What a Government Is Not
政府不是什么
This series asks how a government judges in particular situations, and to whom, and for what, its judgments must answer. Institution Theory handed how to do it, and whether it can be done, to specific theories of institutions, and the Theory of Government is one of them. Before setting to work, this paper clears away a few things a government is not. A government is not an end: it is a means. A government is not a subject: those who sign are the persons sitting in positions, and the government is the address of attribution. A government is not a duty-bearer: to it this series says ought and limit; to the slot in which it is converged, and to the positions within it, accountability. A government is not a "we": its rules do not generate a third first person that completes each person's inner legislation on his behalf; public prosecution prosecutes on behalf of all subjects, and does not form a "we" on everyone's behalf either. Holding a position, embedding and carrying out: none of these is legitimacy. A government is not the source of basic rights, nor the only party that may not violate them; what is peculiar to it is guaranteeing the recognition-based rights it has embedded for its internal subjects. Without the guarantee, the power is illegitimate, that is, it must be questioned; with it, the power is not thereby legitimate. This series is neither a design manual nor a handbook of judgment: for arrangements it establishes only functions and fixes no form; it does not teach anyone how to judge well. After these, this paper says what kind of construct a government is and who the officeholders are, sets out the conventions of the whole series, settles the accounts received from upstream, registers how far each of the two slots this series has taken on is answered, and says what the series will not do for the reader. This paper proves no proposition; where something is to be proved, it marks the paper in which it is proved.
Introduction
The City Council of Apple City has passed a new parking rule: street parking in the old quarter becomes metered, with no parking after 10 p.m. A resident of the old quarter disagrees, goes on parking on the street at night as before, and receives a ticket. If the ticket goes unpaid, the car may be towed.
Three questions can be asked about this.
The first is on what grounds: on what grounds a city comes to have something that can set rules of this kind and issue tickets of this kind. This is the question of on what grounds an institution stands, and How Is Institution Possible (Foundational Paper 6; cited as F6) has answered it.
The second is what for: what this thing that can set rules ought to achieve, and what it may not do. Institution Theory has answered this: five oughts, with the Kingdom of Ends as their direction.
The third is how: how this rule should be made, how the ticket should be issued, who answers that resident when he disagrees and with what, and what to do when something cannot be achieved. Institution Theory handed this question on at its very start: "specific theories of institutions, such as the Theory of Government or a theory of the firm, answer how to do it, and they also judge whether a given thing can be done, and what to do when it cannot." (the Institution Theory Prequel, §6)
This series starts from the third question. The parking rule is not judged here; it serves only to separate the three questions. That resident's question is taken up again in Paper 1, §7.
Beyond this three-layer division of labor, this series receives three lines from upstream. The normative line, from F6 to Institution Theory, gives the ought. The line of judgment is Action Theory, and it gives judgment: a judgment is completed by the one who judges, and rules cannot do it in anyone's place (Action Theory Paper 1, D5, D6); Action Theory has also handed several matters to the Theory of Government by name (Action Theory Paper 0, §3.2 and §9.4; settled in §9 of this paper). The structural line is Rights Theory, together with its two specialist papers, On Rights and Entitlements and On Accountability · Wei, and Power Theory, which give the structure of rights and of power; this line bears weight on structure, not on the ought. Among the sources cited as concurring, Law Series P1 BL3 (Paper 2, G11) and Law Series P3 §5.1, §5.3 (Paper 4, G26) bear weight at points of connection; they are borrowed, and their application is undertaken by this series.
Before the questions are asked, a few things must be cleared away.
§1 Neither an End nor a Subject
A government is not an end. The first premise of F6 says: "Any institution, including the most elegant constitution, is a means, not an end." (F6 §2.1, Premise I; quoted in the Institution Theory Prequel, §1) A government is one kind of institution, and it too is a means. So one can say to it "this is what you ought to achieve"; and so too its continued existence can be a condition for getting things done, but cannot be a reason to close off questioning (the Institution Theory Prequel, §1). The direction is the Kingdom of Ends: "it is made by persons; an institution cannot make it on their behalf, nor does it count as made because an institution declares it" (Institution Theory Z39). The name is Kant's; Institution Theory Paper 0 has already conversed with Kant (§3.1); here this paper only points back to it.
Nor is a government a subject. The parking rule was passed by a vote of the City Council, and the hands raised were those of council members, one by one; the ticket, too, was issued by someone sitting in an enforcement position. Apple City raises no hand and issues no ticket. Power Theory says: "The state does not sign decrees; key-node officials sign decrees through the state apparatus." (Power Theory P2 §V.3) Institution Theory says: "the construct is the address of attribution, not the subject of the act" (Institution Theory Z7a). A government's acts can all be traced back to their invocation by the persons sitting in positions; they take effect in the government's name, and the address of attribution is the government as a construct. Both ends are there, and neither hides the other. This settles the sentence forms of the whole series (§8), and also where Paper 1 begins (Paper 1, G1).
§2 Not a Duty-Bearer
People often say "the government has a duty to ...". This series does not speak that way.
Rights Theory sets up no horizontal duty: "a horizontal duty is the pushing-outward of an inner law into a demand upon others, structurally an overreach, and is deleted" (Rights Theory Paper 0, §I (M1)). When it comes to government, it puts this more bluntly still: the government is "the bearer of that power, not a duty-bearer. This is not to say the demand is unreal or unenforced — it may be very real, very enforced; only its structural position is the demand of a power, not a horizontal duty." (Rights Theory Paper 0, §IV (M4))
On Accountability · Wei establishes a word of its own: accountability is "the answering load the recipient holds in that position" (On Accountability F36); "Only a subject can hold a duty; construct and subject alike can hold accountability" (F39). A government that is converged by a constitutional order and cannot get out still holds accountability in that slot: "A government converged by a constitutional order cannot exit unilaterally," yet the efficacy of that slot is fully present, and what it holds is still accountability (F38). When a lower level of government is converged by the level above, it likewise holds accountability in that slot (Paper 4, G25). A position within a government is "a single registration event" (F37), and it too holds accountability.
So when this series speaks of a government, it speaks in four places. To the government as a construct, this series says ought, and also limit, that is, where its acts stop; to the slot in which it is converged by a constitutional order or by the level above, it says accountability; to the positions within the government, accountability; to the persons who sit in those positions, and to internal subjects, it writes no ought: that is their own law. Nowhere does the series write "the government's duty."
Pointing back: Hohfeld. The Law Series has already conversed with Wesley N. Hohfeld (Law Series Supplement §6): of his four pairs of concepts, the pair right and duty is where he and the Law Series part; on the side of rights, the kinds are distributed across three places: basic rights have no correlate, entitlements correspond to another's expenditure, recognition-based rights correspond to power, and none of the three lands on duty. Here this paper only goes on from that point of divergence: what a government holds where recognition-based rights are concerned is the power side of the seam (§5), not a duty correlative to a right.
§3 Not a "We"
Institution Theory says: "an institution cannot produce a 'we'" (Institution Theory Z31). The Conflict Treatise has said a sentence of the same shape between two persons: "Consensus does not automatically generate a third first-person legislator." (Conflict Treatise §24) Extending it to a government's rules is a step of this series (extension; own undertaking; Paper 1, §7): a government's rules do not generate a third first person that completes each person's inner legislation on his behalf.
This does not cancel the enforceable validity of public rules over actions within their authority. Where a rule has been made under valid authority and procedure and restricts only actions that may be restricted, an individual's disagreement does not by itself cancel its validity for him at the layer of authority and procedure; subject positions that cannot be overwritten are not included in this, and a rule that crosses the line is read separately under the first ought (Paper 1, G6). How the parking case is judged is written in Paper 1, §7; on what grounds compulsion stands, in Paper 2. A rule can require a person not to park at night; it cannot require him to identify with the view that "not parking at night is right."
Public prosecution belongs here too. The Law Series says that to annihilate a self-aware being threatens all subjects, so that "it must be prosecuted by public authority on behalf of all subjects" (Law Series P1 §5.1). This series reads "on behalf of all subjects" as: initiating proceedings, by a valid public position, for those under protection. Public prosecution prosecutes on behalf of all subjects; it does not form a "we" on everyone's behalf, does not avow anyone's inner law, and does not acquire arbitrary authority under this title. Applying this reading to public prosecution in general is undertaken by this series; it is proved in Paper 2, G12.
Here, too, the person's side is set apart: how each person legislates his own law is his own affair; how one person is to treat another, whether an officeholder or someone inside, is handed to the Critiques, and this series does not take it up (§9).
Pointing back: Rousseau. On the general will, the Law Series has already conversed with Rousseau (Law Series Supplement §7), and there it asked one step further: who defined it, and whether those who defined it mixed something of their own into it. Here this paper only goes on from that point: a government's rule is not something said by a "we"; it is a decision made through positions by the persons sitting in them, and it must be able to answer (Paper 1).
§4 Holding a Position and Carrying Out Are Not Legitimacy
Sitting in a position is not sitting in it legitimately; that a rule has been embedded and carried out does not make it legitimate either.
Power Theory says of registration: "Registration is not consent, is not legitimation, is not the acknowledgment of justice" (Power Theory P1 T2). Rights Theory says of recognition-based rights: "Neither constitution nor operation succeeding is the same as normative legitimacy." (Rights Theory P3 F10) Institution Theory says of protection: "being able to enforce does not prove that what is enforced, or the authority to enforce it, is warranted" (Institution Theory Z17). The Power Theory Prequel has one more sentence: "legitimacy is the claimed form of power, not its actual form." (the Power Theory Prequel, §IV) What is asked there is whether legitimacy, in the sense of the claim to it, is the source of power; the sentence is cited only as concurring.
Paper 1 answers the question of a decision's effect on persons in three layers: its effect in fact; under what authority and procedure it is valid; on what grounds it may normatively be so (Paper 1, G6). A rule is voted on by the City Council and embedded according to procedure, and a ticket is issued according to the rule: at most these answer the second layer, under what authority and procedure it is valid; the third layer remains. The third layer has several necessary conditions: not crossing the line; guaranteeing the recognition-based rights embedded; openness to questioning. The step from these oughts to necessary conditions of legitimacy is undertaken by this series (Paper 1, §§6–7). None of them is a sufficient condition.
With Weber: the three inner grounds of legitimate domination. In Politik als Beruf, Max Weber says that the state is "a relation of domination of human beings over human beings, resting on the means of legitimate (that is: regarded as legitimate) violence" (my translation; ...ein auf das Mittel der legitimen (das heißt: als legitim angesehenen) Gewaltsamkeit gestütztes Herrschaftsverhältnis von Menschen über Menschen; MWG I/17, pp. 159–160 [B 5]); if it is to exist, the dominated must submit to the authority claimed by those who dominate. He goes on to ask: "When and why do they do this?" (my translation; Wann und warum tun sie das?) "On what inner grounds of justification, and on what external means, does this domination rest?" (my translation; Auf welche inneren Rechtfertigungsgründe und auf welche äußeren Mittel stützt sich diese Herrschaft?) He says that "of the inner justifications, that is, of the grounds of legitimacy of a domination, there are ... in principle three" (my translation; Es gibt der inneren Rechtfertigungen, also: der Legitimitätsgründe einer Herrschaft ... im Prinzip drei): "first, the authority of the 'eternal yesterday'" (my translation; Einmal die Autorität des „ewig Gestrigen“); "then: the authority of the extraordinary personal gift of grace (charisma)" (my translation; Dann: die Autorität der außeralltäglichen persönlichen Gnadengabe (Charisma)); "finally: domination by virtue of 'legality,' by virtue of belief in the validity of legal statute" (my translation; Endlich: Herrschaft kraft „Legalität“, kraft des Glaubens an die Geltung legaler Satzung; all of the above p. 160 [B 5]; all from the digital critical edition of the Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe, Bavarian Academy of Sciences; tier A). "Legality" here renders Legalität, conformity to enacted statute; it is a different thing from the "legitimacy" of the Power Theory sentence above, which is the claim to legitimacy. He calls these three the pure types (p. 161).
The common question is: on what grounds a domination stands. The two do not ask the same thing. What Weber asks here is on what grounds, empirically, the dominated obey: what they take as the ground on which those who dominate have the right to command; the phrase "regarded as legitimate" is in his very definition. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (hereafter SEP) reads him this way: for Weber, obedience comes from accepting a command as a valid norm, and the claim of those who dominate is accepted only when it fits the political morality of the place; in the entry's view, domination as he means it has a factual side and also a side of justification (per SEP, "Max Weber," §6.1; tier C). What this series asks is legitimacy in the normative sense: on what grounds a government's acts may normatively be so, and how they are open to questioning. Power Theory Paper 0 has already conversed with Weber's typology of legitimacy (§IV.2), reading legitimacy as a narrative configuration of the source-claim; here this paper only points back to it.
So what is obtained here is only a division of scope, not a refutation: Weber does not use the belief of the dominated to prove a domination legitimate, and this series does not say that he asked the wrong question. The two meet at the third ground: belief in the validity of legal statute can make people obey; on what grounds the statute may normatively be so, that belief does not answer; the latter is what this series has to write.
Pointing back: Hart. Hart places the validity of law in a social fact, officials' acceptance of the rule of recognition, and separates it from the law's moral merit; the Law Series has already conversed with him, and there it does not make this separation (Law Series Supplement §3). What this section separates when it separates validity from legitimacy is the address of answering, not Hart's social-fact account, and it does not alter the Law Series' non-separation in the genesis of law; the relation between the two is registered in Paper 1, §7, not adjudicated.
§5 Not the Source of Basic Rights
A government is not the source of basic rights, nor the only party that may not violate them.
Of a basic right, Rights Theory says that "it comes from one's own law, is ontologically prior"; the recognition it presupposes is of the restraint type, "the others' forbearance from violation," and it does not need to be constituted by anyone (Rights Theory P1 F2). Institution Theory says: "basic rights are not newly made by the institution" (Institution Theory Z17). That basic rights may not be violated is derived from the subject's side, so it holds alike against individuals, against constructs and against governments. The ought toward constructs Institution Theory has already established: the first, the construct's acts cross no line (Z9); the second, guarding the lines between internal subjects, under which securing basic rights falls (Z15). This series takes it over, does not establish it, and does not write it as an undertaking peculiar to government. What is peculiar to government in this half is only backing and enforcement: the core does not move, but the backing can be hollowed out (Paper 3, G18).
What is peculiar to government lies in the other half: guaranteeing the recognition-based rights it has embedded for its internal subjects. "Peculiar" means that in this series this undertaking is established only for government; it does not assert that other constructs owe nothing at all for the positions they have embedded (Paper 3, G17). Rights Theory says: "Recognition-based rights sit with power on the two sides of the T5 seam" (Rights Theory P1 F2): of one and the same seam, "read from the side of exertion it is power, read from the side of the subject's position it is a recognition-based right" (the Rights Theory Prequel, §III; see also Rights Theory P1 §II). A government holds the power side of the seam; if it does not let the rights side operate, the position is de-righted, "the position degenerating into sheer force" (Rights Theory P3 F11). The structure gives only this reading, not the ought. The ought is established by this series: guaranteeing the recognition-based rights embedded is a normative undertaking newly added on the government's side; it adds no sixth heading, and is organized into the first, second and fifth oughts of Institution Theory. The ways of guaranteeing are three: no de-righting; no empty shell; withdrawal or amendment made in public and open to questioning.
This undertaking is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of a government's power: without the guarantee, the power is illegitimate at that point, that is, it must be questioned, must be explained, must be corrected. It is not a sufficient condition: with the guarantee, the power is not thereby legitimate. This section only declares this; it is proved in Paper 3, G17, G19 and G22.
§6 Neither a Design Manual nor a Handbook of Judgment
This series is not a design manual. It writes which functions must be carried by someone; it does not prescribe which form alone may carry them. F6 says: "The separation of powers taken here is one implementation of that function, not the only one." (F6 §3.1b)
Conditions narrow the forms. In this series the multi-branch separation of powers is written as functions: rule-making, execution and checking are not held by one and the same position, and checking is independent of the party checked; what is counted is functions and independent checking positions, not agencies; no constitutional form is fixed. The threshold lies in conditions, not in head count: holding compulsion, where neither exit nor outer-layer routes can carry the day-to-day check on it. That the strong form is taken from the city level up, and that a residential complex enforcing its own covenant reaches the threshold, are this series' normative undertaking (a practical judgment), not a factual assertion about cities in general; those conditions are the reasons for and the explanation of this undertaking, not antecedents to be verified case by case beforehand: it is read by level, not checked city by city; "the city level" is drawn by function, and a town that makes its own rules and itself enforces compulsion is included. Where the separation of powers may be weak, openness to questioning is not. This paragraph only declares this; it is proved in Paper 4, G26. "No form is fixed" means that no form is fixed in advance on the conditions' behalf, not that the conditions cannot fix one.
Nor is this series a handbook of judgment. Action Theory says: "Judgment cannot be done by rules in anyone's place: rules, facts, reasons and feelings can all enter a judgment, yet applying, weighing and taking up remain the work of the one who judges." (Action Theory Paper 1, D6) So no rulebook that could stand in for judgment can be given here: not because it is unfinished, but because by D6 it cannot be written; the other kind, one that teaches judgment, this series does not write either (Paper 6, §8). It does not complete case judgments in place of officeholders; what it writes is to whom public judgments must answer as they are made, carried out and corrected. Action Theory has publicly reassigned to the Critiques the standing to pass a verdict on another's case and claim his assent (the Action Theory Prequel, §5 (V-4)); that standing, and the standards of good judgment, both belong to the critique of judgment, and this series does not take them up.
§7 What Kind of Construct a Government Is
The government this series speaks of is a construct of governance that takes a stretch of territory as its jurisdiction, continuously makes and carries out decisions on the public matters within it, and is carried by public positions through which people come and go. A government is one kind of construct, and the five oughts of Institution Theory fall on it whole; this series does not re-establish them, does not discount them, and adds no sixth heading.
It has several features: a jurisdiction; public decision and carrying out; standing positions, with persons coming and going; constructs above constructs, divided into levels; exit at a cost; the need for public finance. Holding compulsion is not a condition of entry but a condition of heightened scrutiny: whatever holds compulsion must further go through the proof-task chain of Paper 2 and be checked against the separation-of-powers threshold of Paper 4.
Every level of government is included: the residential complex, included by the public decision-making and carrying-out functions it actually carries; the city, the county, the state; and internal governance at the national level. In the Orchard Court residential complex, the owners' assembly passes a covenant, and the owners' committee makes decisions to enforce it: by these functions the complex counts as a government in this series' sense. When the property-management company, following the covenant and under the owners' committee's instructions, carries out suspensions and fines, this counts as the complex enforcing its own covenant; when it provides property-management services under the service contract and collects the service fee from the owners' committee, it is a construct, not a government (Paper 4, §4). Dealings among neighbors are not included. The outward face at the national level, borders and membership, and war go to the Theory of the State.
Jurisdiction and interior are kept apart. A jurisdiction is a stretch of territory where decisions and compulsion land. The interior is drawn by entanglement, not by identity: "those in the entanglement the construct handles, together with those its acts reach who have no way to avoid it by exiting, make up the interior" (Institution Theory Z4). What Apple City releases into the river flows down to the town of Willow Ferry; the people of Willow Ferry are not in Apple City's jurisdiction, yet they may be in its interior; reach of influence is not reach of authority (Paper 4, G25). Cross-jurisdictional spillover within one state is taken up in Paper 4, and does not go to the Theory of the State.
Conditions must be read again level by level: "All institutional differences derive entirely from differences in conditions, not from differences in premises." (F6 §3.1); at the layer of the nation-state, "Exit is constrained, so the check of voting with one's feet fails and the check must come from elsewhere" (F6 §3.1b). A conclusion at the national level is not carried over as it stands to a city, nor a city's to a residential complex; exit and outer-layer routes at each level are read as they actually are (Paper 4, G27).
Those who sit in these positions and judge in them this series calls officeholders. "Officeholders" means everyone who holds a public position and judges in it, the front line included: the mayor who signs an ordinance is one, and so are the permit examiner who approves a stall permit, the patrol officer who rushes to Levee Street at night, and the social worker who takes a child away that same night. To officeholders this series writes no ought; their positions hold accountability (§2).
§8 How This Series Speaks
The conventions of the whole series are set out here; the introductions of the later papers keep only the sentence "Conventions follow the Prequel, §8."
The main line. Taken together, the whole series is one sentence:
Toward its internal subjects, a government holds to anti-colonization and strives for cultivation; its judgments cross no line, must be explained, and remain open to questioning.
"Its judgments" means the judgments that are made through positions and take effect in the government's name (§1). "Cross no line" speaks of this act; it writes no ought for the own judgment of the person who sits in the position. The first half follows the main line of Institution Theory; the second half is this series' own sentence: "cross no line" takes up the first ought, and "must be explained" and "remain open to questioning" take up the fifth, landing them on a government's judgments.
Holding to. This series groups under "holding to" the things that are not discounted for lack of resources and do not stop in an emergency:
- The first and second oughts of Institution Theory. The construct's acts cross no line against any internal subject, and "it does not vary with relational thickness and is not discounted under any condition" (Institution Theory Z9); it guards the lines between internal subjects, and the way it guards must itself be a limit (Institution Theory Z15, Z19). That basic rights may not be violated lies within this, and holds against anyone (§5). The limits of substitute exercise, by way of Paper 2, G13, are also here (Paper 2, G12a).
- The "not sealing the channels" half of the fourth: "without variation, not sealing the channels of refusing, revising, exiting and changing direction" (Institution Theory Z28).
- The channel of being questioned under the fifth. The main-line sentence of Institution Theory says "it itself remains open to questioning" (Institution Theory Z8); "what cannot be withdrawn is the conditions of being questioned and of explaining" (Institution Theory Paper 1, §8); "structures can change, but the three conditions cannot be withdrawn" (Institution Theory Z37). Every government, whatever its size, ought to be open to questioning; the separation of powers may weaken with conditions, but this does not (Paper 4, G26; Paper 6, G35).
- The ways of guaranteeing recognition-based rights: no de-righting, no empty shell, withdrawal or amendment made in public and open to questioning (Paper 3, G19). This one is peculiar to government (§5).
The guarantee of both kinds of rights can also be understood as part of anti-colonization: both lie on the side of holding to, not on the side of striving for (Paper 3, §1). What is held to is these ways, not the continued existence of every embedded position (Paper 3, G19).
Same-word note: "holding to." This grouping is wider than Institution Theory's, and is undertaken by this series. In Institution Theory Paper 1, §8, "holding to" covers only the first two: "'Holding to' names the first two oughts"; the fifth appears there separately, in the main-line sentence, as "open to questioning." On relational thickness, the Institution Theory Prequel has already said: "The first and fifth oughts, the 'not sealing the channels' half of the fourth, and the trigger of the second do not vary with it; the means of the second are bounded by authority, not by relational thickness" (the Institution Theory Prequel, §7). On resources, Institution Theory Paper 1, §8 says: "This series grants that in practice an ought may not be achieved, and does not on that account withdraw or discount any of them"; this sentence governs all five, without dividing holding to from striving for. This series places the conditions on the striving-for side on the side that can be prioritized; this division is undertaken by this series (Paper 3, G24). Extending the grouped items to the condition of emergency is also undertaken by this series (Paper 5, G30). Wherever the papers say "holds to," it is in this wider sense, and it is not presented as Institution Theory's own sense.
Striving for. Striving for is Institution Theory's third ought, together with the "leaving room" half of the fourth: providing conditions for the cultivation of internal subjects according to relational thickness, and leaving room for cultivation between them. It is concerned with conditions, not with outcomes; "concerned with conditions" does not cancel the requirement that the conditions be actually usable. Relational thickness is read from structure; it is not computed by proxy from administrative level or geographic distance, and it is not conflated with the thickness of law, the thickness of provisions or the thickness of accountability (Paper 4, G27, G29).
"Colonization" in the narrow sense. When this series says "colonization," it takes the narrow sense Rights Theory gives the word: "colonization is a boundary-crossing disguised as cultivation" (Rights Theory P6 F26; Institution Theory Paper 1, §8). So the line that "holding to" keeps is wider than "colonization": line-crossings that do not pose as cultivation are also within the first and second oughts. The reason for taking the narrow sense is already written in Institution Theory Paper 1, §8: anti-colonization is itself an act of the construct, governed by the first ought; taken broadly, the construct would have to police influence between persons that already lies within the line, and would itself be the first to cross the line. Habermas also speaks of "colonization," meaning the intrusion of the system into the lifeworld: the same name for a different thing; Institution Theory Paper 0 has already conversed with him (§4.1); here this paper only points back to it.
Sentence forms. See §2: to the construct, ought and limit; to the slot in which it is converged, and to positions, accountability; to persons no ought is written, only their own law; so nowhere does the series write "the government's duty." Accountability binds the position, not the person; once the registration is exited, it is no longer held (On Accountability F38). A government's ought lands on positions only by way of accountability. When it lands on a position held by a person, it must pass the gate that On Accountability sets up, and must also stay within Rights Theory's line (Rights Theory P5 F21). That gate "governs only subject bearers": the person who holds the position "must be preserved as a subject position able to answer, to refuse, and to revoke the registration" (On Accountability F53); on the side where a construct is the bearer, "On the construct side this gate does not apply: whether its accountability stands and continues is checked against F47's conditions of application" (F53).
Specific theories of institutions. Institution Theory says that the Theory of Government is one of the specific theories of institutions (the Institution Theory Prequel, §6). When this series says "specific theories of institutions," it means the specific theories of institutions other than the Theory of Government, together with the design of a particular department or a particular procedure within a government. What this series hands on, it does not hand back to itself.
Extension and own undertaking. Wherever an upstream item's subject term, object, scale, modality, time domain or layer of attribution differs in any one respect from this series' use, the text states on the spot its original range and the new use, marks it "(extension; own undertaking)" or "this step is undertaken by this series," and gives the grounds; a derivation the upstream does not have and this series completes itself is marked "(own undertaking)." Where the upstream has a strong and a weak form of one and the same thing, this series takes the weak form by default and leaves the strong form to the Theory of the State; "one and the same thing" means that subject term, object, premises and matter are all the same, and only the strength of the demand differs. Taking the weak form governs only how structures, arrangements, conditions of continuance and the striving-for side are taken; the items under "holding to" are not reduced on that account: "what is held to is the ought, not a particular structure" (Institution Theory Z22). Leaving the strong form to the Theory of the State is a division of work; it does not mean that the Theory of the State has already obtained its proof. The one place where the strong form is expressly taken is the multi-branch separation of powers, from the city level up (Paper 4, G26).
"Open to questioning" and "must be questioned." "Open to questioning" means that the channel is always open, for every government and at every time. "Must be questioned" means that a verified lapse owes an explanation and a correction. The two are not mixed: being questioned is in itself no evidence of illegitimacy, and providing a channel is no certificate of repair. This series undertakes one sentence (Paper 1, §8, G7): a government can never be perfect, so being questioned is the normal state, not the exception; a claim to perfection is itself a place where questioning is due.
Interfacing in place. Wherever a judgment lands, there it interfaces with the tradition. The method follows the four steps of Institution Theory Paper 0, §2.1: first, a common question that can be checked is sought; next, whether the two speak of the same thing; next, how far the agreement goes and where they part; where necessary, the strongest objection from the other side is drafted, marked "drafted by this paper," and replied to. "Some exchanges reach only 'that is not among the objects of this series'; that states a division of labor, not a completed objection and reply" (ibid.); what obtains only a division of scope is not written up as a refutation. What has already been conversed with is pointed back to by topic, and accounts are not closed by name: Weber in §4 of this paper and Weber at the end of Paper 1 are two topics. The other party's life is not recounted, and no argument rests on the other party's authority; interfacing serves only as concurrence or contrast, and does not by itself supply a normative ground for this series. At the end of a paper a separate section may be devoted to one principal interlocutor.
The four tiers of sources. Outside texts are cited in four tiers, following Action Theory Paper 0, §2.4: tier A, the sentence and its location have been confirmed in a reliable original, and it is quoted as it stands; tier B, the original is in hand, but the exact location or the exact wording has not been confirmed, and it is quoted, with what is unconfirmed noted; tier C, confirmed only through reliable secondary literature, and it is only paraphrased, without quotation marks, with what it rests on stated; tier D, could not be confirmed, and it is not cited. The edition and tier of each item are given in each paper's audit table.
Quotation marks and addresses. Upstream sentences are quoted word for word from the published English of the work quoted, in double quotation marks. Works not written in English are quoted in my translation, with the original in parentheses; works written in English, or quoted from a public-domain English translation, are quoted as they stand. What fictional persons and institutional documents say is also put in double quotation marks. Where an upstream sentence carries dimension numbers, only the part without them is quoted, or it is paraphrased; proposition numbers, section numbers and the names of seams are quoted as they stand. Inside a quotation, the original's double quotation marks become single, and no word is changed. Upstream works are always cited by paper and by section or proposition number; the section of the first version of F6 is cited, each time, as "F6 v1 §2.4 (withdrawn; the author has ruled that its place is the Theory of Government)."
Apple City. One fictional city runs through the whole series: Apple City, together with the state it lies in, a neighboring town downstream, and a residential complex within the city. The city may call a metropolis to mind; this series borrows only the configuration "metropolis, state, multiple levels of government," borrows no facts of any real place, and cites no real events, for the same reason that F6 set its appendix on the nation-state layer on a fictional continent: "so as to assert nothing about any actual state" (F6, the introduction to the Appendices). Real cases are left to essays. Persons are given only by office, never by name. The facts in every paper follow one shared case file, the Apple City Case File. An example states three things before any conclusion: whom it concerns, which line is at stake, and what the baseline is; when it is used again, only new facts are added. A counterfactual branch is introduced with "Suppose that," and is not mixed with the fixed facts.
No Paper 0. Unlike Action Theory and Institution Theory, this series has no Paper 0. The reason lies in its subject term: the subject term of this series is judgment. On what grounds, what for, what to do: these can be stated within the system in advance; judgment cannot, for it has to converse with the tradition where it lands. So interfacing goes where judgment lands. SAE Judgment and Aesthetics, on its side, works the same way: no Paper 0; each paper interfaces directly with the tradition, and at the end of Judgment and Aesthetics there is a separate section, "To Kant." The settlement of the accounts received from upstream is in this paper (§9); the handovers downstream, and where this series stops, are in Paper 6, §8 and its Interfaces.
§9 What Has Been Received, and What This Series Will Not Do for the Reader
The accounts received from upstream. The table below gives the source, what was handed over, where this series takes it up, and to whom the rest goes. "Where this series takes it up" gives the place where the text actually takes it up; where the text takes it up by function without naming the item, it is marked "taken up by function." An address being fixed is not the same as being settled. The original sentences and the verification of each item are in the accompanying audit table.
| Source | What was handed over | Where this series takes it up | The rest goes to |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Institution Theory Prequel, §6 | How to do it; whether it can be done | The whole series | — |
| Institution Theory Paper 1, §8; Paper 0, §10.3 | How to make the transition, and how to attribute responsibility, when it cannot be achieved | Paper 5, G33, G34 | — |
| Institution Theory Paper 3, "Where This Paper Stops" | On what grounds compulsion is warranted | Paper 2 | How procedures are to be designed: specific theories of institutions |
| Institution Theory Paper 4; Paper 0, §5.1 | Which conditions to provide in particular; who makes up the shortfall below the threshold | Paper 3, G24, answered as far as structure | What is given, how it is given, and how the levels share it: specific theories of institutions |
| Institution Theory Paper 6, Interfaces; Paper 0, §4.2 | Compulsion, authorization and the final bearer; how the channel of questioning is set up, and whether it is democratic | Paper 2; Paper 6, G35–G37, G40, whether it is democratic being answered at the layer of structure | The design of channels and of election, recall and oversight: specific theories of institutions (as Institution Theory Paper 6's Interfaces had already handed it) |
| Institution Theory Paper 0, §11, the fourth slot, item 1 (research candidate) | Control within the line | Taken on: posed in Paper 1, G5; answered in Paper 6, G36a (see below) | See below |
| Value Theory P3 V38 and §VIII; The Second Critique, Appendix II, Ch. 6 §7 | What duties a guardian network bears at a subject-to-be (sent to the practical critique; registered by The Second Critique as no address yet) | Taken on: the slot that belongs to the government as a construct, limited to the subject-to-be branch; answered in Paper 2, G12a (see below) | See below |
| The Institution Theory Prequel, §8; Institution Theory Paper 2; Institution Theory Paper 5 | Test items for the three classes of institutional marker; how heavy accountability should be, how much should rest on one position, how relational slots are to be set; how mentoring and peer appraisal are to be designed | Not taken up (mentoring and peer appraisal are not peculiar to government) | Specific theories of institutions |
| Action Theory Paper 0, §9.4, first item; Action Theory Paper 9, Conclusion | The institutional side of guarding: what kind of institutions can guard mutual recognition already formed | Taken up by function: Paper 2 (compulsion itself must be a limit; protect first), Paper 3 (guarantee), establishing functions only | The details of arrangements: specific theories of institutions |
| Action Theory Paper 0, §9.4, second item | Who questions power, and whether there is a final bearer | Paper 6, G35, G36 | — |
| Action Theory Paper 0, §9.4, third item; On Accountability, Reserved item three; F6 §7, fourth open question | Exit given on paper and sealed off in fact; artificial exit cost | Paper 6, G39, taking up only whether it is actually usable | The design of protective arrangements, and how exit cost is to be lowered: specific theories of institutions |
| Action Theory Paper 0, §3.2 | How power that treats persons as means is to be constrained at the institutional level | Taken up by function: Paper 2 (G9 to G13), Paper 3 (G19) | Particular arrangements of constraint: specific theories of institutions |
| The Second Critique, Ch. 6 §4, §7 | Harm beyond the overlap is carried by external constructs, and "To hand something to a construct is not to have proved that the construct is legitimate or effective"; reassigned to Institution Theory and the Theory of Government | Compulsion: Paper 2 (G10, as concurring); the operation of securing (Paper 3) and the check (Papers 4 and 6), taken up by function | "and perhaps another critique in the future" (Ch. 6 §4): not scheduled in advance |
| F6 v1 §2.4 (withdrawn; the author has ruled that its place is the Theory of Government) | The ontological boundary of institutional coercive force | Paper 2, G9, G10, G12, re-established by this series | — |
| F6 §7, first open question | AI as a participant in institutions | Paper 1, G8, taking up only the side of tools and contracting | The qualification to participate: expressly left, not answered |
| F6 §7, fifth open question; On Accountability, Reserved item one | The excess accountability of high-power positions; the quantity of accountability | Paper 1, G2 and Paper 6, G36 take up only that bearing is booked by position; the "excess" side the text does not treat | The quantity and gradient of accountability: specific theories of institutions; On Accountability says that "that is a matter of experience, not an inference from a definition" (F55) |
| Moral Law P9 §1.1, §1.2, §9.3; War Treatise §18 | War; wartime structures dismantled after the war on one's own initiative | War not taken up; Paper 5, G31 takes the weak form of Institution Theory's structures of guarding | War and the strong form: the Theory of the State |
Two differences in restatement. One concerns exit. Action Theory Paper 0 says that the concern with exit given in form but sealed off in fact "has already been handed over from On Accountability to the Theory of Government" (Action Theory Paper 0, §9.4, third item); the original of On Accountability's Reserved item three says only that it is left to "the later papers that handle that layer expressly," and what it hands on is only the half that concerns the design of protective arrangements. Institution Theory Paper 0 has already registered this reading (§10.2). This series follows it; it does not reconcile the two sides on their behalf, nor does it rule the difference in scope a voiding of the reassignment.
The other concerns The Second Critique. Its first version publicly reassigned the institutional layer beyond the overlap to Institution Theory and the Theory of Government (Ch. 6 §7); Institution Theory Paper 0 did not register this reassignment. This series takes up its "Theory of Government" half, divided as in the table above; what it says, "and perhaps another critique in the future" (Ch. 6 §4), is not scheduled in advance.
The two slots taken on. The two slots below were not handed to the Theory of Government by name upstream; this series has taken them on. How far each is answered is registered as in Paper 6, §8 and G41, and not one step further.
One is "control within the line." Institution Theory Paper 0 lists it as a research candidate: "The line is not crossed and the channel is there: do those affected have actual control over the relevant power? Wide discretion within authority is one instance." (Institution Theory Paper 0, §11, the fourth slot) Paper 1 poses the question on the Levee Street case (G5), and Paper 6 answers it (G36a). What is answered is this. The functions of control fall into four candidates: reversal, rectification and reopening the agenda; revocation of authorization; exit; and interruption. For each, it must be possible to say who can activate it, on what it has actual efficacy, and how the party questioned cannot cancel it on its own. For reversal, the three things have been laid out on one case (whether the procedure can be withdrawn, and whether there will be retaliation, are marked as not set); revocation of authorization and exit have each been walked through once on a case; interruption has been given a structural position (the voting-position), and on Paper 6's restricted sense its own efficacy would have to fall on reasons or rules, which Paper 6 has not found. How control connects with the three conditions of the channel (the question left by Institution Theory Paper 0, §11, the sixth slot, item 2, and answered in Paper 6, §2) is written as an extension within the fifth ought (extension; own undertaking), and whether this is sufficient has not been judged. By Paper 6, G36a's own standard, rectification, reopening the agenda and interruption remain nominal in Paper 6. What is not proved: whether the four are exhaustive; beyond the requirement that a public grant retain revocability (Paper 6, G37) and that the confirmation and termination of an emergency not be monopolized by the party taking the measures (Paper 5, G32), which of these every level and kind of decision must at least have; the scale of control; and whether a further ought should be established beyond the fifth (Paper 6, §8, the first of the six slots). Nor does this series certify that any actual government has achieved this.
The other is the slot within "the guardian network" that belongs to the government as a construct. Value Theory sent "what obligations a guardian network bears at a subject-to-be" to the practical critique (Value Theory P3 §VIII; see also V38). What The Second Critique actually registers is this: if what is asked is an ought addressed to the guardian, "it is lateral and is not discussed"; the inside-out face falls within the own law of whoever has adopted, and The Second Critique writes expressly that "this is a reading, not a delivery taken on Value Theory's behalf"; of the three items listed in that sentence of Value Theory P3 §VIII, "the other two belong to the group and institutional layer, no address yet," and the guardian network is one of them (The Second Critique, Ch. 5 §3, Appendix II; Ch. 6 §7). This series takes on only the slot within it that belongs to the government as a construct, and only the subject-to-be branch: what the upstream sent out is guardianship at a subject-to-be. The upstream asks what duty is borne; this series does not write duties, and answers in its own sentence forms the part that falls in the government's slot: to the construct, ought and limit; to the positions within the construct, accountability (§8). Paper 2 answers it (G12a), as far as entry into the slot of substitute exercise, the three items to be proved, and the root and the limits. The branch of those whose gate already self-exercises but who for a time cannot exercise it themselves is one this series has further derived from upstream (extension; own undertaking), and it is not within what this series has taken on. This series does not take on the guardian's personal ought; it does not close, on the Critiques' behalf, the item of what duty the guardian network as a whole bears; and where it cannot be judged whether a state can be recovered from, Paper 2 does not judge.
What this series will not do for the reader. There are three things this series will not do for the reader. It does not write how to achieve anything, and it does not teach judgment: no remediation checklist can be given here, no constitution, and no account of "what good judgment looks like." It does not write oughts for persons: how a person ought to be is his own law; an officeholder is a person too, and this series says accountability to his position and writes no ought for him as a person; how one person is to treat another goes to the Critiques. It does not judge, on the reader's behalf, the government the reader lives under: the main-line sentence is a ruler; where to measure, how, and what the measurement shows rest with the reader; and "a government can never be perfect" is not a verdict on any actual government.
What this series gives the reader is only this ruler; whether to take it up and ask, and whom to ask, is the reader's own affair.
Papers
- Prequel: What a Government Is Not (this paper)
- Paper 1: Judgment
- Paper 2: Compulsion
- Paper 3: Guarantee
- Paper 4: Levels
- Paper 5: Emergency
- Paper 6: Questioning and Bearing (including the close of the whole series)
Seven papers in all; there is no Paper 0 (§8).
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version. The version records used for sentence-by-sentence verification are given in the accompanying audit table.
Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662 (first version, §2.4 since withdrawn; per the version record https://zenodo.org/records/19328663)
Qin, H. (2026). SAE Judgment and Aesthetics: In Tribute to Kant [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19296710
Qin, H. (2026). What an Institution Is Not (SAE Institution Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269330
Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Guarding the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270766
Qin, H. (2026). Conditions (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270922
Qin, H. (2026). Between One Another (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271072
Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
Qin, H. (2026). Institution Theory and the Tradition: The Address of the Ought (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23272468
Qin, H. (2026). What Action Is Not (SAE Action Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970747
Qin, H. (2026). Not Doing and Cannot-Not-Doing (SAE Action Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970752
Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Share of Strength, and Guarding (SAE Action Theory, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970787
Qin, H. (2026). The Place of Judgment (SAE Action Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22974154
Qin, H. (2026). What Rights Are Not (SAE Rights Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20726894
Qin, H. (2026). On How Rights Presuppose No Duty (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21285136
Qin, H. (2026). On the Source and Spectrum of Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20743135
Qin, H. (2026). The Constitution and Withdrawal of Recognition-Based Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20993658
Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595
Qin, H. (2026). On the Cultivation and Diachronic Unfolding of Rights (SAE Rights Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21252863
Qin, H. (2026). On Rights and Entitlements (SAE Rights Theory, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21314907
Qin, H. (2026). On Accountability · Wei (SAE Rights Theory, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853810
Qin, H. (2026). What Power Is Not · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20368866
Qin, H. (2026). The Power Machine and Its Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20707047
Qin, H. (2026). On the Origin of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20370224
Qin, H. (2026). On the Morphology of Power · Shi (SAE Power Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20455221
Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628
Qin, H. (2026). One's Law Meets One's Law: The Structural Origin of Law from 14DD Showdown (SAE Law Series, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19548237
Qin, H. (2026). National Law — Azeroth: A Negative Thought Experiment on the Structural Necessity of Law (SAE Law Series, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19548596
Qin, H. (2026). A Posterior Dialogue with Western Jurisprudence (SAE Law Series, Supplement) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19551526
Qin, H. (2026). On the Colonization of Value (SAE Value Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21611154
Qin, H. (2026). SAE: The Second Critique [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23250387
Qin, H. (2026). The Institutional Architecture of Mixed Reality: The Phase-Transition Evolution of Cultivation and Colonization (SAE Moral Law, Paper 9) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20262737
Qin, H. (2026). SAE War Treatise: How Cultivation Is Not Swallowed by War Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19656617
Weber, M. (1992). Politik als Beruf. In W. J. Mommsen & W. Schluchter (eds.), Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe I/17. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Digital critical edition: https://mwg-digital.badw.de/de/politik-als-beruf/
Kim, S. H. Max Weber. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published 24 August 2007; substantive revision 21 September 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/ (accessed 2026-10-10)
Interfaces
- Main upstream: Institution Theory (the Prequel, §§1, 6, 7, 8; Paper 1, Z4, Z7a, Z8 and §8; Paper 2, Z9; Paper 3, Z15, Z17, Z19, Z22 and "Where This Paper Stops"; Paper 4 (the hand-over listed in §9); Paper 5, Z28, Z31; Paper 6, Z37, Z39; Paper 0, §2.1, §4.2, §5.1, §10.2 and §10.3, §11, the fourth and sixth slots); F6, How Is Institution Possible (§2.1, Premise I; §3.1; §3.1b; §7; the introduction to the Appendices); F6 v1 §2.4 (withdrawn; the author has ruled that its place is the Theory of Government); Action Theory (Paper 1, D5, D6; the Prequel, §5 (V-4); Paper 0, §2.4, §3.2, §9.4; Paper 9, Conclusion).
- Also used: Rights Theory (the Prequel, §III; Paper 0, M1, M4; P1 F2; P3 F10, F11; P5 F21; P6 F26); On Rights and Entitlements (named in the Introduction); On Accountability · Wei (F36–F39, F53, F55; Reserved items one and three); Power Theory (the Prequel, §IV; Paper 0, §IV.2; P1 T2; P2 §V.3); Conflict Treatise §24; Law Series P1 §5.1, BL3; Law Series P3 §5.1, §5.3; Value Theory P3 V38 and §VIII; The Second Critique (Ch. 5 §3; Ch. 6 §4 and §7; Appendix II); Moral Law P9 §1.1, §1.2, §9.3; War Treatise §18; SAE Judgment and Aesthetics (the section "To Kant," only as a precedent of convention).
- Interfacing: Weber (the three inner grounds of legitimate domination, §4; MWG I/17, pp. 159–161, tier A; SEP §6.1, tier C). Pointing back: Kant (ends and means, the Kingdom of Ends: Institution Theory Paper 0, §3.1); Hohfeld (Law Series Supplement §6); Rousseau (Law Series Supplement §7); Hart (Law Series Supplement §3); Habermas (the colonization of the lifeworld, the same name for a different thing: Institution Theory Paper 0, §4.1).
- This series: Papers 1 through 6. It takes on "control within the line," posed in Paper 1, G5 and answered in Paper 6, G36a; it takes on the slot within "the guardian network" that belongs to the government as a construct, limited to the subject-to-be branch, answered in Paper 2, G12a; both slots are registered in §9, and how far each is answered is as Paper 6, G41 states.
- Handed to Paper 1: what a government is not has been cleared away; how it judges in particular situations begins in Paper 1.