What a State Is Not
国家不是什么
This series asks one question. When there is no regulator of force at a higher level above it, how does a state answer: how does each of its "lasts" still guard the line and remain open to questioning? The Theory of Government writes the general case of governments at every level; this series writes only the few places that exist only when there is no higher level above: the supreme rule, the last instance, membership, the last force, the outward side. Before setting to work, it clears away a few things a state is not. A state is not a subject: the reply note says "The will of the UCSE is unshakable"; the one who signed it was the Executive for External Affairs, and what passed it was a meeting of nine; a state can conclude treaties and can be sued, and bearing falls on positions and persons; one place upstream writes the state as a subject in its outward dealings, and this series does not take it. A state is not an end: its continued existence is no reason to close off questioning. "Last" is not an endpoint. "Last" refers to level: there is nothing above. It does not refer to exemption from questioning. A state is not a "we": the resolution says "unanimously," and the vote was 238 to 57. Sovereignty is not an indivisible core; Bodin says that power that is held in trust and can be taken back is not sovereignty, and by this criterion of his, no position in this series is a sovereign. After these, the paper gives the definition of the state's end of the range and the three things derived from it, the derivation being in Paper 1; on one point, the multi-branch separation of powers, part is derived, and the rest is undertaken separately, following the Theory of Government. It then sets out the three states: a leaning is a direction, not an identity, and judgment falls on acts. It then sets out how the whole series speaks: the three-layer sentence form; the unified sentence for the people of other states; where each of the seven hard questions the upstream has left to this series (the strong forms) is answered; and the measure by which, wherever judgment is required, strong judgment is taken while the remainder is acknowledged. Finally it settles the accounts received from upstream and says what this series will not do for the reader. This paper proves no proposition; where something is to be proved, the paper that proves it is named.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
In the spring of Year 9, the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Purposes (DRP) delivered a note, signed by the President of the Republic, demanding that the United City-States of Ends (UCSE) withdraw all military, police and administrative personnel from the West Flats within thirty days, "in response to the common will of the people of the Republic to recover the West Flats."
The UCSE's reply note was signed by the Executive for External Affairs, under the letterhead "Executive Council of the United City-States of Ends," and it read: "The UCSE does not accept ultimatums. The will of the UCSE is unshakable." The reply note was passed at a meeting of the Executive Council; the minutes record that, of the nine, the Executive for Trade abstained. That evening, in a televised address, the First Executive said: "The UCSE will not take one step back. On this matter, the will of all the people of the UCSE is unanimous." The next day the Chamber of Citizens passed the Resolution on the West Flats: "The people of the UCSE unanimously support the position of the Executive Council." The vote was 238 to 57, with 5 absent (UCSE Case 01).
Three things first. Whom it concerns: the internal subjects of the UCSE, above all those swept in together under "the will of the UCSE" and under "all the people" being "unanimous": the fifty-seven members who voted against and those they represent, and the residents of the West Flats. Which line: the fifth ought: a decision made in the state's name must be traceable to the positions and persons that made it, so that those who question can find the address. Baseline: the existing configuration for outward dealings: a note is signed by the Executive for External Affairs and decided at a meeting of the Executive Council, whose minutes record the vote; a resolution of the Chamber of Citizens has its vote count entered in the record.
Both documents speak of a will. Who signed each? One, the DRP President; the other, the UCSE's Executive for External Affairs, behind whom stands a meeting of nine with one abstention; behind the resolution stands a single vote of 295 members. In the UCSE's document, what can be found beneath the word "will" is these positions and these votes.
The matter can be divided into several questions. On what grounds the UCSE comes to have something that can answer another state in its name, How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6) has answered; what that thing ought to achieve, Institution Theory has answered, with the Kingdom of Ends as the direction; how the reply note is made, and to whom it answers, the Theory of Government has answered. What remains are the few places that exist only when there is no higher level above: the supreme rule, the last instance, membership, the last force, the outward side. The share that in the Theory of Government was borne by the level above is no longer there. Under which channel it cannot itself close each of these lies is listed place by place in Paper 7, §1.
The question of this series is this. When there is no regulator of force at a higher level above it, how does a state answer: how does each of its "lasts" still guard the line and remain open to questioning? Its range is:
How a construct that has no regulator of force at a higher level above it, inwardly or outwardly, guards the line, answers, and remains open to questioning at its several "lasts" (the last rule, the last instance, the last exit, the last force, one another, with no superior, the last resort).
Taken together, the whole series is one sentence:
Toward its internal subjects, a state holds to anti-colonization and strives for cultivation; outwardly, it does not colonize, and does not decide on behalf of the people of other states; each of its "lasts" remains open to questioning.
The first clause follows the main line of Institution Theory and the Theory of Government (the Theory of Government Prequel, §8). The middle clause is the most literal form of anti-colonization on the outward side: the firewall of the War Treatise says that "the victorious party shall not decide on the defeated party's direction of subjectivity-development on their behalf." (War Treatise §18) This series extends it from after the war to ordinary times (extension; own undertaking; Paper 5, §2). The last clause is this series' subject term, and takes up the fifth ought of Institution Theory.
How to read. A construct is an arrangement with institutional status (a mill, a level of government, a state), not a person. A construct's interior is made up of those its acts reach who cannot exit from them; it is not drawn by citizenship (§6). The five oughts are the five things a construct owes those inside it: its acts cross no line against anyone inside it; it guards the lines between those inside it; it provides conditions for their cultivation according to relational thickness; it lets cultivation between them happen, leaving room and not sealing the channels; it itself remains open to questioning, the channel being independent of the party questioned, within reach of those inside, and bringing no retaliation for its use (the Institution Theory Prequel, §7). The line is the boundary between limit and violation: a constraint that holds a person's exercise in check, closes none of the dimensions he already has, does not press him down to where he cannot live, and does not seal off his ways of exit, refusal and revocation is a limit; one that crosses any of these is a violation (Institution Theory Paper 2). Cultivation is providing the conditions for a person's growth without deciding for him what he is to become; "colonization" is taken in the narrow sense, a boundary-crossing disguised as cultivation (Rights Theory P6 F26; the Theory of Government Prequel, §8). A position is an office within an organ, not the person who sits in it. How "last" is to be read is set out in §3; which direction each of the three states leans more toward, in §7. The upstream means the SAE series published before this one (F6, Institution Theory, the Theory of Government, the War Treatise and others); it is cited as it stands, and its range is not altered. Where the upstream has a strong and a weak form of one and the same thing, the weak form is taken by default, and the strong form is left to this series to prove or not to take (§8). What is marked "(own undertaking)" is a step this series vouches for itself and the upstream does not have; what is marked "(extension; own undertaking)" extends an upstream sentence to a range the original did not speak of, and the step of extension is undertaken by this series.
Before the questions are asked, a few things must be cleared away.
§1 Not a Subject
If the "will of the UCSE" in the reply note were really read as a will, there would have to be something that thinks and decides. F6 says: "an institution has no cannot-not of its own. A construct has no first person." (F6 §2.3) Power Theory says: "the state cannot structurally be a 13DD subject, because it has no self-conscious field" (Power Theory P2 §V.1); "The state does not sign decrees; key-node officials sign decrees through the state apparatus." (Power Theory P2 §V.3) No person called the UCSE signed the reply note: those who signed, passed, spoke and voted were all persons in positions. The reply note takes effect in the UCSE's name, and the address of attribution is the UCSE as a construct: "the construct is the address of attribution, not the subject of the act" (Institution Theory Z7a). Both ends are there, and neither hides the other.
So this series does not write "the state wants," "the state believes" or "the will of the state"; it writes that persons in positions make the decision and that it takes effect in the state's name (the sentence form of Theory of Government G1). Outwardly it is the same: a note is signed by the Executive for External Affairs; a treaty is negotiated by the Office of External Affairs, signed by the First Executive and ratified by the joint session (Charter, Article 60, fact).
Not being a subject does not cancel the construct's legal status, or attribution to it. The UCSE is a party to the Cloud River Water-Sharing and Flood Notification Agreement, has requested arbitration under it, and has complied with the award (UCSE Case 20; three things at the opening of Paper 5); it can be sued (Paper 2, §5). The construct's failures are checked against the construct's ought; the state's name does not shield the bearing of positions and persons, and the construct's failure is not automatically transferred onto any one person (Paper 7, N39). If this reply note has crossed the line, the account is booked under the UCSE's name and is also booked to the positions and persons that signed it and voted on it. It lies under channels within the UCSE: members of the Chamber of Citizens can put questions; the Chamber of Citizens can remove the First Executive by a majority motion of no confidence, and the Executive Council cannot close this vote; UCSE citizens and those lawfully resident in its territory can complain to the Inspectorate, and whether a complaint is taken up is not decided by the Executive Council; when a channel fails, the account is booked as in Paper 7, N39.
The strong form is answered here. Appendix B of F6 drafts a fictional constitution: "(c) Civilizational subjects. The Azerothian Commonwealth itself, when engaging with external forces as a whole, possesses subjecthood." (F6, Appendix B, Article 3(c); a working demonstration; used only as an example) This is the strong form; the weak form is in the body of F6, §2.3, and in Power Theory P2 §V.1. This series does not take the strong form. First, the appendix is a working demonstration, not evidentiary; this article does not agree with the body of F6, and the body is taken. Second, outward dealings need no subject: concluding treaties, sending notes, requesting arbitration and being sued are all done through positions, and all have an address of attribution; to say that the construct "as a whole" possesses subjecthood makes possible nothing that could not be done before, and adds instead something that can say "our will" on everyone's behalf; that sentence in the reply note is what it looks like. Third, the article is headed "Civilizational subjects," and speaks of the layer between civilizations; this series' domain does not reach it (§6), and it goes to Law Series P4.
Pointing back: Hegel. Reading the state as a whole with a spirit of its own has already been judged by Power Theory: "Any attempt to elevate an abstract collective entity to subjecthood (Hegelian spirit of the state, strong-form readings of legal personality doctrine, theories of collective will) commits ontological-category misplacement" (Power Theory P2 §V.1). Here this paper only goes on from that point: the "will" in a diplomatic note, whichever state it comes from, is read as words spoken in the state's name by persons in positions.
§2 Not an End, Nor the Highest Good
A state is a means that people make. The first premise of F6 says: "Any institution, including the most elegant constitution, is a means, not an end." (F6 §2.1, Premise I) A state is one kind of institution. So one can say to it "this is what you ought to achieve"; and so too, "the continued existence of a means can be a condition for getting things done; it cannot be a reason to close off questioning" (the Institution Theory Prequel, §1). Institution Theory sets this up as a proposition: "The construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically" (Institution Theory Z38). A state is a construct too.
On the evening the state of emergency was declared, the First Executive said: "Before the survival of the UCSE, there is nothing that cannot be suspended." (UCSE Case 16; three things in Paper 2, §1) This sentence puts the survival of the state above everything. Whether it stands is answered in Paper 4, §3 (N20); here this paper only points out that survival is a weighty reason, and that where it comes from, and whether it can be used to shut off questioning, must be asked.
Nor is a state the highest good. The direction is the Kingdom of Ends: "it is made by persons; an institution cannot make it on their behalf, nor does it count as made because an institution declares it" (Institution Theory Z39). What a state guards matters because those things are persons': persons' lines, persons' recognition-based rights, persons' channels and lives. So the survival of the state is not the survival of persons (Paper 4, N23).
§3 "Last" Is Not an Endpoint
One night in the autumn of Year 8, on a sandbar by the east bank of the Boundary River at Reedtown, a sentry post of the Border Defense Division of the Office of Defense exchanged fire with a DRP patrol: two UCSE sentries and a DRP soldier were killed. Each side said the other had fired first. The Office of External Affairs proposed a joint investigation, and the DRP's Foreign Ministry refused; the Office then asked the Nation Union of Telos (NUT), to the north, to send investigators, and the NUT's Council for External Affairs decided, 4 to 1, to provide only a venue and technical staff, its reply note reading: "The NUT is not a judge between the two states, and the findings of the investigation bind neither party." Among the three states there is no common court, nor any other body that could take up the matter. In the winter the two states each published an investigation report; the two say opposite things about who fired first and about which state the sandbar belongs to (UCSE Case 02).
Three things first. Whom it concerns: the families of the two sentries who died; the residents of the West Flats. To which position of the UCSE the family of the DRP soldier can put its questions, this section does not judge: for the other side's combatants in action, the limit on using force follows the methods-constraint of the War Treatise (§15), and this series sets up no other; those who have laid down their arms, been captured, or are wounded or sick come under the unified sentence (§8; Paper 6, §3). Whether that night's exchange of fire counts as combat, this section does not judge either. Which line: the fifth ought: what happened that night, who determines it, and whether that determination can be questioned. Baseline: the consensus the two states already had before the incident, the Treaty of Commerce and the Border Return Protocol, neither of which contains any provision dealing with armed conflict.
This series reads "last" in this way:
"Last" refers to level: there is nothing above. It does not refer to exemption from questioning.
Theory of Government G36 runs through the whole series: "Decisions can be final"; "Positions cannot be final"; "Questioning does not need an unquestionable endpoint" (Theory of Government G36). Institution Theory is on the account at the same time: "An institution cannot acquire the standing of permanent exemption from questioning" (Institution Theory Z37).
On the UCSE's side, the report of the Office of External Affairs is, in terms of level, the last word on that night; there is no body above it to review it. It is not exempt from questioning on that account: members of the Chamber of Citizens can ask about it, and the families of the two sentries and the residents of the West Flats can complain to the Inspectorate; what is questioned is this report and the Office of External Affairs that made it, and the Office cannot close these routes; when a route fails, the account falls, as in Paper 7, N39, on the positions and persons that made the report. The DRP's report says the opposite. Above the two there is no third reader; the matter is made final by neither report, and it stays on the account as an unsettled matter between the two states, which can be asked again in later procedures and in their questions to one another (Paper 5, §§1, 4). That there is no one overhead shows only where the questions must come from; it does not show that the questioning has stopped.
Every "last" spoken of in the papers that follow is read in this way; under which channel it cannot itself close each "last" lies is made clear in each paper and listed place by place in Paper 7, §1.
§4 Not a "We"
After the state of emergency was declared, the Wartime Publicity Division of the Office of Defense put up posters in every city: "We are the UCSE." A resident of the West Flats told a radio station in the Western Plains State that her two brothers live across the Boundary River, and that she does not know whom the "we" on the poster means (UCSE Case 01). The resolution says "unanimously"; the vote was 238 to 57.
Institution Theory says: "An institution cannot produce a 'we.'" The framework's commitment and actual mutual recognition between persons are two things, and the former does not achieve the latter on persons' behalf (Institution Theory Z31). At the national level this is plainer still: "Between citizens of a nation, there may be no shared cannot-not beyond territory and flag." (Law Series P3 §4)
This does not cancel the resolution's validity. The Chamber of Citizens passed the resolution within its authority and by its procedure, and at that layer the resolution is valid. Only one thing is taken away: the "unanimously" in the resolution is not a fact. It does not make the fifty-seven who voted against, and those they represent, vanish from the record, nor does it relieve their questions of the need for an answer. Whether that resident of the West Flats is in the poster's "we," the poster cannot answer on her behalf; whether her brothers are in the UCSE's interior is not settled by where the "we" is drawn either: the interior is drawn by entanglement (§6).
The first sentence of the Preamble to the Charter is also a "we": "We, the people of the cities and states along the Cloud River ..." (UCSE Case 03; three things in Paper 1, §1). How the supreme rule does not produce a "we" is answered in Paper 1, §2 (N2).
Pointing back: Rousseau. On the general will, the Law Series has already conversed with Rousseau (Law Series Supplement §7), and what it presses there is: "who defined the general will?" Here this paper only goes on from that point: who speaks the "we" on the poster and in the resolution must itself be questioned; those who speak it are persons in positions. The revocation of authorization is a different topic from the same author, which the Theory of Government has taken up separately (Theory of Government Paper 6, §4).
§5 Sovereignty Is Not an Indivisible Core
The classical answer of sovereignty theory is that the highest power has an indivisible single source. Power Theory has read this answer: "The indivisibility of sovereignty reads, in the machine, as an extreme configuration of borrowing-legitimacy (narrative bearing times key-node density): to call the bearing-position an indivisible single highest source is one particular borrowing-narrative." (Power Theory Paper 0, §IV.1) That section takes Bodin and Hobbes as the classical formulations of sovereignty theory. On the indivisibility of sovereignty, this paper points back to that section.
This series derives no "last" from an indivisible sovereignty. The supreme rule, the last instance and the last force are each a function, carried by one position or by several; they are kept apart (Paper 1, N5: part is derived, and the rest is undertaken separately, following the Theory of Government; Paper 4, N19), and each lies under its own channels (Paper 7, N36). To say that keeping them apart would split sovereignty presupposes that sovereignty was an indivisible core to begin with; this series does not grant that presupposition.
With Bodin: the perpetuity of sovereignty. Jean Bodin defines sovereignty in book I, chapter 8 of The Six Bookes of a Common-weale, and the definition contains one more word: perpetual. In Knolles's English translation of 1606: "Maiestie or Soueraigntie is the most high, absolute, and perpetuall power over the citisens and subiects in a Commonweale" (The Six Bookes of a Common-weale, bk. I, ch. 8, trans. Knolles; London: G. Bishop, 1606; Perseus Digital Library e-text; tier A). He says why "perpetual" must be said: absolute power over subjects may be granted to one person or to several for a short or a fixed term, and when the term is over they are no more than subjects again; nor, while they hold it, can they call themselves sovereigns, for "they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this soueraigne power, vntill it shall please the people or the prince that gaue it them to recall it" (ibid.).
The common question is what kind of power is "last," and whether there is still anyone above it. The agreement goes this far: power that is held in trust and can be taken back is not a top; to judge it, one looks at whether there is a position above it that can take it back, not at how great it is while it is held. They part at the next step. Above those who hold in trust, Bodin looks for a perpetual holder, the people or the prince, in whose hands the power always remains; this series does not look for one. By Bodin's own criterion, no position in this series is a sovereign: every position is held in trust, and can be questioned and taken back. What takes it back is not a perpetual holder but another link in the closed loop, and the channels of internal subjects (Paper 1, §6): those who initiate are these positions and internal subjects, what is affected is the position held in trust, the party questioned cannot close it, and when it fails the account falls, as in Paper 7, N39, on positions and persons. What is perpetual is at most the level, not any position. This is a difference between the two on whether a "last" has a holder; it is not a refutation.
Pointing back: Hobbes. On the unquestionable sovereign, the Law Series has already conversed with him (Law Series Supplement §2): "over a longer time horizon, the Leviathan is a waypoint, not a destination." The Theory of Government goes on to say that Hobbes closes the chain of questioning with an unquestionable position, and that it does not close it (Theory of Government Paper 6, §3); at the national level this series does likewise: for the class of corrections that must be realized by this state, the chain is folded back, and at least forms a closed loop (Paper 1, §6). His other topic, the sovereign's judging of war and peace, is taken up separately in Paper 4, §3.
§6 What Kind of Construct a State Is
The state this series speaks of is a construct: inwardly, there is no higher level above it to govern it; outwardly, there is no higher level above it to govern what lies between it and other states. This definition is undertaken by this series itself. What happened that night on the Boundary River falls on its outward side (UCSE Case 02; §3).
The definition names an extreme. A real state may have treaty mechanisms above it that carry no force, and so stands at some distance from this end; the distance from this end changes how much external routes can make up; it does not change the taking-up at this level that the class of corrections that must be realized by this state requires. When the distance goes so far that a superior with force already stands above it, that is a level in the Theory of Government, and the separation of powers follows the undertaking of Theory of Government G26. What the stretch between the two is like, this series acknowledges as a remainder, and leaves to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation to come.
Three things are derived from this definition (own undertaking): external routes exist, but they land in this state; exit can only be lateral; the guarantee is always there. For internal acts that must be realized by this state, that is, for the class of corrections that must be realized by this state, namely those that require this state to do, or to stop, an act toward its internal subjects, external routes cannot take the place of independent implementation at this level; the range of internal checks derived from this is set out in Paper 1, §§5 and 6: what has been proved is independent implementation at this level, together with at least a closed loop when the positions already established at this level are taken as the set; at least one independent position of checking judgment at this level, full separation of the three, and day-to-day checking judgment carried by checking at this level are undertaken separately, following Theory of Government G26, and the foregoing derivation does not serve as their proof. Whether external routes are usable, and what they can deliver, is still checked item by item. Theory of Government G27 says that "each level's exit and external routes are read as they actually are, not presumed from its rank." This series does not presume that the external routes at the national level are in fact weak; those that are usable are used (Paper 5, §1); what is derived from the definition is only this: for that class of corrections to land, that step lies in this state, however strong the external routes in fact are (Paper 1, §5).
The domain.
- Inwardly, it takes up only the few things that exist only when there is no higher level above: the supreme rule, the last instance, membership, the armed forces and the exception bearing on survival, and the strong forms left at various places upstream (for the channels, see Paper 7, §1). The general governance of the national level remains in the Theory of Government; the places where the Theory of Government writes, at the national level, "not judged" or "not answered," or hands a matter to the outer layer to make up, are checked again here. The two series divide by question; they do not divide all matters exhaustively by whether there is a level above; this series is not a rewriting of the Theory of Government.
- Outwardly, it writes of what lies between states, that is, between peers whose entanglement cannot be avoided and who cannot exit from one another. The interstellar and what lies between civilizations are not in this series (Law Series P4).
- The interior is drawn by entanglement, not by citizenship. The Theory of Government says: "Jurisdiction is not the interior: those whom a level of government's acts reach and who have no way to avoid it by exiting are in its interior even if they are not in its jurisdiction" (Theory of Government G25). Extended to the national level (extension; own undertaking; Paper 3, §1): those whom this state's acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting are, as regards those acts, in this state's interior, whether or not they hold this state's membership and whether or not they are within its borders. Refugees at the door, the ordinary people of another state under sanctions, and the other side's civilians in war all come in this way (Paper 3, §5; Paper 5, §5; Paper 6, §3). How the five oughts apply to them follows the unified sentence in §8; this confers no membership on them (Paper 3, N12).
- The division at the border. How a reception camp is run is general governance at the national level, and belongs to the Theory of Government; who can come in, whether they can stay, and whether they can acquire membership belong to this series; decisions restricting personal liberty (detention, screening, restrictions on going out) go with "coming in and staying," and belong to this series (Paper 3, §§1, 5).
Entanglement, not geography. Between the three states only one thing matters: their entanglement cannot be avoided, and they cannot exit from one another; whether they share a border is not a condition, and states that share no border can still come into conflict. The locations, rivers and borders in the case file are only a backdrop. In the case of the nation-state, F6 says that "sharing one continent makes external checks hard to invoke independently" (F6 §3.1b); this series reads "sharing one continent" as entanglement that cannot be avoided. What F6 goes on to say, that "sharing a continent does not by itself prove that every external check must fail to be independent" (ibid.), holds for entanglement just as well, so this series does not derive directly from entanglement that external routes fail (Paper 1, §5).
§7 The Three States
The names of the three states have already appeared in the Introduction and in §3; here they are set out together:
| Full name | Abbreviation | Self-description (in its own words) |
|---|---|---|
| the United City-States of Ends | UCSE | a union formed under the Charter by six member units |
| the Nation Union of Telos | NUT | "The nations form a union for the common good" |
| the Democratic Republic of Purposes | DRP | "The people form a democratic republic under common purposes" |
From here on the text uses the abbreviations. The UCSE is made up of six member units; Apple City, of the Theory of Government, lies in one of them, the Kingdom State. Above the three states there is no common court, assembly or army, only bilateral treaties and protocols; the UCSE is one of the three, not a judge. The facts of every case follow the United City-States of Ends Case File (the UCSE Case File), shared by the whole series.
Leaning. When this series says that one of the three states "leans more toward" a direction, it uses two of the War Treatise's numbers; they appear here for the first time, and each is given one sentence of direction. On the 14DD side is the expansion and oppression of systemic purpose: "14DD systemic purpose is a target construction external to concrete subjects," and its internal oppression and external expansion are two sides of the same structure (War Treatise §5). On the 15DD side is the defense and resistance against it: it has no systemic purpose, and its "purpose" is "recognizing subjects as ends in themselves" (ibid.). The War Treatise judges only this one kind of war: "So SAE-defined war has only one form — 14DD systemic purpose's expansion/oppression triggering 15DD's defensive resistance." (ibid.) These are cited as they stand; their range is not altered, and no further definition is given.
A leaning is a direction, not an identity. All three states are mixed, and in each there are forces moving in both directions; to say that a state "leans more toward the 15DD direction" or "leans more toward the 14DD direction" is to say which way the systemic purpose of its construct broadly points, not to say anything about the people there. The War Treatise sets this limit itself: "what this treatise calls '14DD expansion' refers specifically to 14DD operation after it has been externalized as systemic purpose. It does not mean every individual 14DD is inherently expansionist." (ibid.) So this series does not write "a 15DD state" or "a 14DD state," and the UCSE is no exception. The NUT leans more toward the 15DD direction, and the DRP more toward the 14DD direction; whether the UCSE, under pressure, slides toward the 14DD direction is something to be written (Paper 5, §6; Paper 6, §4; Paper 7, §5).
Judgment falls on acts, not on the names of states. A measure, a law, a crossing of the boundary: each is checked on its own. That a state leans more toward the 14DD direction is no ground for presuming in advance that each of its acts is expansion or oppression; nor is a state's leaning more toward the 15DD direction a ground for presuming in advance that each of its acts is defense. This reading takes up Institution Theory Z19, "it judges the operation, not the person," and extends it to what lies between states (extension; own undertaking). The leanings of the NUT and the DRP serve only as the backdrop from which cases are drawn; they sign off in advance on no particular act.
A few disciplines. The NUT is not written as an ideal state: between it and the UCSE there is likewise no superior, and there will likewise be disagreements (Paper 5). The internal subjects of the DRP are ends all the same; this series writes no ought for the DRP's interior. "The DRP leans more toward the 14DD direction" is not used to open the door to liberation, conquest or occupation: liberating others on their behalf is exactly what that firewall of the War Treatise is there to stop (Paper 5, §2; Paper 6, §5); "colonization" is taken in the narrow sense, a boundary-crossing disguised as cultivation (the Introduction, "How to read"). "Democratic republic" is that state's name for itself, and it is not used to assess democracy or republicanism; this series does not judge which form of government is good. All three states carry "ends" in their names (Ends, Telos, Purposes); the name vouches for no direction.
§8 How This Series Speaks
The conventions of the whole series are set out here; the introductions of the later papers begin with the sentence "Conventions follow the Prequel, §8," and after it list in place only the few items that paper uses, without expanding on them. Those that are the same as in the Theory of Government follow the Theory of Government Prequel, §8, and are not rewritten: the four steps of interfacing in place, the four tiers of sources, quotation marks and addresses, the distinction between "open to questioning" and "must be questioned," and the marking of extension and own undertaking.
The three-layer sentence form.
The construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law.
A state is a construct (§1), so to the state this series says ought; those who declare war, the judges of the final instance and commanders are in positions, and to positions it says accountability; soldiers, civilians, refugees and the delegates to a constitutional convention each have their own law, and this series writes no ought for them. The series does not write "the state wants" or "the state believes"; it writes that persons in positions make the decision and that it takes effect in the state's name.
Measure. The core of this series is that persons are ends. So wherever judgment is required, this series takes the positive direction and strong judgment; at the same time it acknowledges the remainder: actual situations are more complex than philosophy supposes, and whether and how to act in a particular case rests on the judgment of the political and military leaders in their positions; the consequences are theirs to shoulder, and fall on their positions and on them as persons (Paper 7, N39). "Shoulder" names the address of the account; it adds no further kind of responsibility beyond N39. This series gives direction; it does not judge in their place, nor does it exempt them from the account. One instance in war is in Paper 6, §3: whether an act is within the cannot-not, and whether the part of it that falls on a particular person crosses the line, are two accounts. Wherever the papers use this measure, they follow this paragraph and do not state it another way.
The sentence form outward. Outwardly, this state faces two objects. Toward the other state as a construct: it does not colonize, does not decide the direction for its people, and keeps the consensus both sides have acknowledged; this series writes no ought for the other state, only how this state is to stand toward it. Toward the people of other states, it follows the sentence below, the unified sentence:
Those whom this state's acts reach and who have no way to avoid them by exiting are, as regards those acts, in this state's interior; the five oughts apply each on its own conditions (Institution Theory Z4: "the five oughts apply each on its own conditions and are not reduced for want of a position"): the first and fifth oughts (a channel that is independent, within reach, and brings no retaliation for its use) and the "not sealing the channels" half of the fourth do not vary with relational thickness; the trigger of the second does not vary with it, and its means are bounded by this state's authority at that place; the third ought, and the "leaving room" half of the fourth, go by relational thickness (the Institution Theory Prequel, §7, the entry "Relational thickness"). This confers no membership (N12).
Paper 3, N15; Paper 5, N25 and N29; and Paper 6, N32 all follow this sentence: they either write it out in full or state expressly "following the unified sentence," and do not state it another way. It extends Theory of Government G25 to the national level and beyond the border (extension; own undertaking).
"Last" is not written as exemption from questioning. Wherever something final, supreme or last is written, the same sentence or paragraph states under which channel it lies; to say that a "last" lies under a channel is to state who initiates it, which object it affects, whether the party questioned can close it, and how the account is booked when it fails (§3; Paper 7, §1). A decision at the national level is answered in three layers, following Theory of Government G6: its effect in fact; under what authority and procedure it is valid; on what grounds it may normatively be so. The three necessary conditions of the third layer apply as they stand: not crossing the line; guaranteeing the recognition-based rights embedded; openness to questioning.
Function, not form. For the separation of powers, the final instance, military power and constitutional amendment alike, only functions and independent positions are established; no agencies and no provisions are fixed; the Charter and the statutes serve only as facts, and are written "(Charter, Article N, fact)." Wherever a procedure is established, the same paragraph states the remainder it leaves, and does not declare that nothing outside the procedure can be legitimate; this does not require listing everything unknown, nor does it cancel the procedure's limited effect of closing the case.
Usage. State, construct, internal subjects; other states are peers. "The people of other states" means persons who hold the citizenship of another state or live in another state; whether, as regards a given act of this state, they are in this state's interior is recognized item by item by entanglement, and is not presumed from what they are called. "Outsiders" means those who, as regards the act in question, are not in this state's interior. The units directly below the national level, cities, States and special districts, are written "member units"; what belongs to persons is written "membership," and, as a fact in the case file, "UCSE citizenship"; "member" on its own never refers to a unit. An "act" means an action that a position of this state takes in this state's name and that acts on persons, legal and physical alike; speech by itself does not count, but publicly calling, in an official capacity, on the people of other states to take actions that put their lives at risk and that serve this state's war aims does count. The thickness of law, the thickness of provisions and of accountability, and relational thickness are named apart. The strong form and the weak form follow the Theory of Government Prequel, §8: "one and the same thing" means that subject term, object, premises and matter are all the same, and only the strength of the demand differs.
How the upstream is cited. The War Treatise is cited from its v2, whose Chinese and English editions have been unified and make the same claims: a sentence quoted from it is taken from its English text, and every citation, of a quotation or of a paraphrase, is written (War Treatise §N), with no language marked; in every case it is cited as it stands, and its range is not altered. The Conflict Treatise writes of first-person laws of one's own as they meet one another; where it is borrowed to read what lies between states, or between a state and its internal subjects, each place is marked (extension; own undertaking). Appendix B of F6 is written "F6, Appendix B, Article N (a working demonstration; used only as an example)." The three uses Azeroth has upstream are cited by their original examples; the text itself does not use it. DD numbers are used only to speak of direction (§7), never as labels for states or persons; where they occur in upstream quotations, they are kept.
The text is fictional. It cites no real events; real history is left to essays. Persons are given only by office. An example states three things before any conclusion: whom it concerns, which line is at stake, and what the baseline is; a branch is introduced with "Suppose that."
Answering the strong forms. For each strong form the upstream has left to the Theory of the State, it is stated whether it is taken, not taken, narrowed or taken up, and why. "Leaving the strong form to the Theory of the State is a division of work; it does not mean that the Theory of the State has already obtained its proof." (the Theory of Government Prequel, §8) So wherever the strong form is taken, the proof is given in this series. The seven rows are these:
| Row | Strong form | Source | Disposition | Where answered |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SF1 | The multi-branch separation of powers is a structural necessity at the national scale; the right to question can be realized at the national scale only through the multi-branch separation of powers | Law Series P3 §7, §9 | Taken, confined to the class of corrections that must be realized by this state; part is derived, and the rest is undertaken separately. Proved: implementation at this level that the position questioned cannot monopolize; taking the positions already established at this level as the set, a check at this level on each position, at least forming a closed loop. Undertaken separately: full separation of the three at this level, with checking at this level carrying day-to-day checking judgment; this undertaking includes at least one independent position of checking judgment at this level (following Theory of Government G26). "Only" is taken as far as separation in function; read as one particular form of agencies, it is not taken; by which configurations of agencies it is realized is left as a remainder | Paper 1, §§5, 6 (N5) |
| SF2 | Wartime structures must be dismantled after the war on one's own initiative | War Treatise §18, Obligation One; left by Theory of Government G31 | Taken: with the end of the war as the threshold of expiry | Paper 4, §5 (N22) |
| SF3 | The sovereign decides on the exception | Left by Theory of Government Paper 5, §4 | Not taken: the determination is not monopolized, and no position becomes final because of survival | Paper 4, §§3, 4 (N20, N21); Paper 4, §8 |
| SF4 | The construct as a whole possesses subjecthood outwardly | F6, Appendix B, Article 3(c) (a working demonstration) | Not taken: a state is a construct, not a subject | This paper, §1 |
| SF5 | The determinations of the constitutional court carry the highest authority | F6, Appendix B, Article 15(d) (a working demonstration) | Narrowed: the last authority belongs to the decision and does not reach the position; the position lies under the closed loop | Paper 2, §1 (N7) |
| SF6 | Exiting the reorganization space of the defeated party's subjectivity after the war | War Treatise §18, Obligation Two | Taken up | Paper 6, §5 (N34) |
| SF7 | Group exit (secession) requires federal consent | F6, Appendix B, Article 6(c) (a working demonstration) | Not taken: a procedure is established; secession is not vetoed unilaterally by the national level, nor are all common matters disposed of with finality by one side's unilateral declaration; the procedure does not claim to be complete, and states at least four remainders | Paper 3, §6 (N16) |
Paper 7, §5 looks back over them row by row at the close.
No Paper 0. Interfacing goes where judgment lands, and at the end of a paper a separate section may be devoted to one author from the tradition; where only secondary literature is in hand, no such section is set up, and the contrast is made in place instead, without quotation marks; the section is added once the original is in hand. The accounts received from upstream are settled in §9; the handovers downstream are in Paper 7's Interfaces.
§9 What Has Been Received, and What This Series Will Not Do for the Reader
The accounts received from upstream. "Handed over expressly" means that the upstream states that it hands the matter to the Theory of the State (or to what Moral Law calls the "SAE Political Theory series"); "handed over tacitly" means that the upstream marks off its own range without naming a destination, and the matter lands here; "no handover" means that the upstream handed nothing, and this series sets the matter up itself; "not judged" means that the upstream states expressly that it does not judge the matter at that point, and this series takes it up from there. An address being fixed is not the same as being settled; the original sentences of each item, and their verification, are in the accompanying audit table.
| Item | Source | Status | Where taken up |
|---|---|---|---|
| The outward side and borders | The Theory of Government Prequel, §7: "The outward face at the national level, borders and membership, and war go to the Theory of the State." Theory of Government Paper 4, §§2, 5; Paper 6, Interfaces; the Institution Theory Prequel, §8 | Handed over expressly | Paper 5; coming in and staying at the border, Paper 3, §5 |
| Membership | Theory of Government Paper 3, §5: "Who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State"; Paper 6, Interfaces | Handed over expressly | Paper 3 |
| War | Moral Law P7 to P9; the Institution Theory Prequel, §8; Theory of Government Papers 2, 5 and 6 | Handed over expressly | Paper 6; the armed forces and the state of war, Paper 4, §§1, 2 |
| The exception bearing on survival | Theory of Government Paper 5, §4 | Handed over expressly | Paper 4, §§3, 4 |
| Dismantling after the war on one's own initiative | Theory of Government G31: "The strong form, dismantling after the war on one's own initiative, is left to the Theory of the State." | Handed over expressly | Paper 4, §5 (N22) |
| The general rule for strong forms | The Theory of Government Prequel, §8 | Handed over expressly | The whole series; the table in §8 |
| 14DD against 14DD | War Treatise §5: "14DD against 14DD is not within this treatise's discussion range." | Handed over tacitly | Paper 6, §4 (N33), taking up only the stretch where both sides' acts have crossed the boundary |
| The ought of the "war-party" | The Second Critique, Ch. 6 §7: the group layer, no address yet | Handed over tacitly | Paper 6, §2 (N31), taking up only the construct's slot |
| The constitution | — | No handover | Paper 1 |
| The final instance | — | No handover | Paper 2 |
| The armed forces | — (F6 §3.1b lists the allocation and constraint of military power among the increments at the nation-state tier) | No handover | Paper 4, §§1, 2 |
| Colonization and empire | — (Obligation Two of War Treatise §18 was not handed over by name) | No handover | Paper 5, §2 (N25); Paper 6, §5 (N34) |
| Whether there are external routes above the national level | Theory of Government Paper 4, §5 states expressly that it does not judge this | Not judged | This paper, §6, by definition; the class of corrections that must be realized by this state, Paper 1, §§5, 6, where part is derived and the rest is undertaken separately, following the Theory of Government |
The name of the destination. The destination Moral Law P7 to P9 write down is the "SAE Political Theory series": "War has been moved out of this series — it falls within the independently treated SAE Political Theory series." (Moral Law P9 §1.1) Institution Theory records it as the Theory of the State, and states that this is its own relabeling (Institution Theory Paper 0, §10.4). This series stands at that destination, and does not set up "Political Theory series" as a separate overarching name.
To whom the rest is handed. The interstellar and what lies between civilizations, and the law above states, go to Law Series P4; third-state rescue in the face of large-scale line-crossing inside another state, how treaty mechanisms above states bind states, multi-state systems of cooperation, the common procedure for multilateral sanctions, and how the exit from or switching of an external arrangement is to be reviewed, and by whom, go to the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation; the design of constitutional orders and agencies goes to specific theories of institutions; the person's side, and the group layer registered by The Second Critique, go to the Critiques; real history goes to essays. Each item is listed in Paper 7's Interfaces.
What this series will not do for the reader. There are three things this series will not do for the reader. It does not write how to achieve anything: no constitution, no military system and no diplomatic program can be given here. It does not write oughts for persons: this series says accountability to the positions of officeholders, judges and soldiers; how one person is to treat another goes to the Critiques. It does not judge, on the reader's behalf, the state the reader lives in: the main line is a ruler; where to measure, how, and what the measurement shows rest with the reader.
What this series gives the reader is only this ruler; whether to take it up and ask, and whom to ask, is the reader's own affair.
Papers
- Prequel: What a State Is Not (this paper)
- Paper 1: The Last Rule
- Paper 2: The Last Instance
- Paper 3: The Last Exit
- Paper 4: The Last Force
- Paper 5: One Another, with No Superior
- Paper 6: The Last Resort
- Paper 7: Questioning the Last Layer (including the close of the whole series)
Eight papers in all; there is no Paper 0 (§8).
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662
Qin, H. (2026). What an Institution Is Not (SAE Institution Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269330
Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Guarding the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270766
Qin, H. (2026). Between One Another (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271072
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). Institution Theory and the Tradition: The Address of the Ought (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23272468
Qin, H. (2026). What a Government Is Not (SAE Theory of Government, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23411670
Qin, H. (2026). Judgment (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23412130
Qin, H. (2026). Compulsion (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413056
Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112
Qin, H. (2026). Levels (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413192
Qin, H. (2026). Emergency (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413413
Qin, H. (2026). Questioning and Bearing (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511
Qin, H. (2026). The Power Machine and Its Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20707047
Qin, H. (2026). On the Morphology of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20455221
Qin, H. (2026). On the Cultivation and Diachronic Unfolding of Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21252863
Qin, H. (2026). National Law — Azeroth: A Negative Thought Experiment on the Structural Necessity of Law (SAE Law Series, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19548596
Qin, H. (2026). Interstellar Law and Grand Closure — The Recession of Coercive Law (SAE Law Series, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19549018
Qin, H. (2026). A Posterior Dialogue with Western Jurisprudence (SAE Law Series, Supplement) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19551526
Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628
Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617
Qin, H. (2026). 15DD Phase Transition and the Historical Manifestation of Individual 15DD (SAE Moral Law, Paper 7) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20177415
Qin, H. (2026). Collective 15DD and the Four-Stage Evolution of Community Form (SAE Moral Law, Paper 8) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20218248
Qin, H. (2026). The Institutional Architecture of Mixed Reality: The Phase-Transition Evolution of Cultivation and Colonization (SAE Moral Law, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20262737
Qin, H. (2026). SAE: The Second Critique [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23250387
Bodin, J. (1606). The Six Bookes of a Common-weale. Trans. R. Knolles. London: G. Bishop. Book I, ch. 8. Perseus Digital Library (Perseids reader). https://fgh.perseids.org/read/pdlpsci/bodin/livrep/perseus-eng1/1.8 (accessed 2026-10-17)
Interfaces
- Main upstream: the Theory of Government (the Prequel, §§7, 8, 9; Paper 1, G1, G6; Paper 2 (the account table in §9); Paper 3, §5; Paper 4, G25–G27 and §§2, 5; Paper 5, G31 and §4; Paper 6, G36, §§3, 4 and Interfaces); Institution Theory (the Prequel, §§1, 7, 8; Paper 2 (the line); Z4, Z7a, Z19, Z31, Z37, Z38, Z39; Paper 0, §10.4); F6, How Is Institution Possible (§2.1, Premise I; §2.3; §3.1b; Appendix B, Articles 3, 6 and 15, used only as examples).
- Also used: Power Theory (P2 §V.1, §V.3; Paper 0, §IV.1); Rights Theory P6 F26; Law Series P3, P4 and Supplement; Conflict Treatise (conventions); War Treatise §5, §15, §18; Moral Law P7 and P8 (the account table in §9), P9 §1.1; The Second Critique, Ch. 6 §7.
- Interfacing: Bodin (the perpetuity of sovereignty, The Six Bookes of a Common-weale, bk. I, ch. 8; trans. Knolles, 1606; tier A). Pointing back: Hegel (Power Theory P2 §V.1); Bodin, the indivisibility of sovereignty (Power Theory Paper 0, §IV.1); Rousseau (Law Series Supplement §7; Theory of Government Paper 6, §4); Hobbes (Law Series Supplement §2; Theory of Government Paper 6, §3).
- This series: Papers 1 through 7; the class of corrections that must be realized by this state, Paper 1, §§5, 6, with what is proved and what is undertaken separately kept apart; the channels of the six "lasts," listed place by place in Paper 7, §1.
- Handed to Paper 1: what a state is not has been cleared away; on what grounds its supreme rule stands, and who can change it, begins in Paper 1.