson 1990), nearly the same form as the two gates; Dworkin distinguishes impact as a voter from influence in persuading others (Dworkin 2000, paraphrased from Rosenkrantz), close in keeping a vote's impact apart from persuasive influence, and on campaign finance standing on Robeyns's side (§4).
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Inalienability. Mill on selling oneself into slavery, Radin on what is inalienable in the market (§6); "a person cannot pledge where he goes after leaving" lies within this tradition. At the rule layer, Delaware's "employee choice doctrine" and the United States Federal Trade Commission's 2024 rule draw the line in different places (§6).
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The employer as a kind of private government. Anderson; Paper 3 has already interfaced with this in place, and it is not redone here. Exit and voice: Paper 0, §7 has already interfaced with Hirschman, and this is not redone here either.
Where this series has anything to say in these places, it lies in combination and criterion, not in the problems themselves.
As far as the literature this paper has verified goes, the following few places were not seen stated in the same way. This means only that they were not seen within the range this paper has verified; it is not a claim of "originating" them.
- The two hinges taken together, falling on two layers, as a single criterion, used to read the debates over non-competes, relief and platforms. Each hinge has its own neighbors (items 2 and 3 above); taken together and used as falling on two layers, this paper has not seen it.
- Deciding a person's own affairs for him is separated first by "is it his own affair, and can he decide it himself"; where it comes from a construct, it is read as a construct's act crossing the line, and "master" is not extended to constructs; situations this proposition does not reach are handed to the rule layer, the normative layer's three requirements on such rules are necessary but not sufficient, and the remainder yields no permission (§3). Republicanism's "controlled, not arbitrary," the Mental Capacity Act and General Comment No. 1 are neighbors (item 4 above).
- The normative layer laying down only direction and floor and leaving the line to the rule layer, as a way of giving a judgment at a deadlock (§2). Rawls's four-stage sequence (Rawls 1971, §31) and Kaplow's analysis of rules and standards (Kaplow 1992) are neighbors; González-Ricoy's "comprehensive regulation is neither possible nor desirable" is close in spirit, but he moves from it to one form, while this series derives no form from the normative layer (§3).
- How widely "the party reviewed" is drawn, calibrated by the power-face of the party reviewed and the actual situation (§5). Ayres and Braithwaite's responsive regulation, which escalates the intensity of regulation step by step with the actual conduct of the regulated party (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992), is a neighbor. At the rule layer, obligations increasing with scale also have ready-made forms: the European Union's Digital Services Act sets additional obligations on designated very large online platforms with an average of forty-five million or more monthly active users (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Article 33); the Digital Markets Act presumes gatekeepers by turnover, market capitalization and number of users (Article 3(2)).
- Where the holding up is thin, attaching conditions is a concession of feasibility, not a requirement of the norm (§8). Besley and Coate's reading of work conditions as screening under a limited budget (Besley & Coate 1992) is a neighbor; they speak of a mechanism, and this paper speaks of normative standing.
Two of these, what "the party reviewed" is calibrated by, and the feasibility view of conditions when the holding up is thin, are places where this paper's argument is not yet finished; that the same view was not seen in the literature does not mean they are already new contributions.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has laid down these things, and read these things. Several contemporary debates stall on "better for whom," several others between two principles; this series reads both kinds by structure: whether one can leave is exit in the Base Layer; whether one has a choice is the fork in the Emergence Layer; both are needed, and the ground is that a human being is an end; the normative layer lays down only direction and floor (E40). A person's own affairs are decided neither by another person nor by a construct; deciding a person's own affairs for him when he can decide them himself is, from a person, the relation of master, and from a construct, a construct's act crossing the line; there is no need to wait for it to interfere, and an institution's permitting it does not change the reading either; the normative layer admits that it has a remainder, situations not reached are handed to the rule layer, guardianship being one of them, and the remainder yields no permission (E41). Checks are set beforehand and questioning examines afterward, whatever the intent and whatever the size; no overall cap is set on wealth as such, and the total of wealth is not a state an institution is to sign off as achieved (E42). Those who review do not depend in substance on those they review, and how widely "the party reviewed" is drawn depends on the power-face of the party reviewed and the actual situation (E43). Whether conditions can be dispensed with depends on actual fiscal and administrative capacity, and thickness cannot decide it alone; where conditions are attached, the institution is not judged wrong for that reason, and whether people were held up is examined by actual effect; the ways of meeting the conditions are taken in the wide sense, and caring for family and work in the community should both count (E44). The rules made for many people by a position others cannot get around have their scope drawn by the institution, and the rules made can be questioned (E41a). The non-compete place sets no new proposition, and uses only grounds already published: for forbidding a direction, no exception is left; for an extra payment beyond what a person already has, which he can actually afford to refuse, the normative layer does not judge it a violation; how "what is already his" is recognized, a suggestion is given to the rule layer (§6). Whether to break up platforms, this paper does not decide; it lays down only four things any rule must meet, and states that this paper leans in timing toward before the fact; breakup is the rule layer's last resort (§7). In several places it judges differently from contemporary schools only because of one undertaking of this series: a person cannot pledge where he goes after leaving (§6); holdings are not taken as a substitute for checks (§4); in matters where a person truly cannot decide for himself, others are permitted to handle them on his behalf (§3); the rules do not exempt in advance, on the generalization "being in structural injustice," conditions that can be met and do not cross the line, individual situations the rules have not secured are handed to the judgment layer, and gaps the institution itself creates are explained by the institution (§8). These are written as undertakings, and their costs are written out as they are.
What it has not proved: where the lines are drawn. The term of a non-compete, the disclosure of wealth, the cap on donations and the cooling-off period, how far relief may require, whether to break up: all lie at the rule layer, and this paper gives only directions. Nor has it proved whose empirical judgments among the contemporary schools are right or wrong: the economic consequences of non-competes, the effects of donation bans, the competitive effects of platform self-preferencing; this paper cites them only as background or corroboration, and draws no conclusions on their behalf. The largest difference from limitarianism lies in which layer equality falls on: limitarianism uses the requirement of political equality to set a cap on wealth in the Emergence Layer; this series recognizes equality only in the Base Layer, and the Emergence Layer does not seek equality and is not leveled; Robeyns would not accept this, and this paper only sets it out (§4). Christiano's four mechanisms and White's several chapters rest only on abstracts; the mapping in §5 is this paper's, and does not argue on their behalf. The several places §9 says were "not seen" are so only within the range of literature this paper has verified, and in two of them the argument is not yet finished.
Handed elsewhere: whom a company should be run for, how authority is divided inside a company, and what form workplace democracy takes are handed to the theory of the corporation.
Remainders left.
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Paper 6's structural inevitability (Paper 6, E32). It stands on the three premises of the Economics series; whether it is new and whether it stands are two matters. The contemporary literature of political economy can prove nothing for it, and this paper does not borrow that literature to endorse it.
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The power of ratings. Wood and Lehdonvirta, studying remote gig platforms, hold that platforms are producing a new, reputational precarity (paraphrased from the abstract of Wood & Lehdonvirta 2023). Bonsall and colleagues, studying subscriber-paid credit ratings, conclude: "Our findings, therefore, imply that changing the compensation structure of credit ratings to a subscriber-pay model will not necessarily eliminate conflicts of interest, but rather alter the nature of these conflicts in the ratings process." (Bonsall et al. 2024, introduction) Where ratings show a power-face when they become the condition of others' decisions was read in Paper 1, E5; ratings and record-keeping as channels of questioning were read in Paper 4, E22. When ratings become a chokepoint, this paper does not unfold.
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The concentration of compute. Narechania and Sitaraman divide artificial intelligence into "four basic layers: microprocessing hardware, cloud computing, algorithmic models, and applications" (Narechania & Sitaraman 2024, p. 101). A preprint by Sastry and colleagues says of compute that "it is detectable, excludable, and quantifiable, and is produced via an extremely concentrated supply chain" (Sastry et al. 2024, abstract), and also that ill-considered compute governance itself carries considerable risks for privacy, economic impact and the concentration of power (ibid.). The first half is a matter of closeness to a chokepoint (Paper 2, E7); the second half is that those who check are also questioned (Paper 3, E16). This paper does not unfold it.
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Kant's independence. In recent years two readings have taken what Kant calls the civil self-sufficiency of citizens as not being subject to private authority, rather than as how much property one has. Vrousalis says: "Rather, property is relevant only insofar as it gives citizens unsubjected discretion over the exercise of their rightful powers." (Vrousalis 2022, p. 445) Davies says: "I argue that Kant attributes civil self-sufficiency to those who are not under the authority of any private individual for their survival." (Davies 2023, p. 118) The two disagree elsewhere; only the point they share is taken here. This reading narrows the distance by which Paper 0 departs from Kant on the qualification to vote; the departure itself still holds, since Kant does not give passive citizens the vote (Paper 0, §3). This paper only records this, and does not go back to revise Paper 0. Vrousalis's short book of 2026 pushes this reading further (paraphrased from the abstract of Vrousalis 2026).
These are all recorded as they are, and each has its place to go.
The Six Propositions of This Paper
E40 A way out, a way forward (own undertaking). In reading an arrangement, the normative layer first asks two things: whether there is a way out, and whether there is a way forward. A way out is exit in the Base Layer: the structural channel for leaving, refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure is still in the person's own hands (Paper 4, E21; Paper 2, E13). A way forward is the fork in the Emergence Layer: after leaving there are places to choose among, and how many there are is a matter for the Emergence Layer; the right to choose, and the direction of choosing not being sealed off from outside, carry basic weight (Paper 2, E12a). Both are needed, and the ground is that a human being is an end: an institution has no standing to seal off a person's leaving; an institution that does not secure his Base Layer, or does not give him room in the Emergence Layer, has no reason to require him to stay. An institution that keeps people by restricting their leaving is not in the direction of the Kingdom of Ends: "The Kingdom of Ends is a direction; it is not an ought, nor a state to be signed off as achieved." (Institution Theory Z39) The two layers holding each other up is the reasonable state in this direction; it is written as a direction, not as a guarantee, and it can fall back (written the same way as Paper 6, E32). The criterion does not move with "better for whom"; the empirical inputs a reading needs are examined at the judgment layer. The normative layer lays down only the direction and floor of these two things, and does not draw in principle the line the rule layer must draw (terms, amounts, breadth): the line lies at the rule layer, the individual case at the judgment layer.
E41 Look first at structure, then at exercise (own undertaking). A person's own affairs (leaving, refusing, where to go, dissolving a standing bond) are decided neither by another person nor by a construct; which affairs are his own is derived from his own law, not drawn by an outside position (Rights Theory P5 F21). To decide a person's own affairs for him when he can decide them himself is, from a person, the relation of master; from a construct, a construct's act crossing the line (Institution Theory Z9), and "master" is not extended to constructs. Requiring consent is itself exercise: everyone who wants to go must ask and wait for its nod, and never refusing does not make it read as not converging (Paper 5, E26); where an institution permits it, the permitting is also an act, likewise examined under Z9, and does not change the reading (Paper 2, §8). It runs into Gate One (Paper 4, E21); what decides a person's direction for him is read as violation (Paper 2, E12a); what is dressed up as cultivation is colonization in the narrow sense (Rights Theory P6 F26). In the affairs he shares with others, such as the arrangement of work, the scope of authority is drawn by the institution and can be questioned, and whether the line is crossed is examined by exercise (Paper 1, E3). This proposition, as a construct, cannot close either; the remainder is always there ("remainder is the part the construct cannot enclose," Methodology 00, §6); the normative layer admits that it has a remainder, and that is why a rule layer is needed (the original speaks of the working of chisel and construct; here it is extended to norms and rules; own undertaking). Situations this proposition does not reach are handed to the rule layer to set rules, and guardianship is one of them. The remainder yields no permission: guardianship can decide for a person because in those matters he cannot decide for himself, and the antecedent of this proposition is absent; where a person can decide his own affairs for himself, no rule decides them for him. What the rule layer sets is also a construct, and the remainder is still there, so it must be open to questioning; the normative layer's requirements on it are: a ground of its own, a scope drawn by the institution and not fixed by the holding party itself, and openness to questioning; the three are necessary, and having them is not enough.
E41a The rules made by a position that cannot be got around have their scope drawn by the institution (own undertaking). A position others cannot get around (Paper 2, E7) makes rules for many people: how ranking, access, settlement and appeals are handled falls on their way to sustaining their lives or unfolding their own paths. The scope of these rules is drawn by the institution, not fixed and changed by the rule-making party on its own; that the scope is drawn by the institution means on what kinds of matters rules may be made and to what limit, not that every rule must be submitted for approval. The rules made can be questioned, and the channel of questioning is functionally independent of the rule-making position: that position cannot on its own close off review, cancel necessary effects or retaliate against those who activate the channel; relations such as appointment are examined by actual control (Paper 3, E14, E16, E18). This requirement has the same form as E41's requirement on authority in shared affairs: the scope is drawn by the institution and can be questioned; here it is extended, through the chokepoint, to the rules one position makes for many people (own undertaking). The closer to a chokepoint, the stronger this requirement. How it is achieved lies at the rule layer and the judgment layer; at the rule layer, breakup is the last resort: used only when lighter means are not enough, stating its effect, cost and alternatives when used, and not presupposing that this requirement has already been achieved (Paper 3, E17, E18; "last" is an own undertaking). How the scope of rule-making is drawn, and by which level of institution, lies at the rule layer.
E42 Checks beforehand, questioning afterward, whatever the intent, whatever the size (own undertaking). Checks beforehand and questioning afterward are two tasks that cannot replace each other, and do not exclude supervision in the course of things or inquiry beforehand. Checks are not set only once a position acts: they are set in advance according to the range this position could reach once it is exercised, and scale and power-face affect their form and strength (Paper 3, E14); which exercise counts as an act of power, and which matter questioning pursues, is examined afterward by exercise and actual convergence (Paper 1, E3). Intent buys no exemption: not intending to act does not withdraw the checks beforehand; nor does goodwill vouch that a use is warranted (Paper 5, E26; the original speaks of whether something becomes cultivation; here it is extended to use; own undertaking). "the direction is 'the larger, the stronger,' not 'the larger, the more exempt.'" (Paper 3, §1): no position is exempt from checks because it is large, and none because it is small. When accumulation grows to a certain size, the checks themselves may be bought; what this danger yields is the second gate, those who check being questioned, and the contraction of the particular use that seals off a road (Paper 3, §1), not a cap; what cannot be stopped beforehand is taken up afterward through questioning and holding to account, and this is a task, not a guarantee. On accumulation, the two gates draw where it cannot be used (Paper 4, E21, E22), not how much there is; no overall cap is set on wealth as such, and reduction is not the aim; a quantitative limit on a certain kind of use is a tool of the rule layer, and states under Paper 3, E17 which item it addresses (the Prequel, §4; Paper 3, E17, E18). The total of wealth is not a state an institution is to sign off as achieved (Institution Theory Z39; the original speaks of the Kingdom of Ends; here it is extended to the total of wealth; own undertaking). How to monitor, how to disclose and how to hold to account lie at the rule layer; disclosure governs the uses that reach toward others, and does not extend to private consumption.
E43 Those who review do not depend in substance on those they review (own undertaking). A position that reviews an economic position, makes rules for it, adjudicates it or questions it does not depend in substance on the party reviewed for its income, its term, its promotion or its later prospects; this is a check beforehand. Said from the reviewer's side, this proposition is extended into the territory of the theory of government: the reviewer's position is granted; capture is judged by structure, and relations such as nomination or membership of the same party do not automatically prove capture (Theory of Government G38, as cited in Paper 4, E23; the two places point to each other; own undertaking); said from the side of accumulation, the party reviewed does not use its accumulation to create such dependence. Dependence means dependence formed through payments from the party reviewed, including spending that does not pass through the reviewer's hands but actually sustains his term; whether it is substantial depends on whether the payment can be withdrawn at any time, whether the reviewer has alternative support, and whether his term and later career rest on it; that dependence is present does not mean that capture has occurred; a state's structural dependence on capital is read under Paper 3, E20. Independence is examined as "independent of the party questioned," in the functional sense (Institution Theory Z34; Paper 4, E22); the original speaks of the independence of an institution's own channels of questioning; here it is extended to reviewers at the level of public power and the economic positions they review (own undertaking). Particular donations and employments are examined afterward, one by one, by structure and sequence (Paper 4, E23). The restriction falls on the relation, not on the amount or on who gives the money; neither political equality nor freedom of speech is taken as the touchstone. How widely "the party reviewed" is drawn depends on two things: how large the power-face of the party reviewed is (Paper 3, E14; a structural quantity that can be examined, not an abstract possibility), and how bad the actual situation is (how common conversion actually is, whether the independent channels of questioning work, whether there is a specific, examinable risk); the larger and the worse, the more widely it is drawn, without waiting for a conversion to occur; conversely, the narrower; an abstract "may be converted" does not by itself widen it (Paper 4, E24). Widening is a precaution of the rule layer, falling on the reviewer's side, and does not judge any particular exchange improper: "risk can make rules need prevention, but does not serve as a final verdict that capture has already occurred" (Paper 3, E16). How wide, and how caps, publicity, recusal and cooling-off periods are set, lies at the rule layer; the individual case lies at the judgment layer.
E44 The ways of meeting conditions are taken in the wide sense (own undertaking). Where the Base Layer is not held up thickly enough, the rule layer may set conditions on receiving (Paper 6, E35). Whether conditions can be dispensed with under the present configuration depends on actual fiscal and administrative capacity and the particular arrangements, and thickness cannot decide it alone; if they can be dispensed with, so much the better; if they cannot and conditions are attached, then if the conditions really improve securing and do not cross the line, the institution is not judged wrong for the mere fact of having attached them: this is a concession of feasibility, not a requirement of the norm; the direction is still that the thicker the holding up, the more conditions can be dispensed with (Paper 6, §4; own undertaking). Whether it can be done is examined against the actual situation, not vouched for by a single "it cannot be done"; where conditions are attached, whether they really let the limited share hold up those who should be held up is also examined by actual effect, and squeezing people still in need off the list does not count as holding them up (Paper 6, E34); feasibility and not crossing the line are examined apart. Conditions ask only of those who can: those who are sick, disabled or for a time unable are still held up by the Base Layer; where a condition is entirely out of reach for a class of people, the condition has not been given (Paper 6, E34); individual situations the rules have not secured are handed to the judgment layer; gaps the institution itself creates are explained and corrected by the institution (Institution Theory Z35). The conditions ask whether a person is doing something toward his own way onward: looking, working or learning (Paper 6, §4); caring for family and work in the community are roads onward he has chosen himself, kinds of "working," paid or not; and the care undertaken is exactly what the Base Layer is meant to do, the conditions being there to hold people up, so this case most deserves to count. If the existing list leaves them out, the rules should count them among the ways of meeting the conditions. This work creates conditions for others' cultivation, and should be counted as economic contribution; this is a description, not a return, and the conditions of receiving do not come from it; how the accounting is done is not in this paper. It is not that the thinner the holding up, the more may be required (Paper 6, §4). Whether the conditions are actually given is examined by actual effect; how to recognize and examine this lies at the rule layer.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. External works are grouped by the tier of verification; the editions and locations used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133
Qin, H. (2026). Accumulation (SAE Political Economy, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874138
Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140
Qin, H. (2026). Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874142
Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146
Qin, H. (2026). Growth (SAE Political Economy, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874150
Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154
Qin, H. (2026). Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power (SAE Political Economy, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874158
Qin, H. (2026). The Interface and Transformation between Recognition-Based Rights and Power (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21093939
Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595
Qin, H. (2026). On the Cultivation and Diachronic Unfolding of Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21252863
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Law: The SAE Critique of Ethics and Morality (SAE Applied Paper A16) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19037566
Qin, H. (2026). Via Rho: The Way of the Remainder (SAE Methodology 00) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19657439
II · External works (original verified; quotation and location confirmed; tier A)
Atkinson, A. B. (1996). The Case for a Participation Income. The Political Quarterly, 67(1), 67–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1996.tb01568.x
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1992). Workfare versus Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs. American Economic Review, 82(1), 249–261.
Birch, S. (2022). Private electoral finance and democratic theory. Constellations, 29(4), 492–506. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12617
Bryan, A. (2023). Structural Domination and Freedom in the Labor Market: From Voluntariness to Independence. American Political Science Review, 117(2), 692–704. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000922
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. (2014). General comment No. 1 (2014): Article 12: Equal recognition before the law. United Nations, CRPD/C/GC/1. (Distr.: General, 19 May 2014; per the official text held in the UN Digital Library; paragraph numbers per the official text)
Culpepper, P. D. (2015). Structural power and political science in the post-crisis era. Business and Politics, 17(3), 391–409. https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2015-0031 (per the publisher's version held in the European University Institute repository)
Davies, L. (2023). Kant on Civil Self-Sufficiency. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 105(1), 118–140. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0030
Federal Trade Commission. (2024). Non-Compete Clause Rule. Federal Register, 89, 38342–38506 (16 CFR Part 910); for the removal, see Federal Register, 91, 6507–6510 (2026-02-12).
Frye, H. (2020). The Ethics of Noncompete Clauses. Business Ethics Quarterly, 30(2), 229–249. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2019.30
González-Ricoy, I. (2014). The Republican Case for Workplace Democracy. Social Theory and Practice, 40(2), 232–254. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201440215
Halldenius, L. (2022). Why Limitarianism Fails on its Own Premises – an Egalitarian Critique. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25(5), 777–791. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10337-1
Katz, M. L. (2025). Does it Matter if Competition is 'Fair' or 'on the Merits'? An Application to Platform Self-Preferencing. Review of Industrial Organization, 66(1), 43–70. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09982-w
Khan, L. M. (2019). The Separation of Platforms and Commerce. Columbia Law Review, 119(4), 973–1098.
Lessig, L. (2014). What an Originalist Would Understand "Corruption" to Mean. California Law Review, 102(1), 1–24. (per the full text held in the Berkeley Law repository)
LKQ Corp. v. Rutledge, No. 110, 2024 (Del. Dec. 18, 2024). (discussing Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie, 312 A.3d 674 (Del. 2024))
Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9 (UK), ss. 1–2.
Mill, J. S. (1859). On Liberty. John W. Parker and Son. (chapter V)
Molander, A., & Torsvik, G. (2022). In Their Own Best Interest. Is There a Paternalistic Case for Welfare Conditionality? Journal of Social Policy, 51(1), 191–208. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000768
Naidu, S., Posner, E. A., & Weyl, E. G. (2018). Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power. Harvard Law Review, 132(2), 536–601.
Narechania, T. N., & Sitaraman, G. (2024). An Antimonopoly Approach to Governing Artificial Intelligence. Yale Law & Policy Review, 43(1), 95–.
Neves, C. (2024). How Unconditional Basic Income encourages reciprocity. Análise Social, 59(250), 110–132. https://doi.org/10.31447/2021127
Rahman, K. S. (2018). Infrastructural Regulation and the New Utilities. Yale Journal on Regulation, 35, 911–939. (per the full text held in the Yale Law School repository)
Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 265, 1–66. (Article 6(5))
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 277, 1–102. (Article 33)
Robeyns, I. (2019). What, if Anything, Is Wrong with Extreme Wealth? Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 20(3), 251–266. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2019.1633734
Sastry, G., Heim, L., Belfield, H., Anderljung, M., Brundage, M., Hazell, J., O'Keefe, C., Hadfield, G. K., Ngo, R., Pilz, K., Gor, G., Bluemke, E., Shoker, S., Egan, J., Trager, R. F., Avin, S., Weller, A., Bengio, Y., & Coyle, D. (2024). Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence. arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08797.
Schinkel, M. P., & van Oosten, R. J. (2025). Breaking up Big Tech: scissor-line suggestions for smart cuts. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 13(2), 237–264. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnae048
Timmer, D. (2024). Limitarianism, Upper Limits, and Minimal Thresholds. Res Publica, 30(4), 845–863. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-024-09662-2
Vrousalis, N. (2022). Interdependent Independence: Civil Self-Sufficiency and Productive Community in Kant's Theory of Citizenship. Kantian Review, 27(3), 443–460. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000164
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III · External works (original or author's manuscript verified; quotation confirmed; page or edition not fully confirmed; tier B)
Bonsall, S. B., Gillette, J. R., Pundrich, G., & So, E. (2024). Conflicts of interest in subscriber-paid credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 77(1), 101614. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101614 (the quotation is in the last paragraph of the introduction; page not confirmed)
Braun, B. (2022). Exit, Control, and Politics: Structural Power and Corporate Governance under Asset Manager Capitalism. Politics & Society, 50(4), 630–654. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292221126262
Breen, K. (2015). Freedom, Republicanism, and Workplace Democracy. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18(4), 470–485. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2015.1033857 (per the author's accepted manuscript held in the Queen's University Belfast repository; pages are those of the manuscript)
Cagé, J., Le Pennec, C., & Mougin, E. (2024). Firm Donations and Political Rhetoric: Evidence from a National Ban. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 16(3), 217–256. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20220218 (the text cites the working paper of April 2022, titled "Corporate Donations and Political Rhetoric: Evidence from a National Ban," SSRN 3894330; pages are those of the working paper)
Dawood, Y. (2024). The Theoretical Foundations of Campaign Finance Regulation. In E. D. Mazo (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Election Law. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197547922.013.27 (per the author's manuscript held at SSRN 4417453, 2023; pages are those of the manuscript)
Howard, M. W. (2026). Basic income, reciprocity, and the power to exit. World Development Perspectives, 43, 100818. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2026.100818
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IV · External works (only abstract, publisher's description or secondary paraphrase; tier C)
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Interfaces
Main upstream: the propositions of this series' eight papers: Paper 1, E2, E3, E4, E5; Paper 2, E7, E12, E12a, E13; Paper 3, E14, E15, E16, E17, E18, E20; Paper 4, E21, E22, E23, E24; Paper 5, E26, E27, E30; Paper 6, E32, E34, E35, E36, E37. Institution Theory Z9, Z34 (extended to reviewers at the level of public power and the economic positions they review; own undertaking), Z35, Z39 (extended to the total of wealth; own undertaking); Rights Theory P4 F15, P5 F21, P6 F26; Methodology 00, §6 (the construct cannot close; the remainder is always there).
Also used: Paper 0, §3 (the qualification to vote lies in the Base Layer), §7 (Hirschman, pointed back to); Paper 1, §6 (settlement positions ordinarily not visible); Paper 3, §1 ("the direction is 'the larger, the stronger,' not 'the larger, the more exempt'"; checks themselves may be bought); Paper 4, §3 (the division of labor with Theory of Government G38); the Prequel, §4 (not aiming at reduction), §5 (granted and accumulated); Rights Theory P5 §III (the criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness); A16 §I (the original speaks of morality being valid only for oneself; here it is used to state the starting point from which this paper discusses equality and justice, and normative requirements between persons are not derived from it; own undertaking).
Interfacing: Republicanism and the workplace: Pettit (tier B, author's manuscript), González-Ricoy 2014 (A), Bryan 2023 (A), Breen 2015 (B, author's accepted manuscript), Rouméas 2023 (B), Taylor 2017 (C). Guardianship: Mental Capacity Act 2005 (A), CRPD/C/GC/1 (A, official text). Limitarianism and equality: Robeyns 2019 (A), 2023 [2017] (B), 2024 (not read), Timmer 2024 (A), Neuhäuser 2023 (B), Halldenius 2022 (A), Walzer 1983 (C, per Arneson 1990), Dworkin 2000 (C). Money and politics: Dawood 2024 (B, author's manuscript), Birch 2022 (A), Lessig 2014 (A), Lessig 2011 (bibliographic), Thompson 1995 (C), Stigler 1971 (C), Carpenter & Moss 2013 (C), Dal Bó 2006 (C), Christiano 2012 (C), Smith 2001 (C), Smith 1996 (C, as cited in Dawood), Cagé, Le Pennec & Mougin (B, working paper). Non-compete clauses: Frye 2020 (A), Ween 2026 (A), Cowgill, Freiberg & Starr 2026 (C), Naidu, Posner & Weyl 2018 (A), the US FTC rule (A; definition p. 38342, forfeiture and conditional severance p. 38364), LKQ v. Rutledge 2024 (A), Mill 1859 (A), Radin 1987 (C). Platforms: Khan 2019 (A), Katz 2025 (A), Schinkel & van Oosten 2025 (A), Rahman 2018 (A), Narechania & Sitaraman 2024 (A), Digital Markets Act (A), Digital Services Act (A), Kaplow 1992 (C). Relief: Neves 2024 (A), Molander & Torsvik 2022 (A), Howard 2026 (B), Lister 2020 (B, author's final version), Atkinson 1996 (A), Besley & Coate 1992 (A), White 2003 (C, chapter abstracts), White 2025 (C, chapter abstract), Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017 (C), Widerquist 2013 (C), Waring 1988 (C), Folbre & Wagman 1993 (C). Method: Rawls 1971 (bibliographic), Ayres & Braithwaite 1992 (C). Objects of judgment: Culpepper 2015 (A), Braun 2022 (B), Ciepley 2013 (C). Remainders: Wood & Lehdonvirta 2023 (C), Bonsall et al. 2024 (B), Narechania & Sitaraman 2024 (A), Sastry et al. 2024 (A), Vrousalis 2022 (A), Davies 2023 (A), Vrousalis 2026 (C).
This paper: E40 to E44, with E41a. §6 sets no new proposition and uses Paper 2, E12a; §7 uses Paper 2, E7 and Paper 3, E14, E16 to E18, and sets E41a.
Handed to the theory of the corporation: whom a company should be run for; the division of authority inside a company; what form workplace democracy takes.