Self-as-an-End
SAE Rereading Classical Concepts · Paper 4

Owning a Wrong: It Cannot Be Done in Another's Place
认错:错不能替

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24294217 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

After a wrong has been done, what can be done by someone else in the doer's place, and what cannot? This paper separates three things: making good, giving an answer, and owning the wrong. The first two can be done in another's place; owning cannot, and a person can own only his own wrong. From outside, two kinds of material can be read in the act of owning a wrong: saying it in the place where the original words did their work is the act of this occasion; what he does afterward is later material that can go on being read. Later material does not leave that step hanging or void it; changing is his own affair and is not for others to inspect and pass. A correction goes back to where the original words did their work; what is changed is the misstated fact or the mistaken verdict, and what happened stays as it was. Owning a wrong does not cancel the account. Relaying words the person has himself already owned is not owning, in his place, a wrong he has not owned; the phrase "on behalf of" does not by itself tell which of the two is going on. An institution cannot own a wrong; those who can are persons, each his own share; what a predecessor did, a successor cannot own, though he can take the responsibility upon himself of his own accord. What has been owned is not conditional on the other's forgiving, and is not taken back if the other does not forgive; the other person does not thereby owe forgiveness. Lu Xun striking out his own inference in the pages of Yusi in 1924, Samuel Sewall's statement read out in public in 1697, a check sent by Chris Chelios for his teammates, a sentence of Frances Arnold's on retracting a paper, a letter of Chen Xiaolu's and his phrase "on behalf of," and Willy Brandt kneeling in Warsaw are the historical cases.

This is an independent English rewrite, not a translation, of the Chinese final text v1.0. Terminology and framing are recomposed for an English-reading audience; the philosophical content is the same.

Introduction

Paper 1 said: the account is reckoned in full; the person is not entered in it. It also kept one section to say that an account has two ends, and that one can be standing at the owing end.

This paper is about that end. Beyond the account, one more thing appears here: the wrong.1

An account is outside: what was broken, what is missing, how much is to be made up. A wrong is something else: the one who made that judgment and did that thing is me. An account can be paid by someone else. Can a wrong?

One word about English. "Apology" covers two things that this paper keeps apart: an answer given to the injured party, and the doer's own owning of what he did. Where the distinction matters, this paper uses the more specific terms.

§1 Three Things

After a wrong has been done, there are three things that can be given to the injured party.

Making good. What was broken is repaired; what is missing is replaced. This is responsibility.

Giving an answer. Saying to the injured person: this happened, and it was not right.

Owning the wrong. The person who made that judgment turns back himself and owns it: I did it, and I was wrong.

The first two can be done in another's place. An insurer can pay; a successor can say, for his predecessor, "this was not right." The third cannot. Action Theory has a sentence for it: what a person has done himself cannot be owned by someone else in his place (Action Theory, Paper 8).3 Someone who owns a wrong for another has given an answer. Relaying a sentence the person has himself already owned is a different matter, taken up in §6.

The three are seen most clearly when they come apart.

After the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, members of the United States men's hockey team wrecked rooms in the Olympic Village; the damage came to about three thousand dollars. The captain, Chris Chelios, wrote to the Nagano organizing committee: "I want to take this opportunity to apologize to the people of Japan." He called the conduct "inexcusable," and enclosed a check for three thousand dollars. The report says that those responsible were a few players who were not publicly identified; that Chelios denied wrongdoing; and that no one had taken responsibility for the incident (CBS News, 14 March 1998).

The answer was given, by the captain in others' place. The making good was given, by someone in others' place. The owning: as of that report, none of those who did it had come forward to own it. This paper does not assess those who did not come forward; it reads only where the three things fell.

Now a document, and an institution's affair. On 5 September 2014 the City of New York settled, for forty-one million dollars, the suit brought by five men who had been wrongly convicted. The same press release carries two voices. The mayor said: "This settlement is an act of justice for those five men that is long overdue." The city's Corporation Counsel said: "This agreement should not be construed as an acknowledgment that the convictions of these five plaintiffs were the result of law enforcement misconduct"; he went on to say that those who handled the case had acted reasonably in the circumstances of the time (New York City Law Department, press release).

The settlement was approved; and it was said that this was an injustice to be made up. The same page also says: this is not to be read as accepting that there was misconduct in the handling of the case.

This leads to institutions. An institution's own wrong: who owns it?

An institution can make good, and can give an answer. Owning a wrong is something persons do, and an institution cannot itself own a wrong. Those who can are persons: the person who made that judgment at the time owns his own share; the person at the head of the institution owns his own share.

If the wrong was done by a predecessor, the successor cannot own it. A wrong can be owned only by the one whose it is. The successor can take the responsibility upon himself of his own accord: making good and giving an answer, the two things that can be done in another's place.

That making good does not take the place of owning was already kept apart by an earlier writer. Maimonides, setting out the rules of repentance, says that one who has injured his fellow or damaged his property, even though he has paid what he owes, is not granted atonement until he confesses and resolves never to do such a thing again (Laws of Repentance, 1:1). Here he is speaking of atonement in that tradition, not of forgiveness by the injured party. Only this one point is taken up here: having paid is not having owned.

§2 What Can Be Read from Outside

Owning a wrong is the person's own affair. From outside, two kinds of material can be read.

One is the act of this occasion: he said it in the place where the original words did their work.

One is later: what he does from then on.

These two are not two checkpoints. Later material can help in rereading that time, but it does not leave that step hanging. Some people never meet the same kind of matter again and have no chance to "show that they have changed"; some people later do wrong once more. The original owning counts all the same in both cases.

Changing is his own affair, and is not for others to inspect and pass. Parent-Child Theory, writing about parents who fall back and afterward turn back, uses the word "clues": owning up and changing an arrangement are clues visible from outside; whether it was a turning back is confirmed only at the person's own end (Parent-Child Theory, Paper 1).2 This paper keeps to that measure.

The ancients spoke of owning and correcting together. Confucius said: to have a fault and not correct it, that is what is called a fault (Analects 15.30). Mencius said of the gentleman of old that his faults were like eclipses of the sun and moon, which all the people saw, and that when he corrected them all the people looked up to him; and of the men of later times that they not only went along with their faults but went on to make up a case for them (Mencius, Gongsun Chou II). "Making up a case for it" is the commonest form of the opposite of owning.

§3 Back to Where the Words Did Their Work

When something was misstated, or a wrong verdict passed on someone, the correction goes back to where those words did their work. Quietly deleting does not count.

On the morning of 13 November 1924 a young man came to Lu Xun's door, giving his name as Yang Shuda. That night Lu Xun wrote an account of the visit in which he concluded that the visitor was feigning madness; he was certain, he wrote, that it was put on. The piece went to the weekly Yusi.

Before the second issue was printed he already knew he had been wrong. The young man was really ill. The original piece appeared in the second issue as written.

Lu Xun then wrote a correction, printed in the third issue of Yusi, the very next one. Its first section has one sentence that matters: the passages of oversensitive inference in the second half of his account, he writes, ought to be struck out. The second section is a letter to the editor. He had received an explanation written by a friend of the young man; he says of himself that he is too ready to suspect and too ready to be angry, and asks, now that the young man has fallen into such a state, how he could fail to hurry to remove his misunderstanding of him. He asks the editor to print the friend's piece alongside; if there is not room, to add two pages, without raising the price, the responsibility for that to be borne by himself (the two pieces as collected in Lu Xun's Complete Works).

Reading this:

Where he got it wrong is where he went back to correct it. The same periodical, the next issue.

What he struck out was the inference, not the account. That visit happened, and stays as it was; the verdict he passed on that person, he withdrew.

He put the other side's explanation in the same place.

There are no words asking for forgiveness.

Samuel Sewall's owning, in 1697, took another form. Five years earlier he had been one of the judges in the Salem witch trials. He wrote a statement and, on a public fast day, gave it to the minister of his own church to be read out; he stood while it was read, and bowed when it was finished. It says of the guilt contracted in those trials that "he is, upon many accounts, more concerned than any that he knows of," and that he "Desires to take the Blame and Shame of it" (Sewall's statement, 1697).

The one who read it out was the minister. The voice can change; the one owning did not change: he wrote it, and he stood there.

"Going back to the original place" is sometimes impossible. If the original place has dispersed, one goes and says it wherever those words reached, as far as one can get; this is not a guarantee that everyone will hear. If the other person does not wish to see him again, owning the wrong is not used as a reason to seek him out. The correction is directed at the place where the words did their work, not in pursuit of the person.

What is misjudged is not always a person. In 2012 the paleographer Qiu Xigui published a reading of an inscription. In 2018 the full excavation report appeared; having read it, he concluded that his earlier account had gone the wrong way, and published a new paper. He later wrote that the 2012 article was without merit, should be void, and would not go into any future collection of his work; and that when one finds an error in one's own paper, one ought to point it out and correct it promptly, so that it does not mislead (Qiu Xigui, autobiographical account). He had misread an inscription; he had not falsely accused anyone. Going back to the public place and declaring the old paper void has the same shape.

§4 Only One's Own Share

A person can own only his own wrong. Where several people are in one matter, this can be seen.

In January 2020 the chemist Frances Arnold and two coauthors retracted a paper published in Science: the results could not be reproduced, and key parts of the laboratory record were missing. All three signed the retraction. What she wrote publicly that day was: "It is painful to admit, but important to do so. I apologize to all. I was a bit busy when this was submitted, and did not do my job well" (Retraction Watch, 2 January 2020).

In these sentences she speaks only of her own share.

In August 2013 Chen Xiaolu published a letter of apology. At the start of the Cultural Revolution he had been a student leader at Beijing No. 8 Middle School. The letter says that, as the student leader and head of the school's revolutionary committee at the time, he bore direct responsibility for the school's leaders and some of its teachers and students having been denounced and sent to forced labor. It also says that his formal apology came too late.

The letter contains a question as well: he did not know whether his fellow alumni authorized him to make such an apology.

In October he went back to the school and said to his former teachers, face to face, that he wished, on behalf of the alumni of No. 8 who had hurt them in those years, to apologize sincerely (China Youth Daily, 15 October 2013).

Two things are joined in one person here, and they have to be read apart.

"Bore direct responsibility" is what he himself owned. That is owning a wrong.

The "on behalf of" sentence has to be divided again. For those alumni who had already owned their shares and asked him to say so, he was relaying; for those who had not, this sentence could not do it for them. He had asked about authorization. The report describes three reactions among his fellow alumni after the letter became public: many supported him; some thought he was making a show of feeling; and some said that those who should come forward were the students who had done the beating, not he. How things stood at each alumnus's end, these records cannot fill in.

So only this much is said: the phrase "on behalf of" does not by itself tell whether he owned anything in others' place. Each of those alumni's shares is still with each of them.

§5 The Wrong Is Owned; the Account Remains

Owning a wrong does not cancel the account.

Lu Xun says this himself in that piece. The sour wine he had brewed, he writes, was of course his to drink to the dregs. The cost of the added pages: the responsibility to be borne by himself. Two items can be read here. One is the printing cost of two extra pages, owed to the periodical, which he said was his. The other is toward the young man: in his own words, to remove his misunderstanding of him, and the means was to print the friend's explanation in the same place. To read this second thing as an account as well is this paper's reading. In the same passage in which he owned the wrong, he took both upon himself. Whether the printing cost was later paid is not known here.

The reverse: to say of an account not yet paid "I have already apologized," and to use that sentence to ask that no more be made good. That is using the owning of a wrong to offset an account. Owning does not offset the account. The account is reckoned as in Paper 1: for the share that is already clear, whether to claim it and how much to pursue is for the holder; where it is disputed whether anything is owed, or how much, that is not for one side alone to settle.

There is another end. When the holder of the account says "I don't want it," the holder's end is cancelled. Whether the one who did wrong makes it up at his own end is still his own cannot-not.

This framework has written about one situation: two people each treat the other as an end, and one unintentionally injures the other. The one who caused the injury cannot-not make it up, and in the form the other finds fitting; the injured one does not accept more than is fitting, and receives to the degree he himself finds fitting; both can be right, and yet the two do not meet (Moral Law, Paper 4). Only this shape is borrowed here: each end has its own cannot-not, and the holder's not wanting it does not cancel the other end for him. As for the stretch where the two do not meet, that paper says that when two people cannot bring it together by themselves, a third party is needed to take it up; this paper does not go into that.

§6 In Another's Place

There are several situations in which one person owns a wrong for another. In each, what the one standing in can give is making good and an answer. Relaying is a different kind, and is taken last.

A successor for a predecessor. On 7 December 1970 the West German chancellor Willy Brandt, having laid a wreath at the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, went down on his knees. During the Nazi period he had been in exile abroad. He wrote later in his memoirs that, at the abyss of German history and under the burden of the millions murdered, he did what people do when language fails (Brandt, Memoirs). Those things were not done by him, and he did not say a word. Reading the kneeling as an answer rests on that sentence in his own memoirs: it was what is done when language fails. On this paper's reading, it was an answer. It is not the less for not being the owning of a wrong; it is simply another thing.

The head of an institution. Two things are first kept apart here. His own share in that position he can own: for example, that it was he who decided at the time, or that he later knew and did not put it right. That is owning, not standing in. What a predecessor did he cannot own. He can take the responsibility upon himself of his own accord: making good, giving an answer, putting right what is to be put right. What he takes up is the responsibility; the wrong is still the predecessor's.

One member of a group for the rest. Chelios's letter is this. Which kind Chen Xiaolu's "on behalf of" sentence was, §4 has said, cannot be told from the phrase alone.

Relaying. Sewall's statement was read by the minister. Relaying words the person has himself already owned is one thing. Owning for him a wrong he has not owned is another, and cannot be done.

Parents for a child. This differs from the others, because part of the child's share was at first held for him by the parents, and is to be handed back to him item by item (Parent-Child Theory, Paper 0).

A child breaks a neighbor's flowerpot and says that another child did it. The parents pay, and tell the neighbor what they know for certain of how it happened. Making good and an answer have been given.

"I put it on someone else just now" still has to be owned by the child himself.

If the parents helped him hide it, they own their own share separately.

So there are three shares: the making good and the answer toward the injured party, which the parents can give; the parents' own share; and the child's own share. How large the child's share is varies with how far he has grown, and this paper does not settle it for any household.

One record stands on this edge. Among the accusers at Salem in 1692 was a twelve-year-old girl, Ann Putnam. Fourteen years later she stood in the church while the minister read her statement. It says that what she did she did ignorantly, deluded by Satan, and not out of anger or ill will toward anyone; that she had been made an instrument for accusing those persons, whom she now had good reason to believe innocent; she names Goodwife Nurse and her two sisters, and begs forgiveness (Putnam's statement, 1706).

How large her share was in that year, this paper does not judge. How she herself marks out that share is written in the statement; whether she marked it rightly, this paper does not judge either. Grown up, she owned what she took to be her own share. What was owned is read as owned; what was not, is another matter.

§7 When the Other Does Not Forgive

What has been owned is not conditional on the other's forgiving.

Asking for forgiveness is permitted. Sewall's statement itself asks pardon of men. To ask is to voice a hope; whether to give is still with the other. What goes past this is something else: setting forgiveness up as a condition, "I own it, so you should forgive," or "if you don't forgive, what I said doesn't count."

When the other does not forgive, four sentences hold.

The step of owning has already been taken by him. It lies in the step itself, not in the other's hands.

Owning is not completed by forgiveness. What has been owned is not taken back if the other does not forgive. To own a wrong on condition of being forgiven is to turn it back into an account.

Forgiveness cannot cancel the wrong either. If the other forgives, the thing was still done by him.

If the other does not forgive, that account is the other's, and there is nothing wrong with keeping it. He does not treat forgiveness as something the other owes him. Parent-Child Theory wrote about the same point: because the parent has turned back, the child does not thereby owe forgiveness; turning back is the parent's own matter and does not need the child's cooperation in closing the account (Parent-Child Theory, Paper 1).

A small constructed case. At a meeting of the whole team, Lao He says that Xiao Lin's data were made up. It is later established that the data were sound. At the next meeting of the whole team Lao He says: last time I said Xiao Lin's data were made up; I was wrong, and I take that sentence back. After the meeting Xiao Lin does not speak to him, and from then on has little to do with him.

Lao He's step has been taken. That Xiao Lin has little to do with him is Xiao Lin's affair. Lao He has no need to follow up with "so you forgive me, then?"; and the sentence at the meeting is not taken back on that account.

Asking for forgiveness is permitted; so is not asking. One physician did not ask. David Hilfiker misjudged a patient's pregnancy. Afterward he met with the couple and told them what he had done and what he had been thinking at the time. The husband asked whether an ultrasound would have shown it. He answered: yes. He writes that he never told them of his own agony, since they had grief enough of their own without bearing his; and that he never asked for their forgiveness (Hilfiker, New England Journal of Medicine, 1984). The whole of that essay says that the profession of medicine has no place in which to set down the owning of a mistake; not having asked forgiveness is not something he writes of as having been the right thing. Only one thing is taken here: what he owned did not wait on a word of forgiveness to count.

§8 After It Is Said, Still Read Apart

§2 said that saying it in the place where the original words did their work is the act of this occasion. That was said of a matter that has already stopped.

When someone says "I was wrong" while the thing is still being done, it has to be read differently.

A small constructed case. Lao Zhou is holding documents that should have gone back to Xiao Wu. He says to Xiao Wu: "It isn't right to keep hold of these." The documents are still not returned.

The words have been said, and the thing is still being done by him. One cannot, on those words alone, read the act of this occasion, stopping and turning back, as already done. The words and the continuing act can both be read from outside, and are read together: the second is not used to wipe out that the words were said, and the stopping is not counted as done merely because they were said.

This is different from what §2 calls "later doing wrong once more." There, the thing stopped, and later there was another; the original owning counts all the same. Here the thing never stopped. If Lao Zhou returns the documents and later holds on to someone else's, that is another occasion and is read separately.

There is an old saying that is often quoted, and its original setting is worth a look. The Zuozhuan says that Duke Ling of Jin did not act as a ruler, and lists several things: he levied heavily in order to decorate his walls; from a terrace he shot pellets at people to watch them dodge; when his cook did not stew the bear's paws through, he had him killed. Shi Ji remonstrated. The duke said: I know my faults, and I will change. Shi Ji said: who is without faults? To have faults and be able to change: there is no greater good. The Zuozhuan then writes three characters: still he did not change. It goes on to say that Zhao Dun remonstrated again and again, and that the duke sent a man to kill him (Zuozhuan, Duke Xuan, year 2).

This passage is read only so far: the sentence was said; what he did afterward did not change. The two are read apart. Whether one and the same thing never stopped, or whether another was done later, the Zuozhuan does not say in detail, and nothing is filled in for it here. The distinction drawn above does not rest on this passage.

What that sentence was at his own end is, from outside, still not judged.

§9 Where This Paper Stops

This paper has said what owning a wrong is, and has not said who should own one. Whether to own is the person's own affair; others cannot demand it into being, nor hurry it out of him.

Whether the injured party wants the wrong owned, and whether it may be made a condition for closing the matter, the Conflict Treatise has spoken to: apology, acknowledgment of fact, repair and compensation are not established as universal obligations in all cases, yet in a given matter the parties' own law or existing procedure may perfectly well list one of them as a condition (Conflict Treatise). That belongs to the other end, and this paper does not cross over to it.

The reversal of verdicts, the manner of compensation, and what an institution says in its own name belong to the institutional side.

Whether the other forgives is the subject of the next paper.

A Few for Oneself

The lines below are only for one's own use, and are not used to measure others.

My wrong: I do not wait for someone else to say it for me.

Where I said it wrongly is where I go back to say it.

I own only my own share; another's share I do not own for him, and do not push onto him.

Having owned it, I still pay the account; I do not use an apology to offset it.

What I have owned I do not take back if he does not forgive.

If he does not forgive, that is not something he owes me.

Propositions of This Paper

  • GD23 After a wrong has been done there are three things: making good, giving an answer, and owning the wrong. The first two can be done in another's place; owning cannot. A person can own only his own wrong. An institution cannot own a wrong; those who can are persons; what a predecessor did, a successor cannot own, though he can take the responsibility upon himself of his own accord.
  • GD24 From outside, two kinds of material can be read in the act of owning a wrong: saying it in the place where the original words did their work is the act of this occasion; what he does afterward is later material that can go on being read. Later material does not leave that step hanging or void it. Changing is his own affair and is not for others to inspect and pass.
  • GD25 A correction goes back to where the original words did their work. What is changed is the misstated fact or the mistaken verdict; what happened stays as it was.
  • GD26 Owning a wrong does not cancel the account.
  • GD27 Relaying words the person has himself already owned is not owning, in his place, a wrong he has not owned. What is given in another's place is making good and an answer.
  • GD28 What has been owned is not conditional on the other's forgiving, and is not taken back if the other does not forgive. How the other responds is the other's.
  • GD29 The step of owning is taken by the person himself and is not completed by forgiveness. The other person does not thereby owe forgiveness.

Notes

  1. Every proposition of this paper sets out from the place where others are ends too (15DD). ↩︎
  2. "Clues," and "confirmed only at the person's own end," in §2 are the wording of Parent-Child Theory, Paper 1, where they are said of parents turning back after falling back. ↩︎
  3. Action Theory, Paper 8, D49. The published English of that proposition has "acknowledged" where this paper says "owned." This paper separates giving an answer from owning the wrong, and keeps "own" throughout for the doer's own act; the sentence in the text is this paper's wording, not a quotation. ↩︎

Acknowledgments

This paper is Paper 4 of the Rereading Classical Concepts series of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.

The writing and review of this paper were assisted by Anthropic's Claude, OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's Gemini, xAI's Grok and Meta's Muse. Thanks are due to these companies and to their research and engineering teams.

References

Group I lists works of this system, archived on Zenodo with Chinese and English versions under the same record, all single-authored (Han Qin); DOIs follow those listed at the head of each paper on the author's site. The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the title and the paper noted in parentheses at the place of use. The Prequel and Papers 1 to 5 in the text are the papers of this series. Kant's works are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition (AA). Sources not in English are given in the author's own renderings. Works marked † were read in an online transcription, an excerpt or a translation; what was checked against which text is recorded separately in the case verification table for Rereading Classical Concepts.

I · Works of this system

Qin, H. (2026). Procedure of the Moral Court (SAE Moral Law, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20066987

Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

Qin, H. (2026). Finding One Another (SAE Action Theory, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970783

Qin, H. (2026). The Place of Parent-Child Theory (SAE Parent-Child Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24121569

Qin, H. (2026). Another End (SAE Parent-Child Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24121537

II · Other works

Analects (Lunyu); Mencius (Mengzi); Laozi (Wang Bi text); Zuozhuan. Cited by book and chapter from the received texts. †

Brandt, W. (1989). Erinnerungen. †

CBS News. (1998, March 14). [Report on Chris Chelios's letter of apology]. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chelios-apologizes-for-us-team/

Chen Xiaolu. (2013, August). [Letter of apology]. †

Hilfiker, D. (1984). Facing our mistakes. New England Journal of Medicine, 310(2), 118–122. †

Lin Yan & Gao Siwei. (2013, October 15). Wei xin daoqian [An apology for the heart's sake]. China Youth Daily, p. 3.

Lu Xun. (2005). Lu Xun quanji [Complete works of Lu Xun]. Beijing: People's Literature Publishing House. †

Maimonides. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah [Laws of Repentance] (E. Touger, Trans.).

New York City Law Department. (2014, September 5). Statements of Mayor de Blasio and Corporation Counsel Zachary W. Carter on Central Park Five settlement [Press release]. https://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/pr090514.pdf

Putnam, A. (1706, August 25). [Confession read in the church of Salem Village]. †

Qiu Xigui. [Autobiographical account]. †

Retraction Watch. (2020, January 2). Nobel winner retracts paper from Science. https://retractionwatch.com/2020/01/02/nobel-winner-retracts-paper-from-science/

Sewall, S. (1697). [Statement read on the public fast day], as entered in his diary. †