Mutual Defense
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Withdrawing cooperation cannot stop colonization that enters by force. This paper asks what the armed forces of cooperation stop and what they do not; whose starting of a war each sending of forces is, who judges it and who bears it; what members that send no forces bear; and, once one side of a split has been admitted, or once a member has itself split, how far the stopping goes. One matter runs through the whole paper, the matter of the strait: the ships of the Plateau Federation enter the Stonegorge Strait and take Lamp Island; the Conference of Members of the Three-Borders Cooperation System records "there is a colonizing entry," stating at the same time that this is not an authorization; the UCSE sends forces for escort and air defense, and takes no part in action against Lamp Island; the NUT sends no forces, but opens its railway and airspace and supplies fuel and medicine; the DRP's proposal to send forces falls seventeen votes short in the People's Assembly. The answer reaches this far. Joint defense stops colonizing entries, is not turned inward, and goes no further than stopping them; an invitation does not change "not turned inward." It can be used in three slots, outside the system against a member, member against member, and a member against outside the system, and the ground is where the colonizing comes from. Each participating state's sending of forces is its own starting of a war, and each passes Gate Four of the War Treatise; neither the system's record nor an invitation stands in for this judgment; as for the three grounds the UCSE listed for sending forces, this paper only classifies them, and whether they suffice is determined inside the UCSE. The three slots narrow differently; the slot of a member against outside the system is the hardest to pass, and the matter of the Outer Sandbars serves as the contrast. What is standing is only coordination and preparation. Deployment, withdrawal and command all rest with each state, and wartime joint structures are dismantled after the war. Not sending forces is not bearing nothing. A supposed case of the split of the Sandbars is used to write that once one side of a split has been admitted, the other members' sending forces to defend it against entry counts as defense; that "member against member" is read by acts; and the five guardrails on assisting the defense when a member splits. Joint acts keep to sameness of structure; membership does not require sameness. Along the way the paper takes up Kant on hiring out troops and on standing armies; at the end it converses with Grotius: they agree that an alliance imposes no obligation to support an unjust war, and that before a war each ally judges for itself; they part on punishment, where this series is on Kant's side. The paper has nine propositions (XZ28 to XZ36), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
The Mirror Sea is an inland sea north of the continent, and it has only one sea route to the open ocean: the Stonegorge Strait at its eastern end. The strait is about one hundred ten kilometers long and about fourteen kilometers wide at its narrowest, and both shores belong to the Stonegorge Commonwealth (Stonegorge). In the middle of the strait lies Lamp Island, home to some four thousand people, most of them fishermen and staff of the pilot station and the lighthouse; the deep-water lane lies south of Lamp Island and runs its whole length within Stonegorge's territorial waters. The Plateau Federation, on the north shore of the Mirror Sea, does not border Stonegorge, yet its seaborne trade, and its Mirror Sea Fleet on its way in and out of the open ocean, must all pass through this strait. Ships from the east-coast ports of the United City-States of Ends (UCSE) bound north into the Mirror Sea also pass through it.
In Year 13, the UCSE and its two neighbors, the Nation Union of Telos and the Democratic Republic of Purposes, signed the Three-Borders Compact at the town of Three Borders and formed the Three-Borders Cooperation System. Hereafter these are called the system and the Compact; following the earlier series, the two neighbors are written as the NUT and the DRP. Stonegorge joined in the autumn of Year 14, the fourth member; the Plateau Federation is outside the system. In the spring of Year 15, Stonegorge refused two demands put to it by the Plateau Federation: that the Mirror Sea Fleet set up a supply station on Lamp Island, and that the fleet pass through the strait year-round exempt from inspection. The Plateau Federation then cut off fuel supplies, imposed additional tariffs and stopped clearing, and the members of the system responded with common measures. How far withdrawing cooperation can go was written in Paper 4. In the spring of Year 17, what came was the fleet.
At dawn one day that spring, six ships of the Mirror Sea Fleet entered the Southern Lane within Stonegorge's territorial waters, and about one thousand two hundred troops landed on Lamp Island. The Coastal Guard station on Lamp Island, about ninety strong, resisted; on the second day, Lamp Island came under the Plateau Federation's control. Among the dead were seventeen of Stonegorge's Coastal Guard, six civilians of Lamp Island, and nine on the Plateau Federation's side. The Plateau Federation set up the "Lamp Island Sea-Lane Administration Post" on Lamp Island and announced that ships using the Southern Lane must register with it. On the first day, two UCSE-registered freighters refused to register and were detained, together with their thirty-one crew members. The Federal President of the Plateau Federation issued a statement: "The Stonegorge Strait cannot be handed over to a system that has put the Plateau Federation on a list. The Lamp Island Sea-Lane Administration Post guarantees the passage of the ships of all states."
Stonegorge's Coastal Guard set up defenses on both shores of the strait beyond Lamp Island. On the first day, the Chief of the Commonwealth asked the UCSE, the NUT and the DRP in writing for assistance, and asked the Secretary-General to convene an extraordinary session. On the fourth day, the Conference of Members, under clause 1 of Article 18 of the Compact, adopted a record:
"The ships and forces of the Plateau Federation have entered the territorial waters of the Stonegorge Commonwealth and Lamp Island, have set up a sea-lane administration post on Lamp Island, require ships using the Southern Lane to register with that post, and have detained two unregistered ships. The Conference of Members records: there is a colonizing entry. This record is a public question and record; it constitutes no authorization, and no obligation on any member to deploy."
The UCSE, the NUT and Stonegorge voted in favor; the DRP abstained. The DRP's permanent representative said that the record should read "armed entry," since "the word 'colonizing' is a characterization of the Plateau Federation"; his words were entered in the record. One thing must be said here first: the Compact, the organs of the system and the laws of each state alike are examples set up by this series; it cites their provisions so that there are facts to judge by; this series does not claim that they are the best design.
The three states then each made their own decisions. On the sixth day, on the proposal of the UCSE's Executive Council under the UCSE's own Joint Defense Participation Act, the joint session approved, by 189 votes to 122, the deployment of two frigates and a battalion, about six hundred people, for ninety days, solely within Stonegorge's territorial waters and territory, with the task of escorting shipping in the Southern Lane and providing air defense for the harbor at Gorgemouth, and taking no part in action against Lamp Island. In the debate a member asked: "Does the detention of two freighters count as an attack on the UCSE?" On the seventh day, the UCSE's Executive for External Affairs, under clause 3 of Article 18 of the Compact, submitted a written explanation to the Conference of Members listing three grounds for the deployment: two UCSE freighters and thirty-one crew members had been detained within Stonegorge's territorial waters; the Stonegorge Strait is the only sea route from the UCSE's east-coast ports north into the Mirror Sea, and since the entry every UCSE ship using the Southern Lane had stopped sailing; and the written request of Stonegorge's government. On this the DRP's permanent representative said: "The detention of the freighters is not the same as an attack on the UCSE." Both were entered in the record. The NUT's Council for External Affairs decided, 5 to 0, to send no forces, and at the same time opened the Stonegorge Pass railway and the airspace of the Northern District for the transit of the UCSE's battalion and supplies, supplied Stonegorge with fuel and medicine, and had the transit station in the Northern District stop handling military cargo for the Mirror Sea Fleet. The DRP President proposed sending engineer and air-defense detachments, about eight hundred people, to Gorgemouth; the People's Assembly voted 284 to 279, with 37 absent, seventeen short of the three hundred one votes that make a majority of its six hundred members, and the proposal did not pass.
What followed was this. On the twenty-third day, the Plateau Federation released one freighter and fourteen crew members; the other, with seventeen crew members, was not released until the summer. In the summer, an escorted convoy in the Southern Lane met a ship of the Mirror Sea Fleet and the two sides exchanged fire; three UCSE sailors and five Plateau Federation sailors died, and each side said the other had fired first. Two weeks later, the Plateau Federation's ships withdrew from Stonegorge's territorial waters; about six hundred troops stayed on Lamp Island, the administration post carried on as before, and passage through the Southern Lane resumed under escort. In the summer the UCSE's joint session renewed the deployment for ninety days by 171 votes to 148; in the winter, when the term ran out, the UCSE withdrew, and the joint command structure was dissolved with it. About one thousand seven hundred people from Lamp Island moved to the area around Gorgemouth; about two thousand four hundred stayed on the island, carrying "transit cards" issued by the administration post and living under a night curfew. The Secretary-General wrote to the Plateau Federation asking about the situation of Lamp Island's residents and the term of the administration post; the Plateau Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied: "The Lamp Island Sea-Lane Administration Post is a temporary arrangement to guarantee freedom of navigation."
The matter falls on several groups of people: the residents of Lamp Island, those who left and those who stayed; the thirty-one detained crew members; the Coastal Guard; the crews in the Southern Lane; and the people on the sending side, those in the UCSE's battalion and on its frigates, the three sailors who died in the exchange of fire among them. Several lines are to be looked at: what the armed forces of cooperation stop and what they do not; whose starting of a war each state's sending of forces is; who decides on deployment, withdrawal and command; what members that send no forces bear. Before this, transit registration in the strait was the same for all ships and was handled by Stonegorge's Strait Authority. The Compact provides only for the coordination and preparation of joint defense; Article 17 states: "The system shall have no standing force." Clause 1 of Article 18 allows the Conference of Members to make a record that "there is a colonizing entry," and clause 2 states that this record is not an authorization. The UCSE's Joint Defense Participation Act requires that, for the Defense Force to take part in joint action abroad, the Executive Council must propose it and the joint session must approve it by a majority within seven days, for at most ninety days each time.
The matter leaves several questions. The Conference of Members recorded "there is a colonizing entry," and also wrote that the record "constitutes no authorization": what is this record to the members, and what is it not? Article 4(1) of the Compact says that members do not enter the territory or territorial waters of any state by armed force, and the UCSE, at Stonegorge's request, entered Stonegorge's territorial waters: does this article govern the case or not? The UCSE listed three grounds, and the DRP said that one of them is not the same as being attacked: the first face of a state that sends forces, that is, its own reason why it cannot-not start a war, who states it and who questions it? The NUT sent no forces but opened its railway and stopped military supplies, and the DRP fell seventeen votes short: what do members that sent no forces bear? The UCSE took no part in action against Lamp Island, renewed ninety days at a time, and withdrew when the term ran out, while the garrison on Lamp Island stayed: where did "stopping" stop?
Paper 4 stopped at one point: withdrawing cooperation cannot stop colonization that enters by force. This paper writes of the armed forces of cooperation; this series calls the arrangement joint defense, and calls a state's action sending forces. Besides the questions above, it asks one more: when a state has split and one side of the split has been admitted, or when the one that splits is a member, how far does joint defense go in stopping?
The paper proceeds in thirteen steps. §§1 and 2 write that what joint defense stops is a colonizing entry, that it is not turned inward, and that an invitation does not change this. §3 writes in which slots it can be used. §§4 and 5 write that each sending of forces is the participating state's own starting of a war, and that the slots narrow differently. §§6 and 7 write where standing arrangements, deployment, withdrawal and command each lie. §8 writes what members that send no forces bear. §§9 to 11 write of splits: how entries are stopped once a state has split and the system has admitted one side; how "member against member" is to be read; how entries are stopped when a member itself splits. §12 writes how the line is held when acting together with members of a different direction. §13 converses with Grotius. Wherever a norm is given, the same place states which step is left to the judgment of those in positions; the division into the normative layer, the rule layer and the judgment layer follows the Prequel, §11. This paper does not judge strategy or tactics; how forces are composed and what form command takes are left to military and political leaders. Of any particular state, it writes only what it did, on whom this fell, and under what instrument.
§1 Stopping a Colonizing Entry
The system has no superior over its head, and does not itself act as a superior. Clause 2 of Article 2 of the Compact says: "No organ of the system may exercise force against a member or against persons within a member's territory." Yet this series also says that states may have armed forces of cooperation among them. Put side by side, the two sentences look as if they were at odds.
They are not at odds. What that clause of the Compact forbids is the system's organs exercising force against members and against persons within a member's territory; the armed forces of cooperation are each member's own forces, and what they stop is an entry that comes from outside and decides on behalf of others. The former governs whether the system can press down on its members from above; the latter governs whether members can together face outward and stop colonization; only when the two are read together do they not obstruct each other. Hence "inward" and "outward" are divided not by geography but by function. What joint defense stops is a colonizing entry, that is, entering another state by force and deciding on behalf of the people there, whether or not the entering party is a member. "Not turned inward" means three things: not entering any state to manage its internal affairs; not enforcing the system's own decisions against members; not deciding on behalf of the people of any state. In the matter of Lamp Island, the entering party was outside the system; the kind in which the entering party is a member is written in §3.
Stopping is itself a use of armed force. Does stopping others by armed force count as force, as deciding on their behalf? This series' criterion is: force is substituting one's own judgment for the other party's judgment on its own affairs (the Prequel, §2). By this criterion, it must be stated item by item whose judgment is substituted, and which judgment. The administration post requires ships using the Southern Lane to register with it, and detains ships that do not. Who may pass through Stonegorge's territorial waters, and on what registration, was Stonegorge's own affair and that of the ships in the strait; here the Plateau Federation made that judgment in their place. When the Mirror Sea Fleet is stopped and the post's registration is not recognized, what is stopped is only this judgment made in others' place. The judgment the Plateau Federation makes on its own affairs is still there after the stopping: what it does within its own territory and territorial waters, and how it responds afterward, are still for it to decide. To stop a colonizing entry is to refuse to let the entering party judge in others' place, and so it is not substitute exercise. This requires that the entry really be a colonizing entry. Whether it is determined to be one rests with each member that sends forces (§4); if the determination is wrong, the stopping itself substitutes for others' judgment on their own affairs: if, for example, an entry by invitation (the first or third kind in §2) were stopped as a colonizing entry, what is substituted is the inviting party's judgment as to whom it asks to come. By the same criterion, this is booked to the side that made the determination.
The record of the Conference of Members on the fourth day also writes of acts. It first lists the facts: ships and forces entered Stonegorge's territorial waters and Lamp Island, set up an administration post, required registration, and detained ships; only then does it write "there is a colonizing entry." Read by the norm, these facts, entering by armed force, setting up an administration on another state's island, and deciding for others who registers and who passes, point to the side of "entering another state by force and deciding on behalf of the people there." The judgment that "there is a colonizing entry" was made by the Conference of Members: three votes in favor, from the UCSE, the NUT and Stonegorge, with the DRP abstaining. The DRP said that the wording should be "armed entry," and that the word "colonizing" is a characterization. Which word to use is a judgment the Conference of Members makes under the rules, under clause 1 of Article 18 of the Compact; the DRP's objection was entered in the record, and this paper does not judge the word in the Conference's place. What the norm requires is something else: the wording follows the acts, not who the acting party is (Paper 3, §3). In the summer of Year 18, the second record of the Conference of Members, concerning an administration office that a member had set up on an island of a state outside the system, used the same sentence (Paper 4, §7).
How far does stopping go? The UCSE's forces escorted shipping and provided air defense only within Stonegorge's territorial waters and territory, and did not enter the Plateau Federation's territory or territorial waters. Going no further than stopping means not going on to deal with the violating party. The War Treatise has written of two drifts of a war's objective: one slides from stopping a specific oppression to regime change; the other slides from ending to prolonged occupation: "A war that has achieved its original objectives, and should now be at its ending, continues under the rationale of 'stabilization' or 'preventing recurrence.'" (War Treatise §14) The Theory of the State has given three criteria for crossing the boundary: whether the threat is being dissolved; whether management of the other side's internal affairs has begun; whether a control is set up with no time limit and no path of exit (Theory of the State N33). It goes on: "Removing one side's shelter does not give the other side an unlimited qualification to act." (ibid.) Having stopped the Mirror Sea Fleet, no sending state thereby acquired any qualification to go on and deal with the Plateau Federation. The difference between going no further than stopping and punishment is written in §13, in the conversation with Grotius.
That the UCSE took no part in action against Lamp Island is another matter. Lamp Island is Stonegorge's island; retaking a member's occupied territory is still within stopping, and is not dealing with the violating party. Whether to take part is for each sending state to decide by its own judgment: to take this further step is an expansion of the war, and must pass a "cannot-not" of its own (§7). Lamp Island was not within the scope the UCSE's joint session approved; the UCSE did not take this step.
After the stopping, one more thing holds: one does not decide for the protected party what it is to become. Institution Theory, writing of guarding, says: "Toward the protected party, it does not draw his lines for him; once the violation is blocked, it does not decide for him what he is to become." (Institution Theory Z19) The original speaks of a construct guarding those its acts reach; here it is extended to the relation between a member that sends forces and the member it protects: a state that has sent forces does not thereby acquire a position from which to decide for Stonegorge with whom it deals from now on, or how it negotiates with the Plateau Federation (own undertaking).
Here there is one point stricter than the upstream. The Theory of the State allows a state's armed forces to be used internally under a confirmation: "A ruling that a court makes according to law, and that must be enforced, can constitute this confirmation, the deployment being limited to enforcing that ruling." (Theory of the State Paper 4, §1) That is within one state, where there is a chain of compulsion overhead. The system has no such chain; it holds no compulsion over its members; so joint defense is never turned inward, and there is no exception under confirmation. This step is not derived from Theory of the State N18; the reason lies in the definition of the system. Another sentence of N18 applies all the same: "Force turned outward is not turned inward." The original sentence speaks of states, and the force there means the armed forces and armed force; applied to joint defense, it is read as: armed force used outward is not turned inward.
It may be said that going no further than stopping amounts to leaving Lamp Island to the entering party. After the summer, the ships of the Mirror Sea Fleet left the territorial waters, but the six hundred troops on Lamp Island stayed, and the administration post carried on as before; renewed ninety days at a time, the UCSE withdrew in the winter. The weight of this objection lies in the facts: what was stopped was the Southern Lane; what was not stopped was Lamp Island. But Lamp Island is Stonegorge's, and retaking it is Stonegorge's own defense and its own judgment; whether a sending state expands along with it is for each to decide by its own judgment. What the system can do lies outside stopping: questioning, recording, and asking each member to stop its support for the entering party. The part that was not stopped is written down as cost, as it is. The two thousand four hundred people who stayed on Lamp Island live under the administration post's transit cards and curfew. Read by the unified sentence of the Theory of the State, as regards those acts they are within the reach of the Plateau Federation's acts; this reading gives the Plateau Federation no title of any kind to Lamp Island, and only shows to which address the questions must go. The Secretary-General's letter asked about precisely their situation. How the garrison on Lamp Island later withdrew is written in §13 and in Paper 7, §4; that too is part of the cost.
Up to which line the stopping goes, down to a particular stretch of sea or a particular island, is left to the judgment of the political and military leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons. The full text of this proposition, together with the note on invitation, is set out in the next section.
§2 An Invitation Does Not Change "Not Turned Inward"
Article 4(1) of the Compact is the members' first commitment: not to enter the territory or territorial waters of any state by armed force, and not to set up administration within another state's territory. The UCSE's frigates and battalion entered Stonegorge's territorial waters and territory. Does this article govern the case or not?
A ready answer is: Stonegorge asked, so it does not count. This answers too quickly. If an invitation meant that it did not count, then a government that asked foreign forces in to deal with its own people would not count either. What is to be judged is not whether there was an invitation, but whether the acts after the entry substitute for judgment. By this criterion, three things fall under invitation, and they must be kept apart.
The first: guarding, by invitation, the people who arrive and humanitarian supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will. Such an entry does not join the fighting as a party, judges in place of neither side, and does not require the other side's consent. It is one slot within rescue, written out in full in Paper 6, §8.
The second: "defense" by invitation that is directed, however, against another party within that state. This is helping a government deal with its own people. It is turned inward, and is not allowed; with or without an invitation it is the same.
The third: defense, by invitation, against a colonizing entry from outside. This is the slot of joint defense, or a state's own defense. Each state that sends forces must still pass Gate Four, which the War Treatise sets for the intervention side, and an invitation does not stand in for this judgment (§4).
Read by acts, the UCSE in the matter of Lamp Island points to the third. What it stopped was an entry from outside. It acted within the scope and term of Stonegorge's written authorization: the joint command authorization the two states signed was limited to ninety days, and to Stonegorge's territorial waters and the harbor at Gorgemouth. It did not judge Stonegorge's own affairs in Stonegorge's place: how the Coastal Guard set up its defenses, whether and how Lamp Island was to be retaken, and how to negotiate with the Plateau Federation thereafter were all in Stonegorge's hands. What Article 4(1) bars is an entry that decides on behalf of others; these facts do not point to that kind. As to whether this entry was consistent with Article 4, there is no record of any member raising a question on it, and the Conference of Members made no record on it; how it is judged under the rules is left with those positions. From this the edge of an invitation can also be seen: once the invitation is withdrawn, the forces must withdraw; if they do not, it becomes an entry without consent, and then Article 4 governs it.
A supposed case can serve as a contrast. The Republic of the Sandbars (the Sandbars) is outside the system; from Year 16, its Stability Squads carried out "sweeps," detentions and village burnings in the three northern provinces, and people fled across the Grey River toward the Stonegorge side (Paper 6). Suppose that in the winter of that year, with the approval of Stonegorge's Commonwealth Chamber, about three thousand of the Coastal Guard cross the Grey River, go fifteen kilometers into West Shoal Province along the river, and hold a corridor from three villages to the Grey Ferry crossing, for sixty days. In this supposition there is no invitation, and the Whitewall government declares it "Stonegorge's invasion of the Republic." In the course of the supposition, some armed men from the north follow behind the Coastal Guard and demand that they push west together, and the Coastal Guard refuses. Where foreign forces are within another state's territory alike, whether there is an invitation, and whether what they do is guarding people on the move or fighting for one side, place them in different slots. Which slot this case falls in is judged in Paper 6, §7. Here it is used only to see one point clearly: at the moment the Coastal Guard refuses to push west, what it refuses is fighting for one side in an internal strife.
It may be said that when a government asks others in to put down an uprising, that is its own judgment; the foreign forces only carry it out, and the one judging is still that state's government. The weight of this objection is that the government is indeed a position of that state, and its request is indeed its decision. But putting down an uprising is directed against that state's people. What judges in place of the people there is the combined force of the government that asked and the party that sent troops; the sending party does not, by being asked, stop fighting with its own judgment. The system is never turned inward, and an invitation does not change this.
How far the guarding side may strike back once it is attacked is written in Paper 6, §8, and is not rewritten here.
XZ28 Joint defense stops colonizing entries and is not turned inward. States may have armed forces of cooperation among them, and their function is defense outward, stopping colonization. "Inward" and "outward" are divided by function: what is stopped is a colonizing entry, that is, entering another state by force and deciding on behalf of the people there, whether or not the entering party is a member; "not turned inward" means not entering any state to manage its internal affairs, not enforcing the system's own decisions against members, and not deciding on behalf of the people of any state. It goes no further than stopping, and does not go on to deal with the violating party. Stopping a colonizing entry is not judging the entering party's own affairs in its place; it is refusing to let it judge in others' place, and so it is not substitute exercise (the Prequel, §2); this requires that the entry really be colonizing, and whether it is determined to be so rests with each member that sends forces (XZ30); if the determination is wrong, the stopping itself substitutes for others' judgment on their own affairs, and this is booked to the side that made the determination. Armed force used outward is not turned inward (Theory of the State N18; the original sentence speaks of states, and force there means the armed forces and armed force). Crossing the boundary is checked item by item against the three criteria of Theory of the State N33. The objective does not slide from stopping to regime change or to prolonged occupation (War Treatise §14). After the stopping, the protected party's lines are not drawn for it, and what it is to become is not decided for it (Institution Theory Z19). Theory of the State N18 allows the armed forces to be used internally under a confirmation; that the system is never turned inward is a step stricter than the upstream, the reason being that the system holds no compulsion over its members; it is not derived from N18. An invitation does not change "not turned inward": what is judged is not whether there was an invitation, but whether the acts after the entry substitute for judgment. Guarding, by invitation, the people who arrive and humanitarian supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will, does not join the fighting as a party and judges in place of neither side; it belongs to the third slot of the division by place in Paper 6, XZ42. If "defense" by invitation is directed against another party within that state, it is helping a government deal with its own people; it is turned inward and is not allowed, with or without an invitation. Defense, by invitation, against a colonizing entry from outside is the slot of joint defense or a state's own defense; each state passes Gate Four, and an invitation does not stand in for this judgment (XZ30).
§3 Objects Divided by Where the Colonizing Comes From
For whom does joint defense stop entries? In the matter of Lamp Island, the entering party was outside the system, and the one entered was a member. But colonization does not come only from outside the system.
Three slots are available. Outside the system against a member: Lamp Island is this slot. Member against member: armed entry between two members; there is no instance of it among the matters this paper uses, and §10 writes how it is to be read. A member against outside the system: a member enters a state outside the system with military force and decides on behalf of the people there. There is also a fourth slot, outside the system against outside the system, which joint defense does not take up.
For a member against outside the system there is one actual case. In the summer of Year 17, the Sandbars' Committee for Republican Stability pulled its garrison on the Outer Sandbars back to the mainland in the north. That autumn, two UCSE ships and a company of about one hundred fifty landed on Great Outer Sandbar, and the Office of Defense set up the "Outer Sandbars Provisional Administration Office": it registered the island's roughly two thousand three hundred residents and issued residence cards; it collected fishing fees from boats fishing in the waters of the Outer Sandbars; it replaced the primary-school textbooks with "provisional textbooks" printed in Rivermouth City; and it imposed a night curfew. The second record of the Conference of Members, in the summer of Year 18, wrote "there is a colonizing entry," with the NUT and Stonegorge in favor and the DRP abstaining. This matter has already been read by the norm in Paper 4, §7; here the side of joint defense is looked at. It falls on the people on the islands of the Outer Sandbars; what is to be asked is this: the slot of "a member against outside the system" is available, and whether it is used falls on each state's own first face. Article 16 of the Compact set up the Joint Defense Coordination Council, and the Coordination Council has three joint plans: one for the northern route and the Stonegorge Pass, one for the Stonegorge Strait, and one for the southern shore of the Mirror Sea. The Coordination Council discussed the Outer Sandbars. The NUT's defense representative said: "None of the Coordination Council's plans is directed at a member." No member deployed.
Why these three slots and not four? The ground is where the colonizing comes from, not where it lands. The system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members or from the system itself, wherever it lands; what issues from outside the system and lands outside the system, joint defense does not take up. This has the same shape as the unified sentence of the Theory of the State. The unified sentence speaks of what this state's acts reach: a state is responsible for its acts, wherever those they reach may be. The system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members on the same reasoning. It is not a world police standing above the states. To stop all colonization on behalf of the whole world would require a position that judges for the whole world who is colonizing and whom to stop; that position is precisely the superior that the system does not become.
"Does not take up" refers only to not using armed force directly. Colonization from outside the system against outside the system is still within the range of what the system stands against; shelter, supplies and passage, putting questions, recording and sanctions, and receiving those who leave: these indirect means remain open. Which of them to use, and how far, is left to the judgment of the political and military leaders in their positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
At what point in time the origin is determined is governed by two rules.
One: it is determined by whether the party was a member when the colonization took place, and is not traced back. Suppose that after Stonegorge's exit from the system has taken effect, in the autumn of Year 19, about one thousand of its Coastal Guard cross the Grey River into a ferry-crossing area along the river in the northern half of the Sandbars' West Shoal Province, about thirty square kilometers, set up a "Ferry Crossing Administration Post," collect crossing fees and register those who pass through. This entry takes place when Stonegorge is not a member, and does not count as coming from the system. What this entry itself is, and where the floor lies when Stonegorge comes back with that post to apply for re-accession, is judged in Paper 7, §5.
The other: colonization begun before expulsion still counts, after expulsion, as coming from the system. In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, there was a proposal in the autumn of Year 18 to expel the UCSE, and it did not pass. In the discussion, the NUT's permanent representative said: "Once it is expelled, has what it did on the Outer Sandbars nothing more to do with the system? It went in while it was in the system." Expulsion changes membership from then on; it does not change where that entry came from. How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6), speaking of "elimination" as a mode of maintaining order, says: "Elimination can therefore only move the account between its aspects; it cannot empty the account." (F6 §2.1, Note (elimination)) The original says that removing certain people does not resolve what lies between them; here it is extended to this: expelling a member does not resolve the account of its earlier acts (own undertaking). How expulsion is carried out, and on whom its costs fall, is written in Paper 7, §6.
"Can be used for" is a range; it does not mean that sending forces is equally available in each slot. It may be said that since the slot of "a member against outside the system" is available, the system ought to send forces for the Outer Sandbars, and that if it does not, anti-colonization is empty talk. The weight of this objection is that, available but unused, the slot indeed stopped nothing: the administration office on the Outer Sandbars was still there in Year 20. But "available" says only in which direction this arrangement can be used; whether to send forces is each state's own starting of a war, and requires its own first face to hold (§§4, 5). The system's burden toward colonization that issues from its members includes, beyond sending forces, a whole set: questioning, recording, stopping support, suspension, expulsion. How far each of these went in the matter of the Outer Sandbars, and what remains of this slot once it has narrowed, is written in §5.
One point is left here. Among the coordination and preparation there is no plan directed at a member; the advance preparation for this slot is empty. Whether there should be one is left to the judgment of those in positions: a plan directed at a member may set members on guard against one another in advance; without one, when this slot really has to be used, it starts from nothing. This paper does not decide it for them.
XZ29 Objects are divided by where the colonizing comes from. Joint defense can be used in three slots: outside the system against a member; member against member; a member against outside the system. Outside the system against outside the system, joint defense does not take up; "does not take up" refers only to not using armed force directly, and the indirect means remain open; which of them to use, and how far, is left to the judgment of the political and military leaders in their positions. The ground is the origin: the system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members or from the system itself, wherever it lands, in the same shape as "what this state's acts reach" in the unified sentence of the Theory of the State; it is not a world police standing above the states. The origin is determined by whether the party was a member when the colonization took place, and is not traced back; colonization begun before expulsion still counts, after expulsion, as coming from the system. "Can be used for" is a range; it does not mean that sending forces is equally available in each slot (XZ30).
§4 Sending Forces Is Each State's Own Starting of a War
The Conference of Members recorded "there is a colonizing entry." After the record, the one that sent forces was the UCSE, the one that sent none was the NUT, and the one that wanted to send forces but could not get it passed at home was the DRP. The three states took different paths, and the Compact allows them to differ: it has no clause such as "an attack on one shall be deemed an attack on all, with automatic entry into the war." This section explains why such a clause is not written, and, it not being written, whose matter sending forces is.
First, why it is not written. If membership automatically supplied a reason for starting a war, a state would be drawn, merely by being a member, into a war it had not itself judged; the one making that judgment in its place would be the system. Then the system would in effect decide on war for its members, acquire compulsory power over them, and become the superior it does not become. So the Compact contains no such clause; clause 2 of Article 18 states besides that the record constitutes "no obligation on any member to deploy." If a covenant contains a declaration of the kind "deemed an attack on all," this series reads it as the members' common determination and prior coordination, not as each member's reason for starting a war having already been established. Whether to send forces is still decided by each state separately, under its own law and through a determination that is not monopolized.
Next, whose matter sending forces is. Two terms of the War Treatise are needed here. Starting a war requires that the starting party's own "cannot-not" hold; this is the first face; the oppression others suffer can only be a face seen at the same time, once the first face already holds, and cannot by itself make up a reason for starting a war. The War Treatise sets this one "cannot-not" that starting a war requires as its first theorem, Theorem One; speaking of allies, it says: "An ally that sends forces on the failed party's behalf is opening a war of its own and must pass Theorem One: the ally's own first face must hold" (War Treatise §19). How the first face is recognized when one state sends forces for another, Gate Four of the War Treatise gives the measure: "The intervention side itself need only be genuinely drawn in: its own cultivation is being eroded now, and this erosion comes from the same source as the oppression the other party suffers, the expansion of one and the same 14DD systemic purpose." (War Treatise §13) It also says: "Completely 'selfless' trans-border intervention is, if anything, structurally suspicious" (ibid.). What the system stands against is colonization itself, but this does not supply any state with a stake of its own. That the system stands against colonization does not mean that every member has already been eroded.
Nor does the system's determination stand in for each state's internal determination. The Theory of the State says that starting a war, expanding it, and crossing the boundary are each a new decision, each determined on its own: "The determination is not monopolized by a single position, is time-limited, and is open to questioning" (Theory of the State N30). That sentence is set within one state. The record of the Conference of Members is external questioning and recording; it does not stand in for the sending state's internal determination, which is not monopolized; inside the sending state there must still be a determination that the side declaring war does not monopolize. In the matter of Lamp Island, each of the three states went through its own positions. In the UCSE the Executive Council proposed and the joint session voted within seven days; in the debate a member asked on the spot whether the detention of two freighters counted as an attack. In the NUT the Council for External Affairs decided. In the DRP the President proposed, the National Purposes Commission gave its opinion, and the People's Assembly voted, falling seventeen votes short. The decisions of the three states each fell on their own positions.
The hardest step is this: the first face of a state that sends forces, who states it and who questions it. Within seventy-two hours the UCSE wrote its explanation under clause 3 of Article 18 of the Compact, listing three grounds; the DRP's permanent representative said that the detention of the freighters is not the same as an attack on the UCSE. Both were entered in the record. By Gate Four, the three can be looked at separately as to which kind of ground each is. The first two, the detention of ships and crew and the halt on the only sea route, point to erosion that the UCSE itself was suffering at that moment and that issued from one and the same entry; they are the kind of ground Gate Four asks about. The third is Stonegorge's written request; it is an invitation, and an invitation does not stand in for the judgment to join the war (§2).
Whether these three suffice for the UCSE's first face to hold, this paper does not judge. That judgment is made by the UCSE's internal determination, which is not monopolized: the joint session approved by 189 votes to 122, and the dissenting votes and that question put on the spot are both within the UCSE's own channels. The system only records and only questions; the DRP's objection stays in the record, and the sending state cannot close this question (Paper 2, §§1, 4). How a particular sending of forces is judged under the rules is a matter for the judgment layer, and the account falls on the positions and persons there.
One more side must be kept apart. Stonegorge's asking allies to send forces is, for Stonegorge's own defense, an expansion of the participants. The War Treatise says that any expansion of a war, bringing in allies included, must pass a "cannot-not" of its own (War Treatise §14). Asking others to come is a step Stonegorge judges for itself; whether the state that comes sends forces is judged by the state that comes. The two are not one.
Under the second Preliminary Article of Perpetual Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden), Kant speaks of a practice: one state hiring out its troops to another to fight a war against an enemy the two do not have in common. He says that this too is to be counted among what the article forbids, "for the subjects are used and used up as things to be handled at will" (my translation; denn die Unterthanen werden dabey als nach Belieben zu handhabende Sachen gebraucht und verbraucht; Zum ewigen Frieden, First Section, Preliminary Article 2, commentary, per the first edition, Nicolovius, 1795, Project Gutenberg EBook #46873; compared with the English translation by M. C. Smith, EBook #50922; tier A).
The common question is whether a state's soldiers can be taken to fight a war that is not their own state's. The agreement goes this far: they cannot. If a state's soldiers are taken to fight a war against an enemy that is not their own state's, people are treated as things; that sending forces requires the sending state's own first face to hold is the other side of the same thing. They part in two places. What Kant forbids is hiring out troops, a kind of trade; this series does not forbid joint defense, and several states sending forces together is in itself unobjectionable; what it forbids is letting membership or a covenant of alliance supply a state's first face for it. Kant's reason falls on the subjects who are used; this series has one more layer beyond that: the position that supplies a state's first face for it thereby becomes its superior. This is a division of scope, not a refutation.
It may be said that if each state judges for itself, the system is left with nothing but a record on paper; in the matter of Lamp Island, only one state actually sent forces. The weight of this objection is that when each judges for itself, it may indeed be that no one comes. The cost is written down as it is: the system does not guarantee that anyone will come. But the system's strength never lay in issuing orders to states to send forces. It lies in questioning, in recording, in asking all members to stop their support for the entering party, and in non-war aid (§8). Whether a state's first face holds is determined concretely inside that state, and the account falls on the positions and persons there. The full text of this proposition is set out in the next section.
§5 The Three Slots Narrow Differently; Spillover
The previous section said that each state's sending of forces must pass Gate Four. This gate narrows to different degrees in the three slots.
In the two slots of outside the system against a member and member against member, the one attacked is a member, and it is the party being stood beside. For another member to send forces, it must point to erosion of itself that is under way and that comes from the same source as what the attacked party suffers. In the matter of Lamp Island, the UCSE's first two grounds were of this kind: its ships detained, its sea route halted, both issuing from one and the same entry.
The slot of a member against outside the system is different. The one colonized is a state outside the system, and the source of the erosion is a member; the other members themselves have mostly not been eroded by that same source. In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, the one entering was the UCSE; there is no record that the ships, routes or people of the NUT, the DRP or Stonegorge themselves suffered erosion because of the administration office on the Outer Sandbars, nor did any state explain a sending of forces on that basis. Gate Four is hardest to pass in this slot, and in practice what often remains is only non-war aid and stopping support. This narrowing must be written openly, the cost written down as it is, and no side door opened: one cannot, because this slot is hard to use, loosen the first face and let "anti-colonization" itself serve as a state's reason for starting a war. That is exactly the selfless intervention which the previous section said is structurally suspicious.
Once narrowed, this slot does not come to nothing. Its real content lies in three places, which must be written together.
One, the system's burden. The system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members: questioning, recording, checks, suspension and expulsion are used as they stand, and all members stop their own share of support for the colonizing party (Paper 4, §§7, 8). In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, the Conference of Members opened questioning and made two records; the NUT stopped the transit of military supplies through the Stonegorge Pass bound for the Outer Sandbars; the DRP withdrew from the joint exercise held under the plan for the southern shore of the Mirror Sea; Stonegorge said that port services were commercial contracts, and went on refueling ships bound for the Outer Sandbars as usual; the proposal to suspend the UCSE's right to vote and the proposal to expel the UCSE both failed to pass. How far each of these went has been judged in Paper 4, §7, and Paper 7, §6.
Two, the colonized party outside the system receives non-war aid and admission (Paper 6, §6). In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, this point is recorded as it is: it was not done. By Year 20, the member that had entered was the UCSE, and none of the other members had provided the residents of the Outer Sandbars with aid of the kind of supplies, admission or passage, nor had any member put forward a proposal of this kind.
Three, sending forces is not excluded; it only requires the sending state's own first face to hold.
Reading the three together is a step of this series (own undertaking). To say that joint defense can be used for a member against outside the system is not only to say that forces may be sent; it is to say that the system bears a whole set of burdens toward colonization from this origin, of which sending forces is the hardest, and the first two do not depend on sending forces.
One more situation must be written separately: spillover. Under Gate Four, the War Treatise lists the stakes an intervention side may have, one of which is the other side's internal oppression spilling over, and it goes on: "under Gate Four, each of these must be erosion already under way and from the same source as the oppression suffered by the party being stood beside" (War Treatise §13). How spillover is to be read, the upstream does not develop; here one step is taken (own undertaking). If the spillover is that expansion itself reaching across to the intervention side, as when shellfire lands on its side, pursuit crosses the border, or people are driven across in order to overwhelm the admitting party, it can be erosion that is under way and from the same source. What must be stated is which concrete mechanism it is.
One matter sits at the edge of this point. In the autumn of Year 16, the Grey Ferry camp that Stonegorge had set up on the east bank of the Grey River was twice shelled from the west bank; twenty-three people died, nine of them children. The Whitewall government said that what it fired on were armed men crossing the border, and that the north's armed forces were hiding in the camp. The Secretariat sent staff to the camp for two days, and their report said: "Over these two days, no weapons were seen inside the camp." The Conference of Members recorded the two shellings, 4 to 0. If a state were to use this matter as its first face, what it would have to make clear is which concrete mechanism it is, landing within which state's territory, and landing on whom. How this matter is judged is written in Paper 6, §7; this paper does not judge it.
Those who come are not themselves erosion. When people flee across from the other bank, receiving them is the part that must be done, and the burden goes through sharing among members (Paper 6, §§3, 4). The numbers and the burden of admission do not by themselves supply a first face; to use those who come as a reason for starting a war is to treat them as bargaining chips with which others start a war.
Two further things are not waived because of spillover. The critical threshold is borne by the party being stood beside: it is that party that has been pressed to the critical threshold and has itself risen. The intervention side must still pass, separately, the two tests of fa-mou (attacking through strategy) and fa-jiao (attacking through diplomacy) exhausted and an ending can be envisioned (War Treatise §13); neither membership nor figures of scale, such as how many people have come, stand in for these judgments.
It may be said that the slot of a member against outside the system is available in name but hard to use in fact, and that the claim of "available" comes to nothing. The weight of this objection lies in the Outer Sandbars: the administration office was still there in Year 20, no state sent forces, and non-war aid did not arrive either. But the real content of this slot lies in the three places above, and the first two do not depend on sending forces. The second was not done in the matter of the Outer Sandbars; that is a failure to do it, not an emptiness of the slot itself. The third is hard; that is a cost, and it is written down as it is. Which concrete mechanism counts as spillover, and whether it counts as under way and from the same source, is left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
XZ30 Each participating state's sending of forces is its own starting of a war, and each passes Gate Four on its own (carried over from War Treatise §13, §19). The Compact does not write "an attack on one shall be deemed an attack on all, with automatic entry into the war": if membership automatically supplied the first face, the system would in effect decide on war for its members and acquire compulsory power. If a covenant contains a declaration of this kind, it is read as the members' common determination and prior coordination, not as each member's first face having already been established. An ally's sending of forces is the ally's own starting of a war, and the ally's own first face must hold (War Treatise §19). The first face of the intervention side is recognized by its own cultivation being eroded now, and by this erosion coming from the same source as the oppression suffered by the party being stood beside (War Treatise §13). Completely selfless trans-border intervention is, if anything, structurally suspicious; what the system stands against is colonization itself, and this does not supply any state with a stake of its own. The system's determination does not stand in for each participating state's internal determination, which is not monopolized (Theory of the State N30). An attacked member's asking allies to send forces is, for its own war, an expansion of the participants (War Treatise §14). Defending, at a state's request, against a colonizing entry from outside is still the participating state's own starting of a war, and the invitation does not stand in for this judgment. The three slots narrow differently: in the two slots of outside the system against a member and member against member, other members must point to erosion of themselves that is under way and from the same source; in the slot of a member against outside the system, the other members themselves have mostly not been eroded by the same source, Gate Four is hardest to pass in this slot, and in practice what often remains is only non-war aid and stopping support. This narrowing is written openly, the cost is written down as it is, and no side door is opened. Once narrowed, the real content of this slot lies in three places, written together. One, the system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members; questioning, recording, checks, suspension and expulsion are used as they stand, and all members stop their support (Paper 4, XZ27; XZ33; Paper 7, XZ50). Two, the colonized party outside the system receives non-war aid and admission (Paper 6, XZ41). Three, sending forces is not excluded; it only requires the sending state's own first face to hold. Reading the three together is a step of this series (own undertaking). Spillover: the other side's expansion itself reaching across to the intervention side, as with shellfire, pursuit across the border, or people driven across in order to overwhelm the admitting party, can be erosion that is under way and from the same source, and which concrete mechanism it is must be stated (own undertaking). Those who come are not themselves erosion: receiving them is the part that must be done, and the burden goes through sharing (Paper 6, XZ38, XZ39); the numbers and the burden of admission do not automatically supply a first face. The critical threshold is borne by the party being stood beside; the intervention side must still pass, separately, fa-mou and fa-jiao exhausted and an ending can be envisioned, and neither membership nor figures of scale stand in for these judgments.
§6 What Is Standing Is Only Coordination and Preparation
Lamp Island fell in only two days. Had the system had a force that could deploy at any time, could it have stopped the entry?
That is exactly what Stonegorge thought. In the summer of Year 16, the year before the matter of Lamp Island, Stonegorge's Commonwealth Chamber passed a resolution by 112 votes to 68 asking the Conference of Members to amend the Compact to set up a "Three-Borders Standing Force" of six thousand, stationed permanently at Gorgemouth and at the UCSE's Eagle Gap and commanded by the director of the Joint Defense Coordination Office: "on a colonizing entry, it may deploy upon a determination by the Secretary-General, the members confirming afterward." In the autumn, the Conference of Members discussed the proposal. The UCSE's permanent representative said: "Who orders the standing force to deploy? Whoever gives that order stands above the members. The UCSE supports one more joint exercise and one more site of prepositioned logistics." The NUT's permanent representative read out clause 2 of Article 2 and Article 17 of the Compact. The DRP's permanent representative said: "The Republic is opposed." Amending the Compact requires the consent of all members, and the proposal did not enter the procedure. At the same session, the Conference decided, 4 to 0, to add a prepositioned logistics site at Gorgemouth and one more joint exercise in the Stonegorge Strait each year.
One side of this matter has been judged in Paper 4, §6: whether, under pressure, the system's coordination and preparation grew into a force, which is the danger of mirror assimilation at the system level. Here the positive rule is written. What may be done is coordination and preparation: joint plans, joint exercises, prepositioned logistics, practicing in ordinary times until the forces can work together. What is not set up is a force that can deploy of its own accord. The reason lies in the question of the UCSE's permanent representative: if a force can deploy of its own accord, someone must give the order; whoever gives the order is a superior. The words "it may deploy upon a determination by the Secretary-General" put the decision to deploy in the one position of the Secretary-General, and with that the system grows a superior (Paper 7, §2). One more depot, one more exercise, is still within coordination and preparation, because the decision to deploy is not inside it.
The matter of Lamp Island separated the two exactly. The UCSE's action used the Coordination Office's joint plan for the strait and the prepositioned depot at Gorgemouth; but the deployment was still decided by the UCSE under its own law: ninety days, approved by the joint session. Preparation belongs to ordinary times; deployment belongs to each state.
Three places upstream hold preparation in. The War Treatise writes of the second form of attack: internal oppression is preparation for attack, and the outside party, seeing it intensify, knows this to be a potential attack directed at itself, and "must prepare to defend." (War Treatise §5) What it gives is only preparation; sending forces cannot be read out of it. Preventive war does not qualify: "a threat that lies in the future has not caused one's own cultivation to fail to hold in the present, so the second condition is not met." (War Treatise §13) Deterrence, too, reaches only as far as preparation: it does not make the other side give up its intention to expand, and a deterrent war still does not qualify (War Treatise §10).
Coordination and preparation have two further edges. One is the name: standing coordination may not be a wartime structure under another name. The Theory of the State says: "What is renamed, or continued through ordinary procedure, does not by itself prove that it has been lifted: recognized by function, not by name" (Theory of the State N22). The other is the time limit: "A temporary structure of guarding must be re-examined after its conditions change, and is not renewed automatically on the strength of its origin" (Institution Theory Z22). After the matter of Lamp Island, the joint command structure was dissolved, and what remained were a few plans and a few depots; the plans and depots themselves are also under these two edges.
The appendices of F6 contain two sample charters that can serve as contrasts (a working demonstration; used only as an example). Appendix A describes an interstellar federation, and the opening sentence of its Article 14 is "The Federation maintains no standing military force." When collective defense is needed, a joint defense force is formed for the occasion, and "Authorization automatically terminates upon expiration." (F6, Appendix A, Article 14) Its Article 13 places several things outside legitimate force: "Preemptive attacks, punitive strikes, and enforcement of Federation resolutions through force are all outside the scope of legitimate force." (F6, Appendix A, Article 13) These places can be taken up. The same appendix has the joint defense force established by authorization of the Federal Assembly; this strand this series does not take: the system does not authorize the use of armed force. Appendix B describes a tighter federation on a shared continent, which sets up a standing defense force and allows it, once the Constitutional Court has confirmed, to be used between members: "The defense force may not be used in the Commonwealth's internal affairs, unless one member is committing armed aggression against another and this is confirmed by the Constitutional Court." (F6, Appendix B, Article 26) That is what the end looks like where there is already a superior with force overhead. A system of cooperation does not go that far.
In the third Preliminary Article, Kant says: "Standing armies ... shall in time cease altogether." (my translation; Stehende Heere ... sollen mit der Zeit ganz aufhören.; Zum ewigen Frieden, First Section, Preliminary Article 3, same source) His first reason is that standing armies, by their readiness always to appear equipped for war, ceaselessly threaten other states with war (Denn sie bedrohen andere Staaten unaufhörlich mit Krieg, durch die Bereitschaft, immer dazu gerüstet zu erscheinen; ibid.). He then sets one case apart: "It is an altogether different matter with the voluntary, periodically undertaken exercise of citizens in arms, by which they secure themselves and their fatherland against attacks from outside." (my translation; Ganz anders ist es mit der freywilligen periodisch vorgenommenen Uebung der Staatsbürger in Waffen bewandt, sich und ihr Vaterland dadurch gegen Angriffe von außen zu sichern.; ibid.)
The common question is how far preparation for defense against the outside may go. The agreement goes this far: standing armed force that can deploy at any time is itself a threat to other states; preparation and practice for defense against the outside are another matter. They part in two places. Kant speaks of a single state's standing army, and his reasons are the arms race and the use of people as machines and instruments in another's hands; this series speaks of the system level, and its reason is that a force that can deploy of its own accord needs someone to give the order, and whoever gives the order is a superior. How each member's own armed forces are set up is not within this rule.
It may be said that without a standing force the system cannot stop a sudden entry. Stonegorge's proposal said just this, and that Lamp Island fell in two days also looks like evidence for it. The weight of this objection is real. But whether an entry can be stopped falls on each state's deployment and on advance preparation: only when the plans are written, the depots stocked and the practice done in ordinary times can the deploying state come quickly. If, for the sake of coming quickly, one position were allowed to issue deployment orders on behalf of the members, the system would no longer be cooperation. The cost is written down as it is, and is not made up by growing a superior. How deep preparation must go before the forces count as practiced enough to work together is left to military leaders.
XZ31 What is standing is only coordination and preparation. Joint plans, joint exercises, prepositioned logistics, practicing in ordinary times until the forces can work together; no force that can deploy of its own accord is set up. If a force can deploy of its own accord, someone must give the order, and whoever gives the order is a superior. War Treatise §5 says that the outside party, seeing the other side's oppression intensify, must prepare to defend; sending forces cannot be read out of this. Preventive war does not qualify (War Treatise §13). Deterrence reaches only as far as preparation (War Treatise §10). What is renamed, or continued through ordinary procedure, is recognized by function, not by name (Theory of the State N22): standing coordination may not be a wartime structure under another name. A temporary structure of guarding must be re-examined after its conditions change, and is not renewed automatically on the strength of its origin (Institution Theory Z22).
§7 Deployment, Withdrawal and Command Rest with Each State; Dismantling After the War
The UCSE's battalion and frigates stayed in Stonegorge for two terms of ninety days. On the sixth day the joint session approved ninety days; in the summer it renewed them for ninety days by 171 votes to 148; in the winter, when the term ran out, the UCSE withdrew and the joint command structure was dissolved. Deployment, renewal, withdrawal: each step was a decision the UCSE made itself; deployment and renewal each went through one vote of the joint session, and when the term ran out without renewal, the forces withdrew.
This is what the rule looks like. Each state taking part in the war decides on deployment and withdrawal separately, under its own law, through a determination that is not monopolized, and with a time limit; the sending state explains its own first face publicly to the system (Paper 2, §4). Sending forces and the joint action themselves are the acts of each participating state, not the acts of the system. In this action, what was done in the system's name was only the part within coordination and preparation: plans, exercises, depots; the record under Article 18 is another thing, a public question and record (Paper 2, §1; XZ9).
Joint command, too, is in the hands of each state. The joint command authorization the UCSE and Stonegorge signed bore the signatures of these two parties only, and was limited to ninety days and to Stonegorge's territorial waters and the harbor at Gorgemouth. Article 19 of the Compact says the same: joint command exists only within the scope and term of each participating state's written authorization, each participating state may withdraw at any time, and when the joint action ends, the joint command structure is dissolved. This article, too, is an example.
Why so narrow? Because joint command must not carry a state into action that its own first face does not cover. If the UCSE's first face holds, what it covers is its ships and its sea route; retaking Lamp Island is another matter. The War Treatise says that any expansion of a war, in scope, in objective, or in participants, must pass a "cannot-not" of its own (War Treatise §14). Each state judges its own expansions by this. It also says: "If what appears is a new 'cannot-not' unrelated to the original objective, it does not count as an expansion of this war; it is an independent application of Theorem One in a new round, and must pass Theorem One on its own from the start." (ibid.) If joint command were a machine that moves forward by itself, a state would be carried by it through steps it had not itself judged. That the authorization states its scope and term is precisely what keeps it from moving that way.
An emergency can change the point at which being questioned takes place; it does not withdraw being questioned. The Theory of Government, writing of emergency, says that an emergency "may move review and being questioned from beforehand to afterward, but it does not withdraw being questioned" (Theory of Government G30). The UCSE's law places being questioned before deployment, the joint session voting within seven days; even if some state's law allows deployment first and approval afterward, the questioning afterward remains. Whether the determination holds, and when it ends, are likewise not monopolized by the party taking the measures (Theory of Government G32).
Nor does joint action rest on concealment from each participating state's own people. The War Treatise defines gui (deception) as "the war-technique that operates at the cost of oppressing one's own side's subjectivity and cutting off internal questioning" (War Treatise §12). The original speaks of a warring party toward its own side; here it is extended to the joint action of several states (own undertaking): joint action may not, on grounds of secrecy, make it impossible for the determinations and questioning that ought to take place inside each participating state to happen. If the reasons and materials that ought to reach the positions with authority over the questioning are sealed off, or if the responsible party gains, through secrecy, a status in which it is not questioned, the case falls under the cutting off spoken of here; not every detail of an action that has not been made public is already such a case. An emergency can change the point at which being questioned takes place, but does not withdraw being questioned, as in the previous paragraph.
When the fighting ends, the wartime joint structures must be taken apart. The War Treatise says: "All the temporary structures built in wartime ... must be actively dismantled after the war ends. Not 'let them naturally fade'; not 'keep them in case.'" (War Treatise §18) In the matter of Lamp Island, the joint command structure was dissolved when the term ran out, and was not kept on as a standing headquarters.
One matter has not run its course. In the exchange of fire in the Southern Lane that summer, three UCSE sailors and five Plateau Federation sailors died; each side said the other had fired first, and there was no third-party determination. In which record this matter was entered, there is no record. Here the address where it ought to fall is written. On the UCSE's side, it falls on the positions through which its sending of forces passed: the Executive Council, and the joint session that voted on the renewal in the summer. On the entering party's side, it falls on that party's own positions. What has not been determined is recorded, as it is, as undetermined, and the case is not closed on one side's version (Paper 2, §2; Paper 3, §2).
It may be said that if each state can withdraw at any time, joint action cannot win. The weight of this objection is that a joint force from which someone may pull out at any time does indeed find a long war hard to fight. But this series does not judge strategy or tactics; that is left to military leaders. The time limit and the possibility of withdrawal exist so that no state is carried into a war it has not itself judged. To fight a long war, each state must judge afresh at each renewal; the joint session's vote that summer did exactly this. What form command takes and how forces are composed, this paper does not write.
XZ32 Deployment, withdrawal and command all rest with each state; dismantling after the war (carried over from Theory of the State N22, N30). Each state taking part in the war decides on deployment and withdrawal separately, under its own law, through a determination that is not monopolized, and with a time limit; the sending state explains its own first face publicly to the system (Paper 2, XZ12). Sending forces and the joint action themselves are the acts of each participating state, not the acts of the system. Joint command exists only within the scope and term each state has authorized, and does not carry a state into action that its own first face does not cover. Each state judges its own expansions by War Treatise §14; a new "cannot-not" unrelated to the original objective does not count as an expansion, and must pass Theorem One from the start. An emergency may move being questioned to afterward; it does not withdraw being questioned (Theory of Government G30, G32). Joint action does not cut off each participating state's own internal questioning by concealment; whether it is cut off depends on whether the positions with authority over the questioning can obtain the necessary grounds, and whether the procedure can still be used to check (the gui of War Treatise §12 extended to joint action; own undertaking). Wartime joint structures are actively dismantled after the war, and are not kept in case (War Treatise §18).
§8 Not Sending Forces Is Not Bearing Nothing
The NUT sent no forces. Its Council for External Affairs made four decisions, 5 to 0: to open the Stonegorge Pass railway and the airspace of the Northern District for the transit of the UCSE's battalion and supplies; to supply Stonegorge with fuel and medicine; to have the transit station in the Northern District stop handling military cargo for the Mirror Sea Fleet; and to send no forces. Under clause 4 of Article 18 of the Compact, the NUT reported these decisions to the Conference of Members. The DRP's proposal to send forces did not pass the People's Assembly; under the same clause it reported: "Between the Republic and the Plateau Federation there is only trade in fertilizer; there is no cooperation in arms, logistics or transit."
What do members that sent no forces bear?
For a member whose first face does not hold and that sends no forces, its share lies in non-war aid: supplies, admission, passage. The War Treatise, speaking of the two kinds of aid, makes this layer clear: "Non-war aid — shelter, supplies, passage, the preservation of culture — does not pass through Theorem One; any ally that holds to point two may give it." (War Treatise §19) Point two is that aid must be directed toward letting the other party stand up again as a subject, not toward making it one's own appendage. The same passage also says: "A purely disinterested ally can be an excellent giver of non-war aid; its sending of forces does not stand under the criterion." (ibid.) Sending forces must pass the criterion for starting a war; giving passage or fuel need not. The NUT's share lay in the railway, the airspace, the fuel and the medicine. It is not zero because it sent no forces.
This share can be apportioned through a common procedure. Article 19 of the Compact allows members that have not deployed to share aid other than armed force through the sharing procedure of Article 12; this article and the sharing formula of Article 12 are both examples. In the matter of Lamp Island, the NUT's fuel and medicine were given by its own decision; whether they were apportioned through the common procedure, there is no record.
The other share is one that all members must bear: stopping their own share of support for the colonizing party, that is, arms, logistics, transit, and cooperation within joint arrangements. The NUT stopped the military cargo that the transit station in the Northern District handled for the Mirror Sea Fleet; the DRP reported that there were none of these things between it and the entering party. Whether or not a member sends forces, this share is there.
Each state's report, entered in the record, is an account visible from outside (Paper 3, §§1, 2). Reporting "no cooperation" and reporting nothing at all are not the same thing. Power Theory, speaking of how recognition is transmitted through a network, has said: "At the network-topology layer, silence (with subject-position registration, without an operational counter-vector) is a zero-resistance transmitting node that objectively amplifies the power gradient." (Power Theory P3 §V.4) The original speaks of bystanders in a field; here it is extended to members that keep silent within the system: a member that carries on cooperating with the colonizing party and says nothing at all is, in that network, a node that adds no resistance, passing force on for the entering party (own undertaking).
"Stopping support" applies equally to colonization that issues from a member. In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, Stonegorge's harbor at Gorgemouth went on as usual fueling UCSE ships bound for the Outer Sandbars; its report said: "Port services are commercial contracts; the ships of the Mirror Sea Fleet also fuel at Gorgemouth as usual." Paper 4, §7, has already read this statement by the norm: the facts point to the side of transmission, not to neutrality; how it is judged under the rules lies with the Conference of Members and with Stonegorge's own positions. Here it is only pointed back to.
It may be said that the DRP has a fertilizer trade with the Plateau Federation, and that whether to stop it is the DRP's own affair. The weight of this objection is that ordinary trade is indeed not cooperation in support of an entry; to count all dealings as support would turn this rule into a total blockade. But what this rule requires to be stopped is only the share of support for the colonizing party: arms, logistics, transit, cooperation within joint arrangements. Ordinary trade is checked separately against the line between checks and erosion (Paper 4, §5), and is not within this rule. Which things count as support, at the margin, is left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
XZ33 Not sending forces is not bearing nothing. For a member whose first face does not hold and that sends no forces, its share lies in non-war aid, that is, supplies, admission and passage, and can be apportioned through a common procedure. All members must stop their own share of support for the colonizing party: arms, logistics, transit, and cooperation within joint arrangements. Non-war aid such as shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture does not pass through Theorem One, and any ally that holds to the point of not making the other party its appendage may give it; a purely disinterested ally can be an excellent giver of non-war aid, and its sending of forces does not stand under the criterion (War Treatise §19).
§9 After One Side of a Split Has Been Admitted
The first eight sections all spoke of one state entering another. There is a harder situation: a state that has itself split in two.
The Republic of the Sandbars is outside the system. In the winter of Year 15, its President set up the Committee for Republican Stability and declared the three northern provinces to be in a "state of stability"; thereafter the Stability Squads carried out sweeps, detentions and village burnings in the north, and people fled to the east bank of the Grey River and to the NUT's Northern District. In the spring of Year 18, members of the assemblies of the three northern provinces and representatives of port and fishing associations convened the "Provisional Assembly of the Republic" at Sandmouth, declaring that the Stability Committee in Whitewall no longer represented the Republic and that the Provisional Assembly was the sole legitimate representative of the Republic of the Sandbars. The Provisional Assembly controls Sandmouth Province, the whole of North Strand Province and the northern half of West Shoal Province, about nine million people, and has its own taxation, courts and guard; its Northern Guard numbers about thirty thousand. The Whitewall government calls this a rebellion, still claims to represent the whole, and continues to fight in the southern half of West Shoal Province. In the summer of Year 18 the Provisional Assembly applied to join the system. In the spring of Year 19 a vote was taken under Article 7(a) of the Compact: the UCSE consented; the NUT's Council for External Affairs voted 3 to 2, short of four, so that the NUT could not give its consent; the DRP did not consent. There was no admission. These events were written in Paper 1, §8.
This section uses a supposed case. Suppose that in the spring of Year 19 all three members give written consent, and the three provinces actually under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth are admitted as a member under the name "the Republic of the Sandbars (Sandmouth)," the instrument of admission stating that "the admission does not recognize its claim to the whole." Suppose that in the summer of the same year the Stability Squads from Whitewall cross the dividing line between the two sides' control and enter North Strand Province. The Northern Guard resists, and Sandmouth asks the Conference of Members and each member for assistance. Whether the Conference of Members makes a record and in what wording, whether each member sends forces and what it sends, this paper does not stipulate. By this time Stonegorge is no longer a member; the Grey River is still the route by which people from between the two sides flee east.
This supposed matter falls on the people in the three provinces actually under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth, on the Northern Guard, and on the people of North Strand Province after the Stability Squads crossed the dividing line. What is to be asked is: after admission, is an entry against the admitted party an object of joint defense, and how far does the stopping go?
This question has a history. Kant's fifth Preliminary Article forbids any state to interfere by force in the constitution and government of another state, and at the same time leaves an exception: when a state splits in two through internal discord, each part claiming to represent the whole, assisting one of them does not count as interference; internal strife that has not reached such a state of split still admits no intervention by outside force. The Theory of the State, in its conversation with Kant, handed the case of "splitting into two states and helping one of them" to this series (Theory of the State Paper 6, §5). Paper 1, §8, has already brought it into mutual covenant: the system's admitting one side of a split is a covenant and also an act, and the three guardrails on admission are written there. The exception itself is taken up in the final section of Paper 6. Here only how it connects to mutual defense is written.
Once one side has been admitted as a member, the other side's entry against it is "outside the system against a member"; by §3, this is an object of joint defense. The nature of the war is thereby defense, not intervention in another state's internal strife. Before admission, the very same crossing of the dividing line is a step in an internal strife; while the system has not yet admitted, then by Paper 6, §10, the system has judged that it cannot yet intervene by armed force. This judgment is the result the system's procedure gives: admission requires the consent of all members; it was not obtained, and the result is "not yet." It is not the meaning of each vote: in the case of Sandmouth, the NUT's Council for External Affairs voted 3 to 2, a majority in favor of consenting, only short of four; the DRP did not consent. Each state's votes stand as recorded, each cast by that state's positions, and the account falls there as well. This is a blank the system deliberately leaves: before things reach that point, it first does not recognize, leaving room to see how events develop; the observation period of observer members was set up for just such situations (Paper 1, §9; XZ7). Admission changes the premise of this judgment.
But what admission changes is only the nature of the war; it does not automatically give each member a reason for starting a war. In mutual defense, the third guardrail goes one step further and a fourth is added; together with the first two, these are the four guardrails for this matter. The third: what admission recognizes is that part itself, and joint defense, too, guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not assert the claim to the whole on its behalf. The instrument of admission recognizes those three provinces, so what is guarded is those three provinces, and the stopping goes as far as the dividing line between the two sides. The fourth: when the admitted party defends itself, its first face holds directly; other members that send forces still each pass Gate Four.
By these two, the questions in the case can be settled one by one. The Stability Squads' entry belongs to "outside the system against a member." The first face of Sandmouth's self-defense and the first face of other members' sending of forces are not the same thing: Sandmouth's holds directly; the UCSE, the NUT and the DRP must each state the erosion they themselves are suffering now and from the same source, and the classification of §4 is used as it stands. What is guarded is the piece the instrument of admission recognizes; the stopping goes as far as the dividing line and does not cross it to take Whitewall's ground on Sandmouth's behalf. If the three members' determinations do not agree, each one's decision falls on its own positions: the UCSE's joint session, the NUT's Council for External Affairs, the DRP's People's Assembly. Opening the land border of about forty kilometers between the NUT's Northern District and the north, and letting supplies through, is non-war aid, under §8.
It may be said that admission is itself taking a side, and amounts to giving a reason for sending forces in advance. The weight of this objection is that admission does change the nature of the war, and Whitewall will read it as the system having taken the rebels' side. But admission is a covenant and also an act, itself public and open to questioning (Paper 1, §8). What it changes is the nature; sending forces still requires each state's own first face. If the dividing line itself is disputed, where the stopping goes is left to the judgment of those in positions.
The full text of this proposition, together with the slot of a member's own split, is set out in §11. The next section first reads "member against member," because the last guardrail for a member's split is to be read by it.
§10 "Member Against Member" Is Read by Acts
§3 said that joint defense can be used for "member against member." But the War Treatise has a very hard sentence for this slot. Writing of the collision of 14DD against 14DD, it says that this is a conflict between two directions of expansion, and that SAE war theory sets up no criteria for such collisions, "because both sides operate at 14DD, neither uses 'subjects as ends' as the starting point for judgment, and SAE criteria do not function for them" (War Treatise §5). When two members fight, can Gate Four still judge?
The Theory of the State has found a reading for this sentence: "This paper does not read '14DD against 14DD' as naming any particular pair of states; read by acts, it corresponds to the stretch after both sides' acts have crossed the boundary." (Theory of the State Paper 6, §4) It is read not by the names of states but by acts. The slot of "member against member" is read in this way.
So this slot divides into two kinds. Where one side enters and the other only defends, it is the slot of joint defense: the defending side's first face holds directly, and other members each pass Gate Four. Where both sides are expanding, joint defense takes no side, and the system does only the non-war part. For Gate Four to be able to judge in the first kind, "the 15DD party" of which the War Treatise speaks must be read as the party that, by acts, is the one entered and the one decided for by another, not as any kind of state (own undertaking). The Theory of the State Prequel already has a sentence: "A leaning is a direction, not an identity." It goes on: "That a state leans more toward the 14DD direction is no ground for presuming in advance that each of its acts is expansion or oppression; nor is a state's leaning more toward the 15DD direction a ground for presuming in advance that each of its acts is defense." (the Theory of the State Prequel, §7) Judgment falls on acts, and a leaning does not prejudge.
The second situation is itself a diagnosis. If there are two members in the system that both lean strongly toward the 14DD direction and attack each other, this shows that something has gone wrong with the system: its questions, its records and its checks have failed to bring their entries against one another to a stop before arms were used. This lies on the same line as Paper 8's saying that "15DD predominance" is a diagnosis, not a threshold (Paper 8, §2).
Armed entry between two members does not occur among the matters this paper uses. The reading must rely on contrasts.
One contrast is the exchange of fire in the Southern Lane. Each side said the other had fired first, and there was no third-party determination. The entry into Lamp Island itself was clear; by the moment of the exchange of fire, who had fired first could already be made out only through records and questioning (Paper 3, §2). When member fights member, even "who is entering whom" can often be made out only in this way.
Another contrast takes the case of the previous section one step further. Suppose that in the autumn of Year 19 the Stability Squads fall back south of the two sides' original dividing line. In the winter of the same year, the Northern Guard crosses the dividing line into the southern half of West Shoal Province and takes two towns along the river, saying that it is "pursuing the artillery positions that shelled North Strand Province." The Whitewall government says: "This is an attack by the rebels on the rest of the Republic." The statement of the Provisional Assembly at Sandmouth says: "The Guard goes only as far as the artillery positions." In the spring of Year 20, the Guard is still in the two towns. What each member says and does about this stretch, this paper does not stipulate.
The slot must first be made clear. After admission, Sandmouth is a member and Whitewall is outside the system. This stretch, in which the Guard crosses the dividing line, is "a member against outside the system," not this section's "member against member." It is used here only to see one thing clearly: within one and the same war, how to read which stretch is defense and which stretch is also expansion.
Reading by acts means looking at several things. One: whether the threat is being dissolved. The reason Sandmouth gave is pursuing the positions that shelled North Strand Province, and this reason points to dissolving the threat; whether the positions have been neutralized, this paper does not stipulate. One: whether management of the other side's internal affairs has begun. Who runs affairs in the two towns, this paper does not stipulate. One: whether a control is set up with no time limit and no path of exit. That the Guard is still there in the spring of Year 20 is a fact to be questioned (Theory of the State N33). The War Treatise has also warned of the drift of objectives: the original objective has been achieved, yet the war continues on the grounds of "stabilization" or "preventing recurrence" (War Treatise §14). The facts, so far, give an account that points to defense, and also a duration that must be questioned. Whether this stretch is defense or also expansion is left to the judgment of those in positions. That judgment is made by each member's positions, when they decide whether to send forces and whether to stop support; this paper does not judge in their place.
Since the slots differ, the consequences are written separately too. The instrument of admission recognizes those three provinces; for the stretch in which the Guard advances south of the dividing line, joint defense does not follow (§9). If this stretch is judged to be expansion, the part that crosses is not within defense: it is a member's act outside the system, and what the system can do about it follows the origin of §3 and the questioning, recording and checks of Paper 4. This stretch moves back and forth between the two slots of "outside the system against a member" and "a member against outside the system"; this paper uses it only as a contrast, and sets up no separate rule for it.
The scope of taking no side must be made clear. It governs only one thing, sending forces: joint defense sends forces for neither side. Questioning, recording, checks, non-war aid and the humanitarian part go on as before.
It may be said that taking no side amounts to indulging both sides. The weight of this objection is that while both sides are expanding, people go on dying, and the system's not sending forces looks like acquiescence. But taking no side governs only the one matter of sending forces; were the system to send forces for an expanding side, it would become an extension of that side's expansion. When something has gone wrong with the system, it must go back to questioning and recording to find out where: which side first crossed which line, and which arrangement failed to work. For the particular judgment of which stretch is defense and which is expansion, the account falls on positions and persons.
XZ35 "Member against member" is read by acts (carried over from Theory of the State Paper 6, §4). The Theory of the State reads the "14DD against 14DD" that the War Treatise places outside its range by acts, as the stretch after both sides' acts have crossed the boundary; the slot of "member against member" is read in this way. Where one side enters and the other only defends, it is the slot of joint defense: the defending side's first face holds directly, and other members each pass Gate Four. Where both sides are expanding, joint defense takes no side, and the system does only the non-war part; this situation is itself a diagnosis that something has gone wrong with the system. War Treatise §5 says that, between 14DDs, SAE criteria do not function for them; for Gate Four to be able to judge, "the 15DD party" is read as the party that, by acts, is the one entered and the one decided for by another, not as an identity (own undertaking). Who only defends and who is also expanding is left to the judgment of those in positions.
§11 The Slot of a Member's Split; Five Guardrails
§9 spoke of a state outside the system splitting and the system admitting one side. There is another possibility, closer to the system: the one that splits is a member.
There is no member split among the matters this paper uses. This slot can only be written structurally, with the case of the Sandbars as a contrast.
When a member splits in two, the system may recognize one part and expel the other. "Expelling the other part" is read as not recognizing that part as succeeding to that member's membership. Article 27 of the Compact writes of expelling a member, and does not write of the case of a member's split. A note in passing: its suspension suspends only the right to vote, which is narrower than this series' direction; its conditions for expulsion are not limited to line-crossing, which is wider than this series' direction (Paper 7, §6). What is spoken of here is this series' direction, not that article.
If the expelled part does not cease fighting, it is "outside the system against a member": it is already outside the system, and what it enters is the recognized part. If this war had already begun before the expulsion, then by §3 it still counts as coming from the system, and is "member against member." Both slots are within joint defense.
Here the defense is the recognized part's own; other members that send forces are lending their strength within its defense. This slot is called assisting the defense. "Assisting" here means that the subject of the defense is the party defended; the kind of assistance the Prequel speaks of, sending or selling arms, with the receiving party judging how to use them, is a different sense. How a sending state uses its forces is still for it to judge, within the scope of the authorization (§7).
"Not ceasing to fight" is read as continuing to enter the recognized part. What assisting the defense stops is this entry, and it goes no further than stopping it. When the recognized part turns around to attack the other side, assisting the defense does not follow.
Assisting the defense has five guardrails. The first four have the same shape as those for admitting one side of a split; the fifth is new to this slot. They are written one by one.
The first: the split must really have reached that point; the system's recognition and expulsion are public judgments, open to questioning; while internal strife is undecided, no such judgment is made. This has the same shape as the first guardrail on admission in Paper 1, §8. In the case of the Sandbars, the Conference of Members argued in the autumn of Year 18 over "whether the point of a split has been reached." The UCSE's Executive for External Affairs said that Sandmouth controls two and a half provinces and has its own taxation, courts and guard, and that "it is already a split"; the DRP's Foreign Minister said, "this is internal strife whose outcome is not yet decided"; the NUT's permanent representative said that the two sides were still talking in the NUT's Northern District, and that the NUT makes no ruling. Whether that point has been reached is a judgment that must be made publicly and can be questioned.
The second: the recognized part must have risen and stood up by itself, not been manufactured by outside force. Gate Three of the War Treatise says: "Genuine rising proceeds from the inside out; the outside can recognize it and can support it, but cannot manufacture it." (War Treatise §13) Whitewall says that the north was manufactured by outside force; some of the Northern Guard's arms were captured from the Stability Squads' depots, and some were bought by sea from "merchants outside the system"; from the summer of Year 18, the administration office on the Outer Sandbars also allowed its ships to refuel at the wharf. What this guardrail asks about is facts such as these.
The third: what is recognized is that part itself; assisting the defense guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not advance into the expelled part. This has the same shape as the third guardrail in Paper 1, §8, which §9 extended to defense: the instrument of admission there states that it does not recognize the claim to the whole, and recognition is the same.
The fourth: when the recognized part defends itself, its first face holds directly; other members that send forces each pass Gate Four. This has the same shape as the fourth guardrail added in §9.
The fifth: which part is recognized depends on acts, that is, on who is entering whom and who is crossing the line against people; it does not depend on which part holds the original government and seat. When both sides are entering each other, then by the previous section no side is taken, and only the non-war part is done. Before the split has reached that point, helping either side by armed force is turned inward and is not allowed; this is the second kind spoken of in §2. This guardrail guards against a temptation that lies very near: when a member splits, the side that holds the capital and the original seat is the one most easily taken as "that member"; once the system recognizes it, the system has judged for one side in an internal strife whose outcome is not yet decided.
The phrase "both sides are entering each other" in the fifth guardrail is to be read by the previous section, as both sides' acts being expansion. The difficulty lies in the stretch in between: after the recognized part has pushed the entering party back to the dividing line, is the stretch in which it itself crosses the dividing line defense, or is it also expansion? This question is left to the judgment of those in positions. If it is judged to be expansion, then by the fifth guardrail no side is taken, and only the non-war part is done. If it is not judged to be expansion, then by the sentence on "not ceasing to fight," assisting the defense does not follow, and the original defense continues as before. The scope given here to assisting the defense does not stand in for judgment of the other side's acts in the same period; a judgment that both sides are expanding still requires grounds for each separately. The norm goes this far and no further; the room it leaves for the judgment of those who carry it out lies in the determination of whether that stretch is defense or expansion.
The case of the Sandbars can serve as a contrast for this reading, with the difference of slot written down as it is: there, the one that split was a state outside the system, and Sandmouth was admitted, not a recognized part split off from a member. Suppose the slot is changed, and Sandmouth is the recognized part; then the stretch in which the Guard enters the two towns is exactly the stretch the fifth guardrail has to read. If it is judged to be expansion, then by the fifth guardrail assisting the defense no longer sends forces for either side and does only the non-war part; this is the limit of support this series sets for this situation. It cannot be concluded, merely from this side's stretch having been judged to be expansion, that the other side is also still expanding in the same period: in the case, the Stability Squads had already fallen back south of the dividing line in the autumn of Year 19, and "both sides are expanding" still requires that both sides' acts in the same period be checked separately. If it is not judged to be expansion, assisting the defense does not follow into the two towns, and the original defense north of the dividing line continues as before. Neither road takes assisting the defense across the dividing line; the difference lies in whether the original defense is still there.
Expulsion does not write off the account. The acts of the expelled part while it was a member stay on the account as recorded (Paper 7, §6).
It may be said that recognizing one part and expelling the other is the system deciding for that state who the legitimate government is. The weight of this objection is that recognition is indeed a weighty judgment, and the expelled side will say that the system has picked a side. But what the fifth guardrail requires is precisely that recognition go not by who holds the government and the seat but by acts; what is recognized is that part itself, not its claim to the whole; and recognition itself is public and open to questioning. The system does not decide for that state's people what their government is; what it decides is only to whom its own membership goes. Whether the split has reached that point, and whether the stretch across the dividing line is defense or expansion, are left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
XZ34 After one side of a split has been admitted, the other members' sending forces to defend it against entry counts as defense. Once a state has split into two parts, each claiming to represent the whole, and the system has admitted one of them, the other members' sending of forces to defend the admitted side against entry is classified as defense. The exception in Kant's fifth Preliminary Article connects to mutual defense by way of mutual covenant: admission is a covenant (Paper 1, XZ8); once one side has been admitted as a member, the other side's entry against it is "outside the system against a member" or "member against member," an object of joint defense, and the nature of the war is defense, not intervention in another state's internal strife. Joint defense guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not assert the claim to the whole on its behalf. When the admitted party defends itself, its first face holds directly; other members that send forces still each pass Gate Four. What admission changes is the nature of the war; it does not automatically give each member a reason for starting a war. The slot of a member's split: when a member splits in two, the system may recognize one part and expel the other; "expelling the other part" is read as not recognizing that part as succeeding to that member's membership. If the expelled part does not cease fighting, it is "outside the system against a member"; if the fighting began before the expulsion, it still counts as coming from the system, and is "member against member"; both slots are within joint defense. Here the defense is the recognized part's own, and other members' sending of forces is assisting the defense; "assisting" here means that the subject of the defense is the party defended, a different sense from the assistance of sending or selling arms. "Not ceasing to fight" is read as continuing to enter the recognized part: it goes no further than stopping; when the recognized part attacks the other side, assisting the defense does not follow. Five guardrails. (1) The split must really have reached that point; the system's recognition and expulsion are public judgments, open to questioning; while internal strife is undecided, no such judgment is made. (2) The recognized part must have risen and stood up by itself, not been manufactured by outside force (War Treatise §13, Gate Three). (3) What is recognized is that part itself; assisting the defense guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not advance into the expelled part. (4) When the recognized part defends itself, its first face holds directly; other members that send forces each pass Gate Four. (5) Which part is recognized depends on acts, that is, on who is entering whom and who is crossing the line against people, not on which part holds the original government and seat; when both sides are entering each other, no side is taken under XZ35, and only the non-war part is done; before the split has reached that point, helping either side by armed force is turned inward and is not allowed (XZ28). The reading of (5): "both sides are entering each other" is read under XZ35 as both sides' acts being expansion; whether the stretch in which the recognized part crosses the dividing line is defense or also expansion is left to the judgment of those in positions; if it is judged to be expansion, no side is taken and only the non-war part is done; if it is not judged to be expansion, assisting the defense does not follow, and the original defense continues as before. The scope given here to assisting the defense does not stand in for judgment of the other side's acts in the same period; a judgment that both sides are expanding still requires grounds for each separately. Expulsion does not write off the account (Paper 7, XZ50).
§12 Joint Acts Keep to Sameness of Structure
Writing of how the failed party seeks help from outside, the War Treatise sets down a rule: "An ally must itself be a subject operating at 15DD (or evolving toward 15DD)." (War Treatise §19) The reason is that if one allies with another party that has slid into 14DD, then after the alliance the ally will act in 14DD ways. So "An alliance must hold to structural kinship in cultivation, not merely to a short-term alignment of interests." (ibid.)
Yet the members of a system of cooperation can be mixed: some lean more toward one direction, some more toward the other, and membership sets no such threshold. Put side by side, the two must be kept apart as to what each speaks of.
The setting of that sentence of the War Treatise is the failed party seeking help from outside in desperate straits; the "ally" is a party that is to use armed force alongside it and under whose shelter it is to come. A system of cooperation is a multilateral arrangement of ordinary times, and membership is another matter. So the requirement of sameness of structure is not dropped; it is moved to another layer, the layer of joint acts (own undertaking). Which states send forces together, and who does what in joint command, is checked item by item against the warning of War Treatise §19 and the two kinds of aid.
The matter of Lamp Island has one thing that can be looked at. The DRP President proposed sending engineer and air-defense detachments, about eight hundred people, to Gorgemouth; the opinion of the National Purposes Commission was that "the relation between sending forces and the national purposes is unclear"; the People's Assembly did not pass it. The DRP abstained on the record, saying that the word "colonizing" is a characterization. Had the proposal passed at the time, what would have to be checked is not what kind of state the DRP is. What would have to be checked is what those detachments do in joint command, whether they keep to going no further than stopping, and whether they stay within the scope and term of the authorization.
Sameness of structure, too, is recognized by acts, not by the names of states. In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, the DRP withdrew from the joint exercise held under the plan for the southern shore of the Mirror Sea; the one that had at that time entered another state's island with military force and set up an administration office was the UCSE (Paper 4, §7). Judgment falls on acts: who the acting party is does not change this judgment. When a party acting jointly is colonizing, cooperation with it in joint arrangements must stop (§8).
A general word, naming no state. For acting together with a member that leans more toward the 14DD direction, the model is the gray zone written in War Treatise §19. The party that borrows force from a 14DD must "use the ally's physical shelter, but never internalize its 14DD systemic purpose" (War Treatise §19). As for whether this can be held, the War Treatise has also said: "Whether it can be held is a judgment within the specific situation, not a universal answer that philosophy can give." (ibid.)
It may be said that if states that are not alike do not act together, the system cannot stop entries. The weight of this objection is that in a mixed system the members willing to send forces are few to begin with, and if they are further picked by sameness of structure, there may be none left. But membership does not require sameness, and joint acts are checked item by item, not cut off wholesale. Sending forces together is allowed; what is checked is what that force is doing. The part that cannot be held is recorded as it is. Whether it was held in the gray zone is left to the judgment of those in positions, and the account falls on positions and persons.
XZ36 Joint acts keep to sameness of structure; membership does not require sameness (carried over from War Treatise §19; own undertaking). The War Treatise says that an alliance must hold to sameness of structure in cultivation, not merely to a short-term alignment of interests; the setting of the original is the failed party seeking help from outside in desperate straits. A system of cooperation is a multilateral arrangement of ordinary times, and membership does not require sameness; the requirement of sameness of structure is moved to the layer of joint acts: which states send forces together, and who does what in joint command, is checked item by item against the warning of War Treatise §19 and the two kinds of aid. For acting together with a member that leans more toward the 14DD direction, the model is the gray zone of §19: using its physical shelter, without internalizing its systemic purpose; whether this can be held is a judgment within the specific situation, not a universal answer that philosophy can give.
§13 With Grotius
Once an alliance has been made, must the allies follow in fighting? Whether this war ought to be fought, who judges? These two questions, which this paper has answered on the matter of Lamp Island, were asked by Hugo Grotius in The Rights of War and Peace.
First, whether it is the same question. Grotius writes of the law of war between sovereigns: under what conditions a war is just, and how far a covenant of alliance binds. This paper writes of cooperation among states that cannot exit from one another and have no superior at the top, and what its part on joint defense asks is also how far a covenant of alliance binds. The question is the same up to this point: whether a covenant of alliance places every ally under an obligation to send forces; and, before a war is started, who judges.
On whom a third state should help when two states are at war and it has alliances with both, he first sets down: "Here too we must observe there can be no obligation to support unjust wars." (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 15, §10, trans. A. C. Campbell, Project Gutenberg EBook #46564; that edition is an abridged translation, and the Latin original has not been checked; tier B) Speaking of allies, he says again: "Yet no such compacts can bind either of the parties to the support or prosecution of unjust wars." (same work, bk. II, ch. 25, §4, same source) He then gives an example: "And this is the reason, why the Lacedaemonians, before they went to war with the Athenians, left all their allies at liberty to decide for themselves upon the justice of the quarrel." (ibid.)
They agree in two places. One: a covenant of alliance does not place members under an obligation to support an unjust war: the Compact does not write automatic entry into war, and clause 2 of Article 18 states besides that the record constitutes no obligation on any member to deploy. The other: before a war is started, each ally judges for itself: in the matter of Lamp Island, the three states each made their decisions through their own positions; the UCSE sent forces, the NUT sent none but gave supplies and passage, and the DRP's proposal did not pass. This is exactly what each ally's judging for itself looks like.
They part on what is judged. Grotius judges by the justice or injustice of the war: an ally may decline to follow because that war may be unjust. This series judges by each participating state's own first face: even if a war stands on the side of justice, if a member itself suffers no erosion that is under way and from the same source, its sending of forces still does not stand (§4). The Conference of Members recorded "there is a colonizing entry," and this record supplies no state's first face for it; a member without a first face gives non-war aid and stops its support for the colonizing party (§8). Grotius's ally asks "is this war just?"; this series' member must also ask "is this war mine?"
Punishment must be written separately. Grotius gives sovereigns a wider right, holding that "kings and those who are possessed of sovereign power have a right to exact punishment not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves or their own subjects, but for gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other states and subjects." (same work, bk. II, ch. 20, §40, same source) Such punishment may be carried out by way of war.
Here this series is on Kant's side. In the commentary on the sixth Preliminary Article of Perpetual Peace, Kant says: "between states, however, no war of punishment (bellum punitiuum) can be conceived (since between them there is no relation of a superior to an inferior)" (my translation; zwischen Staaten aber sich kein Bestrafungskrieg (bellum punitiuum) denken läßt (weil zwischen ihnen kein Verhältniß eines Obern zu einem Untergebenen statt findet); Zum ewigen Frieden, First Section, Preliminary Article 6, commentary, same source). So joint defense goes no further than stopping, and does not go on to deal with the violating party; the system's determination is only questioning and recording, and the record is kept for the booking of accounts later, not for punishment. The matter of Lamp Island shows exactly what this parting looks like: the UCSE did not enter the Plateau Federation's territory or territorial waters, and took no part in action against Lamp Island; the exchange of fire and the matter of Lamp Island were left to records and questioning.
Here is the strongest objection, drafted on Grotius's behalf. Without punishment, the entering party bears no cost, and even gains. The garrison on Lamp Island stayed for more than a year, and its eventual withdrawal depended on the Lamp Island Agreement that Stonegorge and the Plateau Federation concluded separately: the Mirror Sea Fleet gives twenty-four hours' notice before passing through the Southern Lane and is exempt from registration; the Plateau Federation leases a supply wharf in the harbor at Gorgemouth for twenty-five years; Stonegorge takes part in no multilateral economic measure directed against the Plateau Federation; and before that, Stonegorge had also given notice of its exit from the system. Joint defense that only stops and does not punish can stop this time, but not the next.
The reply has two points. One: this cost is real, and this paper writes it down as it is (§1). The other: punishment requires a punisher. Between states there is no superior; whoever acts as this punisher is acting as a superior. Grotius gives this right to every sovereign, so that every sovereign may appoint itself punisher for another state's gross violations; this series does not give it, and so joint defense stops where the stopping is done, and the rest is handed to questioning, recording, common measures and the later booking of accounts. The two part on who is to punish and on what authority, not on one speaking of justice and the other not. This is a division of scope, not a refutation.
This section takes up only these three points: that an alliance carries no obligation to support an unjust war, that each judges for itself before a war is started, and punishment. Grotius's view that a third state may go to war for the oppressed subjects of another state is taken up along the way in Paper 6.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has proved only these things. Joint defense stops colonizing entries, is not turned inward, and goes no further than stopping; an invitation does not change "not turned inward." It can be used in three slots, outside the system against a member, member against member, and a member against outside the system, and the ground is where the colonizing comes from. Each participating state's sending of forces is its own starting of a war, and each passes Gate Four; neither the system's record nor another state's invitation stands in for this judgment. The three slots narrow differently; the slot of a member against outside the system is the hardest to pass, and its real content lies in three places. What is standing is only coordination and preparation, and no force that can deploy of its own accord is set up. Deployment, withdrawal and command all rest with each state, and wartime joint structures are dismantled after the war. Members that send no forces bear non-war aid, and all members stop their support for the colonizing party. Once one side of a split has been admitted, the other members' sending forces to defend it against entry counts as defense; when a member splits, assisting the defense has five guardrails. "Member against member" is read by acts, and when both sides are expanding, no side is taken. Joint acts keep to sameness of structure; membership does not require sameness.
What it has not proved: strategy and tactics; the composition of forces and the form of command, which are left to military and political leaders. The criteria of the War Treatise themselves, this paper cites as they stand, and their range is not altered. Whether a state's first face holds is determined concretely inside each state, and the system only records and only questions; whether the UCSE's three grounds suffice, this paper has not judged. Who only defends and who is also expanding, and whether the stretch across the dividing line is defense or expansion, are left to the judgment of those in positions. How deep preparation goes is left to military leaders.
The remainder it leaves is registered here as it stands. The advance preparation for the slot of a member against outside the system is empty: the Coordination Council has no plan directed at a member, and whether there should be one, this paper does not decide for those in positions. In the matter of the Outer Sandbars, the member that entered was the UCSE; by Year 20 none of the other members had provided non-war aid to the residents of the Outer Sandbars, nor had any member proposed it. The exchange of fire in the Southern Lane has no third-party determination. The two thousand four hundred people who stayed on Lamp Island lived for more than a year under the administration post's transit cards and curfew; the garrison on Lamp Island finally withdrew only after Stonegorge had concluded a separate agreement and had already given notice of its exit from the system (Paper 7).
How far the guarding side may strike back once it is attacked, and the side of people outside the system, are handed to Paper 6.
The Nine Propositions of This Paper
XZ28 Joint defense stops colonizing entries and is not turned inward. States may have armed forces of cooperation among them, and their function is defense outward, stopping colonization. "Inward" and "outward" are divided by function: what is stopped is a colonizing entry, that is, entering another state by force and deciding on behalf of the people there, whether or not the entering party is a member; "not turned inward" means not entering any state to manage its internal affairs, not enforcing the system's own decisions against members, and not deciding on behalf of the people of any state. It goes no further than stopping, and does not go on to deal with the violating party. Stopping a colonizing entry is not judging the entering party's own affairs in its place; it is refusing to let it judge in others' place, and so it is not substitute exercise (the Prequel, §2); this requires that the entry really be colonizing, and whether it is determined to be so rests with each member that sends forces (XZ30); if the determination is wrong, the stopping itself substitutes for others' judgment on their own affairs, and this is booked to the side that made the determination. Armed force used outward is not turned inward (Theory of the State N18; the original sentence speaks of states, and force there means the armed forces and armed force). Crossing the boundary is checked item by item against the three criteria of Theory of the State N33. The objective does not slide from stopping to regime change or to prolonged occupation (War Treatise §14). After the stopping, the protected party's lines are not drawn for it, and what it is to become is not decided for it (Institution Theory Z19). Theory of the State N18 allows the armed forces to be used internally under a confirmation; that the system is never turned inward is a step stricter than the upstream, the reason being that the system holds no compulsion over its members; it is not derived from N18. An invitation does not change "not turned inward": what is judged is not whether there was an invitation, but whether the acts after the entry substitute for judgment. Guarding, by invitation, the people who arrive and humanitarian supplies, and escorting those who leave of their own will, does not join the fighting as a party and judges in place of neither side; it belongs to the third slot of the division by place in Paper 6, XZ42. If "defense" by invitation is directed against another party within that state, it is helping a government deal with its own people; it is turned inward and is not allowed, with or without an invitation. Defense, by invitation, against a colonizing entry from outside is the slot of joint defense or a state's own defense; each state passes Gate Four, and an invitation does not stand in for this judgment (XZ30).
XZ29 Objects are divided by where the colonizing comes from. Joint defense can be used in three slots: outside the system against a member; member against member; a member against outside the system. Outside the system against outside the system, joint defense does not take up; "does not take up" refers only to not using armed force directly, and the indirect means remain open; which of them to use, and how far, is left to the judgment of the political and military leaders in their positions. The ground is the origin: the system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members or from the system itself, wherever it lands, in the same shape as "what this state's acts reach" in the unified sentence of the Theory of the State; it is not a world police standing above the states. The origin is determined by whether the party was a member when the colonization took place, and is not traced back; colonization begun before expulsion still counts, after expulsion, as coming from the system. "Can be used for" is a range; it does not mean that sending forces is equally available in each slot (XZ30).
XZ30 Each participating state's sending of forces is its own starting of a war, and each passes Gate Four on its own (carried over from War Treatise §13, §19). The Compact does not write "an attack on one shall be deemed an attack on all, with automatic entry into the war": if membership automatically supplied the first face, the system would in effect decide on war for its members and acquire compulsory power. If a covenant contains a declaration of this kind, it is read as the members' common determination and prior coordination, not as each member's first face having already been established. An ally's sending of forces is the ally's own starting of a war, and the ally's own first face must hold (War Treatise §19). The first face of the intervention side is recognized by its own cultivation being eroded now, and by this erosion coming from the same source as the oppression suffered by the party being stood beside (War Treatise §13). Completely selfless trans-border intervention is, if anything, structurally suspicious; what the system stands against is colonization itself, and this does not supply any state with a stake of its own. The system's determination does not stand in for each participating state's internal determination, which is not monopolized (Theory of the State N30). An attacked member's asking allies to send forces is, for its own war, an expansion of the participants (War Treatise §14). Defending, at a state's request, against a colonizing entry from outside is still the participating state's own starting of a war, and the invitation does not stand in for this judgment. The three slots narrow differently: in the two slots of outside the system against a member and member against member, other members must point to erosion of themselves that is under way and from the same source; in the slot of a member against outside the system, the other members themselves have mostly not been eroded by the same source, Gate Four is hardest to pass in this slot, and in practice what often remains is only non-war aid and stopping support. This narrowing is written openly, the cost is written down as it is, and no side door is opened. Once narrowed, the real content of this slot lies in three places, written together. One, the system is responsible for colonization that issues from its members; questioning, recording, checks, suspension and expulsion are used as they stand, and all members stop their support (Paper 4, XZ27; XZ33; Paper 7, XZ50). Two, the colonized party outside the system receives non-war aid and admission (Paper 6, XZ41). Three, sending forces is not excluded; it only requires the sending state's own first face to hold. Reading the three together is a step of this series (own undertaking). Spillover: the other side's expansion itself reaching across to the intervention side, as with shellfire, pursuit across the border, or people driven across in order to overwhelm the admitting party, can be erosion that is under way and from the same source, and which concrete mechanism it is must be stated (own undertaking). Those who come are not themselves erosion: receiving them is the part that must be done, and the burden goes through sharing (Paper 6, XZ38, XZ39); the numbers and the burden of admission do not automatically supply a first face. The critical threshold is borne by the party being stood beside; the intervention side must still pass, separately, fa-mou and fa-jiao exhausted and an ending can be envisioned, and neither membership nor figures of scale stand in for these judgments.
XZ31 What is standing is only coordination and preparation. Joint plans, joint exercises, prepositioned logistics, practicing in ordinary times until the forces can work together; no force that can deploy of its own accord is set up. If a force can deploy of its own accord, someone must give the order, and whoever gives the order is a superior. War Treatise §5 says that the outside party, seeing the other side's oppression intensify, must prepare to defend; sending forces cannot be read out of this. Preventive war does not qualify (War Treatise §13). Deterrence reaches only as far as preparation (War Treatise §10). What is renamed, or continued through ordinary procedure, is recognized by function, not by name (Theory of the State N22): standing coordination may not be a wartime structure under another name. A temporary structure of guarding must be re-examined after its conditions change, and is not renewed automatically on the strength of its origin (Institution Theory Z22).
XZ32 Deployment, withdrawal and command all rest with each state; dismantling after the war (carried over from Theory of the State N22, N30). Each state taking part in the war decides on deployment and withdrawal separately, under its own law, through a determination that is not monopolized, and with a time limit; the sending state explains its own first face publicly to the system (Paper 2, XZ12). Sending forces and the joint action themselves are the acts of each participating state, not the acts of the system. Joint command exists only within the scope and term each state has authorized, and does not carry a state into action that its own first face does not cover. Each state judges its own expansions by War Treatise §14; a new "cannot-not" unrelated to the original objective does not count as an expansion, and must pass Theorem One from the start. An emergency may move being questioned to afterward; it does not withdraw being questioned (Theory of Government G30, G32). Joint action does not cut off each participating state's own internal questioning by concealment; whether it is cut off depends on whether the positions with authority over the questioning can obtain the necessary grounds, and whether the procedure can still be used to check (the gui of War Treatise §12 extended to joint action; own undertaking). Wartime joint structures are actively dismantled after the war, and are not kept in case (War Treatise §18).
XZ33 Not sending forces is not bearing nothing. For a member whose first face does not hold and that sends no forces, its share lies in non-war aid, that is, supplies, admission and passage, and can be apportioned through a common procedure. All members must stop their own share of support for the colonizing party: arms, logistics, transit, and cooperation within joint arrangements. Non-war aid such as shelter, supplies, passage and the preservation of culture does not pass through Theorem One, and any ally that holds to the point of not making the other party its appendage may give it; a purely disinterested ally can be an excellent giver of non-war aid, and its sending of forces does not stand under the criterion (War Treatise §19).
XZ34 After one side of a split has been admitted, the other members' sending forces to defend it against entry counts as defense. Once a state has split into two parts, each claiming to represent the whole, and the system has admitted one of them, the other members' sending of forces to defend the admitted side against entry is classified as defense. The exception in Kant's fifth Preliminary Article connects to mutual defense by way of mutual covenant: admission is a covenant (Paper 1, XZ8); once one side has been admitted as a member, the other side's entry against it is "outside the system against a member" or "member against member," an object of joint defense, and the nature of the war is defense, not intervention in another state's internal strife. Joint defense guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not assert the claim to the whole on its behalf. When the admitted party defends itself, its first face holds directly; other members that send forces still each pass Gate Four. What admission changes is the nature of the war; it does not automatically give each member a reason for starting a war. The slot of a member's split: when a member splits in two, the system may recognize one part and expel the other; "expelling the other part" is read as not recognizing that part as succeeding to that member's membership. If the expelled part does not cease fighting, it is "outside the system against a member"; if the fighting began before the expulsion, it still counts as coming from the system, and is "member against member"; both slots are within joint defense. Here the defense is the recognized part's own, and other members' sending of forces is assisting the defense; "assisting" here means that the subject of the defense is the party defended, a different sense from the assistance of sending or selling arms. "Not ceasing to fight" is read as continuing to enter the recognized part: it goes no further than stopping; when the recognized part attacks the other side, assisting the defense does not follow. Five guardrails. (1) The split must really have reached that point; the system's recognition and expulsion are public judgments, open to questioning; while internal strife is undecided, no such judgment is made. (2) The recognized part must have risen and stood up by itself, not been manufactured by outside force (War Treatise §13, Gate Three). (3) What is recognized is that part itself; assisting the defense guards only that part, goes no further than stopping, and does not advance into the expelled part. (4) When the recognized part defends itself, its first face holds directly; other members that send forces each pass Gate Four. (5) Which part is recognized depends on acts, that is, on who is entering whom and who is crossing the line against people, not on which part holds the original government and seat; when both sides are entering each other, no side is taken under XZ35, and only the non-war part is done; before the split has reached that point, helping either side by armed force is turned inward and is not allowed (XZ28). The reading of (5): "both sides are entering each other" is read under XZ35 as both sides' acts being expansion; whether the stretch in which the recognized part crosses the dividing line is defense or also expansion is left to the judgment of those in positions; if it is judged to be expansion, no side is taken and only the non-war part is done; if it is not judged to be expansion, assisting the defense does not follow, and the original defense continues as before. The scope given here to assisting the defense does not stand in for judgment of the other side's acts in the same period; a judgment that both sides are expanding still requires grounds for each separately. Expulsion does not write off the account (Paper 7, XZ50).
XZ35 "Member against member" is read by acts (carried over from Theory of the State Paper 6, §4). The Theory of the State reads the "14DD against 14DD" that the War Treatise places outside its range by acts, as the stretch after both sides' acts have crossed the boundary; the slot of "member against member" is read in this way. Where one side enters and the other only defends, it is the slot of joint defense: the defending side's first face holds directly, and other members each pass Gate Four. Where both sides are expanding, joint defense takes no side, and the system does only the non-war part; this situation is itself a diagnosis that something has gone wrong with the system. War Treatise §5 says that, between 14DDs, SAE criteria do not function for them; for Gate Four to be able to judge, "the 15DD party" is read as the party that, by acts, is the one entered and the one decided for by another, not as an identity (own undertaking). Who only defends and who is also expanding is left to the judgment of those in positions.
XZ36 Joint acts keep to sameness of structure; membership does not require sameness (carried over from War Treatise §19; own undertaking). The War Treatise says that an alliance must hold to sameness of structure in cultivation, not merely to a short-term alignment of interests; the setting of the original is the failed party seeking help from outside in desperate straits. A system of cooperation is a multilateral arrangement of ordinary times, and membership does not require sameness; the requirement of sameness of structure is moved to the layer of joint acts: which states send forces together, and who does what in joint command, is checked item by item against the warning of War Treatise §19 and the two kinds of aid. For acting together with a member that leans more toward the 14DD direction, the model is the gray zone of §19: using its physical shelter, without internalizing its systemic purpose; whether this can be held is a judgment within the specific situation, not a universal answer that philosophy can give.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662
Qin, H. (2026). Guarding the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270766
Qin, H. (2026). Emergency (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413413
Qin, H. (2026). What a State Is Not (SAE Theory of the State, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584292
Qin, H. (2026). The Last Force (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584329
Qin, H. (2026). The Last Resort (SAE Theory of the State, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23584352
Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617
Qin, H. (2026). On the Recognition of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20480134
II · External works (public-domain originals, tier A)
Kant, I. (1795). Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius. Project Gutenberg, EBook #46873. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46873
Kant, I. (1917). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. Trans. M. Campbell Smith (1st ed. 1903; 3rd impression). London: George Allen & Unwin. Project Gutenberg, EBook #50922. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50922
III · External works (public-domain translation, tier B)
Grotius, H. (1901). The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations. Trans. A. C. Campbell. New York & London: M. Walter Dunne. Project Gutenberg, EBook #46564. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46564 (abridged translation; Latin original not checked)
Interfaces
Main upstream: War Treatise §13 (the first and second faces; Gates Three and Four; spillover), §14 (expansion and objective-drift), §19 (the two kinds of aid; sameness of structure; the gray zone); Theory of the State N18, N22 (Paper 4), N30, N33 and the "reading by acts" of Paper 6, §4 (Paper 6); Institution Theory Z19, Z22 (Paper 3).
Also used: War Treatise §5 (the second form; 14DD against 14DD), §10 (deterrence), §12 (gui, extended to joint action), §18 (dismantling wartime structures); Theory of Government G30, G32 (Paper 5); the Theory of the State Prequel, §7 (a leaning is a direction), and Theory of the State Paper 6, §5 (the exception in Kant's fifth Preliminary Article; pointed back to); F6 §2.1, Note (elimination); F6, Appendix A, Articles 13 and 14, and Appendix B, Article 26 (a working demonstration; used only as an example); Power Theory P3 §V.4 (silence).
Interfacing: Kant (Perpetual Peace, First Section, Preliminary Article 2, commentary; Preliminary Article 3; Preliminary Article 6, commentary; tier A, per the first edition of 1795, compared with Smith's English translation), along the way and at the end; Grotius (The Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, ch. 15, §10, ch. 20, §40, and ch. 25, §4; tier B, per Campbell's abridged English translation), in the final section.
This series: the Prequel, §2 (the criterion of force) and §11 (the three layers); Paper 1, §8 (XZ8) and §9 (XZ7); Paper 2, §§1, 2, 4 (XZ9, XZ10, XZ12); Paper 3, §§1–3 (XZ16, XZ17, XZ18); Paper 4, §§5–8 (XZ25, XZ26, XZ27); Paper 6, §§3, 4, 6–8, 10, 11 (XZ38, XZ39, XZ41, XZ42, XZ44); Paper 7, §§2, 4, 5, 6 (XZ46, XZ49, XZ50); Paper 8, §2 (XZ53).
Handed to Paper 6: going no further than stopping; on the side of people outside the system, the system can only create conditions.