Self-as-an-End
SAE Marriage Theory · Paper 6

Three
三个人

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23819255 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

This paper reads what lies between husband and wife after a third one has come. A child has come, and this series still reads only what lies between husband and wife: the side of shared child-rearing that lies between husband and wife. What lies between the child and the parents belongs to Parent-Child Theory; dealings among three persons are broken down and entered on separate accounts, pair by pair, and passing through a third one does not release the instigator from his part. The child is a third one, not a third composed of the two; above the two, no position that legislates for everyone is set up just because there is one more person. A third one welcomed through adoption is likewise read by this paper; the preparation the two make together for his coming is read by Paper 5.

The child is able to unfold without revolving around me, and also able to unfold without revolving around her: this test is read person by person. The two people's looking-toward crosses on one and the same child, and each belongs to each, so the test also belongs to each person: passing for one person does not pass for the other; each can confirm only his own end; arrangements the two decide together are also entered on separate accounts, pair by pair. This is a test, not that the child must in fact leave; being able is limited to constitutive independence, not real-world self-sufficiency: that the child cannot do without the two does not let either party acquire his constitution, nor let either party thereby hold alone the adjudication of what the two do together.

"For the child's sake" cannot legislate for the two people. What this phrase says may be, not what the child has said, but how the party speaking reads what the child wants; it can be a reason, a request; taken up to settle for the other party that she must yield, it legislates for her in the child's name, and has the same form as "for the sake of this household." Whether it appeals to something done together, to existing arrangements, or borrows mutual recognition to pass final judgment, is to be checked case by case, not assigned by the form of the sentence. Using the child to keep the other party: on the child's side, the child is taken up as the condition of the other party's staying; where this falls to "only as," the child is treated only as a condition, which carries the direction of colonization; whether it falls there is seen in whether, in the two people's arrangements, he still has a place of his own, not decided by one sentence. On the other party's side, it raises the cost of the other party's exit outward; once spoken it carries the direction of colonization; raised until the other party actually cannot leave, at the layer of basic rights it is a violation.

The share each person has done in shared child-rearing cannot be acknowledged by someone else in his place: a fault cannot be passed over to another, and giving is not taken up to possess the other party's adjudication either. Shared child-rearing is not settled by unilateral exit, nor does it turn into a demand that "you must come back": a marriage can end, and the matters of shared child-rearing remain between the two as before. This paper interfaces with Aristotle, Hegel and Locke. This paper does not prove that one ought to stay for the child's sake, nor that children bring husband and wife closer.

Introduction

In the fifth year of their marriage, Tang Pu and Luo Wei had a child.

That year the things to be done at home suddenly multiplied. The two agreed: in the mornings Tang Pu would take the child to the day nursery, in the evenings Luo Wei would pick the child up; at night, whoever got up, they would take turns. Luo Wei does structural design at a design institute; her leave was nearly used up, and she wanted to go back to work full time. Tang Pu said: "For the child's sake, why don't you stay at home for two years first?" Luo Wei did not agree.

For a while the two quarreled badly. Tang Pu once said, "I don't want to go on living like this"; Luo Wei answered him: "If you leave, you can forget about ever seeing the child again." Luo Wei's mother came to stay for a month, and when she left she said to the two of them: "For the child's sake, you'll still have to make do and get along." Another time Luo Wei was working late at the institute and phoned to ask Tang Pu to pick up the child; he agreed, and then forgot; the nursery teacher phoned, Tang Pu hurried over, and when he got home he said: "You didn't remind me either."

These sentences were all said between two adults. Whether or not the child was present, the child is in every one of them. What this paper reads is this stretch: what lies between husband and wife after a third one has come.

What this paper reads. Among the remainders of the SAE Marriage Principles, Appendix D of How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6), there is one item: "These principles do not cover children. After children arrive, 'we' is no longer just two people; a third subject appears, and many principles' applications change. This is a vast remainder, left for those who have children to chisel on their own."1 That appendix is a working demonstration, not evidentiary; this paper reads the principle contained in this remainder, and picks up only the side between husband and wife. What lies between the child and the parents is the business of Parent-Child Theory. Paper 5 reads two people creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come; this paper turns to shared child-rearing between husband and wife after that person has come.

This paper reads four things. First, after a third one has come, which stretch Marriage Theory reads. Second, the test of whether the child is able to unfold without revolving around a given person: how it falls on the two people. Third, what the phrase "for the child's sake" does. Fourth, the share each person has done in shared child-rearing: who acknowledges it, and whether exit can settle it. Last, a word is added on adoption.

On each of these, the direction of colonization can be read. Colonization, in this series, names the direction of one effect: toward pouring in and occupying; the other direction is cultivation, toward making space. The direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action.2 Violation is judged separately, only at the layer of basic rights.3

Shared words. "Three persons" speaks of three bearers, not of a single subject made of three. Relation Theory says "a little circle of two does not form a third bearer,"4 meaning that no collective is set up above the two; when this paper says that the child is a third one, it means that another person has come. The two sentences do not conflict: the child is a third one, not a third composed of the two.

"Shared child-rearing": this paper reads only its side between husband and wife: how the two share it, how they talk it over, what each has avowed, what each has done. What each has done to the child, and what effect it has had on the child, belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

"For the child's sake" and "for the sake of this household" are both read by what they were used to do on that occasion, not by their wording. Once "we" is said, it has to be made clear which branch it is: doing things together, or mutual recognition; Paper 2 has read this.5

"Lock": in everyday speech, "using the child as a lock" means using the child to keep the other party from leaving. Relation Theory uses this word narrowly: words that characterize exit, and raising the cost of exit outward while the way is still passable, are not yet a lock; only sealing off exit itself is locking.6 This paper's proposition keeps the everyday way of speaking, and in reading it things are kept apart by Relation Theory's division (MA36).

"Child": in the main text this paper writes "child" throughout; "descendants," which carries the sense of keeping the family line's incense burning, appears only where tradition is interfaced.

Method. As in Paper 1: the conclusions of upstream papers are said in plain words; sources, the proposition numbers of other papers and the places where upstream words are carried beyond their original place all go in the notes, and where something is extended, this series takes it on as its own undertaking. What has already been said at the relational layer is used here directly, not rewritten; how love works within marriage belongs to Love Theory; what lies between the child and the parents belongs to Parent-Child Theory. This paper speaks only of structure, not of good and bad, and issues no ought: it does not rank marriages by whether there are children, how many there are, or how well they are raised.

One couple, Tang Pu and Luo Wei, runs through the whole paper. Both are within scope: the stretch of bad quarrels passed, Luo Wei went back to the design institute, and Tang Pu later said that was her affair; Tang Pu wants to teach at a night school on weekends, and Luo Wei likewise acknowledges that this is his. The few sentences from that stretch are read by their effect on that occasion, and do not overturn the two being headed in this direction; people are all mixed, and falling back is read as it occurs. This is a made-up example, used only to see structure; from outside, a married couple's words and deeds are only clues, and do not certify who is at which layer. Examples use only adult characters: the child appears only as "the child," in the words and deeds of the two adults; this paper does not write about the child himself.

§1 A Third One Has Come

MA34 After a third one has come, Marriage Theory reads only what lies between husband and wife: the side of shared child-rearing between husband and wife. What lies between the child and the parents is handed to Parent-Child Theory; where three or more are involved, dealings are entered on separate accounts, pair by pair

A child has come, and the household has gone from two persons to three. This proposition answers: which stretch does Marriage Theory read now?

Marriage Is Still Between Two People

Paper 1 says that the marriage this series reads is made up of three things: the love between the two, each person's own commitment, institutional endorsement.7 All three are between husband and wife: love is between the two; commitment is what each has made to the other; endorsement recognizes this union of these two people. The child's coming does not add a party to these three: the child is not a party to this marriage, is not in the two people's commitments to each other, and is not the spouse that institution recognized. The child is a third one, another end.8

So Marriage Theory still reads what lies between two people. Yet with the child's coming much has changed between the two: how time is divided, how money is spent, who goes back to work, who gets up at night; many of the new promises, expectations and disputes between the two revolve around the child. What this paper reads is this side: the side of shared child-rearing between husband and wife.

Separate Accounts, Pair by Pair

How are dealings among three persons entered? Relation Theory's reading is: "Where three or more are involved, dealings that do not pass through an institution are broken down into effects between pairs and entered on separate accounts; passing through a third person does not release the instigator from his part".9 With a child, what lies among Tang Pu, Luo Wei and the child breaks down into three: Tang Pu and Luo Wei, Tang Pu and the child, Luo Wei and the child. Marriage Theory reads the first; the latter two belong to Parent-Child Theory. Household matters also have a part provided for by institutions, such as how guardianship is settled, which goes by that institution's rules; the provisions themselves are acknowledged but not judged, and only the part the institution does not provide for, or that goes beyond its provisions, is within the scope Relation Theory reads.10

"Passing through a third person does not release the instigator from his part" can come into use in a marriage with a child. When one person does something to the other by way of the child, finding fault with the other in front of the child, or having the child carry a sentence that is hard to say face to face, the account from him to her is still his, and does not change hands for having passed through the child; the account between him and the child belongs separately to Parent-Child Theory.

Entering separate accounts, pair by pair, also does not set up "the household" above the three as a fourth bearer. A little circle of two does not form a third bearer; with one more person, it does not form one on that account either. Whether "the household" could, on other conditions, come to stand separately as a bearer, this series does not judge, and leaves it as a remainder.11 The appendix's sentence, "'we' is no longer just two people," speaks broadly; read by Relation Theory, once "we" is said, it has to be made clear which branch it is, and one more person does not give rise to a position that legislates for the three.

The Side of Shared Child-Rearing Between Husband and Wife

The side of shared child-rearing between husband and wife can be something the two do together. Action Theory writes doing things together as: "One person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C: C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone; it is doing something together, not a shared law."12 If Tang Pu and Luo Wei have each avowed raising the child together, it is read by this proposition: C is the share of the work and the talking-over of this rearing between the two, not the child; the child is another end, not the product of this undertaking.13 A and B are each their own; why Tang Pu takes the child, why Luo Wei picks the child up, neither examines in the other.

What the two do together is not all that lies between them. Taking the child in the morning, picking the child up in the evening, taking turns getting up at night: these are arrangements the two agreed on, what was promised, in word and deed, read as commitment; what no one ever said and only took shape over the year, such as whoever hears first gets up, is expectation and sediment, read by Relation Theory, and Paper 4 reads how they change over the long years.14 How the two divide labor after the child comes is read by Paper 4; division of labor is not exchange either. This paper reads only three things that arise only after a third one has come: how the test of whether the child is able to unfold without revolving around a given person falls on the two people (MA35); the phrase "for the child's sake" (MA36); the share each has done (MA37).

§2 Not Revolving Around Me, Nor Around Her

MA35 The child is able to unfold without revolving around me, and also able to unfold without revolving around her: the test is read person by person. This is a test, not that the child must in fact leave; being able is limited to constitutive independence, not real-world self-sufficiency

One Test

Reading the kind of relation in which one person supports another, Meaning Theory set up a test: "That the other is able to unfold without revolving around me is the hardest test in this row".15 The other may use the conditions I provide to go in directions I did not foresee or do not approve of, and may even go in a direction in which he no longer needs me; what he has obtained from me, "once avowed in his own law, is his, and does not become a constitution I completed on his behalf".16 This proposition writes the relation on the supporter's side: whether a relation in the name of support can pass this test.

In the same proposition Meaning Theory writes about infants: "My outward meaning relation may take an infant as the concrete other it looks toward"; for an other not yet within the domain of the meaning relation, what this proposition protects is his existing standing as an end, that the source of his value is not placed outside him, and the openness of the conditions of first-person running; "The meaning predicates on my side are not copied onto the other."17 How things stand on the child's side belongs to Parent-Child Theory. This paper reads something else: when a child has two supporters, how this test falls on the two people.

Read Person by Person

It is read person by person, for two reasons.

One lies in the test itself. What this test tests is a relation: whether my support of him passes. The "me" in the test is that one person who supports. Tang Pu's support of the child is one relation; Luo Wei's support of the child is another; each has its own "me."

One lies in the two people's looking-toward. The attribution of meaning lies with each person: "The life-orientations of several bearers can cross and point to one another while each relation remains anchored in its own bearer."18 Paper 5 says that the two people's looking-toward crosses on one and the same someone who has not yet come; each belongs to each, and they do not merge into one meaning of the household;19 after that person has come, it is still so. Tang Pu looks toward the child, Luo Wei looks toward the child; they look toward the same person, but the two relations do not merge into one.

So this test is two tests: can the child unfold without revolving around Tang Pu; can the child unfold without revolving around Luo Wei. Three things are read from this.

One is that there is no test of "the two of us." "Can the child unfold without revolving around the two of us?" reads like a joint test, but in fact two tests have been pressed together by a "we"; this "we" does not form a combined supporter. Whether the two pass, each passes on his own.

One is that passing for one person does not pass for the other. When Luo Wei says, "I've never wanted the child to follow my road later on," she speaks of her own end; it does not testify for Tang Pu's end. Conversely, one cannot use the other's not passing to prove that one has passed oneself: "He's the one who won't let go, not me": this sentence speaks of him, and says nothing of herself. Each can confirm only his own end; the other end appears as the other's first-person words and deeds; it is not certified, nor, for being unable to certify it, cancelled on his behalf.20

One falls between husband and wife. Of the other's test, I can say what I see: "I think you're holding on to the child too tightly." Saying an expectation out loud is a form of questioning. Once a qualifying condition is hung on it, things are different: "If you really wanted what's best for the child, you'd let go the way I do." This sentence fixes for the other what wanting the best for the child is, and measures her by the way I let go, sliding in the direction of colonization;21 that is taking my direction as her ruler; my cannot-not is not your must.22

Arrangements the two decide together are read the same way. If an arrangement about the child that the two decided together seals the child's channel for taking another road, it is not, for having been decided together, entered as a combined "we" not passing, nor does it thereby become a case in which no one person failed: Tang Pu's end is read as Tang Pu's, Luo Wei's end as Luo Wei's. Relation Theory has written a sentence of the same form: "parents quarreling in front of their child are entered in two relations, father to child and mother to child".23 How that arrangement stands on the child's side belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

A Test, Not a Fact

This is a test, not that the child must in fact leave. Meaning Theory says it clearly: the title of this proposition "is in the mode of ability, not a statement of fact"; "the test is not that he must in fact leave me"; that the student took a road the teacher did not approve is one shape, that another student walks the teacher's road all his life is another, and both can pass this test.24 This test does not look at whose road the child takes later on. What fails is something else: when the child does not match the expectation of one of the two, that one person reads his not matching as his being wrong, and on that ground seals his channel for taking another road.25 How that is read belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

Being Able, Not Real-World Self-Sufficiency

Being able is limited to constitutive independence, not real-world self-sufficiency. In reality the child cannot do without these two people, and this dependence is real; Meaning Theory states plainly that someone who in care cannot do without those who support him does not thereby give the supporter "the constitutive right over their values".26 That the child cannot do without the two does not let either party acquire his constitution.

This sentence has one more use between husband and wife. "The child can't do without me, so I decide about the child": this sentence takes the child's dependence in reality and uses it to hold alone the adjudication of what the two do together. In doing things together, neither side holds the purpose and adjudication alone;27 where how a thing is done is decided by one party alone, and the other party's way of taking part in deciding, adjusting and withdrawing is not there, it is no longer the thing the two do together.28 Directed at the other party, making her way of taking part hard to travel carries the direction of colonization.29 Where one party is willing to do things by the other party's arrangement, so long as her way of taking part, adjusting and withdrawing is there, it does not count as holding alone.

§3 "For the Child's Sake"

MA36 "For the child's sake" cannot legislate for the two people; taking the child as a lock to keep the other party, where it falls to "only as," is treating the child only as a condition, and carries the direction of colonization. "For the child's sake" and "for the sake of this household," when used to judge one party's law for her, have the same form; whether it appeals to something done together, to existing arrangements, or borrows mutual recognition to pass final judgment, is checked separately, case by case

Who Is Speaking in This Sentence

"For the child's sake, why don't you stay at home for two years first?" This sentence seems to bring in a third voice, the child's. But the child has said nothing. The one speaking is Tang Pu; what "for the child's sake" says is how Tang Pu reads what the child wants.

This reading can be right, and can be wrong; it is a reason, and can be said. Where two laws meet, the Conflict Treatise draws this line very finely: "I may state reasons. I may make requests. I may set out boundaries. I may propose an action plan. What is actually forbidden is something else: my law cannot, on its own strength alone, acquire the authority to settle for you that you must yield."30 When Tang Pu says, "I think the child needs someone around most these two years; could you stay at home for now?", that is a reason and a request; whether Luo Wei goes back to the design institute is still hers to judge. If he takes this reading as already established on her behalf, "For the child's sake, you have to stay at home," he has settled for her that she must yield. The child's name does not change this sentence's structure: it is still his law landing on hers.

The child's own needs do not legislate for the two people either. That the child needs someone to look after him is true; it enters each of the two people's conditions of occurrence, and each avows it in his own law, as each one's own cannot-not. Doing things together does not automatically produce a position that legislates each side's own law for them;31 the rules the two agree on for this, such as who stays at home first, have binding force that "must pass separately through each party's own law, or come from a procedure both have acknowledged".32 "For the child's sake" does not become that position.

Which Branch Is Borrowed

"For the child's sake" can carry a "we" with it: our child, this household of ours. What it appeals to must be checked case by case, not assigned by the form of the sentence. Roughly there are three.

One is something done together. "Raising the child is something we do together, so you have to listen to me": that the two raise the child together is true, but neither side holds alone the adjudication of what is done together (MA35). Appealing to something done together can only appeal to it; it cannot borrow it to decide for the other.

One is existing arrangements. "We agreed we'd take turns getting up at night; tonight it's your turn": this sentence appeals to what the two agreed on, to what was promised, in word and deed, and to the days already arranged by it,33 and makes sense; what binds her is whether she herself still stands there. If it goes on, "We agreed, so you're not allowed to change it," characterizing her change, that layer is read separately, and slides in the direction of colonization.34

One is borrowing mutual recognition to pass final judgment. "We're one family; for the child's sake you have to agree": this sentence borrows the mutual recognition between the two to pass final judgment on something done together. Love Theory has read its original form: "'We love each other, so you have to agree' borrows mutual recognition to pass final judgment on a matter done together".35 Paper 2, reading "for the sake of this household," has read this form too.36

So "for the child's sake" and "for the sake of this household," when taken up to judge one party's law for her, are one and the same shape: using a name that seems to stand above the two people to take in and replace one party's own judgment. This name can be the child; it can be the household; Paper 2 has said that marriage, like other institutions, cannot give rise to a "we" that takes each person into one.37

Luo Wei's mother's sentence, "For the child's sake, you'll still have to make do and get along," is said by yet another person. By pair-by-pair accounting, toward her daughter it is one account, toward her son-in-law another; if she is offering advice, voicing her worry, that is a form of questioning; if she uses it to settle for the two how they are to live, that is legislating for the two, sliding in the direction of colonization.38 Either way, her sentence does not make "for the child's sake" into a position that legislates for the two people.

Using the Child to Keep the Other Party

"If you leave, you can forget about ever seeing the child again." This sentence uses the child to keep the other party from leaving. The two sides are read apart.

On Tang Pu's side. This sentence is directed at his exit, and hangs a consequence on his going. Relation Theory reads what is done to exit at the layer of running as three kinds, divided by structure: words that characterize exit slide in the direction of colonization; raising the cost of exit outward while the way is still passable carries the direction of colonization, and of words that announce consequences, "once spoken they are already the second kind, without waiting to be carried out"; sealing off exit itself, by whatever means, is at the layer of basic rights a violation, and also carries the direction of colonization.39 What Luo Wei's sentence announces is a consequence, and it falls under the second kind: once spoken, it carries the direction of colonization, without waiting on whether she does it. If, together with other deeds, it makes him actually unable to leave, it falls under the third kind: at the layer of basic rights it is a violation; from then on, that marriage is no longer in this series either.40 Only here is the everyday "lock" the lock Relation Theory speaks of.

The direction is read on this one effect, not by intention. This sentence may have been words said in anger during that stretch of quarreling, regretted by her as soon as they were out; what is read is still where this one effect is headed, and whether it took hold is seen in whether he afterward lets this consequence stand in for his own judgment of whether to leave; merely not having left does not by itself show this.41 If she does the same thing by way of the child, for instance having the child beg him not to go, the account from her to him is still hers (MA34).

On the child's side. In this sentence the child is taken up as the condition of the other party's staying. Whether this falls to "only as" goes, as in Paper 5, not by one sentence but by whether, in the two people's arrangements, he still has a place of his own; where it falls there, it is treating the child only as a condition, and carries the direction of colonization.42 A sentence is one effect, read on that occasion; people are all mixed; this sentence is no ground for judging that the child has only this one place left in this household, nor for judging that this marriage has exited scope. How things stand on the child's side is handed to Parent-Child Theory; this paper only registers it.

One more thing has to be kept apart. That a person himself stays for the child's sake is his own reason, at his own end; this paper does not judge it, nor does it prove that one ought to stay for the child's sake. If the love between the two is already gone, and the two both love the child and remain together, that is the other case Paper 1 speaks of: where both love the child and there is no love between them, it is not among the marriages this series reads; this series looks at structure, does not read minds, and does not criticize; it does not judge who is a means, nor turn and judge the two people.43 What this proposition reads is only using the child to keep the other person.

§4 The Share One Has Done Oneself

MA37 The share each person has done in shared child-rearing cannot be acknowledged by someone else in his place; shared child-rearing is not settled by unilateral exit

Not Acknowledged by Someone Else

That day Tang Pu agreed to pick the child up, and forgot. When he got home he said: "You didn't remind me either."

Writing of doing things together, Action Theory laid down a sentence: "What a person has done himself cannot be acknowledged by someone else in his place".44 In the same place: doing things together "does not let what one has done oneself turn into something 'we' did, something no one did"; "a thing done was done by the one who did it; the account of it can change, the one who did it cannot".45 Picking up that day was something Tang Pu agreed to, and forgetting was his forgetting too; whether Luo Wei should have reminded him is another entry, which can be spoken of separately, and cannot take this entry away. By the division of breach of faith, what can be reported from outside is this one non-fulfillment, together with traces; whether he owns it in his heart is a matter at his end.46

Not being acknowledged by someone else runs in both directions. A fault cannot be passed over; nor can giving. This year Luo Wei got up more at night; that is something she did; if Tang Pu says, "We raised the child together," and means doing this together, he is not wrong; to use it to rub out the extra share she did as something no one did is to have it acknowledged by someone else. Conversely, "This year I'm the one who raised the child, so I decide about the child" takes the share one has done oneself and uses it to lay claim to the other party's adjudication. Where Action Theory speaks of guarding, it writes of "not possessing others under 'I have contributed'."47 Giving is real, and is entered with the one who gave; it does not turn into adjudication over another person, nor into possession of the child. How credit is reckoned has its own account.48 "I got up three times last night; tomorrow morning it's your turn": if this is a rotation the two agreed on, it appeals to existing arrangements; if it trades this time for a time, it is a moment of exchange, read in Paper 4.

Not Settled by Unilateral Exit

Suppose that one day Tang Pu and Luo Wei part. A marriage can end; the matters of shared child-rearing do not end along with it.

The Conflict Treatise writes this point very precisely: "no party can, by withdrawing unilaterally, close out this incompatibility as regards that party's first-person responsibility, the shared relation, third-party responsibility, or institutional consequence"; "Written this way it holds intimate relations, shared child-rearing, organizational role and public responsibility"; "Departure can happen; departure does not by itself close those accounts."49 Relation Theory goes on to say: "shared matters that remain after parting are not settled by unilateral exit"; leaving the shared matters room for natural development when one exits points in the direction of cultivation; neither staying nor leaving certifies cultivation.50

This sentence has two layers. One is what has already been done: the share each has done in shared child-rearing over these years is entered with each, does not vanish because one party leaves, and does not pass to someone else because of leaving either. The other is what is still to be done: the child still has to be raised, this undertaking still lies between the two, and how the two divide it from then on goes by what the two talk over from then on: the one who leaves does not simply walk away from it, nor does the one who stays use it to fix, on his behalf, every later step.51 It is not settled, nor does it turn into a demand that "you must come back."52

So marriage and shared child-rearing are two ledgers. A marriage can end, and the matters on the side of shared child-rearing between the two remain as before; a marriage can also go on as before after the child has grown up, and then it is still made up of the love between the two, each person's own commitment and endorsement, not held up by the child. The two steps of divorce, and what one says on the other's behalf when leaving, are read in Paper 7.

§5 After Adoption

MA38 After adoption has welcomed a third one, the side of shared child-rearing between husband and wife is read by this paper; the preparation the two make together for his coming is read by Paper 5

Tang Pu's elder sister and her husband adopted a child the year before last.

Preparing for adoption Paper 5 has read: someone who has not yet come is someone who has not yet come into these two people's lives, not necessarily someone who does not yet exist.53 After the preparation, the child came. From then on, the several things this paper reads hold between those two in the same way: Marriage Theory reads only what lies between husband and wife, and among three, dealings are entered on separate accounts, pair by pair; whether the child is able to unfold without revolving around a given person is read person by person; "for the child's sake" does not legislate for the two people; the share each has done is not acknowledged by someone else, and shared child-rearing is not settled by unilateral exit. How a third one came does not change the structure between husband and wife after he has come.

Adoption has a further procedure: that institution recognizes, by its rules, this parent-child relation; this is between persons and a construct, is registered by its rules, and the rules are acknowledged but not judged.54

In adoption there is one way of having something acknowledged by someone else that should be singled out: "You were the one who insisted on adopting." If adoption is something the two each avowed and did together, the decision is the two people's, and each acknowledges his own share; it cannot afterward be passed over to the other. If at the time only one party avowed it and the other did not, then there was no undertaking the two did together;55 that is something that should have been entered apart at the time, not a reason for passing it to someone else afterward.

§6 Interfacing with Tradition

Several have asked, one after another, about the things this paper reads. For each, this paper writes faithfully what he sees and why he looks, where he presses on this paper, where they meet and where they part; other traditions appear in their own words. Aristotle on friendship Relation Theory has already interfaced; Hegel on marriage not being a contract, and Locke on conjugal society being made by a voluntary compact, Paper 1 has already picked up; here only the layer after a child has come is picked up.56

Children are a bond (Aristotle). In Book VIII, chapter 12 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats friendship among kin, and comes to husband and wife: "Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature"; in this kind of friendship there seem to be both utility and pleasure; if the two are good, it may also be based on virtue. Then he says that children seem to be a bond of union, which is why childless people part more easily; for children are a good common to both, and what is common holds them together.57 He looks in order to divide friendship by the kinds of community, and to explain on what each of the several friendships in the household rests. What he sees: after children come, there is one more shared thing between the two; this thing really enters between the two, and is not either one's private affair. He presses on this paper at two points. First, children are a bond: then what holds a marriage together is not only the love between the two. Second, childless people part more easily: then a marriage with children lasts longer. They meet in: the shared matters children bring are real; they lie between the two, and are not settled because one party leaves (MA37); the thing the two do together is indeed held in common. Before speaking of children, he first spoke of the friendship between husband and wife itself; this paper does not read children as a substitute for the love between the two either (Paper 1). They part at three points. First, the common good this paper reads as what the two do together and the effects it leaves; it can be a reason each of the two is willing to go on, and it can also be taken up by one party to keep the other; the two are checked apart: it is not judged a lock from the word "bond," nor is it inferred from it that the love between the two is no longer something this marriage cannot do without; only what is taken up by one party to keep the other is the kind MA36 reads. Second, lasting longer is not being better: stability means only that a stretch of dealings is maintained over time, and carries no evaluation;58 this series does not rank marriages by whether there are children, nor does it prove that children bring husband and wife closer. Third, he divides friendship by the kinds of community; this series reads direction on one effect, and among three enters separate accounts, pair by pair (MA34).

The unity becomes objective in the children (Hegel). In the Philosophy of Right, treating the family, Hegel comes to children. §173: in substance marriage is a unity, but only a unity of inwardness or disposition; in outward existence this unity is sundered in the two parties; only in the children does the unity itself exist externally, objectively and explicitly as a unity, because the parents love the children as their love, as the embodiment of their own substance.59 The Addition to this section says it more directly: the relation of love between husband and wife is in itself not objective; parents first acquire such objectivity in their children, in whom they can see the entirety of their union objectified.60 §175: children are not things, and cannot be the property either of their parents or of others.61 §177: once the children have been educated to freedom of personality and have come of age, they are recognized as persons in the eyes of the law, and can hold property of their own and found families of their own; their substantive destiny is thenceforth in the new family, and the old family falls into the background as merely their ultimate basis and origin.62 He looks in order to show how the family, as a moment of ethical life, is completed, and how in the children it passes over into civil society. What he sees: after children come, what lies between the two is no longer only between the two; when the children grow up, they go into lives of their own. He presses on this paper at two points. First, the children are the objective existence of the two people's unity: on this account, what is in the children is the one unity the two make together; this paper reads the two people's looking-toward person by person, as each belonging to each (MA35), and diverges from him in substance. Second, the relation of love between husband and wife is not in itself objective, and acquires objectivity only in the children: on this account, a marriage without children seems to lack a piece; this stands against this series' not ranking marriages by whether there are children. These two divergences do not directly grant either party the authority to decide for the other in the children's name; he himself says in §175 that children are not things and not property, and in §177 that children, once grown, are recognized as persons in the eyes of the law. They meet in §175 and §177: children are no one's property; children grow up and go into lives of their own, and the old family falls back to basis and origin; this runs the same way as Meaning Theory's test: that the other is able to unfold without revolving around me is the boundary of support, not its failure. They part at three points. First, parents can, on their own side, love the children as the embodiment of their love; the meaning predicates on this side are not copied onto the children,63 and the child is another end (Paper 5). Second, the two people's looking-toward crosses in the child without merging; this paper does not read the child as the objective form of the two people's unity; a little circle of two does not form a third bearer, nor does it become one by way of the child. Third, he writes the dissolution of the family as one event: the children come of age, and the old family falls back; this paper's test is read person by person, and is about being able, not about fact; nor does it say that marriage falls back as the children grow up: after the children grow up, what lies between the two is still between the two (MA37). The destinations he assigns to sons and daughters in §177 this paper does not take up.

The union lasts until the children can provide for themselves (Locke). In chapter VII of the Second Treatise of Government Locke says that the conjunction of man and woman ought to last as long as the rearing of the young requires, "till they are able to shift and provide for themselves"; he holds that herein lies the chief, if not the only, reason why male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures; these are ties that make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man than in other species of animals.64 Paper 1 has already cited the question he goes on to ask: once rearing and inheritance are provided for, why may this compact not, like any other voluntary compact, be made determinable by consent, at a certain time, or on certain conditions?65 He goes on to say that the wife in many cases, by natural right or contract, has a liberty to separate; and upon such separation the children fall to the father or the mother as the contract determines.66 He looks in order to separate conjugal society, paternal power and political power, and to explain where each comes from and where each stops. What he sees: after children come, there is between the two people one more thing that must last many years; this thing has a time of its own, and does not change with the two people's staying or leaving of the moment. He presses on this paper: he uses the needs of rearing to explain why the human union lasts long; on this account, "for the child's sake" is a real reason for a marriage's continuing, and for him even the chief reason. He does not say that once rearing has come to an end husband and wife may not go on, nor does he erase the arrangements for the children after separation. They meet in: the matters of shared child-rearing have a time of their own, last until the child no longer needs them, and are not settled by one party's staying or leaving of the moment (MA37); that the children's matters need separate arrangements after separation, he saw as well. They part at: he explains the reason for the union's continuing by the needs of rearing; this paper enters marriage and shared child-rearing apart, and the two end out of step. A marriage can end, and the side of shared child-rearing between the two remains as before; after the children can provide for themselves, a marriage can also go on as before, and the love between the two is something it cannot do without (Paper 1). This paper uses this to make its own reading clear, and does not say that he has merged the two ledgers into one. The children's needs are real; they enter each of the two people's own law, and do not become the reason that legislates for the two people (MA36).

§7 Drawing Together and Downstream

This paper has laid down five propositions. Taken together, they say: after a third one has come, Marriage Theory still reads only what lies between husband and wife, the side of shared child-rearing between husband and wife; what lies between the child and the parents belongs to Parent-Child Theory; among three persons, dealings are entered on separate accounts, pair by pair, and passing through a third one does not release the instigator from his part; the child is a third one, not a third composed of the two. The child is able to unfold without revolving around me, and also able to unfold without revolving around her: the test is read person by person; passing for one person does not pass for the other, and arrangements the two decide together are also entered on separate accounts, pair by pair; it is a test, not a fact, and being able is limited to constitutive independence, not real-world self-sufficiency; the child's dependence in reality does not let either party acquire his constitution, nor let either party hold alone the adjudication of what the two do together. "For the child's sake" cannot legislate for the two people; whether it appeals to something done together, to existing arrangements, or borrows mutual recognition to pass final judgment, is checked case by case; when taken up to judge one party's law for her, it has the same form as "for the sake of this household." Using the child to keep the other party: on the child's side, the child is taken up as the condition of the other party's staying, and where this falls to "only as," it is treating the child only as a condition, which carries the direction of colonization; whether it falls there is read by the two people's arrangements, not by one sentence; on the other party's side, raising the cost of the other party's exit outward carries the direction of colonization, and what has sealed it off is a violation. The share each has done in shared child-rearing is not acknowledged by someone else: faults are not passed over, and giving is not taken up to possess the other party either; shared child-rearing is not settled by unilateral exit, nor does it turn into a demand that "you must come back"; marriage and shared child-rearing are two ledgers. A child who came by adoption is likewise read by this paper.

This paper does not prove that one ought to stay for the child's sake, nor that children bring husband and wife closer.

The question left open. A child one party brings into the marriage, for instance a child one party already has on remarrying, comes into the other party's life without the two having prepared together for a child. On the side between husband and wife, the several things in this paper can for the most part be read as they are; but the two people's starting points with the child differ, and what each has avowed, and from when, this paper has not read; it is left for Paper 0 to register. After the child grows up, the household is down to two people again; how things then stand between the two is a matter of the long years, read in Paper 4.

Downstream. What this paper has laid down is used later as follows. That shared child-rearing is not settled by unilateral exit, Paper 7 invokes when reading leaving; saying on the other's behalf, when leaving, "Nothing has been lost in these years," is read there. How the two divide labor after the child comes is read by Paper 4. What lies between the child and the parents belongs to Parent-Child Theory; how Meaning Theory's test reads on the child's side also belongs to Parent-Child Theory. The check on the shared words "three persons" and "third bearer," the everyday "lock" and Relation Theory's lock, "shared child-rearing" read only on its side between husband and wife, and "descendants" appearing only where tradition is interfaced, is listed together in Paper 0.

Acknowledgments

This paper is signed by Han Qin alone; the author decided every argument and choice and bears sole responsibility for the text. Models from Anthropic and OpenAI assisted with drafting and review; the author thanks them.

Notes

  1. F6, Appendix D, SAE Marriage Principles, item 8(d). Appendix D is a working demonstration, not evidentiary (Relation Theory Paper 0, §16). ↩︎
  2. Relation Theory H8: cultivation and colonization are two directions, cultivation going toward making space and colonization toward pouring in and occupying; the direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action. Paper 1, Introduction. ↩︎
  3. Relation Theory H9: "Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights; it and the direction of colonization are two lines". ↩︎
  4. Relation Theory H12. ↩︎
  5. Relation Theory Paper 1, under H3: "Whenever Relation Theory says 'we,' it must state which branch it means"; one branch is doing things together, the other is mutual recognition. Paper 2 reads the two branches of "we". ↩︎
  6. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26: "The first two, short of trapping him, are not yet a lock: exit is still within reach, and the way is still passable, only hard to travel"; the third is sealing off exit itself: "Only this is locking". Relation Theory's paper on commitment is Relation Theory Paper 3, Commitment. ↩︎
  7. Paper 1, MA1. ↩︎
  8. Paper 5, MA31: the new subject is an end too; the child is another end welcomed through preparing for a child, not a product of this undertaking. ↩︎
  9. Relation Theory H12. ↩︎
  10. Relation Theory H11: "within an institution, the part of what passes between persons that the institution does not provide for, or that goes beyond its provisions, is within range; the relation between persons and constructs is not; the provisions themselves are acknowledged but not judged". ↩︎
  11. Relation Theory H12: "a little circle of two does not form a third bearer". Meaning Theory Y27 states plainly: "that another bearer might come to stand on other conditions and coexist with each of them is not within this reductio, and is left undecided as Value Theory leaves it". Paper 2, MA11. ↩︎
  12. Action Theory Paper 8, D47. ↩︎
  13. Paper 5, MA29, reading preparing for a child: C is the undertaking of creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come, not the child. Reading the side of rearing between husband and wife on the same structure here is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  14. Relation Theory H24, H29, H10, H34. ↩︎
  15. The title of Meaning Theory P3, Y26. ↩︎
  16. Meaning Theory P3, Y26: "Whatever another has obtained from me, once avowed in his own law, is his, and does not become a constitution I completed on his behalf." ↩︎
  17. Meaning Theory P3, Y26: "For an other not yet within that domain, what this proposition protects is his existing standing as an end, that the source of his value is not placed outside him, and the openness of the conditions of first-person running". ↩︎
  18. Meaning Theory P3, Y27. ↩︎
  19. Paper 5, MA33. ↩︎
  20. Conflict Treatise §2, the operation layer: "I can confirm only my own end"; Paper 1, MA2. The original place divides two laws; carrying it to the test of each of two supporters is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  21. Relation Theory H37: saying an expectation out loud is a form of questioning; attaching a qualifying condition to an expectation, fixing for the other party what something means to him, is to slide in the direction of colonization, and whether that takes hold depends on the other party's later understanding and action. ↩︎
  22. "My cannot-not is not your must" (Aesthetics Ray 11 §5). ↩︎
  23. Relation Theory Paper 1, under H12: dealings between two of them that enter the conditions of occurrence of the third among them, as a construct left behind, are entered on each of those two's accounts with the third. The original place speaks of words and deeds in front of the third; carrying it to an arrangement the two decided together is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  24. Meaning Theory P3, Y26: "The title of this proposition is in the mode of ability, not a statement of fact"; "the test is not that he must in fact leave me". ↩︎
  25. The relation layer of Meaning Theory P3, Y26: when the other refuses, restates his own reasons or changes direction, whether this relation that calls itself support treats that response, which does not match expectation, as grounds for declaring his constitution invalid, and whether it on that account seals his channels of actual expression, revision and change of direction. ↩︎
  26. Meaning Theory P3, Y26: "Ability is limited to constitutive independence, not to real-world self-sufficiency"; the same place says of those who in care cannot do without those who support them: "this never gives the supporter the constitutive right over their values". ↩︎
  27. Action Theory Paper 8, D47. ↩︎
  28. The boundary that Paper 5, MA30, draws in reading the undertaking of preparing for a child: where how a thing is done is decided by one party alone, and the other party's way of taking part in deciding, adjusting and withdrawing is not there, it is not the thing the two do together. Reading the side of rearing between husband and wife by the same boundary here is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  29. Relation Theory H8. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26: acting outward so that the cost of the other party's leaving, saying no or seeking help rises carries the direction of colonization. ↩︎
  30. Conflict Treatise §2. ↩︎
  31. Action Theory Paper 8, D48: "Doing things together does not automatically produce a position that legislates each side's own law for them; institutions can let people find each other, but cannot produce a 'we' on behalf of both." ↩︎
  32. Conflict Treatise §24. ↩︎
  33. Relation Theory H24: "Commitment is entered as three things: what was promised, in word and deed; where one stands, and revising; the effects left". ↩︎
  34. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26: "You promised, so you're not allowed to leave"; "Leaving is betrayal": these hang a qualifying condition on the commitment and characterize exit on the other party's behalf, and slide in the direction of colonization. The original place speaks of exit; carrying it to a single revision of the agreement is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  35. Love Theory L46. ↩︎
  36. Paper 2, MA15. ↩︎
  37. Paper 2, MA15; Meaning Theory Y27: what this proposition blocks is "a total orientation that takes in each person's orientation and replaces it". ↩︎
  38. Relation Theory H12, H37. ↩︎
  39. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26. ↩︎
  40. Paper 1, MA9. ↩︎
  41. Relation Theory H8. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26: "while exit is still actually passable, if he from then on lets this characterization stand in for his own judgment of whether to leave, the first kind has taken hold; merely not having left does not by itself show this." The original place speaks of the kind that characterizes exit; reading a sentence that announces consequences in the same way here is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  42. Paper 5, MA31: the child is not only the continuation of the two, a link in continuing the line, a security for old age, or a condition for keeping the other party; where it falls to "only as," it is treating the child only as a condition, which carries the direction of colonization, and the child's side is handed to Parent-Child Theory. The same paper reads "only": not by whether these words appear in a sentence, but by the concrete account and arrangements: whether that person, in the two people's arrangements, has a place of his own besides this one position. ↩︎
  43. Paper 1, MA3, MA9. ↩︎
  44. Action Theory Paper 8, D49. ↩︎
  45. Action Theory Paper 8, §6. ↩︎
  46. Relation Theory H28: breach of faith is entered apart, as dropping, falsity, non-fulfillment, obstruction and joint revision of the agreement; dropping and falsity are first-person matters, and from outside only non-fulfillment, obstruction and joint revision of the agreement are reported, together with traces. ↩︎
  47. Action Theory Paper 9, D56: "not possessing others under 'I have contributed'". The original place speaks of guarding when many people do things together; carrying it to shared child-rearing between husband and wife is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  48. The boundary of settlement in Meaning Theory P3, Y26: ownership of things, authorship, causal contribution, credit, proceeds and responsibility each have their own accounts, and are not settled by that proposition automatically. Action Theory Paper 8, §6: "How the credit and authorship for this are reckoned is a separate account". ↩︎
  49. Conflict Treatise §2. ↩︎
  50. Relation Theory H58. ↩︎
  51. Relation Theory Paper 6, under H58: fixing the future for the other party, as something he must follow and cannot revise himself, goes toward deciding for the other party, and slides in the direction of colonization; if what the handover leaves are conditions the other party can still use as they are, revise or set aside, it does not point that way. The original example is the looking-after of an elderly person after two people part; carrying it to shared child-rearing is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  52. Relation Theory Paper 6, §4: where one party exits and the other party's reliance remains, "exit does not settle it; nor does it turn into a demand that 'you must come back.'" Relation Theory Paper 3, under H24: "Not being settled does not mean having to resume contact, having to answer without limit or having to repair." ↩︎
  53. Paper 5, MA32. ↩︎
  54. Relation Theory H11; Paper 1, MA5. ↩︎
  55. Paper 5, MA30: where one party does not avow it, there is no undertaking the two do together. ↩︎
  56. Aristotle on friendship: Relation Theory Paper 0, §5 and §13; Hegel §§161–164 and Locke, Second Treatise of Government §§78–82: Paper 1, §6. ↩︎
  57. Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12. Ross's translation: "Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature"; "both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship"; "But this friendship may be based also on virtue, if the parties are good"; "children seem to be a bond of union (which is the reason why childless people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is common holds them together". ↩︎
  58. Relation Theory H30: "Stability means only that a stretch of dealings is maintained over time, and carries no evaluation". ↩︎
  59. Philosophy of Right §173. Knox's translation: "In substance marriage is a unity, though only a unity of inwardness or disposition; in outward existence, however, the unity is sundered in the two parties. It is only in the children that the unity itself exists externally, objectively, and explicitly as a unity, because the parents love the children as their love, as the embodiment of their own substance". ↩︎
  60. §173, Addition. The Additions were compiled by the editor from students' lecture notes, and rank below the main text. Knox's translation: "The relation of love between husband and wife is in itself not objective"; "Such an objectivity parents first acquire in their children, in whom they can see objectified the entirety of their union". ↩︎
  61. §175. Knox's translation: "they are not things and cannot be the property either of their parents or others". ↩︎
  62. §177. Knox's translation: "once the children have been educated to freedom of personality, and have come of age, they become recognised as persons in the eyes of the law"; "They now have their substantive destiny in the new family; the old family on the other hand falls into the background as merely their ultimate basis and origin". ↩︎
  63. Meaning Theory P3, Y26: "The meaning predicates on my side are not copied onto the other." ↩︎
  64. Second Treatise of Government §79: "this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last", "so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones", "till they are able to shift and provide for themselves"; §80: "And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures"; §81: "these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals". ↩︎
  65. Same work, §81; Paper 1, §6. ↩︎
  66. Same work, §82: "the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it"; "and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's lot, as such contract does determine". ↩︎

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. Quotations are checked item by item in the accompanying audit table.

I · SAE works directly cited in this paper

Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

Qin, H. (2026). The Half That Is Not Mine to Settle (SAE Meaning Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22731235

Qin, H. (2026). Finding One Another (SAE Action Theory, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970783

Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Share of Strength, and Guarding (SAE Action Theory, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970787

Qin, H. (2026). The Beauty of Purpose (SAE Aesthetics, Ray 11) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22991142

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 0: The Place of Relation Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545115

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 1: What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 3: Commitment [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545023

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 4: Dealings and Expectation [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545057

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 6: Asymmetry, Divergence and Ending [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545087

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Love Theory Paper 6: That Moment [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23627781

II · External works

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, ch. 12. Trans. W. D. Ross. (MIT Internet Classics Archive transcription; the Greek original has not been checked)

Hegel, G. W. F. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820), §173 and Addition, §175, §177. English: Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. (marxists.org transcription; the German original has not been checked)

Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government (1690), Second Treatise, ch. VII, §§79–82. (marxists.org transcription)

Interfaces

  • Main upstream: Meaning Theory P3 (Y26, together with its two sentences on infants and its boundary of settlement; Y27); Action Theory Paper 8 (D47, D48, D49, §6); the Conflict Treatise (§2); Relation Theory Paper 1 (H12, together with the section under it; the section under H3 on the two branches of "we"); F6 (Appendix D, item 8(d)).
  • Also used: Relation Theory Paper 1 (H8, H9, H10, H11), Paper 3 (H24, H26, H28, H29, H30; the sections under H24 and H26), Paper 4 (H34, H37), Paper 6 (H58, together with the section under it; §4); Action Theory Paper 9 (D56); the Conflict Treatise (§24); Aesthetics Ray 11 (§5); Love Theory Paper 6 (L46); Relation Theory Paper 0 (§5, §13, §16).
  • This series: continues from Paper 1, its Introduction, MA1, MA2, MA3, MA5, MA9 and §6; from Paper 2, MA11 and MA15; from Paper 5, MA29 to MA33; division of labor after the child comes, moments of exchange, and the two people after the child has grown up are read by Paper 4; Paper 7 takes up that shared child-rearing is not settled by unilateral exit; Parent-Child Theory takes up what lies between the child and the parents; Paper 0 lists the shared words together, and registers the child one party brings into the marriage.