Chokepoints
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Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.

Introduction

In the autumn of Year 23, Springhollow Water Company issued one and the same notice to two villages: where charges were four full months in arrears, the water supply would be stopped.

Springhollow lies in the hills of the northern Kingdom State, about two hours' drive from Apple City. It has two villages: Upper Hollow, with about four hundred households, and Lower Hollow, with about six hundred. Each village had long had a few public old wells. From Year 16 to Year 19 the old wells of Upper Hollow dried up one after another; the State Geological Survey's report of Year 19 said: "The groundwater level has fallen; the cause has not been determined." The old wells of Lower Hollow were still giving water in Year 18; the State Health Agency had tested them twice, and once the bacteria count exceeded the standard.

In Year 17 Springhollow Water Company was founded; its shareholders were the Stone Bridge Franchise Company (thirty percent) and several investors from Apple City. In the same year the State Water Resources Agency issued the company a water-abstraction permit for the spring, and the permit states that this water is for the public water supply of the two villages of Upper Hollow and Lower Hollow. The company draws water from a spring behind the hill, purifies it at a treatment station, and in Year 18 laid its pipe network to the two villages. It is the only piped-water supplier in Springhollow, and it has fourteen employees.

The two villages were connected to the network in different ways. In Year 18 the company signed a Pipe Network and Water Source Agreement with the Lower Hollow village committee: the company would pay for laying the pipes, and the water price would be halved for the first two years; the village committee would transfer to the company the plots on which the three old wells stood, "to ensure water quality and a unified supply," and the company would fill the old wells in. The agreement was put to a vote of the Lower Hollow village assembly, and about sixty percent were in favor. That winter the old wells were filled in. Upper Hollow had no such agreement; the company laid its pipes there at the same price, and each household connected and paid at the stated price. In Year 19 the company connected the two villages' primary schools free of charge.

In the spring of Year 23 the company announced that the water price would rise by sixty percent, giving as its reasons that the spring's output was falling and that the treatment station needed new equipment. The Kingdom State's Public Utilities Act covers only water suppliers serving five thousand households or more, and the State Public Utilities Commission has no authority over Springhollow's water price. By the autumn, about one hundred and twenty households in the two villages together were more than three months in arrears, and so the notice came. None of the substitutes the two villages could turn to was easy: hiring water trucks from Apple City cost about four times the price of tap water per ton; drilling a new well required a permit from the State Water Resources Agency, and when the Upper Hollow village committee applied in the spring of Year 23 to drill one, the permit was under review for five months, with no result; the former well sites of Lower Hollow already belonged to the company.

In the winter of Year 23 the company cut off the water to twenty-three households, nine in Upper Hollow and fourteen in Lower Hollow; in two of them there were bedridden elderly people. The company said: "We have only stopped supplying our water; we have taken nothing from anyone." Villagers in Lower Hollow asked for the old wells to be reopened; the company answered: "The plots already belong to the company."

The Public Utilities Act, the water-abstraction permit, this agreement and that notice, and, later in the paper, the Kingdom State's Wage Payment Act, the State Labor Agency's written reply, and the contracts and the program document in Bluekiln, are all examples set up by this series; the provisions this paper cites serve only as facts, and this series does not claim that they are the best design.

Is one and the same notice, in the two villages, one and the same thing? The company's sentence, "only stopped supplying our water": in which village, and for which household, does it hold, and where does it not? The Lower Hollow agreement was passed by the village assembly: does this change the reading? Springhollow Water Company has only fourteen people: is its power small or large?

This paper asks at the level of relations: when an economic position becomes a place others cannot get around, and whether, when they cannot get around it, the people there still have a real way. The Prequel said that capital is not the source of power, and that power lies in the position that can mobilize accumulation; Paper 1 said that an accumulation shows a power-face only when it actually converges others (Paper 1, E3). This paper looks at where convergence goes deepest: down onto people's livelihoods and lives, down onto the road by which people go where they go.

The paper has nine sections. The first six are in Springhollow. It first says what a chokepoint is (§1); then how many readings ceasing one's own supply has (§2); why, where others' way has first been sealed off, lifting the closure is required (§3); which resources count as the content of basic rights, and why the normative layer does not settle this (§4); when a condition becomes force (§5); what accountability the sole position of supply at the life-substrate holds, and what accountability the institution that manages it holds (§6). The last three sections go to Bluekiln: several constraints together crossing the line (§7); which of non-compete agreements and conditional payments leaves the person's choice in place (§8); whether exit is real, and what is guarded (§9).

The reading follows the Prequel: the construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law. Springhollow Water Company, Bluekiln Porcelain Works and the Lower Hollow village committee are constructs, and take the ought; this paper writes no ought for the households that use the water or for the employees. The division into the normative layer, the rule layer and the judgment layer also follows the Prequel, and this paper says, where it uses them, which sentence falls at which layer.

§1 Chokepoints

Springhollow Water Company has only fourteen employees. Does it count as a large power?

By its assets, its revenue and its headcount, it is small. Yet in the winter the water was cut off, nine households in Upper Hollow and fourteen in Lower Hollow depended on it for a mouthful of drinkable water; in two of them there were bedridden elderly people. If they were to drink, they could not get around it.

This paper calls such a position a chokepoint: the position others cannot get around on the way to sustaining their lives or unfolding their own paths. A water source is one; the sole employer in a town is one; hiring and admission, credit, and certification can all be one as well. Their structure is the same: the road others must travel passes through this point, and this point can let them through, or not.

A chokepoint has two magnitudes. One is breadth: how many people must pass through it. The other is depth: when one cannot get around it, which dimension of a person it presses on. Breadth looks at scale; depth looks at where it presses. An online marketplace that tens of thousands of sellers must pass through has great breadth; what it presses on in a seller is, for the most part, business. The water company in Springhollow is the reverse: no more than a thousand or so households pass through it, so its breadth is small; but what it presses on in the households whose water was cut off is drinking, the life-substrate. So at the level of relations depth is looked at, and at the level of scale, breadth; how breadth is subject to checks that increase with scale is in Paper 3 (Paper 3, E14). This section says only one thing: small power can run deep. A company of fourteen people can hold the water of a thousand households.

Where a chokepoint lies depends on whether it can be got around, not on whether there is nominally another way. Springhollow nominally had three: hiring water trucks, drilling a new well, reopening the old wells. Trucked water cost about four times the price of tap water per ton; Upper Hollow's permit for a new well was under review at the State Water Resources Agency for five months, with no result; Lower Hollow's old wells had already been filled in, and the well sites had passed to the company. All three ways were there, and in that winter each had its own obstacle. The obstacles differ: one is cost, one is stuck at an approval in the state, and one was given away earlier by an agreement. Because the obstacles differ, the readings in the sections that follow differ too (§§2 and 3). For which households all three ways were closed must be examined household by household; for the households whose water was cut off and who could not afford trucked water at four times the price, this is a chokepoint. This section identifies only this.

To identify a chokepoint is only to identify where questions are to be asked, not to judge that it crosses the line. Springhollow Water Company gave the two villages tap water for the first time, and also connected the two villages' primary schools free of charge; the chokepoint has opened ways for people, and this side is recorded as it is. From the next section on, what is to be asked is: at this chokepoint, what has this company done, and in which reading does each of these things fall?

The twenty-three households whose water was cut off, and the other households paying water charges sixty percent higher, all stand under this point. In asking whether it is a chokepoint, and which dimension it presses on, the starting point used for comparison must be stated village by village. For Upper Hollow, take the supply before the price adjustment of Year 23; Upper Hollow's old wells had been drying up since Year 16, the cause not determined, so they are not used for comparison, nor is the wells' drying up laid at the company's door. For Lower Hollow, take the old wells before they were filled in Year 18; those wells were still giving water, and in the State Health Agency's tests the bacteria count had once exceeded the standard. The price before the adjustment is a historical figure, used only for comparison; it does not automatically become the price there ought to be.

A common rebuttal is that a high price at a chokepoint is a signal. When the price is high, substitutes will come in: water carriers, well drillers, another waterworks; to treat a chokepoint as a place where questions are to be asked is to stop the price from doing its work. This rebuttal has its grounds: the company says that the spring's output is falling and that the treatment station needs new equipment; if so, there may be real costs behind the price rise; and prices do often bring substitutes in this way. But for a signal to work, the substitutes must be able to come in. In Springhollow, of the ways in, one cost four times as much, one had been under review in the state for five months, and one already belonged to the company; at least in the winter of the cut-off, this signal did not bring substitutes in. To say that this is a chokepoint is to say only this, not that the price rise crosses the line; as to whether the price is "too high," the normative layer gives no scale (§4).

What this section says falls at the three layers differently. The definition of a chokepoint and its two magnitudes are at the normative layer. Which positions in a state usually count as chokepoints, such as water, electricity, a sole employer, or a particular qualifying certificate, can be given as examples at the rule layer. Whether a particular position is a chokepoint at a particular moment is at the judgment layer, and is left to the positions that are to make that judgment.

Why Upper Hollow's old wells dried up, the State Geological Survey says, has not been determined; this is recorded as it stands, and this paper does not fill it in.

E7 Chokepoint: the position others cannot get around. A position others cannot get around on the way to sustaining their lives or unfolding their own paths is a chokepoint: a water source, a sole employer, hiring and admission, credit, certification share one structure. A chokepoint has two magnitudes: breadth, how many people must pass through it; depth, which dimension it presses on when one cannot get around it. At the level of relations depth is looked at; at the level of scale, breadth; small power can run deep. Whether it is a chokepoint depends on whether it can actually be got around, not on whether there is nominally another way. To identify a chokepoint is only to identify where questions are to be asked, not to judge that it crosses the line (own undertaking).

§2 Three Readings of Ceasing One's Own Supply

The company said: "We have only stopped supplying our water; we have taken nothing from anyone." When does this sentence hold?

When Rights Theory treats the limit and violation of basic rights, it meets the same question: a person lives on another's continuing supply; when the supplying party withdraws, is that violation? It first marks off three different situations: "Actively severing an existing circuit is one: the agent has laid hands on the subject's maintenance topology — gatekeeping, interception, monopolization. The failure of an institutionally embedded position of supply is another: an institutionalized position of provision collapses, and that is the recognition layer's affair … Bare natural scarcity is the third: no agent, no interference with an existing circuit, the resource itself runs dry — this is not a rights event." (Rights Theory P5 §II) The dividing lines of all three situations lie in structure: "a violation on the basic layer is confined to action upon the existing thick layer and contains no claim upon future supply." (ibid.)

This division governs the Base Layer: what a basic right protects is that already incorporated dimensions not be closed, not that another's supply be requisitioned as a duty. On this division, and together with the division On Rights and Entitlements draws for what is "already loaded," this series sets out three readings of ceasing supply (own undertaking). They are not the original three situations under new names; they arrange the matter of ceasing supply afresh: the original third, bare natural scarcity, appears here only as a case to be excluded; what is newly brought in is how the withdrawal of a giving is to be read once it has been promised or embedded.

First reading: where one's own supply has not been promised, has not been embedded, and has not been preceded by sealing off the way, ceasing it does not constitute severing.

Rights Theory says: "withdrawing one's own supply while sealing no one else's way of taking over is disposing of one's own exercise under one's own law, with no hand laid on the dependent's maintenance topology." And again: "Where there is neither a hand laid nor an embedded position, the withdrawal registers on no gradation within the structure of rights" (Rights Theory P5 §II). What these two sentences speak of is a subject, disposing of its own exercise under its own law. Springhollow Water Company is not such a subject; it is a construct. Theory of Government said this clearly when it carried the same slot over to a level of government: a construct has no law of its own, "and so it has no such exercise of its own to dispose of. So what is carried over is only the half that concerns the reading: in this slot, ceasing to give is not read as violation; whether it may cease, and how, goes back to the third ought and to the explanation of Z25 (extension; own undertaking)." (Theory of Government Paper 3, §5)

Carried over to a company, too, only this half is carried (own undertaking). Even where a supply falls in this slot, "only stopped supplying our water" earns only "not read as violation"; it does not earn "no explanation needed": whether to stop, and how to stop, this company must explain.

Second reading: where the supply has been promised or embedded, its withdrawal is examined separately by the register it has entered.

Rights Theory goes on in that passage: "If continuing supply is to become something claimable, it is constituted as an institutionally embedded position at the recognition layer; it is not constituted as the content of a basic right." (Rights Theory P5 §II) On Rights and Entitlements, in treating when a giving is no longer something that may be freely ceased, draws a boundary: "a giving already loaded through promise, institution, trust, guardianship, or recognition-based loading is no longer a giving in this bare register; it has entered another register, and its withdrawal is then placed by the register it has entered … no longer read by bare entitlement's free cessation." (On Rights and Entitlements F30) The original speaks of the granting end of a bare entitlement; here it is extended to suppliers in the economy (own undertaking).

Embedding does not come only through promise. Lower Hollow has an agreement: the company paid for the pipes and promised a "unified supply"; this is a promise. Upper Hollow has no agreement, but Upper Hollow's households connected to the company's network and for the five years since have paid at the stated price; the company collects charges from each household, and, for those in arrears, that notice set a rule of "four full months." The network has all along treated these households as holding a conditional, claimable position of supply. By the "recognition-based loading" in On Rights and Entitlements' boundary, Upper Hollow's supply too is in this register, not in the bare register. The water-abstraction permit the State Water Resources Agency issued to the company also states that this water is for the public water supply of the two villages. Where this embedding comes from, and on what it stands, §6 writes.

Third reading: first sealing off the way exclusively, inducing dependence, and then using it as leverage or withdrawing, is severing.

Rights Theory says: "first monopolizing exclusively so that substitute circuits are sealed, then withdrawing; or first inducing dependency — closing the dependent's own pre-existing self-maintained circuit — then withdrawing. Monopolization and induced dependency are themselves the severing; the withdrawal only completes it, and splitting the act in two does not change the reading." In the same place it guards against too wide a reading: "Mere factual irreplaceability is not monopolization: monopolization requires the exclusive laying of hands" (Rights Theory P5 §II).

By this sentence the two villages are told apart. Upper Hollow has a sole supply, but this "sole," so far as the facts show, was not brought about by the company: Upper Hollow's old wells dried up one after another, the State Geological Survey says the cause has not been determined, and the facts do not record that the company caused the wells to dry up; the permit for a new well lies with the State Water Resources Agency. The facts do not show the company laying hands on Upper Hollow's circuits. Lower Hollow is different: the agreement transferred the plots of the old wells to the company, and the company filled the old wells in. That was an exclusive laying of hands, and the next section reads it on its own.

The three readings can coexist. They are not a matter of putting a whole case into one box. One and the same arrangement can have both a promise or embedding and a prior history of sealing off the way. Lower Hollow is like this: the agreement is a promise, and filling the wells is sealing off the way first. Each is booked by its own source and effect, and neither cancels the other: having a promise does not wash out the filling of the wells; reading the filling of the wells as severing does not cancel the examination of the promised supply either.

The normative layer must also say something on the reverse side. The normative layer sets no general duty of supply on holders: basic rights do not thereby generate a general claim on any holder's future supply; a person cannot, because he needs it, requisition another's supply into a duty owed to himself. This sentence does not wash out supply already promised or embedded; where such supply falls in the Base Layer, it is handled under the requirement of securing. It says only that in the first reading the holder has no duty to continue supply. What must be kept on withdrawal is not sealing off others' way of taking over. In Springhollow one way of taking over is stuck at the outer layer: Upper Hollow's permit to drill a new well lies with the State Water Resources Agency, under review for five months with no result. If there is a sealing-off here, the party that seals is at the state layer, not the company.

What follows is a hypothetical case.

Suppose that, in Year 24, the company, on the ground that "the spring is no longer worth operating," gives six months' notice that it will stop supplying water to the whole of Upper Hollow and will leave the pipe network to the village.

The starting point of this case must be written as it was: in the winter of Year 23, nine households in Upper Hollow had already had their water cut off; the case reckons from the state of things at that time, and is not written as if everyone in the village were being supplied normally. By the readings above, Upper Hollow's supply entered through recognition-based loading and is not in the first reading; the company cannot take it back on the strength of the words "no longer operating" alone. Leaving the pipe network to the village does not, as an item, seal off the village's way; but a pipe network without the spring and without the treatment station will not give water by itself. Whether six months' notice is enough, and who takes over and how, this section does not answer; that is the division between the efficacy of accountability and the procedure of exit, in §6.

Whether a given supply is in the slot of bare entitlement, Theory of Government says, in treating a government's supply, is "tested item by item" (Theory of Government G21); here this is extended to a company's supply (own undertaking). This paper has read only the two villages of Springhollow; which reading a supply elsewhere falls in is at the judgment layer, examined item by item.

E8 Three readings of ceasing one's own supply. Rights Theory P5 §II separates three situations: actively severing an existing circuit; the failure of an institutionally embedded position of supply; bare natural scarcity. On this division, and together with On Rights and Entitlements F30, this series sets out three readings of ceasing supply (own undertaking). First, where one's own supply has not been promised, has not been embedded, and has not been preceded by sealing off the way, ceasing it does not constitute severing; carried over to a construct, only the half that concerns the reading is carried: in this slot, ceasing to give is not read as violation; whether it may cease, and how, goes back to the construct's burden of explanation (Theory of Government Paper 3, §5). Second, where the supply has been promised or embedded, its withdrawal is examined separately by the register it has entered (On Rights and Entitlements F30; the original speaks of the granting end of a bare entitlement; here it is extended to the supplier; own undertaking); embedding does not come only through promise: a continuing supply, where those supplied have connected to the network and pay at the stated price, and the network treats them as holding a claimable position, also enters this register through recognition-based loading; the right on the side of those supplied must run through the three-fold interlock before it generates, in this register, an accountability on the side of the supplier (E11a). Third, first sealing off the way exclusively, inducing dependence, and then using it as leverage or withdrawing, is severing, and splitting the act in two does not change the reading; mere factual irreplaceability is not monopolization. The three readings are not mutually exclusive bins for a whole case: within one arrangement, embedding and prior sealing-off may both need examining; each is booked by its own source and effect, and they do not cancel each other. The normative layer sets no general duty of supply on holders: basic rights do not thereby generate a general claim on any holder's future supply; supply already promised or embedded is examined separately by its source, and where it falls in the Base Layer it is handled under the requirement of securing. A withdrawal must not seal off others' way of taking over.

§3 Lifting a Closure Is Ceasing to Compress

Villagers in Lower Hollow asked for the old wells to be reopened. The company answered: "The plots already belong to the company."

First, Lower Hollow's matter set out in order. Before Year 18, Lower Hollow had three public old wells that still gave water; the State Health Agency had tested them twice, and once the bacteria count exceeded the standard. In Year 18 the village committee signed an agreement with the company: the company would pay for the pipes, and the water price would be halved for the first two years; the village committee would transfer to the company the plots on which the three old wells stood, "to ensure water quality and a unified supply," and the company would fill the old wells in. The village assembly voted, and about sixty percent were in favor. That winter the old wells were filled in. Five years later the water price rose by sixty percent, and in the winter of Year 23 fourteen households in Lower Hollow had their water cut off. They turned back to the old wells; the wells had been filled in, and the land already belonged to the company.

For the fourteen households in Lower Hollow whose water was cut off, and for the other households of Lower Hollow, the way they once had of maintaining their own water is now not in their hands. How that way was lost, and who should do what now that it is gone: for this, two historical facts must first be kept apart: three old wells that gave water, and one test in which the bacteria count exceeded the standard. The former does not cease to count as a way because of the latter, and the latter does not cease to count as a real concern because of the former.

Rights Theory gives a criterion: "A resource is not itself a dimension, but closing a dimension by way of it is still a violation of that dimension." (Rights Theory P2) A well is not a basic right; the dimension of life that drinking water maintains is. Filling in a well is not in itself violation; but if the well was a household's pre-existing circuit for maintaining this dimension itself, then filling it in, taking the land away, and then leaving this dimension maintainable only through one company's pipes, is laying hands on the circuit. The third reading of the previous section governs just this kind of thing: first closing the pre-existing self-maintained circuit, inducing dependence, then withdrawing; splitting the act in two does not change the reading.

Reading Lower Hollow by this criterion, the facts point here: filling the wells and taking the land were the company's acts, made through the agreement; the cut-off came five years later, and is the second step. The cut-off of the fourteen households in Lower Hollow is read differently from the cut-off of the nine households in Upper Hollow. Upper Hollow's way, so far as the facts show, was not cut by the company, and the cause of its old wells' drying up has not been determined; part of Lower Hollow's way was taken by the company.

Where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands that has closed others' pre-existing self-maintained circuits, lifting that closure is required. The ground is ceasing to compress, not granting a new right. This distinction must be drawn precisely, because the two phrasings lead to two different things. To say "granting a right" is to rest the ground for lifting the closure on a new claim to water by the people of Lower Hollow against the company; the normative layer sets no general duty of supply (§2). The ground for this lifting comes from ceasing to compress; the promise in the agreement, and the accountability of supply at this position, are examined separately under §2 and §6. To say "ceasing to compress" is to say that the company still holds, over Lower Hollow, a closure it made itself; what it must stop is going on holding it. How it stops may be reopening the old wells, may be giving an equally usable way elsewhere, or may be another supply that is secured; this is at the rule layer and the judgment layer, and this paper does not choose for it.

The way of stopping has boundaries of its own. Institution Theory says: "Dismantling is also an act of the construct: the dismantling itself may not cross the line, for instance by first sealing off people's pre-existing self-maintained or substitute circuits, so that they can depend only on that supply, and then withdrawing; this part falls under the first ought and is not discounted (own undertaking)" (Institution Theory Z38). In lifting one closure, another may not be shut.

There is also that vote. The agreement was passed by the village assembly, with about sixty percent in favor. Does this change the reading?

Rights Theory has answered a sharper question: a subject declares that it voluntarily hands over its encapsulation, letting another position decide for it; does this change the judgment? "It does not. The criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness. What structure separates is authorization from the surrender of position." (Rights Theory P5 §III) Revocable authorization is the subject's committing certain decisions to another position while retaining revocation and exit; the surrender of position that seals revocation and exit is another matter. The original speaks of a subject and its own encapsulation; here it is extended to a village ceding its own circuit for maintaining its water (own undertaking). What is carried over is this: a vote in favor does not by itself change the structural reading. What must be looked at is what was ceded that time. The half price for the first two years and the pipes paid for were things that can be priced and renegotiated; they were exchange. The plots of three wells were transferred and the wells filled in: the village's pre-existing way of maintaining its own water was shut by this cession, and to get it back the facts show no ready way. Whether this is a surrender of position that seals revocation also depends on whether the agreement left the village a channel of amendment or exit; that part of the agreement the facts do not record, and this paper does not fill it in. On what is recorded, what was shut was a self-maintained circuit, and this item is read under the third reading.

And the rest? The record has only about sixty percent in favor; it does not record whether the rest were against, abstained or were absent. This paper does not fill these in as opposition. What is to be said is only this: what binds those who did not express consent is an act made by the village committee as a construct. Institution Theory says that an institution's acts cross no line against any internal subject (Institution Theory Z9); the village committee's act of signing this agreement and ceding the whole village's circuit is examined separately by its own authority and by Z9.

This judgment has not yet been made by any position in the facts. The State Public Utilities Commission has no authority over Springhollow's water price; nor do the facts record any lawsuit. Read to this point, the facts point to this: the cut-off in Lower Hollow is in the third reading, and the company holds there a closure that is to be lifted. As for who is to rule on it and how it is to be lifted, the facts do not record which position can deal with it, or how far; what is recorded is two things: the State Water Resources Agency's water-abstraction permit states that this water is for the public water supply of the two villages, and the State Public Utilities Commission has no authority over the water price. How this is settled is a matter for the manager's side, which §6 takes up.

Someone will say that Lower Hollow voted for this itself, that the majority got the benefit, and that the water quality really was a problem; to come back for the wells only now that the water has been cut off is to change the contract after the fact. The weight of this view is that the agreement gave Lower Hollow real things: pipes paid for, two years at half price, peace of mind after a test that exceeded the standard; and the village assembly did indeed vote. But what is to be lifted here is not the whole agreement, only the part of it that ceded the circuit. The half price and the pipes are examined separately as promised supply, under the second reading; filling the wells and taking the land are read under the third. The benefits of the agreement are recorded as they are; they do not cancel that closure, and that closure does not make the rest of the agreement void across the board.

What the water quality would be once the old wells were reopened, and who would look after it, is at the judgment layer, and this paper does not fill it in.

E9 Lifting a closure is ceasing to compress, not granting a right. "A resource is not itself a dimension, but closing a dimension by way of it is still a violation of that dimension." (Rights Theory P2) Where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands that has closed others' pre-existing self-maintained circuits, lifting that closure is required; the ground is ceasing to compress, not granting a new right. Dismantling and withdrawal may not themselves first seal off the way (Institution Theory Z38). A majority vote to cede a circuit does not by itself change the structural reading: the criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness; revocable authorization and the surrender of position that seals revocation are read apart (Rights Theory P5 §III; the original speaks of a subject and its own encapsulation; here it is extended to a village ceding its self-maintained circuit; own undertaking). How those who did not consent are bound by this is examined separately by the act of the construct that made the binding (Institution Theory Z9). How the closure is lifted lies at the rule layer and the judgment layer.

§4 Which Resources Count as the Content of Basic Rights

What follows is another hypothetical case.

Suppose that, in the summer of Year 24, a flash flood damaged Springhollow's treatment station. The company repaired it in three days; for the first month after the repair it charged three times the usual price, saying: "The cost of the emergency repair has to be recovered."

Does water count as a basic right? Does three times the price for a month cross the line?

The first question first. This series does not open a list of "the content of basic rights" at the normative layer. The normative layer sets only criteria. Rights Theory gives two: "The first is the type criterion: a candidate must be an independently addressable dimension of being, cognition, or unfolding in the subject's structure, not an external resource, input, tool, or substitutable means that sustains some dimension. The second is the constitution criterion: compressing this dimension directly compresses the subject's capacity to sustain the bearer of its own law, or to form, revise, or carry out its own law. Only what passes both enters the thick layer." (Rights Theory P2) By these two, water is a resource, not a dimension; life and body are dimensions. So the same paper says that nutrition, material conditions and the like are "in themselves resources or supporting conditions; they do not become rights automatically by being important," while "the deprivation of these conditions, if it directly closes off life, body, or expression, basic dimensions already admitted, can be judged, in the paper on limit and violation, a violation of a basic right" (Rights Theory P2).

This turns the question around: not whether water is on a list, but whether a particular action, by way of water, has closed which dimension of whom. Rights Theory holds to this layer when it treats property, too: of the end of property rights that has a basic component, "that basic component is anchored in P2's dimensions, not in livelihood or bare subsistence, names of resources that move with the times" (Rights Theory P4 §VI; P2 is Rights Theory P2). The names of resources change with the times: electricity, the network, a certain medicine; what is not there today may be there tomorrow. Anchored in dimensions, the criterion does not drift with the names.

This is not to say a list is useless. A state can list in its law which supplies count as supply at the life-substrate: water, electricity, heating; what it lists are examples at the rule layer; examples are not norms, and no claim is made that this is the best way to list them. Whether a particular supply, in a particular month, falls on the life-substrate for a particular household is at the judgment layer.

Then the second question. Three times the price does not by itself complete a normative judgment. What the emergency repair cost, the facts do not say; a figure of three times, on its own, cannot tell whether the price is too high. The normative layer gives a price no scale. What is to be asked is on whom this price falls: households that can pay paid an extra month's money; for households that cannot pay, if their water was cut off on this account, that part is no longer only a matter of price; by way of water it has touched the dimension of life. How that part is read is in the next section; how those who cannot pay are kept from being cut off is in §6.

This question has been asked before. There are two places that can be set beside it; this paper relies on both only through secondary accounts, puts neither in quotation marks, and draws no conclusion from either.

One is Polanyi. In The Great Transformation (1944) he says that labor, land and money are not produced for sale, and that treating them as commodities is a "fiction"; leaving them wholly to the market mechanism would tear society itself apart, and so calls forth a countermovement that protects society (per secondary sources). What he asks is close to what is asked here: some things cannot be treated as ordinary commodities. He starts from kinds of things, and lists labor, land and money; this paper starts from dimensions and actions, lists no kinds of things, and asks only by way of which thing an action has closed which dimension of whom. Whether the two starting points finally agree, this paper, relying on secondary accounts, does not conclude.

The other is Thompson. In "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" (1971) he wrote of the English crowd in years of dearth: they held that bread and grain had a customary fair price; when grain dealers and millers raised prices on the strength of the scarcity, the crowd went to stop them, and sometimes set the price themselves and sold at it; Thompson called this commonly held set of norms a "moral economy," set against the political economy of the free grain market then rising (per secondary sources). The threefold price after the flash flood meets just this: the price at a chokepoint in a time of scarcity. In this series' reading, a "fair price" held by a community is that community's recognition and custom, and can become something at the rule layer; the normative layer does not take any one price as its criterion, and what it asks is still whether that price shuts those who cannot pay out of the life-substrate.

The cost of the emergency repair has not been quantified; whether three times is "recovering the cost" is at the judgment layer.

E10 Which resources count as the content of basic rights is not settled at the normative layer. The normative layer sets only criteria: for a dimension to enter the Base Layer it must pass the type criterion and the constitution criterion (Rights Theory P2); a resource does not become a right by being important; only closing an already incorporated dimension by way of it is violation. The end of property rights that has a basic component is anchored in dimensions, not in names of resources that move with the times (Rights Theory P4 §VI). The list lies at the rule layer, as examples; whether a particular supply falls on the life-substrate lies at the judgment layer. The level of a price does not, by itself alone, complete a normative judgment.

§5 Force Is Recognized Only Where Judgment Is Substituted

The notice says: where charges are four full months in arrears, the water supply will be stopped. The company uses water as a condition, and what it asks for is the water charges owed. Is this force?

Withdrawing one's own cooperation is a check; taking away what is the other party's own is force: the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation set this down between states. What is withheld is what the party applying pressure was to give, and whether to give it is a judgment that party makes on its own affairs; taking away what is the other party's own is making that judgment for the other party (Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 4, XZ22 and §2).

This question first needs a test. The test has its source in two places where Institution Theory speaks of the line: "if effluent presses on the bodies and livelihoods of the household downstream, if a configuration seals off a person's way of refusing, these crossings do not necessarily pose as cultivation, and they all fall within the first two oughts." (Institution Theory Paper 1, §8) One place is not pressing a person down to where he cannot live; the other is not sealing off his way of refusal. The Theory of Inter-State Cooperation extended these two places into a test between states: "If a measure makes the other party unable to live unless it does as the party applying pressure wishes, or in fact cancels its room to bear the cost and not comply, the measure has already slid into substituting judgment, and it is not done." It also wrote in an exception: "Requiring the other party to stop crossing the line, or to perform a covenant it has acknowledged, does not count as 'what the party applying pressure wishes'" (the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Prequel, §2). Here the same test is extended to economic positions, the subject term being changed from states to an economic position and those it converges (own undertaking).

The test, carried over, runs like this. First state which condition the holder uses, such that the recipient no longer has actual room to refuse in which of his own matters. Three cases are registered separately and are not counted in: where the recipient can still bear the cost and not comply; a demand for the performance of an existing commitment; exposure to natural scarcity.

At an economic position one further division is needed. If what the holder asks for is a condition of its own thing, such as the price of water, the quantity of goods, or the hours of work, that is exchange. If the holder uses its supply to demand what is the other party's own affair, such as demanding that a household sell its land, that a village not go to petition, or that a person vote a certain way, that is substituting judgment: it uses its own judgment to decide for the other party on the other party's own affair. This cut is this series' own (own undertaking): the exception in the original sentence of the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation has only two things, "to stop crossing the line" and "to perform a covenant it has acknowledged," and says nothing of the price of a holder's own thing.

Springhollow's notice asks for water charges. Upper Hollow's supply entered through recognition-based loading; Lower Hollow's supply was promised by agreement. The water charges owed are the price of this supply. Lower Hollow has an agreement; Upper Hollow has none, and reading its years of paying at the stated price as having acknowledged this price is this paper's extension (own undertaking); whether both villages have acknowledged the portion after the sixty percent rise, the facts do not record, and this is examined at the judgment layer. As for the portion already acknowledged, pressing for it is asking the other party to perform; by the test above, the aim of this demand falls within the exception. Nor do the facts show the company using water to demand that the people of the two villages do anything else; Lower Hollow's asking to reopen the old wells, and the company's answering "The plots already belong to the company," belong to the closure of the previous section, not to using water as a threat. Only, for Lower Hollow one more layer must be read: the old wells there were filled by the company and the land was taken by the company, so the cut-off is at the same time the completion of the closure of the previous section, and is read separately under the third reading; that the aim of the demand for payment falls within the exception does not wash out this layer (§2: the three readings can coexist).

But this is not yet the end of the reading. In treating blockades, the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation gave the same test a second use: "If a blockade cuts off the life-substrate of the people in a place, the people there cannot survive unless they do as the party applying pressure wishes; what is being used as leverage is their lives. … if what is cut off is the life-substrate, the measure has already slid into substituting judgment, so that part must be carved out (own undertaking)." It also cited a sentence of the Theory of the State: "If what they target really is the capacity to wage war, then the part that falls on the life-substrate must be carved out, and carved out so that it lands" (Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 4). There, even where the aim of a measure is warranted, the part that falls on the life-substrate is not excused on that account.

Extended to Springhollow (own undertaking): the aim of pressing for arrears is warranted, but the means, cutting off water, falls on the life-substrate. When the share of water a household needs to drink, cook and wash is used as leverage for collecting payment, what is staked is the part of that household that sustains its life. That part must be carved out, whether the household can pay or not: the money owed is pursued by other routes, not by cutting off the share of water that sustains life. The difference between those who can pay and those who cannot still has its use: it bears on how the debt is pursued, and on who takes up the share that cannot be paid (§6); it does not decide whether that share of water may be cut off. Which share of water counts as falling on the life-substrate, the rule layer can set a pattern for; where a particular household fell in that winter is at the judgment layer, examined household by household. The two households with bedridden elderly people must also be examined household by household; this cannot be settled for them in advance.

Once that part is carved out, who pays for those households' water? This section cannot answer that. Dependence and grave consequences do not by themselves yield a duty on this company to continue supply without limit; how those who cannot pay are kept from being cut off is in §6, on the manager's side.

The flash-flood case reads differently. Three times the price is the price of water, a condition of exchange; in itself it neither cuts off supply nor uses water to demand anything else of anyone, and it is not substituting judgment. If it thereby cut off any household's water, it goes back to the reading above: the part that falls on the life-substrate is carved out all the same.

This test has its range of application. It applies only where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands, or where the supply has already been promised or embedded (recognition-based loading included). In the first reading, where a supply that has not been promised, not been embedded and not been preceded by sealing off the way is stopped, this does not constitute a violation on the Base Layer; but this does not mean that there is no power-face there, nor that no checks are needed. Whether an economic position shows a power-face is read under Paper 1; what checks it is subject to, and what securing a construct that does the work of the Base Layer needs beyond checks, are in Paper 3 (Paper 3, E14, E14a).

The test also has an upper limit. Power Theory says: "Stripping B's subject-position completely causes A to simultaneously lose power over B; the relation degenerates into control, violence, the processing of objects." (Power Theory P1 T5) To press a person down until his subject-position is wholly lost is no longer power; it is something outside this paper. What this section's test governs is the stretch where power is still there but has already slid into substituting judgment.

There is another rebuttal: to keep supplying water to those who do not pay is to make the company pay for those who cannot; who pays for the spring and the equipment? It is not without grounds: Springhollow Water Company has only fourteen people; among the reasons the company gave for the price rise there may be real costs; it is not a charity. But what is carved out here is a means, not a debt: the debt can still be pursued, only not by way of cutting off water. Who bears the cost once that part is carved out is the business of the next section; it does not fall on the company alone without limit, nor on the households that cannot pay.

E11 Force is recognized only where judgment is substituted. Withdrawing one's own cooperation is a check; taking away what is the other party's own is force (Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 4, XZ22). The source of the test is the two places where Institution Theory speaks of the line: not pressing a person down to where he cannot live, and not sealing off his way of refusal (Institution Theory Paper 1, §8); the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation extends these two places into a test between states (its Prequel, §2); here it is extended to economic positions, as the same form (own undertaking). First state which condition the holder uses, such that the recipient no longer has actual room to refuse in which of his own matters; where he can still bear the cost and not comply, where what is demanded is the performance of an existing commitment, and where he is exposed to natural scarcity, each is registered separately. A condition that asks for what is the holder's own is exchange; using supply to demand what is the other party's own affair (selling land, not petitioning, how to vote) is substituting judgment (this cut is this series' own; own undertaking). The part that falls on the life-substrate must be carved out: where what is cut off is the life-substrate, it has already slid into substituting judgment, and it is not excused because the demand itself is warranted (Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 4; the original speaks of blockade; here it is extended to ceasing supply; own undertaking). This test applies only where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands, or where the supply has already been promised or embedded (recognition-based loading included); other cases do not constitute a violation on the Base Layer, nor do they mean that there is no power-face and no need for checks. Dependence and grave consequences do not by themselves yield a duty on the holder to continue supply without limit. Stripping a person's subject-position completely is no longer power (Power Theory P1 T5). The original speaks of pressure between states; here the subject term is changed to economic positions and those they converge (own undertaking).

§6 The Sole Position of Supply at the Life-Substrate

The previous section left a question: once that part is carved out, who pays for those households' water? To answer it, one must first ask what this position is.

Springhollow Water Company's assets, the abstraction of water from the spring, the treatment station and the pipe network, were accumulated: money put up by investors, the Stone Bridge Franchise Company's thirty percent stake (the Prequel, §5). But what it does in Springhollow is not only operating what is its own. It is the sole supplier of piped water to the two villages; of the other ways, one costs four times as much as piped water, one is still under approval, and one has been ceded; the position it is in touches the life-substrate. This series calls such a position the sole position of supply at the life-substrate, not a "monopolist": Rights Theory keeps "monopolization" as a term, and it requires an exclusive laying of hands (§2); the facts of Upper Hollow show no such laying of hands, and the company is still in this position there.

Such a position is a mixture of public utility and private operation. It carries out an executive accountability for a larger construct: that the households of a place can get drinking water is, in the first place, something the institution or government that manages that place is to ensure; what this company does is precisely the part of that assurance that lands on the ground. So this supply is part of the accountability of the institution or government that manages it, and this layer is there whether or not there is a permit: the manager's share of the burden of securing does not arise from the permit; the water-abstraction permit issued by the State Water Resources Agency is the form in which the manager converges and embeds this position; the Public Utilities Act covers only five thousand households or more, so the law does not cover it along the route of water prices, and this does not cancel this layer either (own undertaking).

This position holds the accountability of supply. Where does the accountability come from? This must be made clear, because On Accountability is strict about accountability: an accountability must "have a source, content, and a registration"; "Disappointment, or an expectation come to nothing, is not enough to establish that an accountability was ever there." (On Accountability) Where the source of accountability lies, it also says: "Accountability has its source in the power that converges upon the position, binds the position, and is released by exit: to exit that registration is to hold it no longer." (On Accountability F38) A construct, too, can hold accountability (On Accountability F39).

The first route, on the side of those supplied. §2 said that Upper Hollow's supply entered through recognition-based loading: if continuing supply is to become something claimable, "it is constituted as an institutionally embedded position at the recognition layer" (Rights Theory P5 §II); On Rights and Entitlements sets "recognition-based loading" beside promise, institution, trust and guardianship as the several roads by which a giving enters another register (On Rights and Entitlements F30). Upper Hollow has no agreement, but it has a supply continued over many years: the households connected to the pipes and paid at the stated price; the company collected charges from each household, and acted by the rule on the notice when they fell into arrears. The network is treating these households as holding a claimable position.

On Accountability says that between the same two nodes there can be two chains running in opposite directions. The second runs thus: "the power-face of the recognition-based right the bearing side relies on converges the position-holder, and the position-holder holds accountability and issues an act." (On Accountability F42) In Springhollow, the position-holder is the position of supply, and the bearing side is the households that use the water. On the first chain, the position of supply converges these households by its position: it sets the price, it issues the notice, it cuts off the water; this is its power-face. On the second chain, the position of these households as supplied is embedded at the recognition layer, and its power-face in turn converges the position of supply; the position of supply holds accountability in that register.

The two chains are on an equal footing. On Accountability writes it clearly: "Each chain has its own conditions of constitution, and neither is the price of the other." (On Accountability F42) It also says: "A recognition-based right is not got in exchange for recognizing a power." (On Accountability F43) So it cannot be written that the households that use the water recognized the company's power and thereby got in exchange a right to be supplied. The households of Upper Hollow have not traded anything for it. Each chain asks its conditions of its own side, and neither asks anything of the other; that one stands does not make the other stand (On Accountability F42). So the two chains must each be read on their own.

For the second chain to stand, the right of the bearing side must be one "running through the three-fold interlock" (On Accountability F42). What the three are, Theory of Government has said: "A recognition-based right operates on three legs: institutional embedding, effective community recognition and real power backing." (Theory of Government G19) Look at Upper Hollow by these three. Institutional embedding is in two places: the company collects charges from each household, and for those in arrears that notice set a rule of "four full months," which is the company's own institution embedding these households; the water-abstraction permit the State Water Resources Agency issued to the company states that this water is for the public water supply of the two villages, so the state's institution, too, has embedded this supply. Of effective community recognition, what can be seen is the fact that over these years the households connected to the network and paid at the stated price. Real power backing lies in that permit: the state allows the company to draw this spring's water, with its use written as the public water supply of the two villages; the state stands on the side of the households' position as supplied (read by the use attached to the permit; own undertaking). All three are present, and the second chain stands in Springhollow: the power-face of these households' position as supplied converges the position of supply, and the position of supply holds accountability in that register. The first chain is the same: the recognition-based right the position of supply relies on has been embedded by the permit and recognized by the two villages in paying at the stated price, and the state's permit stands behind it (read by the use attached to the permit; own undertaking); this right is read as borrowed, per the Prequel, §6: the company does not hold it in its own name; the company is that chain's address of attribution. Both chains stand in Springhollow.

One thing must be recorded as it is: it is known that the State Public Utilities Commission, under the present threshold, has no authority over Springhollow's water price; which other positions may take up this dispute, and what actual effect each can have, the facts do not record. This does not mean that the third leg is absent; what it says is that where that backing lands on the matter of price, the facts do not show. How this route forms a usable calling to account is at the rule layer and the judgment layer; this paper does not supply bodies, nor does it judge that no other route exists. How the manager's side is arranged, see below.

The second route, on the side of the manager. This position carries out an executive accountability for a larger construct. Theory of Government says, of the guarantee of basic rights: "What a government gives is backing and enforcement, not the core" (Theory of Government G18). The core of the dimension of life that a household's drinking water bears on lies on the person's side; giving securing and handling enforcement lie with the institution or government that manages that place. This company's water supply is the part of that securing and enforcement that lands on the ground. In Springhollow this layer is recorded: the State Water Resources Agency issued the company a water-abstraction permit stating that this water is for the public water supply of the two villages. The manager has here converged this position and embedded it. On Accountability says that accountability "has its source in the power that converges upon the position" (On Accountability F38): the second route of this position's accountability lies in this power of convergence, and the permit is its form in Springhollow.

So each of the two holds its own accountability. This position holds the accountability of supply. The institution or government that manages it holds the accountability of creating conditions for this supply: it ought to converge this position, embed it, and secure it. Theory of Government says that an embedded position of supply is guaranteed as a recognition-based right; of what is not embedded, "not being embedded does not automatically mean that giving may be ceased at will, and conditions already undertaken and other sources are checked separately" (Theory of Government G21; the original speaks of a government's own supply; here it is extended to a manager securing the supply of another construct; own undertaking). Upper Hollow's supply is not something in the bare register; in Springhollow the manager has already, by a permit, embedded it into its own institution. What still shows no place to land is the route of price: the State Public Utilities Commission covers only five thousand households or more; which other positions may take up Springhollow's water price, the facts do not record. How this route is arranged or made up, what rules are set, and which position is to question the prices of small suppliers, are at the rule layer; for a state to come closer to the criteria here according to its own development and conditions, the normative layer leaves it room.

Accountability binds the position, not the person. This sentence guards against two misreadings. One reads this position as a bond of servitude that can never be exited, as if the fourteen people and the few investors might never leave Springhollow. It is not so. Accountability binds the position and is released by exit: to exit that registration is to hold it no longer (On Accountability F38). The other is the reverse: reading "released by exit" as "free to walk away at any time." On Accountability guards against this immediately afterward: the efficacy of exit and the availability of exit are two things; "Both sentences say only what follows if one exits; neither asserts that there is always a channel of exit to walk." (On Accountability, F38 elaboration) Among the apparent counterexamples it gives is one such: a government converged by a constitutional order cannot exit unilaterally, yet the accountability there is present all the same.

Read the hypothetical case by this distinction. Suppose that the company gives six months' notice that it will stop supplying the whole of Upper Hollow, and leaves the pipe network to the village. This position can withdraw; but the procedure of withdrawal is not given by the sentence "released by exit." It must be examined separately by the accountability of supply here, the manager's accountability for succession, and the procedures already in place: the withdrawal must go through a procedure that does not seal off others' way of taking over and in which the manager arranges succession. Rights Theory says it briefly: of an institutionally embedded position of provision, "its holder's withdrawal is caught by the recognition layer … enforcement and substitution run on power backing" (Rights Theory P5 §II). A notice of six months does not of itself terminate the accountability; nor can the manager's not having arranged succession thereby turn this supply into an open-ended burden on some one person in the company. Of the cut-off of those nine households in Upper Hollow in the winter of Year 23, the part that falls on the life-substrate, once verified household by household, is a part that has already happened, that should have been carved out and was not; it is recorded separately, and is not erased by a later withdrawal.

"A construct has no law of its own" excludes only one reading. §2 cited that sentence of Theory of Government: a construct has no law of its own, and so has no such exercise of its own to dispose of. What this sentence governs here is only the company's sentence "We have only stopped supplying our water": a company cannot take back a supply on the ground of "disposing of its own exercise under its own law." It does not by itself prove that every cessation of supply by a construct is violation. That this cut-off in Springhollow must be read separately rests on the accountability described above, not on the sentence "a construct has no law of its own."

Supply need not be free. What this position holds is the accountability of supply, not an accountability to give for nothing. Water is charged for at a price; a price rise can have reasons; money owed is pursued as a debt, and the pursuit does not go by way of cutting off the share of water that sustains life (§5). How those who cannot pay are kept from being cut off, who takes over on withdrawal, and how the price is questioned, lie on the manager's side. The flash-flood case is read in the same way: repairing in three days is this position discharging its accountability of supply; three times the price for the first month is a matter of the price being questioned, and the party that questions it is on the manager's side; if it thereby cut off any household's water, the part that falls on the life-substrate is carved out all the same (§5), not depending on whether that household can pay; how those households' water is kept from being cut off is arranged by the manager's side.

A sentence must be added here on the three-layer sentence form. The Prequel says: the construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability. A construct can also occupy a position within a larger construct and hold accountability in that slot: Springhollow Water Company, as a construct, is under the ought; in this sole position of supply at the life-substrate, it holds accountability. Directors and managers, in their positions within it, each have their own accountability, examined separately.

Some may worry that this conscripts a small private company into a public utility: from now on it cannot set its prices freely or exit freely, and who will still go and run a waterworks in a place like Springhollow? This worry has its point: it was this very company that brought tap water to Springhollow; read its position too heavily, and the next village short of water may find no one willing to go. But what is set here holds in one place only: at the life-substrate, with a sole supply, where dependence has already formed. The normative layer sets no duty of supply on holders in general (§2). In this one place, the company is not requisitioned either: it can charge, it can raise the price, it can withdraw; what it must keep is not using households' water as leverage on the life-substrate, and going, on withdrawal, through a procedure in which someone takes over. As for the share of those who cannot pay, it does not fall on the company alone; it falls on the manager's side. In Springhollow the manager's side has already done one thing: it gave the water-abstraction permit and stated the use of this water. Two things still show no place to land: who is to question the route of water price, where the known commission has no authority and other positions are not recorded in the facts; and Upper Hollow's approval for drilling a well. How these two are made up is at the rule layer and the judgment layer, and this paper does not decide it for them.

Which resources count as life-substrate, what counts as sole, and what the particular content of this accountability is, are at the rule layer. The Public Utilities Act's five thousand households is a threshold at the rule layer; below the threshold, the direction of this norm is not cancelled. How the threshold is set is in Paper 3 (Paper 3, E19); that supply in the Base Layer needs securing beyond checks is also in Paper 3 (Paper 3, E14a).

E11a The sole position of supply at the life-substrate. The sole position of supply that touches the life-substrate, for which others have no affordable substitute, is a mixture of public utility and private operation: it carries out an executive accountability for a larger construct, and is not only operating what is its own; this supply is part of the accountability of the institution or government that manages it; this layer is there whether or not there is a permit, and the law's not covering it does not cancel it (own undertaking). The accountability has two routes. On the side of those supplied: a continuing supply enters through recognition-based loading (Rights Theory P5 §II; On Rights and Entitlements F30); the power-face of the recognition-based right those supplied rely on converges the position of supply, and that position holds accountability in that register (On Accountability F42); each of the two chains has its own conditions of constitution, and a right is not got in exchange for recognition (On Accountability F43); the right on this side must run through the three-fold interlock, and mere disappointed expectation does not become an accountability. On the side of the manager: this position carries out an executive accountability for a larger construct. This position holds the accountability of supply; the institution or government that manages it holds the accountability of creating conditions for this supply, and ought to converge it, embed it, and secure it (Theory of Government G18, G19, G21). Accountability binds the position, not the person, and is released by exit (On Accountability F38); the efficacy of exit does not by itself give the procedure of exit: how to withdraw is examined separately, through a procedure that does not seal off others' way of taking over and in which the manager arranges succession; a notice does not of itself terminate the accountability; a succession the manager has not arranged is not turned into an open-ended burden on some one person; what has already gone unperformed is recorded separately. "A construct has no law of its own" excludes only the reading "disposing of its own exercise under its own law"; it does not by itself prove that every cessation of supply is violation. The supply need not be free; how those who cannot pay are kept from being cut off, who takes over on withdrawal, and how the price is questioned lie on the manager's side. Which resources count as life-substrate, what counts as sole, and the particular content of the accountability lie at the rule layer.

§7 Combined Line-Crossing

From Springhollow, west, to Bluekiln.

Bluekiln lies in the mountains of the western Kingdom State; it has a population of about eight thousand, and has made porcelain for more than two hundred years. Bluekiln Porcelain Works employs three thousand four hundred people, about seventy percent of the town's working-age population; its wages are ten percent above the Kingdom State average for the trade. It runs an apprentice program, free of tuition, taking sixty a year; in Year 20 it paid for the road from the town to the state road.

Its employment contract has several things in it.

Forty percent of the housing in town belongs to the company. Employees live in dormitories, with the rent deducted from wages; the Dormitory Terms attached to the contract state: move out within thirty days of leaving employment.

Twenty percent of wages are paid in "kiln scrip." Kiln scrip can be used only in the company's "Bluekiln Cooperative Store" and in its canteen; the cooperative store is the largest store in town, with prices about fifteen percent higher than in Apple City; there are three other small grocery shops in town, which do not take kiln scrip. The Kingdom State's Wage Payment Act provides that wages are to be "paid in general currency," and writes no cap on the proportion; a written reply of the State Labor Agency in Year 22 says that paying part of wages in scrip "requires the employee's written consent." Every employee signed a consent form on hiring.

The company advances wages to employees, up to six months. Article 14 of the contract states: "Where an advance has not been repaid, leaving employment requires the company's consent." Leaving requires three months' notice. Article 19 of the contract states: "For two years after leaving, the employee may not engage in porcelain-making, or work for a porcelain enterprise, anywhere in the Kingdom State; violation incurs payment of twelve months' wages."

The veteran kiln worker had thrown and fired at Bluekiln Porcelain Works for thirty-one years, and held the highest grade of the Kingdom State kiln workers' grade certificate. In the spring of Year 22 he gave notice, intending to open a workshop outside the town with two colleagues. He had four months of advances unpaid, and the company did not consent to his leaving; the company's legal department also sent him a letter reminding him of Article 19. A month later he borrowed money from relatives and repaid the advance, and his leaving was "still put on hold because of Article 19." In the spring of Year 23, Elmseed Capital's long-term partnership, Elmseed Long-Term Partners, put up the money and negotiated terms with the company for him: six months' wages paid to the company as liquidated damages, and the company's written waiver of the application of Article 19 to him. His two colleagues had no such funding, and stayed with the company.

The veteran kiln worker and his two colleagues were all under these several constraints. Taken one by one, what is each; falling on one and the same person, what are they together: that is this section's question. The contract and terms as signed, and the order in which he was in fact blocked, borrowed money, was blocked again, and was finally released by someone else's money, are all facts. To set beside it an employment contract that "provides only for three months' notice of leaving" is a comparison this section sets up, not a contract that existed in the facts.

Taken one by one, each can have the look of a limit; this paper does not presuppose that each, taken alone, passes. The dormitory is a real giving, and moving out within thirty days of leaving is a term. Kiln scrip goes through the employees' written consent, which the State Labor Agency's reply also required. An advance is a sum of working capital given to the employee, to be repaid; that too is common. Three months' notice of leaving is a procedure. Rights Theory has said of sealing the exit channel: "it is not the presence in a relation of terms, procedures, conditions, or costs of exit; it is the subject no longer holding a structural channel for refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure" (Rights Theory P5 §III). Terms, procedures and conditions, each alone, are not sealing. Article 19 is not in this list: taken alone it is already violation, which §8 reads; here it is put into the combination only as one of the things that fall on the same person.

But these several things fall on one and the same person. Institution Theory has a provision: "Many constraints, each within the line taken one by one, can together still cross it: this must be examined with respect to one and the same internal subject, under one and the same actual configuration, by one and the same line, with the baseline used in each item-by-item judgment stated; that each stays within the line under different baselines does not mean that each still passes on its own within one and the same combination (own undertaking)." (Institution Theory Z10) The original speaks of several constraints of an institution upon its internal subjects; here they are changed to employer and employees (own undertaking).

By this provision, take the veteran kiln worker's situation in the spring of Year 22 together. He wants to leave; if he lives in a company dormitory, he must move out within thirty days of leaving, and forty percent of the houses in town are the company's; twenty percent of the wages in his hands are kiln scrip, unusable outside the cooperative store and the canteen, so the cash he has saved is less than the figure on his pay slip; he owes four months of advances, Article 14 says that leaving with an advance unpaid requires the company's consent, and the company has not consented; he repays the advance, and Article 19 stands in front of him again: for two years he may do no porcelain-making anywhere in the Kingdom State, and a violation costs twelve months' wages. He is a man who has made porcelain for thirty-one years.

In this combination, does he still hold a structural channel for refusing and revoking this standing bond? The order the facts give is: on his own, he could not leave; borrowing from relatives, he still could not leave; only when an investment firm paid six months' wages for him did he leave. Economics P2 has spoken to this layer: "'possible in principle' does not mean 'affordable.' Exit costs can be high enough to be practically equivalent to lock-in … an employee with no alternative in her industry faces resignation that exists as a right but threatens livelihood" (Economics P2 §5.1). When Theory of Government treats the cost of exit, it uses the same criterion (Theory of Government G39).

Of the several items, Article 14 comes closest to "sealing": it ties the act of leaving itself to the other party's consent. Yet even it, taken alone, still leaves a way, repaying the money, and the veteran kiln worker did borrow and repay. Only taken together can it be seen clearly: every way is there, and behind every way there is another.

The consent form signed on hiring does not by itself change this reading. Rights Theory says: "The criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness." (Rights Theory P5 §III) That he signed shows that he accepted these terms at the time; it does not show that these terms together did not seal his way.

This judgment has not been made by any position in the facts. The State Labor Agency's reply dealt only with whether kiln scrip needs written consent, not with what these things are together; nor is there a lawsuit in the facts. Read to this point, the facts point to this: for the veteran kiln worker in the spring of Year 22, this combination, before the outside funding, left him no affordable way to leave. As for his two colleagues, why they stayed the facts do not fully record; this paper does not supply reasons for them, nor judge them.

These constraints are at the same time givings. The dormitory is housing, the advance is money, the apprentice program charges no tuition, the road in town was built by the company, and wages are ten percent above the trade. These are recorded as they are, and they are real; those of them that fall on the veteran kiln worker, such as the advance and the wages ten percent above the trade, fall on the same person as the combination above, and that too is real. A giving does not cancel a sealing of the way; a sealing of the way does not make those givings false. That uses of the dormitory and kiln scrip kind are how an accumulation is converted into control over people's leaving is read in Paper 4 (Paper 4, E21); kiln scrip as money usable in only one place is in Paper 1 (Paper 1, E6).

E12 Combined line-crossing. Many constraints, each within the line taken one by one, can together still cross it: this must be examined with respect to one and the same internal subject, under one and the same actual configuration, by one and the same line, with the baseline used in each item-by-item judgment stated (Institution Theory Z10). Dormitories, scrip and wage-advance arrangements that restrict departure can each, taken alone, be limits; this series does not presuppose that each is within the line taken alone; non-compete agreements are not in this list, and fall under E12a; where these fall on one and the same person, it is examined whether he still holds a structural channel for refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure (Rights Theory P5 §III). Exit's existing as a right is not its being affordable for a livelihood (Economics P2 §5.1; Theory of Government G39 runs the same way). Written consent at hiring does not by itself change the reading. The original speaks of several constraints of an institution upon its internal subjects; here they are changed to employer and employees (own undertaking).

§8 A Non-Compete Agreement Violates Fork Rights; a Conditional Payment Is Read Differently

The previous section put Article 19 into the combination. This section looks at it alone: for two years after leaving, the employee may not engage in porcelain-making, or work for a porcelain enterprise, anywhere in the Kingdom State; violation incurs payment of twelve months' wages.

First, what it touches. Rights Theory established a right called Fork Rights: "Fork Rights is a member of the hinge-rights family. Its basic component is the subject's directional cannot-not of self-unfolding, on the Dao spine; its recognition component is the claimable position that this unfolding takes in an identifiable institution or relational field. When the existing grid compresses the subject's direction-space, the subject, combining his own directional cannot-not with the present institution, forks out an alternative path — this is exercising Fork Rights." It also wrote what this right looks like when suppressed: "Pressed to the extreme, the direction-space is sealed off from outside — foreclosure — and the result is the atrophy of generativity; this is the form of Fork Rights suppressed." (Rights Theory P4 F17)

To put this right more plainly: Fork Rights says that a person has the right to choose. Whether to choose or not, and why not, say for some other benefit, is his own affair; only where this choice is gone is there violation (own undertaking). By this sentence, reading an arrangement asks only one thing: whether it leaves the person his choice.

What the veteran kiln worker wanted to do was precisely to make a choice: with two colleagues, to open a workshop of their own outside the town. Where he goes is the direction of his self-unfolding; what Article 19 blocks is precisely this direction.

Two rebuttals must be faced first. One says: the form of suppression F17 speaks of is the state "Pressed to the extreme," in which the direction-space is sealed off; a clause covering only two years and only one trade is far from sealing off the whole of a person's direction, and he can go and do something else. The other says: opening a kiln requires customers and a market, people to buy his porcelain; this is something that stands only with others, not something he alone can encapsulate, and it falls on the encounter boundary.

This series answers as follows (own undertaking). First split the matter into two faces. Whether opening a kiln can succeed does lie on the encounter boundary: it needs buyers, a kiln site and capital, and he has no right that anyone "must come and buy"; the second rebuttal is right about this face. But a non-compete agreement does not govern this face. It does not govern whether he can sell; it governs whether he can go there: backed by liquidated damages, it strikes opening a kiln, in advance, out of the directions he can take. What is struck out is a block of his direction-space. This block does not need this series to walk the two criteria again: Rights Theory has already placed the directional cannot-not of Fork Rights in the basic component (Rights Theory P5 F22; see below); placed in the basic component, it is on the side of encapsulation, and the antecedent of what is quoted below, "a dimension that has passed the two criteria," is thereby met (own undertaking); and the direction-space sealed off from outside is precisely the form of its suppression (Rights Theory P4 F17); the original sentence speaks of the directional cannot-not of Fork Rights; here it is read onto the block a clause strikes out (own undertaking). So a non-compete agreement is violation because it ghostwrites a direction in advance, not because it narrows a market. For the veteran kiln worker, what was struck out was the very road he was walking; but the reading does not rest on this: what is sealed is a block of the direction-space, whether or not it is the road he was most likely to take. On that block it is already "the direction-space is sealed off from outside — foreclosure"; there is no need to wait until the whole is pressed to the extreme, and the first rebuttal thereby has its answer too.

How wide a block is taken away is a matter of gravity, not of whether. A non-compete agreement does not drive the person out: he is still there, and can still do other things. By the gradations of Rights Theory P5, this is gradation one, non-exit suppression: the bearer is still there, and "a single exercise, a whole practice of exercise, the capacity to exercise, or the bandwidth of exercise can be compressed," where the compression lands being typed by F20 (Rights Theory P5 F19, F20). What a non-compete agreement compresses is the bandwidth of the space into which a person unfolds; the larger the territory, the wider the trade, the longer the term it reaches, the heavier the pressure. Shorter or smaller, it is softer in scope; the choice is still taken away.

Signing does not change this reading: the criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness (Rights Theory P5 §III). Having signed, he still does not have his choice after leaving in his hands. Nor does compensation change it. A non-compete agreement with compensation pays the person a sum, but its backing is still liquidated damages and injunction: having taken the money, he is still not allowed to go. It is softer than one without compensation, softer in cost, not in structure: that block of direction is still sealed from outside.

There is one more threshold to face. Rights Theory P5, in dividing limit from closing, says: "Constraints that are local, reversible, open to questioning, and re-concretizable at the encounter boundary can still be limits; only the structural severing of a dimension's unfolding or recovery is closing." (Rights Theory P5 §III) A clause of two years, one state and one trade looks like just such a local constraint; it is reversible when it expires, and it can be taken to a court and questioned.

This sentence, here, marks out precisely the room the normative layer leaves to the rule layer (own undertaking). Conditional payments, service terms and confidentiality can, each by its own structure, fall on the encounter boundary, and are not recognized by name: a conditional payment by the three criteria below, a service term by the threshold of exit, confidentiality by what it protects and by its scope, each examined separately; whether to set them up, and how, is handed to the rule layer, and the judgment layer then reads case by case. A non-compete agreement is not within this room, even one as narrow as the clause in the workshop's apprenticeship contract below (no opening a kiln in Bluekiln within two years of completing the apprenticeship). What it decides for a person is where he goes after leaving; that is the directional cannot-not of Fork Rights: "The directional cannot-not of Fork Rights is the basic component: it can be suppressed" (Rights Theory P5 §IV, F22), on the side of the person's own encapsulation. On the side of encapsulation there is no such threshold: on the encapsulation boundary "there is no such thing as a limit — only halting and transgression: for a dimension that has passed the two criteria, exclusion, ghostwriting, or redrawing by an outside force is violation without exception"; where one constraint falls on both boundaries at once, "the encapsulation side dominates" (Rights Theory P5 §III). To call a non-compete agreement a term, a condition or an exit cost answers whether the channel of exit has been sealed; what it touches is not only whether one can go but also where one goes, and the latter is not on the encounter boundary (own undertaking).

A non-compete agreement also touches exit. How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6), in treating exit costs, divides them into natural and artificial, the artificial kind being "exit friction deliberately created by the institution itself—non-compete agreements, divorce cooling-off periods, citizenship-renunciation hurdles" (F6 §7). In the veteran kiln worker's case Article 19 did indeed first block his leaving: he had repaid the advance, and his leaving was "still put on hold because of Article 19." It touches both faces: where one goes, and whether one can go.

So a non-compete agreement is violation, with compensation as without: what it takes away is the person's choice after leaving, and its gravity depends on how wide a block it takes away. This reading is at the normative layer.

One kind of constraint must be read apart from non-compete agreements. A person has his own ends, and so do others; restricting a person from violating others' ends is not violating this person's ends (own undertaking). Where a constraint in fact limits, in one exercise of his within one role, only the step that would infringe a third party's rights or obstruct the public's channels for questioning, and meets the conditions of scope and procedure below, it is read as being of this kind; merely claiming to protect people does not earn this reading. What it protects is others, not the contracting party's own advantage; it does not strike out a person's direction after leaving. Seen from his side, it is a limit on the encounter boundary: one exercise of his is limited at one point. Seen from the side of those protected, it is his halting before another's encapsulation boundary: §III says that on the encapsulation boundary there is "only halting and transgression." So it is not among non-compete agreements, nor is it an exception made to "violation without exception." It must be able to say which exercise, in which role relation, it limits; whom it protects; why a lesser restriction cannot protect them; and how wide its scope is; and it must itself be a limit, not sealing off the person's ways of refusal, exit and review. If it limits beyond what protecting others requires, what it in fact strikes out is still where he goes, and that part is still violation; it is not renamed permissible on account of the aim of protecting others. When Paper 4 reads the hiring of a head of a review division after he left office, it meets exactly this kind of question (Paper 4, §3). Bluekiln's Article 19 and the workshop's apprenticeship contract below both protect the contracting party itself: keeping people, keeping out competition; they are not of this kind.

This normative reading carries a suggestion to the rule layer. The first ought of Institution Theory is that an institution's acts cross no line against any internal subject; "This ought is held to in full: it governs the construct's own acts, guarding and dismantling included; it does not vary with relational thickness and is not discounted under any condition." (Institution Theory Z9) A company's writing a non-compete clause into an employment contract is its act as a construct; a state's permitting it, and its courts' enforcing it, are likewise acts of that level of institution. The normative layer does not recognize a violation as something that may be permitted or enforced at the rule layer; so this series' suggestion to the rule layer is that, in principle, no opening be made to permit non-compete agreements; for a constraint set to protect others which, per the above, is not among non-compete agreements, the rule layer states which exercise it limits, whom it protects, why nothing less will do, and how wide its scope is. How to prohibit, for instance void on signing, unenforceable, or some other form; how clauses already signed make the transition; how liquidated damages already paid and losses already suffered are remedied: how these are written is for each institution and each level of government to decide; this series only suggests, and does not decide in their place. The several items above are examples at the rule layer, and this series does not claim that any of them is the best.

What, then, of the things a company properly needs to protect: its formulas, its customer lists, the care it has spent on an apprentice? What is the construct's own is protected by arrangements that do not seal off a direction: confidentiality protects what is the construct's own and does not govern where a person goes. When a person may leave is a matter of the service term, examined separately by the threshold of exit, and is not within this provision.

This reading judges the clause, not the person.

The veteran kiln worker's workshop did open later; in Year 25 it employed twenty-two people, and it pays its apprentices wages. The workshop's apprenticeship contract states: "For two years after completing the apprenticeship, the apprentice may not open a kiln in Bluekiln." This clause is far narrower than Article 19: not the whole state, only Bluekiln; not all porcelain-making, only opening a kiln. By the reading above, it is just as much a strict violation. What it seals is not some direction already formed but a block of the apprentice's direction-space: before his direction has formed, that block is written as foreclosed. Whether that is the road he would be most likely to take after completing his apprenticeship does not change the reading. Its difference from Article 19 lies in the different weight it carries in transition and remedy at the rule layer, not in the reading.

This clause is written about not because the one who wrote it was himself once blocked by Article 19. The restriction he once suffered does not make the clause he writes today cross the line as a matter of course, nor make it reasonable as a matter of course; this clause is read by its own structure. What is written down as it was is: a man once blocked by a non-compete agreement, having opened a workshop of his own, also wrote one. This fact does not show what kind of person he is; what is judged is that clause, not the one who wrote it.

There is one more arrangement to be kept apart from non-compete agreements. Imagine a contract that reads: one who does not open a kiln in Bluekiln within two years of leaving may receive a certain compensation. This imagined case is not in the facts; it is a comparison this section sets up; suppose that the money is truly additional, and that refusing it does not cancel where the person can actually go. It forbids nothing: a person can still go and open a kiln, only without taking that money. The choice is still in his hands: accepting the money and not opening a kiln in this town for two years is itself his exercise of this choice, and why he chooses so is his own affair. Whether to give this money is the giving party's disposing of its own giving; it has the same form as "withdrawing one's own cooperation is a check," of which §5 spoke. This paper calls it a conditional payment. The normative layer does not judge it a strict violation; it falls on the encounter boundary, precisely within the share of room the normative layer leaves to the rule layer, and the rule layer may permit it or not.

The dividing line is not always clear at a glance, and the normative layer must give criteria. There are three, and each asks the same thing: whether the person still has this choice.

First, what the backing is. After a breach, is he still forbidden to go, penalized, and subject to compulsory enforcement, or does a payment merely stop? The former is prohibition, and the choice has been taken away; the latter differs in form from prohibition, and whether the choice is actually there must still go on to the next two.

Second, whether what is tied to "not going" is something additional. If what is tied to it is wages a person has already earned, pay deferred to him, or money already paid to him and then clawed back, that is using what is his own to press him; the choice is false, and it goes back to the side of prohibition.

Third, combination and dependence. If a conditional payment falls on the same person together with constraints such as advances and dormitories, it is taken together with them as in the previous section; under deep dependence, if refusing this payment amounts to being unable to live, the choice is gone too, and by the test of §5 it has already slid into substituting judgment.

Which side a particular clause falls on, and how the threshold is set, lie at the rule layer and the judgment layer.

A later matter in Bluekiln falls right on this line. In Year 25 Bluekiln Porcelain Works closed two kiln lines and laid off nine hundred people; the Qiao Foundation ran the "New Bluekiln Program": three years of full living allowance for those laid off, about ninety percent of their former wages, on condition that they enter the design park the Foundation had newly built outside the town, choose one of three paths set by the Foundation for training, and "may not work for any other porcelain enterprise for three years." The program document states: those who withdraw midway will have the living allowance stopped, and what has been paid will not be clawed back. Of the nine laid-off people the workshop hired, two had joined this program and withdrew two months after classes began. The clause "may not … for three years" runs from the day the living allowance is first drawn; whether it still applies after withdrawal, the program document does not say, and the Foundation has not stated a position to these two.

Read this by the criteria above. During the time the living allowance is drawn, if the consequence of this clause is only that payment stops and what has been paid is not clawed back, the form of the backing is that of a conditional payment; on this one item alone, the choice is not yet recognized as actually there. Whether this payment is additional, whether after refusing it a person's Base Layer is still provided for, and how it combines with other constraints, are examined separately by the other two items; the material of this case is not complete; see Paper 6, §4. After withdrawal, if this clause still binds him, so that, no longer taking the money, he is still not allowed to go to another porcelain enterprise, then it is prohibition. The program document does not say, and the Foundation has not stated a position; this paper does not answer for the Foundation. Whether the direction this program gives has been decided for people, and how the menu of three paths and the "certain future" are to be read, is another matter, in Paper 6 (Paper 6, E37).

There are two more boundaries. Fork Rights belongs to persons. An exclusivity clause one construct sets for another, such as "no accepting other investors for three years," written when the long-term partnership invested in the workshop, is not governed by this provision; it is read under chokepoints and checks. The other is the corporate principles of F6, Appendix C: that is a working demonstration, and its Article 6 (d) states: "Non-compete agreements must be reasonably scoped, time-limited, and accompanied by commensurate compensation." That is a non-compete agreement with compensation; this series does not take this article.

The objection most often heard is: if non-compete agreements are not allowed, who will still train apprentices? Training a person costs money; if a person goes and opens a kiln across the street the moment he completes his apprenticeship, the party that trained him loses everything. This objection has its grounds: training does take investment; Bluekiln's apprentice program charges no tuition, and the workshop pays its apprentices wages; Bluekiln has made porcelain for more than two hundred years, and the craft is passed on only if there are people willing to teach it. Whether the training party loses everything if a person leaves the moment he completes his apprenticeship is the worry of this view; the facts do not record it. But what is to be protected can be protected separately. Formulas and customers, by confidentiality; the cost of training apprentices can be arranged by a service term and its threshold of exit; even a conditional payment, the rule layer may permit. Only one thing cannot be protected: where a person goes, as such. That is his own choice, not something belonging to the party that trained him.

E12a A non-compete agreement violates Fork Rights; a conditional payment is read differently. Fork Rights is the right to choose: whether to choose or not, and why not (say, for some other benefit), is the person's own affair; only where this choice is gone is there violation (own undertaking). The basic component of Fork Rights is the subject's directional cannot-not of self-unfolding; the direction-space sealed off from outside, that is, foreclosure, is the form of Fork Rights suppressed (Rights Theory P4 F17). A non-compete agreement, that is, an agreement backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement that forbids a person, after leaving, to go in a certain direction, writes a block of his direction-space as foreclosed in advance, within the territory, trade and term the clause reaches, and takes away his choice after leaving. Whether he could make a go of it lies on the encounter boundary; what is struck out is the direction itself, which Rights Theory has already placed in the basic component (Rights Theory P5 F22); on that block it is already the direction-space sealed off from outside, without waiting for the whole to be pressed to the extreme, and whether or not that was the road he was most likely to take (own undertaking). Nor does it fall among local, reversible limits: local, reversible limits are the room the normative layer leaves to the rule layer, and stand on the encounter boundary; what a non-compete agreement decides for a person is where he goes after leaving; that is where the directional cannot-not of Fork Rights lies, on the side of encapsulation; on the encapsulation boundary there is no limit, and where the two boundaries are present at once the encapsulation side dominates (Rights Theory P5 §III, F22; own undertaking). Non-compete agreements are not within this room; conditional payments are. It is non-exit suppression, and its gravity depends on the territory, trade and term it reaches (Rights Theory P5 F19, F20); signature and compensation do not change the structure (Rights Theory P5 §III): compensation and a short term change the scope and the cost, not the fact that the choice has been taken away. It is at the same time an artificial exit cost (F6 §7). So a non-compete agreement is violation, with compensation as without. A constraint set to protect others is not among non-compete agreements: a person has his own ends, and so do others; restricting a person from violating others' ends is not violating this person's ends; what it limits is not the person's direction but the step by which he would cross another's line: for him, it is a limit on the encounter boundary; for the protected, it is halting before their encapsulation boundary (Rights Theory P5 §III; own undertaking). What it protects is a third party's rights or the public's channels for questioning, not the contracting party's own advantage; where it limits beyond what protecting others requires, what it strikes out is still where he goes, and that part is still violation. That an institution's acts cross no line is held to in full, and is not discounted under any condition (Institution Theory Z9): this series' suggestion to the rule layer is that, in principle, no opening be made to permit non-compete agreements; for a constraint protecting others, the rule layer states which exercise it limits, whom it protects, why nothing less will do, and how wide its scope is; how to prohibit, how clauses already signed make the transition, and how liquidated damages already paid and losses already suffered are remedied are for each institution and each level of government to decide; this series only suggests, and does not decide in their place; what is properly the construct's own is protected by arrangements, such as confidentiality, that do not seal off a direction. A conditional payment is different: it forbids nothing, but only ties an additional payment to a choice; the choice is still in the person's hands, and accepting the payment is itself an exercise of that choice; the normative layer does not judge it a strict violation, and the rule layer may permit it or not. The criterion of the division lies at the normative layer, in three items, each asking whether the person still has this choice: is the backing prohibition and compulsory enforcement, or only no longer paying; is what is tied to "not going" an additional payment, or wages already earned, deferred pay, or money paid out and then clawed back; taken together with other constraints, or under deep dependence, does refusing the payment amount to being unable to live; the three are used together, and that the backing is only no longer paying is not yet enough to recognize that the choice is actually there. Which side a particular clause falls on, and how the threshold is set, lie at the rule layer and the judgment layer. A service term limits when one may leave, and is examined separately by the threshold of exit; Fork Rights belongs to persons, and exclusivity clauses binding a construct are read under chokepoints and checks.

§9 Exit Is Real; What Is Guarded Is the Premise of Emergence

The veteran kiln worker did leave in the end. But how did he leave? An investment firm paid six months' wages for him. If someone must first put up money before he can leave, is this road of exit real?

First, why this question matters. Whether exit is real guards not only this one person of the present. Economics P5 argued that in free markets 15DD emergence is a structural inevitability with premises; of the three premises, the first is: "Markets with nonzero exit freedom exist — participants can choose cooperation partners and exit at least some relationships." It also wrote what can delay this process: "power lock-in (compressing exit freedom and collision direction — extreme suppression violates premise one …)" (Economics P5). In a town where seventy percent of the working-age population work in the same factory, forty percent of the town's housing belongs to that factory, and twenty percent of wages are paid in scrip usable only in its store and canteen, whether these people can get away is also whether that premise still holds in this town. What the level of relations guards is the person of the present, and also the premise of emergence (Paper 6, E32).

Then, how much the institution must bear when exit is hard to a given degree. Economics P1 has a very strong sentence: in economic relationships with extremely difficult or impossible exit, "'voting with one's feet' is impossible or prohibitively costly; institutions must bear the full burden of counterbalancing." (Economics P1 §5.3) The settings this sentence gives are economic decisions within marriage, resource allocation in parent-child relationships, and the citizen-state tax relationship: the band in which exit is nearly impossible. Employment is not in this band. The same section places it in another band: "Economic relationships with frictional but possible exit (employment, long-term business partnerships)" (Economics P1 §5.3); Economics P2 adds that resignation can exist as a right while threatening livelihood (Economics P2 §5.1). So this paper does not carry that "full burden" over to Bluekiln; what Bluekiln needs is for exit to go from possible to affordable.

Power Theory has a sentence often used for comfort: "The space-of-exit is always present. It is B's remainder as a 13DD subject." (Power Theory P1) The sentence is right: a person cannot be exhausted by any arrangement he is in; there is always a share those arrangements cannot take in. But it speaks of the subject, not of an actual channel. It does not certify that a particular employee of Bluekiln has, at this moment, a usable way to leave; that must be examined item by item against the facts.

Reading the veteran kiln worker's leaving in this way, it must be written on both sides. On one side, it shows what the earlier obstacles were, and how a sum of financing changed the conditions. What he actually ran into came in order: while his advance was unpaid, Article 14 let the company withhold consent to his leaving, and the company did not consent; after he borrowed and repaid, Article 19 blocked him again; the long-term partnership put up six months' wages as liquidated damages, in exchange for the company's written waiver of the application of Article 19 to him, and this undid the last barrier. What part the dormitory and kiln scrip played in the year he left, the facts do not record; where they fall on others, they are examined by each person's actual configuration. On the other side, it does not declare that exit in Bluekiln has become real: his two colleagues had no such money, and stayed. Nor does it deny the feasibility that did appear this time: the veteran kiln worker left, the workshop opened, and in Year 25 it employed twenty-two people, nine of whom had been laid off by Bluekiln Porcelain Works that year. A substitute has appeared; for some people there is now somewhere to go after leaving Bluekiln Porcelain Works; how large this substitute is, and whether it is enough for the whole town, the facts do not show, and this paper does not fill it in.

There is one place to set beside this. In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), Hirschman writes exit as "Some customers stop buying the firm's products or some members leave the organization" (p. 4), and voice as "any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs" (p. 30); he says that in organizations such as the family and the state, exit is scarcely available (p. 33); exit and voice, for him, are both mechanisms of recovery that bring a declining organization back to proper functioning (p. 1, p. 82) (original wording and page numbers per Action Theory Paper 0, §7; cited at second hand). He reads how, when an organization declines, exit and voice pull it back to proper functioning; this paper reads the other face of exit: it is a structural channel, its sealing is violation (§7), and its being there guards one premise of emergence. Even if an organization is not declining, the way of exit must stay open. The two readings do not ask entirely the same thing; this paper has not examined the original book, records only this layer here, and draws no conclusion from it.

It can also be rebutted that all this comes back to the person himself: the veteran kiln worker has craft and standing in the trade, so someone was willing to put up money; take an ordinary employee, and no one puts up money, and he cannot leave. This rebuttal reads exit very coldly, and it is not without reason: real exit often depends on what a person already has in hand. But this is exactly the face this section means to speak of: that someone must first put up money before a person can leave shows that, before then, this road was not affordable for those without that money. Whether exit is real does not lie in a person's happening to be singled out by someone; it lies in whether the constraints in a town, taken together, leave an ordinary person a road by which he can get away. That layer §7 has already read; how to give conditions for people's leaving and setting up on their own is in Paper 6.

E13 Exit is real; what is guarded is the premise of emergence. What the level of relations guards is not only the person of the present but also the first premise of 15DD emergence in the free market: "Markets with nonzero exit freedom exist"; power lock-in compresses precisely exit freedom (Economics P5). The sentence "institutions must bear the full burden of counterbalancing" is given only for the band in which exit is nearly impossible (Economics P1 §5.3); employment is in the band of "frictional but possible exit" (Economics P1 §5.3; Economics P2 §5.1). "The space-of-exit is always present. It is B's remainder as a 13DD subject." (Power Theory P1) This sentence states that a subject cannot be exhausted by existing arrangements; it does not certify that a particular real exit already has a usable channel; reachability is examined item by item. Where someone must first put up money before a person can leave, this is written on both sides: it shows how earlier obstacles and financing altered the conditions; it neither declares that exit in a place has become real nor denies the feasibility that has indeed appeared this time (own undertaking).

Where This Paper Stops

This paper has proved these things. A chokepoint is a position others cannot get around on the way to sustaining their lives or unfolding their own paths; it has breadth and depth, and small power can run deep (E7). Ceasing one's own supply has three readings; embedding does not come only through promise, and can also come through recognition-based loading; the three readings can coexist within one arrangement (E8). Where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands, lifting the closure is ceasing to compress, not granting a right; a majority vote does not by itself change the structural reading (E9). As to which resources count as the content of basic rights, the normative layer sets only criteria, and the list lies at the rule layer (E10). Force is recognized only where judgment is substituted; the part that falls on the life-substrate must be carved out (E11). The sole position of supply at the life-substrate holds the accountability of supply, which has two routes, and the institution or government that manages it holds the accountability of creating conditions for supply; in Springhollow both chains stand, and the manager has embedded this position by the water-abstraction permit; on the route of water price, the known commission has no authority, and which other positions may question it the facts do not record; the efficacy of exit and the procedure of exit are kept apart (E11a). Many constraints can together cross the line (E12). Fork Rights is the right to choose; a non-compete agreement takes away a person's choice after leaving and violates Fork Rights, with compensation as without, its gravity depending on how wide a reach it has; it does not fall among local, reversible limits, and this series' suggestion to the rule layer is that, in principle, no opening be made to permit it; a constraint set to protect others, which limits only the step by which he would violate others' ends, is not among them; a conditional payment, when it passes all three criteria, does not take away the choice, and falls within the room the normative layer leaves to the rule layer (E12a). That exit is real guards the person of the present, and also the premise of emergence (E13).

What it has not proved: a list of the content of basic rights; a scale for whether a price is "too high"; the particular content of the accountability of supply at the life-substrate, for instance who continues supply to households that cannot pay, and by what method; the details of rules on non-competition, for instance how clauses already signed make the transition. These lie at the rule layer and the judgment layer, and are handed to specific theories of institutions and to judgment in positions.

Handed to the papers that follow: when a position grows so large that many cannot get around it, how strong the checks must be, what securing a construct that does the work of the Base Layer needs beyond checks, and how thresholds are set, are in Paper 3 (Paper 3, E14, E14a, E19); that uses of the dormitory and kiln scrip kind convert accumulation into control over people's leaving is in Paper 4 (Paper 4, E21); the side of the long-term partnership's investing in the workshop is in Paper 5 (Paper 5, E26); whether the New Bluekiln Program gives conditions or a direction, and why bedridden elderly people cannot wait, are in Paper 6 (Paper 6, E33, E37).

Remainders left: why Upper Hollow's old wells dried up; Upper Hollow's well permit, under review for five months without result; which positions may question Springhollow's water price, which the facts do not record; the ownership of Lower Hollow's well sites, and the water quality after reopening; of the twenty-three households already cut off in the winter of Year 23, which part of each falls on the life-substrate, and which households cannot pay; the two colleagues who stayed; how the clause in the workshop's apprenticeship contract makes the transition. All these are recorded as they are, and each has its place to go.

The Nine Propositions of This Paper

E7 Chokepoint: the position others cannot get around. A position others cannot get around on the way to sustaining their lives or unfolding their own paths is a chokepoint: a water source, a sole employer, hiring and admission, credit, certification share one structure. A chokepoint has two magnitudes: breadth, how many people must pass through it; depth, which dimension it presses on when one cannot get around it. At the level of relations depth is looked at; at the level of scale, breadth; small power can run deep. Whether it is a chokepoint depends on whether it can actually be got around, not on whether there is nominally another way. To identify a chokepoint is only to identify where questions are to be asked, not to judge that it crosses the line (own undertaking).

E8 Three readings of ceasing one's own supply. Rights Theory P5 §II separates three situations: actively severing an existing circuit; the failure of an institutionally embedded position of supply; bare natural scarcity. On this division, and together with On Rights and Entitlements F30, this series sets out three readings of ceasing supply (own undertaking). First, where one's own supply has not been promised, has not been embedded, and has not been preceded by sealing off the way, ceasing it does not constitute severing; carried over to a construct, only the half that concerns the reading is carried: in this slot, ceasing to give is not read as violation; whether it may cease, and how, goes back to the construct's burden of explanation (Theory of Government Paper 3, §5). Second, where the supply has been promised or embedded, its withdrawal is examined separately by the register it has entered (On Rights and Entitlements F30; the original speaks of the granting end of a bare entitlement; here it is extended to the supplier; own undertaking); embedding does not come only through promise: a continuing supply, where those supplied have connected to the network and pay at the stated price, and the network treats them as holding a claimable position, also enters this register through recognition-based loading; the right on the side of those supplied must run through the three-fold interlock before it generates, in this register, an accountability on the side of the supplier (E11a). Third, first sealing off the way exclusively, inducing dependence, and then using it as leverage or withdrawing, is severing, and splitting the act in two does not change the reading; mere factual irreplaceability is not monopolization. The three readings are not mutually exclusive bins for a whole case: within one arrangement, embedding and prior sealing-off may both need examining; each is booked by its own source and effect, and they do not cancel each other. The normative layer sets no general duty of supply on holders: basic rights do not thereby generate a general claim on any holder's future supply; supply already promised or embedded is examined separately by its source, and where it falls in the Base Layer it is handled under the requirement of securing. A withdrawal must not seal off others' way of taking over.

E9 Lifting a closure is ceasing to compress, not granting a right. "A resource is not itself a dimension, but closing a dimension by way of it is still a violation of that dimension." (Rights Theory P2) Where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands that has closed others' pre-existing self-maintained circuits, lifting that closure is required; the ground is ceasing to compress, not granting a new right. Dismantling and withdrawal may not themselves first seal off the way (Institution Theory Z38). A majority vote to cede a circuit does not by itself change the structural reading: the criterion lies in structure, not in professed voluntariness; revocable authorization and the surrender of position that seals revocation are read apart (Rights Theory P5 §III; the original speaks of a subject and its own encapsulation; here it is extended to a village ceding its self-maintained circuit; own undertaking). How those who did not consent are bound by this is examined separately by the act of the construct that made the binding (Institution Theory Z9). How the closure is lifted lies at the rule layer and the judgment layer.

E10 Which resources count as the content of basic rights is not settled at the normative layer. The normative layer sets only criteria: for a dimension to enter the Base Layer it must pass the type criterion and the constitution criterion (Rights Theory P2); a resource does not become a right by being important; only closing an already incorporated dimension by way of it is violation. The end of property rights that has a basic component is anchored in dimensions, not in names of resources that move with the times (Rights Theory P4 §VI). The list lies at the rule layer, as examples; whether a particular supply falls on the life-substrate lies at the judgment layer. The level of a price does not, by itself alone, complete a normative judgment.

E11 Force is recognized only where judgment is substituted. Withdrawing one's own cooperation is a check; taking away what is the other party's own is force (Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 4, XZ22). The source of the test is the two places where Institution Theory speaks of the line: not pressing a person down to where he cannot live, and not sealing off his way of refusal (Institution Theory Paper 1, §8); the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation extends these two places into a test between states (its Prequel, §2); here it is extended to economic positions, as the same form (own undertaking). First state which condition the holder uses, such that the recipient no longer has actual room to refuse in which of his own matters; where he can still bear the cost and not comply, where what is demanded is the performance of an existing commitment, and where he is exposed to natural scarcity, each is registered separately. A condition that asks for what is the holder's own is exchange; using supply to demand what is the other party's own affair (selling land, not petitioning, how to vote) is substituting judgment (this cut is this series' own; own undertaking). The part that falls on the life-substrate must be carved out: where what is cut off is the life-substrate, it has already slid into substituting judgment, and it is not excused because the demand itself is warranted (Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Paper 4; the original speaks of blockade; here it is extended to ceasing supply; own undertaking). This test applies only where there has already been an exclusive laying of hands, or where the supply has already been promised or embedded (recognition-based loading included); other cases do not constitute a violation on the Base Layer, nor do they mean that there is no power-face and no need for checks. Dependence and grave consequences do not by themselves yield a duty on the holder to continue supply without limit. Stripping a person's subject-position completely is no longer power (Power Theory P1 T5). The original speaks of pressure between states; here the subject term is changed to economic positions and those they converge (own undertaking).

E11a The sole position of supply at the life-substrate. The sole position of supply that touches the life-substrate, for which others have no affordable substitute, is a mixture of public utility and private operation: it carries out an executive accountability for a larger construct, and is not only operating what is its own; this supply is part of the accountability of the institution or government that manages it; this layer is there whether or not there is a permit, and the law's not covering it does not cancel it (own undertaking). The accountability has two routes. On the side of those supplied: a continuing supply enters through recognition-based loading (Rights Theory P5 §II; On Rights and Entitlements F30); the power-face of the recognition-based right those supplied rely on converges the position of supply, and that position holds accountability in that register (On Accountability F42); each of the two chains has its own conditions of constitution, and a right is not got in exchange for recognition (On Accountability F43); the right on this side must run through the three-fold interlock, and mere disappointed expectation does not become an accountability. On the side of the manager: this position carries out an executive accountability for a larger construct. This position holds the accountability of supply; the institution or government that manages it holds the accountability of creating conditions for this supply, and ought to converge it, embed it, and secure it (Theory of Government G18, G19, G21). Accountability binds the position, not the person, and is released by exit (On Accountability F38); the efficacy of exit does not by itself give the procedure of exit: how to withdraw is examined separately, through a procedure that does not seal off others' way of taking over and in which the manager arranges succession; a notice does not of itself terminate the accountability; a succession the manager has not arranged is not turned into an open-ended burden on some one person; what has already gone unperformed is recorded separately. "A construct has no law of its own" excludes only the reading "disposing of its own exercise under its own law"; it does not by itself prove that every cessation of supply is violation. The supply need not be free; how those who cannot pay are kept from being cut off, who takes over on withdrawal, and how the price is questioned lie on the manager's side. Which resources count as life-substrate, what counts as sole, and the particular content of the accountability lie at the rule layer.

E12 Combined line-crossing. Many constraints, each within the line taken one by one, can together still cross it: this must be examined with respect to one and the same internal subject, under one and the same actual configuration, by one and the same line, with the baseline used in each item-by-item judgment stated (Institution Theory Z10). Dormitories, scrip and wage-advance arrangements that restrict departure can each, taken alone, be limits; this series does not presuppose that each is within the line taken alone; non-compete agreements are not in this list, and fall under E12a; where these fall on one and the same person, it is examined whether he still holds a structural channel for refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure (Rights Theory P5 §III). Exit's existing as a right is not its being affordable for a livelihood (Economics P2 §5.1; Theory of Government G39 runs the same way). Written consent at hiring does not by itself change the reading. The original speaks of several constraints of an institution upon its internal subjects; here they are changed to employer and employees (own undertaking).

E12a A non-compete agreement violates Fork Rights; a conditional payment is read differently. Fork Rights is the right to choose: whether to choose or not, and why not (say, for some other benefit), is the person's own affair; only where this choice is gone is there violation (own undertaking). The basic component of Fork Rights is the subject's directional cannot-not of self-unfolding; the direction-space sealed off from outside, that is, foreclosure, is the form of Fork Rights suppressed (Rights Theory P4 F17). A non-compete agreement, that is, an agreement backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement that forbids a person, after leaving, to go in a certain direction, writes a block of his direction-space as foreclosed in advance, within the territory, trade and term the clause reaches, and takes away his choice after leaving. Whether he could make a go of it lies on the encounter boundary; what is struck out is the direction itself, which Rights Theory has already placed in the basic component (Rights Theory P5 F22); on that block it is already the direction-space sealed off from outside, without waiting for the whole to be pressed to the extreme, and whether or not that was the road he was most likely to take (own undertaking). Nor does it fall among local, reversible limits: local, reversible limits are the room the normative layer leaves to the rule layer, and stand on the encounter boundary; what a non-compete agreement decides for a person is where he goes after leaving; that is where the directional cannot-not of Fork Rights lies, on the side of encapsulation; on the encapsulation boundary there is no limit, and where the two boundaries are present at once the encapsulation side dominates (Rights Theory P5 §III, F22; own undertaking). Non-compete agreements are not within this room; conditional payments are. It is non-exit suppression, and its gravity depends on the territory, trade and term it reaches (Rights Theory P5 F19, F20); signature and compensation do not change the structure (Rights Theory P5 §III): compensation and a short term change the scope and the cost, not the fact that the choice has been taken away. It is at the same time an artificial exit cost (F6 §7). So a non-compete agreement is violation, with compensation as without. A constraint set to protect others is not among non-compete agreements: a person has his own ends, and so do others; restricting a person from violating others' ends is not violating this person's ends; what it limits is not the person's direction but the step by which he would cross another's line: for him, it is a limit on the encounter boundary; for the protected, it is halting before their encapsulation boundary (Rights Theory P5 §III; own undertaking). What it protects is a third party's rights or the public's channels for questioning, not the contracting party's own advantage; where it limits beyond what protecting others requires, what it strikes out is still where he goes, and that part is still violation. That an institution's acts cross no line is held to in full, and is not discounted under any condition (Institution Theory Z9): this series' suggestion to the rule layer is that, in principle, no opening be made to permit non-compete agreements; for a constraint protecting others, the rule layer states which exercise it limits, whom it protects, why nothing less will do, and how wide its scope is; how to prohibit, how clauses already signed make the transition, and how liquidated damages already paid and losses already suffered are remedied are for each institution and each level of government to decide; this series only suggests, and does not decide in their place; what is properly the construct's own is protected by arrangements, such as confidentiality, that do not seal off a direction. A conditional payment is different: it forbids nothing, but only ties an additional payment to a choice; the choice is still in the person's hands, and accepting the payment is itself an exercise of that choice; the normative layer does not judge it a strict violation, and the rule layer may permit it or not. The criterion of the division lies at the normative layer, in three items, each asking whether the person still has this choice: is the backing prohibition and compulsory enforcement, or only no longer paying; is what is tied to "not going" an additional payment, or wages already earned, deferred pay, or money paid out and then clawed back; taken together with other constraints, or under deep dependence, does refusing the payment amount to being unable to live; the three are used together, and that the backing is only no longer paying is not yet enough to recognize that the choice is actually there. Which side a particular clause falls on, and how the threshold is set, lie at the rule layer and the judgment layer. A service term limits when one may leave, and is examined separately by the threshold of exit; Fork Rights belongs to persons, and exclusivity clauses binding a construct are read under chokepoints and checks.

E13 Exit is real; what is guarded is the premise of emergence. What the level of relations guards is not only the person of the present but also the first premise of 15DD emergence in the free market: "Markets with nonzero exit freedom exist"; power lock-in compresses precisely exit freedom (Economics P5). The sentence "institutions must bear the full burden of counterbalancing" is given only for the band in which exit is nearly impossible (Economics P1 §5.3); employment is in the band of "frictional but possible exit" (Economics P1 §5.3; Economics P2 §5.1). "The space-of-exit is always present. It is B's remainder as a 13DD subject." (Power Theory P1) This sentence states that a subject cannot be exhausted by existing arrangements; it does not certify that a particular real exit already has a usable channel; reachability is examined item by item. Where someone must first put up money before a person can leave, this is written on both sides: it shows how earlier obstacles and financing altered the conditions; it neither declares that exit in a place has become real nor denies the feasibility that has indeed appeared this time (own undertaking).

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.

I · This system

Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662

Qin, H. (2026). Four Layers of Economic Rationality: A Diagnostic Extension of the Rational Agent from Dimensional Sequence Theory (SAE Economics, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19358010

Qin, H. (2026). The Other End of the Bridge: Economic Rationality When 15DD Faces a Party Who Does Not Enter 15DD (SAE Economics, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

Qin, H. (2026). The Structural Inevitability of 15DD Emergence in Free Markets: From Baseline Collisions to Perceptual Leap (SAE Economics, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19394738

Qin, H. (2026). On the Origin of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20370224

Qin, H. (2026). The Place of Judgment (SAE Action Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22974154

Qin, H. (2026). On the Thickness and Boundary of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20769253

Qin, H. (2026). The Interface and Transformation between Recognition-Based Rights and Power (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21093939

Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595

Qin, H. (2026). On Rights and Entitlements (SAE Rights Theory, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21314907

Qin, H. (2026). On Accountability · Wei (SAE Rights Theory, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853810

Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635

Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384

Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324

Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112

Qin, H. (2026). Questioning and Bearing (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511

Qin, H. (2026). What Cooperation Is Not (SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815735

Qin, H. (2026). Mutual Checks (SAE Theory of Inter-State Cooperation, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815769

II · External works (secondary accounts only, tier C; originals not consulted, not quoted in the text)

Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. (the secondary account drawn on describes the second edition, Beacon Press, 2001)

Thompson, E. P. (1971). The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. Past & Present, 50, 76–136. https://doi.org/10.1093/past/50.1.76

III · External works (cited at second hand)

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (original not consulted; the wording and page numbers quoted are taken from Action Theory Paper 0, §7)

Interfaces

Main upstream: Rights Theory P5 §II (the three situations; the embedded position at the recognition layer), §III (the criterion lies in structure; the threshold of sealing exit; the local threshold and the encapsulation boundary, extended to non-compete agreements; own undertaking), §IV F19, F20, F22 (extended to the block a non-compete agreement seals and to its gravity; own undertaking); On Rights and Entitlements F30 (extended to suppliers; own undertaking); On Accountability F38, F39, F42, F43; Theory of Government Paper 3, §5, G18, G19, G21; Institution Theory Paper 1, §8, Z9, Z10, Z38; the Theory of Inter-State Cooperation Prequel, §2, and Paper 4, XZ22 and §2 (extended to economic positions; own undertaking); Rights Theory P4 F17.

Also used: Rights Theory P2 (the type criterion and the constitution criterion; closing a dimension by way of a resource), P4 §VI; F6 §7; Power Theory P1 (T5; the space-of-exit); Theory of Government G39; Economics P1 §5.3 (including the band of employment), P2 §5.1, P5; Action Theory Paper 0, §7 (the source of the second-hand citation of Hirschman); F6, Appendix C, Article 6 (d) (a working demonstration; not taken).

Interfacing: Polanyi, The Great Transformation (§4); Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" (§4); Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (§9). Polanyi and Thompson, tier C, per secondary sources; Hirschman, cited at second hand, the original wording and page numbers per Action Theory Paper 0, §7.

This series: the Prequel, §5 (one position, two sources); Paper 1, E3, E6; Paper 3, E14, E14a, E19; Paper 4, E21; Paper 5, E26; Paper 6, E32, E33, E37.

Handed to Paper 3: when a position grows so large that many cannot get around it, how strong the checks must be; for what does the work of the Base Layer, what is needed beyond checks.

写作声明：本文与 Claude（Anthropic）共同起草，所有思想决策、框架设计和最终编辑判断由作者做出。

引言

第 23 年秋，泉坳水业公司对两个村发出同一张公告：欠费满四个月的，停止供水。

泉坳在王国州（the Kingdom State）北部的丘陵里，离苹果城（Apple City）约两小时车程，有两个村，上坳约四百户，下坳约六百户。两个村历来各有几口公用旧井。第 16 年至第 19 年，上坳的旧井陆续干涸；州地质调查所第 19 年的报告说："地下水位下降，原因未查明。"下坳的旧井到第 18 年还出水；州卫生厅抽检过两次，一次细菌超标。

第 17 年，泉坳水业公司（the Springhollow Water Company）成立，股东是石桥特许公司（三成）与苹果城的几位投资人。同年，州水利厅给公司发了泉眼的取水许可，许可写明这份水用于上坳、下坳两村的公共供水。公司从山后一处泉眼取水，经净水站净化，第 18 年把管网铺到了两个村。它是泉坳唯一的自来水，员工十四人。

两个村接上管网的方式不一样。第 18 年，公司与下坳村委会签了一份《管网与水源协议》：公司出资铺管，头两年水价减半；村委会把三口旧井所在的地块转让给公司，"为保证水质、统一供水"，旧井由公司填平。协议经下坳村民大会表决，赞成的约六成。当年冬天，旧井填平。上坳没有这样的协议；公司照同样的价把管铺了过去，各户接上，照价交费。第 19 年，公司给两个村的小学免费接了水。

第 23 年春，公司宣布水价上调六成，理由是泉眼出水减少、净水站要换设备。王国州的《公用事业法》只管服务五千户以上的供水者，州公用事业委员会对泉坳的水价没有权限。到秋天，两村合计约一百二十户欠费三个月以上，于是有了那张公告。两村能找的替代都不容易：从苹果城雇运水车，每吨的价约是自来水的四倍；打新井要州水利厅许可，上坳村委会第 23 年春申请打一口新井，许可审了五个月，没有结果；下坳原来的井址，已经属于公司。

第 23 年冬，公司对二十三户停了水，上坳九户，下坳十四户；其中两户家里有卧床的老人。公司说："我们只是不再供我们的水，没有拿走谁的东西。"下坳的村民要求重开旧井，公司答："地块已是公司的。"

《公用事业法》、取水许可、这份协议与那张公告，以及后文王国州的《工资支付法》、州劳动厅的复函、青窑镇的合同与计划书，都是这个系列设的例子；本篇引到的条文只作事实，本系列不主张它们是最好的设计。

同一张公告，在两个村，是不是同一件事？公司那句"只是不再供我们的水"，在哪个村、哪一户身上成立，在哪里不成立？下坳的协议是村民大会通过的，这改不改读数？泉坳水业只有十四个人，它的权力算小还是算大？

这一篇问的是关系一级：一个经济位置在什么时候成了别人绕不过去的地方，绕不过去时，那里的人还有没有一条真的路。前置篇说过，资本不是权力的源，权力在能调动积累的位置；第一篇说过，一项积累只在实际收敛别人时显出权力面（第一篇 E3）。这一篇看收敛落到最深的地方：落到人的生计与生命上，落到人往哪里去的那条路上。

全篇九节。前六节在泉坳。先说什么是关口（第一节）；再说停止自身供给有几种读法（第二节）；先封了别人的路，解除关闭为什么是必须的（第三节）；哪些资源算基础权利的内容，规范层为什么不定（第四节）；什么时候一项条件成了强力（第五节）；生命基底处唯一的供给位置持什么职责，管理它的制度持什么职责（第六节）。后三节到青窑镇：几条约束合起来越线（第七节）；竞业禁止与附条件的给付，哪一样把人的选留下了（第八节）；退出真不真，守的是什么（第九节）。

读法照前置篇：构用应当，位置用职责，人用自己的法。泉坳水业公司、青窑瓷业、下坳村委会是构，用应当；本篇不对用水的人家与职工写应当。规范层、规则层、判断层的分法也照前置篇，本篇在用到的地方说明哪一句落在哪一层。

第一节　关口

泉坳水业只有十四名员工。它算不算一个大的权力？

照资产、营收、员工人数，它都很小。可停水的那个冬天，上坳九户、下坳十四户的人家，靠它才有一口能喝的水；其中两户家里有卧床的老人。他们要喝水，绕不过它。

本篇把这样的位置叫作关口：他人维持生活或展开自己的路上绕不过去的那个位置。水源是一处，一个镇上唯一的雇主是一处，录用与录取、授信、认证也都可以是。它们的结构相同：别人要走的路，要经过这一处；这一处可以放行，也可以不放。

关口有两个量。一个是广度：多少人要经过它。一个是深度：绕不过它时，压到人的哪一个维度。广度看的是规模，深度看的是压在哪里。一个几万家卖家都要经过的线上市集，广度大；它在一家卖家身上压到的，多半是生意。泉坳的水业公司反过来：经过它的不过一千来户，广度小；可它在停了水的人家身上压到的，是喝水，是生命的基底。所以关系一级看深度，规模一级看广度；广度怎样随规模递增地受制衡，在第三篇（第三篇 E14）。这一节只说一句：小权力可以很深。十四个人的公司，可以握着一千户人家的水。

关口在哪里，要看绕不绕得过去，不看名义上有没有别的路。泉坳名义上有三条：雇运水车，打新井，重开旧井。运水车每吨约是自来水的四倍；上坳的新井许可在州水利厅审了五个月，没有结果；下坳的旧井已经填平，井址归了公司。三条都在，在那个冬天各有各的障碍。障碍各不相同：一条是贵，一条卡在州里的一道审批，一条是早先的一份协议让了出去。障碍不同，后面各节的读法也不同（第二、三节）。对哪些人家三条都走不通，要逐户核；对停了水、又负担不起四倍运水的人家，这里是一处关口。这一节只认出这一点。

认出一处关口，只是认出要问的地方，不是判它越线。泉坳水业第一次让两个村有了自来水，还给两个村的小学免费接了水；关口给人开过路，这一面照记。下一节起要问的是：在这一处关口上，这家公司做了什么，这些事各落在哪一种读法里。

停了水的二十三户人家，与其余交着涨了六成的水费的人家，都在这一处之下；问它是不是关口、压到的是哪一个维度，比较时用的起点要分村说清：上坳取第 23 年调价以前的供水；上坳的旧井第 16 年起已在干涸，原因未查明，不拿它作比较，也不把井干算在公司头上。下坳取第 18 年填井以前的旧井，那几口井还出水，州卫生厅的抽检里有过一次细菌超标。调价以前的价钱是一个历史的数，只作比较，不自动成为应当的价格。

一个常见的反驳是，关口处的高价是信号。价高了，替代者就会进来，运水的、打井的、另办水厂的；把关口当作要问的地方，是不让价格做它的事。这一反驳有它的根据：公司说泉眼出水在减少、净水站要换设备；若是这样，涨价背后可能有真实的成本；价格也确实常常这样把替代引进来。可是信号要起作用，替代者得进得来。在泉坳，进来的路一条贵四倍，一条在州里审了五个月，一条已经归了公司；至少在停水的那个冬天，这个信号没有把替代引进来。说这里是关口，只说这一点，不说涨价越线；价格是否"过高"，规范层不给刻度（第四节）。

这一节的话落在三层上各不相同。关口的定义与两个量在规范层。哪些位置在一个州里通常算关口，水、电、唯一的雇主、某一张资格证，可以在规则层举例。一处具体的位置在某一时刻是不是关口，在判断层，交给要作这一判断的位置。

上坳的旧井为什么干，州地质调查所说原因未查明；这一处照记，本篇不补。

E7　关口：别人绕不过去的那个位置。他人维持生活或展开自己的路上绕不过去的那个位置，是关口：水源、唯一的雇主、录用与录取、授信、认证，同一结构。关口有两个量：广度，多少人要经过它；深度，绕不过它时压到人的哪一个维度。关系一级看深度，规模一级看广度；小权力可以很深。是不是关口，看实际绕不绕得过去，不看名义上有没有别的路。认出一处关口，只是认出要问的地方，不是判它越线（自担）。

第二节　停止自身供给的三种读法

公司说："我们只是不再供我们的水，没有拿走谁的东西。"这句话在什么时候成立？

权利论在讲基础权利的限与侵时，碰到过同一个问题：一个人靠别人的持续供给活着，供给的一方撤出，是不是侵？它先划出三种不同的处境：「主动切断既有回路是一种：作用者对主体的维持拓扑动了手，设卡，拦截，独占。已载入的供给位置失效是另一种：一个制度化的供给位置塌了，那是承认层的事……纯自然匮乏是第三种：没有作用者，没有对既有回路的干预，资源本身枯竭，这不是权利事件。」（权利论第五篇 §II）三种处境的分界都在结构上：「基础层之侵限于对既有厚层的作用，不含对未来供给的请求。」（同上）

这个分界管的是基础层：一项基础权利护的是已纳入的维度不被关闭，不是把别人的供给征为义务。本系列据这一分界，并结合权益专论对"已载入"的划分，就停止供给另列三种读法（自担）。它们不是把原来三种处境改一个名字，而是按停供这件事重新排过：原来的第三种，纯自然匮乏，在这里只作一个要排除的情形；新加进来的，是一份付出经承诺或载入以后，它的撤回该怎样读。

第一种读法：未承诺、未载入、未先封路的自身供给，停止不构成切断。

权利论说：「它撤出自己的供给而不封他人接续之路，是以自己的法处置自己的行使，其中没有对受养者维持拓扑的动手。」又说：「既无动手又无已载入位置时，撤出在权利结构里不落任何刻度。」（权利论第五篇 §II）这两句的主语是一个主体，以他自己的法处置他自己的行使。泉坳水业公司不是这样的主体，它是一个构。政府论在把同一格搬到一级政府身上时说得清楚：构没有自己的法，「也就没有那样一份自己的行使可以处置。所以搬过来的只是读数那一半：停付在这一格里不读作侵；许不许停、怎样停，回到第三条应当与 Z25 的说明（推及自担）。」（政府论第三篇第五节）

搬到一家公司身上，也只搬这一半（自担）。即使一项供给落在这一格里，"只是不再供我们的水"也只换得"不读作侵"，换不来"不必说明"：停不停、怎样停，这家公司要说明。

第二种读法：已承诺或载入的供给，撤回按它所进的格另核。

权利论接着那一段说：「持续供给若要成为可主张的东西，它成立为承认层的已载入位置，不成立为基础权利的内容。」（权利论第五篇 §II）权益专论在讲一份付出什么时候不再是自由停付的东西时，划了一条边界：「一份付出若已经过承诺、制度、信托、监护或承认性载入，它就不再只是这一裸格里的付出，它进了别的格，那时的撤回要按它所进的格……不再按裸权益的自由停付来读。」（权益专论 F30）原句说的是裸权益的授予端；这里推到经济里的供给者（自担）。

载入不只经承诺。下坳有一份协议，公司出资铺管、承诺"统一供水"，这是一项承诺。上坳没有协议，可上坳的人家接上了公司的管网，此后五年照价交费；公司向各户收费，欠了费，那张公告给他们定了一条"满四个月"的规矩。网络一直把这些人家当作有条件、可主张的供水位置来处理。照权益专论那条边界里的"承认性载入"，上坳的供水也在这一格里，不在裸格里。州水利厅发给公司的取水许可，也写明这份水用于两村的公共供水。这一条载入从哪里来、凭什么成立，第六节写。

第三种读法：先排他性封路、致依赖，再相挟或撤出，是切断。

权利论说：「先以排他性独占封死替代回路再撤出，或先致其依赖，关闭它原有的自维回路，再撤出，独占与致依赖本身已是切断，撤出只是它的完成，分两步走不改读数。」同一处又防了一个过宽的读法：「仅仅事实上无可替代不是独占，独占要有排他的动手。」（权利论第五篇 §II）

照这一句分开两个村。上坳是唯一供水，可这个"唯一"，事实里看不到是公司造成的：上坳的旧井陆续干涸，州地质调查所说原因未查明，事实里没有记载公司造成井干；新井的许可在州水利厅。事实里看不到公司对上坳的回路动过手。下坳不同：协议把旧井所在的地块转给了公司，旧井由公司填平。那是一次排他的动手，下一节专门读它。

三种读法可以并存。 它们不是把一个整案装进一个箱子。同一项安排，可以既有承诺或载入，又有先封路的前史。下坳就是这样：协议是承诺，填井是先封路。两样各按自己的来源与作用归账，谁也不抵销谁：有了承诺，不洗掉填井；填井读作切断，也不取消对已承诺供给的核验。

规范层还要说一句反面的话。规范层不给持有者立一般的供给义务：基础权利本身不因此生成对任意持有者未来供给的一般请求，一个人不能因为需要，就把别人的供给征为自己的义务。这一句不冲掉已承诺、已载入的供给，其中落在基础层的，照保障的要求处理；它只说，在第一种读法里，持有者没有一条续供的义务。撤出时要守的，是不封他人接续之路。泉坳的接续之路有一条卡在外层：上坳打新井的许可在州水利厅，审了五个月没有结果。这一处若有封路，封路的一方在州那一层，不在公司。

下面是一个设例。

设若第 24 年，公司以"泉眼不值得再经营"为由，提前六个月公告：停止向上坳全村供水，管网留给村里。

这一设例的起点要照实写：第 23 年冬，上坳已有九户停了水；设例从那时的状态起算，不写成全村人人正常受供。照上面的读法，上坳的供水经承认性载入，不在第一种读法里，公司不能只凭"不再经营"四个字收回。管网留给村里，这一项不封村里的路；可管网没有泉眼、没有净水站，也不会自己出水。六个月的公告是否够，接续由谁来做、怎样做，这一节不答；那是职责的效力与退出的程序之分，在第六节。

某项供给在不在裸格里，政府论讲政府的供给时说要「逐项检验」（政府论 G21）；这里推到一家公司的供给（自担）。本篇只读了泉坳的两村；别处的一项供给落在哪一种读法里，在判断层，逐项核。

E8　停止自身供给的三种读法。权利论第五篇 §II 分三种处境：主动切断既有回路，已载入的供给位置失效，纯自然匮乏。本系列据这一分界，并结合权益专论 F30，就停供另列三种读法（自担）。其一，未承诺、未载入、未先封路的自身供给，停止不构成切断；搬到构身上只搬读数那一半：停付在这一格里不读作侵，许不许停、怎样停，回到构的说明之责（政府论第三篇第五节）。其二，已承诺或载入的供给，撤回按它所进的格另核（权益专论 F30，原说裸权益的授予端，这里推到供给者，自担）；载入不只经承诺，一段持续的供给，被供给者接上管网、照价交费，网络按可主张的位置处理他们，也经承认性载入进这一格；被供给者一侧的权利须经三支咬合运行，才在这一格上生出供给一方的职责（E11a）。其三，先排他性封路、致依赖，再相挟或撤出，是切断，分两步走不改读数；仅仅事实上无可替代不是独占。三种读法不是整案互斥的分箱：同一安排里，载入与先封路可以同时要核，各按其来源与作用归账，不相互抵销。规范层不给持有者立一般的供给义务：基础权利本身不因此生成对任意持有者未来供给的一般请求；已承诺、已载入的供给按来源另核，其中落在基础层的，照保障的要求处理。撤出须不封他人接续之路。

第三节　解除关闭是停止压缩

下坳的村民要求重开旧井。公司答："地块已是公司的。"

先把下坳的事照次序摆出来。第 18 年以前，下坳有三口还出水的公用旧井，州卫生厅抽检过两次，一次细菌超标。第 18 年，村委会与公司签协议：公司出资铺管，头两年水价减半；村委会把三口旧井所在的地块转让给公司，"为保证水质、统一供水"，旧井由公司填平。村民大会表决，赞成的约六成。当年冬天，旧井填平。五年后水价涨了六成，第 23 年冬，下坳十四户停了水。他们回头去找旧井，井已经填了，地已经是公司的。

下坳停了水的十四户人家，与下坳其余的人家，原有的那条自己维持用水的路，现在不在他们手里。那条路怎样没有的，没有了以后谁该做什么，要先把两样历史的事实分开：三口出水的旧井，一次细菌超标的抽检。前者不因后者而不算一条路，后者也不因前者而不算一个真实的顾虑。

权利论给过一个判据：「资源本身不是维度，但经由它关闭一个维度，仍是对那个维度的侵犯。」（权利论第二篇）井不是基础权利；喝水所维持的那个生命的维度才是。一口井被填平，本身不是侵；可它若是一处人家原有的、自己维持这一维度的回路，填平它、把地收走，再让这一维度只能经一家公司的管子维持，那就是对回路动了手。上一节的第三种读法管的就是这样的事：先关闭原有的自维回路，致其依赖，再撤出，分两步走不改读数。

照这一判据读下坳，事实指向这里：填井与收地是公司的施为，经协议作出；停水在五年之后，是第二步。下坳十四户的停水，与上坳九户的停水，读法不同。上坳的路，事实里看不到是公司断的，旧井干涸的原因未查明；下坳的路有一段是公司拿走的。

已有排他的动手、关闭了别人原有的自维回路时，解除那一处关闭是必须的。根据是停止压缩，不是给予一项新的权利。这一区分要写准，因为两种说法通向两种不同的东西。说"给予权利"，等于把解除关闭的根据放在下坳的人对公司的一项新的要水请求上；规范层不立一般的供给义务（第二节）。这一处解除，根据来自停止压缩；协议里的承诺、这一位置上的供给职责，照第二节与第六节另核。说"停止压缩"，说的是公司在下坳那里还握着一处它自己造出来的关闭；它要停下的，是继续握着它。怎样停下，可以是重开旧井，可以是在别处给出一条同样可用的路，也可以是另有一项有保障的供给；这在规则层与判断层，本篇不替它选。

停下的方式本身也有边界。制度论说：「拆除也是构的施为：拆除本身不得越线，比如先封掉其原有自维或替代通路，使其只能依赖该供给，再撤出，这一部分归第一条，不打折（自担）。」（制度论 Z38）解除一处关闭的时候，不能再关上另一处。

还有那次表决。协议经村民大会通过，赞成的约六成。这改不改读数？

权利论在一个更尖的问题上回答过：一个主体宣称自愿交出它的封装，让另一个位置替它决定，这改变判定吗？「不改变。判据在结构，不在宣称的自愿。结构上要分的是授权与位置让渡。」（权利论第五篇 §III）可撤回的授权，是主体把某些决定交给另一个位置，同时保留撤回与退出；封死撤回与退出的位置让渡，是另一回事。原句说的是一个主体与他自己的封装；这里推到一个村让出它自己维持用水的回路（自担）。推过来的意思是：赞成，不独自改变结构的读数。要看的是那次让出的是什么。头两年的半价、出资铺的管，是可以计价、可以再谈的东西，是交换。三口井的地块转了，井填平了：村里原有的那条自己维持用水的路，被这一次让出关上了；要拿回来，事实里看不到一条现成的路。这是不是封死撤回的位置让渡，还要看协议给村里留没留下修订或退出的通道；协议的这一部分，事实里没有记，本篇不补。就已记的看，被关上的是一条自维的回路，这一项照第三种读法读。

那其余的人呢？记载只有约六成赞成，没有记其余的人是反对、弃权还是缺席。本篇不把这些补成反对。要说的只是：约束未表示赞成的人的，是村委会这一构作出的施为。制度论说，制度的施为对每一个内部主体都不越线（制度论 Z9）；村委会签下这份协议、让出全村的回路，这一施为照它自己的权限与这一条另核。

这一判断，事实里还没有哪个位置作出。州公用事业委员会对泉坳的水价没有权限；事实里也没有记载诉讼。读到这里，事实指向的是：下坳的停水在第三种读法里，公司那里握着一处要解除的关闭。至于由谁来裁定、怎样解除，事实里没有记哪个位置能管、管到哪里；已记的是两样：州水利厅的取水许可写明这份水用于两村的公共供水，州公用事业委员会对水价没有权限。这一处怎样落定，是第六节要说的管理者那一侧的事。

有人会说，下坳是自己投票同意的，多数人得了实惠，水质也确实有问题；现在停了水才回头要井，等于事后改约。这一说的分量在于，协议给了下坳真东西：出资铺的管，两年半价，一次抽检超标以后的放心；村民大会也确实表决过。可是这里要解除的，不是整份协议，只是协议里让出回路的那一段。半价、铺管，照第二种读法，作为已承诺的供给另核；填井与收地，照第三种读法读。协议的好处照记，它不抵销那一处关闭；那一处关闭，也不使协议的其余部分一概无效。

重开旧井以后的水质怎样、谁来管，在判断层，本篇不补。

E9　解除关闭是停止压缩，不是给予权利。「资源本身不是维度，但经由它关闭一个维度，仍是对那个维度的侵犯。」（权利论第二篇）已有排他的动手、关闭了别人原有的自维回路时，解除那一处关闭是必须的；根据是停止压缩，不是给予一项新的权利。拆除与撤出本身不得先封路（制度论 Z38）。多数表决同意让出回路，不独自改变结构的读数：判据在结构，不在宣称的自愿；可撤回的授权与封死撤回的位置让渡分开读（权利论第五篇 §III；原说一个主体与他自己的封装，这里推到一个村让出它自维的回路，自担）。未表示同意的人怎样受这一约束，按作出约束的那一构的施为另核（制度论 Z9）。怎样解除，在规则层与判断层。

第四节　哪些资源算基础权利的内容

下面是另一个设例。

设若第 24 年夏，山洪冲坏了泉坳的净水站。公司三日修好；修好以后的头一个月，按平时三倍的价收，说："抢修的成本要收回来。"

水算不算基础权利？一个月的三倍价，越没越线？

先说前一问。本系列不在规范层开一张"基础权利的内容"清单。规范层只立判据。权利论给的是两道：「第一道是类型判据：一个候选项要是主体结构中可独立寻址的存在、认知或展开维度，不是维持某一维度的外部资源、输入、工具或可替代手段。第二道是构成判据：对这个维度的压缩，会直接压缩主体维持自己的法之载体，或形成、修订、实行自己的法的结构可能性。两道都过，才进厚层。」（权利论第二篇）照这两道，水是一项资源，不是一个维度；生命与身体才是。所以同一篇说，营养、物质条件这些「本身是资源或支持条件，不因重要而自动成为权利」，而「对这些条件的剥夺，若直接关闭了生命、身体、表达这些已纳入的基础维度，则可以在限与侵那一篇里被判为对基础权利的侵犯」（权利论第二篇）。

这把问题换了一个方向：不问水在不在一张单子上，问一次具体的作用是否经由水关闭了谁的哪一个维度。权利论讲产权时也守着这一层：产权里有基础分量的那一端，「那个基础的分量锚在 P2 的维度上，不锚在生计、最低生存这种随时代而变的资源名目上」（权利论第四篇 §VI；P2 即权利论第二篇）。资源的名目随时代变，电、网络、某一种药，今天不在的明天可能在；锚在维度上，判据不随名目漂。

清单不是没有用。一个州可以在它的法里列出哪些供给算生命基底处的供给，水、电、取暖；列的是规则层的例子，例子不是规范，也不主张是最好的列法。一处具体的供给在一个具体的月份对一户具体的人家是不是落在生命基底上，在判断层。

再说后一问。三倍价本身，不完成规范的判断。抢修的成本是多少，事实里没有；一个三倍的数字，单凭它说不出是不是过高。规范层不给价格一个刻度。要问的是这个价落在谁身上：交得起的人家，多付了一个月的钱；交不起的人家，若因此断了水，那一部分就不只是价格的事了，它经由水碰到了生命的维度。那一部分怎样读，在下一节；付不起的人怎样不断供，在第六节。

这一问有人问过。可以拿来对照的有两处，本篇都只据转述，不加引号，也不据它们下结论。

一处是波兰尼。他在《大转型》（1944）里说，劳动、土地与货币不是为出售而生产出来的，把它们当作商品，是一种"虚构"；让它们完全由市场机制支配，社会本身会被撕开，于是引出保护社会的反向运动（据二手转述）。他问的与这里相近：有些东西不能当作寻常的商品。他从物的种类入手，列的是劳动、土地、货币；本篇从维度与作用入手，不列物的种类，只问一次作用经由哪一样东西关闭了谁的哪一个维度。两种入手最后是否相合，本篇据转述不作结论。

另一处是汤普森。他在《十八世纪英国群众的道德经济》（1971）里写过歉收年里的英国群众：他们认为面包与粮食有一个合乎习惯的公道价钱，粮商、磨坊主趁缺粮抬价，群众就去阻止，有时自己定下价来卖；汤普森把这一套共同持有的规矩叫作"道德经济"，与当时兴起的自由粮市的政治经济学相对（据二手转述）。山洪以后的三倍价，碰到的正是缺乏时关口处的价钱。在本系列的读法里，一个共同体持有的"公道价钱"，是这个共同体的承认与习惯，可以成为规则层的东西；规范层不把某一个价钱取作判据，问的仍是那一价钱有没有把交不起的人挡在生命基底之外。

抢修的成本没有量化；三倍是不是"收回成本"，在判断层。

E10　哪些资源算基础权利的内容，规范层不定。规范层只立判据：一个维度进入基础层，要过类型判据与构成判据（权利论第二篇）；资源本身不因重要而成为权利，经由它关闭一个已纳入的维度，才是侵。产权里有基础分量的那一端锚在维度上，不锚在随时代而变的资源名目上（权利论第四篇 §VI）。清单在规则层，作例子；一项具体供给是否落在生命基底上，在判断层。一个价格的高低，单凭它不完成规范的判断。

第五节　强力只在有替代判断时认

那张公告说：欠费满四个月的，停止供水。公司拿水作条件，要的是欠下的水费。这是不是强力？

收回自己的配合是制约，拿走对方自己的是强力：国家间协作论在国与国之间立过这一条，扣下的是施压一方本要给的，给不给是它就它自己的事作判断；拿走对方自己的，是替对方作了判断（国家间协作论第四篇 XZ22 与第二节）。

这一问要先有一个测试。测试的源头在制度论说线的两处：「排放若压到下游人家的身体与生计，一套配置若封死一个人拒绝的路，这些越线不一定装成涵育，也都在前两条里。」（制度论第一篇第八节）一处是不把人压到活不下去，一处是不封死他拒绝的路。国家间协作论把这两处推成了国与国之间的一项测试：「一项措施若使对方不照施压一方的意思去做就活不下去，或者实际上取消了它承担代价而不从的余地，就已滑向替代判断，不做。」它同时写明了一项除外：「要对方停止越线、履行它已认的约，不算"施压一方的意思"。」（国家间协作论前置篇第二节）这里把同一个测试推到经济位置上，主词由国与国换作一个经济位置与受它收敛的人（自担）。

推过来的测试是这样的。先写明持有者用的是哪一项条件，使受效者就他自己的哪一件事，不再有实际的拒绝余地。有三种情形要另外登记，不算进去：受效者仍可承担代价而不从的；对一项已有承诺的履行要求；对自然匮乏的暴露。

在经济位置上，还要多分一处。持有者要的，若是它自己那份东西的条件，比如水的价钱、货的数量、工的时数，那是交换。持有者若拿它的供给，去要对方自己的事，比如要一户人家卖地，要一个村不去上访，要一个人投票时怎样投，那是替代判断：它用自己的判断，替对方就对方自己的事作了决定。这一切分是本系列的（自担）：协作论原句的除外，只有"停止越线、履行已认的约"两样，没有说一个持有者自己的东西的价钱。

泉坳的公告要的是水费。上坳的供水经承认性载入，下坳的供水经协议承诺。欠下的水费，是这一份供给的价钱：下坳有协议；上坳没有，把多年照价交费读作认下了这一份价钱，是本篇的推及（自担）；涨了六成以后的那一份，两村是否都已认下，事实里没有记，在判断层核。就已认下的那一份说，催缴它，是要对方履行；照上面的测试，这一要求的目标落在除外里。事实里也看不到公司拿水去要两村的人做别的事；下坳要重开旧井、公司答"地块已是公司的"，那是上一节的关闭，不是拿水要挟。只是下坳还要多读一层：那里的旧井是公司填的、地是公司收的，停水同时是上一节那一处关闭的完成，照第三种读法另读；催缴的目标落在除外里，不洗掉这一层（第二节：三种读法可以并存）。

可这还没有读完。国家间协作论在讲封锁时，给同一个测试加了第二个用处：「一项封锁若断了一处人的生命基底，那里的人不照施压一方的意思去做就活不下去；被拿来作杠杆的，是他们的命……断的是生命基底，就已滑向替代判断，所以那一部分要切出来（自担）。」它还引了国家论的一句：「若它针对的真是战争能力，落在生命基底上的那一部分，就要切出来，切得落地」（国家间协作论第四篇）。在那里，措施的目标即使正当，落在生命基底上的那一部分也不因此免。

推到泉坳（自担）：欠费催缴的目标是正当的，可停水这一手段，落在了生命基底上。一户人家喝水、做饭、洗漱所需的那一份水被拿来作催缴的杠杆，押上去的就是这户人家维持生命的那一部分。那一部分要切出来，不论这户人家交得起还是交不起：欠下的钱照别的路去追，不经由断掉维持生命的那一份水去追。交得起与交不起的分别仍有用处：它关系到欠款怎样追，付不起的那一份由谁接（第六节）；它不决定那一份水能不能断。哪一份水算落在生命基底上，规则层可以定样子；一户具体的人家在那个冬天落在哪里，在判断层，逐户核。两户家里有卧床老人的人家，也要逐户核到，不能先替他们定。

切出来以后，那几户的水由谁来付？这不是这一节能答的。有依赖，后果严重，并不独自推出这家公司要无限续供的义务；付不起的人怎样不断供，在第六节，在管理者那一侧。

山洪那一个设例，读法不同。三倍价是水的价钱，是交换的条件；它本身没有断供，也没有拿水去要谁的别的事，不是替代判断。它若因此断了哪一户的水，就回到上面那一读：落在生命基底上的那一部分，照样切出来。

这一测试有它的适用范围。它只在已有排他的动手，或已有承诺、载入（包括承认性载入）的供给时适用。在第一种读法里，一项未承诺、未载入、未先封路的供给停了，不构成基础层之侵；可这不等于那里没有权力面，也不等于不须制衡。一个经济位置显不显出权力面，照第一篇读；它受怎样的制衡，做基础层之事的构在制衡之外还要什么保障，在第三篇（第三篇 E14、E14a）。

测试还有一个上限。权力论说：「完全剥夺 B 的主体位置，A 同时失去对 B 的权力，权力退化为控制、暴力、处理物。」（权力论第一篇 T5）把一个人压到主体位置全失，已不是权力，是这一篇以外的东西；本节的测试管的，是权力还在、却已滑向替代判断的那一段。

还有一个反驳：欠费不交还要供水，等于让公司替付不起的人买单；泉眼与设备的钱，谁来付？它不是没有根据：泉坳水业只有十四个人，公司给的涨价理由里，可能有真实的成本，它不是一个慈善机构。可是这里切出来的，是一种手段，不是一笔欠款：欠款照旧可追，追的方式不经由断水。切出来以后的成本由谁承担，是下一节要说的事；那一份不落在公司一方无限承担，也不落在付不起的人家身上。

E11　强力只在有替代判断时认。收回自己的配合是制约；拿走对方自己的是强力（国家间协作论第四篇 XZ22）。测试的源头在制度论说线的两处：不把人压到活不下去，不封死他拒绝的路（制度论第一篇第八节）；国家间协作论把这两处推成国与国之间的测试（前置篇第二节），这里推到经济位置，作同形（自担）。先写明持有者用哪一项条件，使受效者就他自己的哪一件事不再有实际的拒绝余地；仍可承担代价而不从的、对已有承诺的履行要求、对自然匮乏的暴露，分别登记。要的是持有者自己那份东西的条件，是交换；拿供给去要对方自己的事（卖地、不上访、怎样投票），是替代判断（这一切分是本系列的，自担）。落在生命基底上的那一部分要切出来：断的是生命基底，已滑向替代判断，不因要求本身正当而免（国家间协作论第四篇，原说封锁，这里推到停供，自担）。这一测试只在已有排他的动手、或已有承诺或载入（含承认性载入）的供给时适用；其余情形不构成基础层之侵，也不等于没有权力面、不须制衡。有依赖、后果严重，不独自推出持有者无限续供的义务。把人压到主体位置全失，已不是权力（权力论第一篇 T5）。原说国与国之间的施压，这里换作经济位置与受它收敛的人（自担）。

第六节　生命基底处唯一的供给位置

上一节留下一个问题：切出来的那几户的水，由谁来付？要答这一问，先要问这个位置是什么。

泉坳水业公司的资产，泉眼的取水、净水站、管网，是积累来的：投资人出的钱，石桥特许公司的三成股份（前置篇第五节）。可它在泉坳做的事，不只是在经营自己的东西。它是两个村唯一的自来水；别的路，一条贵到自来水的四倍，一条还在审批，一条已经让出；它所在的这个位置，触及生命基底。本系列把这样的位置叫作生命基底处唯一的供给位置，不叫"独占者"：权利论把"独占"留作术语，要有排他的动手（第二节）；上坳的事实里没有这样的动手，它仍然在这个位置上。

这样一个位置，是公用与私营的混合。它在为更大的构承担执行之责：一处人家喝得上水，本是管理这处地方的制度或政府要保证的事；这家公司做的，正是那一份保证落到地上的部分。所以这一供给是管理它的制度或政府职责的一部分，有无许可，这一层都在：管理者那一份保障之责不由许可产生，州水利厅发的取水许可，是它把这一位置收敛、载入的形式；《公用事业法》只管五千户以上，法律在水价这一路没有覆盖它，也不取消这一层（自担）。

这个位置持供给的职责。职责从哪里来？要说清楚，因为职责专论对职责有严格的要求：一项职责要「有源、有内容、有登记」；「仅凭失望或期待落空，不足以断定本来有一项职责。」（职责专论）职责的源在哪里，它也说了：「职责源在收敛这个位置的权力，束缚位置，退出有效，即退出该登记即不再持有。」（职责专论 F38）构也可以持职责（职责专论 F39）。

第一处来路，在被供给者一侧。 第二节说过，上坳的供水经承认性载入：持续供给要成为可主张的东西，「它成立为承认层的已载入位置」（权利论第五篇 §II）；权益专论把「承认性载入」与承诺、制度、信托、监护并列为一份付出进入别的格的几条路（权益专论 F30）。上坳没有协议，可它有一段持续多年的供水：人家接上了管，照价交费，公司向各户收费，欠费时照公告上的规矩办。网络在把这些人家当作可主张的位置来处理。

职责专论说，同样两个节点之间可以有两条方向相反的链。第二条是这样的：「承载一侧所凭承认性权利的权力面收敛持位者，持位者持职责出施为。」（职责专论 F42）在泉坳，持位者是供水的位置，承载一侧是用水的人家。第一条链，是供水的位置凭它的位置收敛这些人家：它定价，它发公告，它停水，这是它的权力面。第二条链，是这些人家被供给的位置在承认层载入，它的权力面反过来收敛供水的位置；供水的位置在那一格上持职责。

这两条链是平等的。职责专论写得清楚：「两链各有各的构成条件，谁也不是谁的价钱。」（职责专论 F42）它也说：「承认性权利不由承认权力换来。」（职责专论 F43）所以不能写成：用水的人家承认了公司的权力，于是换来一份被供水的权利。上坳的人家并没有拿什么去换。两条链各向自己一侧要条件，谁也不向对方要；一条成立，另一条不因此成立（职责专论 F42）。所以两条链要各自读。

第二条链要成立，承载一侧的权利须「经三支咬合运行」（职责专论 F42）。三支是什么，政府论说过：「一项承认性权利靠制度载入、共同体有效承认与真实权力支持三支运行。」（政府论 G19）照这三支看上坳。制度载入有两处：公司向各户收费，欠了费，那张公告给他们定了一条"满四个月"的规矩，这是这家公司自己的制度把这些人家载了进去；州水利厅发给公司的取水许可，写明这份水用于两村的公共供水，州的制度也把这一份供给载了进去。共同体有效承认，能见的是这些年各户接上管网、照价交费的事实。真实权力的支持，在那份许可上：州准公司取这一处泉水，用途写明是两村的公共供水，州站在用水的人家被供给的那一侧（照许可所附的用途读，自担）。三支都在，第二条链在泉坳成立：这些人家被供给的位置，它的权力面收敛供水的位置，供水的位置在那一格上持职责。第一条链也一样：供水的位置凭的那一项承认性权利，许可载入了它，两村照价交费认了它，州的许可在背后支持它（照许可所附的用途读，自担）；这项权利照前置篇第六节借位读：公司不自持它，公司是这一链的归责地址。两条链在泉坳都成立。

有一处要照实记下：已知州公用事业委员会按现有门槛对泉坳的水价没有权限；这项争议还由哪些位置受理、各能起什么实际作用，事实里没有记载。这不使第三支不在；它说的是，那一份支持在价钱上落到了哪里，事实里看不到。这一路怎样形成可用的问责，在规则层与判断层；本篇不补机构，也不判别的路都不存在。管理者那一侧怎样安排，见下。

第二处来路，在管理者一侧。 这个位置在为更大的构承担执行之责。政府论说，基础权利的保证，「政府给的是背靠与执行，不是核」（政府论 G18）。人家喝水所系的那个生命的维度，核在人那边；给保障、管执行的，在管理这处地方的制度或政府那边。这家公司的供水，是那一份保障与执行落到地上的部分。在泉坳，这一层有记载：州水利厅给公司发了取水许可，写明这份水用于两村的公共供水。管理者在这里收敛了这个位置、载入了它；职责专论说，职责「源在收敛这个位置的权力」（职责专论 F38）：这一位置职责的第二处来路，在这一收敛的权力，许可是它在泉坳的形式。

所以两方各持其职。这个位置持供给的职责。管理它的制度或政府，持为这一供给创造条件的职责：应当把这个位置收敛、载入，给它保障。政府论说，已载入的供给位置按承认性权利保证；未载入的，「未载入不自动等于可任意停付，已经承担的条件与其他来源另核」（政府论 G21；原说政府自己的供给，这里推到管理者为另一个构的供给给保障，自担）。上坳的供水不是裸格里的东西；在泉坳，管理者已经用一纸许可把它载进了自己的制度。还看不到落处的，是价钱这一路：州公用事业委员会只管五千户以上；泉坳的水价还由哪些位置受理，事实里没有记载。这一路怎样安排或补足，立什么规则，由哪一个位置去问小供水者的价钱，在规则层；一个州按自己的发展与条件去贴近这里的判据，规范层给它留出空间。

职责束缚位置，不束缚人。 这一句要防两种误读。一种是把这个位置读成一张永远退不出的卖身契：十四个人、几位投资人，从此不能离开泉坳。不是这样。职责束缚位置，退出有效，退出该登记即不再持有（职责专论 F38）。另一种是反过来，把"退出有效"读成"随时可以走"。职责专论紧接着防了这一层：退出的效力与退出的可用性是两件事，「两句都只说若退出则如何，都不断言总有一条退出通道可走。」（职责专论 F38 展开）它举的看似反例里就有一个：受宪制收敛的政府不能单方退出，可那里的职责照样在。

照这一区分读那个设例。设若公司提前六个月公告，停止向上坳全村供水，管网留给村里。这个位置可以撤出；可撤出的程序，不由"退出有效"一句给出。它要由这里的供给职责、管理者的接续之责与已有的程序另核：撤出要经一条不封他人接续之路、由管理者安排接续的程序。权利论说得简短：已载入的供养位置，「其持有者的撤出由承认层接住……强制与替补由权力支持处理」（权利论第五篇 §II）。一份六个月的公告，不当然使职责终止；管理者没有安排接续，也不能因此把这一份供给变成公司里某个人无期限的负担。第 23 年冬上坳那九户的停水里，落在生命基底上的那一部分，经逐户核实，是已经发生、该切出而没有切出的那一部分，另记，不因后来的撤出而抹去。

"构没有自己的法"，只排除一读。 第二节引过政府论那一句：构没有自己的法，没有一份自己的行使可以处置。这一句在这里管的，只是公司那句"我们只是不再供我们的水"：一家公司不能以"自己的法处置自己的行使"为由收回一项供给。它不独自证明一切构停止供给都是侵。泉坳这一处停水之所以要另读，根据在上面说的职责，不在"构没有自己的法"这一句。

供给不必无偿。 这一位置持的是供给的职责，不是白给的职责。水照价收；涨价可以有理由；欠下的钱照欠款追，追的方式不经由断掉维持生命的那一份水（第五节）。付不起的人怎样不断供，撤出时由谁接续，价格怎样受问，在管理者那一侧。山洪那一个设例也照此读：三日修好，是这个位置尽了供给的职责；头一个月的三倍价，是价格受问的事，问的那一方在管理者那里；它若因此断了哪一户的水，落在生命基底上的那一部分照样切出来（第五节），不系于那一户交不交得起；那几户的水怎样不断，由管理者那一侧安排。

三层句式在这里要补一句。前置篇说，构用应当，位置用职责。一个构也可以在更大的构里占一个位置，在那一格上持职责：泉坳水业公司作为构，受应当；它在这个生命基底处唯一的供给位置上，持职责。董事、经理在它里面的位置上，各有各的职责，另核。

或许有人担心，这是把一家私营的小公司征作公用事业：它从此不能自由定价，不能自由退出，谁还会去泉坳那样的地方办水厂？这一担心有它的道理：泉坳的自来水正是这家公司带来的；把它的位置读得太重，下一处缺水的村子可能就没有人去了。可是这里立的，只在一处：生命基底处，唯一的供给，依赖已经形成。规范层不给一般的持有者立供给义务（第二节）。在这一处，它也不是被征用：它可以收钱，可以涨价，可以撤出；它要守的，是不在生命基底上拿人家的水作杠杆，撤出时经一条有人接续的程序。至于付不起的人那一份，不落在它一方身上，落在管理者那一侧。管理者那一侧在泉坳已经做了一样：给了取水许可，写明这份水的用途。还看不到落处的有两样：水价那一路由谁来问，已知的委员会没有权限，别的位置事实里没有记载；上坳那一项打井的审批。这两样怎样补，在规则层与判断层，本篇不替它定。

哪些资源算生命基底，什么算唯一，这一职责的具体内容是什么，在规则层。《公用事业法》的五千户，是规则层的一个门槛；门槛以下，这一规范的方向不取消。门槛怎样定，在第三篇（第三篇 E19）；基础层的供给在制衡之外还要保障，也在第三篇（第三篇 E14a）。

E11a　生命基底处唯一的供给位置。触及生命基底、别人没有可负担替代的唯一供给位置，是公用与私营的混合：它在为更大的构承担执行之责，不只是在经营自己的东西；这一供给是管理它的制度或政府职责的一部分，有无许可，这一层都在，法律没有覆盖也不取消（自担）。职责有两处来路。被供给者一侧：持续的供给经承认性载入（权利论第五篇 §II；权益专论 F30），被供给者所凭的承认性权利，其权力面收敛供给的位置，这一位置在那一格持职责（职责专论 F42）；两条链各有各的构成条件，不是以承认换来权利（职责专论 F43）；这一侧的权利须经三支咬合运行，仅有期待落空不成为职责。管理者一侧：这一位置为更大的构承担执行之责。这一位置持供给的职责；管理它的制度或政府持为这一供给创造条件的职责，应当把它收敛、载入，并给保障（政府论 G18、G19、G21）。职责束缚位置，不束缚人，退出有效（职责专论 F38）；退出的效力不独自给出退出的程序：怎样撤出，经不封他人接续之路、由管理者安排接续的程序另核；一份通知不当然终止职责；管理者未安排的接续，不转成某个人无期限的负担；已发生的未履行另记。"构没有自己的法"只排除"以自己的法处置自己的行使"这一读，不独自证明一切停供为侵。供给不必无偿；付不起的人怎样不断供、撤出时谁接续、价格怎样受问，在管理者那一侧。哪些资源算生命基底、什么算唯一、职责的具体内容，在规则层。

第七节　组合越线

从泉坳往西，到青窑镇（Bluekiln）。

青窑镇在王国州西部的山地里，人口约八千，制瓷两百多年。青窑瓷业（Bluekiln Porcelain Works）雇着三千四百人，约占全镇适龄劳动人口的七成；工资比王国州同行的平均高一成。它办学徒班，免学费，每年收六十人；第 20 年，它出资修了镇上通往州道的路。

它的劳动合同里有几样东西。

镇上四成的住房属于公司。职工住宿舍，房租从工资里扣；合同附的《宿舍条款》写：离职后三十日内搬出。

工资的两成以"窑券"发放。窑券只能在公司的"青窑合作商店"与食堂用；合作商店是镇上最大的商店，物价比苹果城高约一成五；镇上另有三家小杂货铺，不收窑券。王国州的《工资支付法》规定工资"以通用货币支付"，没有写比例上限；州劳动厅第 22 年的复函说，以代用券支付部分工资，"须经职工书面同意"。职工入职时都签了同意书。

公司给职工预支工资，最多六个月。合同第 14 条写："预支未清的，离职须经公司同意。"离职要提前三个月通知。合同第 19 条写："离职后两年内，不得在王国州境内从事制瓷或为制瓷企业工作；违者偿付十二个月工资。"

老窑工在青窑瓷业拉坯、烧窑三十一年，持有王国州窑工等级证的最高一级。第 22 年春，他提出离职，打算和两位同事在镇外开一座窑坊。他有四个月的预支没有还清，公司没有同意他离职；公司的法务又发函提醒他第 19 条。一个月后，他向亲戚借钱还清了预支，仍因第 19 条暂缓。第 23 年春，榆钱资本的长期合伙（Elmseed Long-Term Partners）出资，替他与公司谈定：付公司六个月工资作违约金，公司书面放弃第 19 条对他的适用。另两位同事没有这样的出资，留在了公司。

老窑工与那两位同事，都在这几样约束之下。它们一项一项看各是什么，落在同一个人身上合起来又是什么，是这一节的问。已签的合同与条款，他实际被挡、借钱、再被挡、最后由别人出钱解开的先后次序，都是事实。拿一份"只写了提前三个月通知"的劳动合同来对照，是本节设的一个对照，不是事实里有过的合同。

一项一项看，它们单独都可以是限的样子；本篇不预设它们单独看都合格。宿舍是一项真实的给予，离职后三十日搬出，是一个期限。窑券经职工书面同意，州劳动厅的复函也这样要求过。预支是给职工的一笔周转，要还，也是常事。离职提前三个月通知，是一个程序。权利论说过，封死退出通道「不等于关系中存在期限、程序、条件或退出成本，它指主体不再保有拒绝、撤回持续绑定或转入可审查程序的结构通道」（权利论第五篇 §III）。期限、程序、条件，单独都不是封死。第 19 条不在这一列：它单独看已是侵，第八节读；这里只把它作为落在同一个人身上的一样，放进组合里。

可这几样是落在同一个人身上的。制度论有一条：「许多项约束逐项都在线内，合起来仍可能越线：这要对同一个内部主体、在同一实际配置下按同一条线审，并写明逐项判断所取的基线；在不同基线下各自不越线，不等于在同一组合中各项仍各自合格（自担）。」（制度论 Z10）原说一个制度对它内部主体的几条约束；这里换作雇主与职工（自担）。

照这一条，把老窑工第 22 年春的处境合起来看。他要离开；他若住着公司的宿舍，离职后三十日内要搬出，而镇上四成的房子是公司的；他手里的工资有两成是窑券，出了合作商店与食堂用不出去，攒下的现钱比工资单上的数少；他欠着四个月的预支，第 14 条写着预支未清离职须经公司同意，公司没有同意；他还清了预支，第 19 条又挡在前面，两年内整个王国州的制瓷都不能做，违者赔十二个月工资。他是一个做了三十一年瓷的人。

在这一组合里，他还保不保有一条拒绝、撤回这一份持续绑定的结构通道？事实给的次序是：靠自己，他走不了；向亲戚借钱，还是走不了；直到一家投资机构替他付了六个月工资，他才走了。经济学第二篇说过这一层：「"可能"不等于"可负担"。退出成本可以高到实质上等价于锁定……一个在行业内没有替代选项的员工，辞职在权利上存在，在生计上近乎灾难。」（经济学第二篇 §5.1）政府论讲退出的代价时，用的是同一个判据（政府论 G39）。

几项里，第 14 条离"封死"最近：它把离开这件事本身，系在了对方的同意上。可即使是它，单看也还有一条还钱的路；老窑工也确实借钱还了。合起来看才看得清：每一条路都在，每一条路后面都还有一条。

入职时签下的同意书，不独自改变这一读数。权利论说，「判据在结构，不在宣称的自愿」（权利论第五篇 §III）。签了，说明他当时接受了这些条款；不说明这些条款合起来没有封住他的路。

这一判断，事实里没有哪个位置作出。州劳动厅的复函只管窑券要不要书面同意，没有管这几样合起来是什么；事实里也没有一场诉讼。读到这里，事实指向的是：对第 22 年春的老窑工，这一组合在外部出资以前没有给他留下一条可负担的离开之路。那两位同事，他们为什么留下，事实里没有记全；本篇不替他们补理由，也不替他们判。

这几样约束同时也是给予。宿舍是房子，预支是钱，学徒班不收学费，镇上的路是公司修的，工资比同行高一成。这些照记，它们是真的；其中落在老窑工身上的，比如预支、比同行高一成的工资，与上面那一组合落在同一个人身上，也是真的。一件给予，不抵销一处封路；一处封路，也不使那些给予变成假的。宿舍、窑券这一类用法，是一项积累怎样兑换成对人离开的控制，在第四篇读（第四篇 E21）；窑券作为一种只在一处可用的钱，在第一篇（第一篇 E6）。

E12　组合越线。许多项约束逐项都在线内，合起来仍可能越线：要对同一个内部主体、在同一实际配置下按同一条线审，并写明逐项判断所取的基线（制度论 Z10）。宿舍、代用券、预支锁离职，单独看各自可以是限，本系列不预设它们单独看都在线内；竞业禁止不在这一列，另照 E12a；落在同一个人身上时，核他还保不保有拒绝、撤回持续绑定或转入可审查程序的结构通道（权利论第五篇 §III）。退出在权利上存在，不等于在生计上可负担（经济学第二篇 §5.1；政府论 G39 同向）。入职时的书面同意不独自改变读数。原说制度对内部主体的几条约束，这里换作雇主与职工（自担）。

第八节　竞业禁止侵分叉权；附条件的给付另读

上一节把第 19 条放进组合里看。这一节单看它：离职后两年内，不得在王国州境内从事制瓷或为制瓷企业工作；违者偿付十二个月工资。

先说它碰的是什么。权利论立过一项权利，叫分叉权：「分叉权是铰链权利族的一支。其基础分量是主体自我展开的方向不得不，在道脊；其承认分量是这一展开在一个可识别制度或关系场域中取得的可主张位置。当现存网格压缩主体的方向空间时，主体结合自己的方向不得不与当下制度，开出一条替代路径，即行使分叉权。」它也写了这项权利被压制是什么样子：「压到极处，方向空间被外部封死，即不可选，结果是生成性的萎缩，这是分叉权被压制的形态。」（权利论第四篇 F17）

把这项权利说得更直白些：分叉权说的是人有权选。选还是不选，为什么不选，比如换了别的利益，都是他自己的事；没有了这个选，才是侵（自担）。照这一句，读一样安排，问的只是一件：它把人的选留下没有。

老窑工要做的，正是一次选：他要和两位同事在镇外开出一座自己的窑坊。他往哪里去，是他自我展开的方向；第 19 条挡的，就是这个方向。

有两个反驳要先面对。一个说：F17 说的压制形态是"压到极处"，方向空间被封死；一条只管两年、只管一个行业的条款，远没有封死一个人的全部方向，他可以去做别的。另一个说：开窑要有客户、有市场，要有人买他的瓷；这是要别人才成立的事，不是他一个人封装得了的东西，落在相遇边界上。

本系列这样回答（自担）。先把一件事拆成两面。开窑能不能做成，确在相遇边界上：要有人买，要有窑址与本钱，他对谁都没有"必须来买"的权利；第二个反驳对这一面是对的。可竞业禁止管的不是这一面。它不管他卖不卖得出去，它管的是他能不能往那里去：以违约金为后盾，事先把开窑这一条从他能走的方向里划掉。被划掉的，是他方向空间里的一块。这一块不必由本系列重走两道判据：权利论已经把分叉权方向的不得不放在基础分量里（权利论第五篇 F22，见下）；放在基础分量里，就在封装一侧，下文所引「已通过两道判据的封装维度」这一前件由此满足（自担）；方向空间被外部封死，又正是它被压制的形态（权利论第四篇 F17）；原句说的是分叉权的方向不得不，这里读到被一条条款划掉的那一块（自担）。所以竞业禁止之为侵，在事先代写方向，不在收窄市场。对老窑工，被划掉的正是他自己正在走的那一条；可读数不靠这一点，封的是方向空间里的一块，不论那是不是他最可能走的路。在那一块上，它已经是"方向空间被外部封死，即不可选"，不必等到全局都压到极处，第一个反驳由此也有了回答。

被拿走的有多宽，是轻重，不是有无。竞业禁止没有把人逐出：他还在，还能做别的。照权利论第五篇的刻度，这是刻度一的非退场压制：承载者仍在，「其一次行使、一类行使实践、行使能力或行使带宽可被压缩」，压缩落在哪里，按 F20 归型（权利论第五篇 F19、F20）。竞业禁止压缩的，是人往哪里展开的那片空间的带宽；所及的地域越大、行业越宽、期限越长，压得越重。短一些、小一些，软在范围，选仍是被拿走的。

签字不改这一读数：判据在结构，不在宣称的自愿（权利论第五篇 §III）。签了字，他离开以后的选，仍然不在他手里。补偿也不改。一条带补偿的竞业禁止，付给人一笔钱，后盾仍是违约金与禁令：拿了钱，也不许去。它比不带补偿的软一些，软在代价，不软在结构：那一块方向，仍然是从外部封住的。

还有一道门槛要面对。权利论第五篇在分限与关闭时说：「局部、可逆、可被追问、可在相遇边界中重新具体化的约束，可以仍属限；结构性切断维度的展开或恢复，才属关闭。」（权利论第五篇 §III）一条两年、一州、一业的条款，看上去正是局部的，期满就可逆，也可以诉到法院去问。

这一句在这里，正是规范层给规则层留的空间（自担）。附条件的给付、服务期、保密，照各自的结构可以落在相遇边界上，不因名称就认：附条件的给付照下文三件判据，服务期照退出的阈值，保密照它所护的东西与范围另核；设不设、怎样设，交给规则层，判断层再按个案读。竞业禁止不在这一空间里，窄到下文窑坊学徒合同那一条（满师后两年内不得在青窑镇开窑）也一样。它替人定的是离开以后往哪里去；那是分叉权方向的不得不：「分叉权的方向不得不是基础分量，可被压制」（权利论第五篇 §IV，F22），在人自己的封装一侧。封装一侧没有那一道门槛：「封装边界上没有限这回事，只有止步与越界：对一个已通过两道判据的封装维度，外部力量的排除、代写或重画，一律是侵」；一次约束若同时落在两道边界上，「封装侧支配」（权利论第五篇 §III）。把竞业禁止说成期限、条件或退出成本，答的是退出的通道有没有封死；它碰的不只是能不能走，还有往哪里去，后一样不在相遇边界上（自担）。

竞业禁止还碰退出。《制度如何可能》（下称 F6）在讲退出成本时，分过自然的与人为的两种，人为的一种，是「制度刻意制造的退出摩擦——竞业禁止、离婚冷静期、国籍放弃门槛」（F6 §7）。第 19 条在老窑工身上，也确实先挡了离开：他还清了预支，"仍因第 19 条暂缓"。它两面都碰：往哪里去，与能不能走。

所以，竞业禁止是侵，带补偿也一样：它拿走的是人离开以后的选，轻重看拿走了多宽一片。这一读数在规范层。

有一类约束，要与竞业禁止分开读。人有自己的目的，别人也有；限制一个人去侵犯别人的目的，不算侵犯这个人的目的（自担）。一项约束，若实际只限住他在某一项角色里的某一种行使，越过第三人的权利、或越过公众问的那条路的那一步，并满足下面的范围与程序条件，就按这一类读；只声称是为了护人，取不得这个读数。它护的是别人，不是设约一方自己的好处；它不划掉一个人离开以后的方向。从他这一侧看，它是相遇边界上的一项限：他的一种行使在某一处受限。从被护的人那一侧看，是他在别人的封装边界前止步：§III 说封装边界上「只有止步与越界」。所以它不在竞业禁止之列，也不是给「一律是侵」开的例外。它要说得出：限的是哪一项角色关系里的哪一种行使，护的是谁，为什么用更少的限制护不住，范围多宽；它自己也要是一项限，不封死人拒绝、退出与复核的路。若限得超出护人所需，实际划掉的仍是他往哪里去，那一部分就仍是侵，不因护人的目的改称可以允许。第四篇读一位审查处长离任以后的受聘，碰到的就是这一类问题（第四篇第三节）。青窑第 19 条与下文窑坊的学徒合同，护的都是设约一方自己：留住人，挡住竞争；它们不在这一类。

规范层的这一读数，对规则层有一条建议。制度论的第一条应当是：制度的施为，对每一个内部主体都不越线；「这一条整条坚持：它管构自己的施为，守卫与拆除在内；不随关系厚度调节，也不随任何条件打折。」（制度论 Z9）一家公司把一条竞业禁止写进劳动合同，是它作为构的施为；一个州准许它、它的法院去强制执行它，也是那一级制度的施为。一项侵，规范层不认它可以在规则层被准许、被强制执行；所以本系列对规则层的建议是，原则上不为竞业禁止开允许的口子；为保护他人而设、照上文不在竞业禁止之列的约束，由规则层说明限的是哪一种行使、护的是谁、为什么非此不可、范围多宽。怎样禁止，比如订立即无效、不予执行，或者别的形式；已经签下的条款怎样过渡；已经付出的违约金、已经受的损失怎样救济：这些怎样写，各制度、各级政府自己定，本系列只建议，不代定。上面几样是规则层的例子，本系列不主张哪一种是最好的。

那么一家公司正当要护的东西呢？它的配方、它的客户名单、它花在一个学徒身上的心血？构自己的东西，用不封方向的安排去护：保密，护的是构自己的东西，不管人往哪里去。一个人什么时候可以走，是服务期的事，照退出的阈值另核，不在这一条之内。

这一读数，判的是条款，不判人。

老窑工的窑坊后来开起来了，第 25 年雇了二十二人，给学徒发工资。窑坊的学徒合同写："满师后两年内，不得在青窑镇开窑。"这一条比第 19 条窄得多：不是全州，只是青窑镇；不是一切制瓷，只是开窑。照上面的读法，它同样是严格的侵。它封的不是某一条已经形成的方向，是学徒方向空间里的一块：在他的方向形成以前，就把那一块写成不可选。那是不是他满师以后最可能走的路，不改读数。它与第 19 条的差别，在规则层的过渡与救济上分量不同，不在读数上。

写这一条，不是因为写它的人当年也被第 19 条挡过。他当年受过的限制，不使他今天写的条款当然越线，也不使它当然合理；这一条照它自己的结构读。照实写下的是：一个被竞业禁止挡过的人，自己开了窑坊以后，也写了一条。这一事实不说明他是什么样的人；判的是那一条，不是写它的人。

还有一种安排，要与竞业禁止分开。设想一份合同这样写：离职后两年内不在青窑镇开窑的，可得若干补偿。这一份设想，事实里没有，是本节设的对照；设这笔钱确是额外的，拒绝它也不取消人实际的去向。它不禁止：一个人照样可以去开窑，只是不拿那笔钱。选仍在他手里：收下这笔钱、两年不在本镇开窑，本身就是他行使了这个选；为什么这样选，是他自己的事。给不给这笔钱，是给付的一方处置它自己的给付；与第五节说的"收回自己的配合是制约"同形。本篇把它叫作附条件的给付。规范层不判它为严格的侵；它落在相遇边界上，正在规范层给规则层留的那一份空间里，规则层可以允许它，也可以不允许。

分界不总是一眼看得清，规范层要给判据。判据有三件，问的都是同一件事：人还有没有这个选。

其一，后盾是什么。违约以后，是仍被禁止去、被罚、被强制执行，还是只停止一项给付。前一种是禁止，选被拿走了；后一种在形式上不同于禁止，这个选实际在不在，还要接下两件。

其二，系在"不去"上的是不是额外的东西。若系在上面的，是一个人已经挣下的工资、递延发给他的报酬，或者已经发给他又要追回的钱，那是拿他自己的东西来压他，选是假的，回到禁止这一边。

其三，组合与依赖。一笔附条件的给付，若与预支、宿舍这类约束一起落在同一个人身上，照上一节合起来看；在深的依赖之下，拒绝这笔给付若就等于活不下去，选也就没了，照第五节的测试，已滑向替代判断。

一条具体的条款落在哪一边、门槛怎么定，在规则层与判断层。

青窑镇后来的一件事，正落在这条线上。第 25 年，青窑瓷业关了两条窑线，裁员九百人；乔氏基金会（the Qiao Foundation）办了"新青窑计划"：给被裁的人三年全额生活费，约为原工资的九成，条件是进入基金会在镇外新建的设计园，在基金会定的三条路里选一条受训，"三年内不得为其他瓷器企业工作"。计划书写：中途退出的，停发生活费，已发的不追回。窑坊招的九个被裁的人里，有两人报过这个计划，开课两个月后退出了。"三年内不得"一条自领取生活费之日起算，退出以后是否仍然适用，计划书没有写，基金会对这两人也没有表态。

照上面的判据读。领生活费的那段时间里，这一条的后果若只是停发、已发的不追回，后盾的形式是附条件的给付；单凭这一件，还不认选实际在。这笔给付是不是额外的，拒绝它以后人的基础层有没有着落，与别的约束怎样合起来，照后两件另核；本例的材料没有给全，见第六篇第四节。退出以后，若这一条仍然约束他，不领钱了也不许他去别的瓷器企业，那它就是禁止。计划书没有写，基金会没有表态；本篇不替基金会补答。这份计划给的方向是不是被代定了，三条路的菜单与"确定的未来"怎样读，是另一件事，在第六篇（第六篇 E37）。

还有两处边界。分叉权是人的。一家构对另一家构立的排他条款，比如长期合伙投窑坊时写的"三年内不得接受其他投资人"，不是这一条管的；它照关口与制衡读。另一处是 F6 附录三的公司原则：那是一份工作展示，其中第 6 条 (d) 写「竞业禁止协议须有合理范围和时间限制，且须提供对等补偿」。那是带补偿的竞业禁止；本系列不取这一条。

最常听到的反对是：不许竞业禁止，谁还肯培养学徒？培养一个人要花钱，人一满师就去对门开窑，培养的一方血本无归。这一反对有它的根据：培养确要投入，青窑的学徒班不收学费，窑坊给学徒发工资；青窑镇制瓷两百多年，手艺要有人肯教，才传得下去。人一满师就走，培养的一方是不是就血本无归，是这一说的担心，事实里没有记。可是要护的东西可以分开护。配方与客户，用保密护；学徒的培养成本，可以用服务期与它的退出阈值来安排；甚至一笔附条件的给付，规则层也可以允许。不能护的，只有一样：一个人往哪里去这件事本身。那是他自己的选，不是培养他的一方的东西。

E12a　竞业禁止侵分叉权；附条件的给付另读。分叉权是有权选：选还是不选，为什么不选（比如换了别的利益），是人自己的事；没有了这个选，才是侵（自担）。分叉权的基础分量，是主体自我展开的方向不得不；方向空间被外部封死，即不可选，是分叉权被压制的形态（权利论第四篇 F17）。竞业禁止，即以违约金、禁令或强制执行为后盾，禁止人离开以后往某个方向去，在条款所及的地域、行业与期限里事先把他方向空间里的一块写成不可选，拿走了他离开以后的选。能不能做成，在相遇边界上；被划掉的是方向本身，权利论已把它放在基础分量里（权利论第五篇 F22），在那一块上，它已是方向空间被外部封死，不必等全局压到极处，也不论那是不是他最可能走的路（自担）。它也不落在局部、可逆的限里：局部、可逆的限，是规范层给规则层留的空间，立在相遇边界上；竞业禁止替人定的，是离开以后往哪里去；那是分叉权方向的不得不所在，在封装一侧，封装边界上没有限，两道边界同在时封装侧支配（权利论第五篇 §III、F22；自担）。竞业禁止不在这一空间里，附条件的给付在其中。它属非退场压制，轻重看所及的地域、行业与期限（权利论第五篇 F19、F20）；签字与补偿不改结构（权利论第五篇 §III）：补偿与短期改的是范围与代价，不改选被拿走。它同时是人为的退出成本（F6 §7）。所以竞业禁止是侵，带补偿也一样。为保护他人而设的约束不在竞业禁止之列：人有自己的目的，别人也有，限制一个人去侵犯别人的目的，不算侵犯这个人的目的；它限的不是人的方向，是他去越过别人的线的那一步：对他，是相遇边界上的一项限；对被护的人，是在其封装边界前止步（权利论第五篇 §III；自担）。它护的是第三人的权利或公众问的那条路，不是设约一方自己的好处；限得超出护人所需，划掉的仍是他往哪里去，那一部分仍是侵。制度的施为不越线一条整条坚持，不随任何条件打折（制度论 Z9）：本系列对规则层的建议是原则上不为竞业禁止开允许的口子；为保护他人的约束，由规则层说明限的是哪一种行使、护的是谁、为什么非此不可、范围多宽；怎样禁止、已签的条款怎样过渡、已付的违约金与已受的损失怎样救济，各制度、各级政府自己定，本系列只建议，不代定；构自己正当的东西，用保密这类不封方向的安排去护。附条件的给付不同：它不禁止，只把一笔额外的给付系在一个选择上，选仍在人手里，收下它本身就是行使了这个选；规范层不判它为严格的侵，规则层可以允许，也可以不允许。分界的判据在规范层，三件，问的都是人还有没有这个选：后盾是禁止与强制执行，还是只是不再给；系在"不去"上的是额外的给付，还是已挣的工资、递延的报酬、已发又追回的钱；与别的约束合起来、或在深的依赖之下，拒绝这笔给付是否就等于活不下去；三件合起来用，后盾只是不再给，还不认选实际在。一条具体条款落在哪一边、门槛怎么定，在规则层与判断层。服务期限的是什么时候走，照退出的阈值另核；分叉权是人的，对构的排他条款照关口与制衡读。

第九节　退出真实；守的是涌现的前提

老窑工最后走了。可他是怎样走的：一家投资机构替他付了六个月工资。要先有人出钱才走得开，这条退出的路，是真的吗？

先说这一问为什么要紧。退出真不真，守的不只是此刻的这一个人。经济学第五篇论证过，在自由市场里，15DD 的涌现是有前提的结构性必然；三条前提里，第一条是：「存在非零退出自由度的市场——参与者至少在部分关系中可选择合作对象并退出。」它也写了什么能延缓这一过程：「权力锁定（压缩退出自由度和碰撞方向——极端情况违反前提一……）」（经济学第五篇）一个镇上，适龄劳动人口的七成在同一家厂里做工，镇上四成的住房属于这家厂，工资的两成发成只在它的商店与食堂用得出去的券；这些人走不走得开，也是这个镇上那一条前提还在不在。关系一级守的，是此刻的人，也是涌现的前提（第六篇 E32）。

再说退出难到什么地步时，制度要承担多少。经济学第一篇有一句很强的话：在退出极其困难或不可能的经济关系里，「"用脚投票"不可能或代价极高，制度必须承担全部的制衡功能。」（经济学第一篇 §5.3）这一句它给的场景是婚姻中的经济决策、亲子关系中的资源分配、公民与国家的税收关系，是退出近乎不可能的一档。雇佣不在这一档。同一节把它放在另一档：「退出有摩擦但可能的经济关系（雇佣、长期商业伙伴）」（经济学第一篇 §5.3）；经济学第二篇补了一句，辞职在权利上存在，在生计上可以近乎灾难（经济学第二篇 §5.1）。所以本篇不把那个"全部"搬到青窑镇；青窑镇要的，是让退出从可能变得可负担。

权力论有一句话常被用来安慰人：「这一离开空间永远存在，它就是 B 作为 13DD 主体的余项。」（权力论第一篇）这句话是对的：一个人不能被他所处的任何安排穷尽，总有一份是那些安排收不进去的。可它说的是主体，不是一条现实的通道。它不认证青窑镇的某一个职工此刻有一条可用的离开之路；那要照事实逐项核。

照这样读老窑工的离开，要两面写。一面，它说明了先前的障碍是什么，以及一笔资助怎样改变了条件。他实际碰到的，有先后：预支未清时，第 14 条让公司可以不同意他离职，公司没有同意；借钱还清以后，第 19 条又把他挡住；长期合伙出了六个月工资作违约金，换来公司书面放弃第 19 条对他的适用，解开了最后的一道。宿舍与窑券在他离开的这一年起了什么作用，事实里没有记载；落在别人身上时，照各人的实际配置核。另一面，它不宣布青窑镇的退出已经真实：那两位同事没有这笔钱，留了下来。它也不否认这一次确已出现的可行：老窑工走了，窑坊开了，第 25 年雇了二十二人，其中九人是青窑瓷业那一年裁下的。一处替代出现了，对其中一些人，离开青窑瓷业以后有了一个可以去的地方；这一处替代有多大，够不够全镇的人，事实里看不出来，本篇不补。

可以拿来对照的有一处。赫希曼在《退出、呼吁与忠诚》（1970）里，把退出写成「有些顾客不再购买公司的产品，或者有些成员离开组织」（p. 4），把呼吁写成「任何试图改变、而不是逃离一种令人反感的事态的努力」（p. 30）；他说在家庭、国家这类组织里，退出几乎不可得（p. 33）；退出与呼吁，在他那里都是让一个衰退中的组织回到正常运作的恢复机制（p. 1、p. 82）（原文与页码转据行动论 Paper 0 第七节，转引）。他读的是组织衰退时，退出与呼吁怎样把它拉回正常运作；本篇读的是退出的另一面：它是一条结构的通道，封死了是侵（第七节），它在就守住了涌现的一条前提。一个组织即便不衰退，退出的路也要开着。两种读法问的不全是一件事；原书本篇未核，这里只记下这一层，不据它下结论。

还可以这样反驳，这一切都要回到一个人自己：老窑工有手艺、有口碑，所以有人肯出钱；换一个普通的职工，没人出钱，他也就走不了。这一反驳把退出读得很冷，也不无道理：真实的退出，常常要靠一个人手里本来就有的东西。可这正是本节要说的那一面：要先有人出钱才走得开，说明在那之前，这条路对没有这笔钱的人是不可负担的。退出真不真，不在一个人碰巧被谁看中；在一个镇上的约束合起来，给不给一个普通的人留下一条走得开的路。那一层，第七节已经读过；怎样为人的离开与另立门户给条件，在第六篇。

E13　退出真实；守的是涌现的前提。关系一级守的，不只是此刻的这个人，也是自由市场里 15DD 涌现的第一条前提：「存在非零退出自由度的市场」；权力锁定压缩的正是退出自由度（经济学第五篇）。"制度必须承担全部的制衡功能"一句，只给退出近乎不可能的一档（经济学第一篇 §5.3）；雇佣在「退出有摩擦但可能」的一档（经济学第一篇 §5.3；经济学第二篇 §5.1）。「这一离开空间永远存在，它就是 B 作为 13DD 主体的余项。」（权力论第一篇）这一句说明主体不能被既有安排穷尽，不认证某项现实的退出已有可用的通道；可达性逐项核。要先有人出钱才走得开，两面写：它说明先前的障碍与资助怎样改变了条件，不宣布一处的退出已经真实，也不否认这一次确已出现的可行（自担）。

这一篇停在哪里

这一篇证了这些。关口是别人维持生活或展开自己的路上绕不过去的位置，有广度与深度，小权力可以很深（E7）。停止自身供给有三种读法，载入不只经承诺，也可以经承认性载入；三种读法可以在同一安排里并存（E8）。已有排他的动手时，解除关闭是停止压缩，不是给予权利；多数表决不独自改变结构的读数（E9）。哪些资源算基础权利的内容，规范层只立判据，清单在规则层（E10）。强力只在有替代判断时认；落在生命基底上的那一部分要切出来（E11）。生命基底处唯一的供给位置持供给的职责，职责有两处来路，管理它的制度或政府持为供给创造条件的职责；在泉坳，两条链都成立，管理者已用取水许可载入这一位置；水价一路，已知的委员会没有权限，还有哪些受问的位置，事实里没有记载；退出的效力与退出的程序分开（E11a）。许多项约束合起来可以越线（E12）。分叉权是有权选；竞业禁止拿走了人离开以后的选，侵分叉权，带补偿也一样，轻重看它所及多宽；它不落在局部、可逆的限里，本系列对规则层的建议是原则上不为它开允许的口子；为保护他人而设、只限他去侵犯别人目的那一步的约束，不在其列；附条件的给付，三件判据都过时不拿走选，落在规范层给规则层留的空间里（E12a）。退出真实，守的是此刻的人，也是涌现的前提（E13）。

它没有证的：基础权利内容的清单；价格是否"过高"的刻度；生命基底处供给职责的具体内容，例如付不起的人家由谁、按什么办法续供；竞业规则的细则，例如已签条款怎样过渡。这些在规则层与判断层，交具体的制度论与位置上的判断。

交给后面各篇的：一个位置大到许多人都绕不过去时，制衡要多强，做基础层之事的构在制衡之外还要什么保障，门槛怎样定，在第三篇（第三篇 E14、E14a、E19）；宿舍、窑券这一类用法，是积累兑换为对人离开的控制，在第四篇（第四篇 E21）；长期合伙投窑坊的那一面，在第五篇（第五篇 E26）；新青窑计划给的是条件还是方向，卧床的老人为什么不能等，在第六篇（第六篇 E33、E37）。

留下的余项：上坳的旧井为什么干；上坳的打井许可审了五个月没有结果；泉坳的水价还由哪些位置受问，事实里没有记载；下坳的井址归属与重开以后的水质；第 23 年冬已经停了水的二十三户，每一户落在生命基底上的是哪一部分，哪几户交不起；那两位留下的同事；窑坊学徒合同那一条怎样过渡。这些都照记，各有去处。

本篇命题（合列）

E7　关口：别人绕不过去的那个位置。他人维持生活或展开自己的路上绕不过去的那个位置，是关口：水源、唯一的雇主、录用与录取、授信、认证，同一结构。关口有两个量：广度，多少人要经过它；深度，绕不过它时压到人的哪一个维度。关系一级看深度，规模一级看广度；小权力可以很深。是不是关口，看实际绕不绕得过去，不看名义上有没有别的路。认出一处关口，只是认出要问的地方，不是判它越线（自担）。

E8　停止自身供给的三种读法。权利论第五篇 §II 分三种处境：主动切断既有回路，已载入的供给位置失效，纯自然匮乏。本系列据这一分界，并结合权益专论 F30，就停供另列三种读法（自担）。其一，未承诺、未载入、未先封路的自身供给，停止不构成切断；搬到构身上只搬读数那一半：停付在这一格里不读作侵，许不许停、怎样停，回到构的说明之责（政府论第三篇第五节）。其二，已承诺或载入的供给，撤回按它所进的格另核（权益专论 F30，原说裸权益的授予端，这里推到供给者，自担）；载入不只经承诺，一段持续的供给，被供给者接上管网、照价交费，网络按可主张的位置处理他们，也经承认性载入进这一格；被供给者一侧的权利须经三支咬合运行，才在这一格上生出供给一方的职责（E11a）。其三，先排他性封路、致依赖，再相挟或撤出，是切断，分两步走不改读数；仅仅事实上无可替代不是独占。三种读法不是整案互斥的分箱：同一安排里，载入与先封路可以同时要核，各按其来源与作用归账，不相互抵销。规范层不给持有者立一般的供给义务：基础权利本身不因此生成对任意持有者未来供给的一般请求；已承诺、已载入的供给按来源另核，其中落在基础层的，照保障的要求处理。撤出须不封他人接续之路。

E9　解除关闭是停止压缩，不是给予权利。「资源本身不是维度，但经由它关闭一个维度，仍是对那个维度的侵犯。」（权利论第二篇）已有排他的动手、关闭了别人原有的自维回路时，解除那一处关闭是必须的；根据是停止压缩，不是给予一项新的权利。拆除与撤出本身不得先封路（制度论 Z38）。多数表决同意让出回路，不独自改变结构的读数：判据在结构，不在宣称的自愿；可撤回的授权与封死撤回的位置让渡分开读（权利论第五篇 §III；原说一个主体与他自己的封装，这里推到一个村让出它自维的回路，自担）。未表示同意的人怎样受这一约束，按作出约束的那一构的施为另核（制度论 Z9）。怎样解除，在规则层与判断层。

E10　哪些资源算基础权利的内容，规范层不定。规范层只立判据：一个维度进入基础层，要过类型判据与构成判据（权利论第二篇）；资源本身不因重要而成为权利，经由它关闭一个已纳入的维度，才是侵。产权里有基础分量的那一端锚在维度上，不锚在随时代而变的资源名目上（权利论第四篇 §VI）。清单在规则层，作例子；一项具体供给是否落在生命基底上，在判断层。一个价格的高低，单凭它不完成规范的判断。

E11　强力只在有替代判断时认。收回自己的配合是制约；拿走对方自己的是强力（国家间协作论第四篇 XZ22）。测试的源头在制度论说线的两处：不把人压到活不下去，不封死他拒绝的路（制度论第一篇第八节）；国家间协作论把这两处推成国与国之间的测试（前置篇第二节），这里推到经济位置，作同形（自担）。先写明持有者用哪一项条件，使受效者就他自己的哪一件事不再有实际的拒绝余地；仍可承担代价而不从的、对已有承诺的履行要求、对自然匮乏的暴露，分别登记。要的是持有者自己那份东西的条件，是交换；拿供给去要对方自己的事（卖地、不上访、怎样投票），是替代判断（这一切分是本系列的，自担）。落在生命基底上的那一部分要切出来：断的是生命基底，已滑向替代判断，不因要求本身正当而免（国家间协作论第四篇，原说封锁，这里推到停供，自担）。这一测试只在已有排他的动手、或已有承诺或载入（含承认性载入）的供给时适用；其余情形不构成基础层之侵，也不等于没有权力面、不须制衡。有依赖、后果严重，不独自推出持有者无限续供的义务。把人压到主体位置全失，已不是权力（权力论第一篇 T5）。原说国与国之间的施压，这里换作经济位置与受它收敛的人（自担）。

E11a　生命基底处唯一的供给位置。触及生命基底、别人没有可负担替代的唯一供给位置，是公用与私营的混合：它在为更大的构承担执行之责，不只是在经营自己的东西；这一供给是管理它的制度或政府职责的一部分，有无许可，这一层都在，法律没有覆盖也不取消（自担）。职责有两处来路。被供给者一侧：持续的供给经承认性载入（权利论第五篇 §II；权益专论 F30），被供给者所凭的承认性权利，其权力面收敛供给的位置，这一位置在那一格持职责（职责专论 F42）；两条链各有各的构成条件，不是以承认换来权利（职责专论 F43）；这一侧的权利须经三支咬合运行，仅有期待落空不成为职责。管理者一侧：这一位置为更大的构承担执行之责。这一位置持供给的职责；管理它的制度或政府持为这一供给创造条件的职责，应当把它收敛、载入，并给保障（政府论 G18、G19、G21）。职责束缚位置，不束缚人，退出有效（职责专论 F38）；退出的效力不独自给出退出的程序：怎样撤出，经不封他人接续之路、由管理者安排接续的程序另核；一份通知不当然终止职责；管理者未安排的接续，不转成某个人无期限的负担；已发生的未履行另记。"构没有自己的法"只排除"以自己的法处置自己的行使"这一读，不独自证明一切停供为侵。供给不必无偿；付不起的人怎样不断供、撤出时谁接续、价格怎样受问，在管理者那一侧。哪些资源算生命基底、什么算唯一、职责的具体内容，在规则层。

E12　组合越线。许多项约束逐项都在线内，合起来仍可能越线：要对同一个内部主体、在同一实际配置下按同一条线审，并写明逐项判断所取的基线（制度论 Z10）。宿舍、代用券、预支锁离职，单独看各自可以是限，本系列不预设它们单独看都在线内；竞业禁止不在这一列，另照 E12a；落在同一个人身上时，核他还保不保有拒绝、撤回持续绑定或转入可审查程序的结构通道（权利论第五篇 §III）。退出在权利上存在，不等于在生计上可负担（经济学第二篇 §5.1；政府论 G39 同向）。入职时的书面同意不独自改变读数。原说制度对内部主体的几条约束，这里换作雇主与职工（自担）。

E12a　竞业禁止侵分叉权；附条件的给付另读。分叉权是有权选：选还是不选，为什么不选（比如换了别的利益），是人自己的事；没有了这个选，才是侵（自担）。分叉权的基础分量，是主体自我展开的方向不得不；方向空间被外部封死，即不可选，是分叉权被压制的形态（权利论第四篇 F17）。竞业禁止，即以违约金、禁令或强制执行为后盾，禁止人离开以后往某个方向去，在条款所及的地域、行业与期限里事先把他方向空间里的一块写成不可选，拿走了他离开以后的选。能不能做成，在相遇边界上；被划掉的是方向本身，权利论已把它放在基础分量里（权利论第五篇 F22），在那一块上，它已是方向空间被外部封死，不必等全局压到极处，也不论那是不是他最可能走的路（自担）。它也不落在局部、可逆的限里：局部、可逆的限，是规范层给规则层留的空间，立在相遇边界上；竞业禁止替人定的，是离开以后往哪里去；那是分叉权方向的不得不所在，在封装一侧，封装边界上没有限，两道边界同在时封装侧支配（权利论第五篇 §III、F22；自担）。竞业禁止不在这一空间里，附条件的给付在其中。它属非退场压制，轻重看所及的地域、行业与期限（权利论第五篇 F19、F20）；签字与补偿不改结构（权利论第五篇 §III）：补偿与短期改的是范围与代价，不改选被拿走。它同时是人为的退出成本（F6 §7）。所以竞业禁止是侵，带补偿也一样。为保护他人而设的约束不在竞业禁止之列：人有自己的目的，别人也有，限制一个人去侵犯别人的目的，不算侵犯这个人的目的；它限的不是人的方向，是他去越过别人的线的那一步：对他，是相遇边界上的一项限；对被护的人，是在其封装边界前止步（权利论第五篇 §III；自担）。它护的是第三人的权利或公众问的那条路，不是设约一方自己的好处；限得超出护人所需，划掉的仍是他往哪里去，那一部分仍是侵。制度的施为不越线一条整条坚持，不随任何条件打折（制度论 Z9）：本系列对规则层的建议是原则上不为竞业禁止开允许的口子；为保护他人的约束，由规则层说明限的是哪一种行使、护的是谁、为什么非此不可、范围多宽；怎样禁止、已签的条款怎样过渡、已付的违约金与已受的损失怎样救济，各制度、各级政府自己定，本系列只建议，不代定；构自己正当的东西，用保密这类不封方向的安排去护。附条件的给付不同：它不禁止，只把一笔额外的给付系在一个选择上，选仍在人手里，收下它本身就是行使了这个选；规范层不判它为严格的侵，规则层可以允许，也可以不允许。分界的判据在规范层，三件，问的都是人还有没有这个选：后盾是禁止与强制执行，还是只是不再给；系在"不去"上的是额外的给付，还是已挣的工资、递延的报酬、已发又追回的钱；与别的约束合起来、或在深的依赖之下，拒绝这笔给付是否就等于活不下去；三件合起来用，后盾只是不再给，还不认选实际在。一条具体条款落在哪一边、门槛怎么定，在规则层与判断层。服务期限的是什么时候走，照退出的阈值另核；分叉权是人的，对构的排他条款照关口与制衡读。

E13　退出真实；守的是涌现的前提。关系一级守的，不只是此刻的这个人，也是自由市场里 15DD 涌现的第一条前提：「存在非零退出自由度的市场」；权力锁定压缩的正是退出自由度（经济学第五篇）。"制度必须承担全部的制衡功能"一句，只给退出近乎不可能的一档（经济学第一篇 §5.3）；雇佣在「退出有摩擦但可能」的一档（经济学第一篇 §5.3；经济学第二篇 §5.1）。「这一离开空间永远存在，它就是 B 作为 13DD 主体的余项。」（权力论第一篇）这一句说明主体不能被既有安排穷尽，不认证某项现实的退出已有可用的通道；可达性逐项核。要先有人出钱才走得开，两面写：它说明先前的障碍与资助怎样改变了条件，不宣布一处的退出已经真实，也不否认这一次确已出现的可行（自担）。

参考文献

以下 SAE 文献一律为概念 DOI，始终指向最新版本。逐句核验所据的版本记录，见随稿的转述审计表。

一 · 本系统

秦汉. (2026). 制度如何可能：从主体间余项到共构框架（SAE 基础论文 Paper 6） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662

秦汉. (2026). 经济理性的四个层级：维度序列理论对理性人假设的诊断与扩展（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 1） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19358010

秦汉. (2026). 桥的另一端：15DD面对不进入15DD的对方时的经济理性（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 2） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

秦汉. (2026). 自由市场中15DD涌现的结构性必然：从底线碰撞到感知跃迁（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 5） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19394738

秦汉. (2026). 论权力的起源 · Shi（SAE 权力论系列 Paper 1） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20370224

秦汉. (2026). 判断力的位置（SAE 行动论 Paper 0） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22974154

秦汉. (2026). 论基础权利的厚度与边界（SAE 权利论系列 Paper 2） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20769253

秦汉. (2026). 论承认性权利与权力的界面与转化（SAE 权利论系列 Paper 4） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21093939

秦汉. (2026). 论基础权利的限与侵（SAE 权利论系列 Paper 5） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595

秦汉. (2026). SAE 权利论 · 专论：论权利与权益 [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21314907

秦汉. (2026). SAE 权利论 · 专论：论职责 [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853810

秦汉. (2026). 应当说给谁（SAE 制度论 第一篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635

秦汉. (2026). 不越线（SAE 制度论 第二篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384

秦汉. (2026). 可被追问（SAE 制度论 第六篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324

秦汉. (2026). 保证（SAE 政府论 第三篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112

秦汉. (2026). 追问与承担（SAE 政府论 第六篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413511

秦汉. (2026). 协作不是什么（SAE 国家间协作论 前置篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815735

秦汉. (2026). 互制（SAE 国家间协作论 第四篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23815769

二 · 外部文献（只据二手转述，C 档；原文未核，正文不加引号）

Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.（二手所据为 2001 年 Beacon Press 第二版的介绍）

Thompson, E. P. (1971). The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. Past & Present, 50, 76–136. https://doi.org/10.1093/past/50.1.76

三 · 外部文献（转引）

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.（原书未核；所引原文与页码转据行动论 Paper 0 第七节）

接口

主承： 权利论第五篇 §II（三种处境；承认层的已载入位置）、§III（判据在结构；封死退出的阈值；局部门槛与封装边界，推到竞业禁止，自担）、§IV F19、F20、F22（推到竞业禁止的所封一维与轻重，自担）；权益专论 F30（推到供给者，自担）；职责专论 F38、F39、F42、F43；政府论第三篇第五节、G18、G19、G21；制度论第一篇第八节、Z9、Z10、Z38；国家间协作论前置篇第二节、第四篇 XZ22 与第二节（推到经济位置，自担）；权利论第四篇 F17。

另用： 权利论第二篇（类型判据与构成判据；经由资源关闭维度）、第四篇 §VI；F6 §7；权力论第一篇（T5；离开空间）；政府论 G39；经济学第一篇 §5.3（含雇佣一档）、第二篇 §5.1、第五篇；行动论 Paper 0 第七节（赫希曼的转引所据）；F6 附录三第 6 条 (d)（工作展示，不取）。

对接： 波兰尼《大转型》（第四节）；汤普森《十八世纪英国群众的道德经济》（第四节）；赫希曼《退出、呼吁与忠诚》（第九节）。波兰尼、汤普森两处 C 档，据二手转述；赫希曼一处转引，原文与页码据行动论 Paper 0 第七节。

本系列： 前置篇第五节（一个位置两种来源）；第一篇 E3、E6；第三篇 E14、E14a、E19；第四篇 E21；第五篇 E26；第六篇 E32、E33、E37。

交给第三篇： 一个位置大到许多人都绕不过去时，制衡要多强；做基础层之事的，制衡之外还要什么。