Self-as-an-End
SAE Rereading Classical Concepts · Paper 5

Forgiveness: The Account Carried Inside
宽恕:心里的那一笔

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24294219 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

What does forgiveness cancel, and what can it not cancel? This paper answers: forgiveness cancels the account carried inside by the one who gives it. The outward account, other people's accounts, the public account, the fact that the thing happened, and the other's wrong are beyond its reach. Giving is one end and receiving is the other; if the other is still carrying something at his end, only he can take it up, and no one can receive it in his place; bystanders do not say what is in him on the strength of his not having responded. One can cancel only one's own; forgiving in another's place does not hold. Forgiveness is not an obligation: cancelling is without fault; not cancelling is without fault too; neither ranks above the other. One who does not forgive can keep the person out of the account all the same. One person's forgiveness is not held up as a model for others, and bystanders may not hurry it. Forgiveness is not reconciliation, not the restoring of trust, not the withdrawal of the outward account, and not a rewriting of the past; to be in pain still after saying one forgives does not make what was said then false. Merely staying one's hand is not yet cancelling. John Paul II visiting in prison the man who shot him, Harada Masaharu saying that this was not forgiving him, a question Nagase Takashi never managed to ask, the document Eva Kor read out at Auschwitz, and two women in Iran who had the right to see a sentence carried out are the historical cases.

This is an independent English rewrite, not a translation, of the Chinese final text v1.0. Terminology and framing are recomposed for an English-reading audience; the philosophical content is the same.

Introduction

The last paper stopped on one sentence: what has been owned is not taken back if the other does not forgive. That is the end at which a wrong is owned.

This paper is about the other end: the injured person forgives, or does not.

Paper 1 wrote about the account. What is added here is the account carried inside.1

§1 Three Kinds of Account

When a matter is over, the accounts it leaves are of three kinds.

The outward account: money, goods, a name on a cover, compensation. It belongs to its holder, and whether to claim it is hers to decide. Paper 1 wrote about this.

The account carried inside: I feel that you owe me. It is written on no sheet of paper, yet it is real, and the injured person lives with it. The money that was lent has long been repaid, and still at every meeting there is a sentence within: that year you kept me waiting half a year. The money account is cleared; the sentence remains.

What cannot be cancelled: other people's accounts, the public account, the fact that the thing happened, his wrong.

Forgiveness cancels the middle kind, and of that only the account carried inside by the one who gives it. The first it does not touch; the last it cannot reach.

One case shows the three apart very clearly.

On 13 May 1981 Pope John Paul II was shot. On 27 December 1983 he went to Rebibbia prison in Rome and met Mehmet Ali Ağca, who had fired the shots, and afterward told the prisoners that he had that day been able to meet the man who attacked him and to repeat to him his forgiveness, as he had given it at once, as soon as he was able; and that they had met as men and as brothers (Holy See, 27 December 1983).

Ağca's life sentence was not changed by this. On 13 June 2000 the President of Italy pardoned him. The Holy See's statement that day says that the Pope had forgiven his attacker immediately, and that he had also let the Italian authorities know that he was in favor of an act of clemency, should Italian law provide for one (Holy See Press Office, 13 June 2000).

The forgiveness was his, and he gave it at once. The sentence was the state's, and it ran on for nineteen years. The pardon was the President's. He was in favor of clemency; the words are "in favor," and before them stands "should the law provide for one." Each of the three stayed where it belonged.

§2 How a Matter of the Heart Is Written

This paper writes about an account carried inside, and yet does not read minds.

Of the person himself it can be said directly: the account I carry is cancelled, or it is not. That is something he can say for himself.

Of other people, only two visible things are written. One: whether he made a declaration of forgiveness. The other: whether, after that, he went on using this account to ask anything of the other.

So the historical cases below record only what the persons themselves said. Where someone said "forgive," "forgive" is recorded; where someone said "this was not forgiving," that is recorded. Where nothing was said, nothing is supplied.

§3 Two Ends

Forgiveness has two ends. Giving is one.

What this end cancels is the account carried inside by the one who gives. Once given, her end is complete; it does not wait on the other's receiving in order to count. If the other is no longer alive, the account can still be cancelled: what is cancelled is at her end, and never waited on the other to receive it. The last paper said that owning a wrong is not completed by forgiveness; this is the same shape, said from the other side.

Receiving is the other end. At the other's end, if he is still carrying something, only he can take it up; no one can receive it in his place. Bystanders may not, on the strength of his not having responded, say that he is still carrying it, or that he does not care: he may not accept that he did wrong, and he may not know of the matter at all.

Of the receiving end, someone has left a sentence.

In the Second World War Nagase Takashi was an interpreter with the Japanese army and Eric Lomax was a prisoner of war. In March 1993 the two met beside the River Kwai in Thailand. Nagase said later: "I knew he had hated me for 50 years, and I wanted to ask him if he forgave me, but I couldn't find a way." And: "So I said: 'Can we be friends?' and he said, 'Yes.'" (The Japan Times, 9 October 2005).

He did not get the question out. Had he asked it, the answer would not have been the asker's to fix. Whether to give is still at the other end.

Of the giving end, too, someone has spoken very directly. Eva Kor was a survivor of Auschwitz. On 27 January 1995 she read out a document of forgiveness of her own beside the ruins of the gas chambers. That day a physician who had served in the camp was also present, and signed a document of his own. Kor wrote later that forgiveness, like chemotherapy, is a personal matter, and that she did it for herself (Kor, autobiographical account).

How that physician received it, and whether he did, this case does not judge. What can be seen is this: the end at which she gave, she says, was her own affair.

§4 Only One's Own

The account carried inside is each person's own. One can cancel only one's own.

After Kor's reading, other survivors reproached her, saying she had spoken in their name. She writes that she never did (ibid.). She cancelled only her own account, and did not touch anyone else's. That other survivors disagreed with what she did is recorded too; their accounts are in their own hands.

Forgiving in another's place does not hold. This pairs with the last paper's "it cannot be done in another's place": one can own only one's own wrong, and one can cancel only one's own account.

Simon Wiesenthal wrote of an experience. As he tells it, while in a concentration camp he was brought to the bedside of a dying SS man, who wanted to confess to a Jew and be forgiven. He left the room in silence (Wiesenthal, The Sunflower). This is his telling, and its details are disputed; only the situation is taken here: the man sent, not for anyone he had harmed, but for any Jew. He was asking one person to forgive in others' place.

The book prints responses from many people. Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel writes: "No one can forgive crimes committed against other people" (ibid.). Others see it differently. This paper stands on Heschel's sentence.

§5 Not an Obligation

Forgiveness is not an obligation.

That account is hers. To cancel it is without fault. Not to cancel it is without fault too. Neither ranks above the other.

She may forgive even if he has not owned his wrong; she may withhold forgiveness even if he has. Whether to give is not fixed by the other's end; and whether she looks to the other's end at all is hers to decide as well.

Not forgiving is not the same as entering the person in the account.

In 1983 the younger brother of Harada Masaharu was murdered, and the killer, Hasegawa, was sentenced to death. Harada later went to see him in prison. He says that on the first visit the man was smiling, and that seeing that smile, he had lost; and then: but this was not forgiving Hasegawa; it is not so simple a thing that one can forgive because a feeling has come. He says his anger at what Hasegawa did will not go away. He also petitioned the Ministry of Justice more than once not to carry out the sentence, and in 2001 handed a petition to the Minister of Justice in person. It was not accepted, and the execution took place that year (Human Rights Information Network, interview, 19 November 2004).

He did not forgive, and says so plainly. The account within, he kept. At the same time he went to see the man, and opposed settling the matter with the man's life.

Had he not gone to see him and not petitioned, the account within would have been kept all the same, and that would not have been entering the person in the account either. One who does not forgive can keep the person out of the account all the same. The line drawn in Paper 1 does not depend on forgiveness.

Primo Levi, answering readers' questions, wrote that he had not forgiven any of the culprits, and was not willing to forgive a single one of them now or in the future, unless he showed, in deeds and not in words, and not too late, that he had become conscious of the crimes and errors of fascism, at home and abroad, and was resolved to condemn them and to root them out of his own conscience and that of others (Levi, afterword to If This Is a Man). Whether to give, and on what ground, he fixed for himself. His condition for giving forgiveness was that the other show in deeds that he had come to recognize those crimes and errors and was resolved to condemn and uproot them. This is a condition at the end of forgiveness; it does not turn round into a checkpoint that the owning in the last paper must pass in order to be complete.

In one and the same matter, each person's words are each person's own. In 2015 there was a shooting in a church in Charleston in the United States, and nine people were killed. At the bond hearing, relatives of the dead spoke in turn to the killer. One said: "I forgive you." Another said she was "a work in progress," that she acknowledged she was "very angry," and went on: "We have no room for hate. So we have to forgive" (CNN, 19 June 2015). Her anger is not used here to say that she did not forgive; nor is the road she says she is still on described, for her, as already walked. The trial went ahead in the ordinary way, and a federal jury later returned a sentence of death (U.S. Department of Justice, 10 January 2017).

§6 Bystanders May Not Hurry It

One person's forgiveness is not held up as a model for others.

In 1987 a bomb went off at Enniskillen in Northern Ireland. Gordon Wilson and his daughter were buried in the rubble; she was badly injured and died in hospital some hours later. That evening he spoke on the radio of the last things his daughter had said to him, said that he was praying for those who planted the bomb, and said that talk of revenge was no use. His words spread, were described as forgiveness, and were held up as an example. The biographical dictionary notes specifically that he did not in fact use the word "forgive." It also says that some victims felt that his example made it unacceptable for them to go on expressing grief or anger (Dictionary of Irish Biography).

What he said was his. Those who held it up were bystanders. The holding up put weight on the other victims: look at him.

So this paper does not praise those who forgive. To praise those who forgive is to put weight on those who do not. Every paper in this series has this rule; it weighs most here.

Bystanders may not hurry it either. "It was all so long ago," "you should let it go": what is being hurried is an account carried inside someone else. That account is not the bystander's.

§7 What Forgiveness Is Not

Forgiveness is not reconciliation. The account she carried is cancelled, and she may never see him again.

Forgiveness is not the restoring of trust. Whether to trust looks to what comes after; what forgiveness cancels is the account from before.

Forgiveness is not the withdrawal of the outward account. What is to be made good is still to be made good; whether to claim it is another matter, as in Paper 1.

Forgiveness is not a rewriting of the past. The thing happened, and his wrong is still his.

One further question is often put to those who forgive: didn't you forgive him? Then why are you still in pain?

When a person has said she forgives and afterward is still in pain, still unwilling to meet, one cannot on those grounds say that what she said then was false. Pain is another thing. What she cancelled was "you owe me," not "it hurts."

It also happens that someone says she forgives and later feels again that he owes her. What is said and done later is read separately. The later look of things is not used to wipe out the sentence said then, and the sentence said then is not used to hold down what comes later.

§8 Kept Apart from Staying One's Hand

When the party with the right to pursue to the end stays her hand, that is not yet forgiveness.

There are two kinds of staying one's hand. In one, she simply pursues no further, and the account is still there. In the other, the rules governing the case place a part of a sanction in the injured party's hands, and she expressly waives the part that is hers. This part was put in her hands by those rules; it did not come from the account she holds (Paper 1, §12), and it is not among the three kinds in §1. Her waiving it is read on the pattern that what is someone's is that person's to cancel. Neither kind in itself amounts to forgiveness, and neither excludes it.

The law of Iran places the carrying out of certain punishments in the hands of the injured party. Two cases.

Ameneh Bahrami was blinded in both eyes by a man who threw acid at her. The court sentenced him to be blinded in both eyes. In 2011, before the sentence was carried out, she waived it. Reports record her as saying that she forgave him, she forgave him; and that when one has the power in one's hands it is best to pardon. She said at the same time that she was not giving up the compensation, which she needed for her treatment (Associated Press; Reuters, 2011).

Samereh Alinejad's son was killed. Seven years later, in 2014, on the day of the execution, at the gallows, she first spoke to the crowd and challenged those who had been urging her: did they know what these years had been like for her? Then she slapped the man across the face, and pardoned him. She said later that the slap was the stretch between revenge and forgiveness; and that now that she had forgiven him she felt relieved (Associated Press; Agence France-Presse, 2014).

The "forgive" and "pardon" of the reports are English renderings; what the two women said was in Persian. Reading the reports as they stand:

Each waived the share of the punishment that was hers. What was hers, she waived.

Each also spoke of forgiving. That is another thing. In these cases the two happened together.

In Bahrami's case one can see that the two are apart, and that account is apart from account: the blinding she waived; the compensation she claimed as before; and at the same time she spoke of forgiving.

In Alinejad's case there is also what §6 was about. The crowd was urging her, and her own family had urged her too. She first pushed back at those urging her, and then made the decision herself.

§9 Not on the Absence of Pursuit Alone

The histories have several episodes commonly described as "letting bygones be bygones."

Lian Po carried a bundle of thorns to Lin Xiangru's door to ask his pardon, and the two became sworn friends. Lin Xiangru had earlier given his own reason for keeping out of Lian Po's way: he put the urgent affairs of the state first and private grudges after (Shiji, Biographies of Lian Po and Lin Xiangru).

Guan Zhong once shot an arrow at Duke Huan of Qi. The duke later made him chief minister; in the record, Bao Shuya advises the duke that if he means to win hegemony, no one but Guan Zhong will do, and the duke follows the advice.

At a banquet of King Zhuang of Chu, when the lamps went out someone pulled at one of the king's concubines; the king had every guest tear off his cap-tassel before the lamps were relit, and the reason recorded is that he would not have a man of worth shamed over this. The concubine had torn off the man's tassel and asked the king to light the lamps and identify him. The king's not pursuing it is not her forgiving; her share, the king could not stand in for.

In these episodes there was no pursuit. The reasons the records give are the state, the enterprise, the way to treat men of worth. Whether there was what this paper reads, an account within that was cancelled, no one in the material says. That no one said "I forgive" does not prove there was no forgiveness; nor does it prove there was. So only this is said: from the absence of pursuit alone, what this paper is looking for cannot be read.

§10 What Earlier Thinkers Said

Speaking of this in terms of an "account" is something the ancients already did.

Laozi, chapter 79: when a great grievance is reconciled, some grievance is sure to remain; how can that be counted good? So the sage holds the left half of the tally and does not press his claim on others. Holding the tally in one's hand, and not collecting. The sentence is often read as forgiveness. But the chapter opens with "some grievance is sure to remain," and does not treat not collecting and the grievance being gone as one thing. On this paper's division, from "does not press his claim on others" alone one cannot conclude that anyone's inner account has been cancelled.

In the Lord's Prayer too, what is asked to be remitted is "debts": "And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors" (Matthew 6:12).

Kant, in §36 of the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals, says that one does not repay another's enmity with hatred, does not seek revenge, and may not even call on the judge of the world to avenge one; a conciliatory spirit is a duty of human beings. Of the two reasons he gives, the first is that a person has enough guilt of his own to stand in need of pardon himself; the second, which he marks as the chief one, is that no punishment, from whomever it comes, may be inflicted out of hatred. He at once adds a limit: this is not to be confused with meek toleration of wrongs, which would be throwing one's rights at the feet of others (AA 6:460–461).

This paper takes three things from the passage: no revenge; no throwing away of one's own rights; and no authority in the injured person himself to punish. Paper 1 has already taken up these three. Whether his "conciliatory spirit" is what this paper calls cancelling the account carried inside, this paper does not decide for him. His limiting sentence runs the same way as this paper.

§11 Where This Paper Stops

This paper has said what forgiveness cancels and what it does not. It has not said how one comes to be able to forgive, nor whether one should.

How two people go on afterward, reconciled or not, belongs to the side that writes about what passes between people. The Conflict Treatise has said that it gives no norms of apology, forgiveness and reconciliation, and that it does not prevent other ledgers from listing them as conditions in a given case. This paper gives no such norms either.

Pardon, commutation and amnesty are matters for the institutional side. What is cancelled there is the public account, not an account carried inside any one person.

Whether a person can forgive himself, this paper has not written.

A Few for Oneself

The lines below are only for one's own use, and are not used to measure others.

The account I carry inside: whether to cancel it is my affair.

If I cancel it, it does not need him to receive it in order to count.

What I cancel is mine; another's account I do not cancel for him, and do not urge him to cancel.

If I have not cancelled it, I still do not enter him, as a person, in the account.

If I said I forgave and it still hurts, I do not on that account call what I said then false.

When someone else has forgiven, I do not hold him up against those who have not.

Propositions of This Paper

  • GD30 Forgiveness cancels the account carried inside by the one who gives it. The outward account, other people's accounts, the public account, the fact that the thing happened, and his wrong are beyond its reach.
  • GD31 Giving is one end and receiving is the other. If the other is still carrying something at his end, only he can take it up; no one can receive it in his place. Bystanders do not say what is in him on the strength of his not having responded.
  • GD32 One can cancel only one's own. Forgiving in another's place does not hold.
  • GD33 Forgiveness is not an obligation. Cancelling is without fault; not cancelling is without fault too; neither ranks above the other. One who does not forgive can keep the person out of the account all the same.
  • GD34 One person's forgiveness is not held up as a model for others. Bystanders may not hurry it.
  • GD35 Forgiveness is not reconciliation, not the restoring of trust, not the withdrawal of the outward account, and not a rewriting of the past. To be in pain still, and still unwilling to meet, after saying one forgives does not make what was said then false.
  • GD36 Merely staying one's hand is not yet cancelling. Where the rules governing the case place a part of a sanction in the injured party's hands and she expressly waives the part that is hers, the one to whom that part belongs has cancelled it. This does not in itself amount to forgiveness, and does not exclude it.

Notes

  1. Every proposition of this paper sets out from the place where others are ends too (15DD). ↩︎

Acknowledgments

This paper is Paper 5 of the Rereading Classical Concepts series of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.

The writing and review of this paper were assisted by Anthropic's Claude, OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's Gemini, xAI's Grok and Meta's Muse. Thanks are due to these companies and to their research and engineering teams.

References

Group I lists works of this system, archived on Zenodo with Chinese and English versions under the same record, all single-authored (Han Qin); DOIs follow those listed at the head of each paper on the author's site. The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the title and the paper noted in parentheses at the place of use. The Prequel and Papers 1 to 5 in the text are the papers of this series. Kant's works are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition (AA). Sources not in English are given in the author's own renderings. Works marked † were read in an online transcription, an excerpt or a translation; what was checked against which text is recorded separately in the case verification table for Rereading Classical Concepts.

I · Works of this system

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

II · Other works

Analects (Lunyu); Mencius (Mengzi); Laozi (Wang Bi text); Zuozhuan. Cited by book and chapter from the received texts. †

Associated Press (2011; 17 April 2014); Reuters (1 August 2011); Agence France-Presse (2014). [Agency reports on Ameneh Bahrami and Samereh Alinejad].

CNN. (2015, June 19). [Broadcast transcript including the Charleston bond hearing]. https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ebo/date/2015-06-19/segment/01

Dictionary of Irish Biography. Wilson, (William) Gordon. https://www.dib.ie/biography/wilson-william-gordon-a9072

Holy See Press Office. (2000, June 13). [Statement on the pardon of Mehmet Ali Ağca].

John Paul II. (1983, December 27). [Address to the inmates of Rebibbia prison]. Holy See.

Kant, I. (1797). Die Metaphysik der Sitten. AA 6:203–493.

Kant, I. (1900–). Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Academy edition, cited in the text as AA). Berlin: Reimer / de Gruyter.

Kor, E. M. [Autobiographical accounts], including that published by The Forgiveness Project.

Levi, P. (1976). Appendice. In Se questo è un uomo. Torino: Einaudi. †

Liu Xiang. Shuoyuan [Garden of Stories], chapter "Fu en." †

Sima Qian. Shiji [Records of the Grand Historian]. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. †

The Holy Bible, King James Version.

The Japan Times. (2005, October 9). Building a bridge to forgiveness. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2005/10/09/general/building-a-bridge-to-forgiveness/

U.S. Department of Justice. (2017, January 10). [Announcement of the federal jury's sentence of death].

Wiesenthal, S. (1998). The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness (rev. and expanded ed.). New York: Schocken. †

[Interview with Harada Masaharu]. (2004, November 19). †