Self-as-an-End
SAE Theory of the Market · Paper 0

Theory of the Market and the Tradition: The Line and the Space
市场论与传统:线与空间

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24183388 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

The Prequel and the seven papers of this series are written. They ask how a market in an institution whose consensus includes "a human being is an end" can, in a mixed reality, do two things at once: no person's Base Layer is violated, and the Emergence Layer has space and conditions within reach. The answer is gathered into one main-line sentence: the Base Layer is a line; the Emergence Layer is to have space and conditions: guarding the line does not seal off the space, and leaving it open does not eat into the line; where the two conflict, the line comes first. The subtitle is taken from this sentence. This paper lays down no propositions, and changes no sentence of the eight papers. It does four things. First, it stands outside the eight papers and gives the machine's account of itself: what it asks and what it does not, how its sentence form and three layers are arranged, and how it divides labor with upstream. Next, it interfaces with existing theories of the market, at two depths. Satz is examined to a whole chapter and Mazzucato to the full text, and the four steps are taken in full; Eucken rests on a few pages of an abridged English translation, Laffont and Tirole on a working paper, and Young and Rodrik are examined only to the abstract, and the four steps are taken on the sentences examined. Rawls and Lange reach only a table of contents, a book review or an encyclopedia entry, and go as far as the common question and the surface of contact. Stigler, already interfaced with by an earlier series, receives only one added question. The real-world interfaces are written from judgments, regulatory findings, statutory texts and arbitral documents, and serve only as interfaces, bearing no weight: the Google Shopping case and the Korean Naver Shopping case; France's social-housing quota; the North Carolina Dental Board case; an order of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission against S&P; the Trados case; U.S. Customs' finding on Top Glove; the Azurix v. Argentina arbitration; Ireland's Electricity Regulation Act. Two questions are examined in interfacing: how an analysis of market arrangements, overall orders or structural outcomes lands on constructs open to questioning and their acts; and, in the choice of rules and measures, which requirements serve as constraints and which costs must be weighed. Which conversation falls on which question is written conversation by conversation; how this series answers them, the eight papers have already stated; the overlaps with each school, the questions added and the divergences are confirmed in each conversation separately, and where only the way of asking differs, this is written as such. Last comes the settling of accounts: how the items handed on by upstream land, what is adjacent and not taken up, what is handed downstream, and the six slots of remainders.

Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.

Introduction

This paper was written only after the eight papers were finished. A conversation is to be had once one's own object stands: only someone who knows what he himself is saying can tell where what others say differs from it.

The examples of the eight papers are all constructed examples: the Kingdom State, the Highland State and their towns, companies and bodies serve only as facts, and this series does not claim that any one of them is the best design. Real-world cases this series has from the start reserved for this paper: each conversation with a school is paired with a real-world interface. The facts of an interface are written from the original documents, with year, source and the tier to which they were examined; only the practice in question is judged, and no company or government is characterized; an interface only helps the reader see where in reality a conversation lands, and does not bear the weight of the eight papers' arguments. The constructed examples of the eight papers stand as they are, and are not replaced by these cases.

When this paper cites this series, it gives the paper and the proposition number; when it cites the schools, it says only what each holds and where, and gives the smallest source that can be examined. The schools are interlocutors, not premises of this series; this paper does not write of this series correcting anyone, nor of anyone anticipating this series. Its structure follows Theory of the Company Paper 0: the machine's account of itself, the method of interfacing, interfacing conversation by conversation, handover and remainders.

Outside texts are cited in four tiers, following Theory of the Company Paper 0:

  • Tier A: the sentence and its location have been confirmed in a reliable original; it is quoted as it stands, with the original and the location given;
  • Tier B: the quoted sentence has been examined in the original relied on, but the edition, the exact location or the full text has not yet been confirmed; it is quoted, with what it rests on and what has not been examined noted;
  • Tier C: it rests only on reliable secondary literature; it is only paraphrased, with what it rests on stated, and without quotation marks;
  • Cited at second hand: it rests only on what others have quoted; it follows the text relied on, is marked as cited at second hand, goes as far as the third step, and no objection is drafted;
  • What could not be confirmed is not cited.

Works in English are quoted in the original, and what was examined is the original as quoted. Real-world interfaces are marked by the same four tiers.

§1 What Kind of Machine This Is

I · What It Asks

How a market in an institution whose consensus includes "a human being is an end" can, in a mixed reality, do two things at once: no person's Base Layer is violated, and the Emergence Layer has space and conditions within reach. Where the two conflict, the Base Layer comes first, and the line is not on the scales; regulation is a necessity, and regulators themselves can also be questioned; the two layers holding each other up is a direction, not a guarantee.

It does not ask whether the free market is good, and does not take sides between market and government; "free market," "planning," "publicly run" and "privately run" are all names, and what is judged is structure, place by place (the Prequel, §2). It is not a theory of price, nor is it hands-off, nor is it planning (the Prequel, §3). It does not ask which form of ownership is best; ownership lies at the rule layer, and this series only suggests (Paper 1, SC2). Tax is not within this series.

II · Sentence Form and the Three Layers

The construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law (Institution Theory Z4). The market is not a construct: "the market is not even an address of attribution such as a mill is" (the Political Economy Prequel, §3). The ought is addressed to the four kinds of constructs that receive the ought in a market: the constructs that make and enforce rules; the constructs that organize and operate market infrastructure; suppliers and operators in the market; the bodies and institutions responsible for funding, subsidy and rescue (the Prequel, §6). Individual participants follow their own law, and this series writes no ought for them.

The three layers are the method: the normative layer gives the direction and the line; the rule layer only suggests, may give examples, and does not rank; the judgment layer states who decides and who bears the consequences, listing only the questions to be answered and the positions that answer them. There is always a remainder, and there are exceptions; a remainder yields no permission (the Prequel, §7). Judge structures, not names; judge operations, not persons.

III · The Main Line, and Where Each of the Eight Papers Lands

The main-line sentence: the Base Layer is a line; the Emergence Layer is to have space and conditions: guarding the line does not seal off the space, and leaving it open does not eat into the line; where the two conflict, the line comes first.

  • The Prequel: the market is not a construct; the market oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends; the two things; to whom the ought is addressed.
  • Securing: the Base Layer is a line, not on the market's scales (SC1); the closer to the life-substrate, the stronger the checks and supervision, and the more the question of how large the private share is must be something that can be asked about and answered for (SC2); the line does not change with ownership (SC3).
  • Space: above the line, things are left open as usual, leaving open is not leaving unquestioned, and conditions must be within reach (SC4); the two kinds of "excess" are not symmetrical, the way of examining and the order differ, and the two layers matter equally (SC5).
  • Market Chokepoints: for infrastructure that cannot be got around, the scope of the rules it makes is drawn by the institution, and those rules can be questioned (SC6); questioning through rating, record-keeping and audit is not controlled on its own by the party questioned (SC7).
  • Competition: competition is left open as usual and questioned as usual, and sealing off roads is a kind of effect to be examined with particular care (SC8); no position monopolizes the power to shut the door, and breakup is the last resort (SC9).
  • Funding: funding may carry requirements, but does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction (SC10); public funding is to be able to state its grounds, and is not an endorsement (SC11).
  • Regulation: regulation is a necessity, and regulators too are questioned (SC12); the position that reviews a publicly run supply is functionally independent of the supplier and of its owner (SC13).
  • Borders: the line does not change at borders, and responsibility goes with each party's own acts (SC14); where there is no one above, the channel of questioning does not belong to the party questioned either (SC15).

IV · The Division of Labor with Upstream

What Institution Theory, the Theory of Government, the Theory of the State, Political Economy and its Specialist Paper, and the Theory of the Company have already proved, this series does not prove again, and only lands on the structures of the market: the construct's acts cross no line and are not discounted under any condition (Institution Theory Z9); the channel is independent of the party questioned, and independence is functional (Institution Theory Z34); the Kingdom of Ends is a direction, not a state to be signed off (Institution Theory Z39); that basic rights may not be violated holds against everyone (Theory of Government G17); capture is judged by structure (Theory of Government Paper 6, G38); between states there is no third party that legislates for both (Theory of the State N24); the chokepoint (Political Economy Paper 2, E7); the level of a price does not, by itself alone, complete a normative judgment (E10); the object of securing is the supply, not that construct (Paper 3, E14a); the two gates and exchange outside the gates (Paper 4, E21–E24); only the inevitability of emergence is taken up, not the inevitability of dominance (Paper 6, E32); institutions give conditions, and conditions must be within reach (E34); the two layers matter equally (E35); support does not acquire the authority to decide a person's direction (E37); the rules made by a position that cannot be got around (A Way Out, a Way Forward, E41a); those who review do not depend on those they review (A Way Out, a Way Forward, E43); investors changing the direction (Theory of the Company GS3); the purchasing company and the supply chain (Theory of the Company GS10).

§2 The Method of Interfacing

I · The Four Steps

Each conversation takes four steps: first, a common question that can be examined is sought; next, whether the two speak of the same thing; next, how far agreement goes, and where the two part; last, the strongest objection from the other side is written, with this series' reply. The objection is drafted by this paper, marked as drafted, and as far as possible made to touch the other side's strength; pressure on this series already present in the other side's original text is transcribed from the original, marked as transcribed, and not drafted.

II · Two Depths

Where the original has been examined, the conversation is carried as far as the examination reaches. Where a whole chapter or the full text has been examined with page numbers checked, all four steps are taken: Satz, Mazzucato. Where only a few pages of a translation, a working paper or an abstract have been examined, the four steps are taken on the sentences examined, and it is stated that beyond them this paper does not answer for the other side: Eucken (from an abridged English translation), Laffont and Tirole (from a working paper; the journal version not examined), Young and Rodrik (from abstracts).

Where only a table of contents, a book review or an encyclopedia entry is reached, the conversation goes as far as the common question and the surface of contact: Rawls, Lange. In these two units, this paper writes what its paraphrase rests on, where the surface of contact lies, and which question is to be decided once the original book has been examined; it does not write a settled conclusion of "meeting" or "parting."

What earlier series have already interfaced with is only pointed to, not redone: the twenty thinkers Political Economy Paper 0 interfaced with (Smith, Kant, Marx, Hayek, Friedman, Khan, Hirschman, Hegel, Polanyi, Thompson, Berle and Means, Coase, Galbraith, Anderson, Nozick, Walzer, Sandel, Frankfurt, Piketty, Robeyns); those the Specialist Paper interfaced with, among whom those close to this paper are Lina Khan (the Khan of Political Economy Paper 0), Rahman, Narechania and Sitaraman, Stigler and Pettit; and the thinkers of Theory of the Company Paper 0. Where one of them is used again, this paper first registers how far upstream has gone, and which question this paper adds; this paper adds a question only for Stigler.

III · Real-World Interfaces

Each conversation is paired with a real-world interface (the Eucken conversation with a pair, and the two thinkers of the ownership conversation sharing one), under four rules:

  • the facts go back to the original documents: judgments, regulatory findings, statutory texts, arbitral documents; year, source and tier are stated;
  • only what the original documents wrote is written; what they did not write is written as not written;
  • what is judged is the practice in question, and no company or government is characterized;
  • they serve only as interfaces, bearing no weight: the argument does not rest on the reputation of that company or body, and if it later changes, the argument does not move.

IV · The Two Questions Examined in Interfacing

Two questions are examined in interfacing; which conversation falls on which question is written conversation by conversation.

The first question: how an analysis of market arrangements, overall orders or structural outcomes lands on constructs open to questioning and their acts. Taking an order, a market, or whether several institutional conditions are compatible as the object of analysis is not the same as treating the market as a subject that receives an ought; this question asks only on whose acts, and which of them, that analysis lands.

The second question: in the choice of rules and measures, which requirements serve as constraints, and which costs must be weighed.

How this series answers these two questions, the eight papers have already stated: the ought addressed to constructs lands on the constructs that make and enforce rules, operate infrastructure, supply and fund (the Prequel, §6); the Base Layer side is examined by the line, with no margin (Paper 2, SC5; the line in Paper 1, SC1); a securing measure that restricts others' Emergence Layer is examined by its effect, stating its cost, alternatives and reasons; where both fall on one and the same person, neither direction is permitted: his Emergence Layer is not traded for his securing, nor is the absence of securing in his Base Layer traded for more choice for him (Paper 2, SC5).

The overlaps with each school, the questions added and the divergences are confirmed in the conversations below one by one, each stating which passage of the original supports it. Where only the way of asking differs, this is written as a difference in the way of asking, not as a divergence.

§3 Order and Boundaries

I · Eucken (B, from an abridged English translation)

The original. An abridged English translation of Eucken's Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung (ORDO, vol. 2, 1949), in Competition Policy International, vol. 2, no. 2 (2006), pp. 219–245, translated by Ahlborn and Grave. On p. 227, having said in turn that firms and workers each have their freedoms, he goes on: "Freedom of the consumer exists, but not the freedom to choose how to define the rules of the game or the forms which the economic process takes." On p. 232 he writes of "making the establishment of a functioning price system of complete competition the essential criterion of every economic measure." On p. 241: "The monopoly supervision should thus be transferred to a state monopoly office." This is "to withdraw it from the persistently dangerous influences exerted by interested parties"; it should be "an independent office which is only subject to the law," not set up as a division of the ministry of economics; "The monopoly office is just as indispensable as the Supreme Court." (From the abridged English translation, page numbers examined; the German original has not been examined; this paper reads only these pages, and beyond them does not answer for Eucken.)

The common question. Who sets and who adjudicates the basic rules of the market, and how the position that guards these rules keeps from being held by a party in the market.

Where they meet. Market participants cannot monopolize decision and adjudication on the basic rules: this series says that the scope of the rules made by a position that cannot be got around is drawn by the institution, and that those rules can be questioned (Paper 3, SC6, per A Way Out, a Way Forward, E41a). The supervising position must be withdrawn from the influence of interested parties: this series says that the constructs that make and enforce rules are functionally independent of the party they regulate, and do not depend in substance on the party reviewed for their income, term or prospects (Paper 6, SC12, per A Way Out, a Way Forward, E43). What Eucken asks here is precisely the concrete structure of power, not only form.

Where they part. In two places, both supported by the pages cited above. The first is in the criterion: Eucken takes the function of the competitive price system as the criterion of economic policy (p. 232); this series does not take approaching some market form as the ground for a judgment, and examines how an act guards the line and leaves space, and how that act is questioned (the Prequel, §2; Paper 2, SC5). The second is in how independence is written: Eucken gives an arrangement, subject only to the law and not within a ministry (p. 241); this series' independence is functional and does not look at where a body is set up: "Independence is functional and does not require being outside the institution" (Institution Theory Z34), and the arrangement is handed to the rule layer (Paper 6, SC13). His arrangement can be one form at the rule layer in this series; the difference here is in how it is written, not in direction (own undertaking).

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper, from the side of order). Without the criterion of a functioning competitive price system, each paper can only patch place by place: chokepoints, collusion and mergers are asked about separately, and the whole cannot be asked about. A market's being held by a few positions may not be any one place crossing the line, but the whole form having changed.

Reply. This series does not say that form does not matter. The closer to a chokepoint and the larger the power-face, the stronger the checks (Paper 3, SC6); buying a substitute that has not yet grown, giving one's own offerings preferential placement and sealing off access are a kind of effect to be examined with particular care (Paper 4, SC8). All these look at changes of form, only landing them on positions that can each be questioned: if the form has changed, on whose acts has it changed, and who can question them? Breakup is the last resort, stating its effect, cost and alternatives when used (Paper 4, SC9), and does not take the ideal of some form as its ground (own undertaking). This reply has its limit: it can say how each place is asked about, but cannot say at what step the form of the whole has already changed; that must be recognized at the judgment layer, place by place, by structure.

Real-world interface (B). On September 10, 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union upheld the €2.4 billion fine the European Commission had imposed on Google. The press release writes that "it cannot be considered that, as a general rule, a dominant undertaking" which favors its own products or services departs from competition on the merits; that Google's favoring of its own comparison shopping service on its general results pages amounted to discriminatory treatment departing from competition on the merits was found "in the light of the characteristics of the market and the specific circumstances of the case" (from the Court's Press Release No 135/24; the press release states that it does not bind the Court, and the original pages of the judgment itself were not obtained for this paper).

Real-world interface (A). The Supreme Court of Korea, judgment of October 16, 2025 (2023Du32709): the court below, the Seoul High Court, had upheld the Korea Fair Trade Commission's disposition, finding that a platform's adjustment of its search algorithm to favor the goods of merchants listed on its own open market constituted three violations: discriminatory treatment as an abuse of market dominance, unfair discriminatory trading, and deceptive inducement of customers; the Supreme Court held that the court below had misunderstood the law in its findings on unfairness and effect and on deception, set aside its judgment, and remanded the case to the Seoul High Court (from the operative part of the original judgment). The Court's English summary answers one issue in the affirmative: the method for judging unfairness and intent applies equally to platforms that favor their own goods. Both the judgment and the summary refer to the parties by pseudonym; that one party is Naver rests on the case note of Kim & Chang, the law firm that represented it on appeal. The result after remand this paper has not examined, and it cannot be written that the court has found the conduct concerned lawful.

Reading. Neither place decides the case on the bare label "favoring its own side": one press release states expressly that it cannot be considered so as a general rule, and finds by the specific circumstances; the other remands because the lower court's findings on unfairness and effect were in error. This points the same way as Paper 4: giving one's own offerings preferential placement is a kind of effect to be examined with particular care, and is not judged to cross the line by its label (Paper 4, §2; SC8). In this conversation, this pair of interfaces says: when rules are made by the platform itself, there is a position outside the platform to question them, and what it asks is what effect that practice had in that market. The two places judge those two practices, and characterize neither company; nor does this paper infer from them anything about all self-preferencing.

II · Satz (A)

The original. Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets, chapter 4, "Noxious Markets" (Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 91–113). The PDF examined has at the head of the chapter a passage marked as an abstract (ABSTRACT), which asks several questions in a row, one of them: "Where and for what reasons is it appropriate to regulate a market, and when should we seek to block it?" (p. 91; whether the printed book has this passage, this paper has not examined). She gives four parameters, and herself divides them into two groups: "The first two parameters characterize the consequences of particular markets" (p. 94), namely extremely harmful outcomes for individuals and extreme harm to society; the latter two characterize their source, the situation of the market agents (p. 96), namely very weak or very asymmetric knowledge and agency, and the extreme vulnerability of one party to the exchange. In the same chapter she also writes that there is reason to "block certain market exchanges altogether if citizens are to be equals": for education, health care, opportunities, rights, liberties and personal security, "access to these goods should not depend only on individual preferences or income" (p. 102); she sets out "two different ideals of democratic citizenship," and goes on: "Both conceptions would block markets in votes, judicial offices, legislative offices, and voluntary slavery." (p. 103); "A commitment to equal citizenship, however, does presuppose that there are some rights that individuals cannot contract away." (p. 105); "Some markets trade in things that no democratic society can countenance" (p. 109). On the side of response, she says: "we cannot immediately conclude from the fact that a market is noxious that we ought legally to ban it" (p. 110); a response may be "legislating a safety net," or "instead of changing the market we might try to change the context" (p. 111).

The common question. When a market must be questioned, and how to respond once it is; which things may not be traded.

Where they meet. Neither side takes price and efficiency as the whole of the criterion: "The level of a price does not, by itself alone, complete a normative judgment" (Political Economy Paper 2, E10); the Base Layer is a line, not on the market's scales (Paper 1, SC1). Both keep identifying a problem apart from choosing a response: Satz first identifies by the four parameters, then chooses among banning, regulating, a safety net and changing the context (pp. 110–111); this series first recognizes at the judgment layer whether a matter falls on the line, and then examines securing measures that restrict others by their effect (Paper 1, SC1; Paper 2, SC5). Both sides also have things that may not be traded: the votes, offices and voluntary slavery she blocks on the ground of equal citizenship and of the two ideals of democratic citizenship (pp. 102–103), and the rights that cannot be contracted away (p. 105); this series' two gates, accumulation not converted into domination over people's Base Layer nor into control over questioning (Political Economy Paper 4, E21, E22), and the line (Paper 1, SC1). The line governs acts; it does not set any particular thing outside exchange: that the line is not discounted for price does not mean that the supply must be free of charge (Paper 1, SC1).

Whether they speak of the same thing. The way of asking differs. Satz evaluates a market: whether a market is noxious; her responses are addressed to institutions (pp. 110–111). This series writes no ought for the market (the Prequel, §1), and asks what the constructs that make and enforce rules have embedded and what they have done. Here the way of asking differs; this is not a divergence: her analysis of a market can be material this series looks at when it makes a finding. By this paper's division, three of her four parameters fall on persons, while "extreme harm to society" falls on society; this series does not set up a separate layer of society: where it presses on a person's Base Layer, it is examined there by the line; where it lets the party questioned control the channel of questioning, it is examined there by the second gate (Political Economy Paper 4, E22) (own undertaking).

What still needs telling apart. This series writes the requirements already found to fall on the Base Layer as constraints that later choices may not cross (Paper 1, SC1; Paper 2, SC5). Which parts of Satz's four parameters, and of her several places of "blocking altogether" on the ground of equal citizenship, coincide with this constraint and which still differ cannot be decided merely from the parameters' being matters of degree and responses' needing weighing; this paper does not decide it. One difference that can be written down lies in how the ground is written: in her arguments at those places for excluding exchanges, she grounds them in equal citizenship (pp. 102, 105); this series grounds them in a human being's being an end, with the Base Layer as the line (the Prequel, §5). Whether the two grounds draw the same range is to be examined separately.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). You say that the list lies at the rule layer, and that whether a supply falls on the life-substrate lies at the judgment layer (Paper 1, SC1). Since the content of the line is not at the normative layer, at the judgment layer you are still doing what I do: looking at how severe the harm is, how vulnerable the people are. Your so-called not entering the weighing only moves the weighing to the judgment layer.

Reply. What the judgment layer recognizes is whether a matter falls on the line, not how much the line is worth; once recognized, it is no longer weighed together with price, scale and efficiency (Paper 1, SC1). In recognizing it one does indeed look at material and circumstances; this series writes out the position that makes the finding, which explains it and can be questioned, and does not write the finding as the result of weighing. Satz's four parameters can be material the judgment layer looks at in making a finding; this use is this paper's (own undertaking). She herself has things that, once recognized, are blocked altogether (pp. 102–103, 105, 109); at this place, the two sides are closer than they look.

Real-world interface (A). French Code de la construction et de l'habitation, art. L302-5 (the text in force since January 1, 2023, as last amended by Article 65 of Law No. 2022-217 of February 21, 2022): the section applies to communes with at least 1,500 inhabitants in the Paris urban unit (unité urbaine de Paris) and at least 3,500 inhabitants on the rest of the territory, lying within an agglomeration of more than 50,000 inhabitants comprising at least one commune of more than 15,000 inhabitants, or within an intercommunal grouping with its own tax powers of such size, in which social rental housing is less than 25 percent of main residences; for certain areas listed by decree the ratio is set at 20 percent; another decree lists communes that are excluded, and communes more than half of whose urbanized area is barred from residential building are also exempt (from the article as published on Légifrance). The articles that follow in the Code set out separately the levy and the arrangements for catching up (from the account of France's Agence nationale pour l'information sur le logement, C).

Reading. This is an embedding: at the rule layer, it lays down for one kind of supply a ratio, a scope of application and exceptions, and fixes who bears it. It does not forbid the rental market, nor does it set rents for the market; placed in Satz's words, it is close to changing the context (p. 111), a reading that is this paper's (own undertaking). In this series, the housing section of Paper 1 writes only a direction sentence, and its negative example is against "no securing at all embedded at the rule layer" (Paper 1, §5). This instance is one form at the rule layer, not a rule this series lays down for any state, and its effectiveness and the strength of its enforcement are not assessed.

§4 Those Who Guard the Market

I · Laffont and Tirole (B, working paper)

The original. The abstract of Laffont and Tirole's 1988 working paper "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture" (MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 506): "We develop an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics." In the introduction, section 1: "Congress relies on information supplied by the agency." In the conclusion, section 8: "The organizational response to the possibility of agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation." (Cited by section; the later journal version and the 1993 book were examined only to the bibliographic record.)

The common question. Whether the position that guards the market will be held by the party it guards, and what to do if it is.

Where they meet. Neither side reads minds: capture is read from structure. Laffont and Tirole look at who holds information and whose stakes are tied to regulation; this series follows the Theory of Government: "Capture is judged by structure, not by the name of a body or where it sits" (Theory of Government Paper 6, G38; carried over in Paper 6, SC12). The responses too both land on structure: they reduce the stakes; this series requires that those who review not depend on those they review, looking at whether the payment can be withdrawn at any time, whether the reviewer has alternative support, and whether his term and later career rest on it (Paper 6, SC12, per A Way Out, a Way Forward, E43).

The question this series adds. The working paper analyzes information and collusion among Congress, the agency and firms, with Congress in the position of the principal. From this hierarchical arrangement at the level of the model it cannot be inferred that the authors hold that only Congress should have a channel of questioning. Here this series adds one question: whether those acted on by the relevant decisions can initiate effective questioning, and whether the channel is controlled by the party questioned (Paper 6, SC12, per Political Economy Paper 3, E16). The working paper examined gives neither an affirmative nor a negative answer to this normative question. How the organization is configured, this series places at the rule layer (Paper 6, SC13); reducing stakes can be one means at the rule layer (own undertaking).

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). Letting all who are acted on initiate questioning itself gives interest groups a new entrance: those best at using channels of questioning are exactly the parties with the largest stakes. One more door is one more place that can be captured.

Reply. This series grants this point: the channel of questioning is itself questioned, and the decisions of those who check are also questioned by the three questions (Political Economy Paper 3, E16); that those who review do not depend on those they review holds equally for the positions that take up questioning. It does not on that account narrow who can initiate: initiating only lets a matter be asked about; what efficacy it has is explained by structure by the position that takes it up, which can itself be questioned (own undertaking). What this reply preserves is a requirement; whether such a channel is, in a particular arrangement, enough to guard against capture, this paper has not proved.

Real-world interface (A). North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission (Supreme Court of the United States, February 25, 2015, No. 13-534). The Board sent at least 47 cease-and-desist letters on its official letterhead to nondentist providers of teeth whitening. The Supreme Court held that a state board on which "a controlling number of decisionmakers" are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy the requirement of "active supervision" in order to invoke the state-action immunity from antitrust law. Active supervision has substantive requirements: the supervisor "must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it"; it "must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions"; the mere potential for supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State; and "the state supervisor may not itself be an active market participant." The Court said that "Parker immunity does not derive from nomenclature alone," and affirmed the judgment below (from the full text of the judgment).

Reading. The Court did not grant immunity merely because the Board was created by state law and designated by the State as a state agency; it looked at who actually sits in the decision-making positions, and whether a position not belonging to the regulated party, able to review substance and to veto or modify, supervises. This points the same way as "capture is judged by structure, not by the name of a body" (Paper 6, SC12). The Court also did not say that market participants may not take part in occupational licensing; this series likewise does not say that concurrent office is in itself capture (Paper 6, §2). This instance judges whether that board and that set of cease-and-desist letters could obtain immunity, and does not characterize that profession.

II · Stigler (C, one added question)

How far upstream has gone. The Specialist Paper registered Stigler's theory of regulation (1971) as a near neighbor of "those who review do not depend on those they review": the literature on guarding against regulatory capture is earlier, and also broader; the Specialist Paper paraphrased it from the bibliographic record and the abstract, and wrote down there where the two part (A Way Out, a Way Forward, §9, item 5; E43). This paper points to it and does not redo it.

The question this paper adds. Whom regulation benefits. Paraphrased from the bibliographic record and abstract on RePEc: the article analyzes how public resources and powers can be used to improve the economic status of economic groups, the demand for regulation, and the political features that enable relatively small groups to obtain regulation (C). The abstract reaches only the side of benefit; on whom the burden falls is what this paper goes on to ask.

Real-world interface (A). The administrative order of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission against Standard & Poor's Ratings Services of January 21, 2015 (Securities Act Release No. 9705; Exchange Act Release No. 74104). As the order records: rating fees for conduit/fusion commercial mortgage-backed securities were paid by the issuers; issuers engaged two rating agencies, generally choosing those that reported the lowest credible credit enhancement levels; after the crisis, S&P's share of this market did not return to its pre-2008 level; S&P changed its method of calculating debt service coverage ratios, using averages that S&P staff called "blended constants," which produced lower credit enhancement requirements. The order found that S&P's pre-issuance reports did not tell investors that the method had been changed to use these averages (para. 21), and that these statements were knowingly or recklessly false and misleading (para. 22); S&P did not follow its own internal policies and procedures when it changed this method. Three violations were found: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act (para. 34); the internal-control requirements of Section 15E(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act (para. 35); and the recordkeeping rules of Rules 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) and 17g-2(a)(6) thereunder (para. 36). The order does not say that changing the method was in itself unlawful. S&P neither admitted nor denied the order's findings, except as to the Commission's jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of the proceedings and the facts set forth in Annex A; the order imposed a civil penalty of $35 million and disgorgement of $6.2 million plus $0.8 million in interest; S&P undertook not to rate new issues of this class of securities for twelve months (from the original order).

Reading. Stigler asks whom regulation benefits. This instance is not in public regulation but at a position of questioning: a rating asks "can it repay," the rating fee is paid by the party questioned, and the party questioned also chooses among several agencies. What this series additionally asks here is the other half of the same matter: whether the benefiting party can control the conclusion of the questioning. Paper 3's reading: payment by the party rated is dependence formed through payments, examined by three points; "that dependence is present does not mean that capture has occurred" (A Way Out, a Way Forward, E43); payment does not by itself produce the capacity to control conclusions (Paper 3, SC7). What the order found is that the method was changed, that credit enhancement requirements were lower as a result, and that the pre-issuance reports did not truthfully tell investors; besides, there were violations of internal-control and recordkeeping obligations. These findings do not automatically prove that issuers had acquired the capacity to control rating conclusions; that layer is to be examined separately by structure; on whom the burden fell, the order did not find item by item, and this paper does not supply it.

§5 The Direction of Funding

I · Mazzucato (A)

The original. Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State (Demos, 2011; the full text examined; this conversation cites only the pages below; the expanded edition of 2013 not examined). The cover line: "The state has not just fixed markets, but actively created them." On p. 53, the preceding sentence says that government has not only funded the riskiest research but has often been the source of the most radical innovations; it goes on: "To this extent it has actively created markets not just fixed them." In the example of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, she writes that public laboratories take on the risky research while private drug companies make "me too" drugs, and that "private venture capitalists enter only once the real risk has been absorbed by the state" (pp. 21–22). In the section of recommendations: "When successful, a part of the return from investments made with significant public support should be returned to government." (p. 25) The chapter "Final thoughts on risk-taking in innovation: who gets the return?" says that "while the efforts are collective, the returns remain private" (p. 109), and that "we need social institutions that enable these risk-bearers to reap the returns from the innovation process" (p. 113).

The common question. Whether, and how, the public side's having borne risk constitutes a ground for claiming a return; what rights this ground gives it, and what authority it does not.

Whether they speak of the same thing. Two places must be kept apart. Mazzucato's "direction" is the direction of technology and of markets: what public funding chooses to do. What this series bars funding from claiming on someone's behalf is a person's direction of life: those who give conditions do not acquire the authority to decide a person's direction (Political Economy Paper 6, E37; Paper 5, SC10); a company's business direction and the direction of the Kingdom of Ends are kept apart separately under Paper 5, §3. "The state created markets" speaks of the role of public investment, procurement and technology in the formation of markets; this series says that the market is the result that emerges from many people's transactions taken together, and that no one sets it (the Prequel, §1), which speaks of how the market exists. The two sentences can hold at the same time.

Where they meet. Public funding does not only patch gaps: this series does not require support to be without content; support may have particular content (Political Economy Paper 6, E37), and funding may expect output and attach agreements on use and governance that have a source (Paper 5, SC10). On whom risk and return fall, both sides require to be stated: the public position that gives the support states its grounds, authority, object and cost, and can be questioned (Paper 5, SC11).

Asking further from here. On a public side's claiming a return because it has borne risk, what this series can answer is this: a claim to a return must state its source and can be questioned; where the claim rests on an agreement, it is examined separately by the source and actual effect of the agreement (Paper 5, §1; SC10; own undertaking); the proportion and form of the return lie at the rule layer. It does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction, nor does it endorse the existing acts and continued existence of those supported (SC10, SC11). This limit the pages of Mazzucato examined do not touch; this paper does not say that she denies it. Where there is no agreement, whether having borne risk alone can be a ground for claiming a return, the eight papers have not answered.

Pressure arising from the original (transcribed by this paper). In her own words: when successful, a part of the return should be returned to government (p. 25); the efforts are collective, while the returns remain private (p. 109). The pressure arising from this is: if a public risk-bearer's share was not written into an agreement beforehand, on what ground does this series support or reject its claim to a return? Requiring only that a claim state its source and accept questioning does not yet answer where the entitlement to a return comes from.

Reply. At the normative layer this series answers only that a claim to a return must state its source and can be questioned; proportion and form lie at the rule layer (Paper 5, §1; SC10; own undertaking). Where there is no agreement, whether bearing risk can alone be a ground, the eight papers have not answered, and this paper registers it as it stands (§8, IV, the sixth slot).

Real-world interface (B). The Trados case (Delaware Court of Chancery, August 16, 2013). In July 2005, SDL acquired Trados for $60 million in cash and stock. A management incentive plan took the first $7.8 million of the merger consideration; the preferred stockholders received $52.2 million; "The common stockholders received nothing." The court stated that without the management incentive plan the common stockholders would have received $2.1 million. The preferred stock's liquidation preference together with cumulative dividends came to about $57.9 million; the venture capital investors held preferred stock and had seats on the board. The sale was not approved by a majority of disinterested and independent directors, and the court therefore required the defendants to prove that the transaction was entirely fair. The court noted that the board had not followed a fair process, but held that the defendants had proved entire fairness: under Trados's business plan, the common stock had no economic value before the merger; in a separate analysis of appraisal, it found that the appraised value of the common stock was likewise zero (from the full text of the judgment; the text relied on has no page numbers).

Reading. In this instance, how the sale proceeds were divided involves several things: the liquidation preference funding acquired through terms, the management incentive plan, the interests linking directors with the preferred side, and the court's review. Paper 5's reading: terms such as liquidation preference cannot be judged to cross the line on their names alone; the control they acquire is examined by the three questions, whether those it acts on have actual control over the relevant decisions (Paper 5, §3; SC10). In this instance, the common stockholders went to court, and the court reviewed process and price for entire fairness; this road the party questioned could not close. How risk and return were divided was answered in this instance by the terms, the incentive plan and the court's review, and this series does not judge whether that division was right (own undertaking). Read together with the Mazzucato conversation, it asks about the private side of the same matter: the return the investing party obtains, by what agreement, and under what review.

§6 Ownership

This section takes the two thinkers only as far as the surface of contact.

I · Rawls (section titles from the table of contents; text cited at second hand)

What this paper examined is the table of contents of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001): §41, "Property-Owning Democracy: Introductory Remarks," p. 135; §42, "Some Basic Contrasts between Regimes," p. 138. One sentence of Rawls is cited at second hand from Quish's review of Edmundson, John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (2017), which gives no source: welfare-state capitalism permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production. No quotation marks are used here.

The surface of contact. Rawls places ownership in the basic structure and compares several regimes; this series places ownership at the rule layer, where it only suggests, and at the normative layer says only that the line does not change with ownership (Paper 1, SC2, SC3). Once the original book is examined, two questions are to be decided: whether what Rawls asks in comparing regimes is the same question as this series' "recognized by power-face, not by public or private" (SC3); whether the near monopoly of the means of production spoken of above is read in this series as positions of accumulation and chokepoints (Political Economy Paper 1, E2; Paper 2, E7).

II · Lange (C)

Paraphrased from the entry on Lange in Econlib's Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Lange's scheme of 1936–37, answering Hayek, had the government own the major industries, with a central planning board setting prices for these industries, raising prices where there was a shortage and lowering them where there was a surplus in order to reach equilibrium; later he advocated only that the government set prices in industries with few firms. Of the original book, On the Economic Theory of Socialism (1938), this paper examined only the table of contents. Hayek's side follows Political Economy Paper 0, and is not rewritten.

The surface of contact. Lange separates ownership from allocation: industries are publicly owned, and prices are adjusted by the board according to supply and demand. This series separates at another place: ownership and accountability. A publicly run position of supply guards the line all the same; the position that reviews it is functionally independent of the supplier and of its owner (Paper 1, SC3; Paper 6, SC13). Once the original book is examined, what is to be decided is this: a central planning board setting prices is, in this series, a construct that makes and enforces rules; how its own pricing is questioned, and how Lange answers that.

III · Real-World Interface (B)

The arrangement formed by Ireland's Electricity Regulation Act 1999 and its later amendments. In the current revised text (as published by the Law Reform Commission), Schedule 1, paragraph 9 reads: "Subject to this Act, the Commission shall be independent in the performance of its functions." Section 14 was substituted in full in 2005, and the present wording of its subsection (1) was substituted in 2022: the Commission may grant licences to electricity undertakings, or to any person proposing to exercise the functions of an electricity undertaking; under subsection (2), the Commission may grant to "the Board" referred to in the Act, that is, the incumbent Electricity Supply Board (ESB), a licence to supply electricity to eligible customers. Section 10A (inserted in 2006): the Minister may give the Commission "general policy directions"; subsection (6) does not permit directions concerning the Commission's functions in relation to an individual energy undertaking or person. Section 10 of the original Act made separate provision for ministerial directions, and subsection (4) of the same section states that the section was repealed on February 19, 2000 (from the original Act as published in the Irish Statute Book). ESB's own page states that it was established in 1927 as a statutory corporation under the Electricity (Supply) Act, and that it is majority-owned by the Irish Government. The 1999 original text of the Schedule and of section 14 this paper has not compared.

Reading. The current arrangement writes three things apart: who holds the business of supplying electricity, the government-controlled incumbent supplier included; who can enter, with licences granted to electricity undertakings; who reviews, a commission independent in the performance of its functions, to which the Minister gives only general policy directions, with no directions concerning individual undertakings or persons. This points the same way as this series: the line does not change with ownership, and the position that reviews a publicly run supply is functionally independent of the supplier and of its owner (Paper 1, SC3; Paper 6, SC13). Whether the commission is actually independent is to be examined separately by structure. This instance serves only as an interface, and does not assess the performance of the Irish electricity market.

§7 Across Borders

I · Young (B, abstract)

The original. The abstract of Young's "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model" (Social Philosophy and Policy 23(1), 2006, 102–130): it asks what agents, individual or institutional, bear with respect to global structural processes that produce unjust outcomes. The social connection model holds that "all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice" have responsibilities to remedy it. It takes the transnational production, distribution and marketing of garments as its main example, and, contrasted with a liability model of responsibility, has five features: it does not isolate perpetrators, it judges the background conditions of action, it is more forward-looking than backward-looking, its responsibility is shared, and it can be discharged only through collective action. (From the abstract; the body of the article and the posthumous Responsibility for Justice of 2011 were not obtained for this paper. How responsibility is shared, and whether the parties' shares are equal, the abstract does not say, and this paper does not extrapolate from the abstract.)

The common question. For harms along cross-border supply chains, by what responsibility falls; to whom the responsibility for changing structures is addressed.

Where they meet. Distance does not make responsibility disappear: the line does not change at borders (Paper 7, SC14). An outcome with no single decider still has places that can be asked: the step forward the Prequel took asks what the constructs that make and enforce rules in the institution where the outcome lies have done with respect to it (the Prequel, §1; own undertaking). Neither side looks only for perpetrators: in this series the share of the importing side is its own rules and enforcement, and does not presuppose that it was at fault (Paper 7, SC14; own undertaking), which already sets it at a distance from a model that only pursues past fault.

Whether they speak of the same thing. "Shared" and "each to its own acts" are not necessarily opposed: responsibility can be borne in common and at the same time discharged separately by different subjects; each having a share can also look forward.

Where they part. The parting lies in whether the responsibility to change structures can be addressed directly to the individuals who take part in structural processes. Young addresses the responsibility to remedy injustice to the agents, individual or institutional, who take part in structural processes; it looks forward, and can be discharged only through collective action (abstract). This series writes institutional oughts for constructs, settling what each bears for its own acts; an individual's participation is understood under his own law. This series writes no ought directly for individual participants; the accountability of an individual's position when he holds office, and the rules that apply to his transactions, are examined separately at the corresponding layers (the Prequel, §6; Institution Theory Z4). What the two sides still have to tell apart is what kind of responsibility can be addressed directly to individuals, and how jointly changing structures finds those who carry out the action.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). If changing a structure requires organizing a collective action that has not yet happened, is it enough, to explain who initiates this change, to say only that the existing constructs answer for their own acts? Before any construct takes it up, do individuals have a responsibility for changing structures that can be addressed to them?

Reply. Here this series answers half. The constructs that make and enforce rules on the importing side guard the line by the unified sentence toward those whom their own acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting (SC14, first item); this share of responsibility cannot be transferred to a party abroad. The purchasing company has a share of its own under Theory of the Company GS10. Whether an individual initiates is his own law, and this series does not write an institutional ought for it. Before any construct takes it up, who initiates a joint change and how it finds those who carry it out, the eight papers have not answered; this paper registers it as it stands (§8, IV, the sixth slot).

Real-world interface (A). On March 29, 2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection published a notice of finding (CBP Dec. 21-08, 86 FR 16380): under the categories listed in the statute, certain disposable gloves were produced in Malaysia by Top Glove "with the use of convict, forced, or indentured labor"; the notice states that Customs found that Top Glove produced disposable gloves with forced labor. A notice of September 10 of the same year (CBP Dec. 21-13, 86 FR 50725), titled "Determination That Maintenance of Finding of March 29, 2021, Pertaining to Certain Disposable Gloves Produced in Malaysia, Is No Longer Necessary," determined that these goods were no longer so produced, applying to goods imported on or after that date (from the originals in the Federal Register).

Reading. This finding was made by the importing side's construct regarding its own access: it governs what goods may enter its market, and writes no ought for a factory abroad. Both the making of the finding and the later determination that it need not be maintained lie within the importing side's own rules and enforcement; this is exactly where the importing side's share in Paper 7 lands (SC14, first item). This instance judges access for that class of goods, and does not characterize that company.

II · Rodrik (B, abstract)

The original. The abstract of Rodrik's 2000 "How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?" (Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(1), 177–186): "international economic integration, the nation-state, and mass politics cannot co-exist"; "We have to pick two out of three." (From the abstract; the body was not obtained for this paper. Of the 2011 book The Globalization Paradox, this paper saw only the publisher's description, and does not cite it.)

The common question. When cross-border rules and accountability within one state are not on the same layer, to whom the channel of questioning belongs.

Where they meet. Cross-border arrangements and questioning within one state stand in tension: this series too says that at the level of state and state there is no third party that legislates for both, that treaties bind the parties within their scope of application, and that carrying out and questioning go through each party's own law (Paper 7, SC15, per Theory of the State N24).

Where they part. What Rodrik puts forward is a constraint of compatibility among institutional conditions (abstract). What this series gives at this place is a normative order and addresses of responsibility: the commitments of a treaty, domestic supply and regulation, and arbitration and its implementation are each explained by, and questioned at, the corresponding positions; a procedure that the people whose line it is cannot initiate is not their channel, and their road remains within this state (SC15). These three questions do not correspond one to one with Rodrik's three conditions; writing the three questions apart cannot answer whether the three conditions can be maintained at the same time. Such a distinction does not remove the difficulty of compatibility; how, in a particular conflict, commitments, institutional arrangements and modes of implementation are to be adjusted, this paper has no general solution. "The line does not enter the table of trade-offs" specifies what this series refuses to treat as expendable; it does not prove that the remaining institutional adjustments already have a solution (own undertaking).

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). If the three institutional conditions cannot be maintained at the same time, the normative order of guarding the line still gives no compatible arrangement for achieving it. In a particular conflict, which commitment or institutional arrangement is in fact to be adjusted, and how, after adjustment, is the line still guarded? Writing out separately the addresses of responsibility and of questioning has not yet answered this. Where a treaty already binds this state, how does this state's channel of questioning deal with the difficulties these constraints bring to guarding the line?

Reply. This series takes this place as a limit: what arbitration can do, and where its limits and points of failure lie, is stated separately (the end of SC15). This state's road cannot change treaty obligations already formed; it can ask what this state has done with respect to this commitment, and what the supplier and its regulator have done with respect to supply; suspension or exit is examined separately under the rules between states (Theory of the State N24). Whether, in a particular conflict, what is adjusted is a commitment, an arrangement or a mode of implementation is explained by the position that makes the decision, and can be questioned; a general solution this paper does not have (own undertaking). Here Rodrik is an interlocutor who puts pressure on this series' conditions of achievement.

Real-world interface (A). Azurix v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), under the United States–Argentina bilateral investment treaty. The concession agreement granted Azurix's subsidiary ABA a thirty-year concession for the distribution of drinking water and the treatment of sewage in the Province of Buenos Aires (Award, para. 41). The award of July 14, 2006 (para. 442): Argentina did not breach Article IV(1) of the treaty (expropriation); it breached Article II(2)(a), failing to give fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security; it breached Article II(2)(b) by taking arbitrary measures; it was to pay compensation of US$165,240,753, with interest compounded semi-annually; all other claims were dismissed. The decision on annulment, dispatched on September 1, 2009: "The application for annulment of the Argentine Republic is dismissed in its entirety." The stay of enforcement of the award was terminated (from the English originals of the award and of the annulment decision).

Reading. The award answers whether the state's measures concerning this investment breached the treaty; the application for annulment having been dismissed, this decision is final in the case. This review can itself touch on price and regulatory measures. That this series writes the three questions apart is an arrangement of attribution, not a claim that the three matters never touch in fact. How the award was implemented, this paper has not examined, and does not write. This instance serves only as an interface, and is not written as support for or opposition to state regulation.

§8 Handover and Remainders

I · What Upstream Expressly Handed On

Settlement follows Political Economy Paper 0: delivered, publicly reassigned, publicly withdrawn. The table below is the receiving side's own account, not an acceptance made on upstream's behalf.

From What was handed on Settlement Where it lands
The Theory of the Company Prequel, §7; Theory of the Company Paper 0 Competition, mergers and acquisitions, and access between company and company Delivered Paper 4, SC8, SC9; the side of mergers and acquisitions in which a company is bought and sold but not the people in it, in Paper 5, §2, SC10
Theory of the Company Paper 3; Theory of the Company Paper 0; the Theory of the Company specialist papers Platforms and Gig Work and The Company in the Age of AI How chokepoints are identified and who reviews them, and how competition is reviewed (the two specialist papers have "the determination of platform competition and chokepoints" and "competition and chokepoints") Delivered Paper 3, SC6, SC7; Paper 4, SC8, SC9; on who reviews, this series lays down only functional conditions (Paper 3, SC6; Paper 6, SC12), and organizational configuration is handed to specific theories of institutions
Theory of the Company Paper 4; Theory of the Company Paper 0 Whether giving the platform's own offerings preferential placement is unfair competition, and whether the marketplace and the platform's own sales should be separated; breakup Delivered Paper 4, §§2, 4; SC8, SC9
The Theory of the Company Prequel, §7, and Paper 5, §5; Theory of the Company Paper 0 How states make and enforce rules for companies Delivered Paper 6, SC12, SC13: what the constructs that make and enforce rules guard, how they avoid capture, how their own decisions are questioned; how the organization is configured is handed to specific theories of institutions
Theory of the Company Paper 0 (the Ciepley conversation) On what ground the state makes rules for companies Publicly reassigned The Theory of Government: on what ground government judges and compels; this series writes only what the constructs that make and enforce rules guard, and how they are questioned

Remainders registered upstream and taken up by this series. Political Economy Paper 3, E20 and Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 8, §4 both registered the institutional relations between company and company, and between states and companies, as remainders. These are not accounts expressly handed on. This series takes up several of them: the line, the address of responsibility and the channel of questioning (Papers 4 and 6; the cross-border side in Paper 7, SC14, SC15); the system of cooperation among states it does not take up.

II · Adjacent, Not Taken Up

The theory of price is not written. Tax is not within this series. Tariffs, trade policy and exchange rates are not written; sanctions and blockades fall under the Theory of the State; the system of cooperation among states follows the functional boundaries the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation already has. The interior of the company, and the company and its partners, fall under the Theory of the Company. How arbitration and cross-border mechanisms are to be designed is not within this series.

III · Handed Downstream

Specialist papers of the Theory of the Company: early-stage companies (partners and founders); if written, non-profit organizations.

Tax: if it becomes a series of its own.

Specific theories of institutions: the organizational form, terms, recusal and sources of funds of regulatory bodies; the thresholds for filing mergers and acquisitions; the degree and form of securing for housing; how far the lists of reviewers are published; how the money a settlement body handles is kept apart from its own investments.

The design of arbitration and cross-border mechanisms: how a common procedure can be brought within reach of the people whose line it is. This series writes only as far as the address and the direction.

IV · Where This Series Stops

Registration is in six slots, following Political Economy Paper 0. What the six slots distinguish is the nature of what was not continued; they are not six blanks that every series is to fill.

The first slot: the remainder this construct itself has left. What arrangement takes up guarding the line and being questioned in the stretch below the threshold; how the constructs that make and enforce rules examine "whether it suffices" where there are several suppliers, and by what method (Paper 1). How the conditions of a place and the thresholds of that same place are to be read together, for which only a direction, not a method, was given; how, in a particular rule, the face that falls on the same person is to be separated from the face that falls on others (Paper 2). How "not deciding" at a chokepoint is questioned (Paper 3). Who reads an old rule again once it has come to fall on a new road; coordination that falls outside the four routes (Paper 4). Where dependence cannot be removed for the time being, how decisions are made and answered for (Paper 6). How to examine what the constructs on the importing side "have done" toward the people abroad whom they reach (Paper 7). The step forward the Prequel took, that for an outcome with no decider one asks what the institution in which it lies has done, is tested in the examples of each paper, and has no general procedure of testing.

The second slot: objects adjacent to the jurisdiction. The theory of price; tax; tariffs, trade policy and exchange rates; sanctions and blockades; the system of cooperation among states; the interior of the company.

The third slot: conclusions that have reached their limit. The market is not a construct, and an ought addressed to it is empty (the Prequel, §1). Whether markets oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends will prevail, this series does not rely on: "only the inevitability of emergence is taken up, not the inevitability of dominance" (Political Economy Paper 6, E32). The two layers holding each other up is a direction, not a guarantee (the Prequel, §5; Paper 2, SC5). This is what this layer can give; it is not that a way has not yet been found.

The fourth slot: research candidates. Once Rawls's Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, §§41 and 42, and Lange's original book of 1938 have been examined, the two questions of the section on ownership (§6). Whether Satz's "blocking altogether" on the ground of equal citizenship draws the same range as this series' line (§3, II). Once Young's body text is examined, how responsibility is shared, and whether the parties' shares are equal (§7, I). Once Rodrik's body text is examined, what each of the three conditions refers to (§7, II). Eucken's monopoly office is subject only to the law; how its own decisions are questioned requires reading the whole book (§3, I). The result of the Naver Shopping case after remand (§3, I).

The fifth slot: handovers whose address is already fixed. Specialist papers of the Theory of the Company; tax; specific theories of institutions; the design of arbitration and cross-border mechanisms: see III of this section.

The sixth slot: questions that could be seen only against the schools. Four questions, which none of the eight papers answers, and which became clear only in interfacing: where there is no agreement, whether bearing risk can alone be a ground for claiming a return (the Mazzucato conversation); before any construct takes it up, who initiates the collective action of changing structures, and how it finds those who carry it out (the Young conversation); where cross-border institutional conditions cannot be made compatible, what to adjust in a particular conflict, for which there is no general solution (the Rodrik conversation); whether a channel of questioning that those acted on can initiate is, in a particular arrangement, enough to guard against capture, for which only the requirement has been laid down (the Laffont and Tirole conversation). There is also one place where the sides mostly point the same way: those who guard the market are also questioned. Eucken wants the position that supervises monopoly withdrawn from the influence of interested parties; Laffont and Tirole read capture from information and stakes; the North Carolina case looks at who actually sits in the decision-making positions, and at whether the supervisor can review substance; the differences lie mostly in how this is written: Eucken gives an arrangement, while this series lays down only functions.

Where This Paper Stops

This paper lays down no propositions, and has changed no sentence of the eight papers. It has interfaced this series once with existing theories of the market, and registered as it stands to which layer each school was examined: Satz to a whole chapter and Mazzucato to the full text; Eucken from a few pages of an abridged English translation, Laffont and Tirole from a working paper, Young and Rodrik from abstracts; Rawls and Lange only to a table of contents, a book review and an encyclopedia entry; Stigler following the Specialist Paper, with one added question. The real-world interfaces are each written from the original documents, with their tiers marked separately. Two questions were examined in interfacing, and which conversation falls on which question is written conversation by conversation; overlaps, the questions added and the divergences are written with their sources; where only the way of asking differs, this is written as such.

What it has not done: it has not proved which market form, which form of ownership or which form of regulation is best, and this series does not choose between names; it has not given a complete reply to any school, and has not entered into any argument beyond the range examined; Böhm, Müller-Armack, Kahn, Bork, Kaysen and Turner, Ostrom, and Slobodian's Globalists this paper reached only at second hand or could not obtain in the original, and does not cite.

What it leaves: the six slots of §8, of which the four questions of the sixth slot became clear only in interfacing.

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.

I · This system

Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635

Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384

Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324

Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112

Qin, H. (2026). Questioning and Bearing (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511

Qin, H. (2026). One Another, with No Superior (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584346

Qin, H. (2026). The Close (SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815796

Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133

Qin, H. (2026). Accumulation (SAE Political Economy, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874138

Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140

Qin, H. (2026). Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874142

Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146

Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154

Qin, H. (2026). Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power (SAE Political Economy, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874158

Qin, H. (2026). A Way Out, a Way Forward (SAE Political Economy, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24021385

Qin, H. (2026). What a Company Is Not (SAE Theory of the Company, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045716

Qin, H. (2026). Investment (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045721

Qin, H. (2026). Service (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045731

Qin, H. (2026). Partners (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045733

Qin, H. (2026). Society (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045735

Qin, H. (2026). Theory of the Company and the Tradition: The Price Falls on What Is Done (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045743

Qin, H. (2026). Platforms and Gig Work (SAE Theory of the Company, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24117808

Qin, H. (2026). The Company in the Age of AI (SAE Theory of the Company, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24117816

II · This series

Qin, H. (2026). What a Market Is Not (SAE Theory of the Market, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183364

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Securing (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183368

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Space (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183370

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Chokepoints (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183372

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Competition (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183376

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Funding (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183378

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Regulation (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183380

Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Borders (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 7) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183384

III · External works (originals, tier A)

Satz, D. (2010). Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets, ch. 4, "Noxious Markets," pp. 91–113 (the chapter text ends on p. 112; the question on p. 91 is in the passage marked as an abstract at the head of the chapter in the PDF examined; the printed book not examined). Oxford University Press.

Mazzucato, M. (2011). The Entrepreneurial State. London: Demos. https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/files/Entrepreneurial_State_-_web.pdf

IV · External works (tier B)

Eucken, W. (2006). The Competitive Order and Its Implementation (C. Ahlborn & C. Grave, Trans.). Competition Policy International, 2(2), 219–245. Abridged English translation; original: Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung, ORDO 2 (1949), 1–99 (the German original not examined). https://competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/4372

Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1988). The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture. MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 506. (Cited by section; the journal version not examined.) https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/64145/politicsofgovern00laff.pdf

Young, I. M. (2006). Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model. Social Philosophy and Policy, 23(1), 102–130. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052506060043 (from the abstract)

Rodrik, D. (2000). How Far Will International Economic Integration Go? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(1), 177–186. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.1.177 (from the abstract)

V · External works (tier C and at second hand: the secondary material and tables of contents relied on)

Stigler, G. J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3–21. (Paraphrased from the RePEc bibliographic record and abstract, tier C; following the Specialist Paper.) https://ideas.repec.org/a/rje/bellje/v2y1971ispringp3-21.html

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Harvard University Press. (Table of contents examined for §41, p. 135, and §42, p. 138; text cited at second hand from Quish's review, which gives no source.)

Quish, E. Review of W. A. Edmundson, John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge University Press, 2017). https://www.circolorossellimilano.org/MaterialePDF/john_rawls_socialist.pdf

Lange, O. (1938). On the Economic Theory of Socialism (B. E. Lippincott, Ed.). University of Minnesota Press. (Only the table of contents examined; paraphrased from the Econlib entry, tier C.)

Oskar Ryszard Lange. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Econlib. https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/bios/Lange.html

VI · Original documents of the real-world interfaces

Court of Justice of the European Union. (2024, September 10). Press Release No 135/24: Judgment in Case C-48/22 P, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping). https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2024-09/cp240135en.pdf (a press release, not binding on the Court; tier B)

Supreme Court of Korea, judgment of October 16, 2025, 2023Du32709 (대법원 2025. 10. 16. 선고 2023두32709 판결; the original judgment). https://www.scourt.go.kr/sjudge/1761111821258_144341.pdf ; English summary: https://www.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/decisions/NewDecisionsView.work?pageIndex=1&seq=6049 ; the party's name from Kim & Chang, "South Korea: Naver Shopping prevails in Supreme Court appeal", IFLR1000. https://iflr1000.com/NewsAndAnalysis/south-korea-naver-shopping-prevails-in-supreme-court-appeal-regarding-alleged-se/Index/16070

Code de la construction et de l'habitation, art. L302-5 (version en vigueur depuis le 1er janvier 2023, modifiée par la loi n° 2022-217 du 21 février 2022, art. 65). Légifrance. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000045214963/2026-06-15 ; the levy and the arrangements for catching up from ANIL, Production de logements sociaux : obligations des communes. https://www.anil.org/aj-logement-production-logement-social-obligation-commune/ (tier C)

North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 13-534 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2015). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-534

In re Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act Release No. 74104, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16348 (SEC, Jan. 21, 2015). https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9705.pdf

In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 1512-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013). https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-ol-1512-vcl.html (the text relied on has no page numbers; tier B)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Notice of Finding That Certain Disposable Gloves Produced in Malaysia … (CBP Dec. 21-08), 86 FR 16380 (Mar. 29, 2021). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-03-29/pdf/2021-06393.pdf

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Determination That Maintenance of Finding of March 29, 2021, Pertaining to Certain Disposable Gloves Produced in Malaysia, Is No Longer Necessary (CBP Dec. 21-13), 86 FR 50725 (Sept. 10, 2021). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-09-10/pdf/2021-19535.pdf

Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (July 14, 2006). https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0061.pdf ; Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Sept. 1, 2009). https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0065.pdf

Electricity Regulation Act 1999 (Ireland), s. 10 (as enacted). https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1999/act/23/section/10/enacted/en/html ; s. 10A (inserted 2006 by the Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006, s. 7), s. 14 (substituted 2005 by S.I. No. 60 of 2005; subs. (1) substituted 2022 by S.I. No. 20 of 2022) and Schedule 1 para. 9 (revised, Law Reform Commission). https://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/1999/act/23/revised/en/html

ESB. About ESB. https://esb.ie/who-we-are/about-esb

Interfaces

Main upstream: the eight papers (SC1–SC15).

Also used: Institution Theory Z4, Z9, Z34, Z39; Theory of Government Paper 3, G17, and Paper 6, G38; Theory of the State Paper 5, N24; the Political Economy Prequel, §3; Political Economy Paper 1, E2; Paper 2, E7, E10; Paper 3, E14a, E16, E20; Paper 4, E21–E24; Paper 6, E32, E34, E35, E37; Political Economy Paper 0 (the format of the structure and of the six slots; the twenty thinkers already interfaced with); A Way Out, a Way Forward, E41a, E43 and §9, item 5; Theory of the Company GS3, GS10; the Theory of the Company Prequel, §7, Papers 3 and 4, and Paper 5, §5, and the Theory of the Company specialist papers Platforms and Gig Work and The Company in the Age of AI (the items handed to a later theory of the market); Theory of the Company Paper 0 (the format of the structure, the tiers and the four steps; the items handed downstream); Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 8, §4.

Interfacing: Satz (A); Mazzucato (A); Eucken (B, from an abridged English translation); Laffont and Tirole (B, working paper); Young (B, abstract); Rodrik (B, abstract); Stigler (C, following the Specialist Paper); Lange (C); Rawls (section titles from the table of contents; text cited at second hand).

Real-world interfaces: the North Carolina Dental Board case (A); the SEC's CMBS order against S&P (A); the Top Glove finding (A); Azurix v. Argentina (A); the Korean Naver Shopping case (A; the party's name from the law firm that represented it); French art. L302-5 (A; the levy and catching up from ANIL, C); the Google Shopping case (B); the Trados case (B); Ireland's Electricity Regulation Act (B).

Handed downstream: specialist papers of the Theory of the Company; tax (if set up); specific theories of institutions; the design of arbitration and cross-border mechanisms.