Admission and Rescue
接纳与救援
This paper asks: when people outside the system come out of a state, what must the system and its members do, and what can they do; when people cannot get out, how far can armed force go, and where does what it cannot reach fall? The whole paper runs through the "state of stability" in the Republic of the Sandbars and the flight across the two banks of the Grey River. It draws on a journalist who fled, a sharing decision that drew lots by household, the shelling of the camp on the east bank and Stonegorge's proposal to protect a corridor, a common sanction against the Sandbars, and the north of the Sandbars setting itself up on its own and applying to join; three supposed cases are set alongside for contrast: a commander who has crossed the line flees to the camp, Stonegorge enters the west bank to protect a corridor, and the Sandbars government invites the NUT to guard a reception point. What it answers comes to this. Creating conditions for the cultivation of people outside the system means, for those who can get out, first of all making their exit real, and the conditions are built only where the system's acts can reach. At the door of any state, no one is pushed back; those who have crossed the line are not pushed back at the door either, but asylum does not write off the account. What the system's sharing divides is the shares of the states; it does not sort people, and the room not to go to a given state must be actually usable. Those who leave are not treated as instruments for going back to change the order there. In rescue, the part that must be done is the same for the system as for a single state; what the system has more of lies in what can be done. Divided by place: guarding the line on this state's own side is not starting a war, and entering another state without invitation is starting a war; guarding, by invitation, those who arrive and the supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will, form a slot of their own, where returning fire goes no further than stopping the attack on the spot, and an escort used to help one side drive out a population is not permitted. The system does not authorize the use of armed force; intervention and assistance are divided by judgment, and judgment follows control. While internal strife is not yet decided, outside force does not intervene; that the system has not yet admitted means that it has already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. The cost borne by those who cannot reach the door, and by those like them, is written down as it stands. Along the way the paper interfaces with Grotius, Vattel and Rawls, and at the end it converses with the Fifth Preliminary Article of Kant's Perpetual Peace. The paper has eight propositions (XZ37 to XZ44), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
The Grey River flows from south to north into the Mirror Sea, and its lower course, some one hundred forty kilometers, is the border river between two states. On the west bank is the Republic of the Sandbars (the Sandbars); on the east bank is the Stonegorge Commonwealth (Stonegorge). On the east bank lies Stonegorge's town of Grey Ferry, with a ferry crossing and a market shared by both banks. Many households on either bank have relatives on the other, and the villages of the west bank buy most of their salt, fuel and medicine at the Grey Ferry market.
The Republic of the Sandbars is not within the Three-Borders Cooperation System. The system was formed under the Three-Borders Compact by three states, the United City-States of Ends (UCSE), the Nation Union of Telos (NUT) and the Democratic Republic of Purposes (DRP); Stonegorge joined in the autumn of Year 14. Above the system there is no superior with force, and it sets none up; it has the Conference of Members, the Secretariat, a Petitions Committee that admits individual petitions, and the coordination and preparation of joint defense, and no forces of its own. The articles of the Three-Borders Compact, the organs of the system and the laws of the several states are examples set up by this series; this series does not claim that they are the best design.
In the autumn of Year 15, the National Assembly of the Sandbars passed the Port Revenue Unification Act, under which the port revenues of the three northern provinces were to be collected by the center and then redistributed; the assemblies of the three northern provinces resolved not to carry it out. In the winter, the President of the Sandbars set up the Committee for Republican Stability, declared the three northern provinces to be in a "state of stability," and set up the Stability Squads under the Committee. From the spring of Year 16, the Stability Squads carried out "sweeps" in the villages of the north: most adult men were taken away and held in eight "instruction camps," about forty thousand people by the end of Year 16; thirty-one villages along the river in West Shoal Province were burned; there were executions. The system's Secretariat compiled the statements of those who had come to the east bank of the Grey River and to the NUT's Northern District; by the end of Year 16, the dead who could be identified by name numbered at least six thousand eight hundred. The government in the capital, Whitewall, said: "Stability operations have eliminated four hundred twelve agitators."
People went out. Some fled to the east bank by the ferry crossings and shallows of the Grey River, some fled over the land border to the NUT's Northern District, and some left by fishing boat across the Mirror Sea. By the winter of Year 16, there were about two hundred ten thousand in Stonegorge, about ninety thousand in the NUT's Northern District, and about six thousand who had reached the UCSE by sea; by the end of Year 17, the cumulative arrivals in the three were about three hundred forty thousand, two hundred twenty thousand and twelve thousand respectively, and another two thousand one hundred or so had reached the DRP by sea. Those who drowned in the Grey River in Year 16, or were shot dead while crossing it, number about one thousand one hundred in the Secretariat's compilation.
Two doors were open. Stonegorge set up the Grey Ferry camp north of the town of Grey Ferry, with a design capacity of fifty thousand; at its fullest, in the autumn of Year 16, it held about one hundred forty thousand people. The NUT's Council for External Affairs decided, 5 to 0, that the Northern District's border would stay open, and set up two reception points, at North Gate and at Sand Ridge. Article 4(2) of the Compact sets down one commitment of the members: those who come to a member's door are not pushed back to a place where they would face killing, torture or detention without trial. The members accordingly pushed no one back. In the summer of Year 16, the Secretary-General wrote to the Whitewall government, asking about the number and whereabouts of those in the instruction camps and about the condition of the burned villages. The Whitewall Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied: "This is an internal affair of the Republic. The system is not the Republic's superior, and the Republic is not a member of the system." The letter and the reply were made public under Article 9 of the Compact and are kept by the Secretariat.
In the autumn, the Grey Ferry camp was twice shelled from the west bank of the Grey River; twenty-three people died, nine of them children. The Whitewall government said: "What was hit were armed elements who had crossed the border; northern armed men are hiding in the camp." The record of Stonegorge's Coastal Guard is that since the spring it had confiscated weapons from, and disarmed, about one hundred forty people at the crossings. The Secretariat sent staff to the camp for two days, and their report reads: "Over these two days, no weapons were seen inside the camp." The Conference of Members recorded the two shellings, 4 to 0.
At the extraordinary session after the shelling, Stonegorge's Chief of the Commonwealth proposed: "Stonegorge and the willing members will enter fifteen kilometers into the west bank of the Grey River and protect the corridor from the villages of West Shoal Province to Grey Ferry." The three members each answered for themselves. The UCSE's permanent representative said: "The UCSE can provide air-defense radar and prepositioned logistics on the camp's side; the UCSE will not enter the territory of the Sandbars." The NUT's permanent representative said: "The NUT will take part in no action that enters the Sandbars; the door of the NUT's Northern District is open." The DRP's permanent representative said: "The Republic opposes any action that enters the Sandbars. This is the Sandbars' internal strife." The Chief of the Commonwealth did not put the proposal to a vote, nor lay before the Commonwealth Chamber a bill for entering alone. After this, the UCSE's Office of Trade approved the sale of two radar sets to Stonegorge. In the winter of Year 16, Stonegorge moved the camp twelve kilometers east, to Eastfield, out of the range of the guns. About twenty thousand people did not want to move and stayed near Grey Ferry, saying they would wait by the river for their relatives on the other bank.
This matter falls on several groups of people: those who came to the east bank of the Grey River and to the NUT's Northern District; those still on the west bank who cannot reach the border, and those who died crossing the river; those in the camp who were shelled, and the twenty thousand who stayed near Grey Ferry after the camp moved east. There are two lines to look at. One is at the door: those who arrive are not pushed back to a place where they would face killing, torture or detention without trial. This is what the unified sentence (the Theory of the State Prequel, §8) looks like at the door, and Article 4(2) of the Compact has written it as a commitment of the members. The other is at the border: members do not enter the territory of any state by armed force (Compact, Article 4(1)), and rescue is divided by place. Before all this, the crossing and the market at Grey Ferry were shared by both banks; the Compact already had the three commitments of Article 4, the sharing of admission in Article 12, and the limit that clause 2 of Article 18 sets on the system's determinations: "This record is a public question and record; it constitutes no authorization, and no obligation on any member to deploy."
What this paper asks is this: when people outside the system come out of a state, what must the system and its members do, and what can they do; when people cannot get out, how far can armed force go, and where does what it cannot reach fall? The main-line sentence of this series says that toward people outside the system, the system creates conditions for cultivation, and does not enter other states to decide on behalf of the people there (the Prequel, §5). On the two banks of the Grey River, this sentence has to land in a concrete shape: how the door opens, how far it opens, and what becomes of the people across the river.
The paper proceeds in eleven sections. §1 says what creating conditions for the cultivation of people outside the system means: for those who can get out, it is first of all making their exit real. §2 and §3 treat the door, first a journalist who fled, then a person who has crossed the line. §4 treats the system's sharing and destinations, and §5 says that those who leave are not instruments. §6 divides rescue into must and can. §7 and §8 divide by place: guarding the line on this state's own side, entering another state, and entering by invitation are three slots kept apart, and the cost is written down. §9 divides intervention from assistance, and §10 says that while internal strife is not yet decided, outside force does not intervene. §11 converses with Kant's Fifth Preliminary Article. Conventions follow the Prequel; wherever judgment is required, the paper speaks in the normative layer, the rule layer and the judgment layer, following the Prequel, §11. Toward other states this paper writes no ought; it writes only how the system and its members treat them.
§1 The Door Is Open
The system cannot enter the Sandbars to decide on behalf of the people there; what, then, can it still do for the people of the Sandbars? The sentence "creates conditions for the cultivation of people outside the system," if it does not land on some concrete place, is only a good intention. This section looks for where it lands.
The starting point is in the Theory of the State. The Theory of the State says that exit can only be lateral: "someone who leaves a state has no layer above to go with him, and can only enter another peer, and only if that peer takes him in." (Theory of the State Paper 1, §5) It also says: "Individual exit is not sealed off by the state." (Theory of the State N13) Put together, the two sentences give a person's situation when he leaves a state. If he wants to leave, his home state cannot seal off this road for him; but once he has left, there is no higher place overhead waiting for him, only another state, and whether that state receives him is not up to him. The right to leave is his own; whether leaving becomes real depends on the door at the other end.
So, for people outside the system, creating conditions for cultivation lands at the exit end: those who come out have somewhere to be received. Cultivation is providing the conditions for a person's growth without deciding for him what he is to become. For a person caught between the instruction camps and the burning villages, the conditions for growth are, first of all, staying alive and getting out. The system cannot reach the village where he is; what it can do is see to it that when he reaches the river, there is an open door on the other bank.
A single state can take this step. The door of the NUT's Northern District stayed open, and Stonegorge set up a camp at Grey Ferry; for those who came to these two doors, exit has already become real. What does the system add? Not the first door, but more than one door: several destinations, continuing sharing among the members, and channels by which people can move on from one door to another destination. The Moral Law has said why a single shelter is fragile: "A single shelter under the 14DD-dominant framework is fragile"; "Networks of shelters add resilience" (Moral Law P9 §4.2). There it speaks of communities; here it is extended to a system of cooperation (own undertaking). The Grey Ferry camp is exactly what relying on a single door looks like: a design capacity of fifty thousand, and at its fullest about one hundred forty thousand people living in it, 2.8 times its capacity. The door was open, and there was no room behind it. What the system has to do is see to it that exit does not rely on any single door.
Where the conditions are built must be said clearly. The door is open; those who come can be received and have somewhere to go; channels and comings and goings are not blocked: all of these lie on this side of the door, where the acts of the system and its members can reach. Whitewall says "internal affair"; the system can question Whitewall and can record (Paper 2), but it cannot send people into West Shoal Province to rebuild, on behalf of the people there, an environment for growth prescribed from outside. This section writes only of the conditions on this side of the door; entering another state to rebuild, on behalf of the people there, an environment for growth prescribed from outside is not taken as a realization of the main-line sentence. Whether something decides on behalf of people is checked by whose judgment, and which, is actually substituted after entry, and cannot be settled by place alone; non-war aid and guarding by invitation follow the boundaries drawn later (§§6, 8) and are not ruled out wholesale here. One group of people is not in this section: those still inside another state's territory but within the reach of the system's acts, such as the west-bank villagers reached by the system's sanctions. What the system owes them is the items of the unified sentence that do not diminish with relational thickness, written in §6; what this section speaks of is building conditions for those who can get out.
A further division must be made here. The outward clause of the main-line sentence states a direction, not a must. Under the direction, some things are musts and some are not. Not pushing back those who come to the door, and receiving them, is a must, written in §2 and §3. Sharing and destinations, channels among the members, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later are support the system can provide; they lie in the part that can be done, set up in §6 (XZ41). Placing these under can does not mean that the account of the system's own acts is lightened along with them: on whom the sanctions the system itself has made fall must be questioned and booked to the account all the same, and §6 states this as well.
The conditions must also be actually usable. Speaking of striving for, the Theory of Government says: "It is concerned with conditions, not with outcomes; 'concerned with conditions' does not cancel the requirement that the conditions be actually usable." (the Theory of Government Prequel, §8) It originally speaks of a construct toward its internal subjects; here it is extended to the conditions the system builds outward (own undertaking). Before writing "the door is open," one first asks whether there is room to stand behind the door. When the camp was crowded to 2.8 times its capacity, the door was still open, and whether the conditions were actually usable already had to be asked separately.
Why do these things for people outside the system? The Moral Law has given a diagnosis. It says: "No matter how deep the recognition radius among community members internally," if it does not extend outward across the boundary, it "constitutes only intensified intra-community mutual aid." (Moral Law P8 §2.3) A system that is good only to its own members does not count as heading in the 15DD direction. This paper reads this sentence only as a diagnosis, not as an obligation on members to admit people at the cost of their own survival: what the state at the door must receive is the items written in §2; what goes beyond them lies in the part that can be done, and when it cannot be sustained the cost is written down. The appendix of How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6) has an example in the same direction: "Nurturing must respect the nurtured civilization's right to autonomous choice; nurturing must not serve as a pretext for colonization." (F6, Appendix A, Article 15; a working demonstration; used only as an example) The same appendix also makes nurturing the default relational mode toward non-members; this branch this paper does not take. Toward what lies outside the system, the system only creates conditions for cultivation.
It may be said that receiving those who leave a state is taking a side in that state's internal strife; the wider the door opens, the more the home state is hollowed out, which amounts to using the door to change the order there. The weight of this objection is that flight really does change that state. Forty thousand people went into the instruction camps, more than three hundred thousand reached the east bank, and a whole swath of villages in the north stood empty. But leaving belongs to the own law of the one who leaves; it is not initiated by the admitting side; the home state cannot seal it off, nor did the admitting side open it on his behalf. Receiving him does not decide his direction for him; whether he goes back, and what he does if he does, is up to him (§5). The door is on this state's side, and the system has not entered another state. Whether a side has been taken depends on whether an act has judged on behalf of the people there; keeping a door open has judged on behalf of no one.
Here one point can be set against Rawls. According to the summary in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "John Rawls" (by L. Wenar, revised 2025), Rawls holds that well-ordered peoples have a duty of assistance toward burdened societies, assistance that continues until the other society can manage its own affairs and has become well-ordered, after which there is no further distributive demand (tier C, paraphrased, per §§5.5–5.6 of that entry). This series reads it thus: where they agree, there is a cut-off point, and assistance does not turn into taking over; where they part is on whose institutions the goal falls. Rawls's assistance takes as its goal that the other society grow into a well-ordered one; this series' conditions are built only where the system's acts can reach, take as their goal nothing about what the other's institutions grow into, and do not on that account yield a general positive duty of outward assistance (§6). What this rests on goes no further than a secondhand summary; this is a division of scope, not a refutation.
One thing is left here. For those who cannot reach the door, an open door is of no use: those still in the villages of West Shoal Province who cannot cross the river, and the roughly one thousand one hundred who died crossing it. Where they fall, §8 writes down as it stands.
XZ37 Creating conditions for the cultivation of people outside the system means, for those who can get out, first of all making their exit real. Someone who leaves a state has no layer above to go with him, and can only enter another peer, and only if that peer takes him in (Theory of the State Paper 1, §5); individual exit is not sealed off by the state (Theory of the State N13). A single state can make exit real for those who come to its door; what the system adds is several destinations, and continuing sharing and channels among the members, so that exit does not rely on any single door (Moral Law P9 §4.2 says that a single shelter is a single point of failure; extended from communities to a system of cooperation; own undertaking). The conditions are built where the system's acts can reach: the door is open, those who come can be received and have somewhere to go, and channels and comings and goings are not blocked; it does not enter other states to decide the direction of growth for the people there. This proposition unfolds only the side of the door: whether something decides on behalf of people is checked by whose judgment, and which, is actually substituted after entry, and is not settled by place alone; non-war aid and guarding by invitation are each checked by the corresponding sections of this paper (XZ41, XZ42). Those still inside another state's territory and within the reach of the system's acts follow the unified sentence (system level, Paper 2, §6); see §6. The outward clause of the main-line sentence states a direction, not a must: within it, not pushing back those who come to the door, and receiving them, is a must (XZ38); sharing and destinations, channels among the members, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later are support the system can provide, in the part that can be done (XZ41); placing them under can does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts. It is concerned with conditions, and the conditions must be actually usable (the Theory of Government Prequel, §8; own undertaking). Recognition within that does not extend outward across the boundary is only intensified internal mutual aid (Moral Law P8 §2.3); this sentence is a diagnosis, and is not read as an obligation on members to admit people at their own cost.
§2 Those at the Door
The place of the door is a must. How far the must reaches, and what gives it, is seen first in one person's case.
A journalist, a woman holding Sandbars citizenship, worked for a daily newspaper in Sandmouth, the port city of Sandmouth Province in the north. From the summer of Year 16 she reported on the instruction camps, publishing photographs taken outside the camps and interviews with those who had fled. In the autumn, the Stability Committee issued a warrant for her arrest under Article 31 of the Public Order Act; that article covers "spreading rumors and disturbing stability," and carries three to seven years' imprisonment. In the winter she went by fishing boat to the harbor at Gorgemouth in Stonegorge, then flew on her own Sandbars passport to Rivermouth City in the UCSE, where she applied for asylum at the airport; the Office of Entry and Asylum issued her a temporary stay permit. The Sandbars Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the UCSE's Office of External Affairs requesting her surrender under the two states' Treaty on Extradition and Judicial Assistance: "Spreading rumors is an ordinary criminal offense, not a political offense." At the same time, the Sandbars placed an exit ban on her parents, who had stayed in Sandmouth, and her younger brother was detained for thirty days and then released.
In the summer of Year 17, the Office of Entry and Asylum granted asylum. The Office of External Affairs replied by note: "Article 4 of the Treaty: there is no extradition for political offenses. Under Article 4(2) of the Compact, the UCSE does not push back those who come to its door to a place where they would face detention without trial." The Secretariat entered the note and the reply in the Records Room. During questions in the Chamber of Citizens, a member said: "The UCSE's own National Security Act has an article on 'spreading false information endangering national security.' The Sandbars uses the same wording; what do we answer them with?" The Executive for External Affairs answered: "This matter is handled under the Treaty and the Entry and Asylum Act."
This matter falls on her, and also on her parents and younger brother who stayed in Sandmouth. The line to look at is at the door: she is not pushed back to a place where she would face detention without trial; where the home state demands return on the ground of dissent, she is not handed over, a point §5 reads. Before this, there was a treaty on extradition and judicial assistance between the UCSE and the Sandbars, and the treaty itself says that there is no extradition for political offenses; before the warrant, she reported on the instruction camps in the Sandmouth daily.
Where does the must at the door come from? The Theory of the State extended the unified sentence to the border: "Those at the door are in the interior. Of those who come to the border, those whom this state's refusal of entry, return or detention reaches and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are, as regards these acts, in this state's interior, following the unified sentence" (Theory of the State N15). At the moment she was at the airport in Rivermouth City, the UCSE's refusal of entry and return bore directly on her, and she had no way to avoid them by exiting: going back meant the warrant. As regards these acts, she is in the UCSE's interior. Being in the interior does not on that account give her membership; what it gives her is the items of the unified sentence: not being pushed back, being able to ask, and suffering no retaliation for asking. This is the must of the unified sentence; it does not diminish with distance, nor with which state's passport she holds.
Article 4(2) of the Compact wrote this item into a covenant. The covenant is a commitment the members have acknowledged; it is not the source of this item; without this provision, the items at the door would stand all the same. Conversely, a covenant the members make separately among themselves cannot reduce it either. In a case of return, the Theory of the State said: "that the compact exists does not reduce the several things the UCSE owes these fourteen at its door." (Theory of the State Paper 3, §5) The same reasoning, extended to sharing and return arrangements among members, Paper 1 has already set up: a covenant carries nothing across the line (Paper 1, §4; XZ4).
What, then, of the treaty in the Sandbars' hands? It is a covenant both states have acknowledged, and surrender and judicial assistance as such belong to ordinary cooperation. But if the treaty would require a state to hand someone at its door over to a place where he would face detention without trial, that stretch the treaty cannot carry. Whether her case falls in that stretch, and whether "spreading rumors" counts as a political offense, is judged by the UCSE in its positions: the Office of Entry and Asylum granted asylum, the Office of External Affairs replied by note, and the reasons are public and can be questioned. The Secretariat's entering the note and the reply in the Records Room is only registration; it does not judge on the UCSE's behalf (Compact, Article 9). Which side the facts point to, §5 reads by the norm.
Long-term arrangements are another matter. Since being granted asylum she has held a residence permit renewed every three years; under the UCSE's Membership Act, ten years of lawful residence in its territory qualifies a person to apply for naturalization; under the Membership Registry's internal guidelines, lawful residence is counted from the date asylum is granted, so the earliest she can apply is the summer of Year 27. Renewal every three years and naturalization after ten are both set by the UCSE's law and left to the judgment of the UCSE's political leaders in their positions; the account falls on positions and persons. Theory of the State N14 gave a road, with a time limit, to acquiring membership, but that road is laid only for those holding no citizenship of any state, such as stateless persons born in this state's territory, or those who, stripped of citizenship by another state, have none to return to and have already been received by this state (Theory of the State Paper 3, §4). She still holds a Sandbars passport and is in none of those categories. This paper does not fit that road onto her, nor does it lay down another.
The door also has a "when." The Moral Law says: "Macroscopic phase transition requires waiting, but microscopic recognition is never delayed" (Moral Law P9 §2.7). There it says that the integral transformation of institutions must wait, and that 14DD is not to be overthrown by establishing tyranny; recognition in a concrete encounter does not wait. A person who arrives at the airport must be received at once, not after the situation in the Sandbars has come to some conclusion. Nor is any order set. The Theory of the State says that exit does not stand in for questioning, and at the same time that "there is no order requiring a person in danger to exhaust other channels before leaving" (Theory of the State N37). She need not first go through every appeal in the courts of the Sandbars before she may apply for asylum in Rivermouth City.
The member asked what to answer the Sandbars with. The answer lies not in how the charge is worded but in the act. That the laws of the two states have a similar article does not show that the two states have done the same thing; what must be looked at is what the article is used to pursue. How the UCSE's own article is used is questioned inside the UCSE, and questions in the Chamber of Citizens are one such place.
It may be said that the extradition treaty is a covenant both states have acknowledged, that refusing surrender is a breach of it, and that the must at the door cannot be set off against a covenant. The weight of this objection is that covenants must be kept; the very ground of the system is that a covenant requires the consent of all parties (Paper 1, XZ1). But a covenant carries nothing across the line, and the items at the door are not something added to the treaty from outside; that treaty itself has a clause saying there is no extradition for political offenses, and it is precisely this clause that the reply of the Office of External Affairs cites. Keeping the covenant and not pushing back are not in conflict in this matter. If there is a conflict, it lies only in the stretch where the treaty is read as requiring a state to hand a person over to detention without trial, and that stretch was never within the range any covenant can carry.
The tradition has several accounts of the limits of admission. Each answers its own question; here they are compared one by one, not arranged on a single axis running from thin to thick.
Theory of the State Paper 7, §5 has already conversed with Kant's hospitality. The host "can turn him away, so long as this can be done without his ruin" (my translation; Dieser kann ihn abweisen, wenn es ohne seinen Untergang geschehen kann; Zum ewigen Frieden, Second Section, Third Definitive Article, per the first edition, Nicolovius, 1795, Project Gutenberg EBook #46873; compared with the English translation by M. C. Smith, EBook #50922; tier A); the second half of the same sentence is that, so long as the newcomer behaves peaceably, he is not to be met with hostility. Where they agree: those who arrive are not met with hostility. Where they part: this series' must is written down to three concrete things, not pushing back to killing, torture or detention without trial, and adds the road of questioning that comes with being in the interior as regards admission.
Grotius says: "Nor ought a permanent residence to be refused to foreigners, who, driven from their own country, seek a place or refuge." (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 2, §16, per A. C. Campbell's abridged English translation, 1901, Project Gutenberg EBook #46564; Latin original not checked; tier B) The condition is that they observe the laws of the place and stir up no disorder, and they have no right to demand a share in its government (same section, paraphrased). He also cites Strabo to the effect that driving out those who seek refuge is the practice of barbarians. Where they agree: driving out those who seek refuge is not permissible. Where they part is on long-term arrangements: Grotius, philosophically, allowed permanent residence and attached conditions to it; this series sets no long-term arrangement at the normative layer, leaving it to the admitting state's own law, nor does it lay down a separate road with a time limit. How those who come speak and act in the admitting state belongs to their own law (§5), and is not governed by conditions such as "stirring up no disorder."
Vattel's account can only be paraphrased here. According to the online English translation of The Law of Nations, bk. I, ch. 19, §§229–231 (the Chitty edition; tier C), he says that those who are driven out do not thereby lose the right to dwell somewhere on the earth; this right is in general perfect, but imperfect with respect to each particular state, and each state may refuse on the strength of its own situation. Where they agree: those who leave must have somewhere to go. Where they part is at the place of the door: the must at the door that this series speaks of holds for every state; the "imperfect with respect to each particular state" that Vattel leaves, this series does not rely on any one state to make up; it has the system see to it that exit does not rely on any single door (§1).
What is left here is the ten years before long-term status, which this series does not judge.
When a person who has crossed the line reaches the door, whether the place of the door still holds is answered in the next section; XZ38 is stated in full at the end of §3.
§3 When Those Who Crossed the Line Reach the Door
The journalist was demanded back because of what she wrote. If the person demanded has himself crossed the line, does the door still open? This question did not arise on the Grey River; a case is supposed here.
Suppose that in the spring of Year 18, when the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth already controlled the northern half of West Shoal Province, a commander of the Stability Squads in the northern half of West Shoal Province, a man holding Sandbars citizenship, crossed the Grey River at the shallows south of Grey Ferry with two of his subordinates, handed over his weapons to Stonegorge's Coastal Guard, and applied for asylum. The north's self-rule and the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth are written in §10. The Coastal Guard sent the three to the Eastfield camp to be registered. On the third day after registration, people in the camp from several villages along the river in West Shoal Province recognized him and said that he had led the squad when their villages were burned in the spring of Year 16. Dozens of people surrounded his tent; the Coastal Guard moved him to one of its posts outside the camp and lodged him apart from the camp. In the compilation the Secretariat made from the statements of those who came to the east bank, fourteen statements mention his name. He is one of the Stability Squad commanders listed in Common Measure No. 2; that measure freezes the assets held in each member by the members of the Stability Committee and by individual Stability Squad commanders (§6), and his deposit in a bank at Gorgemouth had been frozen under it since the summer of Year 16.
Two parties came for him. The Whitewall government sent a note to Stonegorge asking for his return: "He is an officer who deserted his post, to be tried by the Stability Committee's military tribunal under the Military Regulations for the State of Stability." The military tribunal does not sit in public; the maximum penalty under those regulations for desertion of post is death. Between Stonegorge and the Sandbars there is no covenant on extradition. In the summer of Year 18, the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth wrote to Stonegorge asking that he be handed over to the "Northern Special Tribunal" it had set up, to be tried for the burning of the villages along the river in West Shoal Province, and stating that "the Special Tribunal tries cases in public, and the accused may choose his own counsel." Between Stonegorge and the Provisional Assembly there is no covenant of any kind. The opinion of Stonegorge's Legal Affairs Office was: "Stonegorge's criminal law covers offenses within Stonegorge's territory and offenses against persons holding Stonegorge citizenship. The burning of the villages took place inside the Sandbars, and those harmed were people of the Sandbars; Stonegorge's courts cannot try it." When Stonegorge's exit from the system took effect in the winter of Year 18, his asylum application had still not been decided. How Stonegorge handled it after that, this supposed case does not suppose.
This matter falls on him and his two subordinates, and also on those in the camp who recognized him. Two lines are to be looked at: at the door, no one is pushed back to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial; what he did in his position remains on his account. Before this, there was no covenant on extradition between Stonegorge and the Sandbars, and no covenant of any kind with the Provisional Assembly; Stonegorge's criminal law covers only offenses within its territory and offenses against its own citizens; his deposit had already been frozen.
It is easy here to go to one of two extremes. One says that a person who has crossed the line does not deserve the protection of the door, and should simply be handed over. The other says that asylum is asylum: once he reaches the door, what went before is wiped out at a stroke. Both tie the door and the account together: either the door is given up for the sake of the account, or the account is given up for the sake of the door. This paper keeps the two apart, gives two directions, and lays down no rule.
Direction One: not pushing back at the door holds for everyone. A person who has crossed the line and reaches the door is not pushed back to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial either. The ground is still the unified sentence. The unified sentence says that those whom this state's refusal of entry, return or detention reaches, and who have no way to avoid it by exiting, are, as regards these acts, in this state's interior; it draws no line by the conduct of those who come. This is a must, and it is the same door as the journalist's in §2. The scene in the camp sets this out plainly: dozens of people surrounded his tent, and the Coastal Guard moved him out of the camp and lodged him apart. The must at the door holds for him, and it holds for those who surrounded him too. What the Coastal Guard protected was that he not be lynched, and also that the people in the camp not cross their own line in their anger.
Direction Two: asylum does not write off the account. What he did along the river in West Shoal Province remains on his account. The Theory of the State set up the minimum content of booking the account: "decisions and reasons made public, records attributed to particular positions and persons" (Theory of the State N39). The orders he gave in his position are recorded under his name; crossing a river and changing states does not erase this entry. Speaking of remainder, Institution Theory says: "past residue is not written off by closing off questioning" (Institution Theory Z35a). There it speaks of an institution closing off questioning; here it is extended to an admitting state granting asylum (own undertaking): what asylum closes is the door of return, not the door of questioning. So the admitting state neither hands him over to the place Direction One bars, nor lets asylum erase the account of his earlier acts. Whether to prosecute follows specific law and acknowledged covenants; where prosecution is decided on according to law, he is tried by this state where it has jurisdiction, or handed over, by an applicable procedure, to a place that can try him fairly and keeps to Direction One. Not prosecuting does not on that account erase the record or close off questioning.
By these two directions, the three roads are looked at one by one.
Handing him to Whitewall. What Whitewall wants to try is desertion of post, not the burning of the villages; the account for the burning does not land there. The military tribunal does not sit in public, and the maximum penalty is death. Whether handing him over would land precisely in the place Direction One bars is judged by Stonegorge in its positions; this paper reads the facts by the norm, and what it reads is this: this road does not land the account for the burning, and it carries the risk of falling into the place Direction One bars.
Trial in this state. Stonegorge's Legal Affairs Office says it cannot be tried: the offense was not within its territory, and those harmed are not its citizens. This is the present state of Stonegorge's law. This series gives directions and leaves the details to specific law; whether Stonegorge changes its criminal law to cover offenses of this kind abroad is Stonegorge's own affair, and this series does not change it on Stonegorge's behalf.
Handing him to the Northern Special Tribunal at Sandmouth. The Provisional Assembly says that the Special Tribunal tries cases in public and that the accused may choose his own counsel; but whether it can try fairly is not settled by the requesting side's own report. There is one further concern: Sandmouth is one side in an internal strife not yet decided (§10); would handing a person over to it be read as taking a side in that strife? The concern is real, but no separate norm need be laid down to bar it. Not intervening in another state's internal strife is laid down with regard to armed force: it speaks of sending forces in and fighting there for one side (§9). Handing a person over for trial is another matter and belongs to ordinary cooperation. The concern about taking sides is handled at the rule layer.
By the three layers of the Prequel, §11, this matter is taken layer by layer. The normative layer has only the two directions above, with nothing added. The rule layer is check items that can be suggested, written out as examples, without claiming to be the best: under "a place that can try him fairly," whether the trial is public and whether the accused can choose his own counsel; where the requesting side is one side of an internal strife not yet decided, the instrument of surrender states that it does not acknowledge that side's claim to the whole, written in the same way as when one side of a split is admitted (Paper 1, §8). As for not handing him over to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial, that is Direction One itself, at the normative layer, and not a check item that can be weighed. The judgment layer: when this case comes, whether to hand him over, and to whom, is judged by those in Stonegorge's positions, the reasons are public, and the account falls on positions and persons. This paper does not make this judgment on Stonegorge's behalf.
Here a covenant changes only the procedure. Covenants on surrender and judicial assistance are ordinary cooperation; the stretch that would require a state to hand a person over to a place where he would face detention without trial, a covenant cannot carry (§2; Paper 1, §4). Between the UCSE and the Sandbars there is a covenant, between Stonegorge and the Sandbars there is none; whether there is a covenant or not changes which procedure is followed, not the two directions.
Set him beside the journalist of §2, and the division becomes clearer. Both came from the Sandbars, and both were demanded by Whitewall. The door is the same for both: neither is pushed back to the place Direction One bars. What differs is Direction Two. What the journalist was demanded for was her reporting, and she carries no account of line-crossing; the commander does. Those in the camp who recognized him are the very other side of this account; those fourteen statements are records kept for booking the account later (§9). The door is the same for both, and the account differs between them; only by keeping the two apart does it make sense for both of them.
His application was undecided when Stonegorge's exit from the system took effect. What remains of the Compact after exit is answered in Paper 7, §3 (XZ47). Only one thing is said here: Direction One never rested on the Compact, but on the unified sentence; Stonegorge has exited the Compact, and the items at the door still rest on Stonegorge itself.
Grotius spoke of asylum and criminals. He says that the benefits of asylum "are designed only for those, who are the victims of unmerited persecution, not for those who have committed crimes injurious to mankind, and destructive to society." (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 21, §5, same translation; tier B); such criminals "ought either to be punished, or delivered up, or, at least, ordered to withdraw." (same section) Where they agree: criminals are not to escape the account by way of asylum, and this is exactly Direction Two. They part at two points. At one, this series adds a limit: surrender may not be to a place where there is no fair trial, or where he would face killing or detention without trial; if "ordering him to withdraw" pushes him to such a place, that too is pushing back. At the other, Grotius gives three roads to choose among, punishing, surrendering and ordering to withdraw; this series lays down no such rule, gives only the two directions, and leaves the details to specific law.
It may be said that if asylum is given to those who committed violence, the door becomes a safe haven, and a man who burned villages is safe once he crosses a river. The weight of this objection is that this is exactly the scene the people in the camp saw, and their anger has its reasons. But this objection ties the door and the account together. Direction Two answers precisely this: asylum does not write off the account, the account remains on him, and the record is kept; the admitting state does not send him back to his death, nor does it let him walk away clean.
Direction Two speaks of a person who has crossed the line reaching the door. It can be extended to the general case: when a person in a state's position has crossed the line, whether or not he has reached another state's door, peers may pursue him. The companion study to the Theory of the State, The Reverse Phase Transition, handed this matter here: "A peer pursuing, under its own law, the people in that state's positions is handed to specific law and to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation." (The Reverse Phase Transition, §5) The original sentence speaks of a state that has slid back and has not been stopped; here it is extended to the general case, whether or not that state is such a state, and whether or not it is in the system (own undertaking). Pursuit is each state's own act, following each state's own law and acknowledged covenants. Stonegorge's Legal Affairs Office says its criminal law does not reach offenses of this kind abroad; that is the present state of its law, and whether to change it is up to Stonegorge itself, as was said above; surrender and judicial assistance go by the covenants acknowledged between the two states, and the stretch a covenant cannot carry across the line it still cannot carry (§2). The system sets up no organ of prosecution and does not decide for the states who should be prosecuted; what it can give is the record. The compilation the Secretariat made from the statements of those who came to the east bank, and the names listed in Common Measure No. 2, are all in the system's record, and the states can use them when they pursue. Pursuit also guards the line: neither surrender nor transfer is ever to a place where the person would face killing, torture or detention without trial; this is Direction One, and it holds for pursuit as well. Whether to prosecute is not settled by the account either. The companion study says: "That the account is not written off does not mean there must be prosecution; writing it off, that is, erasing the record and forbidding later questions, is not permitted." (The Reverse Phase Transition, N46) Whether to prosecute and whether to pardon are left to specific law and to the judgment of those in positions; what is not permitted is erasing the record and closing off later questions.
One thing is left here: if prosecution is decided on according to law, but there is neither a usable route for trial in this state nor a route of transfer that keeps to Direction One, what has not yet landed is this item of judicial handling. It is registered as a remainder, as it stands; the record and being questioned do not disappear on that account.
XZ38 At the door of any state, no one is pushed back; this lands in the member states. Of those who come to the border, those whom this state's refusal of entry, return or detention reaches and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are, as regards these acts, in this state's interior, following the unified sentence (Theory of the State N15). In the state that receives them, they are in its interior as regards admission: not pushed back, able to ask, and suffering no retaliation for asking. This is a must, and it does not diminish with distance; covenants among members cannot reduce it (Paper 1, XZ4). Those at the door are received at once; microscopic recognition does not wait (Moral Law P9 §2.7); there is no order requiring a person in danger to exhaust other channels before leaving (Theory of the State N37). Long-term arrangements are left to the admitting state's own law and to the judgment of political leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons; the road with a time limit of Theory of the State N14 is laid only for those holding no citizenship, and is not fitted onto everyone who flees. When a person who has crossed the line reaches the door, two directions are given, and no rule is laid down. Direction One, that not pushing back at the door holds for everyone: a person who has crossed the line and reaches the door is not pushed back to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial either (the unified sentence). Direction Two, that asylum does not write off the account: what he did in his position remains on his account (Theory of the State N39); the admitting state neither hands him over to the place Direction One bars, nor lets asylum erase this account; whether to prosecute follows specific law and acknowledged covenants, and where prosecution is decided on according to law, he is tried by this state where it has jurisdiction, or handed over, by an applicable procedure, to a place that can try him fairly and keeps to Direction One; not prosecuting does not on that account erase the record or close off questioning. The two directions are at the normative layer; not handing him over to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial is Direction One itself, at the normative layer, and is not a check item that can be weighed. At the rule layer, check items can be suggested as examples: a place that can try him fairly, the trial public, the accused able to choose his own counsel; where the requesting side is one side of an internal strife not yet decided, the instrument of surrender states that it does not acknowledge that side's claim to the whole; the concern about taking sides is handled at the rule layer. When a case comes, whether to hand over, and to whom, is judged by those in the admitting state's positions, the reasons are public, and the account falls on positions and persons. Direction Two extended to the general case (own undertaking): peers pursuing the people in a state's positions is each state's own act, following each state's own law and acknowledged covenants; the system sets up no organ of prosecution and does not decide for the states who should be prosecuted, and the system's record can be used by the states; pursuit also guards the line, never handing over to a place where the person would face killing, torture or detention without trial; that the account is not written off does not mean there must be prosecution (The Reverse Phase Transition, N46). For covenants on surrender and judicial assistance, see Paper 1, XZ4; the details are left to specific law.
§4 Destinations Do Not Sort People
Once people have been received at the door, next comes where they go. More than three hundred thousand people reached the east bank; one camp could not hold them, and one state could not carry them for long. The system's sharing comes on stage here; and it is precisely here that sharing most easily turns into allocating people.
Article 12 of the Compact wrote the sharing of admission into a covenant. What is shared is the members' shares, that is, funds and places for transfer, apportioned by the formula in Annex III of the Compact: forty percent by population, forty percent by output, and twenty percent as an offset for the number already admitted. The same article says: "Sharing does not decide for those who arrive where they are to settle." The Conference of Members makes sharing decisions each year. Sharing Decision No. 1, in the summer of Year 16, allotted 960 million accounting units in funds; Sharing Decision No. 2, in the winter, added tents and fuel for the winter; Sharing Decision No. 3, in the spring of Year 17, was the first to include places for transfer.
Sharing Decision No. 3 was made by the Conference of Members, 4 to 0: thirty thousand people were to be transferred from the Eastfield camp that year, with places of sixteen thousand for the UCSE, eight thousand for the DRP and six thousand for the NUT; the NUT, having already admitted about one hundred ninety thousand people, received an offset under the formula. Those eligible for transfer were people registered in the camp for six months; which state each would go to was decided by lot, household by household; adult children counted as separate households. The decision contains this sentence: "Those drawn who refuse the result of the lot lose eligibility for transfer that year and remain in the camp." The explanation of the Admission-Sharing Office was: "The lot allocates places, not people; those drawn may refuse."
In the camp, forty-six households, two hundred fourteen people, had relatives in the NUT's Northern District but were drawn for the UCSE or the DRP. Thirty-one of these households refused and lost that year's eligibility. In nine households, adult children and their parents were drawn for different states. In the summer of Year 17, one hundred three of these two hundred fourteen people petitioned the Petitions Committee under clause 3 of Article 14 of the Compact against Sharing Decision No. 3 itself, and the Committee decided, 5 to 2, to take up the petition. In the winter, the Committee's opinion asked the Conference of Members to explain how the provision "refusing the result of the lot means losing eligibility for transfer" stands together with Article 12 of the Compact, "sharing does not decide for those who arrive where they are to settle," and asked that families be taken into account in allocation. In the spring of Year 18, the Conference of Members made Sharing Decision No. 4, 4 to 0: adult children may join their parents as one household; those who refuse the result of the lot keep their eligibility for the following year. Brothers and sisters are still not joined as one household. At the session, Stonegorge's permanent representative said: "The camp is in Stonegorge, and those who stay are in Stonegorge too." The side on which the system itself is questioned has already been written in Paper 2, §7; what is looked at here is what fell on those two hundred fourteen people.
Not pushing back at the door is a must, already set up in §2 and §3; sharing, destinations among the members, and records lie in the part that can be done, written in full in §6. Only one point is made here first: can does not mean optional. Once sharing has been written into a covenant with the consent of all parties, it is a commitment in the covenant, and what is not paid in is recorded as it stands and questioned. The DRP paid in neither its Year 16 nor its Year 17 share, and of the eight thousand places for transfer in Year 17 it received not one; the system's record records only these two acts, not what kind of state the DRP is (Paper 3, §3).
What does sharing divide? It divides the shares and conditions the states take on: money, places, tents, fuel. When it comes down to each person, the person chooses where to settle; the system does not allocate it. Speaking of the ending of war, the War Treatise has a sentence that governs a matter of the same form: "Separation is a matter between the war-parties, not a sorting or confining of persons: it does not decide for either side's people who belongs where or who must move where" (War Treatise §15). It originally speaks of separation between two war-parties; here it is extended to the system's sharing (own undertaking). The step of extension changes the subject term: the one deciding changes from the war-parties to the positions that make sharing decisions in the common procedure, that is, the Conference of Members and the members voting in it; those protected are the people in the camp; the account falls on the Conference of Members and on the members who voted, and Article 3 of the Compact requires every document to state how each member voted. The extension goes through because the reason for that sentence lies not in war but in persons: where a person goes, and with whom, is his own affair; if a position outside settles it for him, it has judged on his behalf. The Moral Law says that the forming of a collective is like this too: "Collective formation is constituted by individual choice" (Moral Law P8 §5.1).
"The person chooses" must be read precisely. It says that the system and its members do not move people about as shares, and do not coerce anyone into going to a given state. It does not say that every person has a right to choose any state: whether each state accepts people, and how it arranges things in the long term, follows each state's own law (§2). Not pushing back at the door remains a must, and is a different matter from the choice here.
Read that drawing of lots in this way. The lot itself divides places and does not sort people: thirty thousand places had to be divided among three states, drawing lots by household is one fair way of dividing them, and the Office's explanation is not wrong either. Refusal was allowed. But the cost of refusing was written into the decision: losing that year's eligibility and staying in the camp. On whom does this cost fall? On those who did not want to be separated: the forty-six households with relatives in the NUT's Northern District who were drawn elsewhere, and the nine households whose adult children and parents were drawn for two different states.
Here the whole series' criterion of force can be used. Force is substituting one's own judgment for the other party's judgment on its own affairs. In this matter, the party whose judgment might be substituted is those households in the camp; the judgment in question is where their family goes, and with whom. The result of the lot itself did not judge for them; they could refuse. But if refusing exacts a heavy price, so heavy that going is the only road left, that arrangement already comes close to judging for them. That they can still decide how to respond is not by itself grounds for finding that nothing has been substituted.
By the three layers of the Prequel, §11, this matter is taken layer by layer. The normative layer: no one is coerced into going to a given state; the room not to go must be actually usable, not merely written on paper; if the cost of refusing is so heavy that one can only go, it already comes close to coercion. The rule layer: how a sharing decision is written is an example. The drawing of lots by household and "refusal means losing that year's eligibility" in Sharing Decision No. 3, the joining of households and the keeping of the following year's eligibility in Sharing Decision No. 4, and that sentence of Article 12 of the Compact are all ways of writing at the rule layer, without claiming to be the best; several more could be suggested, such as priority for the state where a person has relatives, not splitting families, and not losing eligibility for refusing. The judgment layer: whether the room not to go is actually usable in a given arrangement, whether waiting a year is too heavy, whether it will do that brothers and sisters are not joined as one household, are judged by those in positions. Reading this matter by the norm: Sharing Decision No. 3 set the cost of refusing the result of the lot at losing eligibility for transfer for that year and remaining in the camp, and that cost fell on the thirty-one households who did not want to be separated from their relatives; this fact points to the side on which "whether the room to refuse is actually usable" must be questioned. Those who judged in this matter were the Committee, which took up the petition 5 to 2, and the Conference of Members, which made Sharing Decision No. 4, 4 to 0. Sharing Decision No. 4 made two changes in this direction; how far the changes must go to count as an answer is not decided by the questioning side alone (Paper 2, §§2, 8; XZ10, XZ15).
For this road of questioning, the four items are written out as the whole series writes them. Those who initiate it are the people in the camp, through the Petitions Committee. What it reaches is the Conference of Members' sharing decision. The Committee took up their questions 5 to 2, and the Conference of Members cannot close this questioning. When it fails, the account rests on the members who voted; Sharing Decisions No. 3 and No. 4 both state how each member voted.
"The person chooses" includes not leaving. When the camp moved east, about twenty thousand people did not want to move and stayed near Grey Ferry, saying they would wait by the river for their relatives on the other bank. They were not moved against their will; this is what it looks like when a choice is taken seriously. Those who stayed are still within the place of the door, and still within range of the guns across the river; how their safety is guarded, §7 writes.
Another two thousand one hundred or so made their own way by sea to ports in the south of the DRP, and the DRP gave them temporary stay. The must at the door holds in the DRP too, and the DRP received these people. The DRP asked that they be counted toward its offset; in the spring of Year 18, the Conference of Members decided to count them at half. How they are counted is, within the part that can be done, a matter for the parties to settle as agreed.
There is one more situation that did not occur in these years: a member state's own dissidents fleeing to another member state. That is a matter between members, and the system does not help the first state get the people back; sharing and destinations are set up for those who arrive, not for retrieving them. There is no record of this; this paper writes only the direction.
It may be said that since sharing has been written into a covenant, the places must land; if people can refuse, the places will never land, and one might as well divide the people along with them. The weight of this objection is that if sharing does not land, the camp stays crowded and the state at the door goes on carrying the load alone; this is a real cost. But what the covenant says is precisely that sharing does not decide for those who arrive where they are to settle. The part of the places that does not land is recorded as it stands; making it up by sorting people is shifting an account between states onto persons.
Two things are left here. One: arrangements of destination always leave misplacement on persons. Speaking of division, How Is Institution Possible listed four shapes of shortfall, "shortfall of intake, misplacement, dual belonging, and exclusion by judgment" (F6 §2); a household divided between two states is the misplacement among them, and is registered as it stands. The other: when shares are not paid in, transfer breaks off, and people remain in the state at the door (§6).
XZ39 The system's function of admission: not pushing back is a must; sharing, destinations and records are support it can provide; destinations do not sort people. In the system's function of admission, only not pushing back at the door of any state is a must; the sharing of admission, destinations among the members, and records are support the system can provide, and how far they are used is left to the political leaders in their positions. Placing them under can does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts; once sharing has been written into a covenant with the consent of all parties, it is a commitment in the covenant, and what is not paid in is recorded as it stands and questioned (Paper 1, XZ1); covenants of sharing among members cannot reduce the items owed to those at the door (Paper 1, XZ4). What is divided is the shares and conditions the states take on; when it comes down to each person, the person chooses where to settle, and the system does not allocate it: separation is not a sorting or confining of persons, and does not decide for either side's people who belongs where or who must move where (War Treatise §15, extended from two war-parties to the system's sharing; own undertaking). "The person chooses" says that the system and its members do not move people about as shares and do not coerce anyone into going to a given state; it does not say that every person has a right to choose any state; whether each state accepts people, and how it arranges things in the long term, follows each state's own law; not pushing back at the door remains a must. The room not to go must be actually usable, not merely written on paper; if the cost of refusing is so heavy that one can only go, it already comes close to coercion: this is the normative layer. How a sharing decision is written, for example drawing lots by household, the consequences of refusal and the scope of joined households, is an example at the rule layer; priority for the state where a person has relatives, not splitting families, and not losing eligibility for refusing can be suggested. Whether the room not to go is actually usable in a given arrangement is judged by those in positions; how far the changes must go to count as an answer is not decided by the questioning side alone (Paper 2, XZ10, XZ15). A member state's own dissidents fleeing to another member state is a matter between members, and the system does not help the first state get them back. Where the state at the door has received people as the must requires and the part that can be done has not come in behind it, the state at the door bears it alone; the part that has not come in is registered as a remainder, as it stands, and is not written up as though "the door is open" were already achieved.
§5 Those Who Leave Are Not Instruments
Once a person has been received, the admitting side has something more in its hands: a person who has come from the other side, who knows the affairs of the other side, and who may still want to go back. This section asks what the admitting side may do with this person.
The journalist again. In the autumn of Year 17, the UCSE's Office of Internal Security asked her to "provide a briefing on the situation in the Sandbars." She refused, saying: "I write for readers, not for any office." The Office of Internal Security did not ask her again; in the summer of Year 20, her residence permit was renewed for three years as usual. In the summer of Year 18, the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth asked her to come back as its spokesperson. She did not accept, and went on writing for the Sandmouth daily and for two newspapers in Rivermouth City.
Both requests came, and she refused both. The requests themselves do not cross the line: an office may ask a person to talk, and an assembly may ask a person to come back. The line is elsewhere: in whether admission is tied to working for someone. Receiving a person is not conditional on her working for anyone; asylum and residence are not affected by her refusal. In this matter, after the refusal she was not asked again, and her residence was renewed as usual; the facts stop on this side of the line. Had the renewal been held up on that account, or had the asylum procedure been traded for a briefing, that would have been using the door as a bargaining chip.
The grounds are in three places. Speaking of the reasons for starting a war, the War Treatise distinguishes two faces: the starting side's own cannot-not is the first face, and the suppressed people inside the other side are the second face; it sets up four gates against abuse of the second face, and the third says: "Genuine rising proceeds from the inside out; the outside can recognize it and can support it, but cannot manufacture it." (War Treatise §13) If those who leave want to change their home state, that is their own rising; the outside can see it and support it, but cannot make it for them. Speaking of protection, Institution Theory says: "Toward the protected party, it does not draw his lines for him; once the violation is blocked, it does not decide for him what he is to become." (Institution Theory Z19) The door blocked her return; once it was blocked, what kind of person she is to become, and for whom she writes, is not settled by the side that blocked it. Speaking of the posture of cultivation, Power Theory also says that the side exercising power at most hopes that the one it lifts up will develop, and does not will that he become some determinate shape (Power Theory P5 §V). The three places say the same thing: receiving a person is not acquiring a person.
The ground on which she was demanded is also read here. The Sandbars says that spreading rumors is an ordinary criminal offense. The charge may be worded so, but the judgment lies in the act. The warrant was issued after she reported on the instruction camps, under the article on "spreading rumors and disturbing stability," and the Sandbars' note too speaks of "spreading rumors"; what the facts point to is the reports she wrote. Read by the norm, this matter points to the side of dissent as the ground. Where the home state demands return on the ground of dissent, the person is not handed over. Article 4 of the Treaty, cited in the reply of the UCSE's Office of External Affairs, under which there is no extradition for political offenses, runs in the same direction. Those who judged in this matter were the UCSE's Office of Entry and Asylum and its Office of External Affairs; this paper does not render a separate final judgment on their behalf.
Her long-term status in the admitting state is set by the admitting state's law (§2). Only one sentence is added here: long-term status has nothing to do with whether she works for anyone. The residence renewed every three years renews her eligibility to remain, not a reward for her cooperation.
Going back, too, belongs to their own law. From the winter of Year 18, about sixty thousand people went back from the Eastfield camp to the north (Paper 1, §8). The admitting side does not decide for them whether to stay or go; going back of one's own accord is not being pushed back. What the place of the door bars is sending people back to a place where they would face killing, torture or detention without trial; it does not bar people from leaving on their own. Only when both staying and going are taken seriously is it not deciding for them.
Her parents were placed under an exit ban, and her younger brother was detained for thirty days. This part falls outside the system, inside the Sandbars. Article 14 of the Compact has a clause under which members take no adverse measures against petitioners or their relatives on account of a petition; that clause binds members, and the Sandbars is not among them. What the admitting state and the system can do about this part is all indirect: questioning, recording, withdrawing cooperation (Paper 1, §6; Paper 2, §1). This part is registered as a remainder, as it stands.
It may be said that the dissidents who have left are precisely the ones who can change the home state; if the admitting side really wants that state to do well, it should organize them, give them money and a platform, and send them back. The weight of this objection is that they may indeed be agents of change, and change in the home state does indeed depend on the people inside. But this objection mixes supporting with manufacturing. Support looks like this: the door is open, and their own law stands as before: what they write, whom they go with, whether they go back, is up to them. To decide their direction for them in the name of support is ghostwriting by an outsider. Institution Theory says it directly: "Once a condition carries the demand 'accept this direction of development,' it becomes ghostwriting by an outsider." (Institution Theory Z27) If admission carried such a condition, the door would no longer be a door.
Two things are left here: the part concerning her family; and, should her situation after her refusal change, it is questioned and recorded as it stands.
XZ40 Those who leave are not treated as instruments. Those who leave are not treated as instruments for going back to change the order there: a rising must proceed from the inside out, and the outside can recognize it and can support it, but cannot manufacture it (War Treatise §13); once the violation is blocked, it does not decide for the protected what they are to become (Institution Theory Z19). How they speak and act belongs to their own law, and the admitting side does not arrange it for them: receiving a person is not conditional on his working for anyone, and asylum and residence are not affected by refusal; going back also belongs to their own law, the admitting side does not decide for them whether to stay or go, and going back of one's own accord is not being pushed back. Where the home state demands return on the ground of dissent, the person is not handed over; whether the ground is dissent is seen from the act for which he is pursued, not from how the charge is worded. The long-term status of those who leave in the admitting state is set by the admitting state's law.
§6 Must and Can
The door has been written, and destinations have been written. Taking up rescue as a whole, one question has been hanging all along: what does the system have beyond a single state? Is what it has beyond a single state something the system must do, or something the system can do?
The Theory of the State handed this question over. Speaking of the two objects outward, it says: "For large-scale line-crossing inside another state, basic rights hold against everyone all the same (Theory of Government G17); what this state can do there, and must do, this paper does not write; it is handed to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation." (Theory of the State N25) What was handed over is two things, can and must.
The part that must be done is only the items the unified sentence already states, which do not diminish with distance. Those who come to the door and to the points of admission are not pushed back, and are received (§§2, 3). Those reached by the acts of this state and of the system, such as those reached by sanctions or by the blocking of channels, follow the unified sentence. Channels are not sealed. Speaking of relational thickness, Institution Theory says that a construct's relation to people is thick or thin, and that it explains, by that thickness, what it has given and what it has left; but "the first and fifth oughts, the 'not sealing the channels' half of the fourth, and the trigger of the second do not vary with it" (the Institution Theory Prequel, §7). The items that must be done are precisely the items that do not vary with thickness. So it is for a single state, and so it is for the system: following the unified sentence (system level, Paper 2, §6), those whom the system's acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting are, as regards those acts, in the system's interior.
On the two banks of the Grey River, the part that must be done has a ready case, and it is the system's own. In the summer of Year 16, the Conference of Members adopted, 4 to 0, Common Measure No. 2 against the Sandbars, for a term of one year: an embargo on arms and "dual-use goods" to the Sandbars; a freeze on the assets held in each member by the members of the Stability Committee and by individual Stability Squad commanders; and a halt to the movement of commercial goods at all the crossings of the Grey River, persons and humanitarian supplies excepted. Once the third item was in force, the Grey Ferry market closed. The licensing review period at Stonegorge's Commerce Office averaged forty-one days in the autumn; water-purification agents were listed as "dual-use goods" and refused licenses. In the winter, a doctor at a clinic along the river in West Shoal Province reported that the supply of cold-chain medicines had been cut off for two months, and the clinic cut back to opening two days a week. Of the four hundred twelve shops in the town of Grey Ferry, thirty percent closed.
The villagers of the west bank are not in the territory of any member, yet their salt, fuel and medicine were held up precisely by this measure of the system, and they had no way to avoid it by exiting. As regards this measure, they are in the system's interior. This is the system's own must, not a can. The doctor and fifty-eight villagers petitioned the Petitions Committee, which took up the petition 4 to 3. In the spring of Year 17, the Conference of Members amended the measure, 4 to 0: the licensing review period was capped at fifteen days, water-purification agents were struck from the "dual-use goods," and a humanitarian market was opened at Grey Ferry twice a week, selling salt, cooking fuel and medicine. The amendment is the part that must be done landing here; for what happened in the months before the amendment, the account is recorded as it stands (Paper 2, §6; Paper 4, §4).
The part that can be done is what the system has beyond a single state: more potential support it can provide outward for cultivation. The sharing of admission and destinations; channels among the members; individual petitions; records kept for booking the account later. A single state can make exit real for those who come to its door; the system sees to it that exit does not rely on any single door (§1). These are not musts; how far they are used is left to the judgment of the political leaders in their positions.
There is a load-bearing sentence here, to be read alongside can: what is placed under can is support added for situations outside the system, and it does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts (Paper 2, XZ14; Paper 3, XZ17). Sharing, answering and implementation that the parties have agreed to and written into a covenant are borne as the covenant says (Paper 1, XZ1; Paper 2, XZ12). That the system can provide more potential support does not on that account yield a separate, general positive duty of outward assistance. Two things must therefore be kept apart: Common Measure No. 2 falling on the people of the west bank is the account of the system's own act, in the part that must be done; Sharing Decisions Nos. 1 to 3 belong to can, and once written into Article 12 of the Compact became commitments in a covenant. If they are not kept apart, one goes wrong in one of two ways. One presents one's own account as goodwill: the sanctions hurt people, yet it is said that the system could have left the matter alone. The other presents goodwill as a debt: when what could be done was not done, it is said that the system has breached an obligation it never acknowledged.
The part that can be done differs with distance and with means. The criterion the War Treatise sets for starting a war is called Theorem One: starting a war requires a cannot-not, with fa-mou (attacking through strategy) and fa-jiao (attacking through diplomacy) exhausted and subjectivity pushed to the critical threshold, and at the moment of starting there must also be an answer to how this war is to end (War Treatise §13). It distinguishes two kinds of aid: "Non-war aid — shelter, supplies, passage, the preservation of culture — does not pass through Theorem One" (War Treatise §19). Aid of this kind anyone may give, without first proving that it has a reason to start a war. Questioning, recording, sanctions, and receiving those who leave are also all on the side that does not pass through Theorem One. The stretch of armed force has its own criterion, written in §7 and §8.
Whitewall's reply says "internal affair," and says "not a member of the system." The first sentence cannot block questions: questioning a matter that has already happened does not require the consent of the party questioned (Paper 2, XZ10). The second sentence is half right: there is no covenant of answering between Whitewall and the system, and Whitewall has no obligation to answer (Paper 2, XZ12); but for the system to question it and record it does not require that it be a member. The letter and the reply were made public under Article 9 of the Compact, and the questioning and recording go on as before.
How can and non-interference are read together needs one more step. The Theory of the State set up non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and explained what it holds back: "What non-interference holds back is deciding the direction for the people there; it does not hold back asking, nor does it hold back this state's guarding of the line as regards its own acts." (Theory of the State Paper 5, §2) The same section also says: "Not interfering is not the same as not asking, either." Rescue that only protects people's getting out and staying alive does not decide the direction for the people there, and is not within what non-interference holds back. The opposite direction must be guarded against too: non-interference cannot be used as grounds for sealing the door or cutting off channels. The DRP's permanent representative said, "This is the Sandbars' internal strife." If this sentence is used to oppose entering the Sandbars, that is a matter for §7 to check; if it is used to shut the door, it runs into the item of not sealing channels.
When the part that can be done cannot hold up, what does the cost look like? The state at the door has received people as the must requires; when the part that can be done has not come in behind it, the cost falls on the state at the door. The Grey Ferry camp filled to 2.8 times its design capacity; the DRP paid in its share in neither of the two years, and of the eight thousand places for transfer not one person was received. There is something larger still, cited here only as a contrast and not judged here: Stonegorge later exited the system, effective in the winter of Year 18, with a transition period ending in the summer of Year 19; transfers under Sharing Decision No. 4 stopped with it, and the Eastfield camp then held about two hundred ten thousand people (Paper 7, §§1, 3). The part that has not come in is registered as a remainder, as it stands, and is not written up as though "the door is open" were already achieved.
It may be said that the system could do more; that to be able and not to act is dereliction, and can should be promoted to must. The weight of this objection is that two hundred ten thousand people left at Eastfield is indeed what something that could be done but was not finished looks like, and it cannot be dismissed with "that was only can." But from the bare fact that the system is able to provide more support, this series does not yet derive a general positive duty of outward assistance. This is the normative scope this paper takes: added support is left to the judgment of those in positions; covenants already acknowledged, and the road of questioning and the guarding of the line that those whom the system's own acts reach require, must still be performed. This scope does not rest on "such a duty cannot possibly hold." Above the system there is no superior with force, and it sets none up, so no one can compel it to carry such a duty out; nor does it guarantee what people outside the system grow into. Neither of these two can by itself prove that such a duty cannot possibly hold. This series takes this scope in keeping with how it writes about what lies outside the system: toward internal subjects the Theory of the State says "strives for cultivation," while toward what lies outside the system this series says only "creates conditions for cultivation," and does not strive for an outcome on behalf of people outside the system. Being able and not acting can still be questioned (Paper 2, XZ11); whether there is a particular obligation to answer or to perform is checked separately, by acknowledged covenants and by the system's own acts (Paper 2, XZ12).
One thing is left here: how far the part that can be done is used is left to the political leaders; where this goes is listed in Paper 8, §5 (XZ56).
XZ41 Rescue is divided into must and can; the part that must be done is the same for the system as for a single state. The Theory of the State handed here what this state can do and must do (Theory of the State N25). The part that must be done is only the items the unified sentence already states, which do not diminish with distance: those who come to the door and to the points of admission are not pushed back, and are received; those reached by the acts of this state and of the system (sanctions, the blocking of channels) follow the unified sentence; channels are not sealed (the Theory of the State Prequel, §8; the Institution Theory Prequel, §7). So it is for a single state, and so it is for the system. What the system has beyond a single state is more potential support it can provide outward for cultivation: the sharing of admission and destinations, channels among the members, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later; a single state can make exit real for those who come to its door, and the system sees to it that exit does not rely on any single door (XZ37). These lie in the part that can be done and are not musts; how far they are used is left to the political leaders in their positions. What is placed under can is support added for situations outside the system, and it does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts (Paper 2, XZ14; Paper 3, XZ17); sharing, answering and implementation that the parties have agreed to and written into a covenant are borne as the covenant says (Paper 1, XZ1; Paper 2, XZ12); that the system can provide more potential support does not yield a separate, general positive duty of outward assistance. The part that can be done differs with distance and with means: non-war aid such as shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture does not pass through Theorem One (War Treatise §19); questioning, recording, sanctions, and receiving those who leave do not pass through Theorem One either; the stretch of armed force follows XZ42. What non-interference holds back is deciding the direction for the people there; it does not hold back asking, nor does it hold back this state's guarding of the line as regards its own acts (Theory of the State Paper 5, §2): rescue that only protects people's getting out and staying alive does not decide their direction for them, and is not within what non-interference holds back; the opposite direction must be guarded against too, and non-interference cannot be used as grounds for sealing the door or cutting off channels. When the part that can be done cannot hold up, the state at the door still receives people as the must requires, and the cost falls on it; the part that has not come in is registered as a remainder, as it stands, and is not written up as though "the door is open" were already achieved (XZ39).
§7 Divided by Place
Once shells fell into the Grey Ferry camp, the question turned from the door to armed force. May Stonegorge guard the camp on its own side? May it cross the river to protect a corridor? This section first sets up a way of drawing the division: by place.
Dividing by place yields three slots: this state's own side; entering another state without invitation; entering another state by invitation. This section writes the first two slots; the third is in the next section. Dividing by place is fairly practical, and it also brings many difficulties: where the shells are fired from, how far their range reaches, how the line in the middle of the river is reckoned, in whose territory a stretch of the corridor lies. In mixed reality these difficulties cannot be avoided; nor does this series claim that a philosophical paper can solve every problem. What dividing by place gives is a visible line, so that judgment has somewhere to land and the account has somewhere to be recorded. The three slots here, divided by place, are not the same thing as the three slots of Paper 5, divided by where the colonizing comes from (outside the system against a member, member against member, a member against outside the system).
The first slot: this state's own territory, this state's side of its points of admission, and sea and airspace belonging to no state. To guard here, with armed force, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies is this state guarding the line where its own acts reach; it is not starting a war across the border. The camp is in Stonegorge's territory, and Stonegorge guarding the camp is in this slot. The radar the UCSE sold to Stonegorge is sited on the east bank for air defense on the camp's side, and it is in this slot too; who judges how it is used, §9 writes. Moving the camp twelve kilometers east, out of range, is a way of guarding in this slot without using armed force: moving people out of the fire, rather than firing back. About twenty thousand people did not want to move and stayed near Grey Ferry. The person chooses not to leave (§4); the line must still be guarded as before, and those twenty thousand are still in this slot of Stonegorge's.
The second slot: entering another state's territory to protect a corridor is starting a war. This slot is judged by the War Treatise's criterion for starting a war, that is, Theorem One (this paper, §6) and the four gates it sets up for the second face (this paper, §5), and it only protects people's getting out and staying alive; it does not change the order. The War Treatise says: "A subject cannot open war across a border because 'another country oppresses some people inside it.'" (War Treatise §13) It also says: "the second face can only be seen alongside a first face that already holds; it cannot by itself constitute a reason for opening war" (ibid.). The first face is the starting side's own cannot-not; the second face is the suppressed people inside the other side. The villagers of the west bank under the burning of their villages are the second face: real, but unable by themselves to carry Stonegorge across the river.
The proposal of Stonegorge's Chief of the Commonwealth and the answers of the three members (Introduction) each fall on the position of whoever spoke, and the account rests with each state; three sentences, three directions, each a state's own judgment. The proposal was not put to a vote, nor was a bill for entering alone laid before the Commonwealth Chamber. The system neither authorizes this nor vetoes it (§9). Whether to enter is Stonegorge's own judgment on starting a war.
And suppose Stonegorge did enter? This step did not happen; a case is supposed here.
Suppose that in the winter of Year 16, with the approval of Stonegorge's Commonwealth Chamber, about three thousand Coastal Guard personnel crossed the Grey River and entered fifteen kilometers into the riverside of West Shoal Province, holding a corridor from three villages to the Grey Ferry crossing for a term of sixty days. No other member sent forces; the UCSE's radar stayed on the east bank as before. The Coastal Guard and the Stability Squads exchanged fire at the western end of the corridor. In the sixty days the corridor was open, about forty thousand people crossed the river by it. Some armed men from the north followed behind the Coastal Guard and demanded to push west together with it; the Coastal Guard refused. The Whitewall government declared this "Stonegorge's invasion of the Republic," and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Plateau Federation said that "a member of the system has invaded a state outside the system." Under clause 3 of Article 18 of the Compact, Stonegorge explained to the Conference of Members in writing, within seventy-two hours, the grounds for its deployment. How the explanation was written, this supposed case does not suppose; three items it might contain are: the camp was twice shelled from the west bank; people crossing the river were shot dead at the crossings; Stonegorge's points of admission lay under fire from the other bank.
This entry falls on the roughly forty thousand who crossed the river by the corridor, on those who had still not got out when the term expired, and also on the roughly three thousand Coastal Guard personnel who crossed the river. The line is: entering another state's territory without invitation is starting a war, and it only protects people's getting out and staying alive. Before this, the camp had already moved east out of range; the UCSE's radar stayed on the east bank as before; the Compact requires a member that deploys to explain in writing within seventy-two hours.
The three items the explanation might contain must be checked separately. The fourth gate of the War Treatise (hereafter Gate Four) tests the intervention side's own first face: the intervention side must be genuinely drawn in, that is, "its own cultivation is being eroded now, and this erosion comes from the same source as the oppression the other party suffers" (War Treatise §13). Look by this sentence. Shells fired into the camp in Stonegorge's territory are fire from the other bank crossing the border river and landing where Stonegorge's acts reach, and this can be one kind of first face; but to say which mechanism it is in particular, one must also ask whether, after the camp moved east, this erosion was still happening at that moment. Those shot dead at the crossings are the oppression suffered by people on the other bank; that is the second face. For the points of admission lying under fire, one must look at which point of admission, and over what period. Those who come, as such, and the burden of admission do not automatically yield a first face (Paper 5, §5): receiving them is a must, the burden goes through sharing, and it is not taken as a reason for starting a war. The War Treatise also says: "Completely 'selfless' trans-border intervention is, if anything, structurally suspicious" (War Treatise §13). If a state says it crosses the river purely for the people on the other bank, it has no cannot-not of its own that can be questioned.
This paper reads the facts by the norm, and reads only this far. Which of the three items amounts to a first face, and whether it is enough, is determined inside Stonegorge by a determination that no single position monopolizes, of which the approval of the Commonwealth Chamber is one place; the system only records and questions.
The Coastal Guard's refusal to push west with the northern armed men is what not changing the order looks like. The War Treatise calls that kind of slide objective-drift: "A war to stop a specific oppression by the other side becomes a war to replace the other side's entire government." (War Treatise §14) The corridor protects people's getting out and staying alive; pushing west, what it protected would become the front line of the northern side. Those who had still not got out when the forces withdrew at the end of the term are this entry's own problem of ending. The War Treatise requires the side that starts a war to be able to answer at the moment of starting: "if this war is fought, how is it to end?" (War Treatise §13) When the corridor closes after sixty days, what becomes of those left at its western end, Stonegorge must answer.
The Plateau Federation says that "a member of the system has invaded a state outside the system." This sentence cannot be judged by its label, nor by the names of states. The Theory of the State gave three criteria for crossing the boundary: "whether the threat is being dissolved; whether management of the other side's internal affairs has begun ...; whether a control is set up with no time limit and no path of exit." (Theory of the State N33) Item by item: whether the corridor is dissolving the threat that falls on people; whether the Coastal Guard has begun managing the internal affairs of the riverside of West Shoal Province; whether a control without a time limit has been set up. The term of sixty days and the refusal to push forward are the way these three are answered. Set against the matter of the Outer Sandbars, the way of checking is the same, and the acts differ. In the autumn of Year 17, the UCSE entered the Sandbars' Outer Sandbars with two naval vessels and a company, set up the Outer Sandbars Provisional Administration Office, issued residence cards to the islanders, collected fishing fees, and replaced the primary-school textbooks (Paper 4, §7). Both are a member entering a state outside the system with military force. On the Outer Sandbars, the member was already deciding the islanders' affairs for them; what must be checked here is Stonegorge's own first face, its guarding of the line, and whether its objective has drifted. Judgment falls on acts: who the acting side is does not change this judgment.
In the tradition, Grotius, Vattel and Rawls all discussed a third state's using armed force for the oppressed people of another state. Grotius says that ordinarily every sovereign is the supreme judge of his own kingdom and subjects, and that foreign powers cannot rightfully interfere; but when a tyrant, by unheard-of cruelty, drives his people to despair and resistance, he forfeits the rights of an independent sovereign; and he says that from this "it does not necessarily follow that other powers are prohibited from giving them assistance when labouring under grievous oppressions." (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 25, §8, same translation; tier B) One of his reasons is the analogy of the guardian: "Thus a guardian or any other friend may undertake an action for a ward, which he is incapacitated from doing for himself." (ibid.) Vattel says that if a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a lawful right to resist, then "every foreign power has a right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance" (The Law of Nations, bk. II, ch. 4, §56, per the online English translation; tier B). According to the same online text (tier C), he also says in the same section that inciting subjects still obedient to their sovereign to rise up is contrary to the law of nations. According to the summary in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "John Rawls" (by L. Wenar, revised 2025), Rawls permits well-ordered peoples to take measures of compulsion against outlaw states to stop violations of human rights (tier C, paraphrased, per §5.5 of that entry); this series reads this as saying that the function of compulsion can operate through a group of states. Theory of the State Paper 5, §4 paraphrased Rawls's principles as leaving room for military intervention; third-state rescue is taken up here.
What the three ask is whether a third state may; what this series asks is on what grounds, and who bears it. This is a division of scope. They agree at two points. Grotius himself says that reasons of this kind cannot always be accepted, for "they may often be used as the cover of ambitious designs." (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 25, §8) This is exactly the kind of slide this series is wary of: changing others' order in the name of saving people. Vattel requires the oppressed themselves to ask for help, and does not allow inciting subjects still obedient to rise up, which runs in the same direction as the third gate's "from the inside out" (§5). They part at one point. The analogy of the guardian in Grotius, this series reads as acting in another's stead: doing a person's own affairs for him because he is deemed incapable is precisely what colonization looks like. An outsider can stand beside the oppressed party only when its own first face holds, and cannot start a war in that party's stead; at the system level there is no authorization, and no endorsement.
It may be said that dividing by place puts a map in the place of morality: people on this side of the river are saved, and people on that side are watched as they die, the only difference being a boundary line. This objection carries the most weight of all, because it names the cost: dividing by place really does let people die on the far side of the border. But what dividing by place divides is not whose life is more worth saving. Basic rights hold against everyone, the same on both banks of the river (Theory of the State N25, citing Theory of Government G17). What it divides is who bears the stretch of armed force, and on what grounds. An outsider can stand beside the oppressed only when its own first face holds; sending forces without a first face of one's own is starting a war on others' behalf, and starting a war on others' behalf is exactly the thing this series disallows from beginning to end. What cannot be done once the division by place is made, §8 writes down as it stands, and does not hide.
One thing is left here. Borderline cases, such as escalation after fire reaches a reception camp, territorial waters and the high seas, and the stretch of a corridor that lies inside this state's territory, are left to the political and military leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
The third slot and the cost are in the next section; XZ42 is stated in full at the end of §8.
§8 The Third Slot, by Invitation; the Cost
The second slot of the previous section says that entering another state's territory to protect a corridor is starting a war. But what if that state itself asks others to come in? What does an invitation change, and what does it not change? This question did not arise on the two banks of the Grey River either; here another case is supposed, set on the facts of the Sandbars.
Suppose that in the spring of Year 17, the Whitewall government invited the NUT in writing to set up a reception point at Westridge, a village inside the Sandbars on the western side of the stretch of land border between the north of the Sandbars and the NUT's Northern District, with NUT personnel guarding the humanitarian supplies brought in and escorting those who leave of their own will to the NUT's reception point at Sand Ridge in the Northern District, for a term of ninety days. The letter of invitation stated: "NUT personnel will not take part in stability operations." The NUT's Council for External Affairs decided, 4 to 1, to accept; the Northern District's member of the Council for External Affairs opposed it, on the ground that "the letter of invitation does not say where the Stability Squads will pull back to." The NUT sent about four hundred personnel carrying light weapons; deployment, scope, duration and withdrawal were decided by the NUT under its own law. The statement of the Council for External Affairs was: "This time it is at the written invitation of the Sandbars government, guarding only supplies and escorting only those who leave of their own will; the NUT does not take part in stability operations, nor in any action against any party within the Sandbars."
Over the ninety days, about eighteen thousand people went by way of the reception point at Westridge to Sand Ridge, and supply convoys came twice a week. On the night of the forty-first day, a company of the Stability Squads opened fire on the reception point from the west; two tents caught fire, and four people died. The NUT personnel returned fire on the spot, and the company withdrew; the NUT personnel did not pursue beyond the reception point. The Whitewall government said: "The fire came from a company that had received no orders; its commander has been replaced." On the sixtieth day, the Whitewall government asked the NUT in writing to escort about nine hundred people on a list "out of the country together." The list was headed "Families of Northern Agitators," and the letter said: "As long as they remain in the Republic, the state of stability cannot end." Of those on the list, some had already registered at the reception point to leave, and some had never come to the reception point. How the NUT answered, this supposed case does not suppose. When the term expired on the ninetieth day, the NUT personnel withdrew to the Northern District.
This matter falls on those in the reception point at Westridge, on the roughly eighteen thousand who went by it to Sand Ridge, and also on the roughly nine hundred on Whitewall's list. There are three lines to look at: the line between guarding supplies and escorting those who leave of their own will, by invitation, and helping a government against its own people; the line at which returning fire goes no further than stopping the attack on the spot; and the line at which escort escorts only those who leave of their own will. Before this, there was Whitewall's written invitation, for ninety days, stating that NUT personnel would not take part in stability operations; there was the decision of the NUT's Council for External Affairs, 4 to 1; and the reception point at Sand Ridge had long been open.
Where there is an invitation, guarding and establishing a channel of exit are not substituting one's own judgment for the other party's judgment. But what is judged is not whether there is an invitation; it is whether the acts after entry substitute judgment. Force is substituting one's own judgment for the other party's judgment on its own affairs. To look at entry by invitation by this, one must state, item by item, whose judgment, and which, is substituted. Under an invitation there are three things, to be kept apart.
(1) Guarding, by invitation, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will. What the NUT did at Westridge is this. It does not enter the fighting as a party. It did not judge on Whitewall's behalf: Whitewall asked it to come, and what it guarded was the one place Whitewall agreed to. Nor did it judge on behalf of any party in the north: how they organize and where they go is not its concern. Still less did it judge on behalf of those in the reception point: whether to leave is their own affair. This does not require the other side's consent, because it does nothing to the other side. This is the third slot.
(2) If what the invited "defense" faces is another party within that state's territory, that is helping a government against its own people; it is turned inward, and is not permitted, with or without an invitation (Paper 5, §2; XZ28). If what the NUT were asked to guard were not a reception point but a stretch of defensive line behind the Stability Squads, what it substituted would be the judgment of the people of the north on their own affairs, and the invitation cannot change this.
(3) Defense, by invitation, against a colonizing entry from outside belongs to joint defense, or to a state's own defense, each passing Gate Four; the invitation does not stand in for this judgment (Paper 5, §5; XZ30).
The third slot is not starting a war, and it is read in the same way as the first slot: the first slot says that guarding with armed force, on this state's own side, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies is not starting a war; here that sentence is extended to another state's territory entered by invitation, and what changes is the place (own undertaking). The sentence of the previous section, "entering another state's territory to protect a corridor is starting a war," is accordingly read as entry without invitation. Two further steps follow: when the invitation is withdrawn, the forces withdraw, or else it becomes entry without consent; and turning to fight for one side, or pushing forward to other places, leaves the third slot and goes back to the criterion for starting a war, following Theorem One and Gate Four.
When the guarding side is attacked and returns fire, where does it stop? The incident on the night of the forty-first day lies right on this line. Returning fire limited to stopping, on the spot, an attack on the guarded people and supplies, going no further than stopping it, still belongs to (1) of the third slot: guarding with armed force those who have come here and the supplies is read in the same way as guarding the line on this state's own side in the first slot. Pursuing, pushing forward, seizing places the other side controls, or fighting in concert with the government side leaves the third slot. Once outside the slot, if what it faces is another party within the territory, it is turned inward under (2) and is not permitted; otherwise it goes by the criterion for starting a war, passing Theorem One and Gate Four. Read that night by this: a company of the Stability Squads opened fire, the NUT personnel returned fire on the spot, the company withdrew, and the NUT personnel did not pursue beyond the reception point. Read this far, the facts remain within (1). That the fire came from the forces of the very side that invited the NUT does not change the reading: what is guarded is the people and supplies in the reception point, and what is stopped is the fire aimed at them, whoever fires it.
Set against the supposed case of the previous section, the division becomes clearer. In the case where Stonegorge protected a corridor without invitation, the Coastal Guard refused to push west with the northern armed men; there, pushing forward is objective-drift. Put the same step in the third slot, and pushing forward is leaving the slot. In both places there is no pushing forward, and for the same reason: what is guarded is people, not a front line.
By the three layers of the Prequel, §11, the matter of returning fire is taken layer by layer. The scope and the boundary of returning fire are the normative layer: stopping on the spot, going no further than stopping, is within the slot; pursuing, pushing, seizing and fighting in concert leave it. The rule layer can give examples, without claiming them to be the best: the covenant of guarding states that returning fire is confined within the reception point and its corridor. The judgment layer: whether a particular instance of returning fire went only as far as stopping on the spot is left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons. Whether there was pursuit beyond the reception point on the night of the forty-first day can be seen. Harder to judge is whether a movement out of the reception point was, in the end, still only stopping an attack that continued to be aimed at the guarded people and supplies, or had already become pursuit, pushing forward or seizure; the classification of this fact is left to the judgment of those in positions, and this paper does not judge on behalf of those on the scene. Once something has been determined to be pursuit, it no longer stays in the third slot.
The list of the sixtieth day is the hardest matter in the third slot. Escort is part of (1); but if escort is used to help one side drive out a population, it decides for the people there whether they stay or go, leaves (1) and falls into (2): it is turned inward, and is not permitted. Look at the list by this. The heading of the list and that letter say plainly that what Whitewall wants is for these people to leave the Republic; but the list and the letter do not make the decision for the people on the list. Some on the list had already registered at the reception point to leave; registration is evidence of their own will, and at the time of escort it must still be checked whether this will remains; if they go, it is by their own will, not by that list. Some had never come to the reception point; it cannot be presumed from the list alone that they consent, nor from their never having come alone that they do not want to leave. If the executing side does not check their own will, or escorts them "out of the country together" by the list against their will, it is carrying out the driving out on Whitewall's behalf, and falls into (2). Driving out a population on a large scale is itself a state's crossing the line against its own people (Paper 4, §8; XZ27). The executing side bears its share in this line-crossing; this point is read together with the line between cooperation and collusion (Paper 4, §5; XZ25). What each of the people on the list then willed, the supposed case does not suppose one by one, and this paper does not supply a judgment.
This matter too is taken in three layers. The normative layer: escort in the third slot escorts only those who leave of their own will; escort used to help one side drive out a population falls into (2), and is not permitted. The rule layer can give a few examples, without claiming them to be the best: those escorted state their will in person, and may leave the column at any time; the list is not supplied by the side requesting the escort; those who do not want to leave suffer no disadvantage of any kind on that account; the course of the escort is recorded and can be questioned. The judgment layer: whether the people in a particular escort went of their own will is judged by those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons. How the NUT answered that letter, the supposed case does not suppose; this paper writes as far as which side the norm points to, and stops there.
It may be said that if the invitation comes from a government that is crossing the line, guarding by invitation lends it a veneer: Whitewall burns villages with one hand and with the other invites a neighbor to guard a reception point, and if the neighbor goes, it amounts to helping Whitewall look respectable to the outside. The weight of this objection is that lending such a veneer can indeed happen, and Whitewall's letter of the sixtieth day was precisely an attempt to use this reception point for its own ends. But (2) already bars helping a government against its own people; deciding for people by Whitewall's list whether they stay or go, and sending them off together without checking their own will, or against it, falls within (2). (1) only guards people and supplies and only escorts those who go of their own will; it judges neither on Whitewall's behalf nor on the other side's. Acts during the guarding are questioned and recorded as they stand (§9). For the ninety days the reception point was open, the record says that about eighteen thousand people went to Sand Ridge, and it also says who opened fire on the reception point on the night of the forty-first day. Questioning and recording keep Whitewall's request, who opened fire, and how the escort was carried out in a record that can be checked, so that the veneer does not easily escape questioning; these records do not in themselves guarantee that such a veneer will not be lent again.
After all the slots have been gone through, one piece remains. A city is besieged, the people cannot get out, and no neighboring state's first face holds: then only non-war means remain, and no side door is opened. The two banks of the Grey River have this piece. Those who drowned in the Grey River in Year 16 or were shot dead while crossing number about one thousand one hundred in the Secretariat's compilation; how many never reached the border at all is not recorded. This is a cost this series acknowledges: when a problem cannot be solved directly by armed force, the cost is watching it happen, with only indirect means left: questioning, recording, receiving those who can get out, and keeping a record for those who cannot. This is not a loophole in this way of dividing; it is the price it pays; it is written out so that it will not be taken as already solved.
One thing is left here. Borderline cases in escort between leaving of one's own will and being driven out, such as a family in which some want to leave and some do not, are registered as they stand.
XZ42 Division by place; the cost is written down. Dividing by place is fairly practical; the difficulties it brings cannot be avoided in mixed reality, and this series does not claim to be able to solve every problem. Dividing by place yields three slots. The first slot: in this state's own territory, on this state's side of its points of admission, and in sea and airspace belonging to no state, guarding with armed force those who have come here and humanitarian supplies is this state guarding the line where its own acts reach; it is not starting a war across the border. The second slot: entering another state's territory without invitation to protect a corridor is starting a war, following War Treatise §13 and Theorem One; an outsider can stand beside the oppressed party only when its own first face holds, and cannot start a war in that party's stead; it only protects people's getting out and staying alive, and does not change the order. The third slot: guarding, by invitation, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will, does not enter the fighting as a party, judges on behalf of no party, does not require the other side's consent, and is not starting a war; when the invitation is withdrawn, the forces withdraw; turning to fight for one side, or pushing forward to other places, goes back to the criterion for starting a war (own undertaking). What is judged is not whether there is an invitation but whether the acts after entry substitute judgment, so under an invitation three things are kept apart: (1) is the third slot; (2) if what the invited "defense" faces is another party within that state's territory, that is helping a government against its own people, turned inward and not permitted, with or without an invitation (Paper 5, XZ28); (3) defense, by invitation, against a colonizing entry from outside belongs to joint defense or to a state's own defense, each passing Gate Four, and the invitation does not stand in for this judgment (Paper 5, XZ30). In the third slot, returning fire after an attack, if limited to stopping, on the spot, the attack on the guarded people and supplies, going no further than stopping it, still belongs to (1); pursuing, pushing forward, seizing places the other side controls, or fighting in concert with the government side leaves the third slot: where what it faces is another party within the territory, it is not permitted under (2); otherwise it goes by the criterion for starting a war. Escort escorts only those who leave of their own will; escort used to help one side drive out a population decides for the people there whether they stay or go, falls into (2), and is not permitted; driving people out on a large scale is itself a line-crossing against one's own people, and the executing side bears its share (Paper 4, XZ25, XZ27). The scope and boundaries above are the normative layer; how covenants of guarding and escort are written, for example that returning fire is confined within the reception point and its corridor, that those escorted state their will in person and may leave the column at any time, that the list is not supplied by the side requesting the escort, that those who do not want to leave suffer no disadvantage on that account, and that the course of events is recorded, are examples at the rule layer; whether a particular instance of returning fire went only as far as stopping on the spot, and whether the people in a particular escort went of their own will, are left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons. The cost is written down: when there is slaughter inside a state, the oppression does not spill over, people cannot reach the border, and no neighboring state's first face holds, only non-war means remain, and no side door is opened; a cost of this kind is watching the problem happen with only indirect means at hand, and it is not a loophole. Borderline cases (escalation after fire reaches a reception camp, territorial waters and the high seas, the stretch of a corridor inside the territory) are left to the political and military leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
§9 Intervention and Assistance
The previous two sections asked how far a state's armed force can go. This section asks about the system: what the system does about armed force, and what it does not do; and, when armed force and weapons pass between members, or between members and what lies outside the system, how the account is divided.
First, what the system did. In the autumn of Year 16, the Conference of Members recorded the two shellings of the Grey Ferry camp, 4 to 0. In the summer, the Secretary-General had already written to Whitewall asking about the number and whereabouts of those in the instruction camps. Clause 2 of Article 18 of the Compact sets a limit on determinations of this kind by the system: "This record is a public question and record; it constitutes no authorization, and no obligation on any member to deploy." The system's determination of line-crossing is exactly this kind of thing: a public question, a public record. It is not an authorization, not an order, and not a permit to send forces issued to any state.
Look at this through the supposed case of §7. Suppose Stonegorge entered the west bank: under clause 3 of Article 18 it gives a written explanation within seventy-two hours; the Conference of Members records the explanation itself and records each member's view of it, and records neither approval nor rejection. The state that sends forces cannot close this questioning: once the explanation is submitted, it is in the record, and every member can put questions on it (Paper 2, §4; XZ12). The system neither authorizes nor vetoes. To authorize is for the system to supply, on behalf of the state sending forces, the reason for starting a war, and the judgment on starting a war then moves from that state's own first face onto the system's votes; to veto is for the system to have force over members. Both are what a superior looks like.
Where, then, does the system's strength lie? Elsewhere. On the two banks of the Grey River almost every item was used: the sharing of admission, Sharing Decisions Nos. 1 to 3; sanctions, Common Measure No. 2; non-armed humanitarian channels, the humanitarian market at Grey Ferry twice a week; individual petitions, the petition of the doctor and fifty-eight villagers of the west bank; records kept for booking the account later, the compilation the Secretariat made from the statements of those who came to the east bank, fourteen of which, in the supposed case, mention the commander's name (§3). None of these is armed force. Their cost was written in the previous section: when a problem cannot be solved directly by armed force, the cost is watching it happen, with only indirect means.
The system itself does not use armed force, yet between members, and from members outward, armed force and weapons do pass. Two things must be distinguished here: intervention and assistance. Sending forces into another state and fighting for one side in its internal strife, where how armed force is used is judged by the sending side, is intervention. Supplying or selling weapons, where how they are used is judged by the receiving side, is assistance. This division is not by things but by judgment: whoever judgment falls to, the account falls to. Whether to supply, to whom, and what, are recorded to the supplying side; how the weapons are used is recorded to the positions and persons of the side using them. The minimum content of booking the account that the Theory of the State set up applies here as it stands: decisions and reasons made public, records attributed to particular positions and persons (Theory of the State N39).
Two matters can be set against each other. One is the radar. The UCSE's Office of Trade approved the sale of two radar sets to Stonegorge, operated by Stonegorge's Coastal Guard; twelve technicians from the radar manufacturer assisted on the east bank, with installation, maintenance and training; they did not stand watch and had no access to targeting data, and switching on and targets were decided by the Coastal Guard's duty officers. No personnel of the UCSE's Defense Force were present, and the matter was not referred to the joint session. Judgment lay with Stonegorge; this is assistance. Whether to sell is recorded to the Office of Trade; how the radar is used, to the Coastal Guard. This matter is at the same time within the first slot of §7: the radar guards the camp on this state's own side.
The other is arms. The Plateau Federation is not in the system, and through Years 16 and 17 it went on selling arms to the Sandbars as usual, shipped in through southern ports other than the harbor at Sandmouth. The account is likewise divided by judgment: whether to sell, and to whom, is recorded to the Plateau Federation; how the arms are used, to the positions and persons of the Stability Committee and the Stability Squads. The Plateau Federation is not bound by Common Measure No. 2; toward it the system has only indirect ways: questioning, recording, withdrawing cooperation (Paper 1, §6; Paper 4, §3). To whom it sells is, here, an act that can be questioned: the buyer is the very force carrying out "sweeps" in the villages of the north. The reverse case also follows this division: when a state outside the system colonizes another state outside the system, and a member supplies weapons to the colonized side, whether to supply and to whom is left to the judgment of that member's positions, and the account is recorded under its name; this is assistance, not intervention.
Judgment follows control, and control is read from what actually happens. This step is added by this series itself (own undertaking). Restrictions, review, intelligence and targeting data all turn on who in fact makes them and who controls the particular decision to use armed force. Merely supplying information, general limits of use, or advice that can be refused does not of itself move the judgment across. If restrictions and approvals have already left the receiving side without a real choice, or particular targets, timing and operation are in fact decided by the supplying side, control and responsibility are checked for that part. Look at the radar: the twelve technicians did only installation, maintenance and training and did not touch targeting data, and switching on and targets were decided by the Coastal Guard's duty officers; judgment lay with Stonegorge. If, for some part, targeting data or switching on were in fact decided by them, that part would move to the UCSE's side, and control and responsibility would be checked for it. How far operating personnel may go, and how much approval and targeting data must move across before it counts as intervention: these boundaries are left to the political leaders in positions in the system; this paper sets out only the direction.
Why divide in this way? Because the division between intervention and assistance is what the whole series' criterion of force looks like when applied to armed force. Force is substituting one's own judgment for the other party's judgment on its own affairs. Sending forces into another state and fighting for one side in its internal strife substitutes for the judgment of that state's people on their internal direction: how the people there are to organize, and who is to govern them, is settled for them by guns from outside. With supplied weapons, the judgment on how to use them remains in the recipient state, and there is no such substitution; the account is recorded separately to the supplying side. Sending forces to stop a colonizing entry is another matter again. The defended party may be a member, a side that has been admitted, or a state that invited the forces, the third item of §8. To stop the entry on the defended party's territory, under its authorization and within its term, is defense (Paper 5, §§2, 7; XZ32): it does not judge on behalf of the defended party, whose defense is its own; nor does it judge on behalf of the entering side on that side's own affairs, and it goes no further than stopping. Each state that sends forces still passes Gate Four: Gate Four originally speaks of the intervention side sending forces for the oppressed people inside another state; here it is extended to a state sending forces to stop a colonizing entry (own undertaking).
And if, after withdrawal, slaughter breaks out again inside the other side? Speaking of what comes after victory, the War Treatise says: "This situation is not a continuation of the previous war; it is an independent application of Theorem One." (War Treatise §18) The side that enters again must establish its own first face afresh. Look at the supposed case: after Stonegorge withdrew to the east bank at the end of the sixty days, if shelling broke out again from the west bank, entering again would be a new decision, not a renewal of the previous one.
It may be said that supplying weapons and sending forces are only a step apart, and that dividing by judgment is mere form: what difference is there between supplying a radar and sending technicians, and sending forces to guard the camp? The weight of this objection is that real aid often has both, things and people going across together. But what is divided is not things; it is where judgment falls. Where accompanying operating personnel, target designation or conditions of use mean that how something is used is in fact decided by the supplying side, it is read as intervention. The radar matter is assistance precisely because switching on and targets were in the hands of the Coastal Guard's duty officers; on the day they no longer are, the reading changes with it.
Two things are left here: borderline cases between intervention and assistance are left to the political leaders in positions in the system; how the supplying side's account is questioned follows Papers 2 and 3.
XZ43 The system does not authorize the use of armed force; the system's strength lies elsewhere; armed intervention and assistance are divided by judgment. The system's determination of line-crossing is a public question and record, not an authorization; a state that sends forces must publicly explain its own first face to the system, and the system places the explanation and each member's view on record, neither authorizes nor vetoes, and the sending state cannot close this questioning (Paper 2, XZ12). The system's strength lies elsewhere: the sharing of admission, sanctions, non-armed humanitarian channels, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later; the cost is watching problems happen, with only indirect means. Sending forces into another state and fighting for one side in its internal strife, where how armed force is used is judged by the sending side, is intervention; supplying or selling weapons, where how they are used is judged by the receiving side, is assistance. This division is what the criterion of force looks like when applied to armed force: what intervention substitutes for is the judgment of that state's people on their internal direction. The account is divided by judgment: whether to supply, to whom, and what, are recorded to the supplying side; how the weapons are used is recorded to the positions and persons of the side using them (Theory of the State N39). Judgment follows control, and control is read from what actually happens: restrictions, approvals, intelligence and targeting data turn on who in fact makes them and controls the particular decision to use armed force; merely supplying information, general limits of use, or advice that can be refused does not of itself transfer judgment; where restrictions and approvals have already left the receiving side without a real choice, or particular targets, timing, switching on and operation are in fact decided by the supplying side, control and responsibility are checked for that part (own undertaking). For example, with a radar sold, if the supplying side's technicians do only installation, maintenance and training, and switching on and targets are decided by the using side's duty officers, judgment lies with the using side; if, for some part, targeting data or switching on are in fact decided by the technicians, control is checked for that part. Sending forces to stop a colonizing entry, for a member, for a side that has been admitted, or by invitation, on the defended party's territory, under its authorization and within its term, is defense, not intervention; each state that sends forces still passes Gate Four (own undertaking). Slaughter breaking out again inside the other side after withdrawal is a new round of Theorem One, and the side that enters again must have its own first face hold (War Treatise §18). Borderline cases, such as how far operating personnel may go, and how much approval and targeting data must move across before it counts as intervention, are left to the political leaders in positions in the system; this series sets out only the direction. Where one state outside the system colonizes another, supplying weapons to the colonized side and the like falls within the judgment of positions, and the account is recorded under the supplying side's name.
§10 Internal Strife Not Yet Decided
By Year 18 the matter of the Sandbars had changed shape. The north was no longer only a place being swept; it had its own armed forces and its own assembly, and it applied to the system for accession. Can outside states now help one side with armed force? And what does it mean that the system has not admitted it?
This is how it went. From Year 16, the "Northern Guard" appeared in the north, made up of dock workers, fishermen and soldiers who had left the Stability Squads; by Year 18 it numbered about thirty thousand. Its weapons were partly captured from the Stability Squads' depots and partly bought by sea from "merchants outside the system"; from the summer of Year 18, the provisional administration office the UCSE had set up on the Outer Sandbars allowed the Northern Guard's boats to refuel at the Outer Sandbars piers. The Whitewall government said: "The north was made by outside force." In the spring of Year 18, members of the assemblies of the three northern provinces and representatives of port and fishing associations convened the "Provisional Assembly of the Republic" at Sandmouth and declared: "The Stability Committee in Whitewall no longer represents the Republic; the Provisional Assembly of the Republic, convened at Sandmouth, is the sole legitimate representative of the Republic of the Sandbars." The Provisional Assembly controls Sandmouth Province, the whole of North Strand Province and the northern half of West Shoal Province, about nine million people, with its own taxation, courts and guard. The Whitewall government calls it a "rebellion," still claims to represent the whole, and fights on in the southern half of West Shoal Province.
In the spring and summer of Year 18, the NUT arranged two rounds of talks between the two sides in a border town in its Northern District, and the statement of the Council for External Affairs was: "The NUT provides the venue, and makes no ruling on the rights and wrongs." In the summer, the Provisional Assembly applied to the Secretary-General for accession to the system as "the Republic of the Sandbars (Sandmouth)," the application stating that it "represents the whole people of the Sandbars." In the autumn, the Conference of Members discussed "whether the point of a split has been reached." The UCSE's Executive for External Affairs said: "The Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth controls two and a half provinces, with its own taxation, courts and guard; it is already a split." The DRP's Foreign Minister said: "This is internal strife whose outcome is not yet decided. Admitting Sandmouth is intervention." The NUT's permanent representative said: "The two sides are still talking in the NUT's Northern District; the NUT makes no ruling." Stonegorge, within the notice period of its exit, took no position on admission. From the winter of Year 18, about sixty thousand people went back from the Eastfield camp to the north. In the spring of Year 19 the vote was taken under Article 7(a) of the Compact, under which admitting a new member requires the written consent of all members: the UCSE consented; the NUT's Council for External Affairs voted 3 to 2, short of the four required, so the NUT could not give consent; the DRP did not consent. There was no admission. In the spring of Year 20, the Provisional Assembly applied again, the application now reading: "What applies for admission is the three provinces actually under the Provisional Assembly's jurisdiction (the northern half of West Shoal Province included); the claim to the whole is dealt with separately." By Year 20 there had been no decision.
Paper 1, §8 has already written this matter from the side of admission; here the side of armed force is looked at. It falls on the people in the southern half of West Shoal Province, where fighting is still going on, on the roughly sixty thousand who went back to the north from the winter of Year 18, and on those who stayed at Eastfield. The line is: while internal strife is not yet decided, outside force does not intervene with armed force; supplying weapons is assistance. Before this, there were the two rounds of talks in the spring and summer of Year 18, and the admission that did not pass in the spring of Year 19.
In the Fifth Preliminary Article of Perpetual Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden), Kant said three sentences, all of which this paper inherits; the original text, and where they part, are placed in §11. The first sentence: no forcible interference in the constitution and government of another state. The second: intervention by outside force while internal strife is not yet decided violates the rights of a people struggling with its inner illness. The third: when a state has split into two parts, each claiming to represent the whole, assisting one of them does not count as interference.
The third sentence is connected to the system by way of admission. Admission is the system's public judgment on "whether the point of a split has been reached"; it is itself an act, and open to questioning (Paper 1, §8; XZ8). Carrying this forward: without admission, the system has made no public judgment that "the point of a split has been reached"; until this judgment is made, the stretch of armed force is read by Kant's second sentence. This series reads this state of affairs as: the system has already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. This judgment is the result yielded by the system's procedure: admission requires the consent of all, it was not obtained, and the result is "not yet." It is not what each vote meant: in the NUT's Council for External Affairs the vote was 3 to 2, the majority in favor of consenting, only short of four. Each state's vote is recorded as it was: the UCSE consented, the NUT could not give consent under its own procedure, the DRP did not consent; each was made by that state's positions, and the account falls there too. This is a blank the system deliberately leaves: before that point is reached, it does not acknowledge, leaving room to see how things develop. The observation period of an observer member is set up for exactly such situations (Paper 1, §9; XZ7).
Before admission, the reading follows Kant's second sentence. A member entering the Sandbars with armed force to assist one side is read as intervening in another state's internal strife, not as the exception of the third sentence. The UCSE Executive for External Affairs' sentence "this is already a split" is one state's view in the discussion in the Conference of Members, recorded under the UCSE's name; it does not stand in for the judgment under Article 7(a).
The system neither authorizes nor vetoes. If a member still sends forces, sending forces is its own act: it must explain its first face to the system, and questioning, recording and checks apply as before (Paper 2, §4). Entering another state's territory is itself checked by the criterion for starting a war (Paper 5). The system does not stop it, nor does it endorse it.
Two places are unaffected. One: guarding the line in this state's own territory and on this state's side of its points of admission goes on as before (§7): the Eastfield camp and the reception points in the NUT's Northern District are all in the first slot, and guarding them is not intervention. The other: non-war aid stays open: shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture do not pass through Theorem One. The NUT's arranging talks for the two sides and declaring that it makes no ruling on the rights and wrongs also belong to the non-war kind: it provided a table, and sat at it on no one's behalf.
Supplying weapons is assistance, not armed intervention. Some of the Northern Guard's weapons were captured, some bought by sea, and its boats refueled at the Outer Sandbars piers. None of these is sending forces in, and each account rests on the side that did it: those who sold were merchants outside the system, the one that allowed refueling was the administration office on the Outer Sandbars, and the account is divided as in §9. Supplying weapons and providing logistics do not change the judgment at admission either. Whether that side rose by itself and stands on its own, rather than having been made by outside force, is looked at by the second guardrail of Paper 1, §8; Whitewall's saying that the north was made by outside force must be checked against the facts, not settled by the say-so of any one side.
Next, a step that did not happen: suppose the system gave Sandmouth an observer's seat. Suppose that in the summer of Year 20, on the proposal of the NUT's permanent representative, and after the three members, the UCSE, the NUT and the DRP, had given written consent under Article 7(a) of the Compact, the Conference of Members made the Observer Member Decision: a side that has applied for accession and has not yet been admitted may take a seat as an observer member, take part in questioning and recording, and make statements in common procedures, its statements entered in the record; it does not vote, does not sit on the Joint Defense Coordination Council, and does not take part in joint plans, joint exercises or prepositioned logistics. "The Republic of the Sandbars (Sandmouth)" took its seat as an observer member, for an observation period of two years, the observation covering the places actually under the Provisional Assembly's jurisdiction, and the decision stated that "observation does not acknowledge its claim to the whole." At an extraordinary session the DRP's Foreign Minister said: "What the Republic agrees to is observation, not admission. That the observer member stays out of joint defense is the Republic's condition for agreeing." The Whitewall government's statement was: "By giving the rebels a chair, the system has taken a side in the Republic's internal strife." At the regular session in the autumn of Year 20, Sandmouth's representative took the seat, the observation period running to the autumn of Year 22. How this seat was set up, and why it was set up so, Paper 1, §9 has already written (XZ7).
What must be asked here is this: if, during the observation period, Whitewall's Stability Squads crossed the dividing line between the two sides' control and entered North Strand Province, how is this entry classified? What has the observer's seat changed?
By the three layers of the Prequel, §11, this is taken layer by layer. The normative layer: the classification of the stretch of armed force changes only with admission. Observation is not admission. An entry against the observer member's side during the observation period is read as before admission: a member assisting Sandmouth with armed force is intervening in another state's internal strife; guarding the line on this state's own side and non-war aid stay open. What the observer's seat changes is questioning and recording; it does not change the stretch of armed force. The rule layer: the Observer Member Decision writes that the observer member does not vote and does not sit on the Joint Defense Coordination Council; this is an example, without claiming to be the best; when the DRP consented, it said that what it agreed to was observation, not admission, and that staying out of joint defense was its condition for agreeing, so here the writing at the rule layer runs in the same direction as the normative layer. The judgment layer: which crossing counts as an entry, and whether a given member's armed force is guarding the line or intervention, is judged by those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
Whitewall says that setting up observation is taking a side. Setting up observation is itself an act, and can be questioned; the decision itself states that it, and the acts done under it, can be questioned under Article 7(b). What it gives is a seat for questioning and recording, not armed force. Questioning goes on as questioning, recording as recording; whether a side has been taken depends on what it did, and what it did was to let one side sit down, be questioned and be recorded.
A split also comes in two shapes, which must be read separately. The Provisional Assembly's first application said that it "represents the whole people of the Sandbars"; this is the original shape of Kant's third sentence: two parts each claiming to represent the whole. The other shape is a side that claims only itself. The latter is read directly by the third guardrail of Paper 1, §8: what admission acknowledges is, from the start, that part itself, not its claim to the whole. Kant's original takes the former as its model; this paper takes in the latter as well (own undertaking). The Provisional Assembly's second application narrowed the scope of this admission to the three provinces actually under its jurisdiction, the claim to the whole being dealt with separately; what was narrowed is the object of the application; there is no record that Sandmouth gave up its claim to the whole, and the application cannot be used to prove that the latter shape has come about. Even if admission is made, it acknowledges only that part itself, not its claim to the whole.
After admission, the reading changes. Suppose Sandmouth were admitted: an entry by the other side would then be an entry against a member, and other members sending forces would be defense, each passing Gate Four; the judgment of this step is in Paper 5, §9 (XZ34). States outside the system assisting one side with armed force is outside the system against outside the system, and the system uses only indirect means.
There are voices of objection on both sides. One is the DRP Foreign Minister's sentence: to admit Sandmouth is to intervene. The weight of this objection is that admission really does change that internal strife: it seats one side in the system, and changes the classification of any later entry against it. But admission is not armed force. It is a public judgment, itself open to questioning; intervention speaks of sending forces in and fighting for one side in internal strife. To read admission as intervention is to say that whenever the system makes a judgment, it has used armed force. The other side says: when the split has gone this far, one state's procedure blocking the consent of all amounts to letting the fighting go on. The weight of this objection is that the NUT Council for External Affairs' falling one vote short really did keep the stretch of armed force on the side of non-admission. But the stretch of armed force is read by the second sentence, and guarding the line, non-war aid, questioning and recording all stay open; nor does the system veto members' own sending of forces; it only requires that they explain and be questioned. The part that cannot be done is written down as cost.
Vattel has a point to set against here. In a note to his English translation of Perpetual Peace, Smith connects Kant's exception to Vattel; he quotes Vattel as saying that when the bonds of political society are broken, "the contending parties may then be considered at two distinct powers; and, since they are both equally independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge them." (note [114] to Smith's English translation of Perpetual Peace, quoting Vattel, The Law of Nations, bk. II, ch. 4, §56; tier B; cited at second hand) And further: "Either may be in the right; and each of those who grant their assistance may imagine that he is giving his support to the better cause." (ibid.) Where they agree: once internal strife has reached that point, assisting one side does not count as interference. They part at two points. This series does not take "both sides are independent, and outsiders have no right to judge" as a license for assistance; judgment falls on the assisting party's own acts: non-war aid does not pass through Theorem One, and sending forces follows Gate Four. This series also places "whether that point has been reached" within the system's admission, which is public and open to questioning. Vattel says that outsiders have no right to judge; this series says that there must be judgment, but that it is a public question and record, an admission open to questioning, not a written permit to send forces.
Two things are left here. The particular determination of "whether the point of a split has been reached" is left to the judgment of those in positions (Paper 1, §8). Borderline cases between intervention and assistance are left to the political leaders in positions in the system.
XZ44 While internal strife is not yet decided, outside force does not intervene; non-admission means that the system has already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. The three sentences of Kant's Fifth Preliminary Article are inherited: no forcible interference in the constitution and government of another state; intervention by outside force while internal strife is not yet decided violates the rights of a people struggling with its inner illness; when a state has split into two parts, each claiming to represent the whole, assisting one of them does not count as interference (Perpetual Peace, First Section, Preliminary Article 5). The third sentence is connected to the system by way of admission: admission is the system's public judgment on whether the point of a split has been reached, and is itself open to questioning (Paper 1, XZ8); that the system has not yet admitted means that it has already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. This judgment is the result yielded by the system's procedure: admission requires the consent of all, it was not obtained, and the result is "not yet"; it is not what each vote meant; each state's vote is recorded as it was, each made by that state's positions, and the account falls there too. Non-admission is a blank the system deliberately leaves: before that point is reached it does not acknowledge, leaving room to see how things develop; the observation period of an observer member is set up for such situations (Paper 1, XZ7). Before admission, a member entering that state with armed force to assist one side is read as intervening in another state's internal strife, not as the exception of the third sentence. The system neither authorizes nor vetoes: if a member still sends forces, sending forces is its own act, and it must explain its first face to the system (Paper 2, XZ12); questioning, recording and checks apply as before. Two places are unaffected: a member guarding, in its own territory and on its own side of its points of admission, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies follows division by place (XZ42), and is not intervention; non-war aid such as shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture stays open. Supplying weapons is assistance, not armed intervention, and the account is divided as in XZ43; supplying weapons does not change the judgment at admission, and whether that side rose by itself and stands on its own is looked at by Paper 1, XZ8. Observation is not admission: an entry against the observer member's side during the observation period is read as before admission, a member assisting the observer member's side with armed force is intervention, and guarding the line and non-war aid stay open; what the observer's seat changes is questioning and recording, and it does not change the stretch of armed force: this is the normative layer. That the observer member does not vote and stays out of joint defense is an example at the rule layer; which crossing counts as an entry, and whether a given member's armed force is guarding the line or intervention, is left to the judgment layer, and the account falls on positions and persons. A split comes in two shapes: two parts each claiming to represent the whole is the original shape of Kant's third sentence; a part that claims only itself is read directly by Paper 1, XZ8: what admission acknowledges is, from the start, that part itself (own undertaking). After admission, sending forces to defend the admitted side against entry counts as defense; each of the other members that sends forces must still pass Gate Four (Paper 5, XZ34); states outside the system assisting one side with armed force is outside the system against outside the system, and the system uses only indirect means.
§11 With Kant
This paper interfaces mainly with Kant. What it takes up most directly is the Fifth Preliminary Article in the First Section of Perpetual Peace, together with the exception that follows it, the case of "splitting into two parts."
Theory of the State Paper 6, §5 has already conversed with the text of this article and with two of its phrases. The text is: "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state." (my translation; Kein Staat soll sich in die Verfassung und Regierung eines andern Staats gewaltthätig einmischen.; Zum ewigen Frieden, First Section, Preliminary Article 5, same source; tier A) The reason is that interference by outside force violates the rights of "a people struggling only with its own inner illness and dependent on no other," and would "render the autonomy of all states insecure" (ibid.). That paper only paraphrased the exception, saying that it does not judge the case of splitting into two states and helping one of them, and handing over to here what a third state does inside another state's territory. What this section takes up is precisely this exception.
The sentence of the exception, this paper translates for itself from the German: "This would not, however, include the case in which a state splits through internal discord into two parts, each of which represents for itself a particular state laying claim to the whole; there, an external state's rendering assistance to one of them could not be reckoned as interference in the constitution of the other (for then there is anarchy)." (my translation; Dahin würde zwar nicht zu ziehen seyn, wenn ein Staat sich durch innere Veruneinigung in zwey Theile spaltete, deren jeder für sich einen besondern Staat vorstellt, der auf das Ganze Anspruch macht; wo einem derselben Beystand zu leisten einem äußern Staat nicht für Einmischung in die Verfassung des andern (denn es ist alsdann Anarchie) angerechnet werden könnte.; ibid.) The sentence that follows immediately is: "But so long as this internal strife is not yet decided, this interference by external powers would be a violation of the rights of a people struggling only with its own inner illness and dependent on no other, would thus itself be a scandal, and would render the autonomy of all states insecure." (my translation; So lange aber dieser innere Streit noch nicht entschieden ist, würde diese Einmischung äußerer Mächte Verletzung der Rechte eines nur mit seiner innern Krankheit ringenden, von keinem andern abhängigen Volks, selbst also ein gegebenes Skandal seyn, und die Autonomie aller Staaten unsicher machen.; ibid.) Smith's English translation renders innere Veruneinigung as "internal corruption," which does not match the German "internal discord"; this paper follows the German.
The common question is: when fighting breaks out inside a people, may outside states help one side with armed force? First, check whether it is the same question. Kant asks what a foreign state may do about a state's internal strife; §10 of this paper asks what the system and its members may do about the internal strife of a state outside the system. On the asking side there is one thing more, a system, but the question is the same: may outside force, with armed force, change the order of the people there on their behalf?
Where they agree: all three sentences are inherited. The first sentence, that outside force does not forcibly change a people's constitution and government on its behalf, runs in the same direction as "does not enter other states to decide on behalf of the people there" in this series' main-line sentence. The second sentence, that intervention by outside force while internal strife is not yet decided violates the rights of a people struggling with its inner illness, this series reads at the system level as: not yet having admitted is having already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. The third sentence, that when a state has split into two parts each claiming to represent the whole, assisting one of them does not count as interference, this series connects to the system by way of admission. Kant says that such intervention renders the autonomy of all states insecure. This series' main reason for not compelling is to leave the other side room to grow by itself: only what grows by itself is most truly its own (the Prequel, §1). The two can be read side by side; this paper does not use Kant's sentence as an argument.
Where they part: at four points, all of which land on the original text.
First, who determines that that point has been reached. The original says that while the internal strife has not yet been decided it is not permitted, and that once there is a split into two parts it does not count as interference, but it does not say who determines that the latter point has been reached. If a foreign state may determine it for itself, it can determine first and then assist. This series places this determination in the system's admission: public, and open to questioning; admission requires the consent of all, and if it is not obtained, the result yielded by the system's procedure is "not yet," a blank the system deliberately leaves; each state's vote is recorded as it was, each made by that state's positions. In the autumn of Year 18, the three members each said a sentence, and Stonegorge took no position; in the spring of Year 19, there was no admission. Who made this determination, and where it lands, can be seen in the record.
Second, the original's assistance (Beystand) does not distinguish armed from non-armed. This series divides by judgment: sending forces in and fighting for one side in internal strife is intervention; supplying weapons, where how they are used is judged by the receiving side, is assistance (§9). Non-war aid, shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture, does not pass through Theorem One, and stays open even while internal strife is not yet decided. The original does not here distinguish item by item between armed and non-war assistance; but what this article prohibits is forcible interference in constitution and government, and from the word Beystand it cannot be inferred that shelter, supplies and passage are all prohibited. This series writes these out separately, to show how the same boundary is carried out at the system level.
Third, the original takes as its model two parts each claiming to represent the whole, and says that there is then anarchy. What this series' admission acknowledges is that part itself, not its claim to the whole (Paper 1, §8). So the shape in which one side claims only itself can be taken in too; the system need not first determine that the state is "already in anarchy" before it can admit one of its parts. That Sandmouth's second application narrowed the object of the application does not mean that its political claims have all changed, and it cannot be used to prove that this shape has come about (§10).
Fourth, the original says only that assistance then does not count as interference. This series goes one step further: after admission, an entry against that part is an entry against a member, and other members sending forces is defense, each passing Gate Four; joint defense guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not claim the whole on its behalf (Paper 5, §9; XZ34).
What the original governs is forcible interference in a state's constitution and government. The several things that are not forcible, guarding the line on this state's own side, non-war aid, questioning and recording, and the observer's seat the system would set up in the supposed case, this paper reads as not within what the original prohibits; they are written out within the same boundary. This is a division of scope, not a refutation. The line Kant drew between one state and another, this series draws in the same way within a system that has no superior; the few extra strokes are there because there is one thing more, a system, and it must be made clear who makes the judgment at the system level, where it is placed, and how it is questioned.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has proved eight things (XZ37 to XZ44): the door is open, and conditions are built only where the system's acts can reach; at the door of any state no one is pushed back, those who have crossed the line are not pushed back either, but asylum does not write off the account, and peers pursuing the people in a state's positions follow each state's own law; destinations do not sort people; those who leave are not instruments; in rescue, the part that must be done is the same for the system as for a single state, and what the system has more of lies in what can be done; armed force is divided by place, and guarding by invitation forms a slot of its own; the system does not authorize the use of armed force, and intervention and assistance are divided by judgment; while internal strife is not yet decided, outside force does not intervene.
What it has not proved has been handed on. Long-term status and naturalization in the admitting state are left to the admitting state's own law. The general governance of reception camps is a subject for the Theory of Government. On the details of surrendering criminals, this paper lays down no rule and gives only the two directions; for covenants on surrender and judicial assistance see Paper 1, §4; the details are left to specific law, and where they go is registered in Paper 8, §5. How far the part that can be done is used is left to the political leaders. Borderline cases of the division by place are left to the political and military leaders. Whether a particular instance of returning fire in the third slot went only as far as stopping on the spot is left to the judgment of those in positions. Borderline cases between armed intervention and assistance are left to the political leaders in positions in the system. The particular determination of "whether the point of a split has been reached" is left to the judgment of those in positions (Paper 1, §8).
The remainder it leaves, registered as it stands: those who cannot reach the door and those who died crossing the river, the cost of the besieged-city kind; the journalist's family who stayed in Sandmouth; where prosecution of a person who has crossed the line is decided on according to law, but there is neither a usable route for trial in this state nor a route of transfer that keeps to Direction One, this item of judicial handling cannot land; the piece that the part that can be done did not come in to cover, the roughly two hundred ten thousand left at Eastfield after Stonegorge's exit; the misplacement that destinations leave on persons; borderline cases in escort between leaving of one's own will and being driven out.
The door is open, and there is a road in; one can also walk out through the door, and the sixty thousand who went back to the north are one instance. The next paper turns to the members' own going out: how a member exits the system, and what remains after exit.
The Eight Propositions of This Paper
XZ37 Creating conditions for the cultivation of people outside the system means, for those who can get out, first of all making their exit real. Someone who leaves a state has no layer above to go with him, and can only enter another peer, and only if that peer takes him in (Theory of the State Paper 1, §5); individual exit is not sealed off by the state (Theory of the State N13). A single state can make exit real for those who come to its door; what the system adds is several destinations, and continuing sharing and channels among the members, so that exit does not rely on any single door (Moral Law P9 §4.2 says that a single shelter is a single point of failure; extended from communities to a system of cooperation; own undertaking). The conditions are built where the system's acts can reach: the door is open, those who come can be received and have somewhere to go, and channels and comings and goings are not blocked; it does not enter other states to decide the direction of growth for the people there. This proposition unfolds only the side of the door: whether something decides on behalf of people is checked by whose judgment, and which, is actually substituted after entry, and is not settled by place alone; non-war aid and guarding by invitation are each checked by the corresponding sections of this paper (XZ41, XZ42). Those still inside another state's territory and within the reach of the system's acts follow the unified sentence (system level, Paper 2, §6); see §6. The outward clause of the main-line sentence states a direction, not a must: within it, not pushing back those who come to the door, and receiving them, is a must (XZ38); sharing and destinations, channels among the members, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later are support the system can provide, in the part that can be done (XZ41); placing them under can does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts. It is concerned with conditions, and the conditions must be actually usable (the Theory of Government Prequel, §8; own undertaking). Recognition within that does not extend outward across the boundary is only intensified internal mutual aid (Moral Law P8 §2.3); this sentence is a diagnosis, and is not read as an obligation on members to admit people at their own cost.
XZ38 At the door of any state, no one is pushed back; this lands in the member states. Of those who come to the border, those whom this state's refusal of entry, return or detention reaches and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are, as regards these acts, in this state's interior, following the unified sentence (Theory of the State N15). In the state that receives them, they are in its interior as regards admission: not pushed back, able to ask, and suffering no retaliation for asking. This is a must, and it does not diminish with distance; covenants among members cannot reduce it (Paper 1, XZ4). Those at the door are received at once; microscopic recognition does not wait (Moral Law P9 §2.7); there is no order requiring a person in danger to exhaust other channels before leaving (Theory of the State N37). Long-term arrangements are left to the admitting state's own law and to the judgment of political leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons; the road with a time limit of Theory of the State N14 is laid only for those holding no citizenship, and is not fitted onto everyone who flees. When a person who has crossed the line reaches the door, two directions are given, and no rule is laid down. Direction One, that not pushing back at the door holds for everyone: a person who has crossed the line and reaches the door is not pushed back to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial either (the unified sentence). Direction Two, that asylum does not write off the account: what he did in his position remains on his account (Theory of the State N39); the admitting state neither hands him over to the place Direction One bars, nor lets asylum erase this account; whether to prosecute follows specific law and acknowledged covenants, and where prosecution is decided on according to law, he is tried by this state where it has jurisdiction, or handed over, by an applicable procedure, to a place that can try him fairly and keeps to Direction One; not prosecuting does not on that account erase the record or close off questioning. The two directions are at the normative layer; not handing him over to a place where he would face killing, torture or detention without trial is Direction One itself, at the normative layer, and is not a check item that can be weighed. At the rule layer, check items can be suggested as examples: a place that can try him fairly, the trial public, the accused able to choose his own counsel; where the requesting side is one side of an internal strife not yet decided, the instrument of surrender states that it does not acknowledge that side's claim to the whole; the concern about taking sides is handled at the rule layer. When a case comes, whether to hand over, and to whom, is judged by those in the admitting state's positions, the reasons are public, and the account falls on positions and persons. Direction Two extended to the general case (own undertaking): peers pursuing the people in a state's positions is each state's own act, following each state's own law and acknowledged covenants; the system sets up no organ of prosecution and does not decide for the states who should be prosecuted, and the system's record can be used by the states; pursuit also guards the line, never handing over to a place where the person would face killing, torture or detention without trial; that the account is not written off does not mean there must be prosecution (The Reverse Phase Transition, N46). For covenants on surrender and judicial assistance, see Paper 1, XZ4; the details are left to specific law.
XZ39 The system's function of admission: not pushing back is a must; sharing, destinations and records are support it can provide; destinations do not sort people. In the system's function of admission, only not pushing back at the door of any state is a must; the sharing of admission, destinations among the members, and records are support the system can provide, and how far they are used is left to the political leaders in their positions. Placing them under can does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts; once sharing has been written into a covenant with the consent of all parties, it is a commitment in the covenant, and what is not paid in is recorded as it stands and questioned (Paper 1, XZ1); covenants of sharing among members cannot reduce the items owed to those at the door (Paper 1, XZ4). What is divided is the shares and conditions the states take on; when it comes down to each person, the person chooses where to settle, and the system does not allocate it: separation is not a sorting or confining of persons, and does not decide for either side's people who belongs where or who must move where (War Treatise §15, extended from two war-parties to the system's sharing; own undertaking). "The person chooses" says that the system and its members do not move people about as shares and do not coerce anyone into going to a given state; it does not say that every person has a right to choose any state; whether each state accepts people, and how it arranges things in the long term, follows each state's own law; not pushing back at the door remains a must. The room not to go must be actually usable, not merely written on paper; if the cost of refusing is so heavy that one can only go, it already comes close to coercion: this is the normative layer. How a sharing decision is written, for example drawing lots by household, the consequences of refusal and the scope of joined households, is an example at the rule layer; priority for the state where a person has relatives, not splitting families, and not losing eligibility for refusing can be suggested. Whether the room not to go is actually usable in a given arrangement is judged by those in positions; how far the changes must go to count as an answer is not decided by the questioning side alone (Paper 2, XZ10, XZ15). A member state's own dissidents fleeing to another member state is a matter between members, and the system does not help the first state get them back. Where the state at the door has received people as the must requires and the part that can be done has not come in behind it, the state at the door bears it alone; the part that has not come in is registered as a remainder, as it stands, and is not written up as though "the door is open" were already achieved.
XZ40 Those who leave are not treated as instruments. Those who leave are not treated as instruments for going back to change the order there: a rising must proceed from the inside out, and the outside can recognize it and can support it, but cannot manufacture it (War Treatise §13); once the violation is blocked, it does not decide for the protected what they are to become (Institution Theory Z19). How they speak and act belongs to their own law, and the admitting side does not arrange it for them: receiving a person is not conditional on his working for anyone, and asylum and residence are not affected by refusal; going back also belongs to their own law, the admitting side does not decide for them whether to stay or go, and going back of one's own accord is not being pushed back. Where the home state demands return on the ground of dissent, the person is not handed over; whether the ground is dissent is seen from the act for which he is pursued, not from how the charge is worded. The long-term status of those who leave in the admitting state is set by the admitting state's law.
XZ41 Rescue is divided into must and can; the part that must be done is the same for the system as for a single state. The Theory of the State handed here what this state can do and must do (Theory of the State N25). The part that must be done is only the items the unified sentence already states, which do not diminish with distance: those who come to the door and to the points of admission are not pushed back, and are received; those reached by the acts of this state and of the system (sanctions, the blocking of channels) follow the unified sentence; channels are not sealed (the Theory of the State Prequel, §8; the Institution Theory Prequel, §7). So it is for a single state, and so it is for the system. What the system has beyond a single state is more potential support it can provide outward for cultivation: the sharing of admission and destinations, channels among the members, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later; a single state can make exit real for those who come to its door, and the system sees to it that exit does not rely on any single door (XZ37). These lie in the part that can be done and are not musts; how far they are used is left to the political leaders in their positions. What is placed under can is support added for situations outside the system, and it does not reduce the road of questioning and the booking of the account for the system's own acts (Paper 2, XZ14; Paper 3, XZ17); sharing, answering and implementation that the parties have agreed to and written into a covenant are borne as the covenant says (Paper 1, XZ1; Paper 2, XZ12); that the system can provide more potential support does not yield a separate, general positive duty of outward assistance. The part that can be done differs with distance and with means: non-war aid such as shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture does not pass through Theorem One (War Treatise §19); questioning, recording, sanctions, and receiving those who leave do not pass through Theorem One either; the stretch of armed force follows XZ42. What non-interference holds back is deciding the direction for the people there; it does not hold back asking, nor does it hold back this state's guarding of the line as regards its own acts (Theory of the State Paper 5, §2): rescue that only protects people's getting out and staying alive does not decide their direction for them, and is not within what non-interference holds back; the opposite direction must be guarded against too, and non-interference cannot be used as grounds for sealing the door or cutting off channels. When the part that can be done cannot hold up, the state at the door still receives people as the must requires, and the cost falls on it; the part that has not come in is registered as a remainder, as it stands, and is not written up as though "the door is open" were already achieved (XZ39).
XZ42 Division by place; the cost is written down. Dividing by place is fairly practical; the difficulties it brings cannot be avoided in mixed reality, and this series does not claim to be able to solve every problem. Dividing by place yields three slots. The first slot: in this state's own territory, on this state's side of its points of admission, and in sea and airspace belonging to no state, guarding with armed force those who have come here and humanitarian supplies is this state guarding the line where its own acts reach; it is not starting a war across the border. The second slot: entering another state's territory without invitation to protect a corridor is starting a war, following War Treatise §13 and Theorem One; an outsider can stand beside the oppressed party only when its own first face holds, and cannot start a war in that party's stead; it only protects people's getting out and staying alive, and does not change the order. The third slot: guarding, by invitation, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will, does not enter the fighting as a party, judges on behalf of no party, does not require the other side's consent, and is not starting a war; when the invitation is withdrawn, the forces withdraw; turning to fight for one side, or pushing forward to other places, goes back to the criterion for starting a war (own undertaking). What is judged is not whether there is an invitation but whether the acts after entry substitute judgment, so under an invitation three things are kept apart: (1) is the third slot; (2) if what the invited "defense" faces is another party within that state's territory, that is helping a government against its own people, turned inward and not permitted, with or without an invitation (Paper 5, XZ28); (3) defense, by invitation, against a colonizing entry from outside belongs to joint defense or to a state's own defense, each passing Gate Four, and the invitation does not stand in for this judgment (Paper 5, XZ30). In the third slot, returning fire after an attack, if limited to stopping, on the spot, the attack on the guarded people and supplies, going no further than stopping it, still belongs to (1); pursuing, pushing forward, seizing places the other side controls, or fighting in concert with the government side leaves the third slot: where what it faces is another party within the territory, it is not permitted under (2); otherwise it goes by the criterion for starting a war. Escort escorts only those who leave of their own will; escort used to help one side drive out a population decides for the people there whether they stay or go, falls into (2), and is not permitted; driving people out on a large scale is itself a line-crossing against one's own people, and the executing side bears its share (Paper 4, XZ25, XZ27). The scope and boundaries above are the normative layer; how covenants of guarding and escort are written, for example that returning fire is confined within the reception point and its corridor, that those escorted state their will in person and may leave the column at any time, that the list is not supplied by the side requesting the escort, that those who do not want to leave suffer no disadvantage on that account, and that the course of events is recorded, are examples at the rule layer; whether a particular instance of returning fire went only as far as stopping on the spot, and whether the people in a particular escort went of their own will, are left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons. The cost is written down: when there is slaughter inside a state, the oppression does not spill over, people cannot reach the border, and no neighboring state's first face holds, only non-war means remain, and no side door is opened; a cost of this kind is watching the problem happen with only indirect means at hand, and it is not a loophole. Borderline cases (escalation after fire reaches a reception camp, territorial waters and the high seas, the stretch of a corridor inside the territory) are left to the political and military leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
XZ43 The system does not authorize the use of armed force; the system's strength lies elsewhere; armed intervention and assistance are divided by judgment. The system's determination of line-crossing is a public question and record, not an authorization; a state that sends forces must publicly explain its own first face to the system, and the system places the explanation and each member's view on record, neither authorizes nor vetoes, and the sending state cannot close this questioning (Paper 2, XZ12). The system's strength lies elsewhere: the sharing of admission, sanctions, non-armed humanitarian channels, individual petitions, and records kept for booking the account later; the cost is watching problems happen, with only indirect means. Sending forces into another state and fighting for one side in its internal strife, where how armed force is used is judged by the sending side, is intervention; supplying or selling weapons, where how they are used is judged by the receiving side, is assistance. This division is what the criterion of force looks like when applied to armed force: what intervention substitutes for is the judgment of that state's people on their internal direction. The account is divided by judgment: whether to supply, to whom, and what, are recorded to the supplying side; how the weapons are used is recorded to the positions and persons of the side using them (Theory of the State N39). Judgment follows control, and control is read from what actually happens: restrictions, approvals, intelligence and targeting data turn on who in fact makes them and controls the particular decision to use armed force; merely supplying information, general limits of use, or advice that can be refused does not of itself transfer judgment; where restrictions and approvals have already left the receiving side without a real choice, or particular targets, timing, switching on and operation are in fact decided by the supplying side, control and responsibility are checked for that part (own undertaking). For example, with a radar sold, if the supplying side's technicians do only installation, maintenance and training, and switching on and targets are decided by the using side's duty officers, judgment lies with the using side; if, for some part, targeting data or switching on are in fact decided by the technicians, control is checked for that part. Sending forces to stop a colonizing entry, for a member, for a side that has been admitted, or by invitation, on the defended party's territory, under its authorization and within its term, is defense, not intervention; each state that sends forces still passes Gate Four (own undertaking). Slaughter breaking out again inside the other side after withdrawal is a new round of Theorem One, and the side that enters again must have its own first face hold (War Treatise §18). Borderline cases, such as how far operating personnel may go, and how much approval and targeting data must move across before it counts as intervention, are left to the political leaders in positions in the system; this series sets out only the direction. Where one state outside the system colonizes another, supplying weapons to the colonized side and the like falls within the judgment of positions, and the account is recorded under the supplying side's name.
XZ44 While internal strife is not yet decided, outside force does not intervene; non-admission means that the system has already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. The three sentences of Kant's Fifth Preliminary Article are inherited: no forcible interference in the constitution and government of another state; intervention by outside force while internal strife is not yet decided violates the rights of a people struggling with its inner illness; when a state has split into two parts, each claiming to represent the whole, assisting one of them does not count as interference (Perpetual Peace, First Section, Preliminary Article 5). The third sentence is connected to the system by way of admission: admission is the system's public judgment on whether the point of a split has been reached, and is itself open to questioning (Paper 1, XZ8); that the system has not yet admitted means that it has already judged that armed intervention is not yet possible. This judgment is the result yielded by the system's procedure: admission requires the consent of all, it was not obtained, and the result is "not yet"; it is not what each vote meant; each state's vote is recorded as it was, each made by that state's positions, and the account falls there too. Non-admission is a blank the system deliberately leaves: before that point is reached it does not acknowledge, leaving room to see how things develop; the observation period of an observer member is set up for such situations (Paper 1, XZ7). Before admission, a member entering that state with armed force to assist one side is read as intervening in another state's internal strife, not as the exception of the third sentence. The system neither authorizes nor vetoes: if a member still sends forces, sending forces is its own act, and it must explain its first face to the system (Paper 2, XZ12); questioning, recording and checks apply as before. Two places are unaffected: a member guarding, in its own territory and on its own side of its points of admission, those who arrive and humanitarian supplies follows division by place (XZ42), and is not intervention; non-war aid such as shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture stays open. Supplying weapons is assistance, not armed intervention, and the account is divided as in XZ43; supplying weapons does not change the judgment at admission, and whether that side rose by itself and stands on its own is looked at by Paper 1, XZ8. Observation is not admission: an entry against the observer member's side during the observation period is read as before admission, a member assisting the observer member's side with armed force is intervention, and guarding the line and non-war aid stay open; what the observer's seat changes is questioning and recording, and it does not change the stretch of armed force: this is the normative layer. That the observer member does not vote and stays out of joint defense is an example at the rule layer; which crossing counts as an entry, and whether a given member's armed force is guarding the line or intervention, is left to the judgment layer, and the account falls on positions and persons. A split comes in two shapes: two parts each claiming to represent the whole is the original shape of Kant's third sentence; a part that claims only itself is read directly by Paper 1, XZ8: what admission acknowledges is, from the start, that part itself (own undertaking). After admission, sending forces to defend the admitted side against entry counts as defense; each of the other members that sends forces must still pass Gate Four (Paper 5, XZ34); states outside the system assisting one side with armed force is outside the system against outside the system, and the system uses only indirect means.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662
Qin, H. (2026). What an Institution Is Not (SAE Institution Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269330
Qin, H. (2026). Guarding the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270766
Qin, H. (2026). Conditions (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270922
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). What a Government Is Not (SAE Theory of Government, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23411670
Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112
Qin, H. (2026). What a State Is Not (SAE Theory of the State, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584292
Qin, H. (2026). The Last Rule (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584315
Qin, H. (2026). The Last Exit (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584325
Qin, H. (2026). One Another, with No Superior (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584346
Qin, H. (2026). The Last Resort (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584352
Qin, H. (2026). Questioning the Last Layer (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 7) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584356
Qin, H. (2026). The Reverse Phase Transition (SAE Theory of the State, Companion Study) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23779070
Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617
Qin, H. (2026). Collective 15DD and the Four-Stage Evolution of Community Form (SAE Moral Law, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20218248
Qin, H. (2026). The Institutional Architecture of Mixed Reality: The Phase-Transition Evolution of Cultivation and Colonization (SAE Moral Law, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20262737
Qin, H. (2026). On the Development of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20582210
II · External works (public-domain originals, tier A)
Kant, I. (1795). Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius. Project Gutenberg, EBook #46873. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46873
Kant, I. (1917). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. Trans. M. Campbell Smith (1st ed. 1903; 3rd impression). London: George Allen & Unwin. Project Gutenberg, EBook #50922. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50922
III · External works (public-domain translation, tier B)
Grotius, H. (1901). The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations. Trans. A. C. Campbell. New York & London: M. Walter Dunne. Project Gutenberg, EBook #46564. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46564 (abridged translation; Latin original not checked)
Vattel, E. de. (1883). The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. Ed. J. Chitty, notes by E. D. Ingraham. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson. Online text: https://constitution.org/2-Authors/vattel/ ; read against the Lonang Institute text (from the 1797 English translation, reprinted 1853). (French original not obtained; read against the two online texts)
IV · External works (secondary sources underlying tier C)
Wenar, L. John Rawls. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision of September 3, 2025). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/
V · External works (cited at second hand)
Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (original not consulted; paraphrased from the Wenar entry; tier C)
Interfaces
Main upstream: the Theory of the State (Paper 1, §5; Paper 3, N13, N14, N15; Paper 5, N25; Paper 6, N33 and §5; Paper 7, N37, N39 and §5); the unified sentence (the Theory of the State Prequel, §8; extended to the system level, following Paper 2, §6 of this series); War Treatise §13 (Theorem One; the second face and the four gates; at the moment of starting a war, an answer to how it is to end), §14, §15, §18, §19.
Also used: Theory of the State Paper 5, §4 (the Rawls layer, pointed back to); the companion study to the Theory of the State, The Reverse Phase Transition (§5; N46); Institution Theory (the Prequel, §7, the entry "Relational thickness"; Paper 3, Z19; Paper 4, Z27; Paper 6, Z35a); the Theory of Government (the Prequel, §8; Paper 3, G17, by way of Theory of the State N25); Moral Law P8 §2.3, §5.1, and P9 §2.7, §4.2 (§2.3 used only as a diagnosis); Power Theory P5 §V; F6 §2, and F6, Appendix A, Article 15 (a working demonstration; used only as an example).
Interfacing: Kant (Perpetual Peace, First Section, Preliminary Article 5 and its exception of "splitting into two parts," in the paper's final section; Second Section, Third Definitive Article, pointing back to Theory of the State Paper 7, §5; tier A, per the first edition of 1795, compared with Smith's English translation); Grotius (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 2, §16, ch. 21, §5, and ch. 25, §8; tier B, per Campbell's abridged English translation); Vattel (The Law of Nations, bk. I, ch. 19, §§229–231, tier C, paraphrased; bk. II, ch. 4, §56, tier B, per the online text, and as quoted at second hand in note [114] to Smith's English translation); Rawls (The Law of Peoples; tier C, per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry by Wenar, §§5.5–5.6).
This series: the Prequel, §1 (the main reason for not compelling), §2 (the criterion of force), §5 (the main-line sentence), §11 (the three layers); Paper 1, XZ1, §4 (XZ4), §6 (XZ6), §8 (XZ8), §9 (XZ7); Paper 2, §1 (XZ9), §2 (XZ10), §3 (XZ11), §4 (XZ12), §7 (XZ14), §8 (XZ15); Paper 3, §2 (XZ17), §3 (XZ18); Paper 4, §3 (XZ23), §4 (XZ24), §5 (XZ25), §7, §8 (XZ27); Paper 5, §2 (XZ28), §5 (XZ30), §7 (XZ32), §9 (XZ34); Paper 7, §1, §3 (XZ47); Paper 8, §5 (XZ56).
Handed to Paper 7: the door is open, the road in and the road out; it is now the turn of the members' own going out.