Self-as-an-End
Self-as-an-End Theory Series · SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · III · 15DD

SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · III: The Cooperative Game
SAE 判断力练习与游戏·三：合作之局

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23609864 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

When two people dance together, play music together, or work on a large jigsaw puzzle together, what the person opposite wants and what I want lie in one place, and are attained together. This paper asks two things: where judgment falls at such a time; and how 15DD, which is worth practicing, is to be practiced. The remainder can show itself in the partner's next step and in what he wants. The partner's next step is his, and it is also part of what we want together; this game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine. This kind of game newly opens 15DD, but does not guarantee it: the partner can also be merely someone who helps me reach my purpose.

15DD can not only be practiced; it is very much worth practicing. Worth it, yet it cannot be forced, and in this it is much like cultivation. The item of what is held that is aimed, at this moment, at "practicing 15DD" cannot reach 15DD, because there are two doors: toward him, that item requires him to serve my purpose; toward oneself, non dubito does not work through self-coercion, and gritting one's teeth to make oneself acknowledge him does not get there. "Worth practicing" lies in going to play, in giving play the conditions for it to happen. This paper parts from Kant: he sets up the cultivating of sympathetic feelings as an indirect duty, with the feelings as means; this paper takes neither.

The telling–listening and performing–watching games are mainly cooperative, with hiding and guessing inside them. Even when writing, one is not alone: the writer imagines a reader, that is, how he himself would think if he were the reader; the use of writing is changing places, which can be set against the second maxim of Kant's §40. This paper also draws contrasts with Gadamer and with Schiller's educational side. 16DD is registered only.

Keywords: Self-as-an-End, SAE, play, judgment, the cooperative game, 15DD, not occupying the other's place in advance, acknowledgment, cultivation, Kant, writing, changing places, Gadamer, Schiller

Writing statement: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design and final editorial judgments were made by the author.

0. Introduction

Two people were dancing a familiar couple dance. When the music reached the beat for the turn, he led half a step further to the right. She did not pull him back; going with that half step, she carried the next move on into a turn they had never rehearsed. When the dance was over, they both laughed.

This dance belonged to the two of them. His half step was his; she did not decide it for him. The turn she joined to it was hers, and it was joined onto his step. Opposite me is another subject; what he wants and what I want lie in one place, and are attained together. This paper first asks where judgment falls at such a moment. Then it asks a harder question: if the 15DD stance, that is, acknowledging another person and not occupying his place in advance, is worth practicing, yet cannot be demanded, how is it to be practiced?

1. What We Want Together

1.1 The Remainder

The remainder of the cooperative game can show itself in the partner's next step and in what he wants (Overview 7.2). The steps are fixed and the music is fixed, but which way the partner turns at this moment is not; nor is whether he wants this passage danced a little faster or a little slower.

1.2 Why the Cooperative Game Is a Cooperative Game

In any game between two people, the next step of the one opposite is his. Competition and cooperation differ in what is sought: in the competitive game, his step is something I want to get the better of; in the cooperative game, his step is part of what we want together. This game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine. The writing side of the telling–listening game is a different case, treated separately in Section 8.

So what the cooperative game sets before a person is a partner of this kind: he makes his own judgments, and what he wants lies in one place with what I want. This is exactly what "acknowledging him, not occupying his place in advance", in what is held at 15DD, looks like in behaviour. But what it looks like in behaviour is not acknowledgment itself; acknowledgment the game can only invite.

1.3 Back to the Dance

The steps, the music, and this particular dance the two have agreed on are the construct of this game. The steps fix only that there is a turn on this beat; they do not fix which way to turn or how far to lead. The extra half step he leads to the right is something the construct has not fully taken in, and it is right there before one's eyes: this is the remainder. Her seeing that "on this beat he can still be met like this" is that judgment, and it is hers. Foreseeing that he will go to the right is anticipation, and material. Carrying the next move on into an unrehearsed turn is the action she performs.

Where she stands at this moment cannot yet be told merely from her having adjusted her steps to his: someone who treats a partner as a tool will also adjust his steps to the partner (Section 2). What has to be looked at is acknowledgment and not co-opting: in taking that turn, does she take his half step as his and connect with him, or does she take it only as material for her own moment of brilliance? From the actions written above alone, what she actually holds at this moment cannot yet be seen; one can only say that the material is insufficient.

That judgment is hers, and is owned by her; his half step is his, and she did not claim it on his behalf (Overview 5.3). That she took this turn well does not prove that she stood at 15DD; nor will she necessarily manage to connect next time.

2. What 15DD Looks Like in the Game

Judgment and Weeping says that one item in the stance of the weeping of non dubito is "not occupying his place in advance, and accepting available material to correct my present understanding" (4.1, condition 4, third point). In the game, this is not occupying the partner's place in advance, and being willing to let how he actually moves correct my understanding of him. What decides whether one is at 15DD at this moment is still the two conditions of acknowledgment and not co-opting (Judgment and Weeping 4.1, conditions 3 and 4); the "I confirm you are an independent end" of Psychoanalysis IV, §2.3 can be read alongside them (already cited in Judgment and Weeping, Section 3).

The dance-partner example calls for thinking one step further. Whichever way he goes, I adjust my steps to his. What that condition of Judgment and Weeping corrects is my understanding of him; but what "I adjust to him" changes is my steps. Someone who treats a partner as a tool will also adjust his steps to him. So adjusting one's steps to him does not by itself fix the layer. Carrying what Judgment and Weeping says over to the dance partner is this series' extension.

3. Opening 15DD, Without Guarantee

The partner can be merely someone who helps me reach my purpose. This runs in a different direction from the "I do things for you" of Psychoanalysis IV, §2.3 (already cited in Judgment and Weeping, Section 3): that sentence is the investment of 14DD, my purpose directed at his welfare; here it is he who serves my purpose. The directions of the two must be kept apart; the original sentence for one direction cannot be used to prove the other.

Nor do division of labour and arrangement, by themselves, cancel his position as a subject. The division of labour between the two, the agreed moves and well-practiced choreography leave conditions for not occupying his place in advance, but do not guarantee that I have acknowledged him. Whether my treating him instrumentally thereby suppresses his participation in the game is another question; my stance alone cannot change the structure of the game (Overview 7.5).

In what is wanted together, there are also those who only wait for others to carry it. Whether such a person's share counts as in the game is judged by the four conditions of Overview 6.1; the layer at which he stands at this moment depends on what he holds. Imposed "cooperation", such as team-building handed down from above, is judged by Overview 6.1, conditions 3 and 4; that share can be work.

4. Worth Practicing, Yet Attainable Only as a Result

4.1 The Intention in Entering the Game and the Stance Within It

15DD can not only be practiced; it is very much worth practicing. But two things must be kept apart: the intention on entering the game, and the stance in the game at this moment. When one plays for the sake of one's own practice, the focal point of this share is still on the game (Overview 3.1); but "wanting to practice" cannot testify for the stance in the game at this moment, and the layer at which the player stands at this moment has to be looked at separately.

4.2 Two Doors

The item of what is held that is aimed, at this moment, at "practicing 15DD" cannot reach 15DD. Two doors stand in its way.

The first door is toward him. To take the partner as material for my practice is to require him to serve my purpose. Judgment and Weeping says: "not requiring his loss to serve my good heart or my purpose" (4.1, condition 4); carrying this sentence over into the game is this series' extension.

The second door is toward oneself. Non dubito is "not through self-coercion" (Psychoanalysis IV, §2.2, criterion 4). Gritting one's teeth to make oneself acknowledge him at this moment is willpower, not a stance.

4.3 Where What Is Held Lands

A casual "wanting to practice" is a passing intention and does not yet reach 14DD; as regards this item of what is held, a person often stands at 13DD. "I should become someone who can acknowledge him" falls on the line of "what I should become", and only then does it reach 14DD. These two kinds of what is held are looked at separately, and the limit is still the two doors above.

4.4 The Other Things Held in Parallel

On the same occasion, the player can also hold other things, for instance wanting to dance this dance well. These are to be looked at separately; having aims of one's own is no ground for saying that there is no 15DD at this moment. What the third rule after the table in Judgment and Weeping, Section 3 says is that different acts or shares of attention running in parallel are looked at separately; carrying it over to several things held in parallel is this series' extension.

4.5 Worth Practicing: It Lies in Going to Play

Practice, as a result, is owned by the one who plays. What this game leaves behind, and whether he will later be better able to stand at 15DD, is another question. "Worth practicing" lies in going to play, in giving play the conditions for it to happen, not in requiring the partner to complete my practice for me. This is the same method as Judgment and Weeping 5.4: there, sympathy for animals is said to be on the way, which is "not to say that it is a means for training up 15DD"; this paper borrows it for play.

5. Cannot Be Forced, Much Like Cultivation

5.1 Both Sides

The practice of 15DD cannot be forced by others: forcing someone into the game is colonization (Overview 6.1, condition 4). Nor can it be forced by oneself; this is the second door above.

5.2 Cultivation

Cultivation is like this too. It can only give conditions, leave blank space, and wait for the right time (Action Theory Paper 6, D34–D35; the items are set out in the Overview, Section 9). The practice of 15DD resembles cultivation, and resembles it at four points: giving conditions, not doing it in his stead, leaving blank space, no guarantee.

5.3 The One Who Arranges the Game

Someone arranges a cooperative game so that a child will learn to respect others. This is doing things with play. Whether it is cultivation depends on whether the child is willing to accept it, whether it suits him, whether the time is ripe, and whether blank space is left. It only invites; it does not guarantee. The child's share in the game is judged by the four conditions; what the child sees in this game is owned by the child (Action Theory Paper 6, D36); the layer at which he stands depends on what he holds.

5.4 The Adult Who Lets the Child Win on Purpose

An adult playing chess lets a child win on purpose. Is this cultivation, is it humouring the child, or is it failing to take the child as an end? It depends on whether blank space is left, and whether the win or loss is claimed on the child's behalf. First, conceding openly must be told apart from conceding covertly. Conceding openly, by giving piece odds or the first move, which the child knows of and accepts, is openly agreeing to change a rule, and so opens a new game (Overview, Section 13). Only conceding covertly brings the divergence that Paper II speaks of (Paper II, Section 3); whether divergence by itself can make a share no longer play, Paper II, Section 9 leaves as a question. When the adult concedes covertly, what must be asked is this: did he take the win he himself arranged as the child's own win, and claim it on the child's behalf?

5.5 15DD Has Its Own Peek-a-boo

Education as Subject-Condition, §3.2 speaks of parents going through conflict–acknowledgment–conflict–acknowledgment in front of the child, and says also that the 15DD peek-a-boo is not a designed game but the quality of the relationship between the parents. Conflict between parents in front of the child is not play (Overview 4.2); the Education paper borrows the word peek-a-boo as a structural analogy. Whether it is anyone's practice of judgment, this paper does not judge. The distinction between guiding and cultivation in §2.2 of the Education paper is not rewritten here.

6. Parting from Kant; Guardrails

6.1 Kant

§35 of the Doctrine of Virtue says that although fellow feeling is not itself a duty, active participation in the fate of others is; to this end, it is an indirect duty to cultivate the natural sympathetic feelings in oneself and to use them as means to participation from moral principles; and one is also to seek out the poor, sickrooms and debtors' prisons (AA 6:457; already cited in Judgment and Weeping 1.2. Judgment and Weeping 1.2 has "at least", which is the second edition's reading, wenigstens).

The two have one point of likeness: as regards "seeking out the occasions that can give rise to it", entering the game is like his seeking out sickrooms. They part at two points: in Kant, the seeking out is a duty and the feeling is a means; this paper takes neither. Once in the game, the focal point is still on the game (Overview 3.1); in the game at this moment, the 15DD stance does not owe its standing to the use for which it is cultivated, nor can it be made into a means. That it is "worth" practicing is this series' view, not a duty. The comparison keeps to the limits of Judgment and Weeping 1.4: what differs between the two is normative office and the ground of standing, not two sets of mutually exclusive mental states.

In §8 of On the Basis of Morality, Schopenhauer criticizes Kant, saying that this amounts to sympathizing with animals only for practice (already cited in Judgment and Weeping 5.4). What he criticizes is §17 of the Doctrine of Virtue on animals (AA 6:443), not §35 above; it serves here only as a contrast.

6.2 Guardrails

To say that 15DD is worth practicing, five guardrails must hold. The first four are taken from Judgment and Weeping 4.11; the fifth is the author's view.

  • Not a duty. This series does not write an "ought" for the player.
  • Not something to seek. What matters is the partner and this game, not the practice itself.
  • It does not rank persons. Someone who does not like playing cooperative games is not thereby judged not to have stood at 15DD.
  • It is not evidence. Neither having played a cooperative game nor having cooperated well proves that one has stood at 15DD.
  • No higher or lower. It is not written as "the most worth practicing", and it is not set above or below the lower layers; to say "the most important" oversteps.

7. Mixtures of Competition and Cooperation

Cooperation within a team and competition between teams form a mixture in the structure of the game; matches between teams belong here, and Paper II, Section 4 takes only their competitive side. The same pair of people can also have competition nested within a cooperative game, as with the hiding and guessing in detective novels (8.4). Taking the opponent as an end within competition, however, is the player's stance, not the structural mixture meant here, and belongs to Paper II, Section 5.

8. The Telling–Listening and Performing–Watching Games

8.1 Mainly Cooperative, with Hiding and Guessing

Watching a ball game, going to the theatre and watching a film are all play, and the one watching is in the game too. The telling–listening and performing–watching games have more cooperation in them. The story already told is the construct; the teller knows what comes later and the listener does not: this is the persistent gap between persons that Section 4 of the Laughter Overview speaks of. The teller hides; the listener guesses.

8.2 Writing

Writing looks like something done alone, but in fact even when writing, one is not alone: the writer has to imagine how the reader will read, for instance when planting a clue. Planting a clue is the "hiding" in hiding and guessing.

While writing, the writer imagines for himself a virtual reader, that is, how he himself would think if he were the reader. At the moment of writing there is only one subject, occupying both positions, writing and reading; but the structure facing the reader has already been set up: the constructs of language and genre, and the remainders left open by hiding and by planted clues, are all organized toward another person's reading, without waiting for a reader actually to come. The imagined reader is this game's orientation; he does not count as another already in the game. If no reader comes, the writing side holds all the same.

For judgment, the use of writing lies in changing places: first moving over to the reader's side and seeing that "here one can still guess like this"; then returning to the writing side and deciding what to hide and what to show. This can be set against Kant. In §40 of the Critique of Judgment he lists three maxims; the second is "An der Stelle jedes andern denken" (to think in the place of everyone else, AA 5:294), which he calls the maxim of the enlarged way of thinking ("die zweite der erweiterten", same page). What he means is that one reflects on one's own judgment by way of others' "nicht sowohl wirkliche als vielmehr bloß mögliche Urtheile" (judgments not so much actual as merely possible), and so rises above the private conditions of one's individual judgment (5:293–295); in the same section he also says that this second maxim is the maxim of judgment ("die zweite der Urtheilskraft", 5:295).

The two are close in changing places, but differ in what they seek and in office. Kant says "jedes andern", everyone else: what is sought is a universal standpoint, and the way to it is to withdraw from private conditions. What this paper imagines is this one reader, and how he will guess on reaching this point. So the two cannot be directly identified, nor can it be determined from this at which layer the writer stands.

Changing places has its limits. The imagined reader is, in the end, imagined by the writer. When a real reader comes to read, he makes his own judgment; that judgment is his, and does not depend on whether it fits the author's expectation; the writer cannot use his own imagining to complete that judgment for him. A real reader's reading may also bring out something the original imagining had not fully taken in; leaving room for such a reading is an arrangement on the writing side, not a condition for the reader's judgment being his. Neither changing places nor leaving room can, on its own, fix the writer's layer.

Writing to satisfy an editor is work.

When, and whether, writing comes about as a cooperative game, this paper does not settle; it is left to Section 12. The use of writing in this series is changing places, and that need not wait for this question to be answered.

8.3 Planting a Clue

The plot and the characters' words written up to this sentence, together with the convention by which novels of this kind hide the murderer, are the construct. Earlier in the text, the nephew said that he had never been in the study; this chapter reads: "He first reached for the second compartment on the right side of the desk, and only then asked where the will was kept." The writer had meant only to write the nephew helping to look.

The writer moves over to the side of a reader who knows only the plot written so far, and asks: on reaching this sentence, will the reader stop? The same gesture can also be read as the nephew having long been familiar with this study, and then what he said earlier becomes suspect; the arrangement that hides the murderer has left an opening here that it has not closed, and this is the remainder. Standing in the reader's place, the writer sees that "on reaching this sentence, it can still be read like this: he had been here before; what he said earlier cannot be trusted"; this is that judgment, and it is the writer's. Whether readers will go on from this to guess that the nephew is the murderer, and whether they will really stop, is anticipation, and material. Back on the writing side, the writer decides to hide, and tones the sentence down; the deciding and the revising are actions. That judgment, made in changing places, is the writer's, and is owned by the writer.

Whether the real reader stops here is the reader's own affair. If the reader sees this opening here, that judgment is the reader's, and it does not fail to count because it does not fit what the writer imagined; whom the reader guesses to be the murderer, and whether the guess is right, is prediction, and material. The example says only that this set of material still admits a suspicious reading; it does not say that the nephew is really lying, nor that he is the murderer.

8.4 The Detective Novel

The detective novel turns hiding and guessing into an open contest, with a set of rules often called "fair play"; it is the kind of mixture in which competition is nested within cooperation (Section 7). Knox's ten rules come from his preface to The Best Detective Stories of the Year, 1928, which he edited with H. Harrington; the year in the title is 1928, and the book was published in 1929. In the preface he describes the detective story as a game between two parties, the author and the reader (secondhand); "fair play between author and reader" is often used to sum up the ten rules, but it has not been found as a sentence of his preface (secondhand).

8.5 The Diary Written Only for One's Later Self

The diary is one difficult case for writing. The imagined reader is oneself, and the real reader is one's later self: the same subject. Relation Theory Paper 2 says that a position in time is not another subject (H14). Is the construct of a diary, then, organized toward another person's reading? And how is it to be told apart from playing chess against oneself? This paper does not settle this; it only puts the two relevant places side by side. Laughter IV says that the other of the laughter of despair is the future self, which is an extended reading within that series; what Relation Theory Paper 2 says is that a position in time is not another subject. The two sentences need not collide; the key is whether "another" refers to another subject or to the other. The cell tomorrow to today in Relation Theory Paper 2, which that paper itself marks as a constructed example, can be read together with the imagined reader as an "orientation".

8.6 Live Performance; Watching Films, Reading Novels

In live performance, performers and audience interact and create together. This can also connect with what Action Theory Paper 6, D37 says, that the one who cultivates can also be cultivated: the two sides are not fixed as giver and receiver.

Films and novels give viewers and readers clues and material, and viewers and readers make their own judgments. When one weeps for a character, the projection has to be the reader's own; the layer is still read by Judgment and Weeping 4.1, and cannot be inferred directly from the author's having once projected (Judgment and Weeping 5.5).

8.7 Where the Listener Stands at This Moment

Merely guessing what will happen next is prediction, and material; seeing that "the story can still go like this" is that judgment, and it has an owner only from 13DD up. Matching wits with the author, when casual, is an intention and does not yet reach 14DD; only when it falls on the line of "what I should become" does it reach 14DD. In weeping for a character, one can stand at 15DD, as judged by the full definition in Judgment and Weeping 4.1. Watching a ball game does not belong here; it is in the game of the match itself (Paper II, Section 4).

9. Contrasts with Gadamer and Schiller

9.1 Gadamer

In Truth and Method (1960), Gadamer says that all playing is a being-played; that the real subject of play is not the player but play itself, which is shown precisely by the experience of a single person playing; and that the spectators too belong to the play, a claim confined to the context of drama presenting itself to an audience (Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 106, pp. 108–109).

His account and this paper are not opposite answers to one and the same question. He asks about the mode of being of play and of the work of art; this paper distinguishes the structure of the game from the stance of the player. The two can be read against each other: the game has its own structure, close to what he calls play's own movement; but the owner of the judgment is still the player, and practice falls on the side of the subject. Paper I, 6.2 gives one reading of how a person's sinking into the game and forgetting himself coexists with "this judgment is mine".

9.2 Schiller's Educational Side

Schiller says that the aesthetic is the only way to make the sensuous human being rational, a necessary condition; and also that the aesthetic by itself decides nothing for cognition or will (Overview, Section 10). This paper says that play is one way, and that cultivation leaves blank space and gives no guarantee; nor does it use the ideal of human wholeness to set universal demands on people.

10. 16DD

Each takes the other as an end: registered only, not developed.

11. Terms

  • The cooperative game (合作之局): the one opposite is another subject; what is sought lies in one place and is attained together; the game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine (1.2).
  • Not occupying his place in advance (不预占): not occupying his place in advance, and accepting available material to correct my understanding of him (Section 2).
  • Two doors (两道门): the item of what is held that is aimed, at this moment, at "practicing 15DD" cannot reach 15DD: toward him, not requiring him to serve my purpose; toward oneself, not through self-coercion (4.2).
  • Changing places (换位): the writer moves over to the side of the imagined reader and sees the remainder, then returns to the writing side to decide what to hide and what to show (8.2).
  • The imagined reader (设想中的读者): the writer himself standing in the reader's place; this game's orientation, not another already in the game (8.2).
  • For the rest, see the Overview, Section 12.

12. Questions Left Open

What this game leaves behind, and whether one will later be better able to stand at 15DD, this paper has not answered (4.5). When, and whether, writing comes about as a cooperative game has not been settled either (8.2); whether the construct of a diary counts as organized toward another person's reading, and whether "another" refers to another subject or to the other, likewise remain open (8.5).

Whether "much like cultivation" can be said of oneself toward oneself is also a question: Relation Theory Paper 2 says that the past self can cultivate or colonize the present self; this reaches the side across time, but not the side of the second door, "toward oneself"; the abstract of that paper also says that it does not develop the synchronic contradictions within one person. The place in the game of the share that only waits for others to carry it (Section 3), and whether the Education paper's 15DD has its own peek-a-boo is anyone's practice of judgment (5.5), are also left for separate treatment.

The original wording of Knox's preface, and Gadamer's German wording and page numbers: the originals to be verified. 16DD is registered only.

Conclusion

In the cooperative game, the one opposite is another subject; what is sought lies in one place, and is attained together. The partner's next step is his, and it is also part of what we want together; this game comes off only when his step is still his and also joins up with mine. This kind of game newly opens 15DD, but does not guarantee it: adjusting one's steps to him does not by itself fix the layer, and what fixes the layer is still acknowledgment and not co-opting; the partner can also be merely someone who helps me reach my purpose.

15DD can not only be practiced; it is very much worth practicing. Worth it, yet it cannot be forced, much like cultivation. The item of what is held that is aimed, at this moment, at "practicing 15DD" has two doors in its way: if that item requires the partner to serve my purpose, it cannot reach 15DD; and non dubito does not work through self-coercion. "Worth practicing" lies in going to play, in giving play the conditions for it to happen. This paper parts from Kant: for him, seeking out sickrooms is a duty and the feeling is a means; this paper takes neither.

The telling–listening and performing–watching games are mainly cooperative, carrying hiding and guessing. Even when writing, one is not alone: the writer imagines a reader, that is, how he himself would think if he were the reader; first he moves over to the reader's side and sees that "here one can still guess like this", then he returns to the writing side to decide what to hide and what to show. The reader who actually comes makes his own judgment, and that judgment is his.

References

SAE upstream

  1. Han Qin. SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · Overview. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23609837. 3.1; 4.2; 5.3; 6.1; 7.2, 7.5; Sections 9 and 10; Sections 12 and 13.
  2. Han Qin. SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · I: The Solo Game (13DD). DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23609842. 6.2.
  3. Han Qin. SAE Exercises and Games of Judgment · II: The Competitive Game (14DD). DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23609854. Sections 3, 4 and 5.
  4. Han Qin. SAE Laughter · Overview: Judgment and Laughter. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23286244. Section 4.
  5. Han Qin. SAE Laughter · IV: The Laughter of Despair and the Knowing Smile (15DD). DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23287669. Abstract.
  6. Han Qin. SAE Laughter · Special Study: Judgment and Weeping. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23446536. 1.2, 1.4; Section 3; 4.1, conditions 3 and 4; 4.11; 5.4, 5.5.
  7. Han Qin. SAE Psychoanalysis (IV): Cert and Unification — The Self Beyond Doubt and the Four-Layer Framework. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19321534. §2.2, criterion 4, checked against the current page; the two sentences of §2.3 quoted via Judgment and Weeping, Section 3.
  8. Han Qin. Not Legislating for Others (SAE Action Theory, Paper 6). DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22970777. D34–D37. Checked against the current page.
  9. Han Qin. Education as Subject-Condition: A Philosophy of Education (the SAE Education paper). DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18867389. §3.2. Checked against the current page.
  10. Han Qin. SAE Relation Theory Paper 2: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23541778. Introduction; H14; the cell tomorrow to today; Abstract. Checked against v1.1 (Zenodo record 23554913).

External

  1. Kant, I. Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), §40, AA 5:293–295. The original sentences checked against the Academy edition's electronic transcription (korpora); the printed original not checked.
  2. Kant, I. Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Tugendlehre (1797). §35 (AA 6:457) checked against the original (Academy edition transcription); in the Academy edition this sentence has no "wenigstens"; the word is found in the second edition, according to the textual note in Schönecker, "Sympathie als praktische Teilnehmung", p. 18, n. 40 (secondhand). §17 (AA 6:443) cited via Judgment and Weeping 5.4.
  3. Schopenhauer, A. Über die Grundlage der Moral (1840), §8. Cited via Judgment and Weeping 5.4.
  4. Schiller, F. Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen (1795). Letters 21 and 23; for the edition used, see the Overview's references.
  5. Gadamer, H.-G. Wahrheit und Methode (1960); English translation Truth and Method, Second, Revised Edition, trans. J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall (Continuum). The three claims on being-played, the subject of play (English translation, p. 106) and the spectators (pp. 108–109) checked against the English translation; German GW 1, S. 112, 114–115, secondhand.
  6. Knox, R. A. Preface. In R. A. Knox & H. Harrington (eds.), The Best Detective Stories of the Year, 1928. London: Faber & Gwyer, 1929. Bibliographic details checked against the CiNii and Princeton library records (CiNii records Knox as the author of the preface); what the preface says is secondhand, the original wording to be verified.

Appendix Table: Connections and Contrasts

For reference. Sources are given at each point in the text; this table sets up no claim of its own.

Point in this paper Connection (within SAE) Contrast (external)
Why the cooperative game is a cooperative game Overview 7.5 —
Not occupying his place in advance; acknowledgment and not co-opting; the dance partner Judgment and Weeping 4.1, conditions 3 and 4; Psychoanalysis IV, §2.3 —
The partner as a mere tool; "I do things for you" runs in a different direction Psychoanalysis IV, §2.3 —
Two doors; things held in parallel Judgment and Weeping 4.1, condition 4, and Section 3, third rule after the table; Psychoanalysis IV, §2.2 —
Worth practicing: it lies in going to play Judgment and Weeping 5.4 —
Cannot be forced; cultivation Action Theory Paper 6, D34–D37; Overview 6.1, condition 4 —
Parting from Kant; guardrails Judgment and Weeping 1.2, 1.4, 4.11, 5.4 Kant, Doctrine of Virtue §17, §35; Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality §8
The telling–listening game; hiding and guessing Laughter Overview, Section 4 Knox
Writing: changing places; limits; the diary Relation Theory Paper 2; Laughter IV Kant, Critique of Judgment §40
Watching films, reading novels Judgment and Weeping 5.5 —
The subject of play; the spectators Paper I, 6.2 Gadamer, Truth and Method
Schiller's educational side Overview, Section 10 Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man