Self-as-an-End
SAE Cooperation Theory · Special Paper

Changing the Game
改局

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24049720 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

This paper reads the threshold of cooperation. There are two questions: I want A, you want B; how do I get a result as close to A as possible? I want A, you want B; how do we do C together? A game, as this paper speaks of it, is only a situation in which one end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question; this paper does not define the word for the discipline of game theory. The cooperation this series reads requires that both avow this undertaking and actually take part; this paper reads the stretch before the avowal: one end is headed in the 15DD direction, the other, in this undertaking, asks only the first question, and no shared undertaking has yet been avowed. It does not ask where cooperation in general comes from. 15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels; at the operation layer this end certifies neither that the other is headed in the 15DD direction nor that the other asks only the first question; what he can recognize is only two things: that there is as yet nothing jointly avowed, and that the other's words and deeds do not yet show the second question.

The end headed in the 15DD direction asks both questions. Within the game he reckons as usual and guards his own share; the gains given within the game do not exhaust the direction in which he changes the game. Changing the game is altering the conditions of a matter: who can do what, whose share hangs in whose hands, what words can be said, what can be avowed. The end that leans toward 14DD changes the game too, and may also bring about options there were not before; the difference lies not in whether one changes the game but in where the change heads. When the end headed in the 15DD direction changes the game, what it heads toward is making the second question one that both ends can ask; cooperation here is the setting in which cultivation may happen, not the source of cultivation. In changing the game only direction is reckoned: the game can only invite, and changing the game can only invite too; the share put into the game for the sake of changing it is not written as an account the other must repay.

Deciding his direction for him on the ground that it is "better for him," or making him unable to refuse, revise or leave, is the shape of the direction of colonization; putting forward a proposal the other can still decline, change, or stay out of is not among these. Of the share handed over, what is to be checked is whether it has obtained a position that the end that handed it over cannot revoke at will: withdrawing it when the other does not act as this end expects can be exactly hanging the other's share back in one's own hands. Speech is also a step that changes the game: the paths actually open and the paths the other takes to be open are read apart, and truth or falsity does not on its own certify direction. After the game is changed, whether to avow is the other's; once avowed, it is read by the papers of Cooperation Theory; nothing is inferred backward in either direction. The end that changes the game can reckon his own gains, and can be glad for the other; what is to be checked is the step of taking the reckoned gains to declare an avowal on the other's behalf, or occupying the other's share on the strength of one's giving. Not every game is changed into cooperation: competition can be just competition, and when the two ends come together, the third person is checked separately.

This paper interfaces with Follett's integration, Pettit's non-domination, Sen's self-imposed constraints, Schelling's commitment, and Brandenburger and Stuart's biform games; for Axelrod it points back to Paper 1. It does not prove that changing the game in the 15DD direction pays, nor that it does not pay; it does not prove that people ought to cooperate; it does not prove game theory wrong.

Introduction

The households of Yue Ming and Shen He share one irrigation channel. Yue Ming's land lies upstream, Shen He's downstream; further down are the Zhou family's fields. At the channel's intake there is a sluice gate, and on the gate a lock; the key is in Yue Ming's hands alone. When Shen He wants water, he has to go and knock at Yue Ming's door. Sometimes Yue Ming opens the gate quickly; sometimes he puts it off to the next day, saying his own fields have not had enough yet.

In the year of the drought, one night Shen He could not wait for daybreak, and pried the sluice board open with a crowbar. Early the next morning the two stood on the bank and quarreled: one said the gate was at the head of his land, the other said the water belonged to both households. That year both households lost: Yue Ming spent a sum repairing the sluice board, and a patch of Shen He's rice dried out all the same. After the autumn harvest, Yue Ming went to Shen He's house and said: "This can't go on. Let's talk it over and find a way."

This is what is ordinarily called a game: each household getting as much water as it can. It can be written as one sentence: I want A, you want B; how do I get a result as close to A as possible? Yue Ming's "let's talk it over and find a way" can lead on to many ways of going about it. In some, what is asked is still this sentence: how to stop Shen He prying the gate open, how to get one's own fields filled first. In others, what is asked is another sentence: I want A, you want B; how do we do C together? This paper starts from these two sentences.

What this paper asks is this: when one end is headed in the 15DD direction, the other, in this undertaking, asks only the former sentence, and no shared undertaking has yet been avowed, how does the end headed in the 15DD direction move within the game; how does he change the game so that a shared undertaking can be avowed; where does the boundary lie in changing the game for the other; and once it is changed, how is the other's avowing or not avowing read.

What this paper reads. The cooperation this series reads has as its premise that at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction; the direction is a premise, not a sufficient condition for entering scope: it requires further that both avow this undertaking and actually take part, that the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation, and that the arrangement the two jointly maintain does not colonize a third person.1 This paper reads the stretch before the avowal, that is, the threshold of cooperation. Paper 1 has said that this series does not ask where cooperation comes from.2 Nor does this paper ask where cooperation in general comes from: not how it appears in evolution, how it grows in a person's development, or how it grows out of repeated games in which each looks out for himself. It reads only a threshold within one game: when no shared undertaking has yet been avowed, how one end alters the conditions so that it becomes possible for both to avow. Once avowed, it is read by the papers of Cooperation Theory; this has the same form as the way Paper 1 writes being passively helped.3

In SAE's layers, the layer at which the other is recognized as an end too is marked 15DD; the layer at which one has one's own direction and guards the things one cannot set down is marked 14DD. 15DD and 14DD here, as in the papers of Cooperation Theory, are stances, not labels for persons, and are read by the current relational condition (Paper 5, CO22).

This paper reads six things. First, the two questions and scope: how the two sentences differ, and which of three cases this paper reads. Second, reckoning within the game and changing the game at the level of the game: how the end headed in the 15DD direction reckons within the game, and what the further layer he reckons is. Third, the boundary of changing the game for the other, and whether the share handed over can be withdrawn. Fourth, speech: how words said out loud change the game. Fifth, after the game is changed: the other declining, the other avowing, and after the avowal; gains and possession; not every game being changed into cooperation. Sixth, interfacing with tradition.

Colonization, in this series, speaks of the direction of one effect: toward pouring in and occupying; the other direction is cultivation, toward making space. The two are not the two extremes of one scale; the same act can carry both directions, and can also carry no direction at all; the direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action.4 Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights.5

Shared words. "Game" (博弈) names in this paper only a situation in which one end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question; terms of game theory such as "cooperative game" and "cooperative solution" keep their own usage and are not mixed up with the cooperation this series reads, and this paper does not define this word for game theory either. "The game" (局) names the set of conditions in a matter: who can do what, and who gets what; "changing the game" names altering that set of conditions, read in §2. In Chinese these are two words, and in English both are game; the cooperative game of Exercises and Games of Judgment III is a game in the second sense. "The first question" and "the second question" are as in §1. "Asking only the first question" and "being reduced to calculation" are not one thing: the former says which sentence is asked in this undertaking, the latter names the stance of treating the other only as a strategy set, read in §1.6 "Calculation" follows Paper 1 and names only that stance; looking out for one's own concerns is not calculation.7 "Avowing," "withdrawing" and "walking away" follow the papers of Cooperation Theory: withdrawing speaks of withdrawing one's own side, and refers to the same thing as exit; walking away is only an external act.8

§1 Two Questions and Scope

CG1 The first question: I want A, you want B; how do I get a result as close to A as possible? The second question: I want A, you want B; how do we do C together? The end headed in the 15DD direction asks both questions; a game, as this paper speaks of it, is only a situation in which one end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question. The difference between the two questions lies not in whether one cares about the other, but in who holds the adjudication: in the first question, the result to be obtained is adjudicated by this end alone; in the second, C is avowed by both, and neither party holds its purpose and adjudication alone. The second question has as its antecedent that B is still the other's: his place for re-explaining, refusing and revising his own purposes is not deleted; asking only the first question does not amount to deleting it. C cannot be read merely as a point of compromise between A and B; a cell in the original table does not complete the avowing for the two

Two Questions

The first question: I want A, you want B; how do I get a result as close to A as possible? The second question: I want A, you want B; how do we do C together? The first halves of the two sentences are the same: A is mine, B is yours, and what the two want differs. They part in the second half: one asks what I get, the other asks what we do.

The end headed in the 15DD direction asks both questions. The A he wants he really wants, and he asks the first question just the same; what he asks in addition is the second sentence. §2 reads this layer. So a game, as this paper speaks of it, is not a situation in which "someone is asking the first question": on that account, between two people both headed in the 15DD direction everything would be a game too. A game, as this paper speaks of it, is only a situation in which one end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question.

In the Introduction, around that night in the drought year, what can be seen of the two people on the bank, as the example is written, is only the first question: one puts off opening the gate, the other pries it open. This paper does not on that basis judge which direction either is headed in. What the example writes is what the two did.

Caring About the Other Is Not the Difference

The difference between the two questions does not lie in whether one cares about the other. Suppose Yue Ming sees that Shen He's fields really are dry, and keeps the gate open two hours longer. This can be called caring; whether to open it, and for how long, is still decided by him alone. Reckoning the other's situation into one's own weighing can still be only a table of one's own. Paper 1 has read this layer in the prisoner's dilemma: writing the other's sentence into one's own payoff as well still gives a matrix, only with a different set of numbers.9

Who Holds the Adjudication

The difference lies in who holds the adjudication. In the first question, the result to be obtained is adjudicated by this end alone: how much counts as close to A, and when it counts as enough, is his to decide. In the second, C is avowed by both, and neither party holds its purpose and adjudication alone. Action Theory Paper 8 has set down this sentence: one person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C; C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone; C belongs neither to A nor to B.10 The second question is read in the shape of this sentence.

The Antecedent of the Second Question

The second question has one antecedent: B is still the other's. His place for re-explaining, refusing and revising his own purposes is not deleted.

Deleting this place is another matter. Paper 1 has read it: one party takes a strategy table he can compute for himself as the whole of his partner, and deletes along with it the partner's place for re-explaining, refusing and revising his own purposes; in this use, the model takes over the subject's place, and falls on the side of mutual calculation.11 That is being reduced to calculation. Asking only the first question does not amount to deleting it: a person can ask only how much he can get, and at the same time not deny that the other has wants of his own, nor say on the other's behalf what he wants. This distinction is used again under CG2 below, and at the start of §2.

C and the Original Table

C cannot be read merely as a point of compromise between A and B. C can include a compromise both avow, and can also adopt a way of doing things that already existed. As will be read below, under the irrigation rotation Yue Ming proposes, the water each household gets can be much the same as what the quarrels had produced before; what is new lies not in that figure but in the two having avowed this undertaking, and in whose hands the key is.

So a cell in the original table does not complete the avowing for the two. A payoff table can have a cell that is exactly the result the two later bring about together; that the cell is on the table does not amount to the two having avowed it. Reading the prisoner's dilemma, Paper 1 says that in that example there is no way to avow a shared undertaking on the spot.12 With that cell on the table, it still takes someone to avow it.

CG2 The three cases, divided by the number of ends headed in the 15DD direction, are a stipulation at the object layer: the case in which neither party is headed in the 15DD direction this paper does not read; where both ends are headed in the 15DD direction, no one asks only the first question; this paper reads the case in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction, the other, in this undertaking, asks only the first question, and there is as yet nothing jointly avowed. In the latter two, where the two people's own laws, each already formed, require incompatible actions and the Conflict Treatise's object threshold is reached, the matter belongs to the Conflict Treatise; a change of the game that does not come off does not in itself put a matter under the Conflict Treatise. Asking only the first question is not the same as being reduced to calculation. At the operation layer, per CO4, nothing is certified in either direction: what this end can recognize is only that there is as yet nothing jointly avowed and that the other's words and deeds do not yet show the second question; reckoning as usual within the game guards his own share, and so does not depend on which case the other is in

Three Cases

By the number of ends that, in this undertaking, operate in the 15DD direction, there are three cases. The three are a stipulation at the object layer: they say which case this paper reads, not which two people in reality are in which case.

Ends headed in the 15DD direction How this paper reads it
None Not read. Its ideal type is both ends treating each other only as a strategy set; where both ends lean toward 14DD and neither is reduced to calculation, the case is also of this kind (Paper 1, CO5, the first kind)
One: the other end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question, and there is as yet nothing jointly avowed This paper's scope
Two No one asks only the first question. Each one's gains are still reckoned as usual; whether a shared undertaking is avowed, and how it is done, is judged by each of the two: they can find C and do it together, read by the papers of Cooperation Theory; they can both confirm that they do not cooperate in this undertaking

The Conflict Treatise's Cell

In the latter two, there is one more cell that does not belong to this paper. Where the two people's own laws, each already formed, require incompatible actions in this undertaking, and the Conflict Treatise's object threshold is reached, the matter belongs to the Conflict Treatise. The Conflict Treatise begins from such a cell: "two independently formed laws, each its bearer's own and each already formed, requiring actions that cannot be jointly realized in the same situation."13 Its threshold further requires that the way that collision is handled would put at risk the position from which a person can go on making first-person revisions and go on being open to questioning.14 The subject term here is law, not purpose: I want A, you want B, what the two want differs, and in this paper that is just the ordinary state of a game; it does not on that account become the Conflict Treatise's cell.

The first case cannot reach this cell. The Conflict Treatise makes clear at its opening that two laws of one's own meeting at 14DD have been written of by Legal Series Paper 1; it itself begins from "at 15DD."15

Nor does a change of the game that does not come off in itself put a matter under the Conflict Treatise. If Shen He declines the way Yue Ming proposes, and the two households go on knocking at doors and quarreling as before, this can be trouble, it can be loss; whether it reaches the Conflict Treatise's threshold is checked separately, by that threshold.

Asking Only the First Question Is Not Being Reduced to Calculation

In the case this paper reads, the other end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question. This does not amount to his being reduced to calculation. The end that leans toward 14DD can at least structurally acknowledge that the other has purposes of his own: what he asks is how much he can get, without denying that the other has wants of his own.6

Paper 1 handed the case in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation over to Paper 5.16 That case lies within this paper's object; this paper's object is wider than it. This paper and Paper 5's CO27 meet at the step of entering and exiting: what CO27 reads is one end judging, in his own fallible judgment, that the existing relation no longer meets the condition of scope "the other is not, in this undertaking, reduced to calculation," and from then on no longer doing this undertaking as cooperation; what this paper reads is the step of going in.

The Operation Layer: Two Things He Can Recognize

The three cases are a stipulation at the object layer. At the operation layer, per CO4, each party confirms only his own end; the other end's taking part and arrangements are described by words and deeds and checkable conditions, and their inner grounds are not certified.17 This is not certifying in either direction: the end headed in the 15DD direction certifies neither that the other is headed in the 15DD direction nor that the other asks only the first question.

What he can recognize is only two things: that in this undertaking there is as yet nothing jointly avowed; and that the other's words and deeds do not yet show the second question. Whether what he is in is the case this paper reads, or the stretch in which both ends are headed in the 15DD direction and simply have not yet found C, he cannot recognize. The way of going about it that this paper reads is the same in both: within the game he reckons as usual, at the level of the game he changes the game, in changing it only direction is reckoned, and once it is changed, whether to avow is the other's. So there is no need to recognize which. This step is an extension, this paper's own undertaking.

Reckoning as usual within the game guards his own share, and so does not depend on which kind the other is either. Yue Ming keeps watch over his own seedling fields without first having to decide what sort of person Shen He is.

A Threshold, Not a Source

What this paper reads is a threshold within one game: in the stretch where no shared undertaking has yet been avowed, how one end alters the conditions so that it becomes possible for both to avow. This paper does not read where cooperation in the general sense comes from. How mutual non-betrayal arises in repeated games, Paper 1 has already read in interfacing with Axelrod, and §6 points back to it.

§2 Reckoning Within the Game, Changing the Game

CG3 The end headed in the 15DD direction reckons within the game as usual: the A he wants he really wants, and guarding his own share is reckoned as usual too. Looking out for one's own concerns is not calculation; calculation is treating the other only as a strategy set. The gains given within the game do not exhaust the direction in which this end changes the game

Reckoning As Usual

Yue Ming keeps watch over his seedling fields as before, and lets into his own land the water that should go there. The A he wants he really wants; guarding his own share, too, he reckons as usual.

Looking out for one's own concerns is not calculation.7 Calculation names the stance of treating the other only as a strategy set. Economics P2 says: "In the 14DD world, the person across from you is a strategy set"; in this series this sentence falls on the side of being reduced to calculation.18 Yue Ming's reckoning how much water his fields need and when to water them is looking out for his own concerns; from this reckoning alone it cannot be read that he treats Shen He only as a strategy set.

The Gains Within the Game Do Not Exhaust the Direction of Changing It

Reckoning as usual within the game is not the same as reckoning only within the game. The gains given within the game do not exhaust the direction in which this end changes the game: the original game had no cell for the irrigation rotation; nor did the original table record into whose hands the key goes. What Yue Ming reckons as usual is his share within the game; what his change of the game heads toward lies, beyond that share, in one more place, read below.

CG4 Changing the game means altering the conditions of a matter: who can do what, whose share hangs in whose hands, what words can be said, what can be avowed. The end that leans toward 14DD changes the game too, and may also bring about options there were not before: binding himself first, putting word out first, changing the rules; the sharpest move within the game can change only the other's view of the game, and what it heads toward is still one's own cell in the game. The difference lies not in whether one changes the game, nor in whether one goes beyond the original table, but in where the change of the game heads. When the end headed in the 15DD direction changes the game, what it heads toward is making the second question one that both ends can ask: making avowable an undertaking that both can avow and in which each has a share. Cooperation here is the setting in which cultivation may happen, not the source of cultivation

What Changing the Game Is

What changing the game alters is the conditions of a matter, and there are four: who can do what; whose share hangs in whose hands; what words can be said; what can be avowed. What is altered is the game, not what the other wants: Yue Ming can alter the gate, the key, the days of a rotation; what Shen He wants is not among these four.

The End That Leans Toward 14DD Changes the Game Too

Suppose that autumn Yue Ming had taken another path. He put a second lock on the gate, put word out that whoever pried it open again would be reported to the village, and said too that in a drought year he would fill his own fields first and only then let water through. This also changes the game: who can do what has changed; what words can be said has changed too. What these steps head toward is still getting water to his own fields first. This variant reads only where these steps head, and does not say which direction Yue Ming is headed in.

Reporting to the village, too, has been put on the table. When the end that leans toward 14DD changes the game, he may also bring about options there were not before. The sharpest move within the game can even leave the conditions untouched and change only the other's view of the game: for instance, making the cost of prying the gate open sound greater than it is. What these steps alter is in every case the game; what they head toward is still one's own cell in the game. §6 comes back here in reading Schelling.

The Difference Lies in Where It Heads

So the difference lies neither in whether one changes the game nor in whether one goes beyond the original table. The difference lies in where the change of the game heads.

When the end headed in the 15DD direction changes the game, what it heads toward is making the second question one that both ends can ask: making avowable an undertaking that both can avow and in which each has a share. What Yue Ming later proposed was an irrigation rotation. He laid out two ways of doing it. Plan One: the days are agreed, and Yue Ming still opens the gate by the days. Plan Two: the days are agreed, a key is cut for Shen He, and on his days he opens the gate himself; if the days are to be changed, the two change them by talking it over. Under the two plans the agreed share of water is the same. Where these two plans head, §3 reads.

Cooperation Is the Setting in Which Cultivation May Happen

What changing the game heads toward is making cooperation avowable; cooperation here is the setting in which cultivation may happen, not the source of cultivation, and the completion of cultivation is not in the enactor's hands, read per Paper 5, CO23.19 What Yue Ming's change of the game alters is how the two households divide the water; what Shen He grows into afterward is not the product of this change.

CG5 In changing the game, only direction is reckoned: whether this step goes toward making space or toward pouring in and occupying, this end can reckon; whether the other avows, and what he grows into afterward, is not in his hands. Three shapes are commonly met: not taking up the other's game; handing over one's skill; putting pace, a key or part of a method into the other's hands; the same act can carry both directions. The game can only invite, and changing the game can only invite too. The share put into the game for the sake of changing it is this end's own; it is not written as an account the other must repay, nor is it used to prove that changing the game pays or does not pay

Only Direction Is Reckoned

What the end that changes the game can reckon is whether this step goes toward making space or toward pouring in and occupying. Whether the other avows, and what he grows into afterward, is not in his hands. Paper 5's CO24 says: the direction is read on that one effect, and whether it took hold is looked at separately, in the other party's later understanding and action; whether the other's capacity has increased is a measure of outcomes, and is not used to judge direction.20 Changing the game goes the same way: this step is reckoned for its direction, and the outcome is looked at separately.

Three Shapes

Take another example. Master Zhong, who makes bamboo ware in the town, has kept a shop on the old street for thirty years. Tang Du, twenty-five, has newly opened a bamboo-ware stall at the head of the street; his prices are low, and he has taken several of Master Zhong's regular customers.

Master Zhong did not cut his prices to match, nor did he run down Tang Du's goods in front of his regular customers. This is the first shape: not taking up the other's game. Cutting prices and speaking ill of the other are moves in that game; when he does not make them, the game has one fewer path being walked.

After a while, Tang Du's bamboo baskets kept cracking, and he came to the shop to ask how to split the strips. Master Zhong taught him, and told him too where the good bamboo was to be had. This is the second shape: handing over one's skill. How far the learning goes is for Tang Du himself to decide: as far as he asks, Master Zhong teaches, neither pressing more on him nor holding him back. This is the third shape: putting the pace into the other's hands. The key of Plan Two in the channel example is also of the third shape: what is handed over is part of the method of opening the gate.

The three are only shapes, not an exhaustive classification.

The Same Act Can Carry Both Directions

The same act can carry both directions. Suppose that when he teaches, Master Zhong agrees with Tang Du that from now on Tang Du may get his bamboo only from him, and may not take on work for the town school. These two terms put limits on Tang Du's later supplies and on the jobs he takes. If both avowed these two terms beforehand, that is an arrangement of reciprocal exchange, read separately per Paper 2, CO9;21 whether they make Tang Du lose an actual path of refusing, revising and switching is to be checked separately. Paper 2 has read making the other dependent to the point where he cannot say no, and the Conflict Treatise says that the kind of dependency manufactured and locked in by the intervention, such that the other cannot say no to the intervener, is the gentle form of colonization.22 If Master Zhong used the skill he had already taught to hold down Tang Du's later path of saying no, switching, or ending this arrangement, that step heads toward occupying.

The Game Can Only Invite

Exercises and Games of Judgment III reads the cooperative game: "what it looks like in behaviour is not acknowledgment itself; acknowledgment the game can only invite"; the cooperative game "newly opens 15DD, but does not guarantee it".23 Changing the game can only invite too. Once the rotation is laid out, Shen He can decline it; once the skill is handed over, Tang Du can learn and leave. What the end that changes the game can move is the game.

The Two Layers Pull Apart

The step that reckoning as usual within the game arrives at, and the direction in which changing the game heads, are not always in one place. Tang Du's goods got better, and he took several more of Master Zhong's regular customers. Reckoned within the game, teaching him was a loss.

This share is one Master Zhong put in himself. It is not written as an account Tang Du must repay: Paper 2 has read that writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay lies at the normative layer and does not change with the kind of relation.21 Nor is it used to prove that changing the game pays or does not pay. The regular customers lost are entered as they stand on Master Zhong's side; being entered there, they do not give rise to a debt on Tang Du's side.

§3 The Boundary of Changing the Game for the Other

CG6 Deciding his direction for him on the ground that it is "better for him," or making him unable to refuse, revise or leave, is the shape of the direction of colonization; putting forward a proposal the other can still decline, change, or stay out of is not among these. Changing the game cannot compress the other's authority, channels or practical possibility of refusing, interrupting, revising, exiting and restating himself. Binding oneself and binding the other are read by what the other still has left after this step. Of the share handed over, what is to be checked is whether it has obtained a position that the end that handed it over cannot revoke at will: withdrawing it when the other does not act as this end expects can be exactly hanging the other's share back in this end's hands, and is not certified as inward by "it is only withdrawing." Withdrawing one's own side is exit: stopping the inputs on one's own side, whether extra ones or one's own share in the arrangement; the items already handed over and already avowed are checked separately; exit does not settle them unilaterally, nor does it impose a new arrangement on the other

Deciding the Game for Him, and Making Space for Him

Suppose that what Yue Ming proposed that autumn was this package: the days of the rotation are set by him, which he says is for Shen He's good, sparing him the trips in the middle of the night; once set, the days may not be changed; when Shen He's days come Yue Ming hands him the key, and when they are over takes it back. In this package the agreed share of water can be the same as in Plan Two. The difference lies elsewhere: Shen He cannot change the days, in whose hands the key is is decided by Yue Ming alone, and if Shen He does not want this package he has no other path either.

Deciding his direction for him on the ground that it is "better for him," or making him unable to refuse, revise or leave, is the shape of the direction of colonization. Economics P2 says: "'for your own good' is cultivation's most common self-justification and colonization's most common disguise."24 In this package, the line "it's for Shen He's good" leaves Shen He no further path; it gathers the days and the key together into Yue Ming's hands.

Putting forward a proposal is not among these. Plan Two was also proposed by Yue Ming, and its days, too, were first named by him. The difference lies after the proposing: Shen He can decline it, can change the days, can stay out of it; once the key is handed over, if the days are to be changed, the two change them by talking it over. Changing the game can begin with one end first putting forward a proposal; proposing in itself does not on its own count as deciding the game for the other.

That Boundary

Paper 5 set down, for cultivative intervention, a structural condition ex ante, taken from the Conflict Treatise: "An intervention may not compress the other's authority, channels or practical possibility of refusing, interrupting, revising, exiting and restating themselves." And a sentence in the same place: "Offering reasons may change whether they are willing to refuse; it cannot lower whether they are able to refuse."25 That condition originally applies within scope, when the person himself chooses to make a cultivative intervention. This paper applies it to changing the game before cooperation: changing the game cannot compress the other's authority, channels or practical possibility of refusing, interrupting, revising, exiting and restating himself. This step is an extension, this paper's own undertaking.

To persuade Shen He to go along with the rotation, Yue Ming can set out reasons: which nights the channel runs fullest, which stretch of the channel bed is badly silted. Reasons can change whether Shen He is willing to say no; they do not lower whether he is able to say no. What the package that decides the game for the other lowers is precisely the latter.

Leaping In and Leaping Ahead

Relation Theory Paper 0 has read Heidegger on the two extremes of solicitude: in the one, solicitude leaps in for him and takes his care over from him, and he is thereby thrown out of his own place; in the other, it leaps ahead of him, not to take his care away but to give it back to him as care.26 Deciding the game for Shen He is close to the former; the key of Plan Two is close to the latter. There Relation Theory Paper 0 also makes clear where the two part: the two extremes are tied to what it is that is being done, and this series does not divide directions by what it is that is being done. Here they are only set side by side, not read again.

Binding Oneself and Binding the Other

Binding oneself and binding the other are read apart. What is read is what the other still has left after this step.

On the other path in §2, Yue Ming put word out that in a drought year he would fill his own fields first and only then let water through. He said this arrangement out loud first. Whether it becomes an actual constraint on himself, and how it alters the conditions on which Shen He draws water, is still to be checked separately. If it is carried out as arranged, and whose fields are watered first and when they count as full are still decided by Yue Ming alone, then it is read by the path it actually narrows: what narrows is Shen He's path. Binding oneself first can also be a step that forces the other to give way. So direction is decided not by who is bound, but by what the other still has left after this step.

In Plan Two, Yue Ming binds himself too: once the key is handed over, he can no longer put off opening the gate on Shen He's days and hold Shen He up. After this binding, Shen He has one more path that need not pass through Yue Ming.

Whether the Share Handed Over Can Be Withdrawn

At the start of spring in the second year the two avowed Plan Two, and each opened the gate by his days. That summer Yue Ming went to stay in town for half a month. Under Plan One, Shen He would have had to send someone into town to ask, and once he had asked, wait for Yue Ming to send someone back to open the gate; under Plan Two he took the key and opened the gate himself. The agreed shares of water under the two plans are the same; where they differed in that half-month can be seen from outside, and can be checked. Under Plan Two, Shen He's share had, in this undertaking, a position for which he need not go to Yue Ming.

In the summer of the third year, on Shen He's days, he did not put all the water on his own fields, but let half of it go to the Zhou family downstream. In the rotation the two had agreed, there was no term governing how he used the water of his own days. When Yue Ming heard of it, he said to Shen He: "I gave you the key so you could water your own fields, not so you could hand out favors with it."

Suppose Yue Ming therefore withdraws the key. The gate is still opened by the days, only by him again. This step can be called withdrawing; but what it withdraws is exactly the share handed to Shen He: Shen He's water has to wait for Yue Ming to open the gate again, and his share hangs once more in Yue Ming's hands. This step also unilaterally turns Plan Two, which the two had avowed, back into Plan One. Paper 3 has read it: a change into a new shared division of labor must be avowed by both parties separately, or be made by a procedure both have recognized and that applies; unilateral withdrawal does not impose a new arrangement on the other party.27 By this sentence, unilaterally withdrawing one's own side does not impose a new arrangement on the other; withdrawing the key, though, imposes Plan One on Shen He, so it is more than withdrawing one's own side. The same place also says that this does not make either party the approver of the other's own revision and exit; once the key is withdrawn, how Shen He uses the water of his own days has once more to get Yue Ming's nod. Of the share handed over, what is to be checked is whether it has obtained a position that the end that handed it over cannot revoke at will; withdrawing it when the other does not act as this end expects is not certified as inward by "it is only withdrawing."

Withdrawing one's own side is another thing: that is exit. Paper 5 has read it: withdrawing one's own side is inward, is exit, and does not carry the direction of colonization; what is withdrawn is the side that, once the items are separated, still belongs to oneself, and the items already avowed are checked separately; where one first induces dependency and then withdraws, violation is checked separately at the layer of basic rights, by Relation Theory.28 Yue Ming used to glance at the channel's intake for Shen He; this was not in the package the two had avowed, but an extra input of his. When he stops looking, that is an instance of withdrawing one's own side; the drawing of water Shen He has avowed goes on as before, and the key stays in Shen He's hands. He can also exit the rotation, no longer doing his own share by the days: this too is withdrawing one's own side. Shared matters that remain after parting are not settled by unilateral exit;29 the items already handed over and already avowed are checked separately, per Paper 5; nor does exit impose a new arrangement on Shen He. How the key is disposed of is one of the items checked separately, and is not carried off along with "I've exited."

Dependency is to be read apart. Shen He's fields having to draw water by way of this channel, and the key being in Yue Ming's hands alone, are two things. People depend on one another in any case, and this kind of dependency carries no direction of colonization; only the kind that was made, and that has locked the path to saying no, carries it.30 Plan One kept the condition of the key being in Yue Ming's hands alone; how this arrangement originally came about, and whether it compressed Shen He's path of saying no, the example does not fully write. Where the key of Plan Two, once handed over, is unilaterally withdrawn by Yue Ming, what is to be checked is how this one time altered the position Shen He had already obtained: it first let Shen He's share come loose from Yue Ming's hands, and then pulled it back.

If Shen He failed to keep to the days the two had agreed on, that would be another matter: breaking the agreement is read per §5; how the item of breaking the agreement is entered and how the item of withdrawing the key is read are checked separately.

Once Handed Over, the Other Can Use It to Leave

Once a skill is handed over, the other can use it to leave. Take another variant: once Tang Du has learned, he runs his business independently, takes no work from Master Zhong's shop, and goes after the bookshelf orders himself. What Master Zhong taught him earlier does not thereby become an account Tang Du owes him.21 What was handed over is, from then on, Tang Du's.

Relation Theory, reading withdrawal, has one more sentence: when one party exits, whichever party acts outward, adding consequences, using the occasion to apply pressure and calling on others to isolate him all carry the direction of colonization.31 If, after Tang Du has left, Master Zhong went about saying that Tang Du learned the craft and then turned on him, that step heads outward; his no longer teaching heads inward.

§4 Speech and the Game the Other Sees

CG7 Speech is also a step that changes the game: it can alter the other's understanding of the game, and can also alter the agreement between the two. The paths actually open and the paths the other takes to be open are read apart: making clear a limit that already exists does not on its own count as narrowing; making up a way out that does not exist does not on its own count as making space. Truth or falsity is a fact to be checked, and does not on its own certify direction; how the other understands is described by words and deeds and checkable conditions

Speech Is Also a Step That Changes the Game

The line Yue Ming spoke at Shen He's house, "let's talk it over and find a way," is itself a step that changes the game: once it is said out loud, there is one more thing between the two households that can be talked over. Speech can alter the other's understanding of the game, and can also alter the agreement between the two: the days of the rotation are agreed in words.

The Paths Actually Open, and the Paths the Other Takes to Be Open

In reading a sentence, two kinds of path are kept apart: the paths actually open, and the paths the other takes to be open.

Suppose Yue Ming says to Shen He: if I put off opening the gate, you can go to the village bookkeeper who looks after the water; the village has this rule. Suppose no one in the village had ever mentioned this rule to Shen He: this sentence states a path that already exists. Lighting up a path that already exists does not on its own count as narrowing. Nor does it on its own count as making space: that avenue already existed; whether this sentence made Shen He better able to find and use this path is checked by the conditions it altered and by Shen He's later words and deeds, and direction is not certified by what was said being true alone.

Suppose what Yue Ming says is another sentence: next year the village will dig a separate channel for those downstream, so you need not fight with me. In fact there is no such thing. Going by this sentence, there is one more path; the actual paths have not increased. How Shen He hears it, the example does not write. Making up a way out that does not exist does not on its own count as making space.

Suppose Yue Ming makes clear a limit that already exists: in a drought year the village rules that the upstream fields are watered first, for three days. This sentence speaks of a limit that already exists; how Shen He understands it is entered apart, by his later words and deeds and checkable conditions. Making clear a limit that already exists does not on its own count as narrowing.

Truth or Falsity Does Not on Its Own Certify Direction

Truth or falsity is a fact to be checked: whether the village has that rule, and whether there will be that channel next year, can both be asked about. Direction is not decided by truth or falsity alone; it is read on the effect the sentence has on the two kinds of path. A true sentence can also narrow the game in the other's eyes, for instance by picking out only a few hard paths to speak of; whatever effect an untrue sentence has is entered by that effect. This reading does not say that any kind of speech is harmless. How Shen He understands what he hears is described by his later words and deeds and checkable conditions, without filling in his inner life.

§5 After the Game Is Changed

CG8 After the game is changed, whether to avow is the other's. If the other declines this proposal, taking away conditions he already had because he declined is acting in a way directed at the other; this end can go on recognizing the other as an end too within the game, and can also withdraw his own side. Once the other avows this undertaking and takes up his own share, and the other conditions are met, from then on it is read by the papers of Cooperation Theory; avowing does not further require the other to show progress, and the earlier stretch is not rewritten because it later became cooperation. Breaking the agreement after the avowal, the arrangement ceasing to work, and joint revision are matters within an existing cooperation, and from them it is not inferred backward that nothing was ever avowed. If the game is changed and the other does not avow, it is not inferred backward that the end that changed the game is not headed in the 15DD direction; if the other avows, it is not inferred backward that he has grown into anything either

The Other Declines

Suppose Shen He declines the rotation, and comes knocking at the door as before. This is read as a game.

Yue Ming does not open the gate less, or later, because he declined. Taking away the conditions he already had because he declined is acting in a way directed at the other: Paper 5 has read that acting in a way directed at him that raises his cost is outward, and carries the direction of colonization; withdrawing one's own side is inward, even if the other party's cost rises as a result.32 If Shen He declines, Yue Ming can go on recognizing the other as an end too within the game: when Shen He knocks, he opens the gate as before, and in a drought year he says plainly, as before, how much his own fields need; he can also withdraw his own side, for instance by no longer keeping an eye on the intake for him.

Whether the other wants it is not something the end that changes the game can obtain by demanding it. Economics P2 says, at its own place: "you cannot force a person to treat you as an end, since force itself violates 15DD".33 Carried over to here: Yue Ming can lay the rotation out, can have the key cut; whether Shen He avows it, he cannot obtain by demanding.

Both Avow

At the start of spring in the second year the two avowed Plan Two, and each opened the gate by his days. From here on, the rotation is read by the papers of Cooperation Theory: both have avowed it, each has a share, and each does his own share by his days; the other conditions are checked separately, per Paper 1.1

Avowing does not further require the other to show progress. Shen He does not first have to become a more considerate person for it to count as avowing; his having avowed the rotation and opening the gate by the days is avowing. The stretch before that is read as a game: the prying open of the gate and the quarrel on the bank are not rewritten as a prelude to cooperation because it later became cooperation.

After the Avowal

Suppose that once, on Yue Ming's days, Shen He let water through for half a night more. This happens after the two have avowed; it is a matter within an existing cooperation. Breaking an agreed arrangement is entered on the books at the layer between person and person: breach of faith is entered apart; it enters the other party's later conditions of occurrence, and expectation changes accordingly.34 If it is the days themselves that were set wrongly, so that during the weeks of the plum rains Yue Ming's fields cannot use that much water, then the arrangement needs changing: a change into a new arrangement must be avowed by the two separately.27 One party's no longer going on with it is his exit; shared matters that remain after parting are not settled by unilateral exit.29 These are checked separately, by the papers of Cooperation Theory. If Yue Ming withdrew the key because of this one time, the item of breaking the agreement and the item of withdrawing the key are checked separately, and the latter is read per §3.

From this one time of letting more through, it is not inferred backward that nothing was ever avowed. Having avowed, and then breaking it, are two things; the latter does not erase the former. If there are other checkable grounds that make it clear there was in fact no avowal at the start, then per CO4: "If it is later confirmed that the object did not obtain, this series exits this case, and does not turn and judge the other end".35

Nothing Is Inferred Backward in Either Direction

If the game is changed and the other does not avow, it is not inferred backward that the end that changed the game is not headed in the 15DD direction: if Shen He declines the rotation, where Yue Ming's step heads is still read on that step. If the other avows, it is not inferred backward that he has grown into anything either: why Shen He avowed the rotation the example does not write; avowing itself does not show what he has grown into. Whether cultivation took hold is looked at separately, in the other party's later understanding and action.

Paper 5 says: long-run relational fact can shift the weight of judgment but cannot complete a certification; there is also a bias in the opposite direction, over-cultivation, reading the other's strategic performance as awakening.36 Shen He went on opening the gate by the days for three years after that, and Yue Ming's judgment of him can change accordingly; these three years certify nothing on Shen He's behalf.

Afterward

At the start of spring in the third year, Shen He proposed that the two households clear the silt from the channel bed together, and proposed too that the days be adjusted for the weeks of the plum rains. On the bamboo side, in the second year the town school wanted bookshelves for a whole library room, more than a single shop could make on its own. When the job was taken on, Tang Du could already judge for himself and take on a share of it; the two talked over the method and the division of labor afresh, took the job on together, each made a part, and they delivered together.

Of these two, the example records only words and deeds. They are the shape of cooperation going on unfolding, not proof of avowal: the avowal was already there when the two avowed Plan Two, and when the two took on that batch of bookshelves together.

CG9 The end that changes the game can reckon his own gains and costs in C, and can also be glad of what the other grows into afterward. These do not make the purpose and adjudication of C his alone, nor do they make the step by which the other becomes himself something the end that changed the game completed on his behalf. What is to be checked is another step: taking the reckoned gains to declare an avowal on the other's behalf, or occupying the other's share on the strength of one's own giving. This paper does not argue from a utility function, nor does it deny that the outcomes of behavior can be described by a model; it does not add an equilibrium for the end that changes the game, and proves neither that changing the game in the 15DD direction pays nor that it does not pay

He Can Reckon, He Can Be Glad

Yue Ming can reckon how many nights the rotation has saved him, how many fewer quarrels there have been, how much of the money for repairing the sluice board has been saved. Master Zhong can be glad that Tang Du weaves baskets that do not crack. Reading contribution, Paper 6 says that what was done is hers: "she can remember them, say so, and be glad of them. What carries a direction is the step of trading them for the other's share."37 Both the reckoning and the gladness lie on the side of the end that changes the game, his own side.

These do not make the purpose and adjudication of C his alone. The rotation is something both avowed; however clearly he reckons, how the days are to change is still for the two to talk over. Nor do they make the step by which the other becomes himself something the end that changed the game completed on his behalf: at that place Paper 6 cites a sentence of the same form from Meaning Theory, that having provided conditions does not make the step by which the other becomes himself something I completed on his behalf.37 The good baskets Tang Du weaves, he weaves.

The Step to Be Checked

What is to be checked is another step: taking the reckoned gains to declare an avowal on the other's behalf, or occupying the other's share on the strength of one's own giving. Suppose Yue Ming says in the village that the rotation was decided by him single-handed and Shen He need only follow it: this sentence turns the undertaking the two avowed into his alone. Suppose Master Zhong says that Tang Du's hand at splitting strips was taught by him, so Tang Du should give up the school's order to him: this sentence trades giving for the other's share. Paper 6's CO31 has read these kinds: others are not possessed under "I have contributed"; recording the other's share as one's own carries the direction of colonization; writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is read as in Paper 2.38

A Model Can Describe

This paper does not argue from a utility function, nor does it deny that the outcomes of behavior can be described by a model. Paper 1 has said: using a model to study the behavior available does not in itself amount to treating people merely as means; the crossing of the line is explained by that antecedent, and is not proved by the form of using a matrix on its own.11 How much water each household gets under the rotation can be written into a table; that table does not on that account avow the rotation on the two's behalf, nor does it on that account occupy anyone.

So this paper does not add an equilibrium for the end that changes the game. It does not prove that changing the game in the 15DD direction pays: the regular customers Master Zhong lost, this paper does not make up for with the later batch of bookshelves. Nor does it prove that it does not pay.

CG10 Not every game is changed into cooperation: competition can be just competition; in a game set up by a third party, with no C between the two, each competing for his own can still recognize the other as an end too; when the two ends move from facing each other in the game to coming together in one place, the premise that arrangement holds toward a third person is checked separately, and one premised on a third person's being merely a means is read as collusion, per Paper 1

Competition Can Be Just Competition

Exercises and Games of Judgment II reads the competitive game: "There can also be 15DD in the competitive game: taking the opponent as an end is the player's stance, not the structure of the game."39 Not every game has to be changed into cooperation. Two people play a game of chess together, and each wants to win; playing this game can be the undertaking both avow, with the game of chess held inside it, and they can stop when they want to. This sentence is an extension, this paper's own undertaking.

A Game Set Up by a Third Party

In the first year after Tang Du opened his stall, the town school wanted a small batch of bookshelves and asked the two shops to quote separately. This game was set up by the school: there was no shared undertaking between the two, and each quoted his own price. Tang Du got the job.

Each competing for his own, one can still recognize the other as an end too: quoting honestly, and not going to the school to speak ill of the other. This is one way in which neither party cooperates in this undertaking: it is not read by Cooperation Theory, nor does it on that account mean that either owes the other.

When They Come Together, the Third Person Is Checked

Suppose Yue Ming and Shen He talk it over and agree to dam off the tail stretch of the channel, so that the two households get somewhat more water and less goes into the Zhou family's fields; how much to dam and when, they do not tell the Zhou family, and when the Zhou family comes to ask, they change nothing. The two have moved from facing each other in the game to coming together in one place, but this place is premised on the Zhou family's being merely a means: the Zhou family's place for putting forward, refusing or revising its own share is shut out by this arrangement. Paper 1 has read that an arrangement the two jointly avow and maintain, premised on a third person's being merely a means, is collusion; in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction, and it is not within the cooperation this series reads.40 What merely has an effect on the Zhou family is not among these: after the two households clear the silt, the flow at the tail of the channel changes too; that is an effect, not a premise of the arrangement.

So "making cooperation avowable," which changing the game heads toward, is not a sentence that looks only at what lies between the two. When the two ends come together, the premise that arrangement holds toward a third person is checked separately.

§6 Interfacing with Tradition

Interfacing goes only as far as the point where the labor is divided: first the common question, then setting side by side; where they part, it writes only what this paper reads in addition.

Follett: integration. In 1925, at a conference of the Bureau of Personnel Administration, Mary Parker Follett gave the talk "Constructive Conflict," dividing the ways of dealing with conflict into three: domination, compromise and integration. She gave an example: in a small room of the Harvard Library, someone wanted the window open and she wanted it shut; in the end they opened the window in the next room, where no one was sitting. She says this was not compromise, since neither one's wish was cut down: "we both got what we really wanted." She says too that "Only integration really stabilizes"; that "that particular conflict is settled and the next occurs on a higher level." She also says: "I do not think integration is possible in all cases."41 The common question: when what two people want differs, how a thing gets done without one side yielding. The second question is closest to integration in shape. At this point this paper goes on to read two things: how this end goes on when the other does not take up the shared arrangement (§5); and whether the share handed over can be withdrawn (§3).

Pettit: non-domination. In "Two Republican Traditions," Philip Pettit writes, in the voice of the one who holds the power, that the problem remains even if I "happen to like you and do not exercise that power," so long as "you depend for your ability to choose as you wish on my will remaining a goodwill"; among his examples are a wife under a kind husband and a worker under a tolerant employer.42 The common question: whether a person's choosing still rests on the other's goodwill. Plans One and Two, read in §3, have the same agreed share of water and differ in dependency; this distinction is exactly what non-domination can discern. Whether the share handed over can be withdrawn at will is exactly the thing non-domination asks. What this paper goes on to separate at this point is withdrawing one's own side, and hanging the other's share back in one's own hands (CO26, CO13); beyond that, it reads several steps between two people: how one end puts forward a change of the game, when the two avow, and how this end goes on after the other declines.

Sen: self-imposed constraints. In "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Amartya Sen writes that a person can first, by self-imposed constraints, take a "permissible" subset, and then seek the maximal elements within it.43 The boundary in §3 is not written into utility; it is a constraint placed on the steps open to oneself; this shape Sen has already written, and it is not an SAE first. In the same place Sen also makes clear that such a choice can be represented by an "as if" preference that varies with the set of options; that is only something constructed. This runs the same way as the last sentence of CG9 in §5: being able to be represented is not the same as having the same explanation. That it is not the same as having occupied anyone is this paper's reading.

Schelling: commitment. In The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling writes that "the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself"; that "in bargaining, weakness is often strength"; and that "to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent."44 The common question: how one side changes the game by first moving its own side. The other path in §2 has exactly this shape; §3's reading of binding oneself and binding the other also picks up from here: binding oneself first can be a step that forces the other to give way. What this paper reads in addition is where the same shape heads: binding oneself first can force the other to give way; the key of Plan Two is also Yue Ming binding himself, and once he is bound, Shen He has one more path.

Biform games. In "Biform Games," Adam Brandenburger and Harborne Stuart divide a game into two stages: "A biform game is a two-stage game"; the first stage is non-cooperative and describes the players' strategic moves; "each profile of strategic choices at the first stage leads to a second-stage, cooperative game." They write that "business strategies shape the competitive environment"; "A good strategic move is one that brings about favorable economics to a player."45 The common question: how changing the game can be written as a layer that can be analyzed. In their work, changing the game is already part of the model. What this paper reads in addition is not changing the game itself, but where changing the game heads. The "good" they speak of is said of one player's economic outcome; this paper does not assess good and bad, and reads whether a change of the game makes the second question one that both ends can ask, or heads toward occupying, and which avowal, and whose share of adjudication.

Axelrod. Paper 1 has already taken this up; this paper points back to it: he asks how mutual non-betrayal grows out of repeated games in which each looks out for himself; this paper reads a threshold within one game.46

§7 Drawing Together and Downstream

This paper has set out ten propositions. Taken together, they say: I want A, you want B; a game asks how I get a result as close to A as possible, and cooperation asks how we do C together; the difference between the two questions lies in who holds the adjudication, and the second question has as its antecedent that B is still the other's. This paper reads the stretch in which one end is headed in the 15DD direction, the other, in this undertaking, asks only the first question, and no shared undertaking has yet been avowed, that is, the threshold of cooperation; at the operation layer nothing is certified in either direction. The end headed in the 15DD direction asks both questions: within the game he reckons as usual and guards his own share; at the level of the game he changes the game, altering who can do what, whose share hangs in whose hands, what words can be said and what can be avowed, and what it heads toward is making the second question one that both ends can ask. In changing the game only direction is reckoned; the game can only invite, and changing the game can only invite too; the share put in for the sake of changing the game is not written onto the other's account. Deciding his direction for him on the ground that it is "better for him," or making him unable to refuse, revise or leave, is the shape of the direction of colonization; of the share handed over, what is to be checked is whether it can be revoked at will. Speech is read by its effect on the two kinds of path. After the game is changed, whether to avow is the other's; once avowed, it is read by the papers of Cooperation Theory; nothing is inferred backward in either direction. One can reckon gains and be glad for the other; what is to be checked is the step of occupying the other's share. Not every game is changed into cooperation; when the two ends come together, the third person is checked separately.

This paper does not prove that changing the game in the 15DD direction pays, nor that it does not pay; it does not prove that people ought to cooperate; it does not prove that changing the game is bound to succeed; it does not prove that leaving is right; nor does it prove game theory wrong.

Questions left open. In the fifth year, Yue Ming transferred that upstream land to someone from another village. The newcomer does not recognize that key. Shen He's share was avowed between the two; whether it stands against a third person who did not avow it is a matter of land rights and village rules, on the institutional side, which this series acknowledges but does not judge.47 In the same place there is one more thing: the Zhou family wants to join the rotation; how three households divide the water is read by Relation Theory's pairwise accounting, and this paper goes only as far as two households.48 Both are registered, and are not in this paper.

With the papers of this series. This paper fits between Cooperation Theory Paper 1 and Paper 5: Paper 1 does not ask where cooperation comes from, and this paper reads only a threshold within one game; Paper 5's CO27 reads the step of exiting, and this paper reads the step of entering. It calls on Cooperation Theory Papers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 and Paper 0, and does not change them.

Acknowledgments

This paper is signed by Han Qin alone; the author decided every argument and choice and bears sole responsibility for the text. In drafting, the author used AI models from various developers as tools.

Notes

  1. Paper 1 of this series, CO1, CO4. CO4: "what the object layer reads is cooperation that has as its direction premise that at least one end is headed in the 15DD direction, and that is checked further for both parties' avowing and actually taking part, for not being reduced to calculation, and for not colonizing a third person". ↩︎
  2. Paper 1 of this series, §7: "this series does not ask where cooperation comes from, and reads only what the thing done together looks like when at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction." What this paper reads is a threshold within one game, not the general source of cooperation; that sentence of Paper 1 stands unchanged. ↩︎
  3. Paper 1 of this series, CO5: "One who was at first passively helped, once he avows this undertaking and takes up his own share, and the other conditions are met, is within scope from then on." Applying the shape of this sentence to the passage from a game into cooperation is an extension, this paper's own undertaking. ↩︎
  4. Relation Theory Paper 1, H8: "Cultivation and colonization are two directions: cultivation goes toward making space, colonization toward pouring in and occupying; the direction is read on this one effect, and whether it took hold is seen in the other party's later understanding and action; the two are not the two extremes of one scale, and the same act can carry both directions, and can also carry no direction at all; they are directions, not labels". ↩︎
  5. Relation Theory Paper 1, H9: "Violation is judged separately, and only at the layer of basic rights; it and the direction of colonization are two lines". ↩︎
  6. Paper 0 of this series, §4, the table of shared words: "In this undertaking, the end that leans toward 14DD and is within scope at least structurally acknowledges that the other has purposes of his own; to be reduced to calculation is to treat the other only as a strategy set." The same paper: "where both ends lean toward 14DD and neither is reduced to calculation, this sentence takes the case in, and scope does not (Paper 1, CO5)." ↩︎
  7. Paper 1 of this series, Introduction: "'Calculation' in this paper names only one stance: treating the other only as a strategy set. Looking out for one's own concerns is not calculation, and neither is keeping clear accounts". ↩︎
  8. Withdrawing and exit refer to the same thing, per the shared-words paragraph in the Introduction to Paper 5 of this series. Walking away follows the Conflict Treatise, §12, whose word for it there is leaving: "Leaving is an external act and takes no technical identity by itself." ↩︎
  9. Paper 1 of this series, §6: "Writing the other's sentence into one's own payoff as well still gives a matrix, only with a different set of numbers; this judgment is not a weight in the matrix, but not taking this table for the whole of the other." ↩︎
  10. Action Theory Paper 8, D47: "One person is for purpose A, another for purpose B, and the two cannot not do C: C is something both of them avow and both are able to do, whose purpose and adjudication neither side holds alone"; the same paper, §5: C "belongs neither to A nor to B". D47 is a proposition in the context of Action Theory Paper 8; applying it to this series' object is an extension, written as in note 16 of Paper 1 of this series. ↩︎
  11. Paper 1 of this series, §6: "Using a model to study the behavior available does not in itself amount to treating people merely as means"; the crossing of the line falls on one kind of use: one party takes a strategy table he can compute for himself as the whole of his partner, and "deletes along with it the partner's place for re-explaining, refusing and revising his own purposes. In this use, the model takes over the subject's place, and falls exactly on the side of mutual calculation (CO5)"; "That this use crosses the line is explained by this antecedent, and is not proved by the form of using a matrix on its own." ↩︎
  12. Paper 1 of this series, §6: "in this example, there is no way to avow a shared undertaking on the spot". ↩︎
  13. The opening of the Conflict Treatise. ↩︎
  14. The Conflict Treatise, §1; Paper 5 of this series, §6, writes after it that the threshold further requires that "the way that collision is handled would put at risk the position from which a person can go on making first-person revisions and go on being open to questioning". The Conflict Treatise, §1: "A collision that touches that position under no handling at all may be trouble, may be loss, may be a thing that hurts badly, but it is not conflict in the sense used here." ↩︎
  15. The opening of the Conflict Treatise, on Legal Series Paper 1 (自己的法遇上自己的法): "One paper has already written what happens when two independently formed laws, each its bearer's own, meet at 14DD, and it says at the outset that at 15DD a subject already has its own law and external law is no longer a necessity." The same treatise, at the end of §4: "Two laws meeting at 14DD is treated in Legal Series Paper 1." ↩︎
  16. Paper 1 of this series, CO5: "Where one end is headed in the 15DD direction and the other, in this undertaking, is reduced to calculation, another of the conditions of scope is not met; Paper 5 reads this (CO27)". ↩︎
  17. Paper 1 of this series, CO4: "At the operation layer each party confirms only his own end, and cannot on that basis declare on the other end's behalf that it avows; the other end's taking part and arrangements are described by words and deeds and checkable conditions, and their inner grounds are not certified". The last sentence of CO6: "whether at least one party is headed in the 15DD direction only that end itself can confirm (CO4), and the clues do not certify it on its behalf". ↩︎
  18. Economics P2, §4.0. Paper 0 of this series, §4, the table of shared words: "The 14DD world Economics P2 speaks of, in which the person across from you is a strategy set, falls in this series on the side of being reduced to calculation". ↩︎
  19. Paper 5 of this series, CO23: "such cooperation can be the setting in which cultivation happens, not the source of cultivation"; "Cultivation is not instruction, not remaking, and not the general opening move of such cooperation; the completion of cultivation is not in the enactor's hands". ↩︎
  20. Paper 5 of this series, CO24: "The direction is read on that one effect, and whether it took hold is looked at separately, in the other party's later understanding and action; whether the other's capacity has increased is a measure of outcomes, and is not used to judge direction". ↩︎
  21. Paper 2 of this series, CO9: "Writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is another matter: it lies at the normative layer and does not change with the kind of relation". ↩︎
  22. Paper 2 of this series, CO11: where one end gives conditions, "using one's giving to possess the other, completing the other's step for him, or making him dependent to the point where he cannot say no" carries the direction of colonization. The Conflict Treatise, §20: "The kind of dependency manufactured and locked in by the intervention, such that the other cannot say no to the intervener, is the gentle form of colonization." (quoted in Paper 5 of this series, §2) ↩︎
  23. Exercises and Games of Judgment III (§1.2): "what it looks like in behaviour is not acknowledgment itself; acknowledgment the game can only invite"; the same paper (Abstract) says that the cooperative game "newly opens 15DD, but does not guarantee it: the partner can also be merely someone who helps me reach my purpose". "Changing the game can only invite too" is an extension, this paper's own undertaking. ↩︎
  24. Economics P2, §4.2 (quoted in Paper 5 of this series, §2). ↩︎
  25. The Conflict Treatise, §20; Paper 5 of this series, §2, uses it and marks it as an extension. This paper's applying it again to changing the game before cooperation is also an extension, this paper's own undertaking. ↩︎
  26. Relation Theory Paper 0, §8.3, "Heidegger: The Two Extremes of Solicitude," reading Being and Time, §26 (SZ 122): leaping in for him, solicitude "takes his 'care' over from him, and he is thereby thrown out of his own place"; leaping ahead of him, "not in order to take the 'care' away from him, but to give it back to him properly, as care"; "The two extremes he calls the one that leaps in and dominates, and the one that leaps ahead and frees". The same section writes where the two part: "the two extremes are tied to what it is that is being done. This series does not divide directions by what it is that is being done". ↩︎
  27. Paper 3 of this series, CO13: "A change into a new shared division of labor must be avowed by both parties separately, or be made by a procedure both have recognized and that applies; this does not make either party the approver of the other's own revision and exit. Unilateral withdrawal does not impose a new arrangement on the other party, nor does it erase the effects already left." ↩︎
  28. Paper 5 of this series, CO26 and §8: what is withdrawn is "the side that, once the items are separated, still belongs to oneself, and the items already avowed are checked separately; where one first induces dependency and then withdraws, violation is checked separately at the layer of basic rights, by Relation Theory". ↩︎
  29. Paper 7 of this series, CO36: "One party's withdrawing his own side is his exit; shared matters that remain after parting are not settled by unilateral exit". ↩︎
  30. Relation Theory Paper 5, H47: "Dependency has two senses: the dependency people have on one another in any case carries no direction of colonization; the kind that was made, and that has locked the path to saying no, carries the direction of colonization; where one first monopolizes, or first induces dependency, and then withdraws, violation is checked at the layer of basic rights by F20" (quoted in Paper 5 of this series, note 29). ↩︎
  31. Relation Theory Paper 6, H56: "Withdrawing one's own side is exit and does not carry the direction of colonization, even if the other party's cost rises as a result; when one party exits, whichever party acts outward, adding consequences, using the occasion to apply pressure and calling on others to isolate him all carry the direction of colonization" (quoted in Paper 5 of this series, §5). ↩︎
  32. Paper 5 of this series, CO26: "withdrawing one's own side is inward, is exit, and does not carry the direction of colonization, even if the other party's cost rises as a result; acting in a way directed at him that raises his cost is outward, and carries the direction of colonization". ↩︎
  33. Economics P2, end of §4.3 (quoted in Paper 5 of this series, §6). The original sentence speaks of the limit reached when the other does not enter 15DD; carrying it over to whether the other avows a shared undertaking is an extension, this paper's own undertaking. ↩︎
  34. Paper 6 of this series, CO32: "Breaking a commitment is entered on the books at the layer between person and person: breach of faith is entered apart; it enters the other party's later conditions of occurrence, and expectation changes accordingly". ↩︎
  35. Paper 1 of this series, CO4. ↩︎
  36. Paper 5 of this series, CO25: "long-run relational fact can shift the weight of judgment but cannot complete a certification"; "There is also a bias in the opposite direction: over-cultivation, reading the other's strategic performance as awakening". ↩︎
  37. Paper 6 of this series, §4. The same section cites a sentence of the same form from Meaning Theory: having provided conditions does not make the step by which the other becomes himself something I completed on his behalf. ↩︎
  38. Paper 6 of this series, CO31: "Others are not possessed under 'I have contributed'; recording the other's share as one's own carries the direction of colonization; writing one's own giving as an account the other must repay is read as in Paper 2". ↩︎
  39. Exercises and Games of Judgment II, Abstract; §5.1 has the second half of the sentence. ↩︎
  40. Paper 1 of this series, CO5, and the paragraph on collusion in §5. CO5: if the arrangement the two jointly maintain is premised on "a third person is merely a means," "the arrangement itself decides who counts as an end by whether someone is one of our own, and the recognition between the two does not rest on the other's being a person either; in this undertaking neither end is headed in the 15DD direction". ↩︎
  41. Follett, M. P., "Constructive Conflict" (a talk given at a conference of the Bureau of Personnel Administration, January 1925). Per the full text of the early edition of Dynamic Administration (as held on archive.org; page numbers checked against the printed pagination in the scan): p. 32, "we both got what we really wanted"; p. 35, "Only integration really stabilizes," "that particular conflict is settled and the next occurs on a higher level"; p. 36, "I do not think integration is possible in all cases". The three sentences agree with the excerpt in the 1973 edition edited by E. M. Fox and L. Urwick (Pitman), pp. 1–20; the pagination of the 1973 edition has not been checked separately. ↩︎
  42. Pettit, P., "Two Republican Traditions," in A. Niederberger and P. Schink (eds.), Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics (Edinburgh University Press, 2013), ch. 7, pp. 169–204. p. 172: "you depend for your ability to choose as you wish on my will remaining a goodwill"; the same page says the problem remains even if I "happen to like you and do not exercise that power". p. 174: "a wife could enjoy at the hands of a kind husband, a worker under the rule of a tolerant employer". ↩︎
  43. Sen, A., "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Econometrica 65(4), 1997, §6, "Preference and Self-Imposed Constraints." p. 769: a person can "first restrict the choice options further by taking a 'permissible' subset K(S), reflecting self-imposed constraints, and then seek the maximal elements M(K(S), R) in K(S)". p. 770: "The as if preference R^S_* is, of course, a devised construction and need not have any intuitive plausibility" (the symbol is printed as R with superscript S and subscript *). ↩︎
  44. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 22: "the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself"; "in bargaining, weakness is often strength"; "to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent". Cited at second hand, by way of the author's own account "Bargaining as Binding Oneself" (1993), written for the "This Week's Citation Classic" column of Current Contents; the original book has not been checked. ↩︎
  45. Brandenburger, A., & Stuart, H., "Biform Games," Management Science 53(4), 2007, 537–549, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0591. Per the authors' working paper of August 2004: "A biform game is a two-stage game"; "each profile of strategic choices at the first stage leads to a second-stage, cooperative game"; "business strategies shape the competitive environment"; "A good strategic move is one that brings about favorable economics to a player". The published version has not been checked. ↩︎
  46. Paper 1 of this series, §7. ↩︎
  47. Paper 3 of this series, CO15: "the provisions, and the authority that comes with positions, are acknowledged but not judged, and are registered as conditions of effects". ↩︎
  48. Relation Theory Paper 1, H12: "Where three or more are involved, dealings that do not pass through an institution are broken down into effects between pairs and entered on separate accounts". ↩︎

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.

I · This series

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 0: The Place of Cooperation Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029128

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 1: Doing Together [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029132

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 2: Each for Their Own Ends [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029135

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 3: Division of Labor [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029139

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 5: One Side [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029145

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 6: Each Bears a Share [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029149

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Cooperation Theory Paper 7: The Process [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24029151

II · Other SAE works directly cited in this paper

Qin, H. (2026). Finding One Another (SAE Action Theory, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970783

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

Qin, H. (2026). The Other End of the Bridge: Economic Rationality When 15DD Faces a Party Who Does Not Enter 15DD (SAE Economics, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 0: The Place of Relation Theory [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545115

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 1: What a Relation Is, and What It Is Not [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545047

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 5: The Sediment of Dealings [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545076

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Relation Theory Paper 6: Asymmetry, Divergence and Ending [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23545087

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · II: The Competitive Game (14DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23609854

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · III: The Cooperative Game (15DD) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23609864

III · External works

Brandenburger, A., & Stuart, H. (2007). Biform games. Management Science, 53(4), 537–549. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0591 (checked against the authors' 2004 working paper; the published version has not been checked)

Follett, M. P. (1925/1973). Constructive conflict. In E. M. Fox & L. Urwick (Eds.), Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett (pp. 1–20). Pitman. (checked against the full text of the early edition and the excerpt in the 1973 edition; the pagination of the 1973 edition has not been checked)

Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. §26, S. 121–122. (as read by way of Relation Theory Paper 0; no edition listed separately)

Pettit, P. (2013). Two republican traditions. In A. Niederberger & P. Schink (Eds.), Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics (pp. 169–204). Edinburgh University Press. https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748643066.003.0008

Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press. (p. 22, cited at second hand, by way of the author's Citation Classic account)

Sen, A. (1997). Maximization and the act of choice. Econometrica, 65(4), 745–779.

Interfaces

  • Main upstream: the Conflict Treatise (opening, §1, end of §4, §12, §20); Action Theory Paper 8 (D47, §5); Relation Theory Paper 0 (§8.3, Heidegger), Paper 1 (H8, H9, H12), Paper 5 (H47), Paper 6 (H56).
  • Also used: Exercises and Games of Judgment II (Abstract, §5.1), III (§1.2, Abstract); Economics P2 (§4.0, §4.2, end of §4.3); Meaning Theory (by way of Paper 6 of this series, §4); Rights Theory P5 (F20, by way of Relation Theory Paper 5, H47); Legal Series Paper 1 (by way of the opening and the end of §4 of the Conflict Treatise).
  • This series: continues from Paper 1, the Introduction, CO1, CO4 to CO6, §5 to §7, and note 16; Paper 5, the Introduction, CO22 to CO27, §2, §5, §6 and §8, and note 29; Paper 2, CO9 and CO11; Paper 3, CO13 and CO15; Paper 6, CO31, CO32 and §4; Paper 7, CO36; Paper 0, the table of shared words in §4. This paper does not change any of them.