Self-as-an-End
SAE Marriage Theory · Paper 5

For One Not Yet Here
孕育

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23819245 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

This paper reads the side of marriage that moves toward preparing for a child. Preparing for a child, in this series, means two people creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come; it is the shape cultivation takes in the one kind that is creating conditions, and this paper reads only this kind. Questioning, and the one who comes later's own response, are entered separately where there are already actual dealings; the beginning of living together is not taken as the only dividing line.

When the two people each avow this undertaking and cannot not do it, it is doing something together: you for A, I for B, and we do C together. C is the undertaking of creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come; it is not the child, nor is it simply either party's A; A and B are each one's own, and neither examines the other. What one party is for can be just this: affirming the other's purpose of wanting a child, and being willing to give and to support for it; this too is his own cannot-not; whether it is this kind only his own end can confirm. C must be avowed by both, each having a share he can do himself, and the shares put together able to bring it about; neither party holds its purpose and adjudication alone: if one party is willing to do things according to the other's arrangement, it does not count as holding alone, so long as his way to take part, adjust and withdraw is there. If one party does not avow it, there is no C; one party avowing on the other's behalf, or saying out loud a characterization of the other's changing his mind, slides in the direction of colonization; sealing the other's way to say no and to change his mind, or making it hard to travel, carries the direction of colonization; what seals off saying no and withdrawing themselves is, in addition, a violation at the layer of basic rights. Whether preparation occurred, what conditions it left, and whether that person later came are entered apart: that he did not come does not retroactively judge that the earlier preparation never occurred, nor is anyone, on this basis, judged to be lacking in something.

The new subject is an end too. The child is another end that preparing for a child welcomes, not a product of this undertaking; what the two leave for him are conditions, and they do not complete the avowal of his direction for him. His standing as an end is not created by the preparation; nor does his own constitutive position pass to the two because he cannot choose which conditions he first enters. He does not figure only as the continuation of the two, a link in continuing the line, a security for old age, or a condition for keeping the other party; "only as" is read from the two people's arrangements, and a sentence is read by that sentence itself; to fall to "only as" is to treat the child only as a condition, and carries the direction of colonization. Preparing to adopt counts too: someone who has not yet come is someone who has not yet come into these two people's lives, not necessarily someone who does not yet exist; while it is not yet known who he is, it is not judged on this basis that that position has been filled by a concrete other, nor, the other way round, that it stands empty. The two people's looking-toward crosses on one and the same someone who has not yet come; each belongs to each, and they are not merged into one meaning of the household. This paper interfaces with the "Meaning of the Marriage Rite" chapter of the Book of Rites, the Mencius, Kant and Arendt. This paper does not prove that marriage ought to prepare for a child, does not prove that a marriage with children is more complete, and does not prove that children make a marriage more stable.

Introduction

It is the third year of Cheng Li and Fang Ning's marriage. One winter evening Fang Ning said that she wanted a child. She said it very slowly: she wanted to watch someone they did not know grow up beside them, someone she would have to come to know anew, who would one day surprise them. Cheng Li heard her out, and it was a long time before he spoke. He said that he himself had no such wanting in his heart, and on this he would not deceive her; but he could see that it was hers, something she had thought about seriously for a long time, and he was willing to prepare for it together with her.

Over the next two years the two did many things. Cheng Li changed to a job that did not require frequent travel. The two went over their savings again, and moved somewhere closer to Fang Ning's parents. They read together, went together to ask friends who had children, and agreed on who would see to the household at what times in future. When the news reached the families, Cheng Li's mother said: "Finally there'll be someone to keep the family incense burning." Fang Ning's father said: "And when you're old, you'll have someone to lean on."

In these two years the child had not yet come. What the two were doing was preparing conditions for someone who had not yet come. What this paper asks is: what kind of undertaking is this; whose is it; and what is that someone who has not yet come within this undertaking?

What this paper reads. This paper reads the undertaking that two adults do together for someone who has not yet come. The side between husband and wife after the child has come is read in Paper 6; what lies between the child and the parents belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

Preparing for a child is not a threshold of marriage. Paper 1 has said that shared life and preparing for a child can be in a marriage, but are not only in marriage, and need not be in a marriage; they are content this series has to read. A marriage that has not moved toward preparing for a child is not in the undertaking this paper reads, and is not on that account short of anything.1

This paper reads four things. First, what preparing for a child is in this series: creating conditions for someone who has not yet come. Second, what it looks like as something two people do together, and when it is not that. Third, the position of the new subject in this undertaking. Fourth, how the two people's own looking-toward crosses on him, and each belongs to each.

On each of these, the direction of colonization can be read. Colonization, in this series, names the direction of one effect: toward pouring in and occupying; the other direction is cultivation, toward making space. The direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action: the half that is action can be seen from outside, while the half that is understanding needs the other party's own first person.2 Violation is judged separately, only at the layer of basic rights.3

Shared words. "Preparing for a child" takes only one sense in this series: two people creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come.

"Someone who has not yet come" means someone who has not yet come into these two people's lives, not necessarily someone who does not yet exist (MA32).

"Child" and "descendants." The first word speaks of that person himself; the second carries a family line, and puts that person on the line as one link in it. In its body this paper writes "child" and "new subject"; "descendants" is used only where tradition is interfaced.

"Doing something together." The thing the two do together this paper does not call a "shared purpose": purposes are each one's own, A is hers, B is his; what is shared is only the one thing that is done. Action Theory says it plainly: "it is doing something together, not a shared law."4

"Conditions" is read as in Meaning Theory: what is left for the one who comes later is something he can enter, not a direction set for him.5

Method. As in Paper 1: the conclusions of upstream papers are said in plain words; sources, the proposition numbers of other papers and the places where upstream words are carried beyond their original place all go in the notes, and where something is extended, this series takes it on as its own undertaking. What has already been said at the relational layer is used here directly, not rewritten; the child's side belongs to Parent-Child Theory, and is not written here either. This paper speaks only of structure, not of good and bad, and issues no ought: it does not rank marriages by whether there are children, or by how much was prepared.

One couple, Cheng Li and Fang Ning, runs through the whole paper; another couple, Shao Hui and Song Lan, who are preparing to adopt, serves as a side example. Both couples are within scope: Fang Ning can say why she wants a child, and that is hers; Cheng Li can say why he is willing, and that is his; both acknowledge that the one who has not yet come will have his own road. The child is not a character in the examples. These are made-up examples, used only to see structure; from outside, a married couple's words and deeds are only clues, and do not certify who is at which layer.

§1 Creating Conditions

MA28 Preparing for a child is two people creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come; it is the shape cultivation takes in the one kind that is creating conditions, and this paper reads only this kind. Questioning, and the one who comes later's own response, are entered separately where there are already actual dealings; the beginning of living together is not taken as the only dividing line

Two Ways of Cultivation, of Which This Paper Reads One

In reading bringing each other into their own, Paper 3 says that bringing someone into their own is cultivation, and that it has mainly two ways: creating conditions, and questioning.6 Both ways can be used between two people who are already present: over many years, one person makes time for the other, and asks the other again and again where he truly wants to go.

This paper reads only the first. Questioning needs someone to be there, who can hear and can answer; questioning is one kind of cultivation because it comes from a law that is not under my control: "it is an avenue of questioning I cannot monopolize."7 In the example of Cheng Li and Fang Ning, there is not yet a concrete one who comes later in actual dealings with the two; here only their preparation is registered, and no answers are invented for that person. Not one of the things they did in these two years was asking that person anything; all of it was preparing for him. When preparing to adopt, that person may already be in dealings with the two; though they do not yet live together, he too may have his own questions and responses; those dealings are not excluded by the words "not yet come," and are entered separately (§4). After that person has come into the two people's lives, the stretch between husband and wife belongs to Paper 6, and what lies between the child and the parents belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

So when this paper says that preparing for a child is cultivation, it means the shape cultivation takes in the one kind that is creating conditions. Cultivation goes toward making space: Cheng Li's giving up a job with frequent travel makes space for the one to come, in days when someone is at home; the two going over their savings again makes space for him, in a margin that is enough; agreeing on who will see to the household when makes space for him, in two adults who are both there. What is made is space; what becomes of the space later is not decided by those who make it.

Conditions, Not a Deposited Direction

What kind of thing is it that the two prepare? Meaning Theory has read one kind of enactment directed toward the future: "outward-turned action toward a possible future bearer — writing a book, spreading a thought, leaving a work or an arrangement".8 To what it leaves behind, Meaning Theory answers: "What anticipatory enactment leaves behind is conditions, not an orientation deposited elsewhere"; "What is left behind is conditions; the avowal is the bearer's own from beginning to end, and no orientation is deposited in an object to run on its own."9

Two people preparing together is read by this structure.10 A room put in order, a job without frequent travel, the division of labor the two have agreed, the recognition that institution leaves for a married couple: all are conditions.11 What that person will enter is these conditions, not a road the two have set for him.

There is also one place that must be told apart: a book, the one who comes later may open or may not open; the first conditions, a child cannot choose. This difference is read in §3.

The Completion of Cultivation Is Not in the Hands of Those Who Prepare

Cultivation goes toward making space; whether it took hold lies at the other party's end. Relation Theory says: "The completion of cultivation is not in the enactor's hands; incomplete cultivation is not colonization."12 In preparing for a child, this sentence presses hard: whether anyone comes into the space made, who comes, how he goes once he has come, are none of them in Cheng Li's and Fang Ning's hands. What the two can do is the preparation on this side.

§2 Doing Something Together

MA29 When preparing for a child becomes a C that the two each avow and cannot not do, it is read as doing something together: you for A, I for B, and we do C together. C is the undertaking of creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come; it is not the child, nor is it simply either party's A; A and B are each one's own, and neither examines the other. One party's B can be just this: affirming the other's purpose of wanting a child, and being willing to give and to support for it; this too is his own cannot-not; whether a given person's B is this kind only his own end can confirm

You for A, I for B, and We Do C Together

Action Theory has set down what two people doing something together looks like: "One person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C: C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone; it is doing something together, not a shared law."13 C "belongs neither to A nor to B; it is the course of action forced into being once two separate purposes meet".14

These two years of Cheng Li and Fang Ning look just like this. Fang Ning is for A: she wants to watch someone she will have to come to know anew grow up beside her. Cheng Li is for B: Fang Ning's wanting is, as he sees it, serious, and hers; he affirms it, and is willing to put his strength into it. What the two do together is C: preparing conditions for someone who has not yet come.

C Is Not the Child

C is this undertaking, not the child. If the child were taken as C, the child would become the thing the two made together, a jointly finished product; this reading §3 has to block. One thing is said here first: what the two do together is preparation; whether that person comes, and who he is when he comes, are not things they can make.

Nor is C simply either party's A. Fang Ning's wanting a child is her A; C is not her A borrowing Cheng Li's hands. C is the thing forced into being only once the two people's purposes meet; how it is done the two find together, and it is not settled by her A alone (MA30).

A and B Are Each One's Own, and Neither Examines the Other

Fang Ning does not require Cheng Li to want a child as she does; nor does Cheng Li assess whether her reasons are good enough. The two people's purposes are each one's own; meeting on the same undertaking, they need not first become one and the same purpose.

Cheng Li's mother said, "Finally there'll be someone to keep the family incense burning." Carrying on the family can be one item in a given person's A; merely having this item does not make this undertaking a transaction.15 Whether a marriage is purely transactional speaks only of what lies between husband and wife;16 if the child is treated only as a condition obtained by exchange, that is another matter, read in §3.

Affirming the Other's Purpose Is Also One's Own Cannot-Not

Cheng Li's B is affirming Fang Ning's purpose of wanting a child, and being willing to give and to support for it. This too is his own cannot-not: what he recognizes is that this wanting is hers, and is worth his strength; he cannot not put his strength into it. This cannot-not comes from him; it is not borrowed from her.

This kind has to be told apart from accommodation. Reading love at the layer of recognizing her as an end too, Love Theory said that the counterfeit that borrows this layer's name is accommodation: "one's own share handed over; it is not 15DD; it is not having stood."17 If a person goes along with it only so as not to quarrel, or for fear of disappointing her, his own share is not in it, and that is not the B spoken of here.

From outside the two can look very alike: either way he goes with her to ask friends, either way he changes jobs, either way they go over the savings together. When Love Theory read accommodation, it stipulated in its example that he withdrew his own judgment from the deliberation in order to keep the peace, and said that not every moment of not speaking up is called accommodation. What can be seen from outside is only whether, when he wanted to go more slowly or to change something, he said so, and whether, once said, it had somewhere to land; these are clues, not verdicts. The difference lies at his end: whether he recognized her purpose and is himself willing to put his strength into it, or handed over his own share. Whether a given person's B is the first kind only his own end can confirm.

MA30 C must be avowed by both, each having a share he can do himself, and the shares put together able to bring it about; neither party holds its purpose and adjudication alone. What holding alone looks like in structure is one party's A borrowing the other's hands, how this undertaking is done being for one party alone to decide, and the other party's way to take part in deciding, to adjust and to withdraw not being there; then it is not the C spoken of here. If one party is willing to do things according to the other's arrangement, it does not count as holding alone, so long as his way to take part, adjust and withdraw is there. If one party does not avow it, there is no C. One party avowing on the other's behalf, or saying out loud a characterization of the other's changing his mind, slides in the direction of colonization; sealing the other's way to say no and to change his mind, or making it hard to travel, carries the direction of colonization; what crosses basic rights is judged separately as violation. Whether preparation occurred, what conditions it actually left, and whether that person later came are entered apart: that he did not come does not retroactively judge that the earlier preparation never occurred, nor is either party, on this basis, judged to be lacking in something; not having welcomed a child is not automatically the same as that position standing empty

Both Avow It, Both Are Able to Do It

C must be avowed by both: "he avows it, and so does she; it is not that one avows it and then says on the other's behalf that she does too."18 Both must also be able to do it: "each side has a share it can do itself, and only when these are put together can the thing be done."19 Cheng Li changing jobs and going over the savings, Fang Ning asking friends and reading: each is one's own share; without either side, this undertaking cannot be done.

Holding Alone

What holding alone looks like Action Theory has also written: "it is not his A borrowing her hands, nor her B borrowing his name; and how the thing is done is not for one side alone to decide."20 Imagine a different two years: Fang Ning decides where they move, what job Cheng Li changes to, when they are ready; nothing Cheng Li proposes is taken seriously, and when he wants to go more slowly or to change something, there is no way to. Then this undertaking is only her A borrowing his hands, not the C spoken of here.

The other way round, Cheng Li's being willing to do things according to Fang Ning's arrangement is not holding alone. He says: you've thought the move through better than I have; let's do it your way. So long as he has a way to take part when he wants to take part, a way to adjust when he wants to adjust, and a way to withdraw when he wants to withdraw, this undertaking is still one the two do together; the dividing line is not in who comes up with more of the ideas, but in whether the other party's way to take part, adjust and withdraw is there.

Holding alone also has a side of purpose. Purpose is held alone when why his share is done, and how far, is measured only by her A. Even if his B is just affirming her purpose of wanting a child, it is his; how far he is willing to put his strength into it is still measured by his own law. If Fang Ning used her wanting a child to settle for Cheng Li why he should do it and how far, purpose would have been held alone.

If One Party Does Not Avow It, There Is No C

Suppose that what Cheng Li said that evening had been: I've thought about it, and I'm not willing. Then there is no C. Fang Ning's wanting is still hers, and real; but the undertaking the two would do together has not come about.

Nowhere in marriage does his avowing become something he owes her. Commitment does not turn into a duty to the other party;21 when the two say "we," that "we" does not legislate for the two either (Paper 2). So the sentence "Once you're married, of course you have children" does not hold here: it speaks of something that has to be avowed by each of the two as though marriage had avowed it on the two people's behalf. Said out loud to him, it has the same form as avowing on the other's behalf, below, and slides in the direction of colonization. If the two agreed before marriage to have children, that is a commitment: the promise is real, and the days arranged by it are real too; but it does not turn into a duty to the other party; whether to avow it today is still for the person of today to do; if it is revised, the revising keeps the books on the change, and the days arranged by it and the effects it has left are entered as they are (Paper 1).

Avowing on the Other's Behalf

Imagine that before that winter evening, Cheng Li's mother had asked Fang Ning: "Lizi wants one too, doesn't he?" (Lizi is what his family calls Cheng Li.) Fang Ning had not yet talked it over with Cheng Li, and answered offhand: "He wants one too." This sentence declared his agreement on his behalf. Action Theory says: "neither side can declare agreement in the other's place".22 This sentence settled for Cheng Li something he has to avow himself, and slides in the direction of colonization;23 whether it took hold is seen in him afterward: if from then on he feels that this has already been settled for him, and no longer asks himself whether he is willing, that direction has taken hold; if he goes on judging for himself, that direction has not taken hold of him. His turning back to say to his mother, "I'm still thinking about it," is the half that is action, which can be seen; whether in his heart he is still judging for himself needs his own end.

The Way to Say No and to Change One's Mind

Having avowed, one can still change one's mind. Commitment cannot lock tomorrow,24 and nor can the undertaking done together. If, in the second year of preparing, Cheng Li says, I want to stop for a while: only if that way is there is this undertaking still one the two do together. His withdrawing is withdrawing his own side; once he no longer avows it, there is no longer a C; the earlier preparation, and the conditions already left, are entered apart by the three things below.

Putting a characterization on this way, or making this way hard to travel, is another matter. "If you say you don't want it now, these two years have been wasted; how can you do this to me?": first see how it is used: to say out loud the loss and distress of these two years is to say out loud her own end; to fix his changing his mind as wronging her is to characterize his changing of mind on his behalf, and slides in the direction of colonization. "If you say you don't want it now, I'll tell both sets of parents it was you who backed out": this announces a consequence that can be carried out, makes his way to change his mind hard to travel, and once spoken carries the direction of colonization, without waiting to be carried out.25 What seals off his saying no and withdrawing themselves, by whatever means, is in addition a violation at the layer of basic rights, and also carries this direction.26

The Three Are Entered Apart

Two years of preparing; whether that person comes is another matter. Imagine that some years further on, that person has in the end not come.

Here there are three things, entered apart. One is whether preparation occurred: the two really did prepare together, and the enactments of those years are real. Two is what conditions were actually left: the job was changed, the home was moved, the savings are still there; some conditions remain, and some later dispersed. Three is whether that person came: he did not. Reading anticipatory enactment, Meaning Theory says: "whether usable conditions were left behind does not decide whether anticipatory enactment occurred at the time, nor does it retroactively judge that the looking-toward of that time never occurred."27 Carrying this to preparing for a child is a step this series takes as its own undertaking: that person not coming does not retroactively judge that the earlier preparation never occurred.

Nor, on this basis, is either party judged to be lacking in something. That he did not come does not say who was not enough, and does not say that this marriage lacks something it should have had. Relation Theory says: "Need is not lack, and someone who finds no one is not thereby short of anything".28

There is one more place that must not be confused. Not having welcomed a child is not automatically the same as that position standing empty. Meaning Theory divides three things: formal orientation, which holds a position open for any end-bearer that might appear in future; anticipatory enactment, outward-turned action toward a possible future bearer; factual filling, a concrete other actually existing in the domain of bearers filling that position.29 Only where what the two are oriented toward is still anyone who might come in future, and that position has not yet been filled by a concrete other, is it read as Meaning Theory reads it: "Empty and lacking are two different things".30 For those preparing to adopt, that person may already be living elsewhere, only not yet come into the two people's lives (§4); if the two already face such a concrete person, it is not on this basis said to stand empty.31

§3 The New Subject

MA31 The new subject is an end too. The child is another end that preparing for a child welcomes, not a product of this undertaking; what the two leave for him are conditions, and they do not complete the avowal of his direction for him. The child's standing as an end is not created by this undertaking of preparation; nor does his own constitutive position pass to the two because he cannot choose which conditions he first enters. Whether the conditions still count as support is checked separately by the negative boundaries of support: the two people's conditions, judgments or arrangements are not passed off as his constitution; his channels of refusal, revision, exit and change of direction afterward are not sealed; and the conditions are kept for him to be able to unfold without revolving around either of the two. In the years when he cannot yet refuse or revise, what is protected is his existing standing as an end, that the source of his value is not placed outside him, and the openness of the conditions of first-person running; the meaning predicates on the two people's side are not copied onto him. He does not figure only as the continuation of the two, a link in continuing the line, a security for old age, or a condition for keeping the other party; "only as" is read from the two people's arrangements, and a sentence is read by that sentence itself; to fall to "only as" is to treat the child only as a condition, and carries the direction of colonization; the child's side is handed to Parent-Child Theory

Welcomed, Not Made

What Cheng Li and Fang Ning do together is preparation. What the preparation welcomes, if that person comes, is another end, not a product of this undertaking.

This division matters a great deal. A thing completed together can be said to be the two people's; a person welcomed is not. What the two leave for him are conditions; where he himself goes, that avowal is his. Meaning Theory says that what a work enters in the world of those who come later "is conditions, not that later person's constitution"; the structural positions of avowal, revision and exit belong to that bearer.32 Here it is read accordingly: the conditions the two leave enter that person's conditions, not his constitution.

His standing as an end is not created by this undertaking of preparation either. Meaning Theory says of people who in reality cannot do without care, such as infants, that this "never gives the supporter the constitutive right over their values: in the domain of bearers, end-value is grounded in being an end".33 That a person is an end is not something two people prepare into being; preparing much or preparing little neither adds to this nor takes from it.

The First Conditions Cannot Be Chosen

§1 left one difference. A book is left there, and the one who comes later may open it or not; in Meaning Theory's example, "in the example it is stipulated that anyone who comes later may open it."34 A child is different: which conditions he first enters he cannot choose. This room, this city, these two people, their savings and their division of labor: all were there before he could say a word.

This difference does not make his constitutive position pass to the two. The first conditions are left by the two, yet conditions are still conditions; how he avows afterward, that step is still his. Not being able to choose the first conditions speaks of the way conditions fall on him, not of that avowal changing owners.

This difference does, rather, make it necessary to check what effect the conditions the two leave actually have. On the concept of support Meaning Theory set three negative boundaries: if a relation seals the other's channels of refusal, revision, exit and change of direction, if it converts the conditions it provides into ownership of the other's first-person constitutive results, or if it declares on his behalf, on the sole basis of my judgment of success, that his constitution has been completed, then at those positions it is no longer support, "but the occupation of the office of constitution."35 It also set a test: "That the other is able to unfold without revolving around me is the hardest test in this row"; he may use the conditions I provide "to go in directions I did not foresee, do not approve, and even no longer need me for."36 Carried to the conditions two people prepare for a child,37 three places are checked: whether the two people's conditions, judgments and arrangements are passed off as his constitution; whether his channels of refusal, revision, exit and change of direction afterward have been sealed in advance; whether he can unfold without revolving around Cheng Li, and without revolving around Fang Ning either. This test is read person by person, and Paper 6 picks it up.

These three boundaries say only what support is not; they confer nothing on him. His constitutive position is with him to begin with; it is not created by these boundaries, nor conferred by the two.

The Years When He Cannot Yet Refuse

For many years a child cannot yet refuse, and cannot yet revise. In these years, what is protected? Meaning Theory says: "For an other not yet within that domain, what this proposition protects is his existing standing as an end, that the source of his value is not placed outside him, and the openness of the conditions of first-person running"; and: "The meaning predicates on my side are not copied onto the other."38

Fang Ning's wanting a child is wanting to watch someone she will have to come to know anew; this is meaning on her side. Cheng Li's being willing to put his strength in is meaning on his side. Both are real, and each is with its own person; they are not copied onto that person, and do not write out in advance, on his behalf, what his coming into the world means.

What becomes of that person afterward belongs to Parent-Child Theory; where a content, before he himself can avow and revise, is arranged as final content that cannot be revised, Value Theory calls it pre-occupation: "The three actions together point at a position not yet running, so that at the moment it begins to run it is already filled."39 That side this paper does not read.

Only As

Cheng Li's mother spoke of keeping the incense burning, and Fang Ning's father of having someone to lean on in old age. Continuation, continuing the line, provision for old age: these wishes in themselves do not make the child a condition; a person can hope that the family will be carried on, and can also hope to have someone by him when he is old.

What is read is "only." If the child figures only as the continuation of the two, a link in continuing the line, a security for old age, or a condition for keeping the other party, then that person is left with only one position in this undertaking: the position of completing something for others. That he himself is an end has no place in that arrangement. To fall to "only as" is to treat the child only as a condition, and carries the direction of colonization.

How "only" is read out is not by whether these words occur in a sentence, but by the concrete accounts and arrangements: whether that person, in the two people's arrangements, has a place of his own besides this one position. A sentence is one effect, and is read on that one occasion: Cheng Li's mother's "Finally there'll be someone to keep the family incense burning," where it is headed as it is said, is read by that sentence itself; it is not on this basis judged that, in the two people's arrangements, the child figures only as a condition for keeping the incense burning. The kind that keeps the other party, using the child to keep the other party, is read in Paper 6. These concern what position the child is put in; what the child's side undergoes belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

Pure transaction is not hung on this here either. Pure transaction speaks only of what lies between husband and wife;40 treating the child only as a condition is another direction, and falls on the position of that someone who has not yet come.

§4 Someone Who Has Not Yet Come

MA32 Preparing to adopt counts too: someone who has not yet come is someone who has not yet come into these two people's lives, not necessarily someone who does not yet exist

Shao Hui and Song Lan are preparing to adopt. The two registered, and waited two years; they put a room in order, took a course, and learned how to welcome a child who has already had a stretch of life. They do not know who that person is, or where.

This too is the preparing for a child this paper reads. Its structure is the same as Cheng Li's and Fang Ning's two years: the two each avow it, and create conditions together for someone who has not yet come; you for A, I for B, and we do C together. When this series speaks of preparing for a child, it speaks of the undertaking of two people creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come; so preparing to adopt counts just as other preparation does.

"Someone who has not yet come" can be seen clearly here: that person may already have been living somewhere for several years; he has not yet come only in that he has not yet come into these two people's lives. So what this paper calls "not yet come" is not the same as "not yet existing."

What this fact can show goes only this far. Shao Hui and Song Lan do not yet know who that person is; at this point it cannot be confirmed on this basis that that position has been filled by a concrete other, nor, the other way round, judged that it must stand empty. If later they already face a particular child who actually exists, that position is not entered as empty because they do not yet live together; the sentence in §2 speaks of this kind.41

If they already face a concrete one who comes later, that person has his days from before he came, and that stretch is his. The conditions the two prepare welcome a person who has already begun; the several places spoken of in §3, not passing anything off as his constitution, not sealing his channels in advance, not copying the two people's meaning, need not be said at length here: the stretch before he came was never in their hands to begin with. Adoption itself, after that person has come, is read in Paper 6; how that institution recognizes what lies between him and the two goes by its rules, and is acknowledged but not judged.42

§5 Each Belongs to Each

MA33 The two people's looking-toward crosses on one and the same someone who has not yet come; each belongs to each, and they are not merged into one meaning of the household

In those two years, the things Cheng Li and Fang Ning did all faced the same someone who had not yet come. The two people's directions crossed on him very densely: changing cities together, reckoning money together, putting that room in order together.

Crossing is not merging. Meaning Theory says: "The life-orientations of several bearers can cross and point to one another while each relation remains anchored in its own bearer"; even if each of them has avowed the content the other as an end, "each person's meaning relation still has both ends in himself, and it is not fused above them into a collective meaning."43 Fang Ning's share of meaning is hers; Cheng Li's is his. The two meet on the same person, meet very deeply, and are still two.

Later Cheng Li's mother said: "Now this household is complete." If "household" in this sentence is used to take in and replace each of the two people's meanings, saying for the two what this undertaking means to them, that is the direction of colonization in the name of "household," read in Paper 2.44 Whether "household" can come to stand separately as a bearer this series does not judge.45

Crossing is not mutual recognition either. Two people's directions crossing on one person for many years does not guarantee that the two recognize each other; having recognized each other does not guarantee continued crossing afterward either.46 This paper speaks only of crossing, and does not say for the two what lies between them at this point.

If that person comes, his meaning is his. The two people's looking-toward on him is the two people's; it is not copied onto him (MA31). Three shares, each remaining in its own place.

§6 Interfacing with Tradition

Several have asked, one after another, about the things this paper reads. For each, this paper writes faithfully why he looks and what he sees; where the source presses on this paper, it writes out the pressure, and then where they meet and where they part; the number of steps need not be the same for each, and where the source has no counter-proposition, none is made up for it. Other traditions appear in their own words. Augustine's goods of marriage, which set offspring, fidelity and sacrament side by side, are interfaced as a whole in Paper 0, and are not interfaced separately here.

Continuing the line (the "Meaning of the Marriage Rite" in the Book of Rites, and the Mencius). The "Hunyi" (The Meaning of the Marriage Rite) chapter of the Book of Rites opens: "The marriage rite is to join in amity two surnames, serving the ancestral temple above and continuing the line to later generations below; therefore the noble man gives it weight."47 Mencius, "Li Lou I": "There are three things that are unfilial, and to have no descendants is the greatest. Shun married without telling his parents because otherwise he would have had no descendants; the noble man held it to be as good as telling."48 The "Hunyi" looks in order to explain why the noble man gives weight to the marriage rite: the rite joins two families in amity, serves the ancestral temple above and continues the line below, and so it is weighty. Mencius looks in order to account for Shun's marrying without telling his parents: to have no descendants is the greatest unfiliality, so in marrying without telling, the noble man held it as good as telling. What they see: two people's marriage, and the child to come, are not only between the two; they stand on a line longer than the two, with the ancestral temple before and later generations after. What they press on this paper is two questions. First, these two passages put the ancestral temple, later generations and filial piety into the reasons for marriage; how do these reasons enter each spouse's own avowal, and is a place kept for the child's own standing? The passages quoted do not themselves prove that the child is merely an instrument for continuing the line. Second, for Mencius to have no descendants is the greatest unfiliality, and preparing for a child becomes a requirement of filial piety; how does this sit with this paper's saying that C must be avowed by each of the two? "Without telling his parents" speaks of the parents, and says nothing of whether the other spouse agreed; it does not answer the latter question. They meet in: the conditions the two prepare are not only the two people's to begin with; what the family, the village and the forebears leave are all among the conditions that person will enter, and a lineage's wedding is also a kind of endorsement (Paper 1). This series also acknowledges that one person's A can include carrying on the family, and that this does not on that account make it a transaction (MA29). They part at three points. First, this paper does not judge the purpose of carrying on the family; continuing the line is one of the reasons, and is not taken as "only as"; only where a concrete account or arrangement confines the child to being a condition for bringing it about is it read by "only as" (MA31). Second, the share of meaning in continuing the line belongs to the person who avows it; it does not become a "meaning of the household" that takes in and replaces each one's meaning (MA33). Third, for Mencius filial piety is a requirement; this paper issues no ought: preparing for a child is something done together only when each of the two avows it (MA30); having no child does not say that anyone owes anyone.

Without his consent (Kant). In the Doctrine of Right, where Kant treats the right of parents and children, there is a sentence often cited: the act should be regarded as one by which a person is brought without his consent into the world and placed in it by the responsible free will of others; this act therefore attaches to the parents an obligation to make the child, as far as they can, contented with the condition thus acquired; so parents cannot regard their child as a thing of their own making, since a being endowed with freedom cannot be so regarded; nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if it were their own property.49 He looks in order to set out, within the system of right, the right between parents and children. What he sees: the child is brought into conditions he never chose; the parents may not regard him as a thing of their own making, nor have they a right to destroy him as if he were their own property. He presses on this paper on duty: from the step of being without consent he derives a juridical duty of the parents toward the child; this series has no concept of a duty toward others,50 and here seems to lack something. They meet in: the child is not a product of this undertaking, not a thing the parents made, and may not be treated as the parents' property (MA31); he cannot choose the first conditions, and this difference is real (MA31). They part at three points. First, whether the parents' duty holds is a matter of right, and is not answered by this paper's analysis of a husband and wife preparing together; this paper issues no ought, and reads only in which direction the conditions the two leave are headed; how the two treat the child afterward belongs to Parent-Child Theory. Second, the duty he speaks of has its content and limit in making the child contented with his condition; what this paper checks is whether the two people's conditions are passed off as his constitution, whether his channels are sealed in advance, and whether he can unfold without revolving around the two (MA31). The two can be compared, and do not stand in for each other; nor, because he mentions the child's condition, is the child's constitution said to have become the parents' achievement. Third, he speaks of right; this paper speaks only of relation. His sections on marriage Paper 1 has already picked up.

Natality (Arendt). In The Human Condition Arendt places the root of action in natality. What follows relies on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's account and quotations:51 action, as the realization of freedom, is rooted in natality, in the fact that each birth represents a new beginning and the introduction of novelty into the world; she writes: "It is in the nature of beginning" that something new is started which "cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before"; "The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him," and this only because "each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world." She looks in order to show where action and freedom are rooted. What she sees: each newcomer is a beginning; he will begin something that cannot be expected from what came before. Her analysis of the new beginning can put a question to this paper: how does preparation keep from predetermining the action of the one who comes later? This paper answers its own side of it with the distinction between conditions and constitution. They meet in: what is welcomed is not made (MA31). What the two leave are conditions, and where that person goes is not in the conditions; he can go in directions the two did not foresee, do not approve, and even no longer need them for (MA31), which runs the same way as the unexpected being expected from him. They part at two points. First, unexpectedness does not by itself rule out preparation. Preparation and beginning are not in the same place: what the two prepare are conditions, and the beginning is that person's own; conditions do not predetermine him, so long as they are not passed off as his constitution and do not seal his channels in advance (MA31). Second, what she speaks of is the human condition, all newcomers and public action; what this paper speaks of is one undertaking two adults do together, and it reads the two adults' side. The two ask different things, and her analysis is not rewritten as a negation already made of this paper.

§7 Drawing Together and Downstream

This paper has laid down six propositions. Taken together, they say: preparing for a child is two people creating conditions together for someone who has not yet come, the shape cultivation takes in the one kind that is creating conditions, and this paper reads only this kind; questioning, and the one who comes later's own response, are entered separately where there are already actual dealings. When the two each avow it and cannot not do it, it is doing something together: you for A, I for B, and we do C together; C is this undertaking, not the child, nor simply either party's A, and A and B are not examined by each other; affirming the other's purpose of wanting a child and being willing to put one's strength into it is also one's own cannot-not, which only one's own end can confirm. C must be avowed by both and able to be done by both, and is not held alone by one party; the dividing line is whether the other party's way to take part, adjust and withdraw is there. If one party does not avow it, there is no C; avowing on the other's behalf, or saying out loud a characterization of the other's changing his mind, slides in the direction of colonization; sealing the way to say no and to change one's mind, or making it hard to travel, carries the direction of colonization; what seals it off is in addition a violation. The preparation, the conditions left, and whether that person came are entered apart; that he did not come does not retroactively judge the earlier preparation, does not judge anyone to be lacking in something, and is not automatically the same as that position standing empty. The new subject is an end too: what is welcomed is not made; his standing as an end is not created by the preparation, and his constitutive position does not pass to the two because he cannot choose the first conditions; the two people's conditions are checked by the negative boundaries of support; the meaning on the two people's side is not copied onto him; "only as" is read from the two people's arrangements, and where things fall to it, it carries the direction of colonization. Preparing to adopt counts too; someone who has not yet come is not necessarily someone who does not yet exist; while it is not yet known who he is, it is not judged on this basis that that position has been filled by a concrete other, nor, the other way round, that it stands empty. The two people's looking-toward crosses on him; each belongs to each, and they are not merged into one meaning of the household.

This paper does not prove that marriage ought to prepare for a child, does not prove that a marriage with children is more complete, and does not prove that children make a marriage more stable.

The question left open. If that person comes into the two people's lives, questioning is among three persons: he will ask, and will answer, and the two will also have a third one beside them. How the two go on to rear him together, how far the sentence "for the child's sake" can go, whether the child can unfold without revolving around either of them: these are the business of Paper 6. What the child's not being able to choose the first conditions means for the two adults, this paper reads only as far as the direction in which the conditions are headed, and issues no ought; the child's side belongs to Parent-Child Theory.

Downstream. What this paper has laid down is used by the papers that follow as follows. Preparing for a child, as something two people do together, connects with the branch of "we" in Paper 2 that is doing things together; how the two share the preparation is read by Paper 4's reading of division of labor. The person-by-person reading of the test in MA31, the kind of "only as" that keeps the other party, and adoption itself, Paper 6 picks up. One party withdrawing while preparation is under way, or the marriage ending in the meantime, is read in Paper 7. The child's side, pre-occupation and all that follows, belongs to Parent-Child Theory. The check on the shared words "preparing for a child," "someone who has not yet come," "doing something together" and "shared purpose," and "child" and "descendants," and the remainder of whether "household" can come to stand separately as a bearer, are listed together in Paper 0.

Acknowledgments

This paper is signed by Han Qin alone; the author decided every argument and choice and bears sole responsibility for the text. Models from Anthropic and OpenAI assisted with drafting and review; the author thanks them.

Notes

  1. Paper 1, MA7. The sentence "is not on that account short of anything" borrows from Relation Theory H62: "Need is not lack, and someone who finds no one is not thereby short of anything"; the original sentence speaks of someone who finds no one; carrying it to a marriage that has not moved toward preparing for a child is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  2. Relation Theory H8: cultivation and colonization are two directions, cultivation going toward making space and colonization toward pouring in and occupying; the direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action. Relation Theory Paper 1, under H8: "Read from outside, direction is visible; of whether it took hold, the half that is action is visible, while the half that is understanding needs the first person." ↩︎
  3. Relation Theory H9: "Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights; it and the direction of colonization are two lines". ↩︎
  4. Action Theory D47. ↩︎
  5. Meaning Theory Y24. ↩︎
  6. Paper 3, MA18. ↩︎
  7. Relation Theory H59. ↩︎
  8. Meaning Theory Y23, reporting the second layer of Value Theory P1 V14. ↩︎
  9. Meaning Theory Y24. ↩︎
  10. Meaning Theory Y24 speaks of the conditions that books and works leave for those who come later; carrying it to the conditions two people prepare together and leave for someone who has not yet come is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  11. That endorsement can be one of the conditions created for someone who has not yet come: see Paper 1, MA7. ↩︎
  12. Relation Theory H45. The same proposition states that these two sentences belong to the value layer; for the two directions in the broad sense, direction is read off that one effect alone, and whether it took hold rests on the other party's later understanding and action. ↩︎
  13. Action Theory D47. ↩︎
  14. Action Theory Paper 8, §5. ↩︎
  15. Carrying on the family as one person's purpose is not on that account pure transaction; only where the child figures only as a condition obtained by exchange is it read otherwise; see MA31. ↩︎
  16. Paper 1, MA9. ↩︎
  17. The sentence on accommodation: Love Theory L40. The sentence on clues follows the section of Love Theory Paper 5 that reads accommodation: "Here he is taken to have withdrawn his own judgment from the deliberation in order to keep the peace; not every moment of not speaking up is called accommodation". ↩︎
  18. Action Theory Paper 8, §5. ↩︎
  19. Same place. ↩︎
  20. Same place. ↩︎
  21. Relation Theory H27: "Commitment does not turn into a duty to the other party". ↩︎
  22. Action Theory D45. ↩︎
  23. Relation Theory H37: to attach a qualifying condition to an expectation, fixing for the other party what something means to him, is to slide in the direction of colonization, and whether that takes hold depends on the other party's later understanding and action. Declaring agreement on the other's behalf is read on the same structure, of the same form as Paper 1, MA6, reading avowing on the other's behalf; an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  24. Relation Theory H26; Paper 1, MA4. ↩︎
  25. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26, reads exit as three kinds: a characterization spoken aloud, such as "Leaving is betrayal," is the first kind, and slides in the direction of colonization; words that announce consequences raise the cost outward, and "once spoken they are already the second kind, without waiting to be carried out"; sealing off exit itself, by whatever means, is the third kind, which at the layer of basic rights is a violation, and also carries the direction of colonization. Relation Theory Paper 3 is Commitment. Applying this reading of exit to changing one's mind within something done together is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  26. Relation Theory H9; Relation Theory Paper 3, under H26. ↩︎
  27. Meaning Theory Y24. ↩︎
  28. Relation Theory H62. The original sentence speaks of someone who finds no one; carrying it to that person's not coming is an extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  29. Meaning Theory Y23, reporting the second layer of Value Theory P1 V14. ↩︎
  30. Meaning Theory Y23: "Empty and lacking are two different things: it stands empty, and standing empty, the solitary subject is still self-sufficient". ↩︎
  31. Meaning Theory Y23 speaks of the formal other-position; applying it to preparing for a child invokes it only within the range in which that position has not yet been filled by a concrete other; not having welcomed a child and the formal position standing empty do not judge in each other's place. An extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  32. Meaning Theory Y24. ↩︎
  33. Meaning Theory Y26, citing Value Theory P1 V3. ↩︎
  34. Meaning Theory Y24. ↩︎
  35. Meaning Theory Y25. ↩︎
  36. Meaning Theory Y26. In the final clause, it is the other who may no longer need the supporter. This clarification follows the Chinese text and the argument of Y26; the English quotation above is reproduced as published. ↩︎
  37. Meaning Theory Y25 and Y26 originally speak of a relation in the name of support; carrying them to the conditions two people prepare for someone who has not yet come is an extension, this series' own undertaking. The two give the negative boundaries of a relation of support; they neither create nor confer that person's constitutive position. ↩︎
  38. Meaning Theory Y26. ↩︎
  39. Value Theory P3 V38. ↩︎
  40. Paper 1, MA9. ↩︎
  41. Meaning Theory Y23 divides formal orientation, anticipatory enactment and factual filling into three, and writes factual filling as "a concrete other actually existing in the domain of bearers filling the fact-position". That there will be one in future, or that there are possible persons in reality, is not yet the same as this position having been filled by a concrete other; the one the two already face, who actually exists and has only not yet come into the two people's lives, is not read as empty by way of the formal other-position. An extension, this series' own undertaking. ↩︎
  42. Relation Theory H11: "the provisions themselves are acknowledged but not judged". ↩︎
  43. Meaning Theory Y27. ↩︎
  44. Paper 2, MA15; Meaning Theory Y27: "What this proposition blocks is a total orientation that takes in each person's orientation and replaces it". ↩︎
  45. Meaning Theory Y27: "that another bearer might come to stand on other conditions and coexist with each of them is not within this reductio, and is left undecided as Value Theory leaves it". ↩︎
  46. Meaning Theory Y27: "Long crossing does not guarantee mutual recognition"; "a single occurrence of mutual recognition does not guarantee continued crossing". ↩︎
  47. Liji [Book of Rites], "Hunyi" [The Meaning of the Marriage Rite], from the Chinese Notes (chinesenotes.com) transcription, which states that its base text is taken from the Chinese Text Project: 昏礼者，将合二姓之好，上以事宗庙，而下以继后世也，故君子重之。 (English rendering this paper's own) ↩︎
  48. Mencius, "Li Lou I," from the Wikisource transcription: 不孝有三，无后为大。舜不告而娶，为无后也，君子以为犹告也。 (English rendering this paper's own) ↩︎
  49. Doctrine of Right §28. Hastie's translation: "a person is brought without his consent into the world and placed in it by the responsible free will of others"; "This act, therefore, attaches an obligation to the parents to make their children ... contented with the condition thus acquired"; "Hence parents cannot regard their child as, in a manner, a thing of their own making; for a being endowed with freedom cannot be so regarded"; "Nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if it were their own property". ↩︎
  50. Relation Theory H27. Relation Theory Paper 3, under H27, cites Rights Theory Paper 0, M1: "SAE Rights Theory has no concept of a duty toward others; it has only one inward duty, the subject's answerability to its own law". ↩︎
  51. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Hannah Arendt," §4.3: "Action as the realization of freedom is therefore rooted in natality, in the fact that each birth represents a new beginning and the introduction of novelty in the world"; quoting Arendt: "It is in the nature of beginning ... that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before"; "The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him"; "each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world" (The Human Condition, pp. 177–178). ↩︎

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. Quotations are checked item by item in the accompanying audit table.

I · SAE works directly cited in this paper

Qin, H. (2026). The Half That Is Not Mine to Settle (SAE Meaning Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22731235

Qin, H. (2026). Finding One Another (SAE Action Theory, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970783

Qin, H. (2026). On the Colonization of Value (SAE Value Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21611154

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 1: What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 3: Commitment [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545023

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 4: Dealings and Expectation [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545057

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 5: The Sediment of Dealings [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545076

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 7: Why Still Relate [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545097

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Love Theory Paper 5: Without Waiting for You [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23627779

II · External works

Classical texts are given in simplified characters.

Liji 礼记 [Book of Rites], "Hunyi" 昏义 [The Meaning of the Marriage Rite]. (Chinese Notes transcription, which states that its base text is taken from the Chinese Text Project; not checked against a standard annotated edition)

Mencius 孟子, "Li Lou I" 离娄上. (Wikisource transcription; not checked against a standard annotated edition)

Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797), §28. English: The Philosophy of Law, trans. W. Hastie. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1887. (from an online transcription of Hastie's translation, titled The Science of Right; the German original has not been checked)

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 177–178. (cited here as quoted in the SEP; the original has not been checked)

III · Secondary literature

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Hannah Arendt", §4.3 Freedom, Natality and Plurality.

Interfaces

  • Main upstream: Action Theory Paper 8 (D45, D47; §5); Meaning Theory P3 (Y23, Y24, Y25, Y26, Y27); Relation Theory Paper 1 (H8, H9; the section under H8).
  • Also used: Relation Theory Paper 1 (H11), Paper 3 (H26, H27; the sections under H26 and H27), Paper 4 (H37), Paper 5 (H45), Paper 7 (H59, H62); Value Theory P3 (V38); Value Theory P1 (V3; the second layer of V14), as quoted in Meaning Theory P3; Rights Theory Paper 0 (M1), as quoted in Relation Theory Paper 3 under H27; Love Theory L40, and the section of Love Theory Paper 5 that reads accommodation.
  • This series: continues from Paper 1, MA4, MA6, MA7 and MA9, and from Paper 3, MA18; continues from Paper 2's branch of "we" that is doing things together, and from Paper 2, MA15; sharing the preparation is read by Paper 4's reading of division of labor; Paper 6 takes up the person-by-person test of MA35, the kind in MA36 that keeps the other party, and adoption itself in MA38; Paper 7 takes up withdrawing while preparation is under way, and ending; Paper 0 lists together the shared words and the remainder on "household."