Self-as-an-End
SAE Theory of Disciplines · Paper 1

Parochialism
本位

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24177748 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

The Prequel said that a discipline is not an end. This paper says what parochialism is: a discipline has a construct but does not acknowledge its remainder. It opens with three rule texts side by side: a boundary on the responsibilities of research ethics committees in a United States federal regulation; a provisional report of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry on group 3 of the periodic table; and a European Commission decision on a formal objection. How far each text can take the argument is settled separately later. The establishment of a discipline is a construct, a means; its boundary is the division it draws and maintains, and its purpose is the further development of scholarship (S1). Division leaves a remainder; this is the normal state of things, not a fault (S2). Parochialism is having a construct while not acknowledging its remainder; at the normative layer, the criterion is that a construct is registered as complete. The paper offers a chain for checking this from public records, as a suggested practice, then three contrasts, and real examples from several disciplines of remainders being acknowledged. In the public records this series has examined, no instance with all four steps was found, and the paper says so plainly (S3). One form of parochialism is refusing to take up a question on the grounds that the boundary must be preserved (S4). Normative questioning can be moved outside the boundary by professional affiliation (S5). The logical starting point of parochialism is not the division into disciplines but treating that division as an end (S6). When results come, a claim can be out of reach, or it can escape; escape is what parochialism looks like at the level of theory (S7). Finally, this series does not hold to parochialism itself, and its own rules of evidence have a remainder (S8). Eight propositions in all (S1 to S8), stated at the end of each section and listed together at the end.

Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.

Introduction

Start with three documents.

The first is a provision on research ethics review in a United States federal regulation. When an ethics review board (IRB) approves research involving human subjects, it must judge whether the risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits. The text then says:

"The IRB should not consider possible long-range effects of applying knowledge gained in the research (e.g., the possible effects of the research on public policy) as among those research risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility." (45 CFR 46.111(a)(2))

This is a clearly written boundary on the responsibilities of a review seat. The text does not name another position to receive questions of this kind.

The second comes from chemistry. Which elements belong in group 3 of the periodic table, below scandium and yttrium, lanthanum and actinium, or lutetium and lawrencium, has been argued over by chemists for decades. The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) set up a project on it. The working group's provisional report says that they concluded "there is no objective means to adjudicate" the matter; that any resolution must grant the scientific community here "a certain degree of conventionality, or choice"; and the report also asks members of IUPAC and other readers for comment (Scerri 2021). IUPAC's current periodic table page still says that the question "has been debated from time to time" (IUPAC, periodic table page). The party that writes the standard has registered the point it cannot settle.

The third comes from the European Union. A harmonised standard for steel storage tanks (EN 12285-2:2005) had its reference published in the Official Journal, so that products made to it were presumed to conform to the relevant requirements. A member state raised a formal objection to the standard, including claims about how such tanks are installed and used. The Commission found that this part of the objection was "inadmissible in the context of formal objections," and would not be taken up in that procedure; the same decision states that member states may prohibit or restrict the installation and use of such tanks (Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1996, recitals 8 and 11).

The three texts are set together not to compare who does better. Each shows something different: how rules mark the boundary of a power, and how an unresolved dispute can be kept on the record. How far each can take the argument is settled later. The first says "this is not handled here" without saying "who handles it"; the second registers the dispute; the third declines to take something up and states that the power lies elsewhere. What the first shows is a checkable form that this paper is concerned with; whether it is parochialism is checked separately by the criterion and checking practice of §3. Stanford University set up an additional Ethics and Society Review, which makes possible risks of research to society a precondition for funding applications (Bernstein et al. 2021), and so takes up part of the kind of question the first text leaves aside. That is a supplementary arrangement; it does not change how the federal regulation itself is written.

The first document concerns research that acts on persons, the second domain in the Prequel's terms. This paper covers every discipline; it opens with that document because its wording is the clearest.

The question of this paper is: when does a discipline that has a construct fail to acknowledge its remainder; what does that look like in institutions; and how can it be told apart from ordinary refusal and ordinary retention. The reading follows the Prequel. §1 says that the establishment draws divisions; §2, that division leaves a remainder; §3, parochialism and its criterion; §4, parochialism keeping questioning outside the boundary; §5 looks at the problem side in the literature of several disciplines; §6 says how normative questioning is moved outside the boundary; §7, how parochialism begins; §8 separates being out of reach from escape; §9 says that this series itself does not hold to parochialism.


§1 The Establishment Draws Divisions

The establishment of a discipline is a construct: a body of people, a course of training, a set of journals and societies, a curriculum, a chain of credentials by which people recognize one another as peers. It is stable and repeatable, carried by positions and procedures, and used to handle the same kind of matter again and again. How Is Institution Possible gives such an arrangement institutional identity, and says that this identity carries no endorsement: the name reports that the conditions of establishment are met; "classification issues no legitimacy" (F6 §2.2). To say that the establishment of a discipline is a construct is to say just this much; it is neither better nor worse for it.

A construct is a means. The first premise of How Is Institution Possible says: "Any institution, including the most elegant constitution, is a means, not an end." (F6 §2.1) This paper takes only one sense of the sentence: the establishment of a discipline does not have itself as its end. What is it for? For the further development of scholarship. Development means that a construct can still be chiseled, and that new constructs can be chiseled out of it (Methodology Paper 2, Chapter 5); it does not need a measure of better and worse fixed in advance. Extending the sentence from institutions to the establishment of a discipline is a step of this series (own undertaking).

A discipline's boundary is the division its establishment draws and maintains: which questions count as belonging to the discipline, which methods count, which results can be cited, who counts as a peer. Division as such is not wrong. For a discipline to go deep, something must first hold steady the premises it uses; it is by dividing into fields that each can go far. This series does not oppose the division into disciplines, and does not propose abolishing boundaries.

S1 The establishment is a construct; the boundary is a division. The establishment of a discipline is a construct; it is a means, not an end. A discipline's boundary is the division the establishment draws and maintains. Its purpose is the further development of scholarship: the construct can still be chiseled, and new constructs chiseled out of it. This series does not oppose the division into disciplines and does not propose abolishing boundaries.


§2 Division Leaves a Remainder

Division leaves something behind. The chain of grounds for this sentence is written out in full here.

In the register of The First Critique, the operational postulate says: "this book understands object-cognition as demarcation"; the indestructibility postulate says: "the construct is cognition's one intake of 'this,' and intake must deviate," and the deficit of intake cannot be removed by any treatment (The First Critique, Chapter 4, §2). These two speak of cognition. How Is Institution Possible carried the registration of remainder over into the social order (F6 §2); Institution Theory applied it to the divisions institutions draw, with a restriction: "this generalization governs only this kind of division, and other acts are registered elsewhere" (Institution Theory Z35). The boundary a discipline's establishment draws is exactly this kind of division, made by category and belonging. So this paper takes over the general sentence and extends it to the establishment of a discipline (own undertaking).

That division leaves a remainder is the normal state of things, not a fault. A particular residue has to be recognized from the record, not proved from the postulates alone: the postulates say only "there must be," not "where."

By how a problem arises, two kinds are registered. One kind is what the rules do not cover: phenomena that fall outside the cells of a classification, raised by whoever runs into them. The other kind is produced by the division itself: cut one thing into two fields, and the seam between the two fields is made by that cut; this kind is for the establishment that drew the division to explain. This assignment follows the burden of explanation in Institution Theory Z35. Who raises a problem does not change its kind; the two kinds can also overlap.

Who is inside a standard? By the drawing of Institution Theory Z4: "The interior is drawn by entanglement: those in the entanglement the construct handles, together with those its acts reach who have no way to avoid it by exiting, make up the interior." Only this drawing is taken here; reach of influence is not reach of authority.

S2 Division leaves a remainder. A discipline's boundary divides by category and belonging and leaves its own unaccommodated residue; this is the normal state of things, not a fault. Particular residue is recognized from the record, not proved from the postulates alone. By how problems arise, two kinds are registered: what the rules do not cover, raised by people; what the division itself produces, explained by the establishment that drew it. Who raises a problem does not change its kind, and the two kinds can overlap. Who is inside a standard is drawn by two branches: those in the entanglement it handles, and those its acts reach who cannot avoid it.


§3 Parochialism

The criterion. To define something is itself an operation of non: to mark it off is also to mark off what lies outside it. The problem is not in definition but in what follows it, in taking the definition to be perfect. Then non is used only on others and is not turned back on oneself to ask about one's own remainder. The reflexivity postulate of The First Critique says: "negation can take its own performer and products as objects — tool and object may coincide." Parochialism is performing non without performing reflexivity.

At the normative layer, the criterion is: a construct is registered as complete. The derivation in the Prequel says that registering a construct as complete is filling in, at that point, the position of not-knowing; in its own procedures the construct no longer entertains questioning at that point, and cognition closes there (Prequel §4). To say that this "is a problem" uses the epistemic ought: for a construct whose proper work is cognition, acknowledging its remainder is a condition of its continuing to operate as cognition. This ought presupposes the indestructibility postulate and does not depend on "a human being is an end."

Describe first, then evaluate. A description has to come down to particulars: which premise, in which jurisdiction, at which step. A construct has no first person (F6 §2.3); at the level of an establishment, "not performing reflexivity" is read as there being no position in its arrangements that makes its own divisions the object of questioning. From one refusal it does not follow that an entire body has never turned back on itself.

One way of checking. Parochialism has one form in institutions that can be checked from public records: the chain below. The four steps are a suggested checking practice, and all four must be checkable:

  1. A standard does in fact adopt a premise p, and on that basis classifies, measures, evaluates or decides admission. The objects may be phenomena, instruments, methods, submissions, or persons; p may be a division of objects, a definition of measurement, a criterion of justification.
  2. Questions directed at p are excluded on grounds of disciplinary belonging, of the existing format of evidence, or of "this is not a technical question."
  3. Within the jurisdiction drawn, no other position that can actually be set in motion, and that can require a response or initiate a review, takes the question up. "Or" is used here deliberately: it is weaker than the joint four conditions of Paper 2, S12; this step serves only for recognition and does not imply an ought to set up these functions. Whether a receiving party that is not independent counts is left to Paper 8.
  4. An earlier review did not in fact deal with this challenge, or the scope its conclusion claims for itself falls short of what it is said to have answered, yet the conclusion continues to be used to register this challenge to p as already answered, and the case is closed on that basis.

Only when all four steps are present is an instance found in this way. If a step is not met or not fully checked, the case is not decided on the remaining steps, nor is it inferred that no other form of parochialism exists. Without step 4, the first three steps recognize "a problem with no position to receive it," which is the failure of seats discussed in Paper 4; on the first three steps alone, this chain does not establish parochialism. Other forms of parochialism, such as refusing on the grounds that the boundary must be preserved (next section), and claims of completeness at the level of rules (below), are checked separately against the criterion. Step 4 is the pushing back that Paper 3 discusses under misrouting.

Checkable forms. The following are materials to look at when checking: intake rules that list "not within this discipline" or "unscientific" as grounds for not taking a question up, without saying to whom it is referred; matters raised and left unanswered that are not registered; a standard's text that writes its own scope of warrant as complete, with no section on "limitations and open matters"; rule texts that state themselves that a certain kind of challenge has been answered by a certain review, or that there is nothing to ask outside their scope; initiation of revision restricted to holders of the discipline's credentials; refusal on the basis of the proposer's disciplinary identity.

Among these, writing that something "has been answered by review" or that "there is nothing to ask outside the scope" is a claim of completeness at the level of rules. Writing only a scope of application ("this standard applies to objects of such a kind"), only a procedural end ("this decision is final"), or only that this seat does not review a certain kind of question, does not count: these say "this is not handled here" or "the procedure ends here," not "this has been answered."

Each of these is evidence for the chain, and none decides a case on its own: a credential condition, a single refusal, or the absence of a "limitations" section is not enough. The places to check include the scope clauses of journals, the comment-handling rules of standards committees, the intake clauses of revision procedures, records of how public consultations were handled, the reasons given for returning submissions, and documents of authorization and adoption.

Three contrasts. Where refusal at this seat is accompanied by effective referral, and the receiving position has the capacities listed in step 3 (it can actually be set in motion and can require a response or initiate a review), this paper makes no finding of parochialism on the basis of that refusal. Where all that has been shown is that the rule states the power lies elsewhere, it is recorded as "destination of the power stated," possibly an effective referral, still to be checked. Retention of a premise after sufficient questioning is not judged, on that basis, to be a failure to acknowledge a remainder: staying is not closure; closure is the absence of any possibility of change. A review that gives only a conclusion of limited scope, whose conclusion has not been used to end questioning beyond that scope, is not judged to involve misrouting. A measurement definition with limited scope that claims no answers from outside its boundary is itself a contrast case.

What acknowledging a remainder looks like. At the level of an establishment, acknowledging a remainder can take three arrangements, which are modes at the rule layer: when not taking a question up, stating to whom it is referred; registering known limitations; responding item by item to outside comments. There are real examples in every discipline, and the series does not tar them all with one brush:

  • Chemistry: the provisional report of IUPAC's group 3 working group states that no objective means of adjudication can be found, that any resolution involves a measure of convention, and invites public comment (Scerri 2021).
  • Mathematics: discussion in set theory of whether to accept new axioms openly divides its reasons into two kinds, intrinsic reasons that come from the concept itself and extrinsic reasons that look to the consequences (Maddy 1988, p.482).
  • Medicine: before rating the evidence, GRADE rates which outcomes count and how important each is (GRADE Handbook). This example belongs to the second domain.
  • Physics: the redefinition of the second has a public roadmap and criteria (International Bureau of Weights and Measures). The Particle Data Group records inconsistency between measurements in the error of the average: when data are inconsistent, the error is enlarged by a scale factor (Particle Data Group, Review of Particle Physics).
  • Biology: the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature states in its preamble that its provisions do not restrict taxonomic judgment (ICZN 1999, Preamble).

These examples serve as contrasts, not as proof that "this discipline has no parochialism"; all they show is that acknowledging a remainder can be done in every discipline.

Joining Methodology Paper 2. Methodology Paper 2 says that people get locked into one quadrant, and "Being locked is not a loss of knowledge—it is the force of habit" (§6.1); it also gives "ignorance" an epistemological reading: "Ignorance = not treating the current quadrant's method as complete" (§6.3). What parochialism loses is precisely this ignorance. One possible form of parochialism in institutions is rules of training and evaluation that leave no exit for referral; this is only a checkable form, and on its own it does not establish parochialism.

The state of the instances. Rule texts can show the grounds for closing a case and their limits; to establish whether a particular case went through step 4, one also has to look at the actual record of what was cited and how the case was handled. In the public records this series has examined (scope in Note 1), no instance with all four steps was found; the existing material cannot establish why none was found. What was found are partial chains and contrasts.

One is the stakeholder comments table for the 2017 partial update of the guideline on heavy menstrual bleeding (NG88) by the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). The table publicly records outside comments and the reply to each. Some replies in it state that a matter falls outside the scope of the 2017 partial update, and in those rows no one is named to whom it is referred (NICE 2017, p.175). They establish only the limited scope of this update, and the absence of a stated referral in those rows; this is close to part of the first checkable form (not taking a question up without saying to whom it is referred), not the whole of it: being outside the scope of this update is not the same as being refused as "not within this discipline" or "unscientific." The table records both challenge and reply publicly: a public record makes the handling checkable, while whether a particular residue is acknowledged is judged separately. So it serves only as an example of a form, not as a finding of parochialism.

Another is the European decision from the Introduction: the objection is not taken up, and the decision states that member states can regulate installation and use. The destination of the power is stated, and it may be an effective referral; whether the member-state position can actually be set in motion, and whether it can require a response or initiate a review, that is, the weaker threshold of step 3, the existing material has not checked.

There are also several kinds of rule provision that look close to step 4 but cannot establish it on the text alone. Step 4 has three elements: there is a challenge to p; the earlier review did not deal with it, or its scope fell short; and that conclusion is used to register the challenge as answered and to close the case. Taking the three elements in turn: NICE's guide to technology appraisal appeals does not allow a second appeal to raise again an appeal point rejected at the first appeal where the relevant content has not changed (PMG41 §4.5); what was handled earlier is exactly that point, so the second element is missing. The US advisory committee on human research protections recommends that an IRB accept the determinations of other review bodies set up for the purpose, "unless it has reason to question their competence or their objectivity" (SACHRP 2024); what was reviewed is the same question, so the second element is again missing. The presumption of conformity in Article 40(1) of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act is limited by its own text to what a standard covers, and likewise lacks the second element. Article 27(2) needs separate treatment: in similar cases a deployer may rely on a previously conducted fundamental rights impact assessment, or on an existing impact assessment carried out by the provider; where the deployer considers that any of the listed elements has changed or is no longer up to date, it must update (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 27(2)). What it waives is an obligation to assess, not the closing of a challenge, so the first element is absent; the second may be present. It is recorded here as a neighboring case not yet settled.

None of these provisions supplies the complete case this paper requires. Whether a closure beyond scope took place still has to be established, for the same premise, by comparing the scope of the original review, the particular challenge, and how the conclusion was actually used; a provision for reopening does not substitute for that comparison.

At the normative layer the criterion is clear. That no complete instance was found shows at least one limit of checking from public records: step 4 lies in the records of particular cases; why none was found remains undetermined. §9 registers this limit as a remainder of the series' method.

S3 Parochialism: the criterion. Parochialism is having a construct while not acknowledging its remainder: using non only on others and not turning it back on oneself. At the normative layer, the criterion is that a construct is registered as complete; this is a problem because, for a construct whose proper work is cognition, acknowledging its remainder is a condition of its continuing to operate as cognition. Describe first from the record (for this premise, in this jurisdiction and at this step), then evaluate by the epistemic ought.

Suggested checking practice: parochialism has one form in institutions that can be checked from public records, a four-step chain (adopting p; questions about p excluded on grounds of belonging or format; no other position within the jurisdiction that can be set in motion and can require a response or initiate a review takes them up; a review conclusion that did not deal with this challenge is used to register it as answered, and the case is closed on that basis). Only when all four steps are present is an instance established; the first three steps alone do not decide a case, and other forms are checked separately against the criterion. Each checkable form is evidence, and no single one decides a case. Three contrasts: refusal with effective referral; retention after sufficient questioning; a review that gives only a conclusion of limited scope.


§4 Keeping Questioning Outside the Boundary

One common form of parochialism is refusing to take a question up on the grounds that the boundary must be preserved. A question is raised, and the answer is: "if this question were taken up, our discipline would no longer be our discipline."

A criterion is given here, following Institution Theory: "The construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically" (Institution Theory Z38). In Institution Theory this rests on "a human being is an end" by way of Z2, so here it is taken over and rests on the end postulate. There is also a reason pointing the same way, at an earlier layer: a construct has no first person (F6 §2.3); the "I" in "I must continue to exist" cannot be found at the construct. It only points the same way and does not replace the ground above.

Paper 3's pushing back and Paper 8's S44 (membership) join here.

S4 Parochialism keeps questioning outside the boundary. A checkable form: refusing to take a question up on the grounds that the boundary must be preserved. Criterion: the construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning.


§5 The Problem Side in Several Disciplines

This section writes only of literature analyzing the problem side, as material for §7; positive examples have been listed in §3. It is written existentially and by type: which field has which kind of analysis, without comparing which is more serious.

Physics. In fundamental physics, "naturalness" was for a time a criterion for choosing theories: if a theory's parameters could match observation only through extremely fine cancellations, the theory was regarded as unnatural and as needing new physics to explain it. Fischer analyzed the situation of this criterion after the results of the Large Hadron Collider: finding no new physics weakened support for it, and its weight in argument declined; he also discussed reconsideration of its foundations (Fischer 2023). This is his analysis. Whether it is the escape discussed in §8 requires checking the original commitment to testing and the record of how it was handled afterwards; a decline in weight alone does not decide it. Ellis and Silk argued in Nature that physics must hold to empirical testability and cannot exempt a theory from testing because it is elegant (Ellis & Silk 2014). Several current project documents do not invoke naturalness as a justification.

Biology. Gould and Lewontin criticized a research programme that breaks an organism into separate traits and writes an adaptive story for each; when one story fails, another is substituted, and the question whether the trait is not a product of adaptation at all is seldom asked (Gould & Lewontin 1979, pp.586–587).

Mathematics. In mathematics, progress in research is often counted as the number of theorems proved. Thurston set this out as an assumption to be examined: "progress made by mathematicians consists of proving theorems"; he said that what mathematicians really aim to do is "advance human understanding of mathematics," and that "our strong communal emphasis on theorem-credits has a negative effect on mathematical progress" (Thurston 1994). The sociologist Merton had long before analyzed disputes over priority in science (Merton 1957). On how proofs are verified, Voevodsky wrote of his own experience and concerns (Voevodsky 2014). The credit standard of mathematics is only interfaced with here; how research is evaluated is a matter for the Theory of the University.

All of these are only interfaced with; no corresponding rule texts were found. Seen together, examples on the problem side come mostly from literature analysis, while examples on the positive side are mostly rule texts. The two sides differ in their sources and in their units of analysis; whether this distribution comes from differences in the objects themselves, from how things are recorded, or from how the examples were selected, the existing material cannot tell.


§6 Normative Questioning Moved Outside the Boundary

This section speaks only of the second domain, standards that act on persons, and offers only a conditional account.

Once fields are divided, the work of the normative layer can also be made into a field of its own: ethics, normative philosophy. If so, its questions can be published in its own journals; they are asked, but they cannot be asked into the procedures in which standards are written and adopted. Other disciplines can decline to take them up on the grounds that "this is not our discipline's question," which is exactly step 2 of §3; and normative research, for its part, may not regard entering those procedures as its business. Research that takes such questions up can exist, but it may not obtain the right of response and the right of review needed to enter those procedures.

This paper found no corresponding case records, so it goes only as far as the conditional. It has two neighbors. In his 1931 inaugural address as director of the Institute for Social Research, Horkheimer proposed sustained cooperation between philosophical questions and specialized empirical research as a way of organizing research (Horkheimer 1931). Habermas discussed philosophy's roles as "stand-in" and "interpreter" (Habermas 1983). Both are neighbors only: they concern the relation between normative work and the organization of fields; how they correspond to the right of response and the right of review spoken of here, this paper does not judge.

S5 Normative questioning is moved outside the boundary by professional affiliation. When the work of the normative layer is made into a field of its own, its questions can be asked but cannot be asked into the procedures in which standards are written and adopted; other disciplines can decline them as lying outside the boundary, and normative research may not enter either. Research that takes them up can exist, but may not obtain the right of response and the right of review needed to enter those procedures. This is a conditional account of a mechanism, for the second domain only.


§7 How It Begins

For how parochialism begins, this paper takes a logical starting point, not a historical one. The starting point is not the division into disciplines; it is treating the division as an end.

A common form is "science" turning from a method into a boundary: questions outside the boundary are called "unscientific," and so need not be answered. Gieryn called this kind of work boundary-work, and studied how scientists set their own activity apart from other kinds of knowledge (Gieryn 1983); his research is a source of evidence for this form.

This starting point shows itself in two ways, both written existentially and by type.

In the disciplines concerned with persons, one type can be seen: the a posteriori route supplants the a priori route, so that only the route from phenomena is recognized as knowledge, the route from principle is said not to be knowledge, and the route that asks about the ought from experience is not taken either, because it lies outside the scope of warrant. This paper gives no rule-text instance of this type.

In the literature of the natural sciences and mathematics there are analyses of two other forms. In one, the part not conferred by experience is not registered, and when results come they are not accepted; naturalness and the adaptationist programme in §5 are literature discussing this form, and whether they amount to escape is judged separately in §8 by the record of verification. In the other, a construct is treated as an end in itself, as in the credit standard of mathematics. These are all only interfaced with and have no corresponding rule texts; each discipline also has positive examples of acknowledging remainders (§3).

Motives and historical claims such as "disciplines wrote standards in order to qualify as science" are not relied on by this paper. How parochialism persists once begun is the business of Paper 5.

S6 How it begins. The starting point is taken logically, not historically: not the division into disciplines, but treating the division as an end; "science" turning from a method into a boundary, with questions outside it called "unscientific." In the disciplines concerned with persons, one visible type is the a posteriori route supplanting the a priori route, for which this paper gives no rule-text instance; in the literature of the natural sciences and mathematics there are analyses of the part not conferred by experience going unregistered and results not being accepted when they come, and of a construct being treated as an end in itself, all only interfaced with.


§8 Out of Reach and Escape

When results come, a claim can treat them in two ways.

Out of reach. The claim has not yet been tested, and it has not refused testing; when results come, it changes according to them. As an illustration, take the "island of stability" of superheavy elements: a region of nuclei predicted in theory to be longer-lived; as new data come in, the predicted center moves with the data. Such a claim is always waiting for its test, and when the test comes it lets the test count.

Escape. The original commitment to verification is no longer borne: the test comes, and the claim neither concedes nor revises; the open question is treated as needing no handling. A common sign is simply losing weight: not revised, not withdrawn, gradually no longer mentioned in later arguments. But losing weight does not decide a case on its own: a claim can lose weight because testing has worked as it should. For naturalness in §5, what Fischer analyzed is its decline in weight after the results; whether it is escape requires checking the original commitment to testing and the later record of its handling, which this paper has not done, so it makes no finding.

By the Prequel's derivation, escape is a claim registering itself as complete: it no longer bears the original test at that point, and at that point the position of not-knowing is filled in. So escape is what parochialism looks like at the level of theory; being out of reach is not.

One can slide into the other. If a center keeps moving to just where it is out of reach, so that every new set of data only pushes it to the next place still out of reach, being out of reach slides into escape.

How can the two be told apart from the record? A suggested practice: where the original conditions of verification and the open status are both retained, record it as out of reach; where the record shows that the original commitment to verification is no longer borne, that changes are unexplained, and that the open question is treated as needing no handling, record it as escape. Whether a claim changed, or whether its weight rose or fell, does not decide a case on its own (Note 2).

Paper 5's shelving is the persistence of that line on the normative ledger in standards that act on persons; escape is its counterpart in the first domain.

S7 Out of reach and escape. When results come, a claim can be out of reach: not yet tested, not refusing testing, changing according to results when they come. It can also escape: the original commitment to verification is no longer borne, and the open question is treated as needing no handling; a common sign is neither revising nor withdrawing, only losing weight, but losing weight does not decide a case on its own. Escape is the claim registering itself as complete, what parochialism looks like at the level of theory; being out of reach is not. Being out of reach can slide into escape.

Suggested checking practice: sort by the record of verification. Where the original conditions of verification and the open status are retained, record it as out of reach; where the original commitment to verification is no longer borne, changes are unexplained, and the open question is treated as needing no handling, record it as escape. Whether it changed, or whether its weight rose or fell, does not decide a case on its own.


§9 This Series Does Not Hold to Parochialism

This series does not look down on any discipline, does not rank philosophy above the others, and does not assign the position that questions the ought to philosophy. To acknowledge a kind of work that runs through every field is not to hand it, by disciplinary identity, to any one of them.

The seat that questions the ought is itself a construct, and it too has a remainder. The construct of the indestructibility postulate is cognition's intake of "this"; a seat is an institutional construct, and between the two lies the step in How Is Institution Possible that carried the registration of remainder over into the social order (Prequel §4). Institution Theory wrote of institutions that "so long as the institution is still dividing, it is still leaving unaccommodated residue" (Institution Theory Z35a); for seats, this paper follows it. A seat cannot treat its own boundary as an end; this is a demand on seats, set out in Paper 9, S52. The drawing of the two domains has also registered its own unaccommodated residue (Prequel §5).

The series' rules of evidence also have a remainder. They use only rule texts and public records. Rule texts can show the form of the first three steps of the chain: how intake rules are written, to whom revision procedures are open, how far a seat's jurisdiction extends. Step 4, however, requires looking at particular cases: rule texts can show the grounds for closing a case and their limits; whether a particular case went through step 4 depends on the actual record of what was cited and how it was handled. So one has to speak precisely: whether something is public cannot by itself decide whether a body acknowledges its remainder. Being publicly visible, acknowledging the particular residue of a given premise, and there being an effective receiver are three separate determinations. The existing material cannot explain why complete instances are lacking; this is evidence neither that parochialism is rare nor that it is common or hidden. That examples on the problem side of the first domain lie mostly in the literature and rarely in rule texts is partly also a product of these rules of evidence.

S8 This series does not hold to parochialism. It does not look down on any discipline, does not rank philosophy above the others, and does not assign the position that questions the ought to philosophy. The seat that questions the ought is also a construct, with a remainder of its own; it cannot treat its own boundary as an end. The series' rules of evidence also have a remainder: being publicly visible, acknowledging a particular residue, and there being an effective receiver are three separate determinations; the lack of complete instances is evidence neither that parochialism is rare nor that it is common.


Where This Paper Stops

This paper does not prove that any particular discipline holds to parochialism; it does not write how disciplines ought to be divided; it does not write the history of how things came to this point; it does not compare disciplines as to which is more serious. The four-step chain of §3 is a way of checking, not the definition of parochialism.

What it hands to the papers that follow: once fields are divided, every discipline has premises that must be held steady, and Paper 2 speaks of the position that holds them and the position that questions them; the pushing back of step 4 in §3 is in Paper 3; "how it persists" is in Paper 5, where the correspondence between escape and shelving is referred back to; membership and independence are in Paper 8; the remainder of the seat that questions the ought is in Paper 9.

The remainder it leaves: no complete four-step instance was found in the public records examined (§3); how the distribution in §5 arose, the existing material cannot say; the overlap of the two kinds of residue in §2 is only registered here, without a scale for telling them apart.


Notes

  1. The public records this series has examined fall into the following kinds: the US federal regulation 45 CFR 46.111(a)(2) and related federal guidance, and the recommendation of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections of 22 October 2024 on uninformative research; the provisional report of IUPAC's group 3 project (Scerri 2021) and IUPAC's current periodic table page; Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1996 (the formal objection to EN 12285-2:2005), the EU decisions on formal objections to EN 14904 and EN 14342 (2017), and Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012; NICE stakeholder comments tables for guideline updates (for example NG203, 2021; NG88, 2017) and its methods manual, and NICE's guide to technology appraisal appeals (PMG41) §4.2, §4.3, §4.5; the description of the responsibilities of the American National Standards Institute's Board of Standards Review, the appeals provisions of the IEEE Standards Association Standards Board Bylaws, and the appeals provisions of Part 1 of the ISO/IEC Directives; the GRADE Handbook (Schünemann et al., eds., 2013 edition), on the importance of outcomes; the rules for proposals and decisions of the World Health Organization's ICD-11 maintenance platform; the rules of the American Psychiatric Association's DSM revision proposal channel since 2017; the International Bureau of Weights and Measures' roadmap and frequently asked questions on the redefinition of the second; the Particle Data Group's Review of Particle Physics, the part of the introduction on averages and scale factors; and the Preamble of the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature, 4th edition (1999). Where no edition is given, the current version consulted in November 2026 is meant.
  2. This distinction is close to Lakatos's distinction between progressive and degenerating research programmes (Lakatos 1970); how the two correspond is not judged here.

The Eight Propositions of This Paper

  • S1 The establishment is a construct; the boundary is a division. The establishment of a discipline is a construct, a means, not an end; a discipline's boundary is the division the establishment draws and maintains; its purpose is the further development of scholarship: the construct can still be chiseled, and new constructs chiseled out of it. Not opposed to the division into disciplines; not proposing to abolish boundaries. (Conceptual distinction; every discipline; establishment as construct follows F6 §2.2 and "classification issues no legitimacy"; means follows F6 §2.1; "development" read after Methodology Paper 2, Chapter 5; extension to the establishment of a discipline, own undertaking)
  • S2 Division leaves a remainder. A discipline's boundary divides by category and belonging and leaves its own unaccommodated residue; this is the normal state of things, not a fault. Particular residue is recognized from the record. Two kinds: what the rules do not cover, raised by people; what the division itself produces, explained by the establishment that drew it; they can overlap. The interior is drawn by two branches. (Descriptive; every discipline; follows the indestructibility postulate, the operational postulate, F6 §2 and the restriction in Institution Theory Z35; the burden of explanation: a norm taken over, Institution Theory Z35; the interior follows Z4; extension to the establishment of a discipline, own undertaking)
  • S3 Parochialism: the criterion. Parochialism is having a construct while not acknowledging its remainder; at the normative layer, the criterion is that a construct is registered as complete; describe first, then evaluate. Suggested checking practice: the four-step chain, an instance established only when all four steps are present; each checkable form is evidence; three contrasts. (Normative: the epistemic ought, undertaken by this series, presupposing the indestructibility postulate; the four-step chain and checkable forms: suggestion; every discipline; the manner of keeping accounts follows Institution Theory Z35a)
  • S4 Parochialism keeps questioning outside the boundary. A checkable form: refusing to take a question up on the grounds that the boundary must be preserved. Criterion: the construct's own continued existence is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning. (First half descriptive, every discipline; second half normative, following Institution Theory Z38, which rests on the end postulate by way of Z2; F6 §2.3 points the same way)
  • S5 Normative questioning is moved outside the boundary by professional affiliation. When the work of the normative layer is made into a field of its own, its questions are asked but cannot be asked into the procedures in which standards are written and adopted; research that takes them up may not obtain the right of response and the right of review. (Descriptive, conditional; second domain)
  • S6 How it begins. The starting point is taken logically: treating the division into disciplines as an end; "science" turning from a method into a boundary. A visible type: the a posteriori route supplanting the a priori route (no rule-text instance); the literature's analyses of the unregistered part with results not accepted when they come, and of a construct treated as an end in itself, only interfaced with. (Descriptive; first half every discipline, second half in two forms)
  • S7 Out of reach and escape. Out of reach: not refusing testing, changing according to results when they come; escape: the original commitment to verification no longer borne, the claim registering itself as complete, commonly showing as simply losing weight, though losing weight does not decide a case on its own; being out of reach can slide into escape. Suggested checking practice: sort by the record of verification. (Conceptual distinction at the normative layer: the epistemic ought, undertaken by this series; checking practice: suggestion; every discipline)
  • S8 This series does not hold to parochialism. It does not look down on any discipline, does not rank philosophy above the others, and does not assign the position that questions the ought to philosophy; the seat that questions the ought is also a construct, with a remainder of its own; the rules of evidence also have a remainder, and the three determinations are kept apart. (Normative: a self-constraint on how this series writes; the seat's remainder follows Institution Theory Z35a, by way of the carrying-over in F6 §2; the demand on seats anticipates Paper 9, S52, and rests on the end postulate)

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.

I · This system

  • Qin, H. (2026). The Epistemological Map of Chisel-Construct: Four Methods, Four Remainders, One Cycle (SAE Methodology, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18918194
  • Qin, H. (2026). How Is Institution Possible: From Inter-Ontological Remainder to Co-Constructive Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19328662
  • Qin, H. (2026). SAE: The First Critique [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21439120
  • Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635
  • Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324
  • Qin, H. (2026). What a Discipline Is Not (SAE Theory of Disciplines, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24177508

II · Rule texts and institutional documents (originals)

  • 45 CFR 46.111(a)(2). Criteria for IRB approval of research. eCFR (current text).
  • Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1996 on the formal objection against harmonised standard EN 12285-2:2005. Official Journal of the European Union. Recitals 8 and 11.
  • IUPAC. Periodic Table of Elements (current page). iupac.org.
  • NICE. (2017). Heavy menstrual bleeding: assessment and management (NG88). Consultation comments and responses (consultation 3 August to 13 September 2017). nice.org.uk.
  • NICE. Guide to the processes of technology appraisal and highly specialised technologies appeals (PMG41), §4.2, §4.3, §4.5. nice.org.uk.
  • Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act), Articles 27(2), 40(1) (consolidated text of 27 July 2026).
  • Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections. (2024, October 22). Recommendation on Assessment Considerations on Uninformative Research.
  • International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature. (1999). International Code of Zoological Nomenclature (4th ed.). Preamble.
  • Bureau International des Poids et Mesures. Roadmap and frequently asked questions on the redefinition of the second. bipm.org.
  • Particle Data Group. Review of Particle Physics. The part of the introduction on averages and scale factors.
  • Schünemann, H., Brożek, J., Guyatt, G., & Oxman, A. (Eds.). (2013). GRADE Handbook. On the importance of outcomes.

III · External literature

  • Bernstein, M. S., Levi, M., Magnus, D., Rajala, B. A., Satz, D., & Waeiss, C. (2021). Ethics and society review: Ethics reflection as a precondition to research funding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(52), e2117261118.
  • Ellis, G., & Silk, J. (2014). Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics. Nature, 516, 321–323.
  • Fischer, E. (2023). Naturalness and the forward-looking justification of scientific principles. Philosophy of Science, 90(5), 1050–1059.
  • Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science. American Sociological Review, 48(6), 781–795.
  • Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 205, 581–598.
  • Habermas, J. (1983). Die Philosophie als Platzhalter und Interpret. English translation: Philosophy as stand-in and interpreter, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990), MIT Press.
  • Horkheimer, M. (1931). Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung. English translation: The present situation of social philosophy and the tasks of an institute for social research, in Between Philosophy and Social Science (1993), MIT Press.
  • Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (pp. 91–196). Cambridge University Press.
  • Maddy, P. (1988). Believing the axioms, I. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 53(2), 481–511.
  • Merton, R. K. (1957). Priorities in scientific discovery. American Sociological Review, 22(6), 635–659.
  • Scerri, E. (2021). Provisional report on discussions on Group 3 of the periodic table. Chemistry International, 43(1), 31–34.
  • Thurston, W. P. (1994). On proof and progress in mathematics. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 30(2), 161–177.
  • Voevodsky, V. (2014). The origins and motivations of univalent foundations. The Institute Letter, Institute for Advanced Study.

Interfaces

Main upstream: F6 §2.1, §2.2, §2.3, §2; The First Critique, Chapter 4, §2; Institution Theory Z4, Z35, Z35a, Z38 (by way of Z2); Methodology Paper 2, Chapter 5, §6.1, §6.3; the derivation in Prequel §4.

Also used: Gieryn 1983; Thurston 1994; Gould & Lewontin 1979; Fischer 2023; Horkheimer 1931; Habermas 1983.

This series: S1 to S8.

Handed to Paper 2: every discipline has premises that must be held steady; the position that holds them and the position that questions them.