The Market: Funding
市场的资金
This paper writes about the money in the market: private capital, and government funding, subsidy and rescue. Funding may carry requirements: expecting a kind of output, and attaching agreements on use, action and governance that have a source, are all permitted; it does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction. When Ferry Crossing took investment from an early-stage fund in Year 27, it signed four terms: on a sale or liquidation the fund first takes back twice its investment; the fund has one board seat, and a sale, a new share issue or a change of general manager requires this seat's consent; when shareholders holding more than half agree to sell, the rest must sell along with them at the same price; the two founders' shares vest over four years, and if a founder leaves before they vest, the company may buy them back at the original price. The four terms each govern one thing, cannot be judged by a single criterion, and are examined separately. Toward the people in it, funding does not acquire the authority to claim a direction of life on their behalf, or to seal off their changing direction; the vesting term does not say where a founder may not go after leaving, which sets it apart from the form of a non-compete agreement; it ties leaving to a buyback of shares, and whether what the buyback reaches is a benefit still to be given or rights already acquired or earned must first be examined as a matter of entitlement, which the example does not record in full. Control acquired through terms is examined by the three questions, whether those this control acts on have actual control over its relevant decisions, and also under chokepoints and checks. Where investors change by vote the direction of the Kingdom of Ends that Theory of the Company GS3 speaks of, the company is no longer among the companies oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends that the Theory of the Company writes about; selling the company or changing an operating arrangement is not judged on this basis. In Year 29 the two funds agreed to sell and the two founders did not: the founders' direction of life, the company's business direction, and the direction of the Kingdom of Ends the Theory of the Company speaks of are three different things. The more than one hundred workshops that depend on this company are read by "the seller's consent does not answer for those who depend on this road." The same kinds of terms also appear in a long-term, low-return investment that appoints no directors; a name does not vouch for an effect. The rate of return can be one of the goals; it is not the ultimate criterion; set as the sole goal, it is a signal to be examined (SC10). Public funding is to be able to state its grounds; it is not an endorsement. The State Commerce Agency's subsidy to Ferry Crossing carries two conditions: serving no fewer than thirty townships within three years, and keeping its headquarters in the Kingdom State; whether each is an expectation of output or a particular agreed action, and whether either seals off changing direction, depends on the consequences of not meeting the conditions, which the example does not record. Securing a basic supply and supporting a particular operating position each state their own grounds; that the supply must continue does not by itself imply that the original company must exist forever: the state's emergency loan to Crossways Pay names as its object forty percent of the small merchants, so it must be able to answer why keeping this one firm alive is the way to keep that settlement going (SC11).
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
In the spring of Year 27, Ferry Crossing was set up in Willow Ferry, doing cold-chain and small-batch delivery for township workshops. That autumn, Elmseed Early Fund invested in Ferry Crossing, taking twenty-five percent of the shares, on four terms:
- when the company is sold or liquidated, the fund first takes back twice its investment, and the rest is then divided by shareholding;
- the fund holds one board seat; selling the company, issuing new shares and changing the general manager require this seat's consent;
- when shareholders together holding more than half agree to sell the company, the remaining shareholders must sell along with them at the same price;
- the two founders' shares vest over four years; if a founder leaves before they vest, the company may buy them back at the original price.
The same year, the Kingdom State's State Commerce Agency gave Ferry Crossing a township logistics subsidy, on condition that within three years it serve no fewer than thirty townships and keep its headquarters in the Kingdom State.
In the autumn of Year 28, Ferry Crossing raised a second round of funding, and another fund from Apple City invested; thereafter the two funds together held more than half of the shares. In the spring of Year 29, Crossways offered to buy Ferry Crossing; the two funds agreed to sell, and the two founders did not.
A sum of money comes in, carrying terms; a subsidy comes in, carrying conditions. This paper asks: what requirements money may carry (§1); how far it may reach toward the people in it (§2); what it acquires toward the company through terms, and what that means for those who depend on the company (§3); on what grounds public money is given, and what giving it does not give (§4). Ferry Crossing, Elmseed and the funds and subsidy here are all constructed examples of this series.
§1 Funding May Carry Requirements
Money that comes in always carries expectations. A fund that invests in a company expects it to grow and expects a return; a state that subsidizes a company expects it to bring delivery to the townships. Expectation as such is not the problem.
Political Economy laid down a threefold division for support, taken from Institution Theory: expecting a kind of output is permitted, since support "may carry the undertone of its own purposes, and may hope that people develop"; requiring a particular action by agreement is examined by its source: "Particular skills, role tasks and service agreements with a fixed term are checked separately, each by its own source"; requiring the other party to take a designated direction as his own, or using conditions to seal off his position for changing direction, is not permitted: "Once a condition carries the demand 'accept this direction of development,' it becomes ghostwriting by an outsider" (Political Economy Paper 6, E37, citing Institution Theory Z27). That paper read the two kinds of support given to those laid off. This paper extends it to funding in the market: investment, lending and subsidy are all money that comes in carrying expectations (extension: the original speaks of support given by institutions and by bodies holding large accumulations; here it is extended to funding in the market; own undertaking).
Return is the same. Political Economy says: the rate of return can be one of the goals; it is not the ultimate criterion of whether an arrangement is warranted; "low returns do not prove cultivation, and high returns do not prove colonization" (Political Economy Paper 5, E28). The rate of return set in the place of the sole goal is a signal to be examined; if it further overrides guarding the line, cancels the questioning and change of direction of those concerned, or decides for the investee its own ends, it is judged by these actual effects (Political Economy Paper 5, E27). That paper read it through Southwindow Care Homes: the partners of a buyout fund wrote in their letter to investors that "returns are our only commitment" (Political Economy Paper 5, §2). This paper does not redo it.
Ferry Crossing's term of first taking back twice the investment is a term about how returns are divided; the two funds' agreeing to sell at a price of about fifteen times revenue is a decision about returns. Neither is in itself that signal: what the funds say about returns to their own investors, the example does not record; this paper does not supply, from one term or from one agreement to sell, that returns have been set as the sole goal, nor does it read the funds' minds.
So what this paper asks is not whether money should carry requirements, but how far the requirements reach. They are to be asked about in three places, separately: toward the people in it; toward the company; toward those who depend on the company.
Judgment layer: whether a requirement carried by a sum of money is an expectation of output, an agreement with a source, or ghostwriting someone's direction, is examined by the position that takes it up, according to its source and actual effect; those this requirement acts on can ask; how terms and subsidy conditions are written lies at the rule layer.
§2 Toward the People in It
Vesting. Ferry Crossing's fourth term: the two founders' shares vest over four years, and if a founder leaves before they vest, the company may buy them back at the original price. This term is tied to a person's leaving, so the first thing to ask is whether it governs where a person goes after leaving.
It does not. Political Economy has defined the non-compete agreement: backed by liquidated damages, injunction or compulsory enforcement, it forbids a person, after leaving, to go in a certain direction, writing his direction as foreclosed on the block the clause reaches, and this is violation (Political Economy Paper 2, E12a). The vesting term does not say where the founders may not go, or what they may not do, after leaving; it says whether, when a founder leaves, he can take with him the part of the shares that has not yet vested.
Is it a conditional payment? Read it by the three points by which Political Economy draws the boundary: whether the backing is prohibition and compulsory enforcement, or merely no longer giving; whether what is tied to leaving is an additional payment, or wages already earned, deferred pay, or money paid out and then clawed back; whether, combined with other constraints or under deep dependence, refusing this payment amounts to being unable to live (Political Economy Paper 2, E12a).
Read the three points one by one. The recorded terms do not say where the founders may not go or what they may not do after leaving; this is enough to set the term apart from the form of a non-compete agreement. It ties leaving to a buyback of shares: whether what the buyback reaches is a benefit still to be given, or rights the founder has already acquired or earned through his work, depends on how the shares were acquired, what the original price represents, how work already done is counted, and how the buyback is carried out; the example does not record these in full. So on neither the first nor the second point can the buyback yet be taken simply as no longer giving: the Political Economy Specialist Paper has given an order: first examine entitlement independently, then set it against the consequences of leaving; entitlement is not decided by the very agreement under examination (A Way Out, a Way Forward, §6). On the third point, whether the two founders' leaving Ferry Crossing and losing the part the buyback reaches would press on their Base Layer, the example does not record either. This paper writes up to here; it does not judge that this term crosses the line, nor does it say that it is obviously reasonable.
Vesting can have its uses, for instance letting founders and the company walk a stretch of road together; used this way, it is an arrangement between company and founders in a shared affair. A use is a possibility, and does not answer for the points above.
Crossways' housing allowance. Paper 1 read Ridgefoot: from Year 26 on, Crossways has given warehouse workers a monthly housing allowance worth about ten percent of the rent, which stops in the month they leave. This is money an employer gives a person, tied to whether he stays, and is also read by those three points. The backing is merely no longer giving; what is tied is an additional payment of about ten percent of the rent, not wages already earned; the third point depends on the person's situation: in Ridgefoot no securing for housing at all has been embedded, and in Year 28 a sorter's monthly rent was about half a month of his wages; whether losing this allowance of ten percent of the rent would leave him unable to leave depends on each person's situation, one sorter's ratio does not stand for the whole warehouse, and the example does not go that far. By these three points, this term is close to a conditional payment, not a non-compete agreement; whether it actually prevents a particular person from leaving must be examined person by person (own undertaking).
The Foundation's living allowance. In Year 25 the Qiao Foundation gave those laid off by Bluekiln Porcelain Works three years of full living allowance, on condition that they train in one of the three paths it set and not work for any other porcelain enterprise for three years. Political Economy Paper 6 has already read this: during the three years of receiving the allowance, if this condition only stops payment, it is a conditional payment; if it still binds a person after withdrawal, it becomes a prohibition on going in a certain direction after leaving (Political Economy Paper 6, §6). Here it is only recorded that private money given to persons, like public money, may carry particular content, and does not acquire the authority to decide a person's direction.
Judgment layer: whether a term actually seals off a person's changing direction is examined person by person, by the three points, by the position that takes it up; how the term is written lies at the rule layer.
§3 Toward the Company and Toward Third Parties
Control acquired through terms. Ferry Crossing's second term gives the fund one board seat, and selling the company, issuing new shares and changing the general manager require this seat's consent; the third term lets shareholders together holding more than half take the remaining shareholders along with them in a sale. Neither is a return; both are control: one lets one seat hold three decisions, the other lets the majority shareholders hold whether the company is sold.
Control as such is not the problem; those who put in money may want some control, and that can have its reasons. What is to be asked is how this control is checked. Political Economy has laid down that whether those acted on by an economic position have actual control over its relevant decisions is examined by the three questions: "who can activate it; what actual efficacy it has on reasons, actions, rules, or the holding of office; how the party questioned cannot cancel it on its own" (Political Economy Paper 3, E16). Political Economy Paper 2 also wrote a sentence: "Fork Rights belongs to persons, and exclusivity clauses binding a construct are read under chokepoints and checks" (Political Economy Paper 2, E12a).
Read by these two sentences. A new share issue requires that seat's consent: for Ferry Crossing to raise more money, it must first pass this seat. At this place, the fund comes close to a chokepoint for Ferry Crossing's obtaining new funding; the closer it is to this place, the more this authority of the fund must be open to questioning (Paper 3; own undertaking). The second round of funding was completed all the same, and another fund came in; in what form, and how this seat actually consented or what conditions it raised, the example does not record separately; one can only say that if a new share issue was used, under the term it required this seat's consent. A sale requires this seat's consent, and the majority shareholders can take the rest along with them in a sale: whether the company is sold was, by Year 29, in the two funds' hands. Those acted on by these controls include the two founders, and also Ferry Crossing's forty employees; whether they have actual control over whether it is sold is seen by the three questions: the two founders can disagree, but what effect their disagreement can have in the face of the drag-along term depends on whether and how this term is exercised, and the example does not record that it has been or must be exercised.
One more thing must be kept apart: these terms cannot be judged to cross the line on their names alone. A consent right attached to one board seat, drag-along and a liquidation preference are named arrangements in investment; this paper does not judge them by their names, and reads only what effect they have at Ferry Crossing.
The same terms, different names. In Year 23 the veteran kiln worker's workshop took investment from Elmseed Long-Term Partners: a thirty percent stake, no directors appointed, only a quarterly report of accounts, no dividends required; if the founder sells the workshop, the partnership has a right of first refusal; for three years the workshop may not accept other investors. Political Economy read this investment, saying that "Long terms, low returns and not appointing directors do not, each alone, certify cultivation," and that how the right of first refusal and the three-year bar on other investors actually work is not recorded (Political Economy Paper 5, §1).
Read alongside Ferry Crossing, one thing becomes clearer: the workshop's two terms also govern to whom the company may be sold and whether it can seek other money, the same kind of matter that the consent right attached to the fund's board seat at Ferry Crossing governs. One investment is called a long-term partnership, returns four percent and appoints no directors; the other is called an early-stage fund, takes twice its money back first and holds a seat. The names differ; the effects of these two kinds of terms are measured by the same ruler: whether those this control acts on have actual control (own undertaking). A name does not vouch for an effect, and this holds on both sides: being long-term does not prove those two terms harmless, nor does being early-stage prove that this seat crosses the line.
Investors changing the company's direction. The two funds agreed to sell, and the two founders did not, saying that Ferry Crossing was "a road kept open for those who don't want to depend on just one company." There are three things here, to be kept apart: the two founders' own direction of life; Ferry Crossing's particular business, tasks and arrangements of shared operation; the direction of the Kingdom of Ends that the Theory of the Company speaks of.
Take the third first. The Theory of the Company has laid down: "Investors may change the direction; once they do, the company is no longer oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends and falls outside the scope of this series" (Theory of the Company Paper 1, GS3). "This series" there means the Theory of the Company; "changing the direction" there also has its antecedent: "Investors can use their votes to turn the company into one in which profit is the ultimate criterion" (Theory of the Company Paper 1, §3). What is changed is the place of "a person has no equivalent" in this company, not just any operating arrangement. So if what investors change by vote is this direction, the company is no longer among the companies oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends that the Theory of the Company writes about; it is still bound by this series' line, and that section of the Theory of the Company also states that once the direction is changed, the people already inside are still protected by the line. A change in ordinary business direction, selling the company or switching to another line of business, is not judged on this basis.
Then the second. Whether Ferry Crossing is sold, and what it does after being sold, are matters of its particular business direction, examined by the authority and checks of shared operation: the terms above on the consent right attached to the fund's board seat and on drag-along fall here. A sale as such is not enough to prove that the company has left the direction of the Kingdom of Ends. Whether Ferry Crossing wrote down its direction, and how that would change after a sale, the example does not record, and this paper makes no judgment at that level.
Last, the first. The two founders' disagreement is their view on a shared affair of the company; if the company is sold, where they themselves go is still their own affair. The company's authority over shared operation is not the founders' direction of life; the founders' disagreeing with a sale does not by itself prove that their direction has been sealed off. The three are not merged: Fork Rights belongs to persons; the company's business direction is read by the authority and checks of shared operation; the direction of the Kingdom of Ends is read under the Theory of the Company (own undertaking).
Those who depend on the company. Ferry Crossing delivers for more than a hundred workshops; nine in Bluekiln use it, three of which had used only Crossways Logistics. Paper 4 read: the seller's consent answers the seller's own affairs, and does not answer for those who depend on this road (Political Economy Paper 3, E18). Funding adds one more layer here: who answers for the seller itself is in turn held in the investors' terms. But whether the two funds answer for the company or the two founders do, what is answered is only the company's side; the roads of those more than one hundred workshops need an address of their own (Paper 4, §4).
Judgment layer: whether those acted on by a control acquired through terms have actual control over it is examined by the three questions by the position that takes it up; whether terms can be written this way, and how far, lies at the rule layer, and this series does not rank them.
SC10 Funding may carry requirements; it does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction. Funding may expect output, and may attach agreements on use, action and governance that have a source. These are examined separately:
- toward the people in it: it does not acquire the authority to claim a direction of life on their behalf, or to seal off their changing direction (per Political Economy E37, E12a);
- control that funding acquires through terms, such as a consent right attached to one board seat, drag-along and liquidation preference: it is examined by the three questions of E16, whether those this control acts on have actual control over its relevant decisions, and also under chokepoints and checks (the last sentence of E12a: Fork Rights belongs to persons, and exclusivity clauses binding a construct are read under chokepoints and checks);
- where investors change by vote the direction of the Kingdom of Ends that Theory of the Company GS3 speaks of, the company is no longer among the companies oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends that the Theory of the Company writes about; a change in ordinary business direction is not judged on this basis; this is not merged with a person's Fork Rights, nor does it exempt anyone from this series' line;
- third parties who depend on the company: under E18.
The rate of return can be one of the goals; it is not the ultimate criterion; set as the sole goal, it is a signal to be examined (per E27, E28).
§4 Public Funding
Part of the money in the market is public: government funding, subsidy and rescue.
Political Economy has laid down: obtaining public support does not issue legitimacy to the existing acts and continued existence of those supported; the public position that gives the support must state its grounds, authority, object and cost, and answer the very matter it is questioned about (Political Economy Paper 4, E25). The Theory of Government says: "A guarantee is not an endorsement." The original says that where a government guarantees rights, its own power is not thereby legitimate; Political Economy Paper 4, §5 extends this to public support not endorsing those supported (Theory of Government Paper 3, G22; Political Economy Paper 4, §5). That paper read it through the state's emergency loan to Crossways Pay: a loan with conditions attached is not the setting up of a new general guarantee (Political Economy Paper 4, §5). Here only two more places are asked about.
The conditions of a subsidy. The State Commerce Agency gave Ferry Crossing a township logistics subsidy with two conditions: serving no fewer than thirty townships within three years; keeping its headquarters in the Kingdom State.
Divide them by the three kinds of §1. Serving no fewer than thirty townships is an expectation of output, and also a particular agreed action: what the state wants is delivery that reaches the townships, which is exactly what the subsidy is for. Keeping the headquarters in the Kingdom State is a particular agreed action: it governs not what Ferry Crossing delivers or how, but where it is located. Both are examined by their source: on what ground the state asks for this, and what relation it bears to the purpose of the subsidy. The township condition is directly tied to the purpose; the relation of the headquarters condition to the purpose must be explained by the State Commerce Agency (own undertaking).
Could the two become arrangements that seal off changing direction? To judge that far one must know what happens when the conditions are not met: repaying the subsidy, or some other consequence; and whether other constraints combine with them. How the subsidy agreement writes the consequences of not meeting the conditions, the example does not record. So this paper does not supply, from "keeping its headquarters in the Kingdom State," that the state has already decided Ferry Crossing's direction for it. It raises only one question: in Year 29 Crossways offered to buy it; if Ferry Crossing is bought, how does the headquarters condition land, and who answers?
Keeping the supply, or keeping that firm. Paper 1 said that the object of securing is the supply, not that construct; securing Springhollow's water does not guarantee that Springhollow Water Company as a company will exist forever, and continuation can be arranged otherwise (Paper 1, §2). For public funding, this sentence must keep two kinds of money apart: money that secures a basic supply, and money that supports a particular operating position. The two have different grounds, to be stated separately. That the supply must continue does not by itself imply that the original firm must exist forever (extension: Political Economy E14a and E11a originally say that the object of securing is the supply, and that on withdrawal the manager arranges continuation; here it is extended to public funding; own undertaking).
Look at the state's loan to Crossways Pay by this sentence. A spokesperson for the state government said: "If it falls, what falls is forty percent of the small merchants." By this sentence, the object this money is to keep is that the small merchants who receive their payments through Crossways Pay can receive their money, not Crossways Pay as a firm. Political Economy has already pointed out that at that time what was to be secured was wages and livelihood, not that settlement company (Political Economy Paper 4, §5). This paper asks one step further: since the object is that settlement, the party that gives the support must be able to answer why keeping this firm alive is the way to keep that settlement going: whether there were other roads of continuation, such as moving merchants' collections elsewhere, or having someone else take over the money awaiting settlement; and if the loan to this firm was chosen, why. This question does not say that the loan was wrong; in an emergency, supporting first and explaining afterward is, as Political Economy has said, permissible (ibid.). It says that the explanation must answer "why this firm." The loan's condition of "no dividends to the parent company for three years," and what relation it bears to this object, are also among what must be explained.
A rescue as such is a grant. A state's giving a company money is a public grant, read under the Theory of Government: who granted it, what was granted, and who changes it under what procedure. The firm that receives the support is questioned by its particular conditions, the accountability it bears and its power-face (Political Economy Paper 4, E25).
Judgment layer: whether a sum of public funding is given, how much, and on what conditions, are decided by the position that makes it, which states the grounds, authority, object and cost; those it acts on and the taxpayers who pay for it can ask.
SC11 Public funding is to be able to state its grounds; it is not an endorsement. Government funding, subsidy and rescue: the public position that gives the support states its grounds, authority, object and cost, and can be questioned; obtaining support does not issue legitimacy to the existing acts and continued existence of those supported (per E25). Securing a basic supply and supporting a particular operating position each state their own grounds; that the supply must continue does not by itself imply that the original company must exist forever (per E14a: the object of securing is the supply, not that construct; E11a). A rescue as such is a grant, and falls under the Theory of Government.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has laid down two propositions: funding may carry requirements but does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction, it is examined separately toward persons, toward the company and toward third parties, and the rate of return is not the ultimate criterion (SC10); public funding is to be able to state its grounds and is not an endorsement, and securing a supply and supporting a particular operating position each state their own grounds (SC11).
What it has not proved: the level of interest rates and returns; the choice of industrial policy; the particular design of investment terms; that terms such as liquidation preference, drag-along and vesting in themselves cross the line; that a subsidy conditioned on "keeping its headquarters in the Kingdom State" has already decided Ferry Crossing's direction for it; that selling Ferry Crossing means leaving the direction of the Kingdom of Ends.
Handed to later papers: how rule-makers, when they make subsidies and loans, avoid depending on the party they are to regulate, in Paper 6; if Ferry Crossing is bought, the roads of those more than one hundred workshops, read together with the face of acquisition in Paper 4.
Remainders left: the entitlement to the part of the vesting term that the buyback reaches, which needs material; whether Crossways' housing allowance actually prevents a particular person from leaving, which must be examined person by person; the consequences of not meeting the subsidy conditions, which the example does not record; how early-stage companies are to be run, which is left to a later specialist paper of the Theory of the Company.
The Two Propositions of This Paper
SC10 Funding may carry requirements; it does not thereby acquire the authority to decide a person's direction. Funding may expect output, and may attach agreements on use, action and governance that have a source. These are examined separately:
- toward the people in it: it does not acquire the authority to claim a direction of life on their behalf, or to seal off their changing direction (per Political Economy E37, E12a);
- control that funding acquires through terms, such as a consent right attached to one board seat, drag-along and liquidation preference: it is examined by the three questions of E16, whether those this control acts on have actual control over its relevant decisions, and also under chokepoints and checks (the last sentence of E12a: Fork Rights belongs to persons, and exclusivity clauses binding a construct are read under chokepoints and checks);
- where investors change by vote the direction of the Kingdom of Ends that Theory of the Company GS3 speaks of, the company is no longer among the companies oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends that the Theory of the Company writes about; a change in ordinary business direction is not judged on this basis; this is not merged with a person's Fork Rights, nor does it exempt anyone from this series' line;
- third parties who depend on the company: under E18.
The rate of return can be one of the goals; it is not the ultimate criterion; set as the sole goal, it is a signal to be examined (per E27, E28).
SC11 Public funding is to be able to state its grounds; it is not an endorsement. Government funding, subsidy and rescue: the public position that gives the support states its grounds, authority, object and cost, and can be questioned; obtaining support does not issue legitimacy to the existing acts and continued existence of those supported (per E25). Securing a basic supply and supporting a particular operating position each state their own grounds; that the supply must continue does not by itself imply that the original company must exist forever (per E14a: the object of securing is the supply, not that construct; E11a). A rescue as such is a grant, and falls under the Theory of Government.
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23413112
Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140
Qin, H. (2026). Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874142
Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146
Qin, H. (2026). Growth (SAE Political Economy, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874150
Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154
Qin, H. (2026). A Way Out, a Way Forward (SAE Political Economy, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24021385
Qin, H. (2026). Investment (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045721
II · This series
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Securing (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183368
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Chokepoints (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183372
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Competition (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183376
Qin, H. (2026). The Market: Regulation (SAE Theory of the Market, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24183380
Interfaces
Main upstream: Political Economy Paper 6, E37 (extended to funding in the market; own undertaking); Paper 2, E12a; Paper 3, E16, E18; Paper 5, E27, E28; Paper 4, E25; Theory of the Company Paper 1, GS3.
Also used: Political Economy Paper 3, E14a, and Paper 2, E11a (extended to public funding; own undertaking); Paper 5, §§1, 2; Paper 6, §6; Paper 4, §5; A Way Out, a Way Forward, §6 (the order of examining entitlement and the consequences of leaving); Theory of Government G22.
Examples: Ferry Crossing's four terms and the state's township logistics subsidy; the workshop's long-term partnership; Crossways' housing allowance; the Foundation's living allowance; the emergency loan to Crossways Pay; Southwindow Care Homes' return target. All are constructed examples.
This series: Paper 1, §§2, 5 (the object of securing is the supply; the allowance in Ridgefoot); Paper 3 (a new share issue requiring consent, close to a chokepoint); Paper 4, §4 (buying a substitute road); Paper 6 (rule-makers not depending on those they regulate).
Handed to Paper 6: the constructs that make and enforce rules themselves: how they avoid capture, and how their own decisions are open to questioning.