What a Market Is Not
市场不是什么
This series asks how a market in an institution whose consensus includes "a human being is an end" can, in a mixed reality, do two things at once: no person's Base Layer is violated, and the Emergence Layer has space and conditions within reach. Before the series begins, this paper clears away what a market is not. "The price is set by the market": sometimes this is said rightly, and it can also be used to push away the position that ought to answer. The market is not a construct, not an address that can be questioned and can answer; not every market outcome has someone who decided it, and forcing such an outcome onto an actor is a different error. This series goes one step further: an outcome with no decider also lands within an institution, and what can be asked is what the constructs that make and enforce rules have embedded in that institution, what they have not, and what they have done. The Theory of the Market does not argue whether the free market is good, nor does it take sides between market and government; "free market," "planning," "publicly run" and "privately run" are all names, and what is judged is structure, place by place. It is not a theory of price, nor is it hands-off: among the participants, persons and constructs oriented toward the Kingdom of Means are present, the line has to be guarded by institutions, and regulation is therefore a necessity. This paper gives the definition and the main line: the Base Layer is a line; the Emergence Layer is to have space and conditions: guarding the line does not seal off the space, and leaving it open does not eat into the line; where the two conflict, the line comes first. The two layers matter equally; what is asymmetric is the way of examining and the order. The ought is addressed to four kinds of constructs: the constructs that make and enforce rules; the constructs that organize and operate market infrastructure; suppliers and operators in the market; and the bodies responsible for funding, subsidy and rescue. Finally the paper sets out how the whole series is written: the three layers are the method; the two things are laid down first, and the papers then follow positions in the market; examples are, by default, constructed examples.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
"The price is set by the market."
This sentence has been said more than once in the Kingdom State, where this series sets its examples. The Kingdom State is a state set up in the Political Economy series and carried over by the Theory of the Company; its towns, companies, bodies and terms are constructed examples, serving only as facts, and this series does not claim that any one of them is the best design. Apple City is the largest city in the state; Crossways is a company that started from four stalls in the East Market of the city and later opened an online marketplace, through which about sixty percent of the Kingdom State's online retail now passes.
Crossways once said: "The fees are set by the market. Sellers who are not satisfied can choose not to sell here." The Political Economy Prequel has already taken this sentence apart: raising the commission from twelve percent to fifteen percent was a decision made by a position at Crossways, and that position can be asked about it; what Crossways is worth is the result of many purchases and sales taken together, and is not forced onto anyone. This paper does not redo that passage.
Later, Crossways Home, Crossways' own brand, said the same kind of thing. It switched to buying its porcelain from a factory abroad, at a price about forty percent below comparable goods made in the state. After an Apple City newspaper reported on that factory, it answered: "We buy according to the law over there; the price is set by the market." Two things are in this sentence. One is where to buy and whose goods to buy, and there is a position that decided it; the other is the price, which is indeed the result of many purchases and sales taken together. Paper 7 returns to it.
About an hour's drive from the border of the Kingdom State lies Ridgefoot, a city in the Highland State. There the average rent for a one-bedroom apartment rose by about seventy percent in three years. This time there really is no one who "set" the rent: the city has many landlords; one longtime landlord has not raised his rent in three years, and a developer has built about two thousand new apartments; the rent is the result of many leases taken together. Yet this result came out within an institution: in the law of the Highland State and the ordinances of Ridgefoot no securing for housing at all has been embedded, and the level above leaves housing to each state to decide for itself. In winter, the only shelter in the city has forty beds; over three years the number of people coming to seek a bed rose from about twenty a night to about ninety, and people are often left outside the door, unable to get in.
Put the three side by side, and they ask one and the same thing: once "set by the market" has been said, what is left that can be asked, and of whom?
This series starts from here. Its scope is:
how a market in an institution whose consensus includes "a human being is an end" can, in a mixed reality, do two things at once: no person's Base Layer is violated, and the Emergence Layer has space and conditions within reach. Where the two conflict, the Base Layer comes first, and the line is not on the scales; regulation is a necessity, and regulators themselves can also be questioned; the two layers holding each other up is a direction, not a guarantee.
Its main line is one sentence:
The Base Layer is a line; the Emergence Layer is to have space and conditions: guarding the line does not seal off the space, and leaving it open does not eat into the line; where the two conflict, the line comes first.
§1 The Market Is Not a Construct
The Political Economy Prequel has laid this down: the market is not a super-subject that takes responsibility. Even a mill has no first person; "the market is not even an address of attribution such as a mill is" (the Political Economy Prequel, §3). The market is the result that emerges from many people's transactions taken together; no one sits in the position of "the market," able to be questioned and able to answer.
The same section also guards against an excessive reading: "Not every market outcome has someone who decided it"; forcing such an outcome onto an actor "is a different error," mistaking emergence for someone's decision (ibid.). The rent in Ridgefoot is an outcome of this kind. To say that some landlord set it, or that the developer set it, is forcing; to say that the rent rose because Crossways expanded its warehouse and its workforce grew from about three thousand to about seven thousand is forcing too: these are facts that stand side by side, not a cause that has been established.
Political Economy stops here: it questions the position that made a decision, not "the market." This series goes one step further.
An outcome with no decider does not hang in the air. It lands within an institution: how leases are made, how many days in advance a landlord must give notice of not renewing, whether a rent increase must be given reasons, whether housing has any securing at all; these were set by the constructs that make rules, or were left unset by them. No one set the rent in Ridgefoot; no securing for housing at all has been embedded in Ridgefoot's institution, and on this matter there is a rule-making construct that can be asked. What is asked is not why the rent is this figure, but what this institution has embedded with respect to housing, what it has not, and what it has done. This step has two parts. Where the outcome falls on the Base Layer, the Theory of Government has already reached that part: "where a government does not guarantee it, its power is likewise illegitimate and must be questioned" (Theory of Government Paper 3, G18); this series takes it over here. Outcomes beyond the Base Layer that have no decider are this series' extension: Political Economy originally says that "the market" cannot answer and that the position that made the decision is to be questioned; here this is extended to outcomes with no decider, and what is asked is what the constructs that make and enforce rules in the institution where the outcome lies have done with respect to it (own undertaking).
This step also has its own boundary. That the rule-making construct can be asked does not mean that every rise in the rent is booked to its name; that no securing has been embedded does not mean, either, that anyone has already crossed the line. Paper 1 keeps these apart.
There is one more thing to keep apart: the market is not a construct, but the bodies within a market that organize it can be constructs. Crossways started from four stalls in the East Market; later, buyers paid Crossways, Crossways deducted its commission and settled with sellers, and sellers and buyers alike took Crossways' accounts as authoritative. From an operator in the market it grew into the book by which the buyers and sellers who trade here settle. Exchanges, clearing and payment bodies, and platforms are all constructs of this kind; having the word "market" in their names does not leave them without an address of attribution.
So an ought addressed to "the market" is empty; an ought addressed to the constructs that organize a market, and that make and enforce its rules, is not empty. §6 of this paper says which kinds these are.
§2 Not a Dispute over Whether the Free Market Is Good
There is one way of talking about markets that lines people up on a single spectrum: is the free market good, or is it better for the government to manage more; should what has been opened up be taken back, should what has been taken back be let out. This series is not on this spectrum. It does not argue that the free market is good or bad, nor does it take sides between market and government.
Not taking sides is not because each side has a point and it is awkward to say so, but because asking this way asks about the wrong unit. "Free market" and "planning," like "publicly run" and "privately run," are names. In a market called free there can be a chokepoint that no one can get around; in an arrangement called planned, people can also have a way out and a way forward. A name does not tell us the structure. What this series judges is structure, place by place: whether the channel is sealed off, whether questions can be asked, on whom the cost falls. It judges structures, not names.
Nor does it rest its case on "winning." The Economics series has argued that in markets meeting three premises the way of seeing people as "a human being is an end" will emerge, and that this is a structural inevitability; the three premises are: people can choose whom to cooperate with in some of their relations, and can also exit; some people have baselines, "this is not for sale"; baselines will collide with one another (Economics P5). Another paper has argued that there is a window of phase transition in free markets (Economics P4). These arguments carry conditions. The measure Political Economy took from them is used by this series as it stands: "only the inevitability of emergence is taken up, not the inevitability of dominance" (Political Economy Paper 6, E32). Whether markets oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends will prevail is not something this series relies on; even if they do not prevail, the line is still there.
Someone may say: not discussing whether the free market is good amounts to saying nothing. In fact a good deal is said, only elsewhere: where someone's Base Layer is being traded for something, where someone has closed others' roads, where the party questioned has itself set how it is to be questioned. These questions are to be asked in a market called free and also in an arrangement called planned; what comes out in answer is more specific than "good" and "bad."
§3 Not a Theory of Price, and Not Hands-Off
This series is not a theory of price. How prices form, and whether they are high or low, economics answers. Political Economy has laid down: "The level of a price does not, by itself alone, complete a normative judgment" (Political Economy Paper 2, E10). Price enters this series only at two points: when it presses on people's Base Layer, which Paper 1 examines; and when a position uses it to close others' roads, which Paper 4 examines.
Nor is it hands-off. In a market where everyone held "a human being is an end" as consensus, it might be possible to manage less; but reality is mixed. Among the participants, persons and constructs that take profit as the ultimate criterion and treat people as things that can be traded off are present. Where participants oriented toward the Kingdom of Means are present, the line cannot be guarded by the participants' own good sense; it has to be guarded by institutions. So, in a mixed reality, regulation is a necessity.
Nor is it planning. That regulation is a necessity does not mean setting up a regulatory body everywhere, nor that every transaction must be submitted for approval. Political Economy says that the threshold for a formal separation of powers lies at the rule layer, and that "Below the threshold, guarding the line and being questioned are not weaker" (Political Economy Paper 3, E19); here this is extended to regulation: where no dedicated body is set up, the line is guarded all the same, and questioning remains possible all the same (own undertaking). How deep regulation goes and what form it takes lie at the rule layer; this series says only what it must guard, and how it is itself questioned.
§4 A Market Oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends
This series writes about only one kind of market: the market oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends.
Definition. A market oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends is a market of this kind: the institution in which it lies has "a human being is an end" as its consensus; the constructs that make and enforce rules guard every person's Base Layer, leave space for the Emergence Layer and provide conditions within reach; above this line, exchange in the market is left open as usual.
The direction is recognized by institutions and practices, not by persons. A market has no consensus of its own, so "direction" does not read the market's mind; it reads how the institution in which the market lies lands: whether the line is written into the rules, whether there are positions that guard the line, whether the channels for asking are there. Nor is it recognized by what kind of people the participants are: how many people and how many companies in a market hold "a human being is an end" as consensus is a result, not a condition of this definition. When the Theory of the Company defined the company oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends, it took the same reading: consensus is identified by where it lands; minds are not read.
A direction, not an endpoint. Institution Theory has laid down: "The Kingdom of Ends is a direction; it is not an ought, nor a state to be signed off as achieved" (Institution Theory Z39). A market oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends is not a market already built and ready to be signed off; it is a direction one can keep walking toward. Markets in reality are mostly mixed; what is judged is one rule and one practice at a time, and no market and no state is characterized as a whole.
Across borders. Once a market crosses borders, "the institution in which it lies" is no longer one. The constructs that make and enforce rules on each side guard the line toward the persons their own acts reach; who guards which stretch is written in Paper 7.
A theoretical passage. The Economics series has written that there are three things institutions can do at the group level: "(1) Help those who have already grown find each other." "(2) Protect those who have already grown so they can sustain themselves." "(3) Punish 14DD behavior that harms others' interests." (Economics P3 §5.2) This series divides these three as follows: the first two fall on the side of the Emergence Layer, letting people be seen and be found, and letting people leave; the third falls on the side of the Base Layer, constraining acts that harm others (a reading; own undertaking). That paper uses the language of dimensions; this series borrows it only in this theoretical passage, and the body of the text does not classify people by dimension.
§5 Two Things
The two things in the scope are the skeleton of this series.
On the side of the Base Layer there is a line. The line says to the constructs that make and enforce rules: their acts cross no line against any person in the interior, and the line "does not vary with relational thickness and is not discounted under any condition" (Institution Theory Z9). The line says to the economic positions accumulated in the market: "accumulation is not converted into domination over people's Base Layer" (Political Economy Paper 4, E21). For constructs that do the work of the Base Layer, such as those that supply water, supply electricity or provide care, the institution does not only check them; it also secures this supply; "The object of securing is the supply, not that construct" (Political Economy Paper 3, E14a).
On the side of the Emergence Layer there are space and conditions. Above the line, exchange in the market is left open as usual: fame bringing opportunities and capital bringing more capital are not, in themselves, the problem; "exchange in the Emergence Layer is not sealed off on the ground that it 'may be converted'" (Political Economy Paper 4, E24). Leaving open is not being hands-off: exchange left open still passes the two gates, and can still be questioned. Beyond space there are conditions: "Institutions give general conditions that do not designate content," and the conditions must be within reach: "conditions out of reach do not count as already given" (Political Economy Paper 6, E34). Those who give conditions do not acquire the authority to decide people's direction for them (Political Economy Paper 6, E37).
The two layers matter equally. Political Economy has written: "the two layers matter equally, and neither is traded for the other; neither direction is permitted" (Political Economy Paper 6, E35). Where both fall on one and the same person, his Emergence Layer is not traded for his securing, nor is the absence of securing in his Base Layer traded for more choice for him. That paper also says: "if the Base Layer is held up thickly at the cost of restricting the Emergence Layer, that thickness is a boundary-crossing disguised as cultivation" (Political Economy Paper 6, §4). Securing a person is not done at the cost of deciding his road for him.
What is asymmetric is the way of examining and the order. Securing and space can conflict. The conflict can fall between different people: a safety rule protects those who tend the kiln fires, and also leaves those who cannot afford to open a kiln unable to open one. Here the two sides are examined differently. The Base Layer side is examined by the line, with no margin: where it falls on a person, crossing the line is crossing the line, and there is no room for "crossing it only a little." A securing measure that restricts others' Emergence Layer is examined by its effect: what it addresses, what it costs the capacity to produce, to serve and to give conditions, whether there are other means, and why this one was chosen; the securing measure itself also guards the line. Where the two conflict, the line comes first. "First" speaks of order, not of weight: the two layers matter equally, and that sentence does not move.
The two layers holding each other up is a direction, not a guarantee. The Political Economy Specialist Paper A Way Out, a Way Forward has written: "Where the Base Layer is guarded well, people dare to leave and dare to try, and the room in the Emergence Layer is large; where the Emergence Layer develops well and the economy is active, it can in turn hold up the Base Layer." It goes on to say: "This sentence is written as a direction, not as a guarantee" (A Way Out, a Way Forward). This series follows it: this is a direction worth striving for; it is not used to demand that every market and every company achieve it, nor does it guarantee that it will happen.
§6 To Whom the Ought Is Addressed
Institution Theory laid down a sentence that this series uses throughout: "The construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law" (Institution Theory Z4). The ought is addressed only to constructs; the person in a position follows the accountability of the position; the person behind the position follows his own law. When this series says "every person" or "subject," it means persons, not the companies sometimes called "market subjects."
The market is not a construct, and the ought is not addressed to it. The constructs that receive the ought in a market fall into four kinds, divided by the role they play in a given matter:
- The constructs that make and enforce rules. Regulatory bodies; the side of competition review and regulatory adjudication; bodies entrusted with setting standards and certifying are also counted here by the role they play. How courts adjudicate the Theory of Government has already written; this series writes only the part peculiar to markets.
- The constructs that organize and operate market infrastructure. Exchanges, clearing and payment bodies, rating and audit, certification, platforms. Many people's purchases and sales must pass through them; when they actually cannot be got around, they are chokepoints.
- Suppliers and operators in the market. Companies, private capital invested in companies included; also publicly run supply bodies, whether called a department, an office or a company. What this series writes about is their acts toward others and toward the market: competition, mergers and acquisitions, access, and how they supply what falls on the Base Layer.
- The bodies and institutions responsible for funding, subsidy and rescue.
One construct can belong to several kinds at once. When Crossways sold goods in the East Market it was of the third kind; once its accounts became the book that buyers and sellers alike took as authoritative, it was also of the second. To read a construct, look at the role it plays in the matter at hand, and assign the address by role.
Of individual participants, this series writes no ought. What a person buys, what he sells and where he works are his own affairs; what this series asks is whether, in those arrangements, he can leave, can refuse and can ask.
§7 How This Series Is Written
The three layers are the method. Every paper writes all three layers. The normative layer gives the direction and the line; the rule layer only suggests, and may give examples, but examples are examples, not ranked, and not rules this series lays down for any institution; the judgment layer states who decides and who bears the consequences, listing only the questions to be answered and the positions that answer them, without answering for those positions. There is always a remainder, and there are exceptions; a remainder yields no permission.
First the two things, then papers by position. The first two papers lay down the two things: Paper 1 writes the side of the Base Layer; Paper 2 writes the side of the Emergence Layer and how the two are balanced. The last five papers follow positions in the market: chokepoints, competition, funding, regulation, borders. The two things cannot be separated from the positions, so each paper by position still writes the two things at its own position; each paper asks only its own one additional question.
Judge structures, not names; judge operations, not persons. Publicly run, privately run, and jointly run by public and private are names; so are "free market" and "planning." This series looks at the structure of a practice: on whom the cost falls, whether the roads of leaving and of questioning are still there, who decides, who is responsible. Speaking only of structure does not mean there is no right and wrong: the line is there, and to cross it is to cross it; what this series does not do is pass verdicts on a person, a company or a government.
Examples. Examples are, by default, the constructed examples of the Kingdom State, together with the few places this series carries further for it. Real cases are used only when they are clean: the facts have been established by a final judgment, by a regulatory finding whose standing is stated, or by the public admission of the party concerned; using them does not drag the argument into partisan or national disputes; only the practice in question is judged, and no company or government is characterized. Cases serve only as illustrations, and bear no weight. Where one case appears in several papers, it is unfolded in one, and the other papers ask only their own new question of it.
Scope. Some things are not written. The theory of price is not written; tax is not within this series. What government is, how it judges, how it compels and how it guarantees, the Theory of Government has already written; the interior of the company, and the company and its partners, the Theory of the Company has already written. Cross-border markets are written only at the layer of the market: the system of cooperation among states, and sanctions and blockades, each have a series already written. How early-stage companies and nonprofit organizations are to be run is left to a later specialist paper of the Theory of the Company, placed after this series.
The tradition. How this series interfaces with existing theories of the market is concentrated in Paper 0. The several thinkers that earlier series have already interfaced with are only pointed to, not redone.
The papers.
| Paper | Title | What this paper additionally asks |
|---|---|---|
| Prequel | What a Market Is Not | The market is not a construct; the market oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends; the two things; to whom the ought is addressed |
| Paper 1 | The Market: Securing | How the Base Layer is guarded, and where securing lands |
| Paper 2 | The Market: Space | How space and conditions are given, and how securing does not seal off space |
| Paper 3 | The Market: Chokepoints | How positions that cannot be got around make rules, and how their authority and the roads of questioning are constrained |
| Paper 4 | The Market: Competition | How competition, coordination, and mergers and acquisitions change others' roads |
| Paper 5 | The Market: Funding | What conditions, control and public grounds the provision of funding forms |
| Paper 6 | The Market: Regulation | How those who review the market stay independent, and how their own decisions are open to questioning |
| Paper 7 | The Market: Borders | Once across borders, how authority, enforcement and the roads of questioning connect, and who bears the gaps |
| Paper 0 | Theory of the Market and the Tradition: The Line and the Space | Interfacing, handover and remainders |
The order of the papers follows "the line comes first": securing first, space after. Regulation is placed last within one state: those who guard are also questioned. Borders come last of all, going from within one state to where there is no one above.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper proves no proposition; it only clears away what a market is not, and gives the definition, the two things and the main line. The points it clears away are each argued later: that the Base Layer is a line, that the object of securing is the supply, and that the line does not change with ownership, in Paper 1; that leaving open is not leaving unquestioned, and that what is asymmetric between the two layers is the way of examining and the order, in Paper 2; chokepoints, competition, funding, regulation and borders, each in Papers 3 to 7.
What it has not done: prove that markets will walk toward the Kingdom of Ends by themselves; prove that the necessity of regulation requires a regulatory body everywhere; say which form of ownership or which form of regulation is best.
Remainders left: the step forward taken in §1, that for an outcome with no decider what is asked is what the institution in which it lies has done with respect to it, is this series' extension, and will be tested in the examples of each paper. The three places in the Introduction are each unfolded in a paper of their own: the rent in Ridgefoot in Paper 1, Crossways' accounts in Paper 3, and Crossways Home's porcelain in Paper 7.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112
Qin, H. (2026). What an Economy Is Not (SAE Political Economy, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874133
Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140
Qin, H. (2026). Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874142
Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146
Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154
Qin, H. (2026). A Way Out, a Way Forward (SAE Political Economy, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24021385
Qin, H. (2026). What a Company Is Not (SAE Theory of the Company, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045716
Qin, H. (2026). Dimensional Sequence Economics in Mixed Markets: Remote Observation, Clustering, and Emergence (SAE Economics, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19384446
Qin, H. (2026). The Phase-Transition Window of the Free Market: The Homologous Skeleton of ZFCρ and SAE Economics (SAE Economics, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19393913
Qin, H. (2026). The Structural Inevitability of 15DD Emergence in Free Markets: From Baseline Collisions to Perceptual Leap (SAE Economics, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19394738
II · This series
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Securing (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183368
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Space (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183370
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Chokepoints (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183372
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Competition (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183376
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Funding (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183378
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Regulation (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183380
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Borders (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 7) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183384
Interfaces
Main upstream: Institution Theory Z4, Z9, Z39; the Political Economy Prequel, §3; Political Economy Paper 2, E10; Paper 3, E14a, E19; Paper 4, E21, E24; Paper 6, E32, E34, E35, E37 and §4; A Way Out, a Way Forward, the passage on E40.
Also used: Theory of Government Paper 3, G18 (where an outcome with no decider falls on the Base Layer); the Theory of the Company Prequel (direction recognized by consensus and practice); Economics P3 §5.2 (theoretical passage), P4 and P5 (corroboration).
Examples: Crossways' commission and "The fees are set by the market" (as pointed to in the Political Economy Prequel); the stalls of the East Market and Crossways' accounts; the rent in Ridgefoot; Crossways Home's porcelain. All are constructed examples.
This series: Paper 1, SC1–SC3; Paper 2, SC4, SC5; Paper 3, SC6, SC7; Paper 4, SC8, SC9; Paper 5, SC10, SC11; Paper 6, SC12, SC13; Paper 7, SC14, SC15; Paper 0.
Handed to Paper 1: how the Base Layer is guarded, and where securing lands.