The Beauty of Mutual Non Dubito
双向不疑之美

1. The Pottery Class

A and B have been taking a Thursday evening pottery class together for two months. One day, over tea, A pushes his cup to one side and says he is not going any more.

B says: go a few more times; that cup you made last time was much better than your first.

A says: it's not because I'm no good at it.

B stops. A does not go on at once either. After a while he says: every time I finish something, I take it to the teacher and wait for him to give a little nod. If he doesn't nod, I don't dare go on. In the end, even when I wanted to leave the rim of a cup a bit different, I had to ask first. I don't want to keep going like this.

B was about to say that the teacher had never asked him to ask about every step. With the words on his lips, he says something else: what you want to stop, is it doing pottery, or waiting like this?

A thinks about it and says: waiting like this. Whether to do pottery, I haven't decided yet.

B does not finish the second half for him with "then take a break for a while."

After a while, B says: but the last time the teacher praised me, I was really pleased.

A looks up: so you still think I should go back.

B says: no. I'm talking about me. When he pointed to that crease and said it was good to keep it, that's when I knew he had seen why I hadn't smoothed it out. I want to keep going.

A listens, and stops too: this remark of B's also has two things run together in it. He asks: what pleased you, that he said it was well done, or that he saw what you wanted to keep?

B says: both. The first one, I don't want to pretend isn't there.

A says "mm," and asks no more.

On Thursday, B went and A did not. Some days later, A shaped a cup on the table at home, leaving the rim a little crooked, and showed it to no one. As for B, that Thursday he finished a bowl, and before the teacher came over, he first looked at it himself for a while: in this one, what was it he wanted to keep?

What can be seen is one thing. B chiseled A once: what you want to stop, is it doing pottery, or waiting like this? A had spoken of two things as if they were one, and this blow landed on his judgment. A did not fall: he did not go back to class because of this question, nor did he push the question away; he separated the two things himself, and the second half, "I haven't decided yet," was his own too. A also chiseled B once: what pleased you, which one? This question was not paid back to B: A asked it because he heard that B's remark also had two things run together in it; and when B asked A, he had not been waiting for this question. B did not fall either: he did not, because of this question, call his own pleasure wrong, nor did he choose one of the two by A's way of splitting it; he said both. And A did not press him further to choose.

Neither finished the other's words for him. B did not say "take a break for a while" for A; A did not arrange for B an ending in which he would sooner or later leave. On Thursday they did different things; there was no answer on the table that the two had to sign together. Yet each took something away. A shaping a cup at home and showing it to no one: that was chiseled open by B's question; B looking for himself before the teacher came over, looking at what he wanted to keep: that was chiseled open by A's question. What each took away was not written for him by the other; he grew it himself, growing it from the other's blow.

Neither asks the other for a confirmation. When B had asked, he did not wait for A to reply "that's a good question"; when A had asked, he did not wait for B to nod either. That A is still standing, B saw for himself; that B is still standing, A saw for himself; neither used this to ask the other for anything. Those who see this point include A, B, and could include someone at the next table who heard a few words. The teacher was not there, and is not judged to be any kind of person because of what A said.

That point is what this paper is about.

This paper follows the reading set out in the general outline.[^1] A personal aesthetic is each person's own and comes from his own cannot-not; aesthetics is the part that subjects with judgment cannot not acknowledge together, here called the overlap. The overlap is large; what does not overlap is larger. The overlap is not everyone being obliged to agree: whoever looks cannot not see, and whoever has seen cannot not acknowledge. When someone says "it is beautiful," he is claiming that this time he has landed on the overlap, and that claim can be right or wrong. What settles out of an act of drawing a boundary is called a construct; what it cannot contain is called the remainder. The remainder gives a place where one can go on, and a direction; it pushes no one; whether to go depends on a person's own cannot-not.[^2] A beauty has two faces: when the construct has come into place, it is completive beauty, quiet; when the construct is being chiseled out, it is generative beauty, tense. The beauty of mutual non dubito has both faces. "Mutual" here means that two people each stand on their own law, and each recognizes the other as an end too; you chisel me, I chisel you; after the chiseling, neither has fallen. A ray is a direction of judgment, not a classification of objects: the same pair of friends can also be looked at from the direction of non dubito, or from the direction of purpose. This paper asks about one thing only: two people recognize each other, chisel each other, and neither falls; and what it is when many people are like this with one another; and what the power of judgment sees in this question.

2. What Mutuality Is and Is Not

What SAE: The First Critique wrote at this station is: two subjects recognize each other as ends in themselves; chisel meets chisel; non dubito is not laying down the hammer; non dubito is the cannot-not of chiseling; at this station negation leaves no construct: it leaves the other's growth.[^3] This paper keeps these ways of putting it.

The general outline calls this level the bridge: I recognize you as an end, and you recognize me as an end; after chiseling each other, neither has fallen; the bridge is not fusion, not annexation, not rewriting each other. The outline also says that mutual chiseling comes first: having chiseled, one finds that the other has not fallen, and this finding is the entrance to this level. Mutual chiseling coming first does not mean that once the chiseling is done one stops chiseling: the First Critique says that non dubito is the cannot-not of chiseling. The confirmation this paper speaks of is this finding, and it has to be made clear first. It is a finding after the chiseling: I chisel, and you are still standing; where you stand is yours, and I have seen it. It is not a demand: I do not wait for you to confirm me before I chisel you, nor do I chisel you so that you will confirm me. Nor is it judging on your behalf: my seeing that you are still standing does not mean that I have judged for you that you stand rightly. So confirmation of this kind, neither asks of the other. A finding cannot be asked for; what can be asked for is a nod, a "you're right," and that is not the confirmation here.

First, chiseling. This paper's first word is mutual chiseling. To chisel is to say what one has seen, and thinks the other has not, against the other's judgment, so that it strikes where the other stands. B's question was one blow of the chisel: it does not assess A as a person; it strikes only the two things run together in A's "I'm not going any more." What is chiseled is a judgment, not a person. Mutual chiseling is you chiseling me and me chiseling you too: both have a hammer in hand.

The non dubito here falls in two places. One is not doubting that the other too is an end: my share of recognizing you as an end too does not wait for you to recognize me first. The other is not doubting that the other can stand: so the chisel can go in. Nor is this having no doubts in one's mind: one may see wrongly, and the other may fall; only, one does not, for fear that the other will fall, lay down the hammer in advance on his account. Not chiseling for fear he will fall is not trusting that he can stand. When the First Critique says that non dubito is not laying down the hammer, this is what it means.

After the chiseling, neither has fallen. To fall is for a person's share to be taken over by the other: going along with the other, exchanging one's own law for the other's; or being struck dumb by a blow, so that one no longer dares to say one's own share. Walking away does not count as falling: a person can walk away standing. Not falling is not the same as not changing. A later separated the two things; he changed; but it was he himself who separated them; he saw it, and only then separated them. Having changed and still standing is not having fallen. Someone who has not changed a word of what he says, but whose judgment from then on keeps watching whether the other nods, has fallen. Whether one changed because one saw it oneself, or changed to follow the other, may not be clear on the spot; the test in Section 7 is a looking back after the fact.

This paper's second word is mutual recognition. Each of two people recognizes the other as an end too, without waiting for the other to recognize him first; having recognized, neither asks anything of the other; they may see each other often, or they may leave each other alone. It is not won in a struggle: those who struggle for recognition want the other to recognize them first (Section 6).

After the chiseling, does anything change? The outline says that the bridge is not rewriting each other. Here one can see in what way it is not: after the chiseling, if anything has changed, it grew in each person himself; it was not written in by the other. A did not copy B and go to class; shaping cups at home and showing them to no one is his own way; B did not copy A and stop going; looking for himself before the teacher comes over is his own way too.

So the construct of this level has to be made clear. The First Critique says that at this station negation leaves no construct: it leaves the other's growth. This paper reads it this way: the one who chisels does not leave his own construct on the other, nor set up between the two a construct that would judge each one's law for him; if something grows, the other grows it himself, and it grows in the other. Whether anything grows is not the threshold of this level: often the chisel goes in, the other examines it, and still does not change. There can be arrangements made together, and they can be kept together; only they remain under the questioning and revision of each of the two, and cannot turn round and judge anyone's law for him. When this level speaks of the construct coming into place, it does not mean that something has been set up between the two; it means that such dealings have become ordinary: each stands where he stands; when they meet, they chisel; whether the other side stands after the chisel goes in no longer keeps anyone in suspense.

Mutuality is not exchange. It is not: I recognize you only if you recognize me; you chiseled me once, so I owe you one. A person's recognizing you as an end too does not in the first place wait for you to recognize him first; this is one-way; when two people are both like this, two one-way recognitions meet, and only then is there mutuality. Meeting often has a before and an after. The other can move first: B asked that question first, and A took it up. Taking it up is not doing as told; it is letting the question land on one's own judgment, neither pushing it away nor falling over in its direction. But the movement is inside A: B asked, and had A not taken it up, the question would have fallen through; what falls through is this one blow; B's share of recognizing A as an end too is still there. The mutuality of this scene begins only when A takes it up and also hands B the blow he himself has seen.

Nor is mutuality fusion. The two did not become one person: A still does not go, B still goes. Nor is it annexation: neither took the other into himself and raised him after his own pattern.

Between two people there is often a common thing: a lump of clay, a piece of music, a question, fish swimming under the bridge. The chisel often lands on this thing. But it is not a condition. That classroom and that teacher were common to A and B; but that day neither blow landed on them; they landed on how each waits and how each is seen. Often there, but not necessarily there.

So the beauty of mutual non dubito is not a kind of friendship, nor a doctrine of friendship. This paper does not prove that people are ends, nor say that two people ought to be like this; it writes only how two people who are both like this look when seen.

3. The Beauty of Mutual Non Dubito

Once a subject has seen two people recognize each other and chisel each other, with neither falling, he cannot not acknowledge:

Two people each stand on their own law, and each recognizes the other as an end too; you chisel me, I chisel you; after the chiseling, neither has fallen; neither asks the other for a confirmation.

That sentence is the beauty of mutual non dubito. "Mutual chiseling" and "mutual recognition" are this paper's two words, already explained. "Each stand on their own law" is that each side has a share, without waiting for the other's nod; "each recognizes the other as an end too" is that neither side waits for the other to recognize him first; both hold on both sides, and so it is called mutual. "Neither has fallen" is the finding after the chiseling; the confirmation this paper speaks of is this. "Neither asks the other for a confirmation" says that this is not exchange: a finding cannot be asked for, and there is no need to ask.

The seeing at this level is first in the two people themselves. When A was struck by that question, he was uncomfortable: what he had meant to say was that he was leaving, and B had taken his words apart. At that moment he was in no hurry to push the question back, nor in a hurry to follow it back to class; he stopped and looked, and saw: this question is B's; whether to separate the two things is A's own. Later, when he asked B that question and B said both, he saw once more: B is standing too; his own question did not take B apart. On B's side it was the same: having asked, he saw that A neither followed him back nor pushed the question away; the two things A separated himself. Each having seen, each cannot not acknowledge.

People nearby can see it too. The person at the next table heard only a few words; what he saw was: the two spoke very directly, and neither gave way to the other; when they had finished, each was still himself, and they left together after tea. This is the point. What each later took away is a later matter; he cannot see it, and need not.

Why is it overlap and not preference? The ways people chisel each other differ: some talk a lot, some little; some argue until they are red in the face, some speak slowly, one sentence at a time. The overlap is in two places. One: those who stop, each in his own dealings with others, can see the same point: after the chiseling, neither has fallen. The other is closer: several people facing the same mutual chiseling see the same point: after the chiseling, neither has fallen. A saw it, B saw it, and so did the person at the next table. What each later took away is each one's own affair, and only later can A and B each see it. This does not depend on which of them was right, nor on whether A later went back.

Take away closeness and see. Someone will say that this is just a good friendship. Two people can go their whole lives without being close: two people in the same field who dislike each other, who argue against each other whenever they meet at a conference, and then each go home; in their next papers, each has a place chiseled open by the other's objection, and neither mentions it. Closeness there is none, and the point is still there. Conversely, two people can be very close: nod at whatever the other says, never object to a single word; the friendship is good, yet the point is not there.

Take away the outcome too, and see. Even if A's few cups were all later put away in a cupboard and he never made a second batch; even if B, half a year later, stopped going to that classroom too: that moment over tea can still be seen. What each took away does not depend on the clay either: in other things, A still does not wait first for someone's nod; B still looks for himself first. Two people nod at each other and get things done very smoothly, and yet this point has never once been there. Beauty is not usefulness.

This seeing is also a different thing from pleasure or displeasure. Being chiseled is often unpleasant: A was uncomfortable when he was taken apart, and so was B when asked which one pleased him. Two people who get along, with everything they say going smoothly, find it pleasant, yet there may not be a single blow of the chisel. The ground of acknowledgment lies in the point that is seen, not in feeling.

Understanding is not seeing either. A man has written several books on friendship and can explain the views of ancients and moderns clearly. One day an old friend reads his new manuscript and says that one whole chapter does not stand up, and says why. He is angry all evening; the next day he rewrites the chapter, and what it becomes is something the old friend had not expected either. He sends the rewritten chapter back, and also says that there is a place in the old friend's own earlier book that he has always disagreed with. The old friend writes back only: that place, I'll think about it again. Not a word about friendship in his books has changed; only after that evening did he see what those words were about.

Seeing can also go wrong. One can take two people's mutual politeness for mutual recognition, and two people's mutually reinforced prejudice for mutual chiseling; one can also take someone who has long since fallen and is only still nodding for someone who has not fallen. The person at the next table thought he saw two people who had chiseled each other and were both still standing; perhaps that day A simply could not be bothered to argue, and went home and thought it through B's way after all. To say "it is beautiful" is to claim that this time one really has seen, and the claim can be wrong.

Completive beauty: mutual chiseling has become ordinary. Many years later, A and B still see each other often. Once B says he wants to send some of his bowls to an exhibition. A says: do you want people to see them, or do you want people to say they're good? B laughs and says: both; this time more of the first. The two go on to talk about other things. B does not wait for A to say he answered well; A does not stop to see whether B has been stumped. Neither fears the other will fall, so neither holds back the hammer. That sentence of the First Critique can be seen here: non dubito is not laying down the hammer; non dubito is the cannot-not of chiseling. The cannot-not of chiseling means not holding back the hammer when they meet, not that they must meet. They need not strike hard every time, nor need someone change every time; after the chisel goes in, the other side is still standing, and this no longer needs anyone waiting in suspense. Completive beauty is quiet: two people both standing, hammers in hand, and between them nothing to be guarded that would judge each one's law for him.

Generative beauty: mutual chiseling is under way. That day over tea, at the moment A said "so you still think I should go back," both might have fallen. B might have gone along and said "yes, you should go back," and then his question would have become persuasion; or he might have drawn back and said "I didn't mean that," and then he would have taken back his share. He said: no, I'm talking about me. On A's side it hung too: when B said "I'm talking about me," A could have gone along and said, then I'll go a few more times; or he could have never raised the matter again. He did neither; he stopped, and heard that B's remark too had two things run together in it. When A asked him which one pleased him, B too might have been taken apart and chosen one of the two; he said both. At every moment someone might have fallen, and no one fell. The tension is here. When two people, for the first time, over something both care about a great deal, say what the other does not want to hear, not knowing whether the other can stand, nor whether the other will chisel back too: that too is mutual chiseling under way. The completive face is chiseling and standing having come together in one place; the generative face is every blow still hanging.

4. Zhuangzi and Hui Shi

The old Chinese books wrote of two people who argued many times. The last passage of "Autumn Floods" in the Zhuangzi:

"Zhuangzi and Huizi were strolling on the bridge over the Hao. Zhuangzi said: 'The minnows swim out and about at their ease; this is the joy of fish.' Huizi said: 'You are not a fish; how do you know the joy of fish?' Zhuangzi said: 'You are not me; how do you know that I do not know the joy of fish?' Huizi said: 'I am not you, so I certainly do not know you; and you are certainly not a fish, so your not knowing the joy of fish is complete.' Zhuangzi said: 'Let us go back to the beginning. When you said "how do you know the joy of fish," you already knew that I knew it, and asked me. I know it here, above the Hao.'"[^4]

Who won, readers have argued for two thousand years. This paper does not decide. What can be seen is: one blow from Hui Shi, one from Zhuangzi, one more from Hui Shi, one more from Zhuangzi; the book records neither side conceding, nor either side walking away. Hui Shi took up Zhuangzi's words: Zhuangzi said "you are not me," and from it he drew "I am not you," and pressed it back on Zhuangzi. The last word is Zhuangzi's, but Hui Shi's question he did not push away either: from Hui Shi's question he took up the words "how do you know" and drew his own words out of them: you ask me how I know, so you already knew that I know, and then asked me. Guo Xiang's commentary on this passage reads it as mutual knowing: you are not me, yet you can know that I am not a fish; so all who know one another can, from this, know the other.[^5] That is Guo Xiang's reading. What this paper takes is only the back and forth: two people both standing, each drawing his own words out of the other's.

In "Xu Wugui" in the same book, Zhuangzi, attending a funeral, passes Hui Shi's grave, turns to those following him, and says:

"A man of Ying had a smear of white plaster on the tip of his nose, as thin as a fly's wing, and had Carpenter Shi slice it off. Carpenter Shi whirled his axe until it made a wind, and, listening, sliced it off; the plaster was all gone and the nose unhurt, and the man of Ying stood there without changing his expression. Lord Yuan of Song heard of it, summoned Carpenter Shi and said: 'Try doing it for me.' Carpenter Shi said: 'I was once able to slice it. But my counterpart (zhi) has long been dead.' Since the Master died, I have had no counterpart; I have had no one to talk with."[^6]

Cheng Xuanying's subcommentary says: "Zhi means counterpart. However skilled Carpenter Shi was, he needed a counterpart that did not move; however worthy Zhuangzi was, he still relied on a counterpart with whom words could be forgotten." It also says that with Hui Shi dead, "the carpenter stopped the wonderful sound of his wind-making axe, and Zhuangzi ceased his subtle words above the Hao."[^7] It was Cheng Xuanying, not this paper, who joined this figure of Carpenter Shi to the scene above the Hao.

What can be seen is: for that stroke of the axe to come off, there has to be someone opposite who neither dodges nor falls. Only because the man of Ying stands there, his expression unchanged, does Carpenter Shi's axe make its wind. What Zhuangzi says he lost is not someone who agreed with him, but someone he could talk with, a counterpart. The man of Ying does not move; Cheng Xuanying says the carpenter needed a counterpart that did not move. This paper's not falling is not not moving: A later changed, and is still standing. From this figure, this paper takes the layer of not dodging and not falling, not that of not moving.

Two more things must be made clear here. One is one-way: the axe is only in Carpenter Shi's hand; the man of Ying does not swing an axe back. Taken alone, this figure is one-way; what Cheng Xuanying joined to it is also only Zhuangzi's side. The evidence for mutuality is not in this figure but in the scene above the Hao: there both have axes in hand, each the other's Carpenter Shi, and each the other's counterpart. Reading the two passages together in this way is this paper's reading. The other is loss: what Zhuangzi writes of is after that man was gone. This paper does not make Hui Shi's death into any kind of beauty; the emptiness after it is Zhuangzi's own. What this paper takes is, while Hui Shi was alive, the moment the axe sliced down and the one opposite did not fall.

It parts from him here: Zhuangzi told this figure at Hui Shi's grave because that man was gone; the scene above the Hao was about whether one knows the joy of fish. He says he has no counterpart, and does not call this beauty. This paper says only that whoever has seen that moment cannot not acknowledge it.

5. The Kingdom of Ends: The Same Point Many Have Looked Toward

Between two people this point can be very small: a cup of tea, an argument, a stroke of the axe. What is it when many people are like this with one another?

In discussing Kant, the First Critique says: the kingdom of ends is the practical side's ideal, the systematic union of subjects who both legislate universally and obey the laws they legislate; it also says that the kingdom is not presupposed; it is what ends actually make when they recognize and question one another; as for whether mutual recognition and mutual examination can grow into common legislation, that is left to SAE: The Second Critique.[^8] This paper borrows the name to point to a direction, and looks only at the side of beauty:

Many people each stand on their own law, and each recognizes others as ends too; they chisel one another, no one falls, and no one asks anyone for a confirmation. This is how the beauty of mutual non dubito looks when widened, and it is heading toward the kingdom of ends. Between two people a first form of it can already be seen; whether what is among many deserves the name of a kingdom, this paper does not decide.

The mutual recognition the First Critique speaks of is here each recognizing others as ends too; its mutual questioning is here chiseling one another. What can be seen and acknowledged is the first form between two people; among many, it is a direction. What is widened is not a set of arrangements but the same recognizing: as with A and B, changed to three people, a crowd, people who do not know one another. How far it can be widened, this level cannot contain; Section 9 comes back to it.

Many people have looked toward this point. Looking toward is not seeing. A few are written about below: philosophers, statesmen, poets. Three things first. First, the overlap is not everyone: many look toward here, more look elsewhere; some have seen it, some have not, some have seen something else. Second, this paper does not change their words into "kingdom of ends" or "beauty": each uses his own words, great unity, siblings, city, brothers, the welfare of all; mostly they did not look for the sake of beauty, but for governing, for self-cultivation, for how a war should end, for a country. Third, their words are not evidence. To say that the direction they looked toward agrees with this point is this paper's view, and can be wrong; overlap comes only with seeing; readers can look for themselves at what each of them saw. For each, the paper writes what he looked toward, why he looked, where he agrees and where he differs.

Philosophers

The great unity. In the "Liyun" chapter of the Book of Rites, Confucius goes out after the zha sacrifice and sighs heavily; Yan Yan asks him why he sighs. He says: "The practice of the great Way, and the outstanding men of the Three Dynasties: I have not caught up with them, yet my heart is set on them. When the great Way was practiced, the world was shared by all. The worthy and able were chosen; trust was taught and harmony cultivated. So people did not treat only their own parents as parents, nor only their own children as children; the old were provided for until their end, the able-bodied had work, the young were raised, and widows, widowers, orphans, the childless, the disabled and the sick were all cared for. . . . This is called the great unity. Now the great Way is hidden, and the world belongs to a family." Zheng Xuan glosses "shared": "Gong means held in common. The throne was passed to the sage, not kept in the family."[^9] Confucius spoke to lament the state of Lu, with the great unity on one side and the time after the great Way was hidden on the other. He looked toward this: people not treating only their own parents as parents, not loving only their own children. They agree in this sentence: others' parents and children are also among one's own. They differ here: the people of the great unity "were all cared for," that is, settled by others; this paper looks at people each standing on his own law and chiseling one another. Confucius says that he did not catch up with the practice of the great Way, "yet my heart is set on" it; his heart turned toward it, which is close to what this paper calls a direction; only, his direction faces a time past, and this paper's does not face the past.

Born for one another. Marcus Aurelius says in the notes he wrote to himself: if intelligence is common to us, then reason and law are common too, and we are fellow citizens; and so the universe is, as it were, a city.[^10] He also says: people are born for one another; so either teach them, or bear with them.[^11] He has himself say in advance, first thing in the morning: today I shall meet the meddling, the ungrateful, the arrogant, the deceitful, the envious, the unsociable; but the one who does wrong is my kin, not of the same blood or seed, but sharing the same intelligence and the same portion of the divine; I cannot be angry with him, nor hate him, for we were born to work together, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth.[^12] He wrote for how to be a human being each day, and wrote it to himself. He looked toward this: all humankind belongs to one city. They agree here: the one who does wrong is also kin, not an enemy; working against one another is against nature. They differ in three places. His ground is a portion of reason shared by all, a common source; this paper sets up no common source; overlap comes only with seeing. His figure is hands and feet: hands and feet work together for one body and have no law of their own; the people in this paper are not the limbs of one body. "Either teach or bear with": teaching and bearing with are both spoken from one side.

Siblings. Zhang Zai's "Western Inscription": "Heaven is called father and Earth is called mother; I, this tiny thing, am mixed in their midst. So what fills heaven and earth is my body, and what directs heaven and earth is my nature. The people are my siblings; things are my companions." Zhu Xi comments: siblings means looking on them all as one's own brothers; companions means looking on them all as one's own peers.[^13] The "Western Inscription," originally titled "Correcting Obstinacy," Zhang Zai wrote for learning and for self-cultivation. He looked toward this: all people under heaven are my siblings. They agree here: others are not outsiders, but stand between heaven and earth just as I do. They differ here: the ground of being siblings is one pair of parents, Qian and Kun; this paper sets up no single source. Being siblings is also given at birth; this paper's recognizing comes only with seeing.

The kingdom of ends. The name is Kant's. He says: by a kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws. He also says that rational beings all stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves; what is thus joined can be called a kingdom of ends, which is admittedly only an ideal. A rational being belongs to it as a member when he gives universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws.[^14] He also says that in the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity; what has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; only what is raised above all price and admits of no equivalent has a dignity.[^15] At seventy-one he wrote Toward Perpetual Peace; its third definitive article is that cosmopolitan right shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality; hospitality is the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on another's land. He says that the community among the peoples of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right in one place on the earth is felt in all.[^16] He wrote to find the supreme principle of morality, and for perpetual peace. He looked toward this: everyone is an end, no one merely a means. They agree here: recognizing others as ends too, not merely as means; what has dignity admits of no equivalent to replace it. They differ here: his kingdom can be thought only by abstracting from the personal differences of rational beings and from the content of their private ends; this paper's point lies exactly where two people differ and still recognize each other. His law is universal legislation, common laws, and he speaks of ought; the people in this paper each stand on their own law; common legislation is left to SAE: The Second Critique, and this paper speaks of seeing.

Statesmen

Malice toward none. On March 4, 1865, with the Civil War nearly over, Lincoln was inaugurated for the second time. The last paragraph of the address says: with malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.[^17] He spoke for how to be a nation after a war that was almost over. He looked toward this: bearing no malice even toward yesterday's enemy. They agree here: not judging the other side in advance as fit only to be punished. They differ here: he speaks of firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, and of the work still to be finished; his ground is the right that God lets people see. This paper does not say who is right; it looks only at whether both sides are still standing.

The welfare of all. In 1908 in South Africa, Gandhi paraphrased Ruskin's Unto This Last into Gujarati and serialized it in Indian Opinion; he did not translate the title, but rendered it freely as Sarvodaya, the welfare of all.[^18] He later said in his autobiography that the book was given him by a friend; he read it through on the train, and decided that night to change his life according to it; the first thing he read in it was that the good of the individual is contained in the good of all, which he already knew; the second, that a lawyer's work has the same value as a barber's, since all have the same right of earning their livelihood from their work; the third, that a life of labor, the life of the tiller of the soil and of the craftsman, is the life worth living.[^19] He paraphrased the book for the readers of Indian Opinion. He looked toward this: no one's good has to be achieved through another's harm. They agree here: in the welfare of all, no one is merely a means for others. They differ here: from this he went on to a way of life, one he judged worth living; this paper does not say which way of life is worth living.

The world shared by all. On March 9, 1924, Sun Yat-sen gave the first lecture on the Principle of Democracy, quoting Confucius's "when the great Way was practiced, the world was shared by all," and saying that this is a world of great unity that upholds popular sovereignty; he also said that the reason for "always citing Yao and Shun" was that Yao and Shun did not treat the world as a family possession.[^20] He spoke to lecture on popular sovereignty. He looked toward this: the world does not belong to one family. They agree here: his reading of "shared" and Zheng Xuan's gloss "not kept in the family" go in one direction: the world is held in common. They differ here: he joins it to popular sovereignty, a political doctrine; this paper does not compare ways of arranging the world, and looks only at how people recognize one another.

Not by the color of their skin. On August 28, 1963, on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, Martin Luther King Jr. said that he had a dream: that his four children would one day live in a nation where they would not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.[^21] He spoke for a movement for civil rights. He looked toward this: a person being seen as this person, not as a category. They agree here: taking away a ruler that is not this person's own. They differ here: he speaks of how to judge a person, by character and not by skin color; this paper's recognizing you as an end too is not a judgment of anyone, and neither skin color nor character is in it.

In harmony and with equal opportunities. On April 20, 1964, Mandela made his statement from the dock at the Rivonia Trial in Pretoria. According to his written text, he said that all his life he had fought against white domination and against black domination; he cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities; it was an ideal he hoped to live for, and, if needs be, an ideal for which he was prepared to die.[^22] He spoke in court, for himself and his fellow accused. He looked toward this: neither side dominating the other. They agree here: neither side is a means for the other. They differ here: that he lived for this ideal and was prepared to die for it is his own; this paper does not say that this direction is worth dying for, nor that it is not; it looks only at the first form that can be seen between two people.

Poets

A vast mansion. The autumn wind tore the thatch off Du Fu's hut, and at night the rain came in. At the end of the poem he writes: "If only I could have a vast mansion of ten thousand rooms, to shelter all the poor scholars under heaven and make them all smile, unmoved by wind and rain, steady as a mountain! Ah, when shall I see such a house rise before my eyes? Then though my hut alone were broken and I froze to death, I would be content!" Qiu Zhao'ao comments that this passage "has much of the sense of 'the people are my siblings, things are my companions'"; it was he who joined the "Western Inscription" to this poem.[^23] Du Fu wrote for his own leaking hut. He looked toward this: all the poor scholars under heaven having a roof. They agree here: from his own broken hut, he reaches out to the houses of everyone under heaven. They differ here: "though my hut alone were broken and I froze to death, I would be content": he is willing to pay with himself, and that is one person's side; the poor scholars are sheltered; this paper looks at each person standing on his own. This paper does not make anyone's sacrifice a condition of this point.

No man is an island. In Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, published in 1624, Donne writes of hearing, while ill, the passing bell tolled nearby for someone else. The heading of the seventeenth meditation is: now this bell tolling softly for another, says to me, thou must die. He writes: "No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."[^24] He wrote of the death he thought of while ill. He looked toward this: people are joined to one another. They agree here: another's death is not someone else's affair. They differ here: his way of joining people is a continent, a piece of earth; in the same meditation he also says that all mankind is of one author, and is one volume. This is the side of joining into one; this paper looks at two people each standing on their own.

Brothers. In 1786 Schiller published "Ode to Joy" in Thalia; the first printing has the line: the magic of joy binds again what the sword of fashion divided, "beggars become the brothers of princes" (Bettler werden Fürstenbrüder). When he collected it in his poems in 1803, he changed the line to "all men become brothers" (Alle Menschen werden Brüder). The chorus sings: be embraced, you millions! This kiss for the whole world! Brothers, above the starry canopy a loving father must dwell.[^25] He wrote an ode with a chorus, for many people to sing together. He looked toward this: all people are brothers; from beggars and princes to all men, he himself widened it one step. They agree here: what fashion divided is joined again. They differ in two places: the name of brothers needs a father above the stars as a common root; and what joins people is the magic of joy. This paper sets up no common father; nor does this point rely on any magic, but on two people each standing on their own.

A man's a man. Early in 1795 Burns sent "A Man's a Man for A' That" in a letter to Thomson, who was editing a collection of Scottish songs. The last stanza says: then let us pray that come it may, as come it will for a' that, that sense and worth o'er a' the earth shall bear the gree an' a' that; for a' that, an' a' that, it's coming yet for a' that, that man to man the world o'er shall brothers be for a' that.[^26] He wrote for the poor and honest. He looked toward this: a person's worth is not in his rank. They agree here: people are brothers, rich or poor. They differ here: he says it will come, as prayer and as prophecy; this paper does not say that it will come.

What I assume. From 1881 on, "Song of Myself" begins: "I celebrate myself, and sing myself, and what I assume you shall assume, for every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you."[^27] He wrote to sing himself; for him, singing himself is singing everyone. He looked toward this: I and you are one and the same. They agree here: he starts from himself, stands very firmly, and also puts you in the same place. They differ here: "what I assume you shall assume" is his speaking on your behalf; in this paper's recognizing you as an end too, what you assume is yours. "Every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you": this is the side of fusion.

Where the mind is without fear. In 1912, in no. 35 of the English Gitanjali, Tagore writes: where the mind is without fear and the head is held high; where knowledge is free; where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls; . . . into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake.[^28] He was praying for his country. He looked toward this: everyone holding his head high, the world not broken into fragments. They agree here: each stands, and they are not walled off from one another. They differ here: this is a prayer to the Father, with the mind "led forward by thee"; this paper sets up no one who leads.

Put together, one can see where they agree: not treating only one's own parents as parents; the one who does wrong is kin too; others are not outsiders; people have dignity and cannot be replaced; bearing no malice toward yesterday's enemy; neither side dominating the other; another's death diminishes me. One can also see that they mostly part from this paper in the same few places. One is the source: heaven and earth as parents, a portion of reason shared by all, a father above the stars, all mankind of one author; this paper sets up no common source. One is the tone: they mostly hope for the day each speaks of, the great unity, the world shared by all, all men brothers; some pray for it to come, some went to prison for it, some say it will surely come; this paper does not say it will come, nor that it ought to; it says only that whoever has seen its first form between two people cannot not acknowledge it. And one more: the place they look toward is often the side of union, joined into one piece, bound into one body; this paper looks at people each standing on their own.

6. What Can Pass for It

The method is still the same: take it away and see. The counterfeits at this level are several: some turn mutuality into exchange; some have only one side; some pass for mutual chiseling; some pass for neither having fallen; some take what others wrote in for what they grew themselves; the last borrows the name of the kingdom of ends.

Exchange. I recognize you only if you recognize me; you chiseled me once, I owe you once. Take away the return and see: if one day the other no longer recognizes you, do you still recognize him? The one who exchanges takes it back at that moment. Mutuality is two one-way recognitions meeting; if they do not meet, each one's share is still there as before.

Politeness. Neither chisels the other, for fear the other will fall. Take away the politeness and see: what is underneath? Not trusting that the other can stand. Non dubito is not laying down the hammer; laying down the hammer for fear the other will fall is doubt.

Mutual reinforcement. Two people nod at each other: I believe everything you say, you believe everything I say. There is also the kind that argues fiercely: disputing back and forth over details, while the same prejudice underneath is touched by neither. Take away the nodding and see: what is left between them? Not a single blow of the chisel. The fiercely arguing kind this test does not separate out; try another: take the place the two both stand on, and see: will they let the other chisel there? Those who reinforce each other chisel back and forth but never land there; those who chisel each other let that place be chiseled too, and after the chiseling, neither has fallen. It looks like mutuality; in fact it is two people falling to the same side.

Fusion. Two people become one: what is yours is mine, and no seam can be found. This can be a person's deepest experience, and Section 7 leaves room for it; but it is not the bridge here. Take away the "we" and see: ask them which place in them was chiseled open by the other and which they grew themselves; can they say? Two people who have fused cannot say, and do not want to divide it; the people at the two ends of the bridge can say: this place you chiseled open; what grew there is mine. Without the other, the people at the two ends of the bridge lose a counterpart, but their own share is still there; when Zhuangzi said he had no one to talk with, what he lost was that counterpart.

Annexation. One person takes another in and raises him after his own pattern: whatever grows in you, I planted. Take him away and see: without him, do you still acknowledge the place that grew in you, and can you change it yourself? The annexed, without him, either do not acknowledge it or cannot change it; what one grew oneself, one still acknowledges, and can change.

Rewriting each other. Both sides do it: you change me into what you want, I change you into what I want, and both say the other chiseled it open. The same test: without the other, does each still acknowledge the place rewritten in him, and can he change it himself? What was written in, without the writer, cannot be changed; what one grew oneself can. When the outline says that the bridge is not rewriting each other, this is the test.

Struggling for recognition. Chiseling in order to make the other fall, so that he will recognize me. Take away winning and losing and see: when the other has not fallen, do you recognize that where he stands is his? The one who struggles does not; he picks up a heavier chisel and strikes again, or walks away; the one who chisels mutually, seeing that the other has not fallen, stops there: that is his. Mutual recognition is not won by struggle either: the one who struggles wants the other to recognize him first; those who recognize each other do not wait.

Preferential love. Two people recognize each other and recognize no one else: a small circle. Kierkegaard says that erotic love and friendship are preferential love, the passion of preferential love; Christian love is self-denial's love.[^29] He sets these against "you shall love the neighbor," writing about how Christian love works in the world. Take this person away and see: change him for a stranger; does he still recognize the stranger as an end too? If not, what is between the two may be only preferential love. The share of recognizing others as ends too does not grow smaller because one has a friend. It parts from him here: what he speaks of is a command, you shall love; this paper does not say ought.

Being understood. Being heard exactly by one person is not yet mutuality; the story of the one who knew the music, in Section 8, is one person listening to another.

In the name of the kingdom of ends. First treating some people as means, so that in the future everyone will be an end; first drawing a blueprint, and then arranging people by it. Take away the blueprint and see: is this person before you, today, still recognized as an end? If not, then this is not widening; it is first tearing down the first form between two people. Demanding, in the name of beauty, that others give and endure for this direction belongs here too: whoever demands that others pay has already treated them as a means.

Neighboring rays. The beauty of non dubito looks at one person's side: he stands, and leaves your share to you, without waiting for you to recognize him first. Here what is looked at is two people both like this. The beauty of purpose looks at how a person's direction came and was taken up; the direction here is among many people. This paper looks only at how two people chisel each other with neither falling, and at how this looks when widened.

One last sentence, which this aesthetics says of every ray: beauty is not correctness, not usefulness, not importance, not understanding. Now that feeling has come in, one more must be added: beauty is not pleasure, and pleasure is not beauty. On this ray, importance and pleasure matter most: the kingdom of ends sounds very important, but that is not the beauty here; nor is the pleasure of two people getting along.

7. What Is Left to Each Person

Whom to chisel with, what to chisel, how hard, and when not to chisel, is each person's own. Some have only one or two people all their lives with whom they chisel; some find them everywhere; some never meet one in their whole lives, and this paper does not say they lack anything.

Fusion is left to each person too. Some, in love, in friendship, in prayer, experience the boundary withdrawing, two becoming one. That can be their own personal aesthetic, and this paper does not argue against it. This paper says only that whoever has seen two people chisel each other and both still stand cannot not acknowledge this point.

Is what grows after the chiseling cultivation, or colonization? Cultivation is the other's blow helping you grow your own eyes; colonization is a ruler that is not your own taking the place of your own law. One can look back like this: take away the ruler that person gave you, and see; without that person, do you still acknowledge that place as yours, and can you change it yourself? This is a looking back after the fact, not a criterion, and can be wrong; nor does it peel you down to a "true self"; what you grew has others in it from the start.

Where to widen it, how far, and how, is also each person's own. This paper gives no blueprint, and requires no one to widen it.

There is one more thing to make clear. This set of papers has been speaking this way all along: whoever has seen cannot not acknowledge; this is not merely the author's preference; it does not legislate for the reader's personal aesthetic. When readers chisel back, which place they chisel open, and whether the author changes, is another matter; this paper judges neither for the reader nor for the author.

To say "these two chisel more cleanly and stand more steadily than those two" is a judgment of beauty, and it can be discussed. Discussion may find that each has a shape of its own, and then each keeps its own.

Aesthetics says only this: whoever has seen cannot not acknowledge that it is beautiful; aesthetics decides for no one with whom to chisel, or how, nor does it require anyone to build a kingdom.

8. Where the Question Comes From

How two people recognize each other was looked at very early, mostly not under the name of beauty, and often for the sake of something else: for treating the worthy, for knowing people, for praising the god of love, for happiness, for liberation, for remembering a dead friend, for duty, for writing how spirit grows, for answering a young poet, for faith, for politics, for understanding, for ethics, for recognition. The sources run in several directions: being heard exactly by one person; two becoming one; the friend as another self; companions on the way being the whole of the way. Later, someone said: because it was he, because it was I; someone said that love and respect, the one draws people near, the other keeps them at a distance; someone said that self-consciousness exists only in being recognized. Today, someone says that two solitudes protect each other; someone says that all actual life is encounter; someone says that friends talk about the world; someone says that understanding is a fusion of horizons; someone says that the face of the other speaks to me; someone says that beside the struggle for recognition there is peaceful recognition. Zhuangzi and Hui Shi are already in Section 4, and preferential love in Section 6. What follows runs in this order. For each figure, the paper reports faithfully what he discerned, why he looked, where he presses on this paper, and where this paper parts from him; other traditions appear in their own words.

The one who knew the music. "The Root of Flavor" in Mr. Lü's Spring and Autumn: "Boya played the zither, and Zhong Ziqi listened. When Boya played with his mind on Mount Tai, Zhong Ziqi said: 'How fine the playing! Towering, like Mount Tai!' A little while later his mind was on flowing water, and Zhong Ziqi said: 'How fine the playing! Rushing, like flowing water!' When Zhong Ziqi died, Boya broke his zither and cut its strings, and never played again all his life, holding that there was no one left in the world worth playing for." The text goes on: "It is not only so with the zither; so it is with the worthy too."[^30] Guan Zhong said of Bao Shu: when we divided the profits, I took more for myself, and he did not think me greedy, knowing I was poor; I fought three battles and fled three times, and he did not think me a coward, knowing I had an old mother; and at the end: "Those who gave me birth were my parents; the one who knew me was Master Bao."[^31] Mr. Lü spoke of how a sovereign treats the worthy; Guan Zhong spoke of how Bao Shu knew him. They discerned that being heard exactly is not the same as being liked; without that listener, the zither is not played. They press on this paper: to be understood like this by one person may be enough; is mutuality something extra? This paper's answer: whether it is enough is each person's own; being heard exactly may, when seen, be another beauty, and this paper does not argue against it. What this paper looks at is the point where both chisel and both stand; in being understood there is no chiseling. Ziqi knew Boya; whether Boya knew Ziqi, the book does not say; so too with Bao Shu knowing Guan Zhong. Mutuality is a step this paper adds on top of knowing the music. It parts from them here: they speak of knowing; this paper speaks of not falling after chiseling; they walk the same road as this paper, one step before it.

Two becoming one. In Plato's Symposium, Aristophanes tells how human beings were originally round, with four hands, four legs and two faces; to weaken them, Zeus cut each of them in two, as one cuts fruit, or cuts an egg with a hair. Ever since, love of one another has been implanted in human beings; it gathers together their ancient nature, trying to make one out of two and to heal human nature.[^32] He also sets up a supposition: suppose Hephaestus with his tools stood over two lovers lying together and asked them first: what is it you want from each other? When they could not answer, he would ask again: is it that you want to be together as much as possible, never to part day or night? If so, he is willing to melt you together and fuse you into one, so that while you live you are one, and when you die, in Hades too you are one; but look and see whether this is what you love. Aristophanes goes on: hearing this, no one would refuse; each would think he had heard exactly what he had long wanted: to be melted together with the beloved, and from two to become one.[^33] This is a speech in praise of Eros at a drinking party, the words of a character in the dialogue, not Plato's settled view. It discerned the power of fusion: what many people want in love is exactly that the boundary be gone. It presses on this paper, at the root: by what right is "still two" more beautiful than "become one"? This paper's answer: this paper does not refute fusion; the many people he speaks of have their place left for them in Section 7; this paper looks at another point. It parts from him here: his two halves are a whole cut apart; the two people in this paper each stand on his own law, and neither is anyone's half.

Another self. Aristotle says that a good person is to his friend as he is to himself, for the friend is another self (ἄλλος αὐτός).[^34] He also says that one must co-perceive the friend's existence, and this comes about in living together and sharing words and thoughts; this is what living together means for human beings, not, as with cattle, grazing in the same place.[^35] He wrote to ask whether the happy person needs friends. He discerned that without either "another" or "self" there is no friend. He presses on this paper: what he wants is two good people; two bad judgments reinforcing each other can look very like mutual chiseling. This paper's answer: agreed that there is this counterfeit; Section 6 took mutual reinforcement apart: not only taking away the nodding, but also seeing whether the chisel will land on the place both stand on. It parts from him here: he wants virtues to be alike, and sees the friend as another I extended from oneself; the two people in this paper can be very different, as Zhuangzi and Hui Shi were; and recognizing you as an end too is not seeing you as another I.

Good friends. In the Saṁyutta Nikāya, Ānanda says to the Buddha: good friends, good companions, good comrades are half of the spiritual life. The Buddha says: not so, Ānanda, not so; this is the whole of the spiritual life (sakalamevidaṁ). He also says: it is by having me as their good friend that beings are freed from birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain and distress.[^36] It speaks for liberation. It discerned that companions on the way are not something added to the way from outside, but the way itself. It presses on this paper: the weight of friendship lies in liberation, not in two people seeing each other; and the good friend here is first of all the Buddha; the relation is not symmetrical. This paper's answer: agreed that it is not symmetrical; this passage was never about two people on an equal footing. It parts from it here: it looks at the way, going to liberation; this paper looks at the point where two people stand, and does not ask where it leads.

Because it was he, because it was I. Montaigne writes of his friend La Boétie: if I am pressed to say why I loved him, I feel it cannot be expressed except by answering: because it was he, because it was I (Par ce que c'estoit luy, par ce que c'estoit moy). The sentence just before is: in the friendship I speak of, souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and it can no longer be found. The same passage also says: my will plunged and lost itself in his, and his in mine, leaving us nothing that was our own, neither his nor mine.[^37] He wrote to remember a dead friend. He discerned that friendship cannot be reduced to qualities and reasons; it is these two irreplaceable people. He presses on this paper: for him, "it was he," "it was I," and the seam effaced stand side by side and hold together; the two singulars, in the end, also melt. This paper's answer: this paper takes "it was he," "it was I"; the seam effaced is his own personal aesthetic, and Section 7 leaves it to him. It parts from him here: the point the looker acknowledges is where the seam is still there; only if the two are still two can the chisels meet.

Attraction and repulsion. In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant says: by analogy with the physical world, the union of rational beings on earth is effected through attraction and repulsion; by the principle of mutual love they are directed constantly to come closer to one another; by that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another.[^38] He also says: friendship, considered in its perfection, is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect; it is merely an idea, but a practically necessary one, unattainable in practice, yet an honorable duty set by reason to strive for.[^39] In the same section he again speaks of love and respect as attraction and repulsion: even the best of friends should not make themselves too familiar with each other. He also says that for a friend to point out the other's faults is a duty of love, for the other's good; yet the one whose faults are pointed out feels that the other lacks the respect he expected, fears falling in the other's esteem, and being watched and corrected is in itself like an offense.[^40] He wrote for the duties of virtue. He discerned that nearness and distance must both be there at once: love draws close, respect holds apart. He presses on this paper: chiseling, he wrote of long ago, and he wrote of its danger too: once the chisel goes in, respect may be gone; what does this paper add? This paper's answer: what it adds is the point after the chiseling: the one chiseled did not fall in the other's esteem, and did not fall; if something changed, what changed was his own. What he fears is falling; what this paper looks at is not having fallen. It parts from him here: he speaks of duty, of ought, and says it is unattainable in practice; this paper does not say ought, and says only that whoever has seen it happen between two people cannot not acknowledge it.

Only in being recognized. Hegel says: self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being recognized.[^41] He also says that the two self-consciousnesses recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another;[^42] but with lord and bondsman, what the lord does to the other he does not also do to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he does not also do to the other; what arises is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal.[^43] He looked in order to write how self-consciousness moves toward spirit. He discerned that recognition is not something added between two self-sufficient people; the recognition of others helps to make me. He presses on this paper, heavily: two people who each legislate for themselves are not first established and then build a bridge; "two people each stand on their own law" presupposes what it sets out to establish. This paper's answer: this paper does not say that people come before relations; it agrees that a person's growing has others in it, as Section 7 says of cultivation. This paper says only that at the time of this mutual chiseling, each of the two is already standing, and this can be seen: A can separate the two things; B can say both. The bridge is in this one time, not in the step that makes a person. In writing of lord and bondsman, he wrote exactly how, once one side has fallen, recognition falls through; this paper's "neither has fallen" meets him here. It parts from him here: his recognition comes from a struggle of life and death; this paper's mutual chiseling is not in order to make the other fall.

Two solitudes. On May 14, 1904, writing from Rome to a young poet, Rilke said that the more human love will consist in this: two solitudes that protect, border and greet each other.[^44] He was speaking of love between the sexes, in reply to the young man's letter. He discerned that distance is not love not yet completed, but the shape of love completed. He presses on this paper: might the best relation only protect, and not chisel? This paper's answer: protecting, bordering and greeting are close to the completive face: two people both standing, quiet between them. But the completive face is still chiseling: non dubito is the cannot-not of chiseling. It parts from him here: with him there is only protecting, no chiseling.

Encounter. Buber says: I become I through the You; becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter. He also says: whoever says You does not have some thing for his object; what, then, does one experience of the You? Just nothing, for one does not experience it.[^45] He wrote for the relation of the human being to the world and to the eternal You. He discerned that you are not an object I have judged correctly. He presses on this paper in two places. One is confirmation: to say "seeing that you are still standing" may still treat you as an object, giving you a score. This paper's answer: Section 2 said that the confirmation here is a finding after chiseling, not giving you a score, and not confirming you once and for all; seeing that you are still standing is not having experienced you completely. The other is chiseling: to chisel is to aim at a judgment of yours, a some-thing; when one says You, there is no some-thing. This paper's answer: at the moment of chiseling, what is aimed at is the judgment; this paper admits that. After the chiseling, the moment of seeing that you are still standing is not aimed at a some-thing but at you. He also says that I become I through the You, so the people at the two ends of the bridge are not there first; this pressure is the same as Hegel's, and Section 10 keeps an item for it. It parts from him here: his You leads in the end to the eternal You; this paper sets up none.

The world. Writing on Lessing, Arendt says that the talk between friends, unlike intimate talk in which individuals speak about themselves, concerns the common world; the world is not humane just because it is made by human beings, but only when it has become the object of discourse; we humanize what is going on in the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking of it we learn to be human.[^46] She wrote to say, in dark times, what humanity is. She discerned that the weight of friendship lies in the world between two people. She presses on this paper in two places. One is the third thing: a bridge that joins only two people may be intimacy without a world; this paper's sentence lacks the third thing. This paper's answer: the third thing is often there, the clay, the fish under the bridge over the Hao, and the chisel often lands on it; this paper does not make it a condition. The other presses on the scene: what A and B talked about that day was themselves, which is exactly what she calls intimate talk in which individuals speak about themselves, not friends talking about the world. This paper's answer: agreed that that day they talked about themselves; but the chisel landed on each one's judgment, and judgment faces the world: making pottery, being seen, waiting for someone's nod, are all matters in the world. This paper does not say that this is better than talking about the world. Many people recognizing one another in this way is the plurality of human beings; the world she speaks of is the affairs and things between people; the two are not the same, and this paper does not substitute the first for the second. It parts from her here: she looked for politics and for the world; this paper looks for the sake of seeing.

Horizons. Gadamer says that understanding is always the process of the fusion of horizons supposedly existing by themselves.[^47] He wrote for the understanding of what has been handed down. He discerned that in understanding both sides are changed, and neither takes the other in. He presses on this paper: in speaking of two people each standing, this paper may be too rigid; in understanding, the horizons of the two sides do not exist by themselves to begin with. This paper's answer: agreed that both sides can change; this paper says only that after the change, what grew is each one's own. He is a near neighbor, not on the side of fusion: his fusion is not two people merging into one person. It parts from him here too: the fusion he speaks of falls on a subject matter and forms a new horizon that the two sides share; this paper looks at the two sides each standing after the chiseling; there can be something shared, but it does not judge anyone's law for him. He looks at understanding; this paper looks at two people.

The face of the other. Levinas says that the face of the other speaks to me, and the first word is obligation.[^48] He wrote to put ethics before everything. He discerned that the other is not an object of my knowing, but the one who speaks to me. He presses on this paper in two places. One is exchange: on his way of thinking, my responsibility to you is asymmetrical from the start; you recognize me and I recognize you already looks like an exchange. This paper's answer: mutuality is not exchange; it is two one-way recognitions meeting, and neither asks the other for a confirmation; each one's share did not wait for the other in the first place. The other is order: the call of the other comes before my freedom; from where, then, does mutuality begin? This paper's answer: the call can arrive first, the other can move first; but the movement is inside the person; mutuality begins when I take it up and also hand over my own blow. Beyond these two, there is one point this paper cannot fully answer: I always owe the concrete you a little more; this point is written into Section 10. It parts from him here: this paper says that this look is beautiful when seen, not that ethics begins here.

Peaceful recognition. Ricoeur says that the struggle for recognition can fall into an endless demand; the other path, beside the struggle, is to be sought in the experience of peaceful mutual recognition, an experience that rests on symbolic mediation and belongs neither to the juridical order nor to commercial exchange. He also says that at the heart of mutuality, the one is not the other, and this cannot be overcome.[^49] He wrote to follow recognition through its course. He discerned that once mutual recognition aims at getting the other's recognition, it degenerates into demand. He presses on this paper: might this paper's confirmation also be a kind of demand? This paper's answer: agreed that there is this danger; Section 2 said that the confirmation here is a finding, not a demand, and neither asks the other for a confirmation. "The one is not the other" meets this paper. It parts from him here: he seeks peace beside the struggle; this paper's mutual chiseling is neither a struggle for recognition nor peace alone: the chisel is still there. And one more: his mutual recognition relies on symbolic mediation; this paper's mutual recognition does not rely on mediation, and the two may also leave each other alone.

9. The Question Left Open

A and B went on seeing each other often. One year, B brought a new friend. The three had tea; B talked about his bowls, and the new friend objected once; A listened for a while, and then objected too, but to B, and then turned and asked the new friend a question. The new friend thought about it, and asked A a question too. When they parted that day, all three were still standing, and no one had gone over to anyone's side.

Between two people, a first form of the kingdom of ends can be seen. Three people, a crowd, many people who do not know one another, recognizing one another this way, chiseling one another, no one falling, no one asking anyone for a confirmation: this is heading toward the kingdom of ends. Among many, it is still a direction. When it will come, how, and whether it will come at all, this level cannot contain. Whether it deserves the name of a kingdom, this paper does not decide; whether many people recognizing and questioning one another can grow into a common legislation, the First Critique says, is left to SAE: The Second Critique; aesthetics does not answer.

The remainder gives a direction, and pushes no one. A person can chisel with only one or two people all his life, without asking what it is like among many; if he cannot not ask, that is his own cannot-not.

Nothing is the most beautiful. The kingdom of ends is not the most beautiful either: the first form that can be seen between two people is the beauty here, and it is not more beautiful than a cloud, a theorem, or a person who has stood; among many, it is still a direction this level cannot contain, and is not set up to compete in beauty with anything. A ray is a direction, not a ladder; the last is only the last.

This ray stops here.

10. What Would Make This Paper Wrong

If any one of six things held, this paper would be wrong. First, mutual chiseling cannot be told apart from exchange, or from mutual reinforcement, in any instance: take away the return, take away the nodding, let the chisel land on the place both stand on, and what is seen is not the least bit different. Second, relation is shown to come before its two ends, to the point that even "two people each standing" cannot be made out: a person is nothing but relations; then there is no one at the two ends of the bridge, and the mutuality this paper speaks of falls through. Hegel and Buber are the pressure on this item, and Gadamer too. Third, I always owe the concrete you a little more; if this little is exactly what matters most, then two one-way recognitions meeting, with neither asking anything of the other, flattens it; then the mutuality this paper speaks of is only a respectable name for exchange. Levinas is the pressure on this item, and Kierkegaard too. Fourth, whoever sees two people become one and whoever sees two people chisel each other and both still stand acknowledge the same point; then the bridge cannot be told apart from fusion, and the division of Section 6 is wrong. Aristophanes and Montaigne are the pressure on this item. Fifth, when there is no third thing, no one has ever seen this point; then the third thing is a condition, and this paper, in saying that it is often there but need not be, is wrong. Arendt is the pressure on this item. Sixth, what the people of Section 5 looked toward, once order, peace, plenty and joy are taken away, leaves nothing at all; then the agreement this paper speaks of was added on their behalf by this paper, and this point, widened, is not heading toward the kingdom of ends. This paper does not think any of these will happen, but it writes them here, and leaves them to those who look to test.

---

Acknowledgments

This paper is the thirteenth ray paper in the aesthetics branch of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system and is published under the sole name of Han Qin. The author made the final decision on all philosophical arguments and choices, and alone is responsible for the final text.

Both drafting assistance and review were carried out with large language models. Drafting and internal precision audit were done by Claude (Anthropic); the structural gate and pre-publication sign-off were handled by ChatGPT (OpenAI). The material on the history of ideas used in Section 8, "Where the Question Comes From," was first gathered by ChatGPT's deep research, and its sources were then checked item by item. This paper, together with the second edition of the general outline and the other twelve ray papers, passed final review by both the internal precision audit and the structural gate, and passed a key-sentence acceptance check. The author thanks these systems and the research and engineering teams behind them. The author ruled on their comments one by one, and both acceptances and rejections are on record; the record of revisions and withdrawals across rounds is not reproduced here.

Notes

[^1]: Han Qin, SAE Judgment and Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (2026), §5.1, "How to Read the Rays," DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19296710.

[^2]: Han Qin, SAE: The First Critique (2026), DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21439120.

[^3]: Han Qin, SAE: The First Critique, chap. 5, §3, "The Road's Later Stretch: from Selection to Mutual Non Dubito," the summit station.

[^4]: Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩, Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋, "Qiushui" 秋水 (CHANT text, Kanripo KR5c0126). The text with Guo Xiang's commentary reads 鯈魚.

[^5]: Guo Xiang's 郭象 commentary, Nanhua zhenjing 南華真經, juan 6, "Qiushui" 秋水, Sibu congkan edition.

[^6]: Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi jishi, "Xu Wugui" 徐無鬼 (CHANT text, Kanripo KR5c0126). The text with Guo Xiang's commentary reads 堊慢 and 無; see Nanhua zhenjing, juan 8, Sibu congkan edition.

[^7]: Cheng Xuanying's 成玄英 subcommentary, Nanhua zhenjing zhushu 南華真經註疏, juan 26, "Xu Wugui" 徐無鬼, Zhengtong daozang edition (Kanripo KR5c0139).

[^8]: Han Qin, SAE: The First Critique, chap. 1, §3, "With Kant: Opposite Directions of Travel, One Formal Meeting Point."

[^9]: Liji 禮記, "Liyun" 禮運, with Zheng Xuan's 鄭玄 commentary, in Zuantu huzhu Liji 纂圖互註禮記, juan 7, Sibu congkan edition; Liji zhushu 禮記注疏, Ruan Yuan 阮元 edition (TLS text, Kanripo KR1d0052).

[^10]: Marcus Aurelius, Ad se ipsum 4.4, ed. J. H. Leopold (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908).

[^11]: Marcus Aurelius, Ad se ipsum 8.59.

[^12]: Marcus Aurelius, Ad se ipsum 2.1.

[^13]: Zhang Zai 張載, "Ximing" 西銘, in Zhangzi quanshu 張子全書, juan 1, with Zhu Xi's 朱熹 commentary, Wenyuange Siku quanshu edition.

[^14]: Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Riga: Hartknoch, 1785), in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 4 (Berlin: Reimer, 1911), 433.

[^15]: Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 4:434.

[^16]: Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1795), in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8 (Berlin: Reimer, 1912), 357–60.

[^17]: Abraham Lincoln, "Second Inaugural Address," March 4, 1865, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, ed. James D. Richardson, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897).

[^18]: M. K. Gandhi, "Sarvodaya [-I]," Indian Opinion, May 16, 1908 (serialized to July 18, 1908), in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 8 (Delhi: Publications Division, 1962), 239.

[^19]: M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography, or The Story of My Experiments with Truth, trans. Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1927–29), pt. 4, chap. 18.

[^20]: Sun Wen 孫文 (Sun Yat-sen), "Minquan zhuyi di yi jiang" 民權主義第一講 (March 9, 1924), in Guofu quanji 國父全集, vol. 1, 55–67 (pages as recorded in the Sun Yat-sen academic database).

[^21]: Martin Luther King Jr., "I Have a Dream," address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, Washington, DC, August 28, 1963, transcript as published by NPR.

[^22]: Nelson Mandela, statement from the dock, Rivonia Trial, Pretoria Supreme Court, April 20, 1964, written text as published by the Nelson Mandela Foundation.

[^23]: Du Fu 杜甫, "Maowu wei qiufeng suo po ge" 茅屋為秋風所破歌, in Qiu Zhao'ao 仇兆鰲, Dushi xiangzhu 杜詩詳註, juan 10, Wenyuange Siku quanshu edition.

[^24]: John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions (London: Thomas Jones, 1624), Meditation 17, 415–16.

[^25]: Friedrich Schiller, "An die Freude," Thalia 1, no. 2 (1786): 1–5; revised in Gedichte, pt. 2 (Leipzig: Crusius, 1803); both versions as given in the LiederNet Archive, TextId 14436 (text of Gedichte, 2nd ed., 1805, collated with Thalia).

[^26]: Robert Burns, "A Man's a Man for A' That" (1795), in Poems and Songs of Robert Burns, Project Gutenberg eBook #1279, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1279.

[^27]: Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," sec. 1, in Leaves of Grass (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1891–92).

[^28]: Rabindranath Tagore, Gitanjali (Song Offerings) (London: India Society, 1912), no. 35.

[^29]: Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 52, as quoted in Sharon Krishek, "Two Forms of Love: The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love," Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (2008): 595–617.

[^30]: Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋, "Xiaoxing lan: Benwei" 孝行覽·本味, with Gao You's 高誘 commentary, Lüshi chunqiu, juan 14, Sibu congkan edition.

[^31]: Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shiji 史記, juan 62, "Guan Yan liezhuan" 管晏列傳 (TLS text, Kanripo KR2a0001).

[^32]: Plato, Symposium 189e–191d, in Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910).

[^33]: Plato, Symposium 192d–e.

[^34]: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 9.4, 1166a31–32, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).

[^35]: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 9.9, 1170b10–14.

[^36]: Saṁyutta Nikāya 45.2 (PTS S V 2–3), Mahāsaṅgīti edition, SuttaCentral; trans. Bhikkhu Sujato.

[^37]: Michel de Montaigne, "De l'Amitié," Essais, bk. 1, chap. 27 (text of Paris: Abel Langelier, 1595), in Essais de Montaigne (self-édition), ed. Ernest Michaud, vol. 1 (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1907).

[^38]: Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pt. 2, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1797), §24, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6 (Berlin: Reimer, 1907 [first-edition year; printing consulted not verified]), 449.

[^39]: Kant, Tugendlehre, §46, 6:469.

[^40]: Kant, Tugendlehre, §46, 6:470.

[^41]: G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bamberg and Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807), chap. 4, A (¶178 in A. V. Miller's numbering).

[^42]: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, chap. 4, A (¶184).

[^43]: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, chap. 4, A (¶191).

[^44]: Rainer Maria Rilke to Franz Xaver Kappus, Rome, May 14, 1904, in Briefe an einen jungen Dichter (Leipzig: Insel, 1929).

[^45]: Martin Buber, Ich und Du (Leipzig: Insel, 1923), pt. 1.

[^46]: Hannah Arendt, "On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing," in Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 24–25.

[^47]: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960), 289 (page as cited in secondary literature; Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1, 311).

[^48]: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 201 (as excerpted in secondary sources).

[^49]: Paul Ricœur, Parcours de la reconnaissance (Paris: Stock, 2004), 225, 317, 319; English in The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 218–19 (pages as cited in secondary literature).

---

References

Works of the SAE system cited here are archived on Zenodo, with the Chinese and English versions in the same record. The DOIs cited are concept DOIs, which always resolve to the latest version, so version numbers and access dates are not given. All are single-authored (Han Qin). Drafting and review assistance is described in the Acknowledgments.

Arendt, Hannah. Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.

Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. Edited by I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

Buber, Martin. Ich und Du. Leipzig: Insel, 1923.

Burns, Robert. Poems and Songs of Robert Burns. Project Gutenberg eBook #1279. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1279.

Donne, John. Devotions upon Emergent Occasions. London: Thomas Jones, 1624.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr, 1960.

Gandhi, M. K. An Autobiography, or The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Translated by Mahadev Desai. 2 vols. Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1927–29.

———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 8. Delhi: Publications Division, 1962.

Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩. Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋. CHANT text (Kanripo KR5c0126).

Hegel, G. W. F. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg and Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807.

———. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Kant, Immanuel. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Hartknoch, 1785. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 4. Berlin: Reimer, 1911.

———. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1797. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6. Berlin: Reimer, 1907 [first-edition year; printing consulted not verified].

———. Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1795. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8. Berlin: Reimer, 1912.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Works of Love. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. "I Have a Dream." Address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, Washington, DC, August 28, 1963.

Krishek, Sharon. "Two Forms of Love: The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love." Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (2008): 595–617.

Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

Liji 禮記. Commentary by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄. Zuantu huzhu Liji 纂圖互註禮記. Sibu congkan edition.

Liji zhushu 禮記注疏. Ruan Yuan 阮元 edition. TLS text (Kanripo KR1d0052).

LiederNet Archive. "An die Freude." TextId 14436. https://www.lieder.net/lieder/get_text.html?TextId=14436.

Lincoln, Abraham. "Second Inaugural Address." March 4, 1865. In A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, edited by James D. Richardson, vol. 6. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897.

Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋. Commentary by Gao You 高誘. Sibu congkan edition.

Mandela, Nelson. Statement from the dock, Rivonia Trial, Pretoria Supreme Court, April 20, 1964. Written text, Nelson Mandela Foundation.

Marcus Aurelius. Ad se ipsum. Edited by J. H. Leopold. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908.

Montaigne, Michel de. Essais de Montaigne (self-édition). Edited by Ernest Michaud. Vol. 1. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1907. Text of 1595.

Nanhua zhenjing 南華真經. Commentary by Guo Xiang 郭象. Sibu congkan edition.

Nanhua zhenjing zhushu 南華真經註疏. Commentary by Guo Xiang 郭象, subcommentary by Cheng Xuanying 成玄英. Zhengtong daozang edition (Kanripo KR5c0139).

Plato. Platonis Opera. Vol. 2. Edited by John Burnet. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910.

Qin, Han. SAE Judgment and Aesthetics. 2026. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19296710.

———. SAE: The First Critique. 2026. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21439120.

Qiu Zhao'ao 仇兆鰲. Dushi xiangzhu 杜詩詳註. Wenyuange Siku quanshu edition.

Ricœur, Paul. The Course of Recognition. Translated by David Pellauer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

———. Parcours de la reconnaissance. Paris: Stock, 2004.

Rilke, Rainer Maria. Briefe an einen jungen Dichter. Leipzig: Insel, 1929.

Saṁyutta Nikāya. Mahāsaṅgīti edition. SuttaCentral, bilara-data. Translated by Bhikkhu Sujato.

Schiller, Friedrich. "An die Freude." Thalia 1, no. 2 (1786): 1–5.

———. Gedichte. Pt. 2. Leipzig: Crusius, 1803.

Sima Qian 司馬遷. Shiji 史記. TLS text (Kanripo KR2a0001).

Sun Wen 孫文. "Minquan zhuyi di yi jiang" 民權主義第一講. 1924. In Guofu quanji 國父全集, vol. 1. Sun Yat-sen academic database.

Tagore, Rabindranath. Gitanjali (Song Offerings). London: India Society, 1912.

Whitman, Walt. Leaves of Grass. Philadelphia: David McKay, 1891–92.

Zhang Zai 張載. Zhangzi quanshu 張子全書. Commentary by Zhu Xi 朱熹. Wenyuange Siku quanshu edition.

一、陶艺课

甲和乙一起上周四晚上的陶艺课，上了两个月。有一天两个人喝茶，甲把杯子往旁边挪了挪，说他不去了。

乙说：再去几次吧，你上次那个杯子，比第一个好多了。

甲说：不是因为做得不好。

乙停住了。甲也没有马上往下说。过了一会儿，他说：我每次做完，都拿给老师看，等他点一下头。他不点头，我就不敢往下做。后来连杯口想留得不一样，也要先问。我不想再这样去了。

乙本来想说，老师从没要他每一步都问。话到嘴边，换了一句：你想停的，是做陶，还是这样等着？

甲想了想，说：这样等着。做不做陶，我还没想好。

乙没有替他把后半句补成「那就先歇一阵」。

隔了一会儿，乙说：可是上次老师夸我，我是真高兴。

甲抬起头：所以你还是觉得我该回去。

乙说：不是。我在说我。他指着那道折痕说留着好，我才知道，他看出了我为什么没有把它抹平。我想接着去。

甲听着，也停下了：乙这句话里，也并着两件事。他问：你高兴的，是他说做得好，还是他看出了你要留什么？

乙说：都有。前一个，我不想说成没有。

甲嗯了一声，没有再问。

周四，乙去了，甲没有去。过了些日子，甲在家里的桌上捏了一个杯子，杯口留得有点歪，没有拿给谁看。乙那边，那个周四做完一只碗，老师还没走过来，他先自己看了一会儿：这一只，他要留的是什么。

看得见的是一件事。乙凿了甲一下：你想停的，是做陶，还是这样等着？甲原来把两件事说成了一件，这一下落在他的判断上。甲没有倒：他没有因为这一问就回去上课，也没有把这一问推开；两件事是他自己分开的，后一半「还没想好」，也是他自己的。甲也凿了乙一下：你高兴的，是哪一个？这一问不是还给乙的：甲是听出乙那句话里也并着两件事，才问；乙问甲的时候，也没有等着这一问。乙也没有倒：他没有因为这一问就把自己的高兴说成错的，也没有照甲的拆法二选一；他说都有。甲也没有再逼他选。

两个人都没有替对方把话说完。乙没有替甲说「先歇一阵」；甲也没有替乙安排一个迟早要离开的结局。周四他们做了不同的事，桌上没有一个要两人一起签字的答案。可两个人都带走了一点东西。甲在家里捏杯子，不拿给谁看，这是乙那一问凿开的；乙在老师走过来之前先自己看，看的是自己要留什么，这是甲那一问凿开的。带走的那一点，不是对方替他写的，是他自己长出来的，从对方那一下那里长起来。

谁也不向谁讨一个确认。乙问完，没有等甲回一句「你问得对」；甲问完，也没有等乙点头。甲还站着，是乙自己看见的；乙还站着，是甲自己看见的；谁也没有拿这个去向对方讨什么。看见这一处的，有甲，有乙，也可以有邻桌那个听见了几句的人。那位老师不在场，也不因为甲这样说，就被判成了什么样的人。

本文要说的就是这一处。

本文沿用总纲的读法。[^1] 审美是各人的，出自各人自己的不得不；美学是有判断力的主体们不得不共同认可的那一部分，这里叫它重叠。重叠很多，不重叠更多。重叠不是人人应当同意：看的人不得不看见，看见了的人不得不认可。一个人说「它是美的」，是在主张自己这一次落在了重叠上，这个主张可对可错。一次划界，沉淀下来的叫构，收不住的叫余项。余项给出可以继续的地方和方向，不推人；走不走，看人自己的不得不。[^2] 一种美有两面：构到位了，是完备之美，安静；构正在被凿出来，是生成之美，有张力。双向不疑之美两面都有。这里的双向，是两个人都在自己的法上站着，都认对方也是目的；你凿我，我凿你，凿过了，谁也没倒。射线是判断的方向，不是对象的分类：同一对朋友，也可以从不疑的方向、从目的的方向去看；本文只问一件事：两个人互相承认，互相凿过，谁也没倒；许多人彼此这样，又是什么；在这一问上，判断力看见什么。

二、双向是什么，不是什么

《SAE第一批判》在这一站写的是：两个主体互相承认对方是目的本身，凿碰到凿；不疑不是放下锤子，不疑就是不能不凿；这一站的否定不留构，留对方的成长。[^3] 本文沿用这几个说法。

总纲把这一层叫作桥：我承认你是目的，你也承认我是目的；互凿之后，谁也没倒；桥不是融合，不是吞并，不是互相改写。总纲又说，互凿在前，凿完之后发现对方没倒，这个发现就是这一层的入口。互凿在前，不是说凿完就不凿了：第一批判说，不疑就是不能不凿。本篇说的确认，就是这个发现，要先说清。它是凿完之后的发现：我凿过去，你还站着，你立着的地方是你的，我看见了。它不是索取：我不等你来确认我，才去凿你，也不是凿你好让你确认我。它也不是替你判定：我看见你还站着，不等于我替你判了你站得对。所以这样的确认，谁也不向谁讨。发现是讨不来的；讨得来的，是点头，是一句「你说得对」，那不是这里的确认。

先说凿。本篇的第一个词是互凿。凿，是把自己看见了、以为对方没看见的，对着对方的判断说出来，碰在对方立着的地方。乙那一问，就是一凿：它不评甲这个人，只碰甲那一句「不去了」里面并在一起的两件事。凿的是判断，不是人。互凿，是你凿我，我也凿你，两边手里都有锤子。

这里的不疑，落在两处。一处是不疑对方也是目的：我认你也是目的这一份，不等你先认我。一处是不疑对方站得住：所以凿得下去。这也不是心里没有疑问：他可能看错，对方也可能倒；只是不因为怕他倒，先替他把锤子放下。为了怕他倒而不凿，是不信他站得住。第一批判说不疑不是放下锤子，说的是这一处。

凿过了，谁也没倒。倒，是一个人那一份被对方占了：照对方的来，把自己的法换成对方的；或者被一凿凿哑了，自己那一份从此不敢再说。走开不算倒：一个人可以站着走开。没倒，不是没改。甲后来把两件事分开了，他改了；可分开的是他自己，他看见了，才分。改了还站着，就是没倒。一个人嘴上一句也没改，判断却从此看着对方点不点头，那是倒了。改了，是自己看见了才改，还是照着对方改的，当场未必分得清；第七节那一试，是事后的回看。

本篇的第二个词是相互承认。两个人各自认对方也是目的，不等对方先认；认了，谁也不向谁讨什么，可以常来往，也可以互相不理。它不是争来的：争承认的人，要对方先认他（第六节）。

凿过以后，改不改？总纲说桥不是互相改写。在这里看得见是怎样的不是：凿过以后，要是有什么改了，是各人自己长出来的，不是对方替他写的。甲没有学乙去上课，他在家里捏杯子，不给谁看，是他自己的样子；乙没有学甲不去，他在老师走过来之前先自己看，也是他自己的样子。

所以这一层的构，要说清。第一批判说，这一站的否定不留构，留对方的成长。本篇这样读：凿的人不在对方身上留下自己的构，也不在两个人中间立一个替两人判定各自的法的构；要是有什么长出来，是对方自己长出来的，长在对方身上。长不长，不是这一层的门槛：凿过去，对方审过了，照样不改，也常有。一起定的安排可以有，也可以一起守，只是它仍在两个人各自的追问和修订之下，不能反过来替谁判定他的法。这一层说构到位，不是说两个人中间立起了什么，是说这样的来往成了常事：各站各的，碰上了就凿，凿过去那一边站不站得住，不再让谁悬着心。

双向不是交换。不是你认我，我才认你；不是你凿了我一下，我就欠你一下。一个人认你也是目的，本来不等你先认他，这是单向的；两个人都这样，两个单向碰上了，才是双向。碰上，常常有先后。对方可以先动：乙先问了那一句，甲接住了。接住，不是照着办，是让这一问落在自己的判断上，不推开，也不顺着倒过去。可动的那一下在甲里面：乙问了，甲不接，这一问就落了空；落空的是这一凿，乙认甲也是目的那一份还在。这一场的双向，从甲接住它，也把他自己看见的那一凿递过去，才算起。

双向也不是合一。两个人没有变成一个人：甲还是不去，乙还是去。也不是吞并：谁也没有把谁收进自己里面，照自己的样子养着。

两个人之间，常有一件共同的事：一堆陶土，一首曲子，一个问题，桥下游着的鱼。凿常常落在这件事上。可它不是条件。那间教室、那位老师，是甲和乙共同的；可那天两凿都没有落在上面，落在各人自己怎样等、怎样被看见上。常有，而不必有。

所以双向不疑之美不是一种交情，也不是一套友谊的学说。本篇不证明人是目的，也不说两个人应当这样；只写两个人都这样了，被看见时是什么样子。

三、双向不疑之美

一个主体看见了两个人互相承认、互相凿过，谁也没倒，就不得不认可：

两个人都在自己的法上站着，都认对方也是目的；你凿我，我凿你；凿过了，谁也没倒；谁也不向谁讨一个确认。

这句话是双向不疑之美。「互凿」「相互承认」是本篇的两个词，前面已经说了。「都在自己的法上站着」，是两边各有一份，不等对方点头；「都认对方也是目的」，是两边都不等对方先认；两样都是两边的，所以叫双向。「谁也没倒」，是凿完之后的发现，本篇说的确认就是它。「谁也不向谁讨一个确认」，说的是这不是交换：发现讨不来，也不用讨。

这一层的看见，先在两个人自己身上。甲被那一问凿中，心里是不舒服的：他本来要说的是离开，乙却把他的话拆开了。那一刻，他不急着把这一问推回去，也不急着顺着它回教室；他停下来看，看见的是：这一问是乙的，分不分开，是他自己的。后来他问乙那一句，乙说都有，他又看见一次：乙也站着，自己那一问没有把乙拆掉。乙那边也一样：他问完，看见甲没有顺着他回去，也没有推开；两件事，是甲自己分的。两个人各自看见了，就不得不认可。

旁边的人也看得见。邻桌的人只听见几句，看见的是：两个人话说得很直，谁也没有让着谁；说完，各自还是各自，喝完茶一起走了。这就是这一处。各人后来带走了什么，是后来的事，他看不见，也不用看见。

为什么它是重叠，不是偏好？各人互凿的样子不同：有人话多，有人话少，有人争得面红耳赤，有人一句一句慢慢说。重叠在两处。一处：停下来的人，各在各的交往里，看得见同一处：凿过了，谁也没倒。一处更近：对着同一次互凿的几个人，看见的是同一处：凿过了，谁也没倒。甲看见了，乙看见了，邻桌的人也看见了。各自后来带走了什么，是各人的事，要到后来，甲和乙各自才看得见。这不靠他们谁说得对，不靠甲后来回没回去。

拿掉亲近试试。有人会说，这不过是交情好。两个人可以一辈子不亲近：两个做同一门学问的人，彼此不喜欢，开会碰上就驳，驳完各自回去；下一篇文章里，都有对方那一驳凿开的一处，谁也不提。亲近没有，这一处还在。反过来，两个人可以很亲近：说什么都点头，从不驳对方一句；交情是好的，这一处却没有。

拿掉结果也试试。就算甲那几只杯子后来都收进了柜子，再没有做第二批；就算乙过了半年，也不去那间教室了：喝茶那天那一下，照样看得见。各人带走的那一点，也不靠陶土：甲做别的事，还是不先等人点头；乙还是先自己看。两个人互相点头，事情办得很顺，这一处却从来没有过。美不等于有用。

这一处看见，也和愉快不愉快是两件事。被凿的时候，常常不愉快：甲被拆开的时候不舒服，乙被问高兴的是哪一个时，也不舒服。两个人合得来，说什么都顺，是愉快的，却可以一凿也没有。认可的根据在看见的这一处，不在情感。

懂了也不等于看见。一个人写过好几本讲友谊的书，古今的说法都讲得清。有一天，他的老朋友读了他的新稿，说有一章整个站不住，说了为什么。他生了一晚上的气，第二天把那一章重写了，写成的样子，老朋友也没想到。他把重写的那一章寄回去，也说了老朋友那本旧书里有一处，他一直不同意。老朋友回信只说：那一处，我再想想。他那几本书里讲友谊的话，一句也没变；他是那一晚上以后，才看见那些话说的是什么。

看见也会看错。人可以把两个人互相客气看成互相认，把两个人互相加固的偏见看成互凿；也可以把一个早已倒了、只是还在点头的人，看成没倒。邻桌的人以为看见了两个人凿过都还站着，也许那天甲只是懒得争，回去还是照乙的意思想。说「它是美的」，是主张自己这一次真看见了，这个主张可以错。

完备之美：互凿成了常事。 许多年以后，甲和乙还常见面。有一回，乙说他想把自己那几只碗送去参加一个展。甲说：你是想让人看见，还是想让人说好？乙笑了，说：都有，这回前一个多些。两个人接着说别的。乙没有等甲说他答得好，甲也没有停下来看乙是不是被问住了。谁也不怕谁倒，所以谁也不收着锤子。第一批判那一句，在这里看得见：不疑不是放下锤子，不疑就是不能不凿。不能不凿，说的是碰上了不收着锤子，不是非碰不可。他们不必每一次都凿得很重，也不必每一次都有人改；凿过去，那一边还站着，这件事已经不用谁悬着心等。完备之美是安静的：两个人都站着，锤子都在手里，中间没有一个替他们判定各自的法的东西要守。

生成之美：互凿正在发生。 喝茶那天，甲说「所以你还是觉得我该回去」的那一刻，两个人都可能倒。乙可能顺着说「对，你该回去」，那他那一问就成了劝；他也可能缩回去，说「我没那个意思」，那他那一份就收回了。他说：不是，我在说我。甲那边也悬着：乙说「我在说我」时，他可以就此顺着说，那我再去几次；也可以从此不再提这件事。他没有，他停下来，听出乙这句话里也并着两件事。甲问他高兴的是哪一个，乙也可能被拆掉，二选一；他说都有。每一下都可能倒，都没有倒。张力就在这里。两个人头一回在一件都很在乎的事上，说了对方不爱听的话，不知道对方站不站得住，也不知道对方会不会也凿过来：这也是互凿正在发生。完备的一面，是凿与站住已经合在一处；生成的一面，是每一凿都还悬着。

四、庄子与惠施

中国的旧书里，写过两个人，争了许多回。《庄子·秋水》末章：

「莊子與惠子遊於濠梁之上。莊子曰：『儵魚出游從容，是魚樂也。』惠子曰：『子非魚，安知魚之樂？』莊子曰：『子非我，安知我不知魚之樂？』惠子曰：『我非子，固不知子矣；子固非魚也，子之不知魚之樂，全矣。』莊子曰：『請循其本。子曰「女安知魚樂」云者，既已知吾知之而問我，我知之濠上也。』」[^4]

谁赢了，读的人争了两千年。本篇不判。看得见的是：惠施一凿，庄子一凿，惠施又一凿，庄子再一凿；书里没有写谁认输，也没有写谁走开。惠施接过了庄子的话：庄子说「子非我」，他接出「我非子」来，推到庄子身上。最后一句是庄子的，可惠施那一问，他也没有推开：他从惠施的问里接过「安知」两个字，接出他自己的话来，你问我怎样知道，是已经知道我知道了，才来问我。郭象注这一段，读成相知：你不是我，尚且可以知道我不是鱼；那么凡是相知的，都可以由此知彼。[^5] 这是郭象的读法。本篇取的只是那一来一回：两个人都站着，各自从对方的话里，接出自己的来。

同一部书的〈徐無鬼〉里，庄子送葬，走过惠施的墓，回头对跟着的人说：

「郢人堊漫其鼻端若蠅翼，使匠石斲之。匠石運斤成風，聽而斲之，盡堊而鼻不傷，郢人立不失容。宋元君聞之，召匠石曰：『嘗試為寡人為之。』匠石曰：『臣則嘗能斲之。雖然，臣之質死久矣。』自夫子之死也，吾无以為質矣，吾无與言之矣。」[^6]

郢人鼻尖上抹了一层白土，薄得像苍蝇翅膀，让匠石用斧头削掉。匠石抡斧成风，听着声音削下去，白土削尽，鼻子没伤，郢人站着，脸色不变。宋元君听说了，召匠石来，要他给自己也来一次。匠石说：我从前能削；可是，我的质已经死了很久了。庄子说：自从先生死了，我没有质了，没有可以与之言的人了。

成玄英疏：「質，對也。匠石雖巧，必須不動之質；莊子雖賢，猶藉忘言之對。」又说，惠施一死，「匠人輟成風之妙響，莊子息濠上之微言」。[^7] 把匠石这一喻和濠梁那一场接在一起的，是成玄英，不是本篇。

看得见的是：那一斧要出得来，对面得有一个人，不躲，也不倒。郢人站着，脸色不变，匠石的斧才成风。庄子说他失去的，不是一个赞同他的人，是一个可以与言的人，一个质。郢人是不动的，成玄英说，匠石必须不动之质。本篇的没倒，不是不动：甲后来改了，还站着。这一喻，本篇取不躲、不倒那一层，不取不动。

这里还有两处要说清。一处是单向：斧只在匠石手里，郢人不还斧。单看这一喻，是单向的；成玄英接的，也只是庄子这一边。双向的凭据不在这一喻，在濠梁那一场：那里两个人手里都有斧，互为匠石，也互为质。把两段放在一起这样读，是本篇的读法。一处是失去：庄子写的是那个人没了以后。本篇不把惠施之死写成什么美；那以后的空，是庄子自己的。本篇取的是惠施活着的时候，那一斧削下去，对面没倒的那一下。

分开在：庄子在惠施墓前说这一喻，为的是那个人没了；濠梁那一场，为的是知不知鱼乐。他说无以为质，不把这叫作美。本篇只说，看见那一下的人，不得不认可它。

五、目的王国：许多人看向的同一处

两个人之间，这一处可以很小：一杯茶，一场争辩，一斧子。许多人彼此这样，是什么？

第一批判讲康德时说：目的王国是实践一侧的理想，既普遍立法、又服从自己所立之法的诸主体的系统联合；又说，王国不被预设，它是诸目的互相承认、互相追问时实际做成的东西；至于互认与互审能否长成共同的立法，留给《SAE第二批判》。[^8] 本篇借这个名字指一个方向，只看美的一面：

许多人各在自己的法上站着，都认别人也是目的；彼此凿，谁也没倒，谁也不向谁讨一个确认。这是双向不疑之美往宽处推出去的样子，是朝着目的王国去的。两个人之间，已经看得见它的一个雏形；许多人之间够不够称作王国，本篇不裁。

第一批判说的互相承认，在这里是都认别人也是目的；互相追问，在这里是彼此凿。看得见、认可得了的，是两个人之间的那个雏形；许多人那里，是方向。往宽处推，推的不是一套安排，是同一种认：甲和乙那样，换成三个人，一群人，不认识的人。推到多宽，这一层收不住，第九节还要说。

许多人看向过这一处。看向不是看见。下面写几位：哲学家，政治家，诗人。先说三件事。一，重叠不是所有人：看向这里的人很多，看向别处的人更多；有人看见了，有人没看见，有人看见的是别的。二，本篇不替他们把话换成「目的王国」或者「美」：他们各用各的词，大同，同胞，城邦，兄弟，众人之福；他们多半不为美看，为治理，为修身，为一场战争怎样收场，为一个国家。三，他们的话不是凭据。说他们看向的方向与这一处相合，是本篇的看，可以错；重叠要看见了才有，读的人自己去看他们各自看见了什么。每一位写看向什么，为什么看，相合在哪里，不同在哪里。

哲学家

大同。 《禮記·禮運》里，孔子在蜡祭之后出游，喟然而叹，言偃问他叹什么。他说：「大道之行也，與三代之英，丘未之逮也，而有志焉。大道之行也，天下為公。選賢與能，講信脩睦，故人不獨親其親，不獨子其子，使老有所終，壯有所用，幼有所長，矜寡孤獨廢疾者，皆有所養。……是謂大同。今大道既隱，天下為家。」鄭玄注「公」：「公猶共也。禪位授聖，不家之。」[^9] 孔子为叹鲁而说，一边是大同，一边是大道既隐以后。他看向的是：人不只亲自己的亲人，不只爱自己的孩子。相合在这一句：别人的父母孩子，也在我的亲里。不同在：大同里的人「皆有所養」，是被安顿好的；本篇看的，是人人各在自己的法上站着，彼此凿。孔子说大道之行，他没赶上，「而有志焉」，心向着它，这和本篇说的方向相近；只是他的方向朝着一个过去的时候，本篇的不朝过去。

为彼此而生。 马可·奥勒留在写给自己的札记里说：理智若是我们共有的，理性和法也就是共有的，我们就是同邦的公民；这样，宇宙就好比一座城邦。[^10] 他又说：人是为彼此而生的；所以，要么教导他们，要么容忍他们。[^11] 他让自己一早就预先说：今天我会碰上多管闲事的、忘恩的、傲慢的、狡诈的、嫉妒的、不合群的人；可犯错的人与我是亲族，不是同血同种，是同分有理智和神性的一份，我不能对他发怒，也不能恨他，因为我们生来是为了协作，像双脚，像双手，像眼睑，像上下两排牙齿。[^12] 他为每天怎样做一个人而写，写给自己。他看向的是：全人类同属一个城邦。相合在：犯错的人也是亲族，不是敌人；彼此作对，违反本性。不同在三处。他的根据是人人同分的一份理性，一个共同的来源；本篇不设共同的来源，重叠要看见了才有。他的比喻是手脚：手脚为一个身体协作，各自没有自己的法；本篇的各人不是一个身体的肢体。「要么教导，要么容忍」，教导或容忍，都是从一边说出去的。

同胞。 張載〈西銘〉：「乾稱父，坤稱母；予兹藐焉，乃混然中處。故天地之塞，吾其體；天地之帥，吾其性。民吾同胞，物吾與也。」朱熹注：同胞，是看他们都像自己的兄弟；与，是看它们都像自己的同辈。[^13] 〈西銘〉原名〈訂頑〉，张载为学、为修身而写。他看向的是：天下的人都是我的同胞。相合在：别人不是外人，是和我一样站在天地之间的。不同在：同胞的根据是同一对父母，乾与坤；本篇不设同一个来源。同胞也是生来就有的；本篇的认，看见了才有。

目的王国。 这个名字是康德的。他说：我把王国理解为不同的理性存在者通过共同的法则而成的系统联结。他又说，理性存在者都在这样一条法则之下：把自己和所有别人，任何时候都同时当作目的，从不只当作手段；这样结成的，可以叫作目的王国，当然只是一个理想。一个理性存在者作为成员属于它，是在其中普遍立法，同时自己也服从这些法则。[^14] 他又说，在目的王国里，一切要么有价格，要么有尊严；有价格的，可以用别的东西作等价来替换；超出一切价格、不容等价的，才有尊严。[^15] 七十一岁时，他写《永久和平论》，第三条确定条款是：世界公民权应限于普遍友好的条件；友好，是一个陌生人到了别人的土地上，不被敌视的权利。他说，地上各民族之间的共同体已经到了这一步：地上一处的权利受到损害，所有地方都感觉得到。[^16] 他为寻找道德的最高原则、为永久和平而写。他看向的是：人人都是目的，没有谁只是手段。相合在：认别人也是目的，不只是手段；有尊严的，不容等价替换。不同在：他的王国，要抽掉理性存在者个人的差别和私人目的的内容，才想得出来；本篇的这一处，恰在两个人不同、还彼此认的地方。他的法是普遍立法、共同的法则，他说的是应当；本篇的各人在自己的法上站着，共同的立法留给《SAE第二批判》，本篇说的是看见。

政治家

无恶意。 1865年3月4日，内战快要结束，林肯第二次就职。演说的末段说：对任何人不怀恶意，对一切人抱着仁爱，坚守上帝让我们看见的那个对，让我们努力完成手上的工作：包扎国家的伤口，照顾担负了战斗的人和他的遗孀、孤儿，做一切能在我们之间、与一切国家之间达成并珍惜公正而持久的和平的事。[^17] 他为一场快要打完的战争之后怎样做一个国家而说。他看向的是：对昨天的敌人，也不怀恶意。相合在：不先把对方判成只配被惩罚的人。不同在：他说坚守上帝让我们看见的那个对，手上的工作还要做完；他的根据，是上帝让人看见的对。本篇不说谁是对的，只看两边是不是都还站着。

众人之福。 1908年，甘地在南非把罗斯金的《给那后来的》意译成古吉拉特文，在《印度舆论》上连载；题目不照译，意译作 Sarvodaya，就是众人之福。[^18] 他后来在自传里说，这本书是朋友送的，他在火车上读完，当夜决定照它改变自己的生活；他从书里读出的第一条是：个人的好，包含在众人的好里，这一条他本来就知道；第二条是：律师的工作和理发师的一样有价值，人人都有靠自己的工作谋生的同样的权利；第三条是：劳动的生活，种地的人、做手艺的人的生活，是值得过的生活。[^19] 他意译这本书，是为了《印度舆论》的读者。他看向的是：没有谁的好，要靠别人的坏来成全。相合在：众人之福里，没有哪一个人只是别人的手段。不同在：他从这里走到一种生活，一种他认定值得过的生活；本篇不说哪一种生活值得过。

天下为公。 1924年3月9日，孙中山讲民权主义第一讲，引孔子「大道之行也，天下為公」，说这就是主张民权的大同世界；又说，「言必稱堯舜」，是因为尧舜不是家天下。[^20] 他为讲民权而说。他看向的是：天下不是一家的。相合在：他读的「公」，和鄭玄注的「不家之」是一个方向，天下是共的。不同在：他把它接到民权上，是一种政治的主张；本篇不比较怎样安排天下，只看人与人怎样彼此认。

不以肤色。 1963年8月28日，马丁·路德·金在华盛顿的林肯纪念堂台阶上说，他有一个梦：他的四个孩子，有一天会生活在一个不以肤色、而以品格来评判他们的国家里。[^21] 他为一场争取民权的运动而说。他看向的是：一个人被当作这个人来看，不被当作一个类别。相合在：拿掉一把不是这个人自己的尺子。不同在：他说的是怎样评判一个人，以品格，不以肤色；本篇的认你也是目的，不是一种评判，肤色和品格都不在里面。

和睦而平等。 1964年4月20日，曼德拉在比勒陀利亚的里沃尼亚审判上作被告席陈述。据他的书面稿，他说：他一生反对白人的统治，也反对黑人的统治；他珍视一个民主而自由的社会的理想，人人在其中和睦相处，机会平等；他希望为这个理想而活，必要时，也准备为它而死。[^22] 他在法庭上，为自己和同案的人而说。他看向的是：哪一边都不统治哪一边。相合在：两边都不是另一边的手段。不同在：他为这个理想而活，也准备为它而死，那是他自己的；本篇不说这个方向值得谁去死，也不说不值得，只看两个人之间看得见的那个雏形。

诗人

广厦。 杜甫的茅屋被秋风掀了顶，夜里下雨，屋漏。诗的末了他写：「安得廣廈千萬間，大庇天下寒士俱歡顏，風雨不動安如山。嗚呼！何時眼前突兀見此屋，吾廬獨破受凍死亦足！」仇兆鰲注说，这里「大有民胞物與之意」；把〈西銘〉和这首诗接在一起的，是他。[^23] 杜甫为自己漏雨的屋而写。他看向的是：天下的寒士都有屋住。相合在：从自己的破屋，推到天下人的屋。不同在：「吾廬獨破受凍死亦足」，他愿以自己为代价，这是一个人这一边的；寒士是被庇的，本篇看的是人人各自站着。本篇不以谁的牺牲作这一处的条件。

没有人是一座孤岛。 1624年刊行的《紧急时刻的祷告》里，多恩写他病中听见邻近为别人敲的丧钟。第十七篇沉思的题目是：这钟为别人轻轻地敲，对我说，你必死。他写：「没有人是一座孤岛，自成一体；每个人都是大陆的一块，大陆的一部分；一块泥土被海冲走，欧洲就少了一点，如同冲走的是一个海岬，是你朋友的或你自己的庄园；任何人的死都减损我，因为我包含在人类之中；所以不要派人去问丧钟为谁而鸣，它为你而鸣。」[^24] 他为病中想到的死而写。他看向的是：人与人连着。相合在：别人的死，不是别人的事。不同在：他连人的法子，是一块大陆、一片土；同一篇里他又说，全人类出自一个作者，是一卷书。这是连成一体的那一边；本篇看的，是各自站着的两个人。

兄弟。 1786年，席勒在《塔利亚》上刊出〈欢乐颂〉，初刊本有一句：欢乐的魔力把时尚之剑分开的又连起来，「乞丐成为王侯的兄弟」（Bettler werden Fürstenbrüder）。1803年收进诗集时，他把这一句改成「人人都成为兄弟」（Alle Menschen werden Brüder）。合唱唱的是：拥抱吧，千百万人！这一吻给全世界！兄弟们，星空之上一定住着一位慈爱的父亲。[^25] 他写的是一首带合唱、给许多人一起唱的颂歌。他看向的是：人人是兄弟；从乞丐与王侯到人人，他自己往宽处推了一步。相合在：时尚分开的，重新连起来。不同在两处：兄弟之名，要星空之上一位父亲作共同的根；把人连起来的，是欢乐的魔力。本篇不设共同的父亲；这一处也不靠什么魔力，靠两个人各自站着。

人就是人。 1795年初，彭斯把〈不管怎样，人总是人〉随信寄给编苏格兰歌集的汤姆森。末节说：让我们祈祷它会来，它总会来的：见识与品格，在全世界拿头奖；它总会来的，不管怎样，人与人，普天之下，终将成为兄弟。[^26] 他为穷而正直的人写。他看向的是：人的分量不在等级。相合在：人与人是兄弟，不管贫富。不同在：他说它会来，是祈祷，也是预言；本篇不说它会来。

我所认定的。 惠特曼〈自己之歌〉1881年以后的开头是：「我赞美我自己，歌唱我自己，我所认定的，你也将认定，因为属于我的每一个原子，也同样属于你。」[^27] 他为歌唱自己而写；在他那里，歌唱自己，就是歌唱每一个人。他看向的是：我与你是同一的。相合在：他从自己出发，站得很稳，也把你放在同一处。不同在：「我所认定的，你也将认定」，是他替你说了；本篇的认你也是目的，你认定什么，是你的。每一个原子也同样属于你，这是合一的那一边。

无畏的心。 1912年，泰戈尔在英文本《吉檀迦利》第三十五首里写：在那里，心是无畏的，头是抬起的；在那里，知识是自由的；在那里，世界没有被狭小的家墙隔成碎片；……父啊，让我的国家醒来，进入那自由的天堂。[^28] 他为他的国家祈祷。他看向的是：人人抬着头，世界不被隔成碎片。相合在：各人站着，彼此不被墙隔开。不同在：这是向父的祈祷，心由你引着往前走（the mind is led forward by thee）；本篇不设引领的人。

把他们放在一起，看得见相合的地方：不只亲自己的亲人；犯错的人也是亲族；别人不是外人；人有尊严，不可替换；对昨天的敌人不怀恶意；哪一边都不统治哪一边；别人的死减损我。也看得见，他们多半在同几处和本篇分开。一处是来源：天地是父母，人人同分一份理性，星空之上有一位父亲，全人类出自一个作者；本篇不设共同的来源。一处是语气：他们多半盼着各自说的那一天，大同，天下为公，人人是兄弟；有人求它来，有人为它坐牢，有人说它总会来；本篇不说它会来，也不说应当，只说在两个人之间看见了它的雏形的人，不得不认可。还有一处：他们看向的地方，常常是合的那一边，连成一片，结成一体；本篇看的，是各自站着的人。

六、什么会冒充它

方法还是一个：拿掉它试试。这一层的冒充者有几样：有的把双向换成交换，有的只有一边，有的冒充互凿，有的冒充谁也没倒，有的把别人写上去的当作自己长出来的；最后一个，借目的王国的名义。

交换。 你认我，我才认你；你凿了我一下，我欠你一下。拿掉回报试试：对方哪一天不认你了，你还认他吗？交换的人，那一刻就收回。双向是两个单向碰上了；碰不上，各人那一份照旧在。

客气。 谁也不凿谁，怕对方倒。拿掉客气试试：底下是什么？是不信对方站得住。不疑不是放下锤子；为了怕对方倒而放下锤子的，是疑。

互相加固。 两个人彼此点头：你说的我都信，我说的你也都信。也有争得很凶的：细处驳来驳去，底下同一个偏见，谁也不碰。拿掉点头试试：他们之间还剩什么？一凿也没有。争得凶的那一种，这一试分不开，换一试：拿掉两个人共同立着的那一处试试，让对方凿到那里，他们肯不肯？互相加固的人，凿来凿去，从不落在那里；互凿的人，那一处也可以被凿，凿过了，谁也没倒。看上去像双向，其实是两个人倒向了同一边。

合一。 两个人成了一个：你的就是我的，分不出接缝。这可以是一个人最深的经验，第七节给它留地方；可它不是这里的桥。拿掉「我们」试试：问他们身上哪一处是对方凿开的，哪一处是自己长的，说得出来吗？合一了的两个人，说不出，也不想分；桥两头的人，说得出：这一处是你凿开的，长成的是我的。离了对方，桥两头的人少了一个质，自己那一份还在；庄子说无与言，少的是那个质。

吞并。 一个人把另一个收进来，照自己的样子养着：你长出来的，都是我种的。拿掉他试试：离了他，你还认你身上长出来的那一处，而且自己改得动吗？被吞并的，离了他，要么不认，要么改不动；自己长出来的，还认，也改得动。

互相改写。 两边都这样：你把我改成你要的样子，我把你改成我要的样子，都说是对方凿开的。同一试：离了对方，各人还认自己身上改出来的那一处，而且自己改得动吗？改写上去的，离了写的人，改不动；自己长出来的，改得动。总纲说桥不是互相改写，是这一试。

争承认。 凿，是为了让对方倒，好让他认我。拿掉输赢试试：对方没倒，你认不认他立着的地方是他的？争的人不认，换一把更重的再凿，或者走开；互凿的人，看见对方没倒，就停在那里：那是他的。相互承认也不是争来的：争的人要对方先认他，相互承认的人不等。

偏爱。 两个人互相认，对别的人一概不认：一个小圈子。克尔凯郭尔说，情爱和友谊都是偏爱，是偏爱的激情；基督教的爱，是舍己的爱。[^29] 他拿「你要爱邻人」来对照，为基督教的爱怎样在世上做工而写。拿掉这个人试试：换一个陌生人，他还认那个陌生人也是目的吗？不认，那两个人之间的，也许只是偏爱。认别人也是目的的那一份，不因为有了朋友就少。与他分开在：他说的是命令，你要爱；本篇不说应当。

被懂。 被一个人准确听见，还不是双向；第八节的知音故事，是一个人听另一个人。

以目的王国之名。 先把一些人当手段，好让将来人人是目的；先画一张蓝图，再照着它去排人。拿掉蓝图试试：眼前这个人，今天，还被认作目的吗？不被，那就不是往宽处推，是先把两个人之间那个雏形拆了。以美的名义要别人为这个方向付出、承受，也在这里：要别人付出的，已经先把他当成了手段。

邻近的射线。 不疑之美看的是一个人这一边：他站住，也把你那一份留给你，不等你先认他。这里看的是两个人都这样。目的之美看的是一个人的方向怎样来了、被接住；这里的方向，在许多人之间。本篇只看两个人怎样互凿，谁也没倒，和它往宽处推出去的样子。

最后一句，这套美学对每一条射线都说：美不等于对，不等于有用，不等于重要，不等于理解。有了感觉以后，还要加一句：美不等于愉快，愉快也不等于美。这一条射线上，重要和愉快两样最要紧：目的王国听上去很重要，那不是这里的美；两个人合得来的愉快，也不是。

七、什么留给各人

跟谁互凿，凿什么，凿多重，什么时候不凿，是各人的。有人一辈子只有一两个可以互凿的人，有人到处都有；有人一辈子没有遇上一个，本篇不说他缺了什么。

合一也留给各人。有人在爱里、在友谊里、在祈祷里，经验到界线退下去，两个成了一个。那可以是他自己的审美，本篇不驳。本篇只说：看见两个人凿过都还站着的人，不得不认可这一处。

凿过以后长出来的，是涵育，还是被殖民？涵育，是对方那一凿帮你长出你自己的眼睛；殖民，是一把不是你自己的尺子，占了你自己的法的位置。可以这样回看：拿掉那个人给的尺子试试，离了那个人，你还认那一处是你的，而且自己改得动。这是事后的回看，不是判据，可以看错；它也不把你剥到一个「真正的自己」上去，你长出来的，本来就有别人在里面。

往宽处推，推到哪里，推多宽，怎样推，也是各人的。本篇不给蓝图，也不要谁去推。

还有一处要说清。这组论文一直是这样说话的：看见了的人不得不认可；这不只是作者的偏好；它不替读者的审美立法。读者凿过来，凿开了哪一处，作者改不改，那是另一回事；本篇不替读者判，也不替作者判。

说「这两个人，比那两个人凿得更干净，站得更稳」，是一个审美判断，可以讨论。讨论下来，也许各有各的样子，那就各留各的。

美学只说：看见了的人，不得不认可它是美的；它不替任何人决定跟谁、怎样互凿，也不要求谁去造一个王国。

八、这个问题的来历

两个人怎样彼此认，这个问题很早就有人看，多半不以美的名字看，而且常常是为了别的：为了待贤，为了知人，为了赞美爱神，为了幸福，为了解脱，为了纪念一个死去的朋友，为了义务，为了写精神怎样长成，为了回答一个青年诗人，为了信仰，为了政治，为了理解，为了伦理，为了承认。源头有几个方向：被一个人准确听见；两个成为一个；朋友是另一个自己；同行的人是路的全部。后来，有人说因为是他，因为是我；有人说爱与敬重，一个使人靠近，一个使人保持距离；有人说自我意识只作为被承认者存在。今天，有人说两份孤独彼此守护；有人说一切真实的生活是相遇；有人说朋友之间谈的是世界；有人说理解是视域的融合；有人说他者的脸向我说话；有人说承认的斗争之外，另有和平的承认。庄子与惠施已在第四节，偏爱在第六节。下面照这个次序写。每一位都照实写他认出了什么、为了什么看，在哪里向本文施压，本文在哪里与他分开；别的传统用它自己的词出场。

知音。 《呂氏春秋·本味》：「伯牙鼓琴，鍾子期聽之。方鼓琴而志在太山，鍾子期曰：『善哉乎鼓琴！巍巍乎若太山。』少選之間而志在流水，鍾子期又曰：『善哉乎鼓琴！湯湯乎若流水。』鍾子期死，伯牙破琴絕絃，終身不復鼓琴，以為世無足復為鼓琴者。」下文接着说：「非獨琴若此也，賢者亦然。」[^30] 管仲说鲍叔：分财利，我自己多拿，他不以为我贪，知道我穷；我三战三走，他不以为我怯，知道我有老母；末了说：「生我者父母，知我者鮑子也。」[^31] 《呂氏春秋》为人主怎样待贤而说；管仲为说鲍叔怎样知他。它们认出：被准确听见，和被喜欢是两回事；少了那个听的人，琴就不弹了。它们向本文施压：被一个人这样懂，也许就够了，双向是不是多出来的？本文的回答：够不够，是各人的；被准确听见，被人看见时，也许是另一处美，本篇不驳。本篇看的，是两个人都凿、都站着的这一处；被懂里没有凿。子期知伯牙，伯牙知不知子期，书里没写；鲍叔知管仲，也是这样。双向是本篇在知音之上加的一步。分开在：它们讲的是知，本篇讲的是凿过以后没倒；它们与本篇同路，走在前一步。

两个成为一个。 柏拉图《会饮》里，阿里斯托芬讲：人原来是圆的，四只手，四条腿，两张脸；宙斯为了削弱他们，把每一个都切成两半，像切果子，像用头发切鸡蛋。从那以后，对彼此的爱欲就种在人身上，它聚合古老的本性，试图由两个做成一个，医治人的本性。[^32] 他又设了一个假想：假如赫菲斯托斯拿着工具，站到同卧的两个人面前，先问：你们想从彼此那里得到的，是什么？两人答不上来，他再问：是不是想尽可能待在一处，日夜不离？若是，他愿意把你们熔在一起，吹合成一个，活着是一个，死了在冥府里也是一个；可你们看看，你们爱的是不是这个。阿里斯托芬接着说，听了这话，没有一个人会拒绝，都会以为听到的正是早就想要的：与所爱的人熔在一起，由两个成为一个。[^33] 这是会饮席上赞美爱神的一篇讲辞，是剧中人的话，不等于柏拉图的定论。它认出了合一的力量：许多人在爱里要的，正是界线没了。它向本文施压，压在根上：凭什么「仍是两个」比「成为一个」美？本文的回答：本篇不驳倒合一，他说的那许多人，第七节给他们留了地方；本篇看的是另一处。分开在：他那两半，本是一个被切开的整体；本篇的两个人，各在自己的法上，不是谁的一半。

另一个自己。 亚里士多德说，好人怎样对自己，也怎样对朋友，因为朋友是另一个自己（ἄλλος αὐτός）。[^34] 他又说，人要一同觉知朋友存在，这要在一起生活、共享言谈与思想里才有；人说一起生活，说的是这个，不像牲畜在同一处吃草。[^35] 他为问幸福的人要不要朋友而写。他认出：「另一个」和「自己」，缺一样也不是朋友。他向本文施压：他要的是两个好人；两个坏判断互相加固，看上去也可以很像互凿。本文的回答：同意有这个冒充，第六节拆了互相加固：不只拿掉点头，还要看凿肯不肯落到两个人共同立着的那一处。分开在：他要德性相近，把朋友看成从自己推出去的另一个我；本篇的两个人可以很不相同，庄子与惠施就不同；认你也是目的，也不是把你看成另一个我。

善友。 《相应部》里，阿难对佛说：善友、善伴、善侣，是梵行的一半。佛说：不是这样，阿难，不是这样；这是梵行的全部（sakalamevidaṁ）。佛又说：众生以我为善友，才从生、老、死、忧悲苦恼里解脱。[^36] 它为解脱而说。它认出：同行的人不是路外的附加，是路本身。它向本文施压：友的分量在解脱，不在两个人彼此看见；而且这里的善友首先是佛，关系不对称。本文的回答：同意不对称，这一段本来不是讲两个平起平坐的人。分开在：它看的是路，走到解脱；本篇看的是两个人站着的这一处，不问它通向哪里。

因为是他，因为是我。 蒙田写他的朋友拉博埃西：若有人逼我说为什么爱他，我觉得说不出来，只能这样回答：因为是他，因为是我（Par ce que c’estoit luy, par ce que c’estoit moy）。紧挨着的前一句是：在我说的这种友谊里，两个灵魂互相混合、融在一起，混得那样彻底，把连起它们的那道接缝抹去了，再也找不到。同一段又说：我的意志沉进他的里面，他的沉进我的里面，没有给我们留下什么是自己的，不论是他的还是我的。[^37] 他为纪念一个死去的朋友而写。他认出：友谊不能还原成性质和理由，是这两个不可替换的人。他向本文施压：在他那里，「是他」「是我」和接缝抹去，紧挨着，同时成立；两个单数，最后也融了。本文的回答：本篇取「是他」「是我」；接缝抹去，是他自己的审美，第七节留给他。分开在：看的人认可的这一处，在接缝还在的地方；两个人还是两个，凿才碰得上。

吸引与排斥。 康德在《德性论》里说：按与物理世界的类比，理性存在者在地上的联结，靠吸引和排斥；凭相互之爱的原则，他们要不断彼此靠近；凭彼此欠着的敬重，要彼此保持距离。[^38] 他又说：友谊，就其完满来看，是两个人格通过同等的相互之爱和敬重的结合；这是一个单纯的、却在实践上必然的理念，施行中不可达到，却是理性交付的、要朝它去努力的光荣的义务。[^39] 同一节他再用吸引和排斥说爱与敬重：最好的朋友之间，也不该不拘形迹。他还说，朋友把对方的过错指给他看，是爱的义务，为的是对方好；可被指出的那一个，会觉得对方少了他期待的敬重，怕在对方眼里掉下去，被人看着、被人管着，本身就像冒犯。[^40] 他为德性的义务而写。他认出：靠近和距离要同时有，爱要拉近，敬重要隔开。他向本文施压：凿，他早写了，还写了凿的险，一凿下去，敬重可能就没了；本篇多了什么？本文的回答：多的是凿过以后的那一处：被凿的人没有在对方眼里掉下去，也没有倒；要是改了什么，改的是他自己的。他怕的是倒；本篇看的，是没倒。分开在：他说义务，说应当，说它施行中不可达到；本篇不说应当，只说看见它在两个人之间有过的人，不得不认可。

只作为被承认者。 黑格尔说：自我意识是自在自为的，这是由于、并且也就因为它为一个他者而自在自为；这就是说，它只作为一个被承认者而存在。[^41] 他又说，两个自我意识承认它们自己是互相承认着的；[^42] 可在主人与奴隶那里，主人对他者做的，没有也对自己做，奴隶对自己做的，没有也对他者做，由此产生的是一种片面的、不对等的承认。[^43] 他为写自我意识怎样走向精神而看。他认出：承认不是两个自足的人之间外加的东西，别人的承认参与造就我。他向本文施压，压得很重：两个各自立法的人，不是先成立了，再来架桥；「两个人都在自己的法上站着」，预设了它要说的东西。本文的回答：本篇不说人先于关系；同意一个人长成，里面有别人，第七节说了涵育。本篇只说，这一次互凿的时候，两个人各自已经站着，这是看得见的：甲分得开两件事，乙说得出都有。桥在这一次，不在造人的那一步。他写主奴，正写出一方倒下以后，承认落了空；本篇的「谁也没倒」，就在这里与他相遇。分开在：他的承认从生死的斗争里来；本篇的互凿，不为让对方倒。

两份孤独。 1904年5月14日，里尔克在罗马给一个青年诗人写信，说那种更有人性的爱，将在于两份孤独彼此守护、彼此相接、彼此问候。[^44] 他说的是两性之爱，为回答那个青年的来信而写。他认出：距离不是爱还没完成，是爱完成的样子。他向本文施压：最好的关系，也许只守护，不凿？本文的回答：守护、相接、问候，近于完备的一面，两个人都站着，中间安静。可完备的一面也还在凿：不疑就是不能不凿。分开在：他那里只有守护，没有凿。

相遇。 布伯说：我因你而成为我；成为我的时候，我说你。一切真实的生活是相遇。他又说：说「你」的人，没有一个某物作对象；关于你，人经验到什么？恰恰什么也没有，因为人不经验它。[^45] 他为人与世界、与永恒的你的关系而写。他认出：你不是我判断对了的一个对象。他向本文施压，压在两处。一处是确认：说「看见你还站着」，可能仍把你当成了对象，给你打分。本文的回答：第二节说了，这里的确认是凿完之后的发现，不是给你打分，也不确认完；看见你还站着，不等于经验完了你。一处是凿：凿，是对着你的一个判断，一个某物；说「你」的时候，没有某物。本文的回答：凿的那一刻，对着的是判断，这一点本篇认；凿完看见你还站着，那一下不是对着某物，是对着你。他还说我因你而成为我，桥两头的人不是先有的；这一压与黑格尔同，第十节留了一条。分开在：他的你，最后通向永恒的你；本篇不设。

世界。 阿伦特写莱辛时说，朋友之间的交谈，不同于各人说自己的亲密话，关乎的是共同的世界；世界不因为是人造的就有人性，只有成为交谈的对象，才有；人只有谈论世界和自己身上发生的事，才使它们有人性，也在谈论里学会做人。[^46] 她为在黑暗的时代说什么是人性而写。她认出：友谊的分量，在两个人之间的世界。她向本文施压，压在两处。一处是第三样：只连两个人的桥，可能是没有世界的亲密；本篇的那句话，少了第三样。本文的回答：第三样常有，陶土，濠梁下的鱼，凿常落在它上面；本篇不把它立为条件。一处压在场景上：甲和乙那天谈的是自己，正是她说的各人说自己的亲密话，不是朋友之间谈世界。本文的回答：同意那天他们谈的是自己；可凿落在各人的判断上，判断是朝着世界的：做陶，被看见，等一个人点头，都是世界里的事。本篇不说这比谈世界更好。许多人彼此这样认，是人的多；她说的世界，是人与人之间的事与物，两样不是一回事，本篇不拿前一样顶后一样。分开在：她为政治、为世界而看；本篇为看见而看。

视域。 伽达默尔说，理解从来是那些看似各自存在的视域融合的过程。[^47] 他为理解流传下来的东西而写。他认出：理解的时候，两边都被改变，谁也没有把谁收掉。他向本文施压：本篇把两个人说成各自站着，也许太硬；理解里，两边的视域本来就不是各自存在的。本文的回答：同意两边都可以变；本篇只说，变了以后，长出来的那一处是各人的。他是近邻，不是融合那一边的人：他的融合不是两个人合成一个人。分开也在这里：他说的融合，落在一件事情上，形成一个新的视域，那是两边共有的；本篇看的是凿过以后两边各自站着，共有的东西可以有，不替谁判定他的法。他看的是理解；本篇看的是两个人。

他者的脸。 列维纳斯说，他者的脸向我说话，第一个词是义务。[^48] 他为把伦理放在一切之先而写。他认出：他者不是我认识的一个对象，是向我说话的那一个。他向本文施压，压在两处。一处是交换：照他的思路，我对你的责任本来不对称；你认我，我认你，已经像一笔交换。本文的回答：双向不是交换，是两个单向碰上了，谁也不向谁讨一个确认；各人那一份，本来就不等对方。一处是次序：他者的召唤先于我的自由，双向从哪里算起？本文的回答：召唤可以先到，对方可以先动；可动的那一下在人里面，双向从我接住它、也把我的凿递过去算起。这两处之外，还有一处本篇答不全：我对具体的你，总是多欠着一点；这一点写在第十节。分开在：本篇说这个样子被看见时美，不说伦理从这里开始。

和平的承认。 利科说，为承认而斗争，可能落进没有尽头的索取；斗争之外的另一条路，要到和平的相互承认的经验里去找，那种经验靠象征的中介，既不入法的秩序，也不入买卖的交换。他又说，在「相互」的中心，一个不是另一个，这一点不可逾越。[^49] 他为写承认怎样走完它的路而写。他认出：互认一旦以得到对方的承认为目的，就退化成索取。他向本文施压：本篇的确认，会不会也是一种索取？本文的回答：同意有这个危险；第二节说了，这里的确认是发现，不是索取，谁也不向谁讨一个确认。「一个不是另一个」，与本篇相遇。分开在：他找的是斗争之外的和平；本篇的互凿，既不是争承认，也不只是和平：凿还在。还有一处：他的相互承认要靠象征的中介；本篇的相互承认不靠中介，也可以互相不理。

九、留下的问题

甲和乙后来还常见面。有一年，乙带来一个新朋友。三个人喝茶，乙说起他那几只碗，新朋友驳了他一句；甲听了一会儿，驳的却是乙，又转过来问了新朋友一句。新朋友想了想，也问了甲一句。那天散的时候，三个人都还站着，谁也没有站到谁那一边去。

两个人之间，看得见目的王国的一个雏形。三个人，一群人，许多不认识的人，彼此这样认，彼此凿，谁也没倒，谁也不向谁讨一个确认：这是朝着目的王国去的。在许多人那里，它还是方向。什么时候来，怎样来，来不来，这一层收不住。够不够称作王国，本篇不裁；许多人彼此认，彼此追问，能不能长成共同的立法，第一批判说留给《SAE第二批判》；美学不答。

余项给方向，不推人。人可以一辈子只和一两个人互凿，不去问许多人之间怎样；他若不得不去问，那是他自己的不得不。

没有最美。目的王国也不是最美的：两个人之间看得见的那个雏形，是这里的美，它不比一片云、一条定理、一个站住了的人更美；在许多人那里，它还是这一层收不住的方向，不拿来和谁比美。射线是方向，不是梯子；最后一条，只是最后一条。

这一条射线到这里停下。

十、什么会让本文错

六件事里有一件成立，本文就错了。第一，互凿与交换、与互相加固，在任何情形下都分不开：拿掉回报，拿掉点头，让凿落到两个人共同立着的那一处，看见的也没有一点不同。第二，关系先于两端，被证明到连「两个人各自站着」也分不出来：一个人除了关系什么也不是；那样，桥两头就没有人，本篇说的双向就落了空。黑格尔、布伯是这一条的压力，伽达默尔也是。第三，我对具体的你总是多欠着一点，这一点若正是最要紧的，两个单向碰上了、谁也不向谁讨，就把它抹平了；那样，本篇说的双向，只是交换的一个体面说法。列维纳斯是这一条的压力，克尔凯郭尔也是。第四，看见两个人成了一个的人，和看见两个人凿过都还站着的人，认可的是同一处；那样，桥与合一分不开，第六节的分法错了。阿里斯托芬、蒙田是这一条的压力。第五，没有第三样的时候，从来没有人看见过这一处；那样，第三样是条件，本篇说它常有而不必有，就错了。阿伦特是这一条的压力。第六，第五节那些人看向的，拿掉秩序、安宁、富足、欢乐，就什么也不剩；那样，本篇说的相合，是本篇替他们加上去的，这一处往宽处推，也就不是朝着目的王国去的。本文不认为这几件事会发生，但把它们写在这里，留给看的人去试。

---

致谢

本文为 SAE（Self-as-an-End）哲学体系美学分支的第十三条射线论文，由秦汉独立署名。全部哲学论证与取舍由作者最终裁决，最终定稿与文责由作者独任。

起草辅助与评审均借助大型语言模型进行。起草与内部精度审计由 Claude（Anthropic）承担，结构闸门与发布前签署由 ChatGPT（OpenAI）承担；「这个问题的来历」一节所用的思想史材料，先由 ChatGPT 的深度研究汇集，再逐条核对出处。本文与总纲第二版及其余十二篇射线论文同批经内部精度审计与结构闸门两方终审，并经核句验收。谨向这些系统及其背后的研究与工程团队致谢。它们提出的意见由作者逐条裁定，采纳与驳回均记录在案；各轮的改定与撤销记录不录于此。

注释

[^1]: 秦汉（Han Qin），《SAE判断力与美学》（SAE Judgment and Aesthetics），第二版，2026，5.1「射线怎么读」，DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19296710。

[^2]: 秦汉（Han Qin），《SAE第一批判》（SAE: The First Critique），2026，DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21439120。

[^3]: 秦汉，《SAE第一批判》，第五章，「三·路之后段」，峰站。

[^4]: 郭慶藩，《莊子集釋》，〈秋水〉（據 CHANT 本，Kanripo KR5c0126）。郭象注本作「鯈魚」。

[^5]: 郭象注，《南華真經》卷六，〈秋水〉，《四部叢刊》本。

[^6]: 郭慶藩，《莊子集釋》，〈徐無鬼〉（據 CHANT 本，Kanripo KR5c0126）。郭象注本作「堊慢」「無」，見《南華真經》卷八，《四部叢刊》本。

[^7]: 成玄英疏，《南華真經註疏》卷二十六，〈徐無鬼〉，《正統道藏》本（Kanripo KR5c0139）。

[^8]: 秦汉，《SAE第一批判》，第一章，「三·与康德」。

[^9]: 《禮記·禮運》，鄭玄注，《纂圖互註禮記》卷七，《四部叢刊》本；阮元校刻《禮記注疏》本（據 TLS 本，Kanripo KR1d0052）。

[^10]: Marcus Aurelius, Ad se ipsum 4.4, ed. J. H. Leopold (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908).

[^11]: Marcus Aurelius, Ad se ipsum 8.59.

[^12]: Marcus Aurelius, Ad se ipsum 2.1.

[^13]: 張載，〈西銘〉，《張子全書》卷一，朱熹注，文淵閣《四庫全書》本。

[^14]: Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Riga: Hartknoch, 1785), in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 4 (Berlin: Reimer, 1911), 433.

[^15]: Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 4:434.

[^16]: Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1795), in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8 (Berlin: Reimer, 1912), 357–60.

[^17]: Abraham Lincoln, "Second Inaugural Address," March 4, 1865, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, ed. James D. Richardson, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897).

[^18]: M. K. Gandhi, "Sarvodaya [-I]," Indian Opinion, May 16, 1908 (serialized to July 18, 1908), in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 8 (Delhi: Publications Division, 1962), 239.

[^19]: M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography, or The Story of My Experiments with Truth, trans. Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1927–29), pt. 4, chap. 18.

[^20]: 孫文，〈民權主義第一講〉（1924年3月9日），《國父全集》第一冊，頁 55–67（頁碼據中山學術資料庫著錄）。

[^21]: Martin Luther King Jr., "I Have a Dream," address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, Washington, DC, August 28, 1963, transcript as published by NPR.

[^22]: Nelson Mandela, statement from the dock, Rivonia Trial, Pretoria Supreme Court, April 20, 1964, written text as published by the Nelson Mandela Foundation.

[^23]: 杜甫，〈茅屋為秋風所破歌〉，仇兆鰲，《杜詩詳註》卷十，文淵閣《四庫全書》本。

[^24]: John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions (London: Thomas Jones, 1624), Meditation 17, 415–16.

[^25]: Friedrich Schiller, "An die Freude," Thalia 1, no. 2 (1786): 1–5; revised in Gedichte, pt. 2 (Leipzig: Crusius, 1803); both versions as given in the LiederNet Archive, TextId 14436 (text of Gedichte, 2nd ed., 1805, collated with Thalia).

[^26]: Robert Burns, "A Man's a Man for A' That" (1795), in Poems and Songs of Robert Burns, Project Gutenberg eBook #1279, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1279.

[^27]: Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," sec. 1, in Leaves of Grass (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1891–92).

[^28]: Rabindranath Tagore, Gitanjali (Song Offerings) (London: India Society, 1912), no. 35.

[^29]: Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 52, as quoted in Sharon Krishek, "Two Forms of Love: The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love," Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (2008): 595–617.

[^30]: 《呂氏春秋·孝行覽·本味》，高誘注，《呂氏春秋》卷十四，《四部叢刊》本。

[^31]: 司馬遷，《史記》卷六十二〈管晏列傳〉（據 TLS 本，Kanripo KR2a0001）。

[^32]: Plato, Symposium 189e–191d, in Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910).

[^33]: Plato, Symposium 192d–e.

[^34]: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 9.4, 1166a31–32, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).

[^35]: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 9.9, 1170b10–14.

[^36]: Saṁyutta Nikāya 45.2 (PTS S V 2–3), Mahāsaṅgīti edition, SuttaCentral; trans. Bhikkhu Sujato.

[^37]: Michel de Montaigne, "De l'Amitié," Essais, bk. 1, chap. 27 (text of Paris: Abel Langelier, 1595), in Essais de Montaigne (self-édition), ed. Ernest Michaud, vol. 1 (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1907).

[^38]: Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pt. 2, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1797), §24, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6 (Berlin: Reimer, 1907 [first-edition year; printing consulted not verified]), 449.

[^39]: Kant, Tugendlehre, §46, 6:469.

[^40]: Kant, Tugendlehre, §46, 6:470.

[^41]: G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bamberg and Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807), chap. 4, A (¶178 in A. V. Miller's numbering).

[^42]: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, chap. 4, A (¶184).

[^43]: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, chap. 4, A (¶191).

[^44]: Rainer Maria Rilke to Franz Xaver Kappus, Rome, May 14, 1904, in Briefe an einen jungen Dichter (Leipzig: Insel, 1929).

[^45]: Martin Buber, Ich und Du (Leipzig: Insel, 1923), pt. 1.

[^46]: Hannah Arendt, "On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing," in Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 24–25.

[^47]: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960), 289 (page as cited in secondary literature; Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1, 311).

[^48]: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 201 (as excerpted in secondary sources).

[^49]: Paul Ricœur, Parcours de la reconnaissance (Paris: Stock, 2004), 225, 317, 319; English in The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 218–19 (pages as cited in secondary literature).

---

参考文献

所引本系统文献均存档于 Zenodo，中英双语版本同记录；所引 DOI 为概念 DOI，始终指向最新版本，故不另注版本号与访问日期；全部单一作者署名（秦汉）。起草与评审辅助已在致谢中说明。

Arendt, Hannah. Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.

Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. Edited by I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

Buber, Martin. Ich und Du. Leipzig: Insel, 1923.

Burns, Robert. Poems and Songs of Robert Burns. Project Gutenberg eBook #1279. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1279.

Donne, John. Devotions upon Emergent Occasions. London: Thomas Jones, 1624.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr, 1960.

Gandhi, M. K. An Autobiography, or The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Translated by Mahadev Desai. 2 vols. Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1927–29.

———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 8. Delhi: Publications Division, 1962.

Hegel, G. W. F. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg and Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807.

———. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Kant, Immanuel. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Hartknoch, 1785. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 4. Berlin: Reimer, 1911.

———. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1797. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6. Berlin: Reimer, 1907 [first-edition year; printing consulted not verified].

———. Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1795. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8. Berlin: Reimer, 1912.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Works of Love. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. "I Have a Dream." Address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, Washington, DC, August 28, 1963.

Krishek, Sharon. "Two Forms of Love: The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love." Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (2008): 595–617.

Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

LiederNet Archive. "An die Freude." TextId 14436. https://www.lieder.net/lieder/get_text.html?TextId=14436.

Lincoln, Abraham. "Second Inaugural Address." March 4, 1865. In A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, edited by James D. Richardson, vol. 6. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897.

Mandela, Nelson. Statement from the dock, Rivonia Trial, Pretoria Supreme Court, April 20, 1964. Written text, Nelson Mandela Foundation.

Marcus Aurelius. Ad se ipsum. Edited by J. H. Leopold. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908.

Montaigne, Michel de. Essais de Montaigne (self-édition). Edited by Ernest Michaud. Vol. 1. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1907. Text of 1595.

Plato. Platonis Opera. Vol. 2. Edited by John Burnet. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910.

Ricœur, Paul. The Course of Recognition. Translated by David Pellauer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

———. Parcours de la reconnaissance. Paris: Stock, 2004.

Rilke, Rainer Maria. Briefe an einen jungen Dichter. Leipzig: Insel, 1929.

Saṁyutta Nikāya. Mahāsaṅgīti edition. SuttaCentral, bilara-data. Translated by Bhikkhu Sujato.

Schiller, Friedrich. "An die Freude." Thalia 1, no. 2 (1786): 1–5.

———. Gedichte. Pt. 2. Leipzig: Crusius, 1803.

Tagore, Rabindranath. Gitanjali (Song Offerings). London: India Society, 1912.

Whitman, Walt. Leaves of Grass. Philadelphia: David McKay, 1891–92.

郭慶藩。《莊子集釋》。CHANT 本（Kanripo KR5c0126）。

《禮記》。鄭玄注。《纂圖互註禮記》。《四部叢刊》本。

《禮記注疏》。阮元校刻本。TLS 本（Kanripo KR1d0052）。

《呂氏春秋》。高誘注。《四部叢刊》本。

《南華真經》。郭象注。《四部叢刊》本。

《南華真經註疏》。郭象注，成玄英疏。《正統道藏》本（Kanripo KR5c0139）。

秦汉（Han Qin）。《SAE判断力与美学》（SAE Judgment and Aesthetics）。2026。DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19296710。

———。《SAE第一批判》（SAE: The First Critique）。2026。DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21439120。

仇兆鰲。《杜詩詳註》。文淵閣《四庫全書》本。

司馬遷。《史記》。TLS 本（Kanripo KR2a0001）。

孫文。〈民權主義第一講〉。1924。《國父全集》第一冊。中山學術資料庫。

張載。《張子全書》。朱熹注。文淵閣《四庫全書》本。