The Beauty of Non Dubito
不疑之美
A student plays a piece in a lesson and plays one place differently from how the teacher taught him. The teacher listens to the end and says: I wouldn't play it this way here, and says why. The student asks: so do I change it? The teacher says: if it sounds right to you, don't change it. A subject who has seen this cannot not acknowledge: a person stands on his own law: if you do not nod, he still stands; if you ask on what grounds, he can say, and he does not forbid your questioning; your share, he leaves to you: whether to listen, whether to change, is yours; he recognizes you as an end too, without waiting for you to recognize him first. That sentence is the beauty of non dubito. Non dubito here has two halves: inwardly, not needing you to tell him he is right, which does not mean having no doubts: he can still be wrong, and can still change; outwardly, not doubting that you too are an end, without waiting for you to recognize him first, which is one-way. The non dubito of the two halves is one thing: not waiting for you. The paper's two words: standing is that your agreement is not a precondition of his judgment; he does not forbid questioning, and if asked, he can say; leaving is that your share is left to you, and what is left is not words. Since he waits neither for your nod nor for you to recognize him, his eyes need not keep returning to himself, and can rest on you: the doing side of this level is forgetting the self. The beauty has two faces: completive beauty is standing and leaving no longer contending, saying it and letting it go; generative beauty is the two still contending, wanting to say it again and holding back. The paper says what non dubito is and is not (the three senses of "confirmation," the two halves of non dubito, one-way, the two sides of one line); uses Kant's three maxims to show where this paper meets them and where it parts from them; says what can pass for the beauty of non dubito (dogmatism, rebellion, self-affirmation, looking on, the village worthy and accommodation, revering or despising by one's own measure, demanding endless endurance in the name of beauty); and what is left to each person. It traces where the question comes from, from Socrates, Zengzi, Confucius, Zhuangzi and Buddhism, through Dōgen, Wang Yangming, Hegel, Emerson, Mill and Nietzsche, to Gandhi, Watsuji Tetsurō, Arendt, Levinas, Murdoch and Honneth. It ends by handing on to the beauty of mutual non dubito the question: if you too stand this way, and recognize me this way too, what is that?
Keywords: beauty of non dubito, standing, leaving, one-way, forgetting the self, one's own law, others too are ends, completive beauty, generative beauty, overlap, 15DD
1. I Wouldn't Play It This Way Here
A student is playing a piece in a lesson. In the middle section there is a place where, last time, the teacher told him to slow down; he does not slow down, but pushes through in one breath.
The teacher listens to the end, is quiet for a moment, and says: I wouldn't play it this way here. And he says why: this phrase looks back; push through it, and what was saved up before scatters.
The student thinks about it and asks: so do I change it?
The teacher says: if it sounds right to you, don't change it.
At the next lesson the student still plays it that way. The teacher listens, opens his mouth, and says nothing more. He goes through the fingering of that place with the student, so that the push through in one breath is steadier.
What can be seen is one thing. The teacher stands: the student did not play it the teacher's way, and the teacher does not take back what he said; "I wouldn't play it this way" does not need the student's nod. His own share he has given in full: what he heard, and his reasons, he has said. The student's share he leaves to the student: whether to change is the student's, and he did not nod on the student's behalf. The student did not slow down as he was taught; the teacher did not make this a condition, did not wait for the student first to follow him, first to take him seriously, before recognizing that the student's way of playing is the student's. Those who see this point include the student, the teacher himself, and could include whoever is waiting outside the door for the next lesson.
That point is what this paper is about.
This paper follows the reading set out in the general outline.[^1] A personal aesthetic is each person's own and comes from his own cannot-not; aesthetics is the part that subjects with judgment cannot not acknowledge together, here called the overlap. The overlap is large; what does not overlap is larger. The overlap is not everyone being obliged to agree: whoever looks cannot not see, and whoever has seen cannot not acknowledge. When someone says "it is beautiful," he is claiming that this time he has landed on the overlap, and that claim can be right or wrong. What settles out of an act of drawing a boundary is called a construct; what it cannot contain is called the remainder. The remainder gives a place where one can go on, and a direction; it pushes no one; whether to go depends on a person's own cannot-not.[^2] A beauty has two faces: when the construct has come into place, it is completive beauty, quiet; when the construct is being chiseled out, it is generative beauty, tense. The beauty of non dubito has both faces. Non dubito here is, inwardly, not needing you to tell him he is right, which does not mean having no doubts; outwardly, it is not doubting that you too are an end, without waiting for you to recognize him first. A ray is a direction of judgment, not a classification of objects: the same person can also be looked at from the direction of the self, or from the direction of purpose. This paper asks about one thing only: how a person stands on his own law, and leaves your share to you; and what the power of judgment sees in this question.
2. What Non Dubito Is and Is Not
What SAE: The First Critique wrote at this station is: it is not only I who am an end; this is one-way recognition. It also recorded that, on the side of doing, this station goes by the name of forgetting the self.[^3] This paper keeps these ways of putting it.
This level can be said in one sentence: I do not need your confirmation, and I do not confirm on your behalf. The first half this paper calls standing; the second half, leaving.
This level has only one construct: a line, with his share on one side and your share on the other. Standing is his side holding up without depending on your nod; leaving is your side kept open for you, which he does not fill in for you. There is only one line; once it is drawn, both sides are there together, so standing and leaving are not two things. Standing only, without seeing that there is still you on the other side of the line, is self-affirmation; leaving only, with nothing at all on one's own side, is mere politeness: neither has drawn this line. When the line has been drawn, standing and leaving no longer contend; while it is still being drawn, and his judgment still reaches over into your side, the two are still contending.
First, the inward half. In "not needing your confirmation," "confirmation" can mean three things. One: only when you have nodded can I judge: this sense this paper does not want. Two: you come to check my reasons, on what grounds I judge so: this sense this paper does not take away. Whether the student nods is not a precondition of the teacher's judgment; he said why, and if the student asks again, he does not shut the question with "this is my judgment." He can also say it once and say no more; that is not dogmatism; dogmatism is not letting anyone ask. Three: my becoming someone who can judge depends on you: this sense, too, this paper does not deny. In a person's learning to judge there are teachers, friends, books read, the times when someone took him seriously. "Not needing your confirmation" takes only the first sense: for this one judgment, your agreement is not its precondition.
Nor is the inward non dubito having no doubts. He can still be wrong. At the next lesson, if he himself hears that the student's way is right, he will take back his word, with no one having to persuade him. Keeping to one's own law is not keeping to every old conclusion. What he does not doubt is this: this judgment is his; whether to change it depends on what he himself sees, not on whether you nod. This is standing: if you do not nod, his judgment still stands; if you ask on what grounds, he can say, and he does not forbid your questioning.
Now the outward half. The outward non dubito is not doubting that you too are an end. He does not first require you to recognize him as an end too before he recognizes you; whether you recognize him is not the condition of his recognizing you. The "recognizing" here is recognizing as an end, not recognizing that he is right; whether he is right is your share to judge. The "one-way" of the First Critique means this. One-way does not mean that you can only be passive: the student can choose not to listen, can argue back, can walk away; it means only that what is looked at here is one person's side. Two people recognizing each other is another matter.
So the non dubito of the two halves is one thing: not waiting for you. Inwardly, not waiting for your nod; outwardly, not waiting for you to recognize him first. Neither half means having no doubt in one's mind: he may still be wrong about how that phrase should be played, and may still be wrong about you.
Recognizing you as an end too, brought down to one matter, is that your share he does not fill in for you: whether to listen, how to judge, whether to change, is yours. This is leaving. What is left is not words: his own share he can say in full; what is left is your share. In your share there is also your own cannot-not: the student plays it that way again next time, not out of pique, but because, as he hears it, that place has to be pushed through. Leaving it to you is not the same as leaving you alone. The teacher helps the student sort out the fingering so that the push through is steadier: what he helps is the student's way of playing, not his own. He can point things out to you; the one who sees has to be you.
At the phrase "others too are ends," readers will think of Kant. He says: act so that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.[^4] This paper borrows the phrase from here; "legislating for oneself" he says elsewhere too, as a note of his quoted in Section 4 shows. But what he states is a command, and this paper does not say ought; his ground is written as reason, while what this paper writes is how a person's having recognized it looks when seen.
So the beauty of non dubito is not a kind of self-confidence, nor mere politeness: the former has only this side of the line and does not see your share; the latter has only that side, and says not a word of its own share. Nor is it an ethical doctrine: this paper does not prove why others are ends, but writes only how a person who has recognized it looks when seen.
3. The Beauty of Non Dubito
Once a subject has seen a person stand on his own law and leave your share to you, he cannot not acknowledge:
A person stands on his own law: if you do not nod, he still stands; if you ask on what grounds, he can say, and he does not forbid your questioning. Your share, he leaves to you: whether to listen, whether to change, is yours. He recognizes you as an end too, without waiting for you to recognize him first.
That sentence is the beauty of non dubito. "Standing" and "leaving" are this paper's two words, already explained. "If you do not nod, he still stands" is the inward non dubito; "without waiting for you to recognize him first" is the outward non dubito, the one-way half. "He does not forbid your questioning" speaks of standing: your agreement is not a precondition of his judgment, and your questioning he does not block either.
The seeing at this level is first in the one who stands. When the teacher had said that sentence, there were two things in his mind: he wanted the student to play it his way; he also knew that it was the student who was playing. At that moment he did not look at these two; he was listening to the next few bars the student played. If he stops, and does not use this moment to get the better of the student, nor to play the enlightened teacher, he cannot not see: "I wouldn't play it this way" is his, and does not need the student's nod; how the student plays is the student's, and he need not nod on the student's behalf. Having seen, he cannot not acknowledge.
The one to whom it is left sees it closest. The student sees that the teacher did not take back what he said, nor force him to change. From this moment he learns two things: the teacher's judgment is the teacher's; his own is his too. What is seen is itself looking too: the student watches the teacher, and the teacher watches how the student takes up this share. Someone waiting outside the door for the next lesson, hearing these two sentences through the door, sees the same point.
Why is it overlap and not preference? Where people stand differs, and so does what they leave to others: some say a lot, some little; some say their piece and go, some wait for your reply. The overlap is in two places. One: those who stop, each in his own standing and leaving, can see the same point: if you do not nod, he still stands; your share, he has not filled in for you. The other is closer: several people facing the same person and the same standing and leaving see the same point; the student saw it, and so did the person outside the door. This does not depend on whether his judgment is right, nor on whether the student later changed.
Take away goodness and see. Someone will say that this is just a virtue: modesty, respect. Kant says that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; and he says that only in this respect does the beautiful carry a claim to the assent of everyone else, a relation that everyone also expects of others as a duty.[^5] This paper meets him here: at this level, beauty and morality come closest. It parts from him here: he rests the beautiful's claim on others upon morality, upon duty; this paper's acknowledgment rests on seeing, and does not say ought. Take away goodness, and the point is still there. A bad-tempered old music teacher, rude to everyone, who never says "that makes a lot of sense"; yet once, when a student played a place differently from him, he said why, and let it go. Modesty and respect he had none of, and the point is still there. Conversely, someone can be impeccably respectful: listens to everyone's opinion, notes it all down, says "that makes a lot of sense" to each; yet in himself he never stood anywhere, and never saw who you are; the respect is right, but the point is not there. Knowing that it is right and seeing that it is beautiful are not the same. Beauty is not correctness.
Take away the outcome too, and see. The student later played it that way in a competition, and lost. The teacher's moment back then can still be seen. Someone who forces others to do things his way may get very good results, and yet the point was never there. Beauty is not usefulness.
This seeing is also a different thing from pleasure or displeasure. The one to whom it is left is not necessarily pleased: the student would perhaps rather the teacher had simply told him how to play, and spared him the judging. The one who stands is not necessarily pleased either: having said that sentence and watching the student play it that way as before, he is uncomfortable. The ground of acknowledgment lies in the point that is seen, not in feeling.
Understanding is not seeing either. A scholar of recognition has written about how people grow up in one another's recognition, and can explain every step. One day a student hands in a thesis whose conclusion he does not agree with. He writes his comments, sets out his reasons in full, signs it, and lets it pass. Having signed, he sits for a while: what he has just done, he never wrote about in his books. Not a word in the books has changed; only, this time he is watching it in his own hands.
Seeing can also go wrong. One can take coldness for leaving, stubbornness for standing; one can also take one's own letting go for respect, when it is only not caring. The person outside the door thought he saw an enlightened teacher; perhaps the teacher was only tired that day. To say "it is beautiful" is to claim that this time one really has seen, and the claim can be wrong.
There is one more point at this level; the name the First Critique recorded at this station is forgetting the self. Not waiting for your nod, nor for you to recognize him first, he has no need to look back at himself: whether what he just said was well said, whether the student defers to him. What can be seen is the next lesson: he did not say that sentence again, but went through the fingering of that place for the student, so that the student's push through was steadier; his eyes were on the student's way of playing, not his own. Standing and forgetting the self look as if they cancel each other: one seems to be holding on to oneself, the other is forgetting oneself. Here they are one point: only because standing does not depend on your nod, and leaving does not wait for you to recognize him, are his eyes free. Someone who always needs people to nod, and needs others to recognize him first, has eyes that keep falling back on himself.
Completive beauty: standing and leaving no longer contend. Many years later, the same teacher; another student plays a place differently from him. He says: I wouldn't play it this way here, and says why; having said it, he lets it go and listens on. He does not need to hold himself back, nor to wonder whether to say it again. His judgment stands there; the student's share stays with the student; between the two there is nothing he has to press down. Completive beauty is quiet: he stands, your share is with you, and his eyes are on you.
Generative beauty: the two are still contending. At the next lesson, the student still plays it that way; the teacher opens his mouth and says nothing more. He wants to say it again; he also knows that the reasons have been given in full, and that saying it again would no longer be giving reasons, but wanting the student's nod. Standing and leaving are still contending: he may hold back, or he may not. The tension is here. When a person, for the first time, over something he cares about a great deal, watches another do it in a way he does not agree with, that too is the two contending. The completive face is standing and leaving having come together in one place; the generative face is the two still pulling at each other, not yet closed.
4. Kant's Three Maxims
In §40 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant speaks of common sense. He says that common sense must be understood as the idea of a communal sense, a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) in thought of everyone else's way of representing, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to the whole of human reason, and thereby avoid the illusion of bringing into the judgment subjective private conditions that could easily be taken for objective.[^6] How is this done? By holding one's judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting oneself in the position of everyone else.[^7]
He then writes three maxims. "The following maxims of common human understanding do not belong here, as parts of the critique of taste, but can nevertheless serve to elucidate its principles: 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself." The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded, the third of the consistent.[^8] He goes on to say that the first is the maxim of a reason that is never passive; its opposite is the need to be led by others. In a note he also says that enlightenment is easy in principle but hard to carry out: not to be passive with one's reason, but always to be self-legislating, is in itself very easy for someone who wants only to be adequate to his essential end; the difficulty is that people always want to know more, and there is never a lack of others who promise with great confidence to satisfy this desire.[^9] He also says that the third is the hardest to reach, and can be reached only by combining the first two and observing them often until they have become second nature.[^10]
He wrote these things to explain by what right a judgment of taste can demand others' agreement. This paper does not match the three maxims one by one to its own words; he himself says that they do not belong here and can only serve to elucidate. Only one point: the opposite of the first maxim is the need to be led by others, and this sits closest to the inward non dubito.
He presses on this paper at the second maxim. Thinking in the position of everyone else means letting others' standpoints come in to test my judgment; if "not needing your confirmation" does not let even your standpoint in, it becomes narrow-mindedness. This paper's answer: agreed. Standing is not failing to listen: the student's way of playing came into the teacher's judgment; if he heard that it was right, he would take back his word, and in Section 8 he does. What is not needed is your actual nod, not your standpoint.
This paper meets him in three places. One is his half-sentence: not so much the actual as the merely possible judgments. The one who stands does not wait for your actual nod, but lets how you might hear it come into his judgment. One is that note: the difficulty lies not in legislating for oneself, but in there always being someone who promises with great confidence to tell you; not needing you to tell him he is right is hard for the same reason. One is that the third maxim can be reached only through frequent observance that has become second nature: saying it and letting it go is also practiced over many years; this is the completive face.
It parts from him in three places. First, what he holds a judgment up to is the possible judgment of everyone else, which is universal; this paper speaks only of this one you, this one time. What the teacher listened to was this one student this one time, not how everyone might hear it. Second, what he writes are maxims of thinking, for people to think by; this paper speaks of how a stance looks when seen, and does not say ought. Third, all three of his maxims are within one person's thinking; the outward side of this paper falls on another person: your share is yours.
5. What Can Pass for It
The method is still the same: take it away and see. The counterfeits at this level are several: some pass for standing, some for leaving, some have only one side of the line; the last borrows its name to make demands of people.
Dogmatism. Not listening to reasons, taking non dubito to mean not letting anyone ask. Take away the "not letting anyone ask" and see: let people ask; does he still stand? One who stands can take in objections and can give reasons; the dogmatist gets angry as soon as he is questioned; he stands because he lets no one touch him.
Rebellion. Everyone says it is good, and he insists it is not. Take away the crowd and see: when no one says it is good, does he still say it is not? He has in fact been waiting for others' confirmation all along, only waiting in reverse.
Self-affirmation. Not caring what others say, and not looking at others either. Take away others' praise and blame and see: he still stands; this test does not separate him out. Try another: change the matter to your own matter, your piece, your road; does he see that it is yours? He still brings his own share to judge it. In his eyes there is only his share. Standing only, without leaving.
Looking on. Each has his own view; he does not concern himself. Take away the phrase "each has his own view" and see: what is underneath? That he does not care. What he leaves to you is what he does not care about. The one who leaves first gives his own share in full, says what he saw, and only then leaves your share open; the onlooker says not a word, and your share is not something he left open, but something he did not want.
The village worthy and accommodation. Offending no one, finding all well whatever you say. Mencius described such a person: if you want to find fault with him, you can find nothing to point to; if you want to blame him, there is nothing to blame; he goes along with the common ways and fits in with a sullied age; he seems loyal, trustworthy, honest and clean; everyone likes him, and he thinks himself right.[^11] Take away the "all is well" and see: where is his own share? What he takes to be right is having everyone in the world of his day speak well of him; his share turns out to be the crowd's nod, and apart from the nod there is nothing for him to stand on. This is exactly the opposite of the inward non dubito. Accommodation is its close kin, yet not the same: the accommodating person has a judgment of his own, but keeps it to himself for the sake of peace. Take away the peace and see: his share is still there, only not given. Both look like leaving: one has nothing to leave, the other has not given his own share in full.
Revering or despising by one's own measure. This one's standing is real, but he turns round and measures others with his own ruler: those who fit his measure he reveres; those who do not, he despises. The teacher measured how that phrase should be played, not the student as a person; this one measures persons. Try another test: the same words, from someone he reveres and from someone he despises; can he hear that they are the same? He cannot. He sees you only through his ruler; your share has not been left to you; he has already judged it for you.
Demanding endless endurance in the name of beauty. Someone will say: this is what is beautiful; since you recognize others as ends too, you should put up with everything. Leaving to you is not submitting to whatever harm you do. Refusing, walking away, protecting oneself can all go together with recognizing you as an end too. Take away the "putting up with" and see: someone who walks away can still recognize you as an end too; someone who puts up with everything has not necessarily seen you, and may only not dare to stand.
Neighboring rays. The beauty of the self looks at how judgment comes to have an owner; here the owner is already there, and the question is how he treats you. The beauty of purpose looks at how a person's direction came and was taken up; here what is looked at is that his direction does not decide yours for you. The beauty of mutual non dubito looks at two people recognizing each other; here only one person's side is looked at. This paper looks only at how a person stands, and leaves to you.
One last sentence, which this aesthetics says of every ray: beauty is not correctness, not usefulness, not importance, not understanding. Now that feeling has come in, one more must be added: beauty is not pleasure, and pleasure is not beauty. On this ray, correctness and pleasure matter most: respecting rightly is not the beauty here; nor is the comfort of being respected.
6. What Is Left to Each Person
How to stand, and where, is each person's own. Some say a lot, some little; some say their piece and go, some wait for your reply; some hardly speak all their lives, and when they speak once, they stand for a long time. This paper does not say which way of standing is good.
Recognizing you as an end too, brought down to a concrete matter, how much to leave, how to leave it, when to speak and when not, is also each person's own judgment. The same student may be left different things by this teacher and by that one, and both may be leaving.
A person's being able to stand has a history: his teachers, the books he has read, the times when someone took him seriously. Having a history is not the same as being colonized; it may also be cultivation. Cultivation is helping a person grow his own eyes; colonization is a ruler that is not his own taking the place of his own law. "Not needing your confirmation" speaks of this one judgment, not of his never having needed anyone.
There is one more thing to make clear. This set of papers has been speaking this way all along: whoever has seen cannot not acknowledge; this is not merely the author's preference; it does not legislate for the reader's personal aesthetic. This paper takes this speaking stance itself and looks at it. Whether this set of papers manages it, this paper does not confirm on the reader's behalf.
To say "he stands more firmly now than he did then, and is better able to leave" is a judgment of beauty, and it can be discussed: is the standing steadier, is what is left cleaner? Discussion may find that each has a shape of its own, and then each keeps its own.
Aesthetics says only this: whoever has seen cannot not acknowledge that it is beautiful; aesthetics decides for no one how to stand, or how much to leave and how to leave it, nor does it require anyone to recognize others as ends too.
7. Where the Question Comes From
How a person stands before the crowd and before authority, and, having stood, how he keeps from imposing his own conviction on others: this question was looked at very early, mostly not under the name of beauty, and often for the sake of something else: for argument, for courage, for answering a student's question, for free wandering, for liberation, for practice, for learning, for freedom, for politics. The sources run in several directions: not taking the majority as the court; first examining oneself, then looking at whether the others are many or few; what you do not want for yourself, do not impose on others; not being moved by praise and blame; neither welcoming nor resisting, self and other equal. Later, someone said that to study the self is to forget the self; someone said that the standard is in one's own mind, and even Confucius's words must pass it; someone said that self-consciousness exists only in being recognized; someone said that to be a man one must be a nonconformist; someone said that custom is a despotism, and that improvement too can be imposed; someone said that the sovereign individual can promise, and also looks at others by his own measure. Today, someone bears witness with his own body, not using violence to decide for his opponent; someone says that the individual is not complete before the between of persons; someone says that judgment has to let the imagination go visiting; someone says that the face of the other comes before my freedom; someone says that the self can suddenly fall away; and someone says that people grow up in recognition. Kant's three places are already in Sections 2, 3 and 4. What follows runs in this order. For each figure, the paper reports faithfully what he discerned, why he looked, where he presses on this paper, and where this paper parts from him; other traditions appear in their own words.
Not taking the majority as the court. Socrates is in prison; Crito comes to urge him to escape. He says: not now for the first time, but always, I am the kind of man who, of all that is mine, listens to nothing but the argument that seems best to me when I reason.[^12] He asks: does a man in training pay attention to the praise, blame and opinion of every man, or only of that one man, the doctor or the trainer? About justice and injustice too, one should follow the opinion of that one man, if there is one who knows, and not that of the many. So, my good friend, we need not in the least care so much about what the many will say of us, but about what the one who knows about justice and injustice, that one man, and the truth itself will say.[^13] He also asks Crito: let us examine it together; if you can refute me at any point, refute me, and I will listen to you; I think it important to persuade you first before doing this, and not to do it against your will.[^14] He looked in order to make clear whether escaping would be just. He discerned that neither the majority nor death is the court of judgment; what is to be listened to is an argument that stands up to scrutiny. He presses on this paper: independence answers to reasons; if "not needing your confirmation" blocks even your questions, it cannot stand; and he thinks it important to persuade his friend first. This paper's answer: agreed: standing has to hold up under questioning; if you ask on what grounds, he can say, and he does not forbid your questioning; caring whether you agree and taking your agreement as a precondition of judgment are two different things. He also discerned that between those who hold different views on this matter there is no common counsel; seeing each other's views, they necessarily despise one another;[^15] that is exactly the dogmatism this paper has taken apart, and the despising by one's own measure. It parts from him here: he hands the measure over to the one who knows, if there is such a one, and to the truth itself; this paper sets up no one who knows; acknowledgment falls on each person who has seen.
First examining oneself. Zengzi said to his disciple Zixiang: "Do you love courage? I once heard about great courage from the Master: if, examining myself, I find I am not upright, then even before a common man in coarse loose clothes, would I not tremble? If, examining myself, I find I am upright, then though there be thousands and tens of thousands, I go forward."[^16] He said that this was the great courage he had heard of from Confucius; Mencius quotes the passage in discussing the unmoved mind. The word rendered "upright," suo, Zhao Qi glosses as "righteous," Zhu Xi as "straight." He spoke about courage. What he discerned is an order: first examine oneself, then look at whether the others are many or few. He presses on this paper: before "not needing your confirmation," is there this self-examination? This paper's answer: there is. The one who stands does not fail to look at himself; what he looks at is the reasons, not whether you nod; the teacher listened to the end and thought it over before saying that sentence. It parts from him here: he speaks of courage, of "I go forward"; this paper speaks of the beauty of a stance when seen, which, having stood, also leaves.
Shu. Zigong asked: is there a single saying that one can practice all one's life? Confucius said: "Perhaps shu! What you do not want for yourself, do not impose on others."[^17] He said it to answer Zigong's question about a saying to practice all one's life. He discerned that not imposing on others, unaltered, what one does not want for oneself draws a line between person and person. He presses on this paper: if leaving to you is only keeping this line, not imposing on you what one does not want oneself, is that not enough? This paper's answer: it is not enough, and it is not the same. Shu extends outward from one's own likes and dislikes, and the ruler is still one's own; this paper's leaving does not measure you with one's own ruler: what one does want oneself need not be imposed on you either. The teacher himself liked playing it slowly, and did not impose that on the student. It parts from him here; it meets him here: not imposing one's own on another unaltered.
Not moved by praise and blame. "Free and Easy Wandering" in the Zhuangzi writes of Song Rongzi: "The whole world might praise him and he would not be spurred on; the whole world might condemn him and he would not be dismayed. He was settled in the division between inner and outer, clear on the boundary of honor and disgrace, and that was all. He did not fuss over the world. Even so, there was still something he had not planted." Under "there was still something he had not planted," Guo Xiang comments: "He could only affirm himself, and could not yet be one to whom nothing is unacceptable."[^18] The chapter was written for free wandering, for depending on nothing. It discerned a person who stands without relying on praise and blame, and said on the spot that this is not yet enough. It presses on this paper: "not needing your confirmation" may be only self-affirmation, or only another kind of dependence. This paper's answer: agreed that there is a counterfeit here; the "self-affirmation" of Section 5 borrows exactly these two characters of Guo Xiang's, and takes only half of their sense: only standing, without seeing your share. Another kind of dependence, this paper also admits: standing depends on seeing, and seeing can be wrong. This paper does not seek to depend on nothing. It parts from it here: Zhuangzi does not depend even on this self that stands; this paper keeps the self-legislating subject, and does not say that non dubito is the highest level; the rays are directions, not a ladder.
Neither welcoming nor resisting; self and other equal. Early Buddhist discourses say: gain and loss, fame and disrepute, blame and praise, pleasure and pain: these eight worldly conditions revolve around the world, and the world revolves around them. The unlearned ordinary person's mind is taken over by these eight; he welcomes praise and resists blame; the learned noble disciple knows them as they are, impermanent, suffering, liable to change, and neither welcomes praise nor resists blame (nānurujjhati, nappaṭivirujjhati).[^19] Later, Śāntideva says in the Bodhicaryāvatāra: first one should earnestly cultivate the equality of other and self: all who are alike in pleasure and pain are to be protected by me as I protect myself; whoever wishes quickly to rescue himself and others should practice the supreme secret: the exchange of other and self (parātmaparivartanam).[^20] They spoke for liberation and for the mind of awakening, and do not call this beauty. They discerned that not being moved by praise and blame can come from loosening clinging; other and self can be held without ranking one above the other. They press on this paper: shaking off others' confirmation is not the same as legislating for oneself; does this paper, keeping a self-legislating subject, still cling to a self? This paper's answer: agreed; neither welcoming nor resisting is not yet standing; the one who stands also has to be able to say what he saw, and to give reasons. This paper's standing stands on this one judgment, not on a self to be held on to; having stood, one's eyes instead turn away from oneself; this is the side of forgetting the self. It parts from them here: they looked for the sake of liberation, and this paper does not take liberation as the beauty here; the exchange of other and self also goes further than this paper's leaving: this paper does not exchange oneself for you, but only leaves your share to you.
Forgetting the self. In the thirteenth century, Dōgen said: to study the buddha way is to study the self; to study the self is to forget the self; to forget the self is to be verified by the myriad dharmas; to be verified by the myriad dharmas is to let the body and mind of the self and the body and mind of others drop away.[^21] He said it for practice. He discerned that studying the self, followed to the end, is forgetting the self; and what drops away is not only one's own body and mind, but also the body and mind of others. He presses on this paper: the deepest non dubito may be not even raising the question "have I stood?" This paper's answer: the completive face is close to this: say it and let it go, and listen on. It parts from him here: he wants body and mind to drop away; this paper keeps the subject who stands, and also keeps your share.
One's own standard. In a letter answering Luo Qinshun, Wang Yangming says: "Learning values getting it in the mind. If I seek it in my mind and find it wrong, then even if the words come from Confucius, I dare not take them as right, still less those of people who do not reach Confucius. If I seek it in my mind and find it right, then even if the words come from ordinary people, I dare not take them as wrong, still less if they come from Confucius."[^22] He also said to Chen Jiuchuan: "That bit of innate knowing of yours is your own standard. Wherever your thoughts land, it knows right as right and wrong as wrong; you cannot hide the least thing from it."[^23] In the letter he was defending the old text of the Great Learning; to Chen Jiuchuan he was speaking of extending innate knowing. He discerned that the standard is in the mind, and even Confucius's words must pass it; conversely, what ordinary people say, if the mind accepts it, he dares not take as wrong, not dismissing words because of the person. He presses on this paper: how is coming from oneself told apart from indulging oneself? His answer is that innate knowing cannot be deceived. This paper's answer: this paper does not say there is something that cannot be deceived; the way to tell is still to take it away and see: take away your nod and the crowd's praise and blame, and the one whose judgment comes from himself still holds to it; when he himself sees otherwise, he can change it. Someone indulging himself does not need your nod either, but when he himself sees otherwise, he cannot change it. It parts from him here: innate knowing is originally in everyone, one and the same standard; this paper does not presuppose that everyone originally has the same ruler; the overlap comes only with seeing.
Existing only in being recognized. Hegel says: "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being recognized."[^24] He looked in order to write how self-consciousness moves toward spirit; what follows is the section on lord and bondsman. He discerned that the free subject does not first grow up and then deal with others; it becomes itself in recognition. He presses on this paper: if "not needing your confirmation" is read as subjectivity having nothing to do with recognition, it is an abstract individual. This paper's answer: agreed; Section 2 has already kept the third sense of "confirmation": in a person's growing into someone who can judge, there are others; this paper says only that this one judgment does not take your agreement as its precondition. He also presses on "one-way": in the section on lord and bondsman, recognition is one-sided and unequal, and so it comes to nothing. This paper's answer: there, the one who recognizes one-way is the side that submits; here, the one who recognizes one-way is the side that stands, and he does not want you to submit. It parts from him here: what he wants is mutual recognition, for recognition to succeed; this paper looks only at one person's side.
Self-reliance. In "Self-Reliance," Emerson says: "Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist." He records a conversation with an adviser when he was young: I said, what have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly from within? My friend suggested: but these impulses may be from below, not from above. I replied: they do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil's child, I will live then from the Devil. He goes on: no law can be sacred to me but that of my nature.[^25] He wrote against society and tradition nailing a person to what he has been. He discerned that others' approval can nail a person in place. He himself set out the danger: on what grounds are the impulses within not from below? That is where he presses on this paper. This paper's answer: this paper's standing does not rest on impulse but on seeing; seeing can be wrong, so the one who stands can give reasons, and listens to objections. "If I am the Devil's child, I will live then from the Devil," read literally, no longer asks where the impulse comes from; that is already dogmatism. It parts from him here: your share, he wrote of too: if you are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to your companions; I will seek my own. But he also said: all persons have their moments of reason, and then they will justify me, and do the same thing.[^26] What he leaves to you is each going his own way; and he is still waiting for you finally to recognize him. This paper's standing does not wait for the day you recognize him.
The despotism of custom. Mill says: "The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement." The next sentence begins: the spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people.[^27] In the previous chapter he says: we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.[^28] He wrote for human development and happiness. He discerned that individuality can grow only through a person's using his own faculties himself; and that improvement, too, can be imposed. He presses on this paper: not needing approval can be right; not needing dissent is dangerous. This paper's answer: agreed; the one who stands has to be able to hear objections, and he does not impose his own improvements on you either. It parts from him here: his reasons are human development and happiness; this paper says that beauty is not usefulness.
The sovereign individual. Nietzsche says that the ripest fruit on the tree of the morality of custom is the sovereign individual: like only to himself, liberated again from the morality of custom, autonomous and supra-moral (for "autonomous" and "moral in the sense of custom" are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, long will and who has the right to make promises. He also says that this "free" man, the possessor of a long, unbreakable will, has in this possession his measure of value as well: looking out at others from himself, he reveres or he despises.[^29] He wrote to inquire into the origins of conscience and responsibility; readers disagree on whether this figure is his positive ideal. He discerned that what makes a person hold up is having the right to promise, being able to vouch for his future self with today's will. He presses on this paper: this paper's standing stands only on one judgment; is that not too light? This paper's answer: this paper does not want it so heavy; standing is this one judgment holding up, not a person from then on vouching for everything by himself. It parts from him here: he reveres or despises others starting from himself, with his own measure; this paper calls this a counterfeit, as Section 5 wrote.
Soul-force. On September 11, 1906, the Old Empire Theatre in Johannesburg was packed; the Indians of South Africa were deliberating how to meet a registration ordinance they considered an insult, and someone proposed taking an oath before God not to obey it.[^30] Gandhi later said that the movement was at first called passive resistance; later he stopped using that phrase and used Satyagraha, the force born of truth and love, that is, of non-violence.[^31] In Hind Swaraj he says: passive resistance is a method of securing rights by personal suffering; it is the reverse of resistance by arms. When I refuse to do a thing that is repugnant to my conscience, I use soul-force.[^32] He spoke for a movement to secure rights. He discerned that one can act on the truth as one has judged it, bearing punishment and suffering oneself, not using violence to turn one's own judgment into the opponent's obedience. He presses on this paper: not confirming on your behalf is not looking on with folded arms; a person can bear witness with his own body. This paper's answer: agreed; looking on was already taken apart in Section 5; the one who stands can stand very far forward, only he does not make your body pay for his judgment. It parts from him here: truth is not a law of his making; what he did was for a movement; this paper speaks of the beauty of one person's stance when seen.
Ningen. Watsuji Tetsurō wrote his ethics starting from the word ningen (human being, written with the characters for "person" and "between"): people are not first each complete, one by one, and then come together. He says that an individual that contains no sense of negation and is essentially self-sufficient is only imagined; the individual, precisely because it is the negation of the whole, is at bottom also that whole.[^33] He wrote to find, for ethics, a starting point between person and person. He discerned that the individual is not something already complete before relations. He presses on this paper: this paper cuts inward and outward too neatly; the "inward" may itself be made between person and person. This paper's answer: "inward" speaks of where the law is legislated, not of where a person comes from; as for where a person comes from, this paper agrees that there are others in it. It parts from him here: he looks at ethics starting from between person and person; this paper looks at beauty starting from one person's standing and leaving.
Visiting. Arendt says that the power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others; the thinking active in judging, even when I am quite alone in making up my mind, is always and primarily in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement.[^34] In her lectures on Kant she also says that to think with an enlarged mentality means training one's imagination to go visiting.[^35] She looked for the sake of political judgment. She discerned that visiting is not substituting; the judgment is still mine; only the standpoints of those not present are allowed to appear. She presses on this paper: "not needing your confirmation" can only mean not needing your actual vote; it cannot mean not needing your standpoint to come in. This paper's answer: agreed; Section 4 has already answered Kant in this way. It parts from her here: her judgment aims at an agreement that must finally be reached; this paper's overlap is not won; it is what those who have seen each come upon.
The face of the other. Levinas says that the face of the other speaks to me; the primordial discourse the face opens, its first word, is obligation, and that first word says: you shall not commit murder.[^36] He wrote to put ethics before everything. He discerned that the other comes before my freedom; facing you, my freedom is called into question, and responsibility comes before all my projects. He presses on this paper hardest, in two places. One is order: this paper's sentence says standing first and recognizing you after, which is the wrong way round. This paper's answer: that is the order of saying, not of before and after; standing and leaving are the two sides of one line, drawn together. Recognizing you as an end too is not something I grant you; it is my seeing that you already are one; one-way, in the first place, does not wait for you to recognize me first; here this paper meets him. The other is symmetry: in this paper's leaving, you have one share and the one who stands has one; but to the concrete you, the shares are not halves; I always owe a little more, and symmetry trims this little away. This point this paper cannot fully answer; it is written into Section 9. It parts from him here: this paper says that this stance is beautiful when seen, not that ethics begins here.
The kestrel. Murdoch wrote of a small incident: anxious and resentful, looking out of the window, oblivious of her surroundings, perhaps brooding on some damage done to her prestige; suddenly she sees a hovering kestrel, and in a moment everything is altered: the brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared, and there is nothing now but kestrel.[^37] She says that beauty is an occasion for unselfing. She looked for the sake of how a person becomes morally better. She discerned that the self can suddenly fall away, and the eyes come to rest on something else. She presses on this paper: can a self that has fallen away still stand? This paper's answer: standing is not holding on to the self; the eyes' turning away from oneself is precisely what is freed up only once one has stood. It parts from her here: she looks at a bird; this paper's forgetting the self is the eyes resting on a person who is also looking.
Three kinds of recognition. Honneth says that three practical relations to oneself, self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Selbstvertrauen, Selbstachtung, Selbstschätzung), grow, respectively, in three kinds of recognition, love, rights and solidarity; disrespect injures a person's relation to himself.[^38] He wrote to explain the moral claims behind social conflict. He discerned that a person who can judge for himself grows up in recognition. He presses on this paper: if standing is said never to need recognition, it is wrong. This paper's answer: agreed, and this paper does not say that; standing speaks of this one judgment. It parts from him here: he asks how a society lets people grow; this paper speaks of how one person looks, in one matter, when seen.
8. The Question Left Open
That student later taught music too. One year he went back to see his old teacher and played that piece; that place he still pushed through in one breath. The teacher listened to the end, was quiet for a moment, and said: played that way, it may be right. This time it was the teacher himself who heard it.
The teacher recognized the student as an end too, without waiting for the student to recognize him first. But on this day the student was standing too, and recognized him too: the student did not stay away because the teacher had disagreed back then, nor did he come back only to make the teacher concede. Both have stood, and each has left the other's share to the other: what is that? One person's side can be seen at this level; what is between two people, this level cannot contain.
The world does not push anyone to ask this. A person can stand and leave all his life without asking whether the other treats him the same way; if he cannot not ask, that is another ray. This ray stops here.
The question left open is: I recognize you without waiting for you to recognize me; if you too stand this way, and recognize me this way too, what is that? That is the beauty of mutual non dubito.
9. What Would Make This Paper Wrong
If any one of six things held, this paper would be wrong. First, standing cannot be told apart from dogmatism, nor leaving from looking on, in any instance: take away the "not letting anyone ask," take away the "each has his own view," and what is seen is not the least bit different. Second, standing and leaving are shown to be two things: when someone who only stands and someone who only leaves are seen, what the looker acknowledges is still the same point; then the one construct this paper speaks of would have to be split into two. Third, "he recognizes you as an end too" is shown to be invisible, only inferred: what is seen is only a person not forcing others, and the rest is all inference; then the outward non dubito this paper speaks of falls through. Fourth, seeing this point is shown to be seeing his virtue: take away goodness, and no one sees the point any longer. Kant's saying that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good is the most direct pressure on this item. Fifth, I always owe the concrete you a little more; if this little is exactly what matters most, then a one-way, symmetrical leaving trims it away; then what this paper calls recognizing you as an end too is only half of it. Levinas is the pressure on this item. Sixth, there is shown to be no subject prior to recognition, to the point that even "this one judgment" cannot be picked out: every standing is only an echo of recognition. Hegel, Honneth and Watsuji Tetsurō are the pressure on this item. This paper does not think any of these will happen, but it writes them here, and leaves them to those who look to test.
Acknowledgments
This paper is the twelfth ray paper in the aesthetics branch of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system and is published under the sole name of Han Qin. The author made the final decision on all philosophical arguments and choices, and alone is responsible for the final text.
Both drafting assistance and review were carried out with large language models. Drafting and internal precision audit were done by Claude (Anthropic); the structural gate and pre-publication sign-off were handled by ChatGPT (OpenAI). The material on the history of ideas used in Section 7, "Where the Question Comes From," was first gathered by ChatGPT's deep research, and its sources were then checked item by item. This paper, together with the second edition of the general outline and the other twelve ray papers, passed final review by both the internal precision audit and the structural gate, and passed a key-sentence acceptance check. The author thanks these systems and the research and engineering teams behind them. The author ruled on their comments one by one, and both acceptances and rejections are on record; the record of revisions and withdrawals across rounds is not reproduced here.
Notes
[^1]: Han Qin, SAE Judgment and Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (2026), §5.1, "How to Read the Rays," DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19296710.
[^2]: Han Qin, SAE: The First Critique (2026), DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21439120.
[^3]: Han Qin, SAE: The First Critique, chap. 5, §3, "The Road's Later Stretch: from Selection to Mutual Non Dubito," the fifteenth and sixteenth stations.
[^4]: Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Riga: Hartknoch, 1785), in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 4 (Berlin: Reimer, 1911), 429.
[^5]: Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), §59, 5:353.
[^6]: Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, 5:293.
[^7]: Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, 5:294.
[^8]: Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, 5:294.
[^9]: Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, 5:294n.
[^10]: Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, 5:295.
[^11]: Mengzi 孟子, "Jinxin II" 盡心下; Zhu Xi 朱熹, Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注, "Jinxin zhangju xia" 盡心章句下, chap. 37, in Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注, Wenyuange Siku quanshu edition.
[^12]: Plato, Crito 46b, in Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905).
[^13]: Plato, Crito 47b–48a.
[^14]: Plato, Crito 48d–e.
[^15]: Plato, Crito 49d.
[^16]: Mengzi 孟子, "Gongsun Chou I" 公孫丑上, with the commentary of Zhao Qi 趙岐, Mengzi, juan 3, Sibu congkan edition; Zhu Xi 朱熹, Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注, "Gongsun Chou zhangju shang" 公孫丑章句上, chap. 2, in Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注, Wenyuange Siku quanshu edition.
[^17]: Lunyu 論語, "Wei Linggong" 衛靈公, 15.24 (chapter numbering follows the CHANT text).
[^18]: Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩, Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋, "Xiaoyao you" 逍遙遊 (CHANT text, Kanripo KR5c0126); for Guo Xiang's 郭象 commentary, see Nanhua zhenjing 南華真經, juan 1, Sibu congkan edition.
[^19]: Aṅguttara Nikāya 8.5–8.6 (PTS A IV 157–160), Mahāsaṅgīti edition, SuttaCentral; trans. Bhikkhu Sujato.
[^20]: Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra 8.90, 8.120, GRETIL e-text (data entry by Richard Mahoney).
[^21]: Dōgen 道元, Shōbōgenzō 正法眼藏, "Genjōkōan" 現成公案, Taishō 82, no. 2582, 23c19–25.
[^22]: Wang Shouren 王守仁, "Da Luo Zhengan shaozai shu" 答羅整菴少宰書, in Chuanxi lu 傳習錄, juan 2, in Wang Wencheng gong quanshu 王文成公全書, juan 2, Sibu congkan edition.
[^23]: Wang Shouren, Chuanxi lu, juan 3, recorded by Chen Jiuchuan 陳九川, in Wang Wencheng gong quanshu, juan 3, Sibu congkan edition.
[^24]: G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bamberg and Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807), chap. 4, A (¶178 in A. V. Miller's numbering).
[^25]: Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," in Essays (Boston: James Munroe, 1841), 41–42.
[^26]: Emerson, "Self-Reliance," in Essays (1841).
[^27]: John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859), chap. 3, para. 17.
[^28]: Mill, On Liberty, chap. 2, para. 2.
[^29]: Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1892), 2.2.
[^30]: M. K. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, trans. Valji Govindji Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1928), chap. 12, 95–96, 102.
[^31]: Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, chap. 12, 95–96, 102.
[^32]: M. K. Gandhi, Indian Home Rule (Hind Swaraj), 5th ed. (Madras: Ganesh, n.d.), chap. 17.
[^33]: Watsuji Tetsurō, Watsuji Tetsurō's Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan, trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 22.
[^34]: Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Culture," in Between Past and Future, enl. ed. (New York: Viking, 1968), 220.
[^35]: Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 43.
[^36]: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 199, 201.
[^37]: Iris Murdoch, "The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts," in The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
[^38]: Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung, stw ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 211; English in The Struggle for Recognition, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 129.
References
Works of the SAE system cited here are archived on Zenodo, with the Chinese and English versions in the same record. The DOIs cited are concept DOIs, which always resolve to the latest version, so version numbers and access dates are not given. All are single-authored (Han Qin). Drafting and review assistance is described in the Acknowledgments.
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———. Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
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———. Satyagraha in South Africa. Translated by Valji Govindji Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1928.
Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩. Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋. CHANT text (Kanripo KR5c0126).
Hegel, G. W. F. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg and Würzburg: Goebhardt, 1807.
———. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
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———. The Struggle for Recognition. Translated by Joel Anderson. Cambridge: Polity, 1995.
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———. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Hartknoch, 1785. In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 4. Berlin: Reimer, 1911.
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Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
Nanhua zhenjing 南華真經. Commentary by Guo Xiang 郭象. Sibu congkan edition.
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———. SAE: The First Critique. 2026. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21439120.
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