Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power
政治经济学与传统：积累的权力

Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.

Introduction

This paper was written only after the seven papers were finished. A conversation can be had only once one's own object stands: only someone who knows what he himself is saying can tell where what others say differs from it. Each of the seven papers compared one to three schools in place, at the points where its judgments were made; this paper gathers them in one place, adds the schools for which there was no room in place, and registers the tier of each school as it actually stands. However far the in-place comparisons went, this paper does not go past that step; for several schools, this paper has examined one layer further than the in-place comparisons: Smith (The Wealth of Nations, Book I, chapters V and X; The Theory of Moral Sentiments), Kant (AA 8:295, 6:314–315) and Hayek (the original sentences of §III of "The Use of Knowledge in Society"); Khan is written of only in this paper.

This paper lays down no propositions, makes no new demands on the reader, and changes no sentence of the seven papers. When it cites this series, it gives the paper and the proposition number; when it cites the schools, it says only what each holds and where, and gives the smallest source that can be examined. The schools are interlocutors, not premises of this series; this paper does not write of this series correcting anyone, nor of anyone anticipating this series. Its structure follows Institution Theory Paper 0: the machine's account of itself, method, interfacing school by school, handovers and remainders; the conventions of interfacing in place follow the Theory of Government.

Outside texts are cited in four tiers:

• Tier A: the sentence and its location have been confirmed in a reliable original; it is quoted as it stands, with the original and the location given;
• Tier B: the quoted sentence has been examined in the original or the translation relied on, but the comparison with the original language, the edition or the exact location has not yet been confirmed; it is quoted, with what it rests on and what has not been examined noted;
• Tier C: it rests only on reliable secondary literature; it is only paraphrased, with what it rests on stated, and without quotation marks;
• Tier D: it could not be confirmed; it is not cited.

Works written in English are quoted as they stand. German is given in my translation, with the original in parentheses; for Marx, the English translation named on the spot is quoted, with the German beside it. What is examined is the original given in parentheses, or, for works in English, the English as quoted.

§1 What Kind of Machine This Is

§1.1 What It Asks

What this series asks is this: how what has been accumulated becomes, in others' decisions, power acting on others, and what direction an institution takes toward it (the Prequel, Introduction). Accumulation means what is obtained in the Emergence Layer through exchange and recognition and can be retained and reused: capital, fame, status, qualifications, attention and influence. Reputation is not among them: it is taken in the sense of Moral Law P3; it is not capital, and cannot be purchased (Paper 1, E4).

There are five things it does not ask:

• How prices form, and what money is. That is the business of the Economics series and of price theory (the Prequel, §1).
• Distributive justice. Who should get how much: Institution Theory Paper 0 and Theory of Government Paper 6 both list it as an adjacent object, and this series does not set up an account of its own either; the gap as such is not the thing to be asked about (the Prequel, §4).
• Tax. Tax is a matter for the rule layer (the Prequel, §8).
• How a company's internal governance is designed. That is handed to a theory of the firm (the Prequel, §9).
• The forms of provisions and bodies. This series gives direction and criteria; the forms are handed to specific theories of institutions (the Prequel, §8).

It handles only one thing: where accumulated power shows itself, how an institution checks its use, how supply in the Base Layer is secured, and how people's emergence is given conditions.

§1.2 Sentence Form and the Three Layers

The sentence form of the whole series follows Institution Theory: the construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law. Companies and bodies that hold and mobilize accumulation, large or small, are constructs, and are addressed directly; directors, trustees and auditors are in positions, and take accountability; the veteran kiln worker, a relative of one resident and a seller each have their own law, and this series writes no ought for them (the Prequel, §6). A construct can also occupy a position within a larger construct, and hold accountability in that slot: the sole position of supply at the life-substrate is one example (Paper 2, E11a).

Wherever a boundary is written, it is said at which layer it lies: the normative layer sets ideas and criteria; the rule layer gives rules and examples, and to it this series only makes suggestions and does not decide in its place, and its examples do not claim to be the best; the judgment layer is the individual case, left to judgment in positions (the Prequel, §8). Non-compete agreements and conditional payments are a sample written at all three layers. Fork Rights says that a person has the right to choose; whether to choose or not, and why not, is the person's own affair. At the normative layer, a non-compete agreement is judged a violation, because it takes this choice away, and its gravity depends on the territory, trade and term it reaches (Rights Theory P5 F19, F20); a constraint set to protect others, limiting only the step by which he would violate others' ends, is not among them: restricting a person from violating others' ends is not violating this person's ends; a conditional payment that passes all three items of the criterion leaves the choice still there; the criterion dividing the two is given at the normative layer. To the rule layer, this series' suggestion is that, in principle, no opening be made to permit non-compete agreements; for a constraint protecting others, the rule layer states which exercise it limits, whom it protects, why nothing less will do, and how wide its scope is; conditional payments fall among local, reversible limits, and may be permitted or not. At the judgment layer, it is seen on which side a particular clause falls (Paper 2, E12a).

§1.3 The Root and the Main Line

The root of these oughts follows Institution Theory: a human being is an end in itself. This series sets up no normative root of its own; it extends the five oughts that Institution Theory addresses to constructs to the institutions that embed and uphold economic positions, and to the constructs that hold and mobilize accumulation, and each place where it extends them is marked (own undertaking).

The main line has three parts. The first is "does not aim at reducing it": power is not the problem; how power is used is (the Prequel, §4; Paper 3, E17). The second is the two gates: accumulation is not converted into domination over people's Base Layer (Paper 4, E21), nor into control over questioning (Paper 4, E22); political–economic separation runs in both directions, and is the extreme case of the second gate at the level of public power (Paper 4, E23). The third is that the arrangements that check it are themselves open to questioning (Paper 3, E16). Besides the main line there is a division of work by layer: where what a construct does falls in the Emergence Layer, checks are the main thing; where it falls in the Base Layer, beyond checks, that supply must also be secured (Paper 3, E14a); giving conditions for people's emergence is called support; the two layers matter equally, and neither is traded for the other; neither direction is permitted (Paper 6, E35); cultivation needs the two layers together, securing in the Base Layer and support in the Emergence Layer, and it fails if either is missing (Paper 6, E36).

§1.4 The Division of Labor with Upstream

The Economics series. The Economics series gives mechanism and inevitability; this series takes up the normative layer. Economics P5 says that in markets that meet three premises, 15DD emergence is a structural inevitability; this series takes up only the inevitability of emergence, together with its premises, and not the inevitability of dominance (Paper 6, E32). Economics P3 handed on the repair and design of bad institutions; this series takes up the half that lies at the normative layer (§9).

Institution Theory. Institution Theory answers what an institution is for, and addresses its five oughts to every construct that has institutional identity. This series stands under it and writes of accumulated power; the Theory of Government writes of granted power. One and the same position can have both sources: a water company with only fourteen employees has accumulated assets, yet its supply at the life-substrate is part of the accountability of the institution or government that manages it (Paper 2, E11a).

The Theory of Government. Granted positions are subject to checks under the Theory of Government; this series overlaps with it at several places: how an embedded supply is guaranteed, how capture is judged, the cost of exit, control within the line. Where they overlap, the two point to each other, and each writes its own part (Paper 3, E15, E16; Paper 4, E23).

§1.5 Not the Same Thing as the Value Theory of Classical Political Economy

The name "political economy," in its classical use, is tied to a theory of value. In Book I, chapter V of The Wealth of Nations, what Smith asks about is the real price of a thing: "The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it" (Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. V, per Project Gutenberg #3300; tier A). Where value comes from, and what serves as its measure, is the core of that set of questions.

This series does not answer that question. It does not ask what a thing is worth, nor where value comes from; what it takes over is the matter that another sentence close by in the same chapter points to: what kind of power wealth becomes in others' decisions (§3). The name is the same; the question is not. Whoever reads this series need not read the classical theory of value into it; whoever reads classical political economy need not look here for a theory of value.

§2 The Method of Interfacing

§2.1 The Four Steps

Each conversation takes four steps: first, a common question that can be examined is sought; next, whether the two speak of the same thing; next, how far agreement goes, and where the two part; last, the strongest objection from the other side is written, with this series' reply. The objection is drafted by this paper and marked as drafted, and as far as it can it is made to touch the other side's strength. Some exchanges reach only "that is not among the objects of this series"; that states a division of labor, not a completed objection and reply.

§2.2 Two Depths

Where the original has been examined, all four steps are taken: Smith, Kant, Marx, Hayek, Friedman, Khan; Hirschman's wording and page numbers are cited at second hand from Action Theory Paper 0, and Institution Theory Paper 0 has already conversed with him from the institution's side, so this paper adds only the economic side.

Where only secondary material is reached, the conversation goes as far as the common question and the surface of contact: Hegel, Polanyi, Thompson, Berle and Means, Coase, Galbraith, Anderson, Nozick, Walzer, Sandel, Frankfurt, Piketty, Robeyns. In these units, this paper writes what its paraphrase rests on, where the surface of contact lies, and which question is to be decided once the original has been examined; it does not write a settled conclusion of "meeting" or "parting." At these places the in-place comparisons of the seven papers likewise list only the points open to comparison, and this paper agrees with them.

§2.3 The Differences Fall on Two Lines

Once the conversations are written out, several differences fall on the same two lines. They are set up here first, and the later sections mark the line at the places where a difference falls on one; the schools reached only through secondary material are not marked. The two lines are this paper's generalization, not any school's own division, nor a classification of all the differences.

The first line, where the question falls: holding and distribution, or use and conversion. Some traditions place the matter to be asked on how much a person holds, and on a society's pattern of distribution. Which schools fall on this side, among those reached only through secondary material, is settled once the original books have been examined; this paper does not use them as examples. This series does not take the quantity held or the outcome of distribution as its terminus; checks fall on how accumulation is used: whose road it converges, what it is converted into, whose questioning it seals off (the Prequel, §4; Paper 3, E17).

The second line, the ground: where the boundary comes from. Some traditions draw boundaries for the market, and ground them in efficiency, in the dispersal of knowledge, or in the public interest; per secondary material, there are also those that draw boundaries by the spheres and meanings of the various goods themselves, and where those stand is settled once the original books have been examined. The boundaries of this series come from structure: whether an effect closes a dimension a person has already incorporated, whether it seals off the roads of exit, refusal and revocation, whether it enables the party questioned to shut the door alone (Paper 2, E9, E12; Paper 4, E22); in the Emergence Layer, they come from a person's own direction: direction is a person's own cannot-not, and the party that gives conditions does not, by knowing more, acquire the authority to decide that person's direction for him (Paper 6, E37).

§3 Wealth, the Division of Labor, and the State

§3.1 Smith: Wealth Is the Power to Buy, Not Political Power

The common question. What kind of power accumulated things bring to their holder. In the same chapter Smith writes: "Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing a certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market" (Book I, ch. V; tier A).

There are three points of contact.

First, holding is not political power. Smith separates the power of purchasing from political power: the former is conveyed directly by possession; the latter does "not necessarily" come with it, and the fortune "may, perhaps," afford the means of acquiring it. The two gates of Paper 4 stand on the same seam, and political–economic separation is the extreme case of the second gate at the level of public power: money can be exchanged for opportunities, capital, qualifications and posts, and these are left open as usual (Paper 4, E24); money does not buy that share of political power which reviews and questions it, and accumulation is not converted into control over questioning (Paper 4, E22, E23). What Smith writes, "not necessarily," is a description; what this series sets on the same seam is a gate.

Second, the interest of those who deal. At the end of Book I Smith says that the interest of the dealers in any particular branch of trade is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public: "To widen the market, and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. … The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention" (Book I, ch. XI, Conclusion of the Chapter; tier A). Paper 4 has already cited this sentence in place (Paper 4, §3). Paper 4 says that the making of rules is one of the channels of questioning, and that accumulation may not be converted into a standing in which the party questioned can close off questioning on its own (Paper 4, E22); when the State Legislature struck out the breakup clause, nine had received donations and eight votes were in favor, and what is to be examined is precisely whether the road by which it is questioned has been bought (Paper 4, E23).

Third, gatherings of the same trade. Smith says that people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices; the law cannot prohibit such meetings, but "it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary" (Book I, ch. X, Part II; tier A). Paper 3 says that a check must state which use that seals off a road it handles (Paper 3, E17); an institution's giving no facilities for sealing off roads runs the same way as this sentence of Smith's.

Another book. Smith was first a moral philosopher. People remember The Wealth of Nations, and often forget The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which he published seventeen years earlier. In that book there are at least three places that connect with this series.

First, being praised and being praiseworthy. Smith says: "We are pleased not only with praise, but with having done what is praise-worthy" (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, ch. I, per the Dublin printing of 1777; tier A; in the structure of the commonly used sixth edition it stands in Part III, ch. II, where the 1872 text has the same words, with one more comma after "pleased"). The point of contact is in Paper 1: this series separates fame from reputation; fame can be accumulated, exchanged and converted, and reputation is not an object of accumulation (Paper 1, E4). Being praised is what others actually give; being praiseworthy is tied to what a person has done, not to whether anyone gives praise. They meet at one point: neither side takes the praise others actually give as the very thing to be asked about: Smith recognizes praiseworthiness beyond it, and this series recognizes reputation beyond fame, which can be accumulated. The two are not the same thing. They part over grounds: Smith's praiseworthiness rests on how an imagined impartial spectator would view it; this series' reputation is taken in the sense of Moral Law P3, as the distributed displaying of recognition relations, and is itself tied to others, not to an imagined spectator. Whether the two grounds can illuminate each other calls for a separate, dedicated comparison; this paper records only this much.

Second, the admiration of the rich. When Smith later revised the book he added a chapter, whose first sentence is: "This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments" (Part I, Sect. III, ch. III, per the 1872 text; tier A). He goes on to say that wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration that are due only to wisdom and virtue, and that this has been the complaint of moralists in all ages. The point of contact is in Paper 4: money can buy badges, but cannot buy reputation (Paper 4, §4); wealth can be exchanged for fame, attention and opportunities, and these are left open as usual in the Emergence Layer (Paper 4, E24). What Smith writes is the other side: people give to wealth and status the respect owed to wisdom and virtue, and what wealth itself cannot be exchanged for, it comes to occupy in others' judgment. This paper's reading is that this is the projection of conversion in others' judgment; the gates of Paper 4 do not reach this layer, nor should they try to: to whom respect is given is each person's own judgment. They meet at one point: neither side grants that wealth and status deserve the respect owed to wisdom and virtue. They part at one point: Smith holds this disposition necessary to the distinction of ranks and the order of society; this series does not discuss whether ranks are necessary, and asks only whether this respect has been taken by a position as a condition of a chokepoint decision (Paper 1, E5).

Third, the man of system. This section too was added in the later revision, and it describes a kind of man who falls in love with his own ideal plan of government and cannot bear the smallest deviation from it: "He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it" (Part VI, Sect. II, ch. II, per the 1872 text; tier A). The point of contact is in Paper 6, chiefly E37: support may have particular content, such as courses and tasks, and does not acquire the authority to decide a person's direction of life for him; where Paper 6, E35 says "What the Emergence Layer gives is conditions, the content being decided by people themselves," the content there is the end of a life, avowed by the person himself. The words "every single piece has a principle of motion of its own" are adjacent to what this series calls a person's own law; it is not the same word in the same sense. They meet at one point: both see that a person has a principle of motion of his own, not one the designer impresses on him. Smith does not reject systematic ideas; in the next paragraph he says: "Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman" (ibid.; tier A); nor does this series oppose an arrangement because it is systematic. He goes on to say of insisting, in spite of all opposition, on establishing all of it at once: "It is to erect his own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong" (ibid.; tier A). They also meet at this layer: a designer may not, because his plan seems complete to him, place his own judgment above others'. Their grounds differ: Smith speaks from the arrogance of the man of system and from public spirit; this series speaks from each person's own law and from an institution's acts not crossing the line; whether the two grounds are isomorphic calls for a separate comparison, and this paper does not settle in advance, by the haste or slowness of implementation, where they part. This place lies on the same ground as Kant in §3.2 and Hayek in §6.1, the three arriving each from his own side: Kant from paternal government, Hayek from the dispersal of knowledge, Smith from the man of system's picture of the chess pieces.

The editions must be stated. The first rests on the Dublin printing of 1777; the chapter and the section in which the second and third stand are not in that printing, and they rest on The Theory of Moral Sentiments as collected in The Essays of Adam Smith (London: Alex. Murray, 1872); both passages have been collated word for word against it, and the spelling follows it (chess-board). Both rest on Project Gutenberg's transcriptions; images of the printed books have not been seen.

Is it the same thing? In part. There are two differences.

First, the ground. The measure in these places of The Wealth of Nations is the public interest: dealers who narrow the competition are in effect levying an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens (Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. XI, Conclusion of the Chapter). The measure of this series lies in structure: whom an effect converges, down to which dimension it presses, whose road it seals off (Paper 2, E7; Paper 3, E14). This series examines person by person, configuration by configuration; how Smith's public interest is to be weighed against the loss of one particular person, the passages cited do not say, and this paper does not answer for him. The measures are named differently; this falls on the second line.

Second, the object of checks. What Smith is wary of is one order, the merchants and manufacturers: "an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public" (Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. XI, Conclusion of the Chapter). This series judges the operation, not the person: one and the same holder of power can open a road in one place and hold others' road in another (Paper 6, E38). What is to be examined is an act, not where the interest of an order lies.

How far the agreement goes. Agreement goes as far as three points: what possession conveys is the power of purchasing, and political power does not necessarily follow; proposals of rules that come from the dealers must be examined with suspicious attention; an institution gives no facilities for sealing off roads to those of the same trade. The two part from the ground and the object onward. The three places in The Theory of Moral Sentiments are recorded separately: being praised and being praiseworthy are kept apart; wealth and status do not deserve the respect owed to wisdom and virtue; on the chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). You place checks on every single use, and examine person by person, configuration by configuration; the cost is too high. Watching the proposals of the dealers' order, and letting competition itself break up their conspiracies, is far cheaper, and needs no institution that looks into everything.

Reply. This series does not want an institution that looks into everything: outside the gates, exchange in the Emergence Layer is left open as usual (Paper 4, E24); measures, forms and thresholds lie at the rule layer, and below the threshold guarding the line and being questioned are not weaker, though no formal separation of powers is needed (Paper 3, E19). Competition is indeed a check, and exit's being real is exactly what this series guards at the level of relations (Paper 2, E13). But competition can fail at a chokepoint: where a person has no affordable substitute at the life-substrate, competition cannot dismantle that place (Paper 2, E11a). Nor is what this series examines only the proposals of rules that come from the dealers; it is also every use in day-to-day operation: when Springhollow Water Company cut off the water, it went through no proposal, and it held others' road all the same (Paper 2, E7).

§3.2 Kant: Paternal Government, and the Passive Citizen

Kant has appeared once in this series: Paper 6, in discussing whether support can decide a person's direction for him, cited the sentence in On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793) that a government aiming at its subjects' happiness, exercising benevolence as a father does toward his children, "is the greatest despotism conceivable" (my translation; ist der größte denkbare Despotismus; AA 8:291, lines 3–4; tier A). Where the two meet and part at that place, Paper 6 has already written in full: neither side lets benevolence judge for a person how he is to be happy; they part over reach: that sentence speaks of a constitution, while what Paper 6 reads is a support program whose provisions allow exit and whose actual refusability has not been fully examined; the facts given are not enough to equate the two, nor to say that it has already kept all the boundaries (Paper 6, §6). This paper does not rewrite it, and takes up only one other place.

The common question. What the relation is between economic dependence and a person's standing in the commonwealth. In the Doctrine of Right, §46, Kant says that the third attribute of a citizen is "civil independence: being able to owe his existence and preservation not to the arbitrary choice of another among the people, but to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth" (my translation; bürgerlichen Selbstständigkeit, seine Existenz und Erhaltung nicht der Willkür eines Anderen im Volke, sondern seinen eigenen Rechten und Kräften als Glied des gemeinen Wesens verdanken zu können; Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre §46, AA 6:314, lines 12–14; tier A). From this he separates active from passive citizens: the journeyman in the service of a merchant or a craftsman, the servant, the minor, all women, and "everyone who is compelled to maintain his existence (food and protection) not according to his own conduct of business but according to the disposition of others (except that of the state) lacks civil personality" (my translation; jedermann, der nicht nach eigenem Betrieb, sondern nach der Verfügung Anderer (außer der des Staats) genöthigt ist, seine Existenz (Nahrung und Schutz) zu erhalten, entbehrt der bürgerlichen Persönlichkeit; ibid., lines 29–32). In On the Common Saying he states what is required to vote thus: apart from the natural one, the only requirement is "that he be his own master (sui iuris), and hence have some property (in which every art, craft, fine art or science may also be counted) that supports him" (my translation; daß er sein eigener Herr (sui iuris) sei, mithin irgend ein Eigenthum habe (wozu auch jede Kunst, Handwerk oder schöne Kunst oder Wissenschaft gezählt werden kann), welches ihn ernährt; AA 8:295, lines 15–18; tier A).

There are two points of contact.

First, dependence on another's arbitrary choice is a matter to be asked about. What Kant asks is whether a person's existence is owed to the arbitrary choice of another. What Paper 2 asks is the economic face of the same matter: when dormitories, scrip and wage-advance arrangements that restrict departure fall on one and the same person, does he still hold a structural channel for refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure (Paper 2, E12); when a person can rely on only one supplier at the life-substrate, how that supplier's ceasing supply is to be read (Paper 2, E11a).

Second, the road upward must be kept open. Kant says that this dependence on the will of others, and this inequality, are not contrary to these people's freedom and equality as human beings (AA 6:315, lines 6–8, paraphrased); but the positive laws, whatever they may be, "must not be contrary to … being able to work one's way up from this passive condition to the active one" (my translation; sich nämlich aus diesem passiven Zustande zu dem activen empor arbeiten zu können, nicht zuwider sein müssen; AA 6:315, lines 20–22; tier A). Paper 6 says that institutions give conditions, and that the conditions must be within reach (Paper 6, E34); Paper 2 says that exit's being real guards the premise of emergence (Paper 2, E13). That the road upward is not sealed off by law runs the same way as these two places.

Is it the same thing? No; there are two differences.

First, the direction of conversion. Here this series parts from Kant. Kant reads economic independence as a condition of active citizenship: those who maintain their existence by the disposition of others lack civil personality, and are not eligible to vote. The property he speaks of at once takes in art, craft, fine art and science, so long as it supports him; what matters is that a person lives by what is his own: where he must acquire his living from others, he does so by alienating what is his, not by granting others the use of his powers (AA 8:295, lines 16–22). So it is a threshold of independence, not a threshold of wealth; he also says that this distinction does not touch these people's freedom and equality as human beings (AA 6:315).

This series does not take economic independence as a condition of eligibility to take part in legislation (own undertaking), and its reasons come in three steps. First, the right to vote comes from a circle of subjects mutually recognizing one another's co-legislative power, and this recognition is mutual by its very constitution: "not recognizing others' voting power, one has no right to vote oneself" (Rights Theory P2 §II). Second, voting takes part in a decision binding on all within the circle, including those who voted against (Rights Theory P4 §II); to sort people within the circle out of it by their standing in the Emergence Layer is to make those bound by this decision lose eligibility for co-legislation. Who is within this circle is handed to the Theory of the State. Those who are bound by the decision, have no way to avoid it by exiting, and yet are not in the circle are, on Institution Theory's reading that draws the interior by entanglement, still internal subjects (Institution Theory Z4): the institution still crosses no line against them, and they can still raise questions. Third, to decide who stays in the circle by property, by whether or not one is economically independent, is to exchange standing in the Emergence Layer for eligibility for co-legislation; this is exactly the kind of conversion the two gates do not permit (Paper 4, E21–E23), and also falls under the rule that the two layers are not traded for each other (Paper 6, E35). So eligibility to vote lies in the Base Layer, is to be secured, and does not change with standing in the Emergence Layer. Voting is still a constitutive recognition-based right, with no basic side of its own; Rights Theory also says: "Voting is at once a right and a power." (Rights Theory P2 §II) To say that it lies in the Base Layer is to say that the institution secures it, not to change its classification: the Base Layer is not the same as basic rights, and embedded recognition-based rights, some of which also serve as powers, are in the Base Layer too (the Prequel, §7).

What Kant asks is who is qualified to take part in legislation; what this series asks is where accumulated power may not be converted; the questions differ, and at this one place, eligibility to vote, the conclusions are opposite. This falls on the first line. How the range of a state's members is drawn is not settled here: "Who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State." (Theory of Government Paper 3) This series says only that, among members, eligibility to vote does not rise or fall with standing in the Emergence Layer. Whether a person can buy his way into this circle with money: on this too there is a word here. The conditions of entry into the circle belong to the Theory of the State; here only accumulation is spoken of, from the side of conversion. The criterion at the normative layer is that accumulation cannot be converted directly into eligibility for co-legislation. Where an investment has created conditions for others' cultivation, employment for example (Paper 5, E26), what it obtains in exchange can be an opportunity to come in and to stay (Paper 4, E24), and can also be a road into the circle after a sufficiently long wait; the ground lies in the conditions it has created for others, not in the money, nor in how long has passed (own undertaking); where other ways have created conditions for others' cultivation, they are read on the same ground. Whether these conditions have actually been given is examined by actual effect (Paper 5, E26); nor does the wait itself make eligibility arise automatically: whether one enters the circle still follows membership's own procedure, and this paper does not add capital and time together to give its outcome in advance. How it is set up, how long the wait is, and how it is examined lie at the rule layer, and this series only suggests (own undertaking).

Second, how dependence is read. Kant reads dependence as a status: the journeyman and the servant lack civil personality, and their existence is "as it were, only inherence" (my translation; gleichsam nur Inhärenz; AA 6:314, lines 32–33). This series does not read status; it reads acts: how an arrangement converges a person is judged by structure; one and the same person can be bound in one place and unfold as usual in another (Paper 2, E12; Paper 1, E3). Dependence is a configuration, not a person's identity.

How far the agreement goes. Agreement goes as far as two points: that one's existence is owed to another's arbitrary choice is a matter to be asked about; the law may not seal off a person's road upward from dependence. The two part from the direction of conversion and the reading of dependence onward.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). A person whose livelihood rests entirely on his employer will find it hard not to vote as his employer wishes; letting him vote amounts to giving the employer one more vote. Your two-directional separation blocks money from buying votes, but cannot block the votes that dependence brings.

Reply. What this objection points to is how dependence turns, by way of votes, into the employer's power; what it asks about is exactly how accumulation is exchanged for political power, and that is where Paper 4 sets its gates (Paper 4, E21–E23). This series' answer is not to take away the dependent person's vote, but to keep dependence from becoming something that can be converted: converting what people need to sustain their lives into control that compresses their life-substrate, and placing people's ability to leave, refuse or revoke a standing bond under another party's control, both fall under Gate One (Paper 4, E21); a person's dependence at the life-substrate is taken up by accountability and securing (Paper 2, E11a; Paper 3, E14a). The less the dependence, the more that vote is his own. Kant himself also leaves this road open: the way up may not be sealed off by law. The difference is that this series does not let a person, before he gets there, first lose eligibility to take part in legislation by voting. Dependence can still make it hard for a person to speak up; how in particular the road of asking is to be arranged, and how retaliation is to be avoided, this series gives only direction for, registered in §9.4, the fourth slot.

§3.3 Hegel: Wealth and Poverty in Civil Society

The common question. When accumulation in a society concentrates in one place, what happens in another. Per Sandkühler's 1970 summary, Hegel writes of civil society in the Philosophy of Right as follows: as needs and exchange become universal, there is on one side the accumulation of wealth, and on the other the division and limitation of labor, and the dependence of those tied to such labor (§243); when a large mass of people sinks below a certain level of subsistence and loses the sense of right and the sense of honor, a rabble is produced, and at the same time it becomes easier for excessive wealth to be concentrated in a few hands (§244); amid this excess of wealth, civil society is not rich enough to prevent excessive poverty and the production of a rabble (§245); and so it is driven beyond itself, to seek consumers and the means of subsistence among other peoples (§246) (paraphrased per H. J. Sandkühler, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 34/1970; tier C).

Surface of contact. In the summary relied on, Hegel writes the accumulation of wealth and the dependence of those tied to the division of labor at the two ends of one process; this series too touches both ends. In Bluekiln, in Paper 2, one company employs seventy percent of the town's working population, and has set up arrangements such as dormitories, scrip and wage advances; what the veteran kiln worker actually ran into, the time he meant to leave, was the recorded advance and the obstacle of the non-compete; in the production cut of Paper 6, nine hundred people lost their livelihoods at once. What is to be decided once the original has been examined is this: whether Hegel's "not rich enough" is a judgment about the mechanism of civil society itself; this series' saying that the Base Layer is to be secured and the Emergence Layer supported (Paper 6, E35) is an ought addressed to institutions. Whether the two answer the same question depends on how the original text of §§241–248 of the Philosophy of Right and the chapter on "the police and the corporation" arranges those remedies; this paper does not make this judgment on secondary material.

§4 Capital and Market Society

§4.1 Marx: Capital Is a Relation

The common question. What capital is, and where its power comes from. Paper 1 has already compared the two once in place (Paper 1, §2); this paper records it as it stands, and does not go past it. In the chapter of Capital, volume one, on the modern theory of colonization, Marx restates what Wakefield discovered in the colonies: a man who has money, means of subsistence and means of production does not become a capitalist if there are no wage laborers; and from this he says that "capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things" (English per the translation on marxists.org, ch. 33; German per textlog.de, ch. 25: daß das Kapital nicht eine Sache ist, sondern ein durch Sachen vermitteltes gesellschaftliches Verhältnis zwischen Personen; edition, translator and page not confirmed; tier B).

Is it the same thing? The same question, in the same direction. The Power Theory Prequel says that capital is not the source of power: capital has power because the narrative of possession is carried by society, and others register it as possession (the Power Theory Prequel, §III; Paper 1, E2). Neither side reads capital as a thing; both read its power as a relation between persons.

They part over the ground of the relation. Marx places that relation in the relations of production: to whom the means of production belong, to whom labor power is sold. This series places it in recognition and registration: one and the same position, read from the position-holder's side, is a right, and shows a power-face where it actually converges others (Paper 1, E3); power lies in the decision position that can mobilize accumulation, and nominal holding and mobilization come apart (Paper 1, E2). What the Power Theory Prequel rebuts is the view that "power derives from possession of the means of production"; that rebuttal is not to be read as a rebuttal of Marx: in the sentence this paper relies on, what Marx says is precisely that capital is not a thing. This falls on the second line.

How far the agreement goes. Agreement goes as far as capital's being not a thing but a relation between persons; the two part from the ground of the relation onward.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). To read the power of capital as "recognition and registration" is to read exploitation as a cognitive problem, as if power would disperse once people stopped registering it as possession. Who actually has the means of production in hand does not change with anyone's recognizing it or not.

Reply. This series does not say that power disperses once recognition is withdrawn. A running recognition-based position has its institutional embedding and its real power backing (the three-fold interlock cited at Paper 2, E11a); registration is a structural fact, not a thought. Nor does it read the situation of those converged as a cognitive problem: where dormitories, wage advances and a non-compete agreement together seal off a person's road out, that is crossing the line, and it does not change with whether he "recognizes" it (Paper 2, E12, E12a). The difference is that this series does not place that relation in the means of production alone: positions of fame, qualifications, scoring and settlement can likewise converge others' roads (Paper 1, E5, E6).

§4.2 Polanyi and Thompson: What Cannot Be Treated as an Ordinary Commodity

The common question. Whether some things can be treated as ordinary commodities and left to the market to price. Paper 2 paraphrased two schools in place, on secondary material: Polanyi, in The Great Transformation (1944), says that labor, land and money are not produced for sale, that treating them as commodities is a "fiction," and that if they are left wholly to the market mechanism society will be torn apart, which calls forth a countermovement for the protection of society; Thompson, in "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" (1971), writes of the crowd in years of dearth, who held that bread had a fair price sanctioned by custom, and who moved to stop the dealers when they raised prices in the shortage (Paper 2, §4; tier C).

Surface of contact. What the two write of is adjacent to what Paper 2 asks at chokepoints: Polanyi writes of labor, land and money being treated as commodities and handed to the market; Thompson writes of the crowd's moving to stop it when the price of grain was raised in a year of dearth. Paper 2's reading is that the normative layer lists no kinds of things, and does not take any particular price as a criterion; what it asks is through what thing an act has closed which dimension of whom, and whether that price has kept those who cannot pay out of the life-substrate (Paper 2, E10, E11). What is to be decided once the originals have been examined: whether Polanyi's "fictitious commodity" is a claim about kinds of things, or a claim about how society is marketized; whether Thompson's "moral economy" is, in this series, a kind of recognition and custom at the rule layer, or carries normative weight of another kind. On neither point does this paper draw a conclusion from secondary material.

§5 Ownership and Control

§5.1 Berle and Means, and an Earlier Sentence of Smith's

The common question. Where power lies once nominal ownership and actual control have come apart. Paper 1 paraphrased Berle and Means's The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) in place, on secondary material: shareholding is dispersed, shareholders are owners in name and take no part in management, and control falls into the hands of managers; from this they ask whether the managers act in the shareholders' interest (Paper 1, §2; tier C). Paper 1 there listed only the points open to comparison, and drew no conclusion of meeting or parting; this paper does the same.

This separation Smith had written of long before; Paper 1 has already cited in place his sentence on the directors of joint-stock companies, who are the managers of other people's money rather than of their own (Paper 1, §2; Book V, ch. I, Part III, Art. I; tier A). In the same place he also says that most of the proprietors of a joint-stock company seldom pretend to understand anything of its business, and are content to receive such dividend as the directors think proper (paraphrased). What Smith asks is whether the money is well looked after; what Berle and Means ask, per the paraphrase, is whether the interests of managers and owners coincide; what this series asks is a third thing: on which position the power-face falls, and whether those it converges can question it (Paper 1, E2; Paper 3, E16). The votes at Crossways are one example: one family, by dual-class shares, holds fifty-six percent of the votes with twenty percent of the equity; a trustee, under an agreement, votes on behalf of a state's civil servants and teachers; and the members of the pension fund have no road by which to speak on how it votes (Paper 1, §2).

§5.2 Coase and Galbraith

Coase. Per the Coase entry in the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (Econlib), Coase asked in "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) why firms exist: using the market has costs, later called transaction costs; if using the market had no cost, people would do everything by arm's-length transactions, and firms would not appear (tier C). The surface of contact is in Paper 1: how an economic position forms. This series says that a position forms through many exchanges and many acts of recognition (Paper 1, E1); Coase says that firms form because using the price mechanism has a cost. Whether the two answer the same question can be said only once the original has been examined; this paper only registers this surface of contact.

Galbraith. Per the Galbraith entry in the same encyclopedia, he said in American Capitalism (1952) that large corporations had replaced small firms, that the textbook model of perfect competition no longer fit, and that the concentration of corporate power was offset by the "countervailing power" of large unions, while consumers were protected by "competing centers of power" (tier C). The surface of contact is in Paper 3: how checks come about. In this series, checks are acts of a construct, and the decisions of those who check are themselves questioned by the three questions (Paper 3, E16); a party that grows up in this way is itself an economic position, examined, public and private alike, by its actual power-face (Paper 3, E14, E15); whether it counts as checks in this series' sense, and whether it is questioned by the three questions, the seven papers have not handled separately; it is registered in §9.4, the sixth slot.

§5.3 Anderson: Private Government

Paper 3 paraphrased Anderson's Private Government (2017) in place, per a book review: she calls the employer's domination of employees private government, a form of governing that holds arbitrary and unaccountable power; she disagrees that the freedom to quit is enough to protect employees; and she proposes constraining it through new rights of employees and ways of participation (Paper 3, §4; per Estlund's 2018 review; tier C). Paper 3 there listed only the points open to comparison: per the paraphrase, she disagrees that the freedom to quit is enough to protect employees; Paper 3's question, whether "can choose not to sell here" answers the very matter asked about, is a question about an adjacent matter. What is to be decided once the original book has been examined: she calls it "government," while this series keeps the granted and the accumulated apart, and does not read an accumulated position as government; whether this difference is, for her, a difference of name or of substance (Paper 3, E15); she gives particular rights and ways of participation, while this series establishes only the function of control and hands the form to the rule layer; where the two correspond.

§6 The Defense of the Market

§6.1 Hayek: The Dispersal of Knowledge

The common question. Who knows where the conditions a person obtains should be used. Paper 6 has already taken the four steps in place (Paper 6, §3), and this paper records them as they stand. Hayek says that what the economic order must use is knowledge of "the particular circumstances of time and place," and that this knowledge "never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess" (Hayek 1945; per the online text of the Library of Economics and Liberty, originally in American Economic Review 35(4): 519–530; the page of the quoted sentences not confirmed; tier B).

Where they meet and where they part. They meet at one point: in a dispersed situation, roads are not chosen for people from one place (what Paper 6, E34 gives are general conditions that do not designate content; that is the direction of arrangement this series proposes here, not something taken from this essay). They part over grounds: Hayek's ground is the dispersal of knowledge, so that choosing roads on people's behalf cannot be done; this series' ground is to whom direction belongs, so that choosing roads on people's behalf does not fall to it (Paper 6, E37). This falls on the second line. Hayek himself also says that, as far as scientific knowledge is concerned, a body of suitably chosen experts may be best placed to command the best knowledge available; what he wants to say is that there is besides a body of very important knowledge that cannot be called scientific, the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place ("a body of suitably chosen experts may be in the best position to command all the best knowledge available"; "there is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific"; §III, ibid.; tier B). So a body's knowing more about a particular risk does not weaken his reason there; the two can hold at once. What this series raises besides is a normative question: even knowing more does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction for him. The two reasons meet at this point; the rest is examined case by case.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). To whom direction belongs is an ethical claim; the dispersal of knowledge is a testable fact. By putting the former in place of the latter, you have exchanged an argument that experience can support for a stance that can only be professed.

Reply. This series does not put the former in place of the latter; the two stand side by side. It grants the dispersal of knowledge, and also grants that in some situations a body knows more; what it says is that even knowing more does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction for him (Paper 6, E37). This step is a stance this series openly undertakes, coming from a human being's being an end in itself (§1.3); it does not pose as derived from fact, nor does it require the reader first to accept Hayek's empirical argument.

§6.2 Friedman: Profit Within the Rules of the Game

The common question. Whether a firm's goal can be profit alone. Paper 5 has already compared the two in place (Paper 5, §2), and this paper records it as it stands. Friedman said in The New York Times Magazine in 1970 that the responsibility of a corporate executive is to conduct the business in accordance with his employers' desires, "which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom"; at the end of the article he cites Capitalism and Freedom: business has one and only one social responsibility, "to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game" (per two online reprints read against each other; the original layout not confirmed; tier B).

Where they meet and where they part. They meet in not giving return a place without boundaries: his profit stays within the basic rules of the society and within the rules of the game. They part over where the boundary comes from: for him the boundary is given from outside, and profit is pursued as far as law and ethical custom draw it; for this series, the rate of return set as the sole goal is a signal to be examined, and if it acquires a standing that overrides guarding the line, cancels questioning and change of direction, or decides for the investee its own ends, it is judged by these actual effects (Paper 5, E27); the line is the boundary between limit and violation, decided by structure, and does not advance or retreat with the law and custom of the moment (Institution Theory Z9; Theory of Government G18). This falls on the second line.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). An executive who takes the shareholders' money to pursue social goals he himself has settled on is taxing the shareholders without authorization; in requiring that, beyond return, the line be examined, and questioning and change of direction be examined, you are asking executives to legislate for society.

Reply. This series does not require executives to pursue social goals they have settled on themselves, nor does it write oughts for the executive as a person; the ought is addressed to the construct, and the position takes accountability (§1.2). What it requires is not setting up another goal, but not crossing the line and being open to questioning: the line is not a social end the executive chooses for himself, but a boundary that holds for everyone acted on (Paper 2, E9). This has the same form as Friedman's requirement of staying "within the rules of the game"; the only difference is that this series does not leave that line for the rules of the moment to set.

§6.3 Nozick: The History of Holdings

The common question. What decides whether a holding is just. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Nozick's political philosophy, Nozick's theory of rights is historical: a holding is just in that it came about through entitling acts of acquisition, transfer or rectification, not in whether the overall distribution conforms to some pattern; with the example of a basketball star he shows that voluntary exchanges quickly upset any preset pattern, and that maintaining a pattern would require repeated interference in people's voluntary dealings (per E. Mack's entry, §4.1, §4.2; tier C); his Lockean proviso, as the entry paraphrases it, takes as its test whether a person's welfare is worsened by others' appropriation, and Nozick does not spell out its baseline (ibid., §4.3; tier C).

Surface of contact. Per the entry, Nozick does not judge whether a holding is just by the pattern of overall distribution; this series too does not take the outcome of distribution as its terminus (the Prequel, §4). What this series goes on to ask is how a justly acquired holding, in use, converges others and seals off their roads; there, checks are still needed (Paper 3, E17). How the original book handles the use made of a just holding, and the boundaries of that use, the entry relied on does not give in full, and this paper does not say that his question stops at holding. Between the Lockean proviso and the sole position of supply at the life-substrate (Paper 2, E11a) there is a possible contact; once the original has been examined, it is to be seen how Nozick handles a resource that is sole and necessary; this paper does not take this step on secondary material.

§7 Spheres and Exchange

§7.1 Walzer and Sandel

Walzer. The Prequel and Paper 4 have each paraphrased Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1983) in place. The Prequel follows the summary in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Equality": each kind of social good has its own sphere, and what is to be ended is the domination of some goods over other spheres, money buying power in the political sphere, for example (the Prequel, §4; tier C). Paper 4, per den Hartogh 1999's paraphrase, lists the "blocked exchanges" he gives in the book: political power and office, personal freedom, several basic freedoms, the right to emigrate and to leave, exemption from communally imposed work, love and others, among which desperate exchanges are accounted for by the principle of need; Paper 4 there listed only the points open to comparison (Paper 4, §4; tier C), and drew no conclusion of meeting or parting.

Once the original book has been examined, two questions are to be decided. First, whether his division of spheres and this series' two gates answer "what money cannot buy" at the same layer, or whether the one gives the whole boundary of money's sphere while the other gives only restrictions on two conversions: Paper 4 has already written explicitly that the two gates are not the full list of what money cannot buy (Paper 4, E24). Second, his ground, per the paraphrase, lies in the distributive principles of each sphere; the ground of this series' two gates lies in structure, one in people's Base Layer, one in the channels of questioning; whether the two grounds meet or part, and at which step each does, will be written only once the original book has been examined. This paper does not write "this series lists only two gates" as a rebuttal of his whole account of exchange.

Sandel. Paper 4, per Kennedy's 2012 review, paraphrased the two objections in Sandel's What Money Can't Buy (2012): fairness, that in unequal circumstances a free choice may not be free; and corruption, that putting a thing on the market can dissolve the value it originally had (Paper 4, §4; tier C). Paper 4 there listed only the points open to comparison: the former objection touches the same kind of situation as "a signature does not change this reading either," in Paper 4, §1: where circumstances press on a person, what the consent in a transaction shows; the latter asks about the meaning of a thing, and the two gates do not take the meaning of things as their ground. Under what circumstances the market changes the meaning of a thing, and which of this series' boundaries this question connects with, will be written once the original book has been examined. What is to be decided once the original book has been examined is whether his "corruption" argument falls, within this series, wholly in the Emergence Layer outside the gates, or whether part of it touches "reputation cannot be purchased" (Paper 1, E4; Paper 4, E24).

§7.2 Frankfurt: Enough

The common question. Whether inequality as such is a matter to be asked about. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Egalitarianism," §6.2, the sufficientarian line holds that what matters for justice is neither priority nor equality; its positive thesis is that it is especially important that people be above a certain line, and its negative thesis is that inequality above the line is irrelevant to justice. The entry lists Frankfurt's "Equality as a Moral Ideal" (1987) under this line; the two theses are the entry's summary of this line, not a paraphrase of Frankfurt's original (per D. Axelsen's entry; tier C).

Surface of contact. Nor does this series take the gap as such as the matter to be asked about (the Prequel, §4); that the Base Layer is to be secured is adjacent to the positive thesis the entry summarizes (Paper 3, E14a; Paper 6, E35). Once the original has been examined, two points are to be decided. One is "the line": the sufficientarian line, in the entry's paraphrase, is a threshold of holdings or of welfare; this series' basic rights are anchored in dimensions, and do not take a quantity of resources as the line, the list lying at the rule layer (Paper 2, E10); some embedded recognition-based entitlements are also in this series' Base Layer, and this thicker layer is not wholly reduced to the type criterion of basic rights (the Prequel, §7). The other is "above the line": sufficientarianism says that inequality above the line is irrelevant to justice; this series says that the gap above the line is not itself the problem, but that the use of accumulation is still subject to checks, and that conversion still meets the two gates. On which line the two points fall is settled once the original book has been examined.

§7.3 Hirschman: Exit, Seen from the Economic Side

Action Theory Paper 0 from the side of a person, and Institution Theory Paper 0 from the side of the institution, have each conversed with Hirschman. This paper adds only the economic side. The wording and page numbers below are cited at second hand from Action Theory Paper 0, §7.

The common question. Exit and voice. Hirschman says that exit is when "Some customers stop buying the firm's products or some members leave the organization" (Hirschman 1970, p. 4); and voice is "any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs" (p. 30).

Point of contact. Hirschman says that in organizations such as the family and the state, exit is scarcely available, and voice is the only response open to dissatisfied members (p. 33, as cited). Paper 2 separated the same bands at the level of relations: in the band where exit is nearly impossible, institutions must bear the full burden of counterbalancing; employment is in the band of frictional but possible exit; exit's existing as a right is not its being affordable for a livelihood (Paper 2, E13).

Where they part. Hirschman starts from decline, and exit and voice are both mechanisms of recovery that bring an organization back to its proper functioning (pp. 1, 82, as cited). This series reads the other face of exit: it is a structural channel, and sealing it off is violation (Paper 2, E12); where it is there, it guards the first premise of emergence in the free market, that markets with nonzero exit freedom exist (Paper 2, E13, following Economics P5). Even an organization that is not declining must keep the road of exit open. The wording and page numbers cited in place in Paper 2 are also taken at second hand from the same place.

§8 Inequality and Concentration

§8.1 Piketty and Robeyns

Piketty. Paper 5 paraphrased Capital in the Twenty-First Century (French edition 2013, English translation 2014), per the publisher's description and encyclopedia entries: the rate of return on capital stays above the rate of economic growth over the long run, and wealth therefore concentrates at the top; he proposes a progressive, global tax on capital in response (Paper 5, §3; tier C). Paper 5 there listed only the points open to comparison: one is the accumulation of return over time, which runs across a generation and also changes where the next generation stands; the other is at the terminus: this series does not take the outcome of distribution as its terminus, and what is to be asked is how accumulation is used. Whether he also asks these things, and how, will be written once the original book has been examined. Tax is, in this series, a matter for the rule layer, and is not judged (the Prequel, §8).

Robeyns. Paper 3 paraphrased Limitarianism (2024), per an interview: an upper limit is set on individual wealth, a political limit and an ethical limit; one of the reasons is that extreme wealth turns into political power and harms democracy (Paper 3, §1; tier C). Paper 3 there listed only the points open to comparison: per the paraphrase, her reasons include the layer of accumulation turning into political power, and this series too, in Paper 4, asks how money turns into control over questioning. Once the original book has been examined, two questions are to be decided: her limit falls on the quantity held, while this series' checks fall on use; whether, for her, these two substitute for each other or can run side by side; and how she handles use within the limit.

§8.2 Khan: Market Power Beyond Price

The common question. By what the power of a large platform is to be measured. The abstract of Khan's 2017 article in the Yale Law Journal on platforms and antitrust begins: "This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competition to 'consumer welfare,' defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy"; it also says: "Second, because online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, integrating across business lines positions these platforms to control the essential infrastructure on which their rivals depend" (L. M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Yale Law Journal 126: 710 (2017), per the abstract on the journal's website and in the author's institutional repository; tier B).

There are two points of contact.

First, the power-face is not measured by price. Paper 3 says that the power-face is compared by its particular effects: whom it converges, down to which dimension, how many must pass through it, how great the cost of walking away; no single scale of total assets is set (Paper 3, E14). Khan says that measuring competition by short-term price effects cannot capture the architecture of market power. Both refuse to measure a position's power by a single number.

Second, the marketplace and selling within it. Paper 3 takes as its example a market that is both the marketplace and a seller within it: search ranking, price terms and logistics bundling fall on tens of thousands of sellers (Paper 3, §1). Khan says that integration across business lines lets a platform control the infrastructure its rivals depend on. Both look at the same structure: a position that is at once a chokepoint others must pass through and a party competing with them there (Paper 2, E7).

Is it the same thing? In part. There are two differences.

First, the layer. Khan's article argues within the framework of antitrust law, and what it would change is a legal standard; this series stops at the normative layer, saying only that checks increase with the power-face and fall on how it is used, and handing measures, forms and thresholds to the rule layer (Paper 3, E19). Her proposal is, in this series' terms, one way of writing at the rule layer.

Second, the means. Per the abstract, the article closes by considering two possible institutional responses: restoring traditional antitrust and competition policy principles, or applying common carrier obligations and duties (per the abstract in the author's institutional repository). This series says that breakup and reorganization are among the means of keeping positions from being final; where checks land on a particular use that seals off a road, that use may be contracted, and the means must state their effect, cost and alternative arrangements (Paper 3, E18); where one place is at once production and choking, it does not promise in advance that the two sides can be separated without loss (Paper 3, E17). Whether the particular means on the two sides are the same calls for examining the argument of her main text, and is not settled in advance by two passages of an abstract.

How far the agreement goes. Agreement goes as far as two points: market power cannot be measured by price alone; a position that is both the marketplace and a competitor within it holds what others depend on. The two part from the layer onward; whether they part over means is settled once the main text has been examined.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). To stop at the normative layer and give no legal standard is to give enforcers nothing they can use; if "checks increase with the power-face" has no operable measure, those who enforce can only fall back on price, because that is the only thing that can be measured.

Reply. This series grants that this is where it stops: the power-face has no commensurable scale, registered in §9.4, the first slot. What it gives is not a measure but criteria: whom it converges, down to which dimension, how many pass through it, the cost of walking away (Paper 3, E14); each of these can be examined at a particular position, without first having one overall number. The rule layer can write them into a standard, and Khan's proposal is one way of writing it; this series does not claim that any one way of writing is the best.

§9 Handovers and Remainders

§9.1 The Three Items Expressly Handed On from Upstream

The Prequel, §9, listed the three items expressly handed on from upstream to here, and stated that an address being fixed is not the same as being settled. They are settled here. Settlement has three routes: discharge, where that work has been done; public reassignment, where it is stated that the work goes elsewhere; public withdrawal, where it is stated that the work will not be done. The table below is the receiving side's own statement, not a sign-off made on upstream's behalf.

Source	The part this series takes up	Settlement	Where it lands	The part not in this series
Economics P3 §5.3: "The repair and design of bad institutions falls within the scope of political philosophy and institutional design theory (SAE foundational series Paper 6 (Qin 2026a) has provided the theoretical framework of self-chiseling necessity), not within the scope of an economics paper."	the half of repair and design on the economic side that lies at the normative layer; the handover is read as far as §5.2	discharge	Papers 2 to 5; Paper 3, E16, Paper 4, E22 (captured channels of questioning)	particular design: specific theories of institutions
Economics P1 §8.2: "The DD framework needs to develop a nurturing economics that does not take ROI as its ultimate criterion. This is an open question."	as far as the normative layer	discharged in part; the rest publicly reassigned	Paper 5, E27, E28	who bears the economic cost of cultivation: the rule layer; a full "nurturing economics": not proposed by this series
Moral Law P3 §9.2: "Is this influence structurally distinct from power, or does it shade into power under certain conditions?"	the mixed-reality side: the face in which reputation is taken by others as a condition of a chokepoint, and the records and scores once it has been turned into indicators	this part discharged	Paper 1, E5; Paper 4, E22	the side of the holder of reputation: read separately under Power Theory; the side of the idealized case: at its original address

That sentence of Economics P3 is to be read together with what comes before and after it. In §5.3 it says that bad institutions can be captured, and that it does not develop this, because individuals in a sufficient market will identify bad institutions and then get clear of them; leaving depends on institutions lowering the cost of exit, and that paper has already said so in §5.2, of what institutions are to do: "reducing 15DD's exit costs, ensuring 15DD can leave after recognizing 'this situation is non-cultivable'". So the handover is read as far as §5.2. What this series adds is those who cannot leave: those who have no affordable substitute at the life-substrate, and those whose leaving is locked by several constraints together (Paper 2, E11a, E12).

§9.2 Adjacent, Not Taken Up

• Theory of Government G20a, the remainder on taxation: not taken up; tax belongs to the rule layer (the Prequel, §8).
• Distributive justice: no account of its own is set up (the Prequel, §4).
• The institutional relations between company and company, and between states and companies: Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 8 states explicitly that it does not take them up; this series does not unfold them either, nor does it register either side as having taken them up (Paper 3, E20); they are registered in the second slot below.

§9.3 Handed Downstream

• A theory of the firm: the design of a company's internal governance; the two organizational types of Economics P6; the unfolding of the Corporate Principles at the level of the company; labor terms other than non-competes.
• A theory of the university: the chokepoints of certification and admission (Paper 5, E31).
• Specific theories of institutions: measures, forms and thresholds at the rule layer (Paper 3, E19); the list of the content of basic rights (Paper 2, E10); the particular content of the accountability of supply at the life-substrate (Paper 2, E11a); rules on non-compete agreements, and thresholds for conditional payments (Paper 2, E12a).
• The Theory of Government: a rescue as such is a grant (Paper 4, E25); how an embedded supply is guaranteed, pointing to and from Paper 2, E11a.
• The Theory of the State (published): how the range of a state's members is drawn: "Who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State." (Theory of Government Paper 3) This series says only that, among members, eligibility to vote does not rise or fall with standing in the Emergence Layer (§3.2).
• The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation (published): the functional boundaries of cooperation among states; conditions of relocation across borders, and economic positions, follow the boundaries it already has (Paper 3, E20).

These are all handovers whose address is fixed. An address being fixed is not the same as being settled; until the corresponding work has a discharge that can be examined, a public reassignment or a public withdrawal, they are registered in their present state.

§9.4 Where This Series Stops

Registration is in six slots. What the six slots distinguish is the nature of what was not continued; they are not six blanks that every series is to fill.

The first slot: the remainder this construct itself has left. The power-face has no commensurable scale: Paper 3 gave criteria for comparison, and did not give a ruler that can make any two positions commensurable (Paper 3, E14, E19). Identifying the "sole goal" has no scale: the rate of return set as the sole goal is a signal to be examined, and when the signal has become an actual effect is judged by effect, with no threshold (Paper 5, E27).

The second slot: objects adjacent to the jurisdiction. Price theory; distributive justice; tax; the institutional relations between company and company, and between states and companies (Paper 3, E20).

The third slot: conclusions that have reached their limit. An economy does not become a good person by being subject to checks; it has no first person; what checks give is places, one by one, where questions can be asked (Paper 6, E39). It is not that a way has not yet been found; what this layer can give is just this.

The fourth slot: research candidates. The particular content of the accountability of supply at the life-substrate: the source of the accountability and its two routes have been established, the content lies at the rule layer, and what counts as sole, and what counts as an affordable substitute, have not been settled here (Paper 2, E11a). How public support counts as commensurate: the position that gives the support must state its grounds, authority, object and cost, and no measure of commensurateness has been set up (Paper 4, E25). The institutional conditions of economic dependence and political participation: there are already the requirements that accumulation not cancel standing in the Base Layer, and that the channels of questioning and actual control not be bought (Paper 4, E21–E23); where economic dependence puts pressure on participation, how in particular the road of asking is to be arranged, how retaliation is to be avoided, and how the accountability of enforcement is to be divided, this series gives only direction for, and hands to specific theories of institutions (§3.2).

The fifth slot: handovers whose address is already fixed. A theory of the firm, a theory of the university, specific theories of institutions, the Theory of Government, the Theory of the State: see §9.3.

The sixth slot: questions that could be seen only against the schools. Two items, both seen clearly only in this paper's conversations. This paper has written how far it has seen them, and has not written them up as already answered.

1. Spontaneous countervailing power. The countervailing power Galbraith speaks of is a check that grows up spontaneously out of another accumulation (§5.2). A party that grows up in this way is itself an economic position, examined, public and private alike, by its actual power-face (Paper 3, E14, E15); in this series, checks are acts of a construct, and those who check are themselves questioned (Paper 3, E16). What the seven papers have not handled separately is whether countervailing of this kind counts as checks in this series' sense, its particular forms, and how the two parties check each other.
2. How aggregate gain compares with the boundary that holds for each person. Smith takes the public interest as the measure of the dealers' proposals (§3.1); this series takes structure as its measure, and the line holds for everyone acted on (Paper 2, E9; Paper 4, E21). Where an arrangement is advantageous on the whole yet seals off the road of a few at some place, how the two measures compare is a general research question; this paper has not said, on the passages cited, that Smith lacks this boundary, nor have the seven papers written it out with a case.

Where This Paper Stops

This paper has done four things. First it had this machine give an account of itself: it asks where accumulated power shows itself and how an institution checks its use; its sentence form, three layers and main line follow the seven papers; it divides the work with the Economics series, Institution Theory and the Theory of Government; it is not the same thing as the value theory of classical political economy. Then it interfaced with the tradition: with the schools whose originals have been examined it took all four steps, and with those reached only through secondary material it wrote as far as the surface of contact and the question that stays open until the original has been examined; several of the differences fall on two lines, one asking where the question falls, on holding and distribution or on use and conversion, the other asking about the ground, where the boundary comes from. Next it settled the three items expressly handed on from upstream, and listed the addresses handed downstream. Last, it registered in six slots the places where this series stops.

What it has not done: it has not delivered a verdict of "already refuted" on any school; it has not, on secondary material, gone past the step the in-place comparisons of the seven papers had already written; it has given no scale for the power-face, nor a full "nurturing economics."

Left for later: the schools reached only through secondary material can be raised in tier once the original books have been examined, and their comparisons rewritten; whether the two items of the sixth slot, and the item on economic dependence in the fourth slot, each call for separate handling is left to later work.

The schools are interlocutors, not premises of this series. The questions outside the jurisdiction each have their own grounds; this series does not answer them on their behalf, nor does it deny them.

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The verification tier of each external work is given in the paraphrase audit table that accompanies this paper. The other seven papers of this series are not yet published; in the text they are cited by paper and proposition number.

I · This system

Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662

Qin, H. (2026). Four Layers of Economic Rationality: A Diagnostic Extension of the Rational Agent from Dimensional Sequence Theory (SAE Economics, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19358010

Qin, H. (2026). Dimensional Sequence Economics in Mixed Markets: Remote Observation, Clustering, and Emergence (SAE Economics, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19384446

Qin, H. (2026). The Structural Inevitability of 15DD Emergence in Free Markets: From Baseline Collisions to Perceptual Leap (SAE Economics, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19394738

Qin, H. (2026). Kingdom of Ends vs Kingdom of Means: Phase-Transition Acceleration in the Age of AI (SAE Economics, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19396633

Qin, H. (2026). The Reputation Economy · Dao (SAE Moral Law, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20046168

Qin, H. (2026). What Power Is Not · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20368866

Qin, H. (2026). On the Thickness and Boundary of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20769253

Qin, H. (2026). The Interface and Transformation between Recognition-Based Rights and Power (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21093939

Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595

Qin, H. (2026). The Place of Judgment (SAE Action Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22974154

Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635

Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384

Qin, H. (2026). Institution Theory and the Tradition: The Address of the Ought (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23272468

Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112

Qin, H. (2026). Questioning and Bearing (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511

Qin, H. (2026). The Close (SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815796

II · External works (public-domain originals, tier A)

Kant, I. (1793). Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), Bd. VIII, 273–313. Per the Korpora transcription of the Academy edition (8:291, 8:295).

Kant, I. (1797). Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre, §46. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), Bd. VI. Per the Korpora transcription of the Academy edition (6:314–315).

Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Project Gutenberg, EBook #3300. (Book I, ch. V, X, XI; Book V, ch. I)

Smith, A. (1777). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Dublin: J. Beatty and C. Jackson (the title page reads "The Sixth Edition"). Project Gutenberg, EBook #67363. (Part III, ch. I)

Smith, A. (1872). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In The Essays of Adam Smith. London: Alex. Murray & Co. Project Gutenberg, EBook #58559. (Part I, Sect. III, ch. III; Part III, ch. II; Part VI, Sect. II, ch. II)

III · External works (original in hand; edition or location not confirmed, tier B)

Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. The New York Times Magazine. (read against two online reprints)

Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530. (per the online text of the Library of Economics and Liberty)

Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon's Antitrust Paradox. Yale Law Journal, 126, 710. (per the abstract and citation on the journal's website and in the author's institutional repository; full text not examined)

Marx, K. (1867). Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Bd. 1, Kap. 25. (German per textlog.de; English translation per marxists.org, ch. 33; edition and translator not confirmed)

IV · External works (paraphrased from secondary sources, tier C; the original books not read against the text)

Axelsen, D. "Egalitarianism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025-03-12. (paraphrasing Frankfurt 1987)

Den Hartogh, G. (1999). The Architectonic of Michael Walzer's Theory of Justice. Political Theory, 27, 491–522. (paraphrasing Walzer 1983)

Estlund, D. (2018). Review of Private Government. Harvard Law Review, 131, 795. (paraphrasing Anderson 2017)

Henderson, D. R. (ed.). The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty: "Ronald H. Coase"; "John Kenneth Galbraith". (paraphrasing Coase 1937; Galbraith 1952)

Kennedy, D. M. (2012). The Root of All…. Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, 26. (paraphrasing Sandel 2012)

Mack, E. "Robert Nozick's Political Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rev. 2026-06-03. (paraphrasing Nozick 1974)

Sandkühler, H. J. (1970). Hegel – Theoretiker der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 34/1970. (paraphrasing Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §§243–246)

What the remaining schools rest on (Polanyi, Thompson, Berle and Means, Piketty, Robeyns, and the summary of Walzer in the entry "Equality") is as given in the references and paraphrase audit tables of the seven papers.

V · External works (cited at second hand)

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press. (wording and page numbers as cited in Action Theory Paper 0, §7)

Interfaces

Main upstream: the structure of Institution Theory Paper 0 (the machine's account of itself, method, interfacing, settling accounts, six slots); this series' Prequel, §9 (the accounts handed down from upstream).

Also used: Economics P1 §8.2, Economics P3 §5.2, §5.3, Economics P5; Moral Law P3 §9.2; the Power Theory Prequel, §III; Rights Theory P2 §II, P4 §II (the classification of voting and its power-face), P5 F19, F20 (the gravity of non-compete agreements); Institution Theory Z4 (the interior drawn by entanglement); Theory of Government Paper 3 (who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State); Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 8 (institutions between institutions not taken up); Action Theory Paper 0, §7 (Hirschman's page numbers).

Interfacing: Smith (The Wealth of Nations, The Theory of Moral Sentiments; A), Kant (A); Marx, Hayek, Friedman, Khan (B); Hirschman (cited at second hand); Hegel, Polanyi, Thompson, Berle and Means, Coase, Galbraith, Anderson, Nozick, Walzer, Sandel, Frankfurt, Piketty, Robeyns (C).

This series: the Prequel, §§1, 4, 6, 8, 9; Paper 1, E1–E6; Paper 2, E7, E9–E13, E11a, E12a; Paper 3, E14–E20, E14a; Paper 4, E21–E25; Paper 5, E26, E27, E28, E31; Paper 6, E32, E34–E39.

Handed to what follows: a theory of the firm, a theory of the university, specific theories of institutions, the Theory of Government, the Theory of the State (§9.3); the item in the fourth slot on economic dependence and political participation; the two items of the sixth slot.

写作声明：本文与 Claude（Anthropic）共同起草，所有思想决策、框架设计和最终编辑判断由作者做出。

引言

七篇写完以后才写这一篇。对话要在自己的对象立定以后做：先知道自己在说什么，才知道别人说的与自己差在哪里。七篇各在判断落下的地方随文对照过一至三家；这一篇把它们收在一处，补上随文没有篇幅去做的几家，也把各家的档次照实登记。随文写到哪一步，本篇不越过；有几家，本篇比随文多核到了一层：斯密（《国富论》第一卷第五、十章，《道德情操论》）、康德（AA 8:295、6:314—315）、哈耶克（《知识在社会中的运用》第三节的原句）；可汗只在本篇写到。

本篇不立命题，不给读者新的要求，也不改动七篇任何一句。它引用本系列，照篇次与命题号；引用各家，只写各家在哪一处主张什么，并给出最小可核的出处。各家是对话者，不是本系列的前提；本篇不写本系列替谁纠错，也不写谁预示了本系列。结构照制度论 Paper 0：机器自陈，方法，逐家对接，交接与余项；随文对接的体例照政府论。

外部文献分四档：

• A 档，已在可靠原文上确认这句话与它的位置：照引，给原文与位置；
• B 档，所据原文或译文的引句已核，原语言对照、版次或精确位置尚未确认：照引，并注明所据与未核之处；
• C 档，只据可靠的二手文献：只转述，写明所据，不加引号；
• D 档，未能确认：不引。

英文与德文的中译为本篇试译，原文附在括注里，核的是括注里的原文。

第一节　这是一台什么样的机器

一 · 它问的是什么

这个系列问的是：积累起来的东西，怎样在别人的决定里成为作用于他人的权力；制度对它取什么方向（前置篇引言）。积累，指在涌现层经交换与承认得来、可以留存与再用的东西：资本、名声、地位、资质、注意力与影响力。声誉不在其列：它取道德律第三篇的意思，不是资本，不可购买（第一篇 E4）。

它不问的，有五件：

• 价格怎样形成，货币是什么。 那是经济学系列与价格理论的事（前置篇第一节）。
• 分配的正义。 谁该得多少，制度论 Paper 0 与政府论第六篇都列作相邻的对象，本系列也不另立一套；差距本身不是要问的那件事（前置篇第四节）。
• 税。 税是规则层的事（前置篇第八节）。
• 公司内部的治理怎样设计。 那交公司论（前置篇第九节）。
• 条文与机构的形态。 本系列给方向与判据，形态交具体的制度论（前置篇第八节）。

它只处理一件：积累的权力在哪里显出来，制度怎样制衡它的使用，基础层的供给怎样保障，人的涌现怎样得到条件。

二 · 句式与三层

全系列的句式承制度论：构用应当，位置用职责，人用自己的法。持有、调动积累的公司与机构，不论大小，都是构，直接受话；董事、受托人、审核员在位置上，用职责；老窑工、一位家属、一个卖家各有自己的法，本系列不对他们写应当（前置篇第六节）。一个构也可以在更大的构里占一个位置，在那一格上持职责：生命基底处唯一的供给位置是一例（第二篇 E11a）。

每写到一条边界，都说明它落在哪一层：规范层立理念与判据；规则层给规则与例子，本系列对它只作建议，不代定，例子不主张是最好的；判断层是个案，交位置上的判断（前置篇第八节）。竞业禁止与附条件的给付是三层齐写的样例：分叉权说的是人有权选，选不选、为什么不选，是人自己的事；规范层判竞业禁止为侵，因为它拿走了这个选，轻重看它所及的地域、行业与期限（权利论第五篇 F19、F20），为保护他人而设、只限他去侵犯别人目的那一步的约束不在其列，限制一个人去侵犯别人的目的，不算侵犯这个人的目的；附条件的给付，三件判据都过时，选还在；两者的分界，规范层给判据；对规则层，本系列的建议是原则上不为竞业禁止开允许的口子，为保护他人的约束由规则层说明限的是哪一种行使、护的是谁、为什么非此不可、范围多宽，附条件的给付落在局部、可逆的限里，可以允许，也可以不允许；判断层看一条具体条款落在哪一边（第二篇 E12a）。

三 · 根与主线

这些应当的根，承制度论：人是目的本身。这个系列不另立一个规范根；它把制度论说给构的五条应当，推到载入并支持经济位置的制度，与持有、调动积累的构，推的地方各自标明（自担）。

主线有三截。第一截是"不以减少为目的"：权力不是问题，权力怎样使用才是问题（前置篇第四节；第三篇 E17）。第二截是两道闸：积累不兑换为对人的基础层的支配（第四篇 E21），也不兑换为对追问的控制（第四篇 E22）；政经分离是双向的，是第二道闸在公共权力一级的极端情形（第四篇 E23）。第三截是制衡的安排自己也可被追问（第三篇 E16）。主线之外还有一条按层的分工：构所做的事落在涌现层的，以制衡为主；落在基础层的，制衡之外还要保障那一项供给（第三篇 E14a）；为人的涌现给条件，叫支持；两层同等重要，一层不拿去换另一层，两个方向都不许（第六篇 E35）；涵育要两层加起来，基础层有保障，涌现层有支持，缺一样都不行（第六篇 E36）。

四 · 与上游的分工

经济学系列。 经济学系列给机制与必然，本系列接规范层。经济学第五篇说，在满足三条前提的市场里，15DD 的涌现是结构性必然；本系列只承涌现的必然，带它的前提，不承主导的必然（第六篇 E32）。经济学第三篇把坏制度的修复与设计交了出来，本系列接规范层那一半（本篇第九节）。

制度论。 制度论回答制度为了什么，五条应当说给一切具有制度身份的构。本系列在它之下，写积累的权力；政府论写授予的权力。同一个位置可以两种来源都有：一家只有十四名员工的水业公司，资产是积累的，它在生命基底处的供给却是管理它的制度或政府职责的一部分（第二篇 E11a）。

政府论。 授予的位置照政府论受制衡；本系列与它有几处重叠：已载入的供给怎样保证，捕获怎样判，退出的代价，线内的控制。重叠处两边互相指引，各写各的（第三篇 E15、E16；第四篇 E23）。

五 · 与古典政治经济学的价值论不是一回事

"政治经济学"这个名字，在古典的用法里连着一套价值论。斯密在《国富论》第一卷第五章问的是一件东西的真实价格：「每一件东西的真实价格，即它对想要得到它的人真正花费的，是取得它的辛劳与麻烦」（The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it；Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. V，据 Project Gutenberg #3300，A 档）。价值从哪里来，用什么作尺度，是那一套问题的核心。

这个系列不答这一问。它不问一件东西值多少，也不问价值的源头；它接过来的是同一章里紧挨着的另一句话所指的那件事：财富在别人的决定里成了什么样的力（第三节）。名字相同，题不相同。读这个系列的人，不必把古典的价值论读进来；读古典政治经济学的人，也不必在这里找一套价值论。

第二节　对接的方法

一 · 四步

每一场对话走四步：先找可核的共同问题；再看两家说的是不是同一件事；再说同意到哪里为止，从哪里分开；最后写对方一侧最强的一条反驳，与本系列的回应。反驳由本篇代拟，标明代拟，尽量触到对方的强处。有些问答只走到"那不在本系列的对象之内"，说明的是分工，不是一次完成的反驳与回应。

二 · 两种深度

原文核到的，四步走完：斯密、康德、马克思、哈耶克、弗里德曼、可汗；赫希曼的原文与页码转据行动论 Paper 0，制度论 Paper 0 已从制度一侧与他对过话，本篇只补经济的一侧。

只到二手材料的，走到共同的问题与接触面为止：黑格尔、波兰尼、汤普森、伯利与米恩斯、科斯、加尔布雷斯、安德森、诺齐克、沃尔泽、桑德尔、法兰克福、皮凯蒂、罗宾斯。这些单元里，本篇写明据什么转述、接触面在哪里、原文核到以后要决定的是哪一问；不写"同在""分在"的定论。七篇随文在这些地方也只列可对照之处，本篇与它们一致。

三 · 差异落在两条线上

对话写下来，有几处差异落在同样的两条线上。先立在这里，后面各节在落在线上的地方标明；只到二手材料的几家，不标。两条线是本篇的归纳，不是哪一家自己的分法，也不是全部差异的分类。

第一条，问落在哪里：持有与分配，还是使用与兑换。 有的传统把要问的事落在一个人持有多少、一个社会的分配格局上。哪几家落在这一边，只到二手材料的，原书核到再定；本篇不拿它们作例子。这个系列不以持有的数量与分配的结果为终点，制衡落在积累怎样使用上：它收敛了谁的路，换成了什么，封住了谁的问（前置篇第四节；第三篇 E17）。

第二条，根据：边界从哪里来。 有的传统给市场划边界，根据在效率，在知识的分散，或在公共的利益；据二手材料，也有以各种善自己的领域与意义划界的，那几家原书核到再定。这个系列的边界从结构来：一项作用有没有关闭一个人已纳入的维度，有没有封死退出、拒绝与撤回的路，有没有使被问的一方能独自关门（第二篇 E9、E12；第四篇 E22）；在涌现层，从人自己的方向来：方向是一个人自己的不得不，给条件的一方不因知道得多而取得替他定方向的权限（第六篇 E37）。

第三节　财富、分工与国家

一 · 斯密：财富是买的力，不是政治的力

共同的问题。 积累起来的东西，给持有者带来的是什么样的力。斯密在同一章里写道：「财富，如霍布斯先生所说，就是力。但一个取得或继承了一大笔财产的人，并不必然因此取得或继承任何政治的权力，无论文的还是武的。他的财产也许给了他取得这两者的手段，但仅仅占有那份财产，并不必然把两者中的哪一种交给他。那份占有直接交给他的力，是购买的力：对当时市场上的全部劳动、或全部劳动产品的一定支配」（Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing a certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market；Book I, ch. V，A 档）。

接点有三处。

其一，持有不等于政治的力。斯密分开购买的力与政治的力：前者由占有直接给出，后者"并不必然"随之而来，财产"也许"给了取得它的手段。第四篇的两道闸立在同一道缝上，政经分离是第二道闸在公共权力一级的极端情形：钱可以换来机会、资本、资质与职位，这些照常放开（第四篇 E24）；钱不买成审它、问它的那份政治权力，积累不兑换为对追问的控制（第四篇 E22、E23）。斯密写的是"不必然"，那是一个描述；本系列在同一道缝上设的是闸。

其二，做买卖的一方的利益。斯密在第一卷末尾说，任何一门生意的经营者，其利益总在某些方面与公众的利益不同，甚至相反：「扩大市场、缩小竞争，总是经营者的利益……凡出自这一阶层的新的商业法律或规章的提议，都应当以极大的审慎去听，非经长期、仔细的审查，不应采纳；不仅要以最认真的注意，也要以最怀疑的注意去审查」（To widen the market, and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. … The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention；Book I, ch. XI, Conclusion of the Chapter，A 档）。第四篇随文已引这一句（第四篇第三节）。第四篇说，规则的制定是问的通道之一，积累不得兑换成使被问的一方能独自关闭追问的地位（第四篇 E22）；州议会删去拆分一款时，九名受捐、八票赞成，要核的正是有没有买走问它的那条路（第四篇 E23）。

其三，同行的聚会。斯密说，同一行业的人很少聚在一起，哪怕为了消遣，谈话最后不落到一桩对付公众的密谋、或抬高价格的某种安排上；法律不能禁止这样的聚会，「但它不应做任何事情去便利这样的聚会，更不应使之成为必要」（it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary；Book I, ch. X, Part II，A 档）。第三篇说制衡要说明它处理的是哪一项封路的用法（第三篇 E17）；制度不为封路提供便利，与斯密这一句同向。

另一部书。 斯密先是道德哲学家。人们记得《国富论》，常常忘了他十七年前出版的《道德情操论》（1759）。那一部书里，与本系列相接的地方至少有三处。

其一，被赞美与值得赞美。斯密说：「我们高兴的，不只是被赞美，也是做了值得赞美的事」（We are pleased not only with praise, but with having done what is praise-worthy；The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, ch. I，据 1777 年都柏林印本，A 档；通行的第六版结构里在 Part III, ch. II，1872 年本字同，"pleased"后多一逗号）。接点在第一篇：本系列把名声与声誉分开，名声可以积累、交换、兑换，声誉不作积累的对象（第一篇 E4）。被赞美，是别人实际给出的；值得赞美，系于一个人做了什么，不系于有没有人给出。同在一处：两边都不把别人实际给出的赞誉当作要问的那件东西本身：斯密在它之外另认值得赞美，本系列在可以积累的名声之外另认声誉。两样不是同一样东西。分在根据：斯密的值得赞美，立在想象中公正的旁观者会怎样看上；本系列的声誉取道德律第三篇的意思，是承认关系的分布式显现，本身就系于他人，不系于一个想象的旁观者。两种根据能不能互相照亮，要另作专门的比较，本篇只记到这里。

其二，对富人的仰慕。斯密后来改订这部书时加了一章，开头一句是：「这种仰慕、几乎崇拜富人与有权势的人，轻视或至少怠慢贫贱者的倾向，虽然为建立与维持等级的区分与社会的秩序所必需，同时却是我们道德情感败坏的最大、最普遍的原因」（This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments；Part I, Sect. III, ch. III，据 1872 年本，A 档）。他接着说，财富与显赫常常得到只该给智慧与德性的敬重，这是历代道德家的抱怨。接点在第四篇：钱可以买来标识，买不来声誉（第四篇第四节）；财富可以换来名声、注意力与机会，这些在涌现层照常放开（第四篇 E24）。斯密写的是另一面：人们把对智慧与德性的敬重给了财富与地位，财富本身换不来的东西，在别人的判断里被它占了位置。本篇的读法是，这是兑换在别人判断里的投影；第四篇的闸挡不到这一层，也不该去挡，敬重给谁，是每个人自己的判断。同在一处：两边都不认财富与地位当得起对智慧与德性的那份敬重。分在一处：斯密认这一倾向为等级与社会的秩序所必需；本系列不讨论等级是否必需，只问这份敬重有没有被一个位置拿去作关口决定的条件（第一篇 E5）。

其三，体系之人。这一节也是后来改订时加的，写一种爱上自己理想的治理方案、容不得一点偏离的人：「他似乎以为，他能像手摆布棋盘上的各个棋子那样容易地摆布一个大社会的各个成员……他没有想到，棋盘上的棋子除了手加给它们的，没有别的运动原则；而在人类社会这个大棋盘上，每一个棋子都有它自己的运动原则，与立法者可能选择加给它的完全不同」（He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it；Part VI, Sect. II, ch. II，据 1872 年本，A 档）。接点在第六篇，主指 E37：支持可以有课程、任务一类具体的内容，不取得替人定人生方向的权限；第六篇 E35 说的"涌现层给的是条件，内容由人自己定"，那里的内容是人生的目的，由人自己认。"每一个棋子都有它自己的运动原则"，与本系列说的人自己的法相邻，不是同一个词义。同在一处：两边都看到，人自己有动的原则，不是设计者加给他的。斯密并不拒绝成体系的观念，他在下一段说，「某种一般的、甚至成体系的关于政策与法律完善的观念，对指引政治家的眼光无疑也许是必要的」（Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman；同处，A 档）；本系列也不因一项安排成体系就反对它。他接着说，不顾一切反对、要一下子把它全部推行，「是把他自己的判断立为是非的最高标准」（It is to erect his own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong；同处，A 档）。同在的还有这一层：设计者不能凭方案在自己看来完整，就把自己的判断放在别人之上。两边的根据不同：斯密从体系之人的傲慢与公共精神讲，本系列从每一个人自己的法与制度的施为不越线讲；两种根据是否同构，要另作比较，本篇不凭推行的急缓预先说它们分在哪里。这一处与第三节第二小节的康德、第六节第一小节的哈耶克落在同一片地上，三家各从一边来：康德从父权式的政府，哈耶克从知识的分散，斯密从体系之人对棋子的设想。

版次要交代：其一据 1777 年都柏林印本；其二、其三所在的那一章与那一节，那个印本里没有，据 1872 年伦敦 Alex. Murray 本《亚当·斯密文集》所收的《道德情操论》，两处原文逐字照它校过，拼写照它（chess-board）。两本都据 Project Gutenberg 的转录，印本影像未看。

是不是同一件事。 部分是。有两处分别。

第一，根据。斯密在《国富论》这几处的尺度是公众的利益：经营者缩小竞争，等于向其余的同胞征一笔荒谬的税（Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. XI, Conclusion of the Chapter）。本系列的尺度在结构：一项作用收敛了谁，压到哪一个维度，封了谁的路（第二篇 E7；第三篇 E14）。本系列逐个人、逐个配置去核；斯密的公众利益怎样与某一个人的损失相比，所引的几段没有说，这里不替他答。尺度的用词不同，这落在第二条线上。

第二，制衡的对象。斯密警惕的是一个阶层，商人与制造业主：「一个其利益从来与公众的利益不完全相同的阶层」（an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public；Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. XI, Conclusion of the Chapter）。本系列判操作，不判人：同一个持权者可以一处开路、一处握着别人的路（第六篇 E38）。要核的是一项施为，不是一个阶层的利益所在。

同意到哪里。 同意到三处为止：占有给出的是购买的力，政治的力不必然随之而来；出自经营者的规则提议，须以怀疑的注意审查；制度不为同行的封路提供便利。从根据与对象起分开。《道德情操论》的三处另记：被赞美与值得赞美分开；财富与地位当不起对智慧与德性的敬重；人类社会这个棋盘上，每一个棋子都有它自己的运动原则。

对方最强的反驳（本篇代拟）。 你们把制衡落在每一项用法上，逐个人、逐个配置去核，代价太大；看住经营者那一阶层的提议，让竞争自己去拆他们的密谋，便宜得多，也不需要一个什么都要过问的制度。

回应。 本系列不要一个什么都要过问的制度：闸以外，涌现层的交换照常放开（第四篇 E24）；量法、形态与门槛在规则层，门槛以下守线与受问不弱，却不必有正式的分权（第三篇 E19）。竞争确实是一种制衡，退出真实正是本系列在关系一级守的东西（第二篇 E13）。可是竞争在关口处会失灵：一个人在生命基底处没有可负担的替代时，竞争拆不了那一处（第二篇 E11a）。本系列要核的，也不只是出自经营者的规则提议，还有日常运行里的每一项用法：泉坳那家水业公司停水，不经任何提议，同样握着别人的路（第二篇 E7）。

二 · 康德：父权，与被动的公民

康德在本系列里出现过一次：第六篇讨论支持能不能替人定方向时，引了《论俗语：这在理论上可能是正确的，但不适用于实践》（1793）里那一句，以臣民幸福为目标、像父亲对孩子那样施行善意的政府，「是可设想的最大专制」（ist der größte denkbare Despotismus；AA 8:291 第 3—4 行，A 档）。那一处的同与分，第六篇已写完：两边都不让善意替人判断他怎样才幸福；分在射程上，那一句说的是一种宪制，第六篇读的是一份条文允许退出、实际可拒绝性尚未核全的支持计划；所给的事实不足以把两者等同，也不足以说它已经守住了全部的边界（第六篇第六节）。本篇不重写，只接另一处。

共同的问题。 经济上的依附，与一个人在共同体里的地位，是什么关系。康德在《法权论》第 46 节说，公民的第三项属性是「公民的独立：他的生存与维持，不归功于民众中另一个人的任意，而能归功于他作为共同体成员的自己的权利与力量」（bürgerlichen Selbstständigkeit, seine Existenz und Erhaltung nicht der Willkür eines Anderen im Volke, sondern seinen eigenen Rechten und Kräften als Glied des gemeinen Wesens verdanken zu können；Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre §46，AA 6:314 第 12—14 行，A 档）。由此他分出主动的与被动的公民：商人或手艺人那里的伙计，仆役，未成年人，一切妇女，以及「一切不是按自己的经营、而是照他人（国家除外）的安排，不得不以此维持自己的生存（衣食与保护）的人，都缺少公民的人格」（jedermann, der nicht nach eigenem Betrieb, sondern nach der Verfügung Anderer (außer der des Staats) genöthigt ist, seine Existenz (Nahrung und Schutz) zu erhalten, entbehrt der bürgerlichen Persönlichkeit；同上，第 29—32 行）。在《论俗语》里，他把投票的资格说成：除了自然的条件，唯一的一项是「他是他自己的主人（sui iuris），因而有某种能养活他的财产（每一种技艺、手艺、美的艺术或学问，都可以算在里面）」（daß er sein eigener Herr (sui iuris) sei, mithin irgend ein Eigenthum habe (wozu auch jede Kunst, Handwerk oder schöne Kunst oder Wissenschaft gezählt werden kann), welches ihn ernährt；AA 8:295 第 15—18 行，A 档）。

接点有两处。

其一，依附于另一个人的任意，是要问的事。康德问的是：一个人的生存，是不是归功于另一个人的任意。第二篇问的是同一件事的经济一面：宿舍、代用券、预支锁住离职，落在同一个人身上时，他还保不保有拒绝、撤回与转入可审查程序的结构通道（第二篇 E12）；一个人在生命基底处只能靠一家供给时，那一家的停供怎样读（第二篇 E11a）。

其二，往上走的路要开着。康德说，这种对他人意志的依附与不平等，并不与这些人作为人的自由与平等相违背（AA 6:315 第 6—8 行，转述）；但实定的法律，不论怎样，「不得与……每个人能够从这一被动的状态往上走到主动的状态相违背」（sich nämlich aus diesem passiven Zustande zu dem activen empor arbeiten zu können, nicht zuwider sein müssen；AA 6:315 第 20—22 行，A 档）。第六篇说，制度给条件，条件要够得着（第六篇 E34）；第二篇说，退出真实，守的是涌现的前提（第二篇 E13）。往上走的路不被法律封住，与这两处同向。

是不是同一件事。 不是，有两处分别。

第一，兑换的方向。本系列在这里离开康德。康德把经济上的独立读成主动公民的条件：依附于他人安排维生的人，缺少公民的人格，没有投票的资格。他所说的财产，紧接着就把技艺、手艺、美的艺术与学问算了进去，只要它能养活他；要紧的是一个人靠自己的东西维生：要向别人取得生计时，靠的是出让属于他的东西，而不是许别人使用他的力（AA 8:295 第 16—22 行）。所以那是一道独立的门槛，不是一道财富的门槛；他也说，这一区分不触及这些人作为人的自由与平等（AA 6:315）。

本系列不取以经济上的独立作参与立法资格的条件（自担），理由有三步。其一，投票的权利来自一圈主体相互承认彼此的共同立法权力，这份承认从构成上就是相互的：「不承认他人的投票权力，自己也就没有投票的权利」（权利论第二篇 §II）。其二，投票参与的是一个约束圈内所有人的决定，包括投了反对票的人（权利论第四篇 §II）；拿涌现层的地位把圈内的人分出去，就是让被这一决定约束的人失去共同立法的资格。谁在这一圈里，交国家论。被决定约束、又无从退出、却不在圈里的人，照制度论按纠缠划内部的读法，仍是内部主体（制度论 Z4）：制度对他们照样不越线，他们照样可以发问。其三，拿财产、拿经济上独立与否去决定谁留在圈里，是拿涌现层的地位去换共同立法的资格；这正是两道闸不许的那种兑换（第四篇 E21—E23），也是两层不许互换的那一条（第六篇 E35）。所以投票的资格在基础层，要保障，不因涌现层的地位而改变。投票仍是构成式的承认性权利，没有它自己的基础侧；权利论也说，「投票既是权利也是权力」（权利论第二篇 §II）。说它在基础层，说的是制度对它取保障，不是改了它的分类：基础层不等于基础权利，已经载入的承认性权利，有的还兼任权力，也在基础层（前置篇第七节）。

康德问的是谁有资格参与立法，本系列问的是积累的权力在哪里不能兑换；问题不同，在投票资格这一处，结论相反。这落在第一条线上。一国的成员范围怎样划，不在这里：「谁是成员，归国家论」（政府论第三篇）；本系列只说，在成员之内，投票的资格不随涌现层的地位增减。一个人能不能拿钱买进这一圈，这里也有一句。入圈的条件归国家论；这里只从兑换一侧，说积累这一项。规范层的判据是：积累不能直接兑换成共同立法的资格。投资若为他人的涵育创造了条件，比如就业（第五篇 E26），换来的可以是进门、留下的机会（第四篇 E24），也可以是经过足够长的等待以后入圈的一条路；根据在它为别人创造的条件，不在那笔钱，也不在过了多久（自担）；别的方式为他人的涵育创造了条件，照同一根据读。这些条件是不是实际给出了，按实际作用核（第五篇 E26）；等待本身也不使资格自动发生，入不入圈，仍照成员资格自己的程序，本篇不拿资本与时间相加，替它预先给出结果。怎样设、等多久、怎样核，在规则层，本系列只建议（自担）。

第二，依附的读法。康德把依附读成一种地位：伙计、仆役缺少公民的人格，他们的生存「仿佛只是依存」（gleichsam nur Inhärenz；AA 6:314 第 32—33 行）。本系列不读地位，读施为：一项安排怎样收敛一个人，判在结构；同一个人在一处受约束，在另一处可以照常展开（第二篇 E12；第一篇 E3）。依附是一个配置，不是一个人的身份。

同意到哪里。 同意到两处为止：生存归功于另一个人的任意，是要问的事；法律不得封住人从依附往上走的路。从兑换的方向与依附的读法起分开。

对方最强的反驳（本篇代拟）。 一个生计完全仰仗雇主的人，投票时也很难不照雇主的意思投；让他投，等于让雇主多一票。你们的双向分离，挡住了钱买票，却挡不住依附带来的票。

回应。 这一反驳指出的，是依附怎样经过票变成雇主的力；它要问的正是积累怎样换成了政治的力，那是第四篇设闸的地方（第四篇 E21—E23）。本系列给的回答不是把依附的人的票拿走，而是让依附不成为可以兑换的东西：把维持生活所必需的东西换成压缩生命基底的控制，锁住离开、拒绝与撤回，都在闸一之下（第四篇 E21）；人在生命基底处的依附，由职责与保障去接（第二篇 E11a；第三篇 E14a）。依附越少，那一票就越是他自己的。康德自己也留了这条路：往上走不得被法律封住。分别在于，本系列不让一个人在走到那里以前，先失去投票参与立法的资格。依附仍会让人难以开口；具体怎样安排问的路、怎样避免报复，本系列只给方向，登在第九节第四格。

三 · 黑格尔：市民社会的财富与贫困

共同的问题。 积累在一个社会里集中到一处时，另一处发生了什么。据 Sandkühler 1970 年的概述，黑格尔在《法哲学原理》里写市民社会：需要与交换普遍化，一边是财富的积累，一边是劳动的分割与局限，以及系于这种劳动的人的依附（§243）；一大群人沉到一定的生计水平以下，失去权利感与荣誉感，这就产生贱民，同时也使过多的财富更容易集中到少数人手里（§244）；在财富过多的同时，市民社会并不富到足以阻止贫困过度与贱民的产生（§245）；于是它被推到自身以外，到别的民族那里寻找消费者与生计（§246）（据 H. J. Sandkühler, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 34/1970 转述，C 档）。

接触面。 所据的概述里，黑格尔把财富的积累与系于分工的人的依附写在同一个过程的两头；本系列也碰到这两头。第二篇的青窑镇，一家公司雇着全镇七成的劳动人口，设着宿舍、代用券与预支这些安排；老窑工那一次要离开时实际碰到的，是记下的预支与竞业的阻碍；第六篇的减产，九百人一次失去了生计。原文核到以后要决定的是：黑格尔说的"不富到足以"，是不是一个关于市民社会自身机制的判断；本系列说基础层要保障、涌现层要支持（第六篇 E35），是一个说给制度的应当。两者是不是在答同一个问题，要看《法哲学原理》第 241—248 节与"警察与同业公会"一章的原文怎样安排那些补救；本篇不在二手材料上下这一判。

第四节　资本与市场社会

一 · 马克思：资本是关系

共同的问题。 资本是什么，它的力从哪里来。第一篇已经随文对过一次（第一篇第二节），本篇照录，不越过它。马克思在《资本论》第一卷讲现代殖民理论的那一章，转述威克菲尔德在殖民地的发现：一个人有钱、有生活资料与生产资料，若没有雇佣工人，就不成为资本家；由此说，资本「不是一件物，而是一种以物为中介的人与人之间的社会关系」（daß das Kapital nicht eine Sache ist, sondern ein durch Sachen vermitteltes gesellschaftliches Verhältnis zwischen Personen；德文据 textlog.de 所载第二十五章；英译 "capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things"，据 marxists.org 所载第三十三章；版次、译者与页码未核，B 档）。

是不是同一件事。 同题同向。权力论前置篇说，资本不是权力的源；资本之所以有权力，是因为关于占有的叙事被社会承载，别人把它登记为占有（权力论前置篇 §三；第一篇 E2）。两边都不把资本当作一件物来读，都把它的力读成人与人之间的一种关系。

分在关系的根据。马克思把那一关系落在生产关系上：生产资料归谁，劳动力卖给谁。本系列把它落在承认与登记上：同一个位置，从持位者一侧读是权利，在实际收敛别人时显出权力面（第一篇 E3）；权力在能调动积累的决策位置，名义持有与调动分开（第一篇 E2）。权力论前置篇驳的，是"权力来自生产资料的占有"这一说；那一驳不读作驳马克思：本篇所据的这一句里，马克思说的正是资本不是物。这落在第二条线上。

同意到哪里。 同意到资本不是物、是人与人之间的关系为止；从关系的根据起分开。

对方最强的反驳（本篇代拟）。 把资本的力读成"承认与登记"，就把剥削读成了一个认知问题，好像只要人们不再把它登记为占有，权力就散了。生产资料实际握在谁手里，不因任何人承认与否而改变。

回应。 本系列不说承认一撤，权力就散。一个运行中的承认性位置有它的制度载入与真实的权力支持（第二篇 E11a 所引的三支）；登记是一个结构的事实，不是一个念头。它也不把被收敛的人的处境读成认知问题：宿舍、预支与竞业禁止合起来封住一个人离开的路，是越线，不因他是否"承认"而改变（第二篇 E12、E12a）。分别在于，本系列不把那一关系只落在生产资料上：名声、资质、评分与结算的位置，同样能收敛别人的路（第一篇 E5、E6）。

二 · 波兰尼与汤普森：不能当作寻常商品的东西

共同的问题。 有些东西能不能当作寻常的商品，交给市场去定价。第二篇随文据二手材料转述过两家：波兰尼在《大转型》（1944）里说，劳动、土地与货币不是为出售而生产的，把它们当作商品是一种"虚构"，让它们完全由市场机制支配，社会会被撕开，于是引出保护社会的反向运动；汤普森在《十八世纪英国群众的道德经济》（1971）里写歉收年里的群众，他们认为面包有合乎习惯的公道价钱，粮商趁缺粮抬价时便去阻止（第二篇第四节，C 档）。

接触面。 两家写到的事，与第二篇在关口处问的事相邻：波兰尼写劳动、土地与货币被当作商品交给市场，汤普森写歉收年里粮价被抬高时群众的阻止。第二篇的读法是，规范层不列物的种类，也不把某一个价钱取作判据；问的是一次作用经由哪一样东西关闭了谁的哪一个维度，那一价钱有没有把付不起的人挡在生命基底之外（第二篇 E10、E11）。原文核到以后要决定的是：波兰尼的"虚构商品"是一个关于物的种类的论断，还是一个关于社会怎样被市场化的论断；汤普森的"道德经济"在本系列里是规则层的一种承认与习惯，还是另有规范的分量。两处本篇都不在二手材料上下结论。

第五节　所有与控制

一 · 伯利与米恩斯，以及斯密早先的一句

共同的问题。 名义上的所有与实际的控制分开以后，权力在哪里。第一篇随文据二手材料转述过伯利与米恩斯《现代公司与私有财产》（1932）：股份分散，股东名义上是所有者而不过问经营，控制落到经营者手里；他们由此问经营者是否照股东的利益行事（第一篇第二节，C 档）。第一篇在那里只列了可对照之处，不作同在、分在的结论；本篇同此。

这一分开，斯密早已写过；第一篇随文已引他论股份公司董事的一句，董事管的是别人的钱，而不是自己的钱（第一篇第二节；Book V, ch. I, Part III, Art. I，A 档）。同处他还说，股份公司的股东大多很少自称懂得公司的业务，满足于领取董事们认为合适的股息（转述）。斯密问的是照看得好不好；伯利与米恩斯，据转述，问的是经营者与所有者的利益合不合；本系列问的是第三件事：权力面落在哪一个位置上，被它收敛的人能不能问它（第一篇 E2；第三篇 E16）。通衢的票是一例：一家凭双重股权以二成股本握住五成六的票，一个受托人凭一份协议替一州的公务员与教师投票，养老基金的成员对怎样投票没有发言的路（第一篇第二节）。

二 · 科斯与加尔布雷斯

科斯。 据 Econlib《简明经济学百科》的科斯条目，科斯在《企业的性质》（1937）里问企业为什么存在：使用市场有成本，后来称作交易成本；若使用市场没有成本，人们会以一臂之距的交易完成一切，企业便不会出现（C 档）。接触面在第一篇：一个经济位置的形成。本系列说位置经许多笔交换与许多次承认形成（第一篇 E1），科斯说企业因使用价格机制的成本而形成。两说是否在答同一问，原文核到以后才能说；本篇只登记这一接触面。

加尔布雷斯。 据同一百科的加尔布雷斯条目，他在《美国资本主义》（1952）里说，大公司取代了小企业，完全竞争的教科书模型不再贴合，而公司权力的集中受到大工会的"抗衡力量"的制约，消费者受到"相互竞争的权力中心"的保护（C 档）。接触面在第三篇：制衡怎样发生。本系列的制衡是构的施为，制衡者自己的决定也照三问受问（第三篇 E16）；这样长出的一方，本身也是一个经济位置，照公私同一、按实际的权力面核（第三篇 E14、E15）；它算不算本系列所说的制衡、照不照三问受问，七篇没有单独处理，登记在第九节第六格。

三 · 安德森：私人政府

第三篇随文据书评转述过安德森《私人政府》（2017）：她把雇主对雇员的支配叫作私人政府，一种握着恣意且不负责的权力的治理；不同意辞职的自由足以保护雇员；主张以新的雇员权利与参与的方式约束它（第三篇第四节，据 Estlund 2018 书评，C 档）。第三篇在那里只列了可对照之处：据转述，她不同意辞职的自由足以保护雇员；第三篇问"可以不在这里卖"答没答到被问的那件事，问的是相邻的一件。原书核到以后要决定的：她叫它"政府"，本系列把授予与积累分开，不把积累来的位置读作政府，这一分别对她是名称之别还是实质之别（第三篇 E15）；她给出具体的权利与参与方式，本系列只立控制的功能、形态交规则层，两者在哪里对得上。

第六节　市场的辩护

一 · 哈耶克：知识的分散

共同的问题。 一个人拿到的条件该用在哪里，谁知道。第六篇随文已经四步走过（第六篇第三节），本篇照录。哈耶克说，经济秩序要用到的，是关于「the particular circumstances of time and place」（特定时间与地点的具体情形）的知识，这种知识「never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess」（从来不以集中或整合的形式存在，只以分散的、不完整的、常常彼此矛盾的片段，存在于各个分立的个人那里）（Hayek 1945；据 Library of Economics and Liberty 网上本，原载 American Economic Review 35(4): 519–530，引句所在页未核，B 档）。

同在与分在。 同在一处：分散的处境里，不由一处替人选好路（第六篇 E34 给的是通用的、不指定内容的条件，那是本系列在这里提出的安排方向，不是从这篇文章里取得的）。分在根据：哈耶克的根据是知识的分散，代人选路做不到；本系列的根据是方向的归属，代人选路不归它（第六篇 E37）。这落在第二条线上。哈耶克自己也说，就科学知识而言，一批选得合适的专家也许最能掌握现有的最佳知识；他要说的是，另有一大块很重要、却不能称作科学的知识，即关于特定时间与地点的具体情形的知识（a body of suitably chosen experts may be in the best position to command all the best knowledge available；there is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific；§III，同上，B 档）。所以一个机构在某项风险上知道得更多，不使他的理由在那里变弱，两者可以同时成立。本系列另提的是一个规范问题：即使知道得更多，也不因此取得替人定方向的权限。两条理由在这一处相接，其余逐案核。

对方最强的反驳（本篇代拟）。 方向的归属是一条伦理的主张，知识的分散是一条可检验的事实；你们用前者替后者，等于把一个能被经验支持的论证，换成了一个只能被信奉的立场。

回应。 本系列不用前者替后者，两条并列。它承认知识的分散，也承认在某些处境里一个机构知道得更多；它说的是，即使知道得更多，也不因此取得替人定方向的权限（第六篇 E37）。这一步是本系列公开承担的立场，出自人是目的本身（第一节第三小节）；它不冒充从事实里推出，也不要求读者先接受哈耶克的经验论证。

二 · 弗里德曼：守在游戏规则之内的利润

共同的问题。 企业的目标能不能只是利润。第五篇随文已经对过（第五篇第二节），本篇照录。弗里德曼 1970 年在《纽约时报杂志》上说，公司经理的责任是照雇主的意愿经营企业，「这通常就是在遵守社会的基本规则——既有体现在法律中的，也有体现在伦理习俗中的——的同时，尽可能多地赚钱」（which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom）；文末引《资本主义与自由》：企业有且只有一项社会责任，「运用它的资源，从事旨在增加利润的活动，只要它守在游戏规则之内」（to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game）（据网上两处转载本对读，原刊版面未核，B 档）。

同在与分在。 同在不给回报一个没有边界的位置：他的利润守在社会的基本规则与游戏规则之内。分在边界从哪里来：在他那里，边界是外给的，法律与伦理习俗划在哪里，利润就追到哪里；在本系列，回报率被置于唯一目标是一项须核的信号，若它取得了压过守线、取消追问与改向、替被投资者定目的的地位，就按这些实际作用判（第五篇 E27），线取限与侵之界，由结构定，不随一时的法律与习俗进退（制度论 Z9；政府论 G18）。这落在第二条线上。

对方最强的反驳（本篇代拟）。 经理拿股东的钱去追求他自己认定的社会目标，是在未经授权的情况下对股东征税；你们要求在回报之外核线、核追问与改向，等于让经理替社会立法。

回应。 本系列不要求经理追求他自己认定的社会目标，也不对经理这个人写应当；应当说给构，位置用职责（第一节第二小节）。它要求的不是另立目标，是不越线、可被问：线不是经理自选的社会目的，是对每一个受作用者都成立的边界（第二篇 E9）。这与弗里德曼要求守在"游戏规则之内"同形；分别只在于，本系列不把那条线交给一时的规则去定。

三 · 诺齐克：持有的来历

共同的问题。 一份持有正不正当，看什么。据斯坦福哲学百科的诺齐克政治哲学条目，诺齐克的权利理论是历史的：一份持有正当，在于它经由获取、转让或矫正这些赋予资格的行为而来，不在于整体的分配是否合乎某种模式；他以篮球明星的例子说明，自愿的交换会很快打破任何预设的模式，维持模式就要一再干预人的自愿往来（据 E. Mack 条目 §4.1、§4.2，C 档）；他的洛克式附带条件，按条目的转述，以一个人的福利是否因他人的占取而变差为准，其基线诺齐克没有细说（同上 §4.3，C 档）。

接触面。 据条目，诺齐克不以整体分配的模式判一份持有正当与否；本系列也不以分配的结果为终点（前置篇第四节）。本系列接着问的是：一份正当取得的持有，在使用中怎样收敛别人、封住别人的路，那里仍须制衡（第三篇 E17）。原书对正当持有之后的使用与边界怎样处理，所据条目没有给足，本篇不说他的问题停在持有上。洛克式附带条件与生命基底处唯一的供给位置（第二篇 E11a）有一段可能的接触，原文核到以后，要看诺齐克怎样处理一处唯一而必需的资源；本篇不据二手材料推这一步。

第七节　领域与交换

一 · 沃尔泽与桑德尔

沃尔泽。 前置篇与第四篇两次随文转述过沃尔泽《正义诸领域》（1983）。前置篇据斯坦福哲学百科《平等》条目的概述：各种社会的善各有其领域，要终止的是某些善对别的领域的支配，例如钱在政治领域购买权力（前置篇第四节，C 档）。第四篇据 den Hartogh 1999 的转述，列出他在书中给的"受阻的交换"清单：政治权力与公职、人身的自由、几种基本的自由、移居与离开的权利、免于共同摊派的差事、爱等，其中出于绝望的交换由需要的原则来说明；第四篇在那里只列了可对照之处（第四篇第四节，C 档），不作同在、分在的结论。

原书核到以后，要决定的有两问。其一，他的领域划分与本系列的两道闸，是在同一层上回答"钱不能买什么"，还是一个给出钱的领域的全部边界、一个只给两项兑换的限制：第四篇已经明写两道闸不是钱不能买的全部清单（第四篇 E24）。其二，他的根据据转述在各个领域各自的分配原则，本系列两道闸的根据在结构，一道在人的基础层，一道在问的通道；两种根据是相遇还是分开、各在哪一步，原书核到才写。本篇不把"本系列只列两道闸"写成对他整套交换论的反驳。

桑德尔。 第四篇据 Kennedy 2012 的书评转述过桑德尔《钱买不到的东西》（2012）的两种反对：公平，不平等的处境里自由选择未必自由；腐蚀，把一样东西放上市场会消解它本来的价值（第四篇第四节，C 档）。第四篇在那里只列了可对照之处：前一种反对，与第四篇第一节"签了字，也不改这一读"碰着同一类处境，处境逼人时，交易里的同意说明什么；后一种问的是一样东西的意义，两道闸不以东西的意义为据。市场在什么情形下改变一样东西的意义，这一问与本系列的哪一条边界相接，原书核到以后再写。原书核到以后要决定的是：他的"腐蚀"论证，在本系列里是否完全落在闸以外的涌现层，还是有一部分会碰到"声誉不可购买"（第一篇 E4；第四篇 E24）。

二 · 法兰克福：足够

共同的问题。 不平等本身是不是要问的事。据斯坦福哲学百科《平等主义》条目 §6.2，足够论一路主张：对正义要紧的不是优先或平等；正面的一条是让人到达某一条线之上尤其重要，反面的一条是线以上的不平等与正义无关。条目在这一路下列了法兰克福的《作为道德理想的平等》（1987）；这两条是条目对这一路的概述，不是对法兰克福原文的转述（据 D. Axelsen 条目，C 档）。

接触面。 本系列也不以差距本身为要问的事（前置篇第四节）；基础层要保障，与条目概述的正面一条相邻（第三篇 E14a；第六篇 E35）。原文核到以后要决定的有两处。一处是"线"：足够论的线，在条目的转述里是一个关于持有或福利的门槛；本系列的基础权利锚在维度，不以资源的数量为线，清单在规则层（第二篇 E10）；一些已经载入的承认性资格也在本系列的基础层，这一更厚的层不全部还原成基础权利的类型判据（前置篇第七节）。另一处是"线以上"：足够论说线以上的不平等与正义无关；本系列说线以上的差距本身不是问题，但积累的使用仍要制衡，兑换仍有两道闸。两处落在哪一条线上，原书核到以后再定。

三 · 赫希曼：退出，从经济的一侧看

行动论 Paper 0 从一个人的一侧、制度论 Paper 0 从制度的一侧，各与赫希曼对过话。本篇只补经济的一侧。下面的原文与页码，转据行动论 Paper 0 第七节。

共同的问题。 退出与呼吁。赫希曼说，退出是「有些顾客不再购买公司的产品，或者有些成员离开组织」（Hirschman 1970, p. 4）；呼吁是「任何试图改变、而不是逃离一种令人反感的事态的努力」（any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs；p. 30）。

接点。 赫希曼说，在家庭、国家这类组织里，退出几乎不可得，呼吁是不满的成员唯一能做的反应（p. 33，转据）。第二篇在关系一级分过同样的几档：退出近乎不可能的一档，制度要承担全部的制衡；雇佣在退出有摩擦但可能的一档；退出在权利上存在，不等于在生计上可负担（第二篇 E13）。

分在哪里。 赫希曼从衰退出发，退出与呼吁都是让组织回到正常运作的恢复机制（p. 1、p. 82，转据）。本系列读退出的另一面：它是一条结构的通道，封死了是侵（第二篇 E12）；它在，就守住了自由市场里涌现的第一条前提，存在非零退出自由度的市场（第二篇 E13，承经济学第五篇）。一个组织即便不衰退，退出的路照样要开着。第二篇随文所引的原文与页码，也转据同一处。

第八节　不平等与集中

一 · 皮凯蒂与罗宾斯

皮凯蒂。 第五篇据出版社的内容简介与百科条目转述过《21 世纪资本论》（法文本 2013，英译本 2014）：资本回报率长期高于经济增长率，财富因此向顶端集中；他主张以累进的、全球性的资本税应对（第五篇第三节，C 档）。第五篇在那里只列了可对照之处：一处是回报在时间里的累积，它跨过一代人，也改变下一代人站在哪里；另一处在终点，本系列不以分配的结果为终点，要问的是积累怎样使用。他是否也问这些、怎样问，原书核到以后再写。税在本系列是规则层的事，不判（前置篇第八节）。

罗宾斯。 第三篇据访谈转述过《限富主义》（2024）：给个人的财富设上限，一个政治的上限、一个伦理的上限；理由之一是极端的财富会转成政治的权力，伤及民主（第三篇第一节，C 档）。第三篇在那里只列了可对照之处：据转述，她的理由里有积累转成政治权力这一层，本系列在第四篇也问钱怎样转成对追问的控制。原书核到以后要决定的有两问：她的上限落在持有的数量上，本系列的制衡落在用法上，这两样在她那里是互相替代，还是可以并行；上限以内的用法，她怎样处理。

二 · 可汗：价格之外的市场力量

共同的问题。 一个大平台的力量，用什么去量。可汗 2017 年在《耶鲁法学杂志》上发表的那篇论平台与反垄断的文章，摘要开头说：「本文认为，现行的反垄断框架，特别是它把竞争系于以短期价格效应界定的'消费者福利'，无力把握现代经济中市场力量的结构」（This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competition to "consumer welfare," defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy）；又说：「由于线上平台充当关键的中介，跨业务线的整合使这些平台能够控制它们的对手所依赖的基础设施」（Second, because online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, integrating across business lines positions these platforms to control the essential infrastructure on which their rivals depend）（L. M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Yale Law Journal 126: 710 (2017)，据期刊网站与作者机构库所载摘要，B 档）。

接点有两处。

其一，权力面不以价格量。第三篇说，权力面按具体的作用比较：它收敛谁，收敛到哪一个维度，多少人要经过它，走开的代价多大；不设资产总额的单一刻度（第三篇 E14）。可汗说，以短期价格效应量竞争，把握不了市场力量的结构。两边都拒绝用一个单一的数去量一个位置的力。

其二，场与在场里卖。第三篇用一个既是场、又在场里卖的市集作例：搜索排序、价格条款与物流绑定落在几万家卖家身上（第三篇第一节）。可汗说，跨业务线的整合使平台控制对手所依赖的基础设施。两边看的是同一种结构：一个位置同时是别人要经过的关口，又是在那里和他们竞争的一方（第二篇 E7）。

是不是同一件事。 部分是。有两处分别。

第一，层。可汗的文章在反垄断法的框架里立论，要改的是一条法律的标准；本系列停在规范层，只说制衡随权力面递增、落在怎样使用上，量法、形态与门槛交规则层（第三篇 E19）。她的提议，在本系列里是规则层的一种写法。

第二，手段。据摘要，文章末尾考虑了两种可能的制度回应：恢复传统的反垄断与竞争政策原则，或施以公共承运人式的义务（据作者机构库所载摘要）。本系列说拆分与重组是让位置不终局的手段之一，制衡落到某一项封路的用法上时那一项可以收缩，手段要说明作用、代价与替代安排（第三篇 E18）；同一处既是生产也是卡住时，不先承诺两面可以无损剥离（第三篇 E17）。两边的具体手段是否相同，要核她正文的论证，不由两段摘要预定。

同意到哪里。 同意到两处为止：市场力量不能只以价格去量；一个既是场又在场里竞争的位置，握着别人所依赖的东西。从层起分开；手段是否分开，正文核到以后再定。

对方最强的反驳（本篇代拟）。 停在规范层，不给法律标准，就等于没有给执法者任何可用的东西；"制衡随权力面递增"若没有一个可操作的量法，执法的人只能回到价格，因为那是唯一量得出来的东西。

回应。 本系列承认这是它停下的地方：权力面没有可通约的刻度，登记在第九节第一格。它给的不是量法，是判据：收敛谁、深到哪一个维度、多少人经过、走开的代价（第三篇 E14）；这几项都可以在一个具体的位置上核，不必先有一个总的数。规则层可以把它们写成标准，可汗的提议就是一种写法；本系列不主张哪一种写法是最好的。

第九节　交接与余项

一 · 上游明交的三笔

前置篇第九节列了上游明交到这里的三笔，并写明地址明确不等于已经结清。这里结。结算分三路：兑现，是那项工作做了；公开改派，是写明交给别处；公开撤销，是写明不做了。下表是收件一方的自陈，不是替上游作的验收。

来处	本系列接的部分	结算	落在哪里	不在本系列的部分
经济学第三篇 §5.3：「坏制度的修复和设计是政治哲学和制度设计理论的射程（SAE基础系列Paper 6（Qin 2026a）已提供了自凿必要性的理论框架），不是经济学论文的射程。」	经济一侧修复与设计在规范层的那一半；交接写到 §5.2 为止	兑现	第二至五篇；第三篇 E16、第四篇 E22（被捕获的追问通道）	具体的设计：具体的制度论
经济学第一篇 §8.2：「DD框架需要发展一套不以投资回报率为最终标准的涵育经济学。这是一个开放问题。」	到规范层为止	兑现一部分；其余公开改派	第五篇 E27、E28	涵育的经济成本由谁承担：规则层；一整套"涵育经济学"：本系列不主张
道德律第三篇 §9.2：「这种影响在结构上与权力截然不同，还是在某些条件下会向权力滑动？」	混合现实一侧，声誉被别人拿去作关口条件的那一面，与它被指标化以后的记录与评分	兑现这一部分	第一篇 E5；第四篇 E22	声誉持有者一侧：照权力论另读；理想型一侧：原址

经济学第三篇那一句，要与它的前后一起读。它在 §5.3 说，坏制度可以被捕获，本篇不展开，因为充分市场里的个体会识别坏制度、然后脱身；离开要靠制度降低退出成本，那一篇在 §5.2 已经说了：制度要「降低15DD的退出成本，确保15DD在识别出"此处不可涵育"后走得出去」。所以交接写到 §5.2 为止。本系列多补的一块，是走不了的人：在生命基底处没有可负担的替代的人，被几项约束合起来锁住离开的人（第二篇 E11a、E12）。

二 · 相邻、不接的

• 政府论 G20a 的征税余项：不接，税归规则层（前置篇第八节）。
• 分配的正义：不另立一套（前置篇第四节）。
• 公司与公司、国家与公司之间的制度关系：国家间协作论第八篇明写不接；本系列也不展开，不登记为任何一边已承接（第三篇 E20），登在下面第二格。

三 · 交下游

• 公司论： 公司内部的治理设计；经济学第六篇的组织两型；《公司原则》在公司一级的展开；竞业以外的劳动条款。
• 大学论： 认证与录取的关口（第五篇 E31）。
• 具体的制度论： 规则层的量法、形态与门槛（第三篇 E19）；基础权利内容的清单（第二篇 E10）；生命基底处供给职责的具体内容（第二篇 E11a）；竞业禁止的规则与附条件给付的门槛（第二篇 E12a）。
• 政府论： 救助本身是授予（第四篇 E25）；已载入的供给怎样保证，与第二篇 E11a 互相指引。
• 国家论（已发布）： 一国的成员范围怎样划：「谁是成员，归国家论」（政府论第三篇）；本系列只说，在成员之内，投票的资格不随涌现层的地位增减（第三节第二小节）。
• 国家间协作论（已发布）： 各国之间协作的功能边界，跨境的迁入条件与经济位置照它已有的边界（第三篇 E20）。

这些都是地址明确的交付。地址明确，不等于已经结清；在相应的工作有可核的兑现、公开改派或公开撤销以前，照原状态登记。

四 · 本系列停下的地方

分六格登记。六格区别的是未继续的性质，不是每个系列都要填满的六个空格。

第一格，这一次构自己留下的余项。 权力面没有可通约的刻度：第三篇给了比较的判据，没有给一把能在任意两个位置之间通约的尺（第三篇 E14、E19）。"唯一目标"的识别没有刻度：回报率被置于唯一目标是一项须核的信号，信号什么时候成了实际的作用，按作用判，没有一个阈值（第五篇 E27）。

第二格，辖域相邻的对象。 价格理论；分配的正义；税；公司与公司、国家与公司之间的制度关系（第三篇 E20）。

第三格，已经到头的结论。 经济不会因为制衡而变成一个好人，它没有第一人称；制衡给的，是一处一处可以问的地方（第六篇 E39）。这不是还没找到办法，是这一层能给的就是这些。

第四格，研究候选。 生命基底处供给职责的具体内容：职责的源与它的两处来路已立，内容在规则层，什么算唯一、什么算可负担的替代，没有在这里定（第二篇 E11a）。公共支持怎样才算相称：作出支持的位置要说明根据、权限、对象与代价，可相称的尺度没有立（第四篇 E25）。经济依赖与政治参与的制度条件：已有不以积累取消基础层地位、不得买走追问通道与实际控制的要求（第四篇 E21—E23）；经济依附使参与受压时，具体怎样安排问的路、怎样避免报复、执行的职责怎样分，本系列只给方向，交具体的制度论（第三节第二小节）。

第五格，已有明确地址的手递。 公司论、大学论、具体的制度论、政府论、国家论，见本节第三小节。

第六格，对照各家才看出来的问题。 两项，都是在本篇的对话里才看清的。本篇写了看到哪里，没有写成已经答完。

1. 自发的抗衡力量。 加尔布雷斯说的抗衡力量，是从另一处积累里自发长出的制衡（第五节第二小节）。这样长出的一方本身也是一个经济位置，照公私同一、按实际的权力面核（第三篇 E14、E15）；本系列的制衡是构的施为，制衡者自己也受问（第三篇 E16）。七篇没有单独处理的，是这类抗衡算不算本系列所说的制衡、它的具体形态，以及两方之间怎样相互制衡。
2. 总收益与逐人的边界怎样相比。 斯密以公众的利益作经营者提议的尺度（第三节第一小节）；本系列以结构作尺度，线对每一个受作用者都成立（第二篇 E9；第四篇 E21）。一项安排于总体有利、却在某一处封住了少数人的路时，两种尺度怎样相比，是一个一般的研究问题；本篇没有据所引的几段说斯密缺少这一边界，七篇也没有拿一个事例写出来。

这一篇停在哪里

这一篇做了四件事。先把这台机器自陈了一遍：它问积累的权力在哪里显出来、制度怎样制衡它的使用；句式、三层与主线照七篇；与经济学系列、制度论、政府论分工；与古典政治经济学的价值论不是一回事。再与传统对接：原文核到的几家四步走完，只到二手材料的几家写到接触面与原文核到以前留着的一问为止；差异里有几处落在两条线上，一条问落在哪里，持有与分配，还是使用与兑换；一条问根据，边界从哪里来。然后结了上游明交的三笔，列了交给下游的地址。最后分六格登记了本系列停下的地方。

它没有做的：没有替任何一家下"已被驳倒"的结论；没有在二手材料上越过七篇随文已写的那一步；没有给出权力面的刻度，也没有给出一整套"涵育经济学"。

留给以后的：只到二手材料的几家，原书核到以后可以升档，重写对照；第六格的两项与第四格经济依赖一条，各自要不要单独处理，留待以后的工作。

各家是对话者，不是本系列的前提。辖域之外的问题，各有自己的根据；本系列不替它们作答，也不否认它们。

参考文献

以下 SAE 文献一律为概念 DOI，始终指向最新版本。外部文献的核验档位，见随本篇的转述审计表。本系列七篇尚未发布，正文中照篇次与命题号引用。

一 · 本系统

秦汉. (2026). 制度如何可能：从主体间余项到共构框架（SAE 基础论文 Paper 6） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662

秦汉. (2026). 经济理性的四个层级：维度序列理论对理性人假设的诊断与扩展（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 1） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19358010

秦汉. (2026). 混合市场中的维度序列经济学：远距离观察，聚集，与涌现（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 3） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19384446

秦汉. (2026). 自由市场中15DD涌现的结构性必然：从底线碰撞到感知跃迁（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 5） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19394738

秦汉. (2026). 目的王国 vs 手段王国：AI时代的相变加速（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 6） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19396633

秦汉. (2026). 声誉经济 · Dao（SAE 道德律系列 Paper 3） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20046168

秦汉. (2026). 权力不是什么 · Shi（SAE 权力论系列 前置篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20368866

秦汉. (2026). 论基础权利的厚度与边界（SAE 权利论系列 Paper 2） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20769253

秦汉. (2026). 论承认性权利与权力的界面与转化（SAE 权利论系列 Paper 4） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21093939

秦汉. (2026). 论基础权利的限与侵（SAE 权利论系列 Paper 5） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595

秦汉. (2026). 判断力的位置（SAE 行动论 Paper 0） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22974154

秦汉. (2026). 应当说给谁（SAE 制度论 第一篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635

秦汉. (2026). 不越线（SAE 制度论 第二篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384

秦汉. (2026). 制度论与传统：应当的地址（SAE 制度论 Paper 0） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23272468

秦汉. (2026). 保证（SAE 政府论 第三篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112

秦汉. (2026). 追问与承担（SAE 政府论 第六篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511

秦汉. (2026). 收束（SAE 国家间协作论 第八篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815796

二 · 外部文献（公版原文，A 档）

Kant, I. (1793). Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), Bd. VIII, 273–313. 据 Korpora 学院版转录（8:291、8:295）。

Kant, I. (1797). Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre, §46. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), Bd. VI. 据 Korpora 学院版转录（6:314–315）。

Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Project Gutenberg, EBook #3300.（Book I, ch. V, X, XI; Book V, ch. I）

Smith, A. (1777). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Dublin: J. Beatty and C. Jackson（题页作 "The Sixth Edition"）. Project Gutenberg, EBook #67363.（Part III, ch. I）

Smith, A. (1872). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In The Essays of Adam Smith. London: Alex. Murray & Co. Project Gutenberg, EBook #58559.（Part I, Sect. III, ch. III; Part III, ch. II; Part VI, Sect. II, ch. II）

三 · 外部文献（原文已核、版次或位置未核，B 档）

Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. The New York Times Magazine.（据网上两处转载本对读）

Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530.（据 Library of Economics and Liberty 网上本）

Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon's Antitrust Paradox. Yale Law Journal, 126, 710.（据期刊网站与作者机构库所载摘要及引注；全文未核）

Marx, K. (1867). Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Bd. 1, Kap. 25.（德文据 textlog.de；英译据 marxists.org 第 33 章；版次、译者未核）

四 · 外部文献（据二手转述，C 档；原书未对读）

Axelsen, D. "Egalitarianism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025-03-12.（转述 Frankfurt 1987）

Den Hartogh, G. (1999). The Architectonic of Michael Walzer's Theory of Justice. Political Theory, 27, 491–522.（转述 Walzer 1983）

Estlund, D. (2018). Review of Private Government. Harvard Law Review, 131, 795.（转述 Anderson 2017）

Henderson, D. R. (ed.). The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty: "Ronald H. Coase"; "John Kenneth Galbraith".（转述 Coase 1937；Galbraith 1952）

Kennedy, D. M. (2012). The Root of All…. Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, 26.（转述 Sandel 2012）

Mack, E. "Robert Nozick's Political Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rev. 2026-06-03.（转述 Nozick 1974）

Sandkühler, H. J. (1970). Hegel – Theoretiker der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 34/1970.（转述 Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §§243–246）

其余几家（波兰尼、汤普森、伯利与米恩斯、皮凯蒂、罗宾斯、沃尔泽的《平等》条目概述）的所据，照七篇各篇的参考文献与转述审计表。

五 · 外部文献（转引）

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press.（原文与页码转据行动论 Paper 0 第七节）

接口

主承： 制度论 Paper 0 的结构（机器自陈、方法、对接、结账、六格）；本系列前置篇第九节（上游交来的账）。

另用： 经济学第一篇 §8.2、第三篇 §5.2、§5.3、第五篇；道德律第三篇 §9.2；权力论前置篇 §三；权利论第二篇 §II、第四篇 §II（投票的分类与它的权力面）、第五篇 F19、F20（竞业禁止的轻重）；制度论 Z4（按纠缠划内部）；政府论第三篇（谁是成员，归国家论）；国家间协作论第八篇（制度间的制度不接）；行动论 Paper 0 第七节（赫希曼的页码）。

对接： 斯密（《国富论》《道德情操论》，A）、康德（A）；马克思、哈耶克、弗里德曼、可汗（B）；赫希曼（转引）；黑格尔、波兰尼、汤普森、伯利与米恩斯、科斯、加尔布雷斯、安德森、诺齐克、沃尔泽、桑德尔、法兰克福、皮凯蒂、罗宾斯（C）。

本系列： 前置篇第一、四、六、八、九节；第一篇 E1—E6；第二篇 E7、E9—E13、E11a、E12a；第三篇 E14—E20、E14a；第四篇 E21—E25；第五篇 E26、E27、E28、E31；第六篇 E32、E34—E39。

交给后续： 公司论、大学论、具体的制度论、政府论、国家论（第九节第三小节）；第四格经济依赖与政治参与一条；第六格两项。