Self-as-an-End
SAE Interfaces with the Philosophy of War · Volume VII

Which End Is the Boundary Set At
边界设在哪一端

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22286653 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0

The Position of Disagreement between Satyagraha and SAE's Cannot-Not

About this series

The SAE War Treatise treats only the 15DD side of war. This series reads historical works of war philosophy and asks where they run alongside SAE, where they diverge, and where they must be criticised. It uses them to show what SAE is.

Four working rules govern every volume: where we agree, the point is why; where we disagree, we set out SAE's own position rather than correcting theirs; where a text touches the ground, criticism is required; where the question lies outside SAE's range, we say nothing. Volumes are ordered by thickness of interface, not by rank.

A note on this volume: it is the one in which SAE most has to account for itself. In the earlier volumes the divergences occur where the grounds differ. Here they do not.


Abstract

Gandhi and SAE are structurally joined at one point: both refuse to reduce the other party to a disposable thing, and neither retreats in the face of domination. But that does not make the ground the same — Gandhi's path carries other weight of its own: truth (satya), non-violence (ahimsa), self-suffering (tapasya), and conversion rather than coercion as the aim.

Satyagraha and SAE's yangmou (open stratagem) correspond closely in their operational demands, and their reasons differ. This volume does not claim that Gandhi's criterion is the stricter, forbidding all deception: that would rest on a rule this volume itself has marked unverified, and by the argument axis that is a missing premise. The comparison of breadth is not made here, and the disagreement in §3 does not depend on it.

The position of disagreement is not "whether to act" but that the two criteria have different principal trigger variables. Gandhi's path is triggered by the character of the action itself and the standing of its practitioners — is the cause just, can these people hold the discipline, has violence broken out, is the aim conversion or coercion. SAE's Theorem One is triggered by the channels of relation and the other party's conduct — are the mild forms still open, what did the other party give in answer, has the carrier of cultivation been lost.

Two stronger claims do not hold. That Gandhi's boundaries are "determinable without knowing who the adversary is" — they are not; all four require facts and a situation. And that he "does not respond to situation and carries no burden of judgement" — that is writing a different path as a correction of it. The difference is not that one requires judgement and the other does not, but that the objects of judgement differ.

Proposition 7.4 is limited to "within the materials examined, no boundary triggered by the character of the adversary was found." It is a negative proposition drawn from a failed search, and this series has applied the contrary discipline elsewhere; the same standard must apply to itself.

SAE must acknowledge two costs: the judgement "have the mild forms been exhausted" falls on the person least fit to make it; and SAE chose a path that issues a permission, and must therefore bear that permission's misuse — though what Gandhi's path is immune to is one specific misuse, not misuse as such.

Proposition 7.9: both paths halt at the boundary of their own criteria, and what each leaves beyond that boundary differs, as does whom it is handed to. It may not be written as "handed to the same people, for the same reason: those who do not bear the consequences do not make that judgement" — that reason does not hold (see §6.1).


Sources and scope

Materials: Gandhi's writings, speeches and prison correspondence (Hind Swaraj; An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth; issues of Young India); SAE War Treatise §12, §19, Theorem One; this series' working note One Axis, Two Directions. Verification status is given in the appendix.

Most of Gandhi's texts are out of copyright, but the compiled editions vary in status. This volume paraphrases his positions and quotes only the few short phrases that have been verified.

Not treated here: historical assessment of the Indian independence movement; comparisons of the effectiveness of non-violent movements; controversies about Gandhi's life. These lie outside this series' problem domain.


1 · The same side

1.1 He is not naïve, and this must be established first

The commonest misreading of Gandhi treats non-violence as a soft or morally fastidious choice — one does not act because one cannot bear to.

It is not that. Satyagraha means, literally, holding to truth, and its actual content is a structured method of confrontation:

  • Conducted openly. Actions are announced in advance; intentions are not concealed; no surprise is manufactured.
  • Without deception. No false appearances are created.
  • Bearing rather than inflicting. The consequences of defiance are borne — arrest, beating, dispossession — rather than transferred to the other party.
  • Leaving the other a way out. The aim is not to make the other submit or be shamed. His own formulation: a satyagrahi's object is to convert, not to coerce, the wrong-doer.

This is not the avoidance of conflict but another way of entering it, and a very costly one. It forbids exactly what pressure most naturally produces.

One item is not on the list above, and its absence must be stated. "Does not exploit the other party's mistaken information" has not been confirmed as a canonical rule of Gandhi's (see §2.2). The confirmed neighbouring principle is refusing to embarrass an opponent and refusing to take advantage of his difficulties — which concerns not taking unfair advantage, not the non-exploitation of an informational asset.

And this volume makes no ranking of strictness. To write that satyagraha's discipline "is stricter than that of violent resistance" is an unavailable comparison — the two disciplines require different things (one requires not striking back and continuing to bear; the other requires obedience and coordination), and there is no common scale on which to rank them. This volume does not need such a judgement.

1.2 What "the same side" precisely means

Proposition 7.1 (narrowed) Gandhi and SAE are structurally joined at the point of not reducing the other party to a mere instrument; but it does not follow that the disagreement between them has nothing to do with grounds.

The narrowing must be stated. To write "the disagreement cannot be explained by a difference of ground" would read a structural join as an identity of ground. Gandhi's path carries other weight: truth (satya), non-violence (ahimsa), self-suffering (tapasya), and conversion rather than coercion as the aim. These four are not SAE's ground, nor derivable from it.

So the accurate statement is: the two are structurally joined at one determinate point — both refuse to reduce the other party to a disposable thing — and that join suffices to make the comparison that follows meaningful, without amounting to a shared ground.

In the earlier volumes of this series, the divergences occur where the grounds differ: an external purpose as authoriser is not of a kind with cultivation; a criterion landing in Recht is not of a kind with one landing in cultivation; whether to establish a position from which to determine "who is the just party"; an honour system is not of a kind with cultivation.

This volume is not like that.

He treats a person as an end: conversion rather than coercion is precisely the refusal to reduce the other to something disposable. He does not retreat before domination: the whole content of satyagraha is not retreating, only not retreating by way of striking back. And he requires that his own executors be lucid, willing, and aware of what they are doing — on this he is more explicit than SAE.

So this volume's disagreement must be found elsewhere, and finding it is its main work.


2 · Where we agree, with different reasons

2.1 Openness and non-deception

§12 of the treatise divides means into four rungs: mou (stratagem), yinmou (covert stratagem), yangmou (open stratagem), gui (deception). The requirements of yangmou correspond almost item by item to the first three of satyagraha's — openness, no reliance on an information gap, the other party participating as a lucid subject.

Proposition 7.2 The two correspond closely in operational demands, and their reasons differ.

Gandhi's reason is truth: means and end are not separable, and a result reached by deception has deception already in it. And truth can only be held to, not imposed — so confrontation must take place where both parties can see.

SAE's reason is cultivation: the defect of gui is that it must use one's own executors as instruments (maintaining an information gap requires one's own people to be uninformed); and conducting things openly means the other party remains in a position from which to respond, which is what "the other party still exists as a subject of cultivation" concretely amounts to.

One registration is required here: the four-rung hierarchy used in this section and in §5 previously drew part of its warrant from a withdrawn attribution — that Sunzi had already ranked mou above gui on the same axis. That attribution has been withdrawn by Volume VI of this series: Attack by Stratagem ranks objects of attack, while Calculations' "all warfare is based on deception" states a mode of operation and is set down as a general proposition about all warfare; the two axes are orthogonal and form no ranked sequence. The re-argument of the hierarchy itself does not belong to this interface series; it is a matter for §12 of the treatise. This volume uses it while that argument remains incomplete.

2.2 One comparison withdrawn

One apparently available proposition is not asserted here: that Gandhi's criterion is stricter than SAE's, forbidding all deception, including such things as concealing a line of march.

It does not stand, and the reason is this volume's own. The end of this section notes: "does not exploit the other party's mistaken information" has not been confirmed as a canonical rule of Gandhi's; the confirmed neighbouring principle is refusing to embarrass an opponent and refusing to take advantage of his difficulties — and the two are different (the former concerns not taking unfair advantage, the latter the non-exploitation of an informational asset).

And that proposition would be built on the former. To use as a load-bearing member something one has oneself marked unverified is, on the argument axis, a missing premise. So this volume does not assert it.

What remains:

Satyagraha does require that action be announced in advance and that no false appearance be created. But how far those requirements extend — whether they reach as far as military secrecy about a line of march — this volume has no material to determine, and Gandhi was not in a position that required him to say.

So the comparison of the two criteria's breadth is not made here. The disagreement in §3 does not depend on it.

2.3 Bearing is not self-destruction

§19 of the treatise forbids completing a gesture by way of destroying the carrier of cultivation. On the surface this conflicts with "bearing"; in fact it does not.

Gandhi's bearing is not self-destruction. It keeps the cost on one's own side rather than transferring it to the other, while preserving that community's capacity to go on acting — those arrested come out; the movement continues.

This series has given the distinction elsewhere (Volume VIII, Proposition 8.9):

The line between preserving the carrier and mere acquiescence lies not in the magnitude of the cost but in whether, after the concession, the standing as a subject has been handed over.

By that line, Gandhi's bearing falls on the side of preserving the carrier: what those who bear surrender is bodily liberty, not the position from which they decide their own direction. The movement continues, and its direction is still set by the participants.

A note on that proposition's standing: a line that can yield a determination directly in another essay does not belong in a closing list of loose ends, and it is accordingly carried there as a proposition.

And this point SAE should acknowledge more plainly: refusing self-destruction is not refusing to bear costs. The distinction is whether, after this act of bearing, that subject is still there.


3 · The position of the disagreement

3.1 Gandhi does have boundaries, and strict ones

One formulation must be excluded first. To say that "on Gandhi's path, exhaustion does not arise in principle," and to take him to set no boundaries, is inaccurate.

At least four boundaries are confirmed:

First, the cause must be just.

There can be no Satyagraha in an unjust cause. (Young India, 27 April 1921)

In an unjust cause there is no satyagraha to speak of. This is not advice but a condition of qualification.

Second, the practitioners must be fit. Even where the cause is just, if the participants lack the capacity to suffer continuously, to hold discipline, and not to strike back, the method cannot be carried.

Third, an outbreak of violence is a reason to suspend, not to escalate. Where a mass satyagraha is accompanied by violence, his response is suspension, not treating violence as the "next stage" of the same method. This is particularly important — it shows he did not fail to consider escalation but expressly refused it.

Fourth, the aim is conversion, not coercion. An action aiming to make the other submit is not satyagraha, however non-violent in form.

So he is not "absolutely non-violent without regard to conditions." He has a fairly strict set of conditions; they simply are not all in the same place.

3.2 What the boundaries are triggered by

Proposition 7.4 (narrowed) Within the materials examined by this series, no boundary of Gandhi's was found that is triggered by the character or obduracy of the adversary.

The reason for the narrowing: to write "Gandhi's boundaries fall entirely on the cause and the practitioners; no boundary triggered by the adversary is to be found" makes the second half a negative proposition, whose warrant is that a search did not find one — while this series has elsewhere accepted the contrary discipline: a negative proposition may not be raised from "not found" to "does not exist." (That discipline was applied to the claim that Ludendorff's Der totale Krieg contains no stopping condition; this series declined to raise "I did not find it" to "there is none," having failed to obtain the primary text.) The same standard must apply to itself.

So this proposition is limited to: not found within the materials examined. It is used as a proposition awaiting verification.

3.3 SAE's boundary is at the other end

Theorem One's threshold: the carrier of cultivation has been lost; cultivation in its mild forms can no longer continue.

"Mild forms" includes satyagraha, and it is among the most powerful of them. Theorem One requires that they be exhausted — a subject that has not seriously attempted open resistance and non-violent non-cooperation does not meet the condition for war.

And "have they been exhausted" must be judged in a particular situation. What it asks is: are these roads still open in this situation? What did the other party give in answer to each approach? What measures remain untried?

Proposition 7.5 The position of disagreement is not "whether to act" but that the two criteria have different principal trigger variables.

3.4 The difference in trigger variables, and two traps here

Proposition 7.6 (rewritten)

Gandhi's path is principally triggered by the character of the action itself and the standing of its practitioners: is this cause just? can these people hold the discipline? has violence broken out? is the aim conversion or coercion?

SAE's Theorem One is principally triggered by the channels of relation and the other party's conduct: are those mild forms still open? what did the other party give in answer to each approach? has the carrier of cultivation been lost?

There are two traps here.

Trap one: using "subtracting conditions / adding conditions" as an exhaustive classification.

That is, writing that "Gandhi's boundaries lie wholly at the subtracting end, SAE's at the adding end," and that his four boundaries "can be determined without knowing who the adversary is."

That does not hold. Whether a cause is just requires knowing what the cause is directed at, what it demands, whom it will affect; whether practitioners are fit requires knowing what these particular people have been trained in and what they have borne; whether violence has broken out is a pure question of fact. All of these require facts and a situation.

And this series' working note One Axis, Two Directions states it itself: subtracting/adding conditions is a set of dominant directions or heuristics, not an exhaustive classification of every act.

Trap two: taking "Gandhi does not respond to situation and carries no burden of judgement" for a property of his path.

This is writing a different path as a correction of it. Gandhi likewise faces difficult judgements: whether a cause is just is a judgement of qualification; whether participants can hold is an organisational judgement; whether violence has broken out far enough to require suspension is a judgement of fact. He too must make these under pressure, and can get them wrong.

So the difference between the two paths is not that one requires judgement and the other does not; it is that the objects of judgement differ:

What it principally asks
Gandhiare our own action and our own people fit?
SAE, Theorem Oneare those channels between us and the other party still open?

The two conclusions still stand, though their reasons must be restated:

First, why on Gandhi's path the question of "exhaustion" does not arise in the same form. Not because his judgements need no situation, but because his trigger variables do not point at the adversary — however obdurate the other party, that does not change the answer to "is this cause just."

Second, why SAE must deal with the trouble of verifiability. Because its trigger variables point at the other party's conduct and the state of the relation, and facts of that kind are the hardest to verify in wartime, the easiest to misread, and the easiest to misread with motive. This is not an oversight; it is the necessary cost of putting the trigger variables there.

3.5 The difference itself constitutes no superiority

This must be stated, because this section is the easiest to read as "SAE is more realistic."

Placing the trigger variables on one's own action and the fitness of practitioners has the advantage of stability — it does not move with the other party's conduct; however brutal the adversary, that cannot make an unjust cause just, nor an undisciplined body fit. The cost is insensitivity to changes in the state of the relation.

Placing them on the channels of relation and the other party's conduct has the advantage of responsiveness — it can distinguish an adversary still negotiating from one already killing. The cost is that it can be distorted by those changes, and that the moment it is most needed is the moment it is hardest to determine correctly.

Each has its own mode of failure, and the two modes cannot judge one another.


4 · Two costs SAE must acknowledge

4.1 The burden of judgement falls on the least suitable person

Proposition 7.7 SAE hands the judgement "have the mild forms been exhausted" to the party concerned, and that party is in the position least fit to make it.

He is angry, exhausted, afraid, and has good reason to think that waiting longer will kill him. These are not his faults; they are his situation.

One thing must be stated precisely: to say "Gandhi's path does not have this problem, because it does not require this judgement" does not hold (see §3.4, trap two) — he too must judge, under the worst conditions, whether the cause is just, whether the body can hold, whether violence has broken out.

What does hold is a weaker sentence: the judgements on his path do not point at the adversary, and so are not beset by that class of question which is hardest to verify and easiest to misread with motive — "is the other party deceiving me," "does this exchange count as a closure." That is a real difference, but it is not "he carries no burden of judgement."

SAE has only two things to meet this with: Theorem One's four gates, and Theorem Four's questioning. Both are of limited force — the gates must be passed by someone, the questioning must be done by someone, and wartime is when fewest are willing to ask.

One further disposition of this series must be added here: part of this burden does not fall within what this series should answer. "Whether there is time to ask" is an execution judgement and does not fall within this series' range. ("Those who bear the consequences" is not a single subject; that phrasing was withdrawn in One Axis, Two Directions, §2: an execution decision is made by actors with the actual information and institutional responsibility; those bearing the risk retain a position from which to speak and refuse; outside critics retain standing to question.) But "whether this criterion can be broken into publicly contestable sub-propositions" is a question about the form of a criterion, and that part stays inside; this series must answer it — and that this series does not make execution decisions does not thereby cost it the standing to question them.

And on this Theorem One is decomposable: which mild forms existed? when was each closed? who closed them? what traces were left? what did the other party give in answer to each approach?

So the accurate shape of the cost is: the whole of the judgement falls on the party concerned, while the decomposition of it can be questioned from outside. SAE can offer no help with the former; with the latter it can.

4.2 SAE chose a path that issues a permission

Proposition 7.8 SAE's criterion outputs a "may," and it must therefore bear that "may" being misused and abused.

"The mild forms have been exhausted" can be said by anyone who wants a war.

And the difference of Gandhi's path on this point must be stated exactly.

To say "Gandhi's path will not be abused in this way" is too strong — any set of claims can be abused; a non-violent movement can equally be used to suppress internal dissent, to require of others a cost they should not have to bear, or to justify inaction.

What does hold is narrower:

His set of claims cannot be used as a licence for escalation to violence. However just the cause, however brutal the adversary, what it outputs is never "we may now fight."

That is a real difference, and not to be waved away with "more realistic"; but it is immunity to one specific misuse, not immunity to misuse as such.

SAE can say only one thing here, and it is a difference of degree, not of kind:

"The mild forms have been exhausted" can be broken into publicly contestable sub-propositions; "our war is just" cannot.

The content of that sentence has been stated precisely and requires no subsequent retraction: each item after decomposition can still be disputed; decomposability buys localisation of dispute, assignable burdens of proof, locatable error, and a handle for revision — not automatic transparency of fact; and the latter is not "irrefutable" but has nowhere for opposition to take hold.

And the realisation of that advantage depends on someone actually asking — which is Theorem Four's business, and one of SAE's thinnest places.


5 · What he has and we lack

A whole body of operational discipline, and the experience of executing it.

§12 of the treatise defines yangmou clearly but says nothing about how it is done. Gandhi did it for decades, and what he left is concrete: how actions are announced in advance; how discipline is maintained among tens of thousands of participants; how participants are trained not to strike back even when struck; how a movement continues after its leaders are arrested; and — hardest of all — how a movement is suspended once violence accompanies it, rather than allowed to slide into escalation.

In the yangmou rung of the four-rung hierarchy, SAE has a definition and no instance. No one has filled that rung more fully than Gandhi.

This does not belong to "the execution layer, outside our range." It is not knowledge of force levels and terrain but knowledge of how a community keeps itself open, non-deceiving, and refraining from expelling the other party from the position of a subject, under extreme pressure — which is exactly the question of how something at the level of principle comes to be enacted; and by this series' working note One Axis, Two Directions, it falls in the middle of the axis, the stretch both ends must walk.

One limit of verification must be noted: it could not be confirmed that a written code of discipline exists in Gandhi's own hand containing simultaneously "no deception," "actions announced in advance," and "do not exploit the other party's mistakes." Most circulating "Gandhian rules" are compilations made by others from statements of different periods. The operational discipline described here is therefore of uncertain written form, though its actual execution is amply recorded.


6 · Where each path halts

Proposition 7.9 (rewritten) Both paths halt at the boundary of their own criteria, and what each leaves beyond that boundary differs, as does whom it is handed to.

SAE states the conditions of the cannot-not, not whether they are met at this moment.

The latter is not judged by a single subject, and must be handled by the threefold distinction: an execution decision is made by actors with the actual information and institutional responsibility; those bearing the risk retain a position from which to speak and refuse; outside critics retain standing to question.

And what the person making that execution decision must handle — the clock, the fear, the incomplete intelligence, the question there was no time to ask — this series cannot supply.

But "this series cannot supply the execution judgement" is not "this series may not question it." Standing to question does not lapse for want of having borne the same consequences; that is written down in One Axis, Two Directions, §2.

And Gandhi's path likewise halts: what he gives are conditions of qualification for a method — is the cause just, are the practitioners fit. He too cannot judge, for a particular community, whether it can still hold that discipline at this moment, or whether the moment for suspension has come.

6.1 An unavailable closing sentence

It may not be written: "Both paths hand it here to the same people, and for the same reason: those who do not bear the consequences do not make that judgement."

Two things in that sentence do not hold.

First, the reason itself does not hold. "Those who do not bear the consequences do not make that judgement" merges three kinds of standing (the authority to decide; the position of those bearing the risk to speak and refuse; and the standing to question and criticise) into one, and once merged it collided head-on with that note's own "misuse two" (execution may not cancel a criterion by appeal to being on the spot). Standing to question does not lapse for want of having borne the same consequences.

Second, what each leaves behind and whom it is handed to both differ.

What is left beyond the boundary Handed to whom
SAEa set of structural conditions on the state of a relation, plus a requirement of questioningthose deciding whether to go to war, and those questioning them
Gandhia set of conditions of qualification for cause and practitioners, plus a disciplinethose maintaining the discipline, and those organising the movement

So the comparison of the two paths is not "handed to the same people at the same place." It is: both walked to the boundary of their own criteria, and what lies beyond differs.

Put this way the comparison is more useful: it shows what each path leaves to practice, whereas "handed to the same people" shows only that both stopped.


7 · The sentence this volume keeps

The closing passage for the series does not stand here — this is not the last volume (Volume VIII follows it), and that passage stands separately as an unnumbered Conclusion appended to the series.

What this volume keeps is one sentence, which belongs to it:

When SAE says cannot-not, it is not saying "you are naïve." It is saying: I do not assume the oppressor will see.

And that sentence needs a qualification at once, because a false dichotomy is very easily made here.

Namely: if bearing can indeed move any oppressor, if there exists no machinery of domination able to run without an audience — then this whole road of SAE's must be walked again, and Gandhi's path is right.

That dichotomy misstates both sides.

It misstates Gandhi: the working of non-violence does not rest only on moving the oppressor. It can work by raising the cost of ruling, by altering third parties and international opinion, by dissolving the cooperation of those who carry out orders, and by maintaining a community's organisational capacity through the bearing. "Whether the oppressor can be moved" is not the sole condition of that path's holding.

It misstates SAE: SAE's cannot-not does not rest only on the empirical judgement that oppressors will not be moved. Theorem One's threshold also contains the condition of whether the carrier of cultivation has been lost, and that has nothing to do with whether the oppressor can be touched.

What holds after the narrowing: SAE does not assume that every structure of domination necessarily contains a position that can be touched — and that remains a judgement about the world, and may still be wrong. If it is wrong, part of Theorem One's threshold requires re-argument; but that is not the same as the whole road having to be walked again, nor does it make the other path automatically true.


8 · Left unresolved in this volume

8.1 Proposition 7.7 separates "the whole of the judgement" from "the decomposition of the judgement," and holds that SAE can offer no help with the former. But decomposition too must be carried out under pressure — can a community under siege break "have the mild forms been exhausted" into five specific questions at that moment? Not answered.

8.2 This may not be registered as "Gandhi's criterion is the stricter; whether SAE should tighten is not considered." That premise was excluded in §2.2 (it would rest on a rule this volume itself marks unverified). A proposition that does not stand cannot serve as the premise of an unresolved item.

What remains open is a narrower question: should SAE's criterion for yangmou extend to forbidding all deception? But that question can no longer be raised by way of Gandhi — this volume has no material to determine how far satyagraha's requirements extend into military secrecy. It must be raised on SAE's own reasons, and this volume has not found them.

8.3 Proposition 7.4 is a negative proposition awaiting verification (§3.2).

8.4 The operational discipline described in §5 is of uncertain written form. If some item proves to be a later compilation rather than Gandhi's own position, the discussion involving it must be revised.


Appendix · Sources and verification status

Material Edition Location Status
Gandhi, "There can be no Satyagraha in an unjust cause"Young India27 April 1921primary source verified
Gandhi, "to convert, not to coerce, the wrong-doer"Standard compilation—verified; precise issue reference outstanding
Gandhi, other positionswritings, speeches, prison correspondence—paraphrased; not quoted
SAE War TreatiseFinal version§12, §19, Theorems One and Fourprimary
One Axis, Two Directionsthis series' working note§2, §3, §6—

Translations from the Chinese are the author's own.

Two notes:

  • "Does not exploit the other party's mistakes" has not been confirmed as a canonical rule of Gandhi's; the confirmed neighbouring principle is refusing to embarrass an opponent and refusing to take advantage of his difficulties.
  • No written code of discipline in Gandhi's own hand could be confirmed containing simultaneously the three items described in §5.

A companion note, Known Limits, records the items this series has left unresolved.


On this series' method

This volume, like the rest of the series, retains its own correction records in the body text.

In this volume the plainest instance is Proposition 7.4. This series applies a discipline elsewhere — that a negative proposition may not be raised from "not found" to "does not exist," where the primary text could not be obtained. Proposition 7.4 is exactly such a proposition, made about Gandhi.

A standard applied to others must be applied to oneself. That is why it is limited here rather than asserted at full strength.