Self-as-an-End
SAE Cultivation Theory · Paper 1

How Is Cultivation Possible?
涵育何以可能

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24154499 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

Can other people take part in the growth of a person's own law? This paper answers: they can. A content that comes from outside is not on that account not his; whether it is his depends on where avowal is accomplished. Avowal contains a negation: he can deny, restate, take apart, look again in another context, and he can also decline; this can happen at the moment of receiving, or years later in looking back, and does not require that he said "no" at the time. Avowal is something only the person himself can do; what the outside can give is the conditions of forming, avowing and revising: material, language, knowledge, skill; steadiness; the removal of false have-tos; a real response, including the giver's own "no." Cultivation has no clear boundary line; what is looked at is the structural direction: whether an act goes toward opening these conditions, or, while giving, seals one of his positions; the latter is locking. Finally three questions are asked separately: did I take on the direction of cultivation; what did my act actually open or close; did he himself complete that step. The first is borne by the giver toward himself; the second is judged by checkable acts and their structural effects; the third can only be completed by him. No side's own account settles the other two questions. Douglass learning his letters, Mill's crisis, and Lyell's objections to Darwin are the three main historical cases of this paper.

This is an independent English rewrite, not a translation, of the Chinese final text v1.1. Terminology and framing are recomposed for an English-reading audience; the philosophical content is the same.

Introduction

The Prequel opened with a small thing: a book passed from one person's hands to another's, and the giver did not lecture. The book came from outside; the step of having one's view opened lay with the reader. This paper asks from there: can other people take part in the growth of a person's own law? On what ground, and how far?

The question is not new. Kant's lectures on pedagogy, published in 1803, say that one of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to lawful compulsion with the capacity to use one's own freedom: "For compulsion is necessary! How do I cultivate freedom under compulsion?" (Kant 1803, AA 9:453; "cultivate" renders Kant's kultivieren and is not this series' term). Kant asks about compulsion. This paper first asks a step earlier: compulsion or not, how can what is given from outside become his own? The half about compulsion, Paper 4 takes up again with Kant's question.

A few words first. This framework calls the law a person gives himself, which governs only himself, his own law (One's Own Law). Cultivation, in this series, means a single act by which a person gives conditions toward another person, or toward an identifiable group; its orientation is to open the other's own space for forming, avowing and revising (Prequel). It is written from the giving side, and its completion lies with the other. This is cultivation directed outward; the branch directed inward is written in Paper 6. Avowal means a content's being taken up by his own law (Action Theory, Paper 6, D36).

The series belongs to a philosophical framework called Self-as-an-End (SAE). Below, "this framework" means it.

§1 What Comes from Outside Can Become His

Most of what a person cannot let go of today came from outside: a sentence in a book, a teacher's question, a parent's habit, a craft. If coming from outside meant not being his, almost nothing would be his.

This framework has established that a content's coming from outside does not on that account make it colonization (Value Theory P3, V28). Its coming in only means that it has been set before him; what happens next is what matters. He can deny it, restate it, take it apart, put it into another context and look again; what he finally avows may be only a small piece of it, or a rewritten version. The criterion does not fall on where it came from; it falls on where this constitution is accomplished. The reverse holds too: what rises up from within him is not on that account his either; it too has to be taken up by him (ibid.). Provenance, as a measure, fails at both ends here (ibid.).

Action Theory wrote this as attribution: what a person gains from others, once avowed by his own law, is his; those who provided the conditions do not thereby become the ones who completed that step for him (Action Theory, Paper 6, D36).

In 1826 Frederick Douglass was sent to Baltimore, enslaved in the household of Hugh Auld (the events in Douglass 1845, chs. V and VI; the years from the Library of Congress timeline). In 1827 the mistress, Sophia Auld, "very kindly commenced to teach me the A, B, C," and then taught him to spell words of three or four letters. The master found out and "at once forbade Mrs. Auld to instruct me further, telling her, among other things, that it was unlawful, as well as unsafe, to teach a slave to read"; reading, he said, "would forever unfit him to be a slave." Douglass heard this. He wrote later: "These words sank deep into my heart"; "From that moment, I understood the pathway from slavery to freedom"; it was "the invaluable instruction which, by the merest accident, I had gained from my master" (ibid., ch. VI). After that, he traded bread with the white boys in the street for "that more valuable bread of knowledge" (ibid., ch. VII).

The letters were given by the mistress. The speech was made by the master, and it was a prohibition; what the prohibition sealed was his road to reading. Both came from outside. Yet the road to reading later became Douglass's own road. Whether it was his is not decided by where it came from but by where he took it up. Holding a person as property crosses the bottom line; it is violation, judged by the definition of violation itself (Rights P5), and lies outside the scope of this series; here only those lessons and that speech are looked at.

This does not say that whatever comes from outside will become his. Most things pass before a person and leave nothing behind. It says only one thing: provenance does not decide attribution.

Nor does it excuse indoctrination. That a content comes from outside does not decide colonization; whether his positions were sealed in the giving is judged separately. The one who indoctrinates can sincerely mean the other well, and the one indoctrinated can feel he has benefited; indoctrination still writes the content of the other's law for him (Rights P6, F26). This is taken up in §4.

§2 Avowal Contains a Negation

Avowal is not taking everything as it comes. The denying, restating, taking apart, looking again in another context mentioned in the last section, and declining as well, all lie within avowal. This can be called the negation: a person's position of saying no to what is set before him. He can deny, restate, take apart, look again in another context, and he can also decline (Value Theory P3, V28).

Declining is also something done from the position of avowal: he looked, judged, and did not take it. This judgment is his. That he does not take it shows neither that the giving side gave wrongly nor that it gave rightly; whether he took it is another question (§5).

The negation need not be said aloud. It can come at the moment of receiving, or years later in looking back; it does not require that he said "no" at the time. Such a negation often falls in rewriting: keeping a part, saying it another way, adding what was not there. Taking something up unchanged may also have passed through his own judgment; rewriting is not the necessary outward look of avowal.

John Stuart Mill was taught by his father himself. Mill wrote later: "Anything which could be found out by thinking I never was told, until I had exhausted my efforts to find it out for myself" (Mill 1873, ch. I). He also wrote of "my education, which was wholly his work" (ibid., ch. V). In the autumn of 1826 he put a question to himself: suppose all the objects of his life were realized at this very instant, "would this be a great joy and happiness to you?" He writes that "an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!'" (ibid.). He did not tell his father about this. He wrote later: "The experiences of this period had two very marked effects on my opinions and character" (ibid.). "I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end." Nor did he give up the power of analysis, but he held that it "had consequences which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of cultivation with it"; "the cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed" (ibid.; "cultivation" is Mill's own word).

What his father gave, he neither threw out whole nor kept unchanged: part was kept, part rewritten, part added to. Denying, restating, taking apart are all there, and they happened many years after receiving. That "No!" was his answer to a question he put to himself, about whether an end could make him happy; it was not a revolt against his father. The negation in his avowal falls more in his later rewriting. Parent-Child Theory has read the same autobiography, reading the side of the conditions his father gave, and does not use it to certify the father's direction either (Parent-Child Theory, Paper 3); what is read here is avowal.

On Douglass's side there was a negation too, only not in words. The master's speech was a prohibition; Douglass put it into another context and looked again, read out of it a road running the opposite way, and later wrote of it as instruction (Douglass 1845, ch. VI). He also wrote: "Mistress, in teaching me the alphabet, had given me the inch, and no precaution could prevent me from taking the ell" (ibid., ch. VII). Giving an inch and taking an ell was originally a line in the master's speech; Douglass took it over, changed who was speaking, and changed its meaning. "Looking again in another context" was, there, the turning point of the whole matter.

§3 What Is Given Is Conditions

Avowal is something only the person himself can do. The first-person step cannot be taken by anyone else. What, then, can the outside give? What can be given is the conditions of forming, avowing and revising. They can be described in several kinds.

The first kind is material, language, knowledge, skill. The letters Sophia taught were of this kind. Letters avow nothing for him; yet without letters, the road to reading does not even have a starting point. The book in the Prequel belongs here too.

The second kind is steadiness. Economics has said that you cannot "tell" a person of a dimension he cannot yet see; you can only create the conditions for him to discover it himself (Economics P2, §2). It says there that when the other is not yet standing firm, the first step of cultivation is helping him stand more firmly on what he himself cannot let go of, the things he will not trade (ibid., §4.1). From this it goes on to a kind of negotiation: the person across the table guards only his own share and cannot yet see that the other side also has things it will not give up; then the first step may be helping him get clear about what he really wants and what he will not give up. Before that, a person not yet standing firm will hear any request to consider the other side as pressure, or as a contest of more for you and less for me (ibid.).

The third kind is the removal of false have-tos. The Methodology has a sentence: cultivation is negating, for the other, those "have-tos" (Methodology, Paper VII, §5). The sentence is complete only when both ends are said. What the giving side can negate falls on his own demands: he can say "you need not take my road," not "you should not think that way." Which of the other's have-tos is false, seen from his side, is only his view; whether it is false is decided by the other.

The fourth kind is a real response, including the giver's own "no." Darwin writes of talking geology with Lyell: "he never rested until he saw the whole case clearly, and often made me see it more clearly than I had done before. He would advance all possible objections to my suggestion, and even after these were exhausted would long remain dubious" (Darwin 1887). Lyell's "no" does not answer for Darwin; it is a condition, a wall to be got over.

None of these takes that step for him; they give the step somewhere to go.

Beyond these kinds there is one more thing, which is a not doing: not adding a cost to his declining. He can decline the book, the sentence, the question; the giver does not add disadvantages because he declined, and does not carry this one refusal into unrelated matters by withdrawing support. When Action Theory writes of a person asking a newcomer whether he is willing to listen, it is speaking of exactly this: what he can do is not add the cost, and if the newcomer says no, really accept it, and not give less afterward because of it (Action Theory, Paper 6, §3). Action Theory also wrote that when the three conditions are not all present, or one judges that one cannot cultivate the other person, not cultivating this time is not losing one's ground; two things still cannot be cancelled: not legislating for the other, and not sealing his roads of refusing, revising, exiting and changing direction (Action Theory, Paper 6, D35). When one holds a position, these are hardest to keep; Paper 5 takes this up.

Earlier writers have had several things to say about this point. A book passing from one person's hands to another's is a very old thing: Marcus Aurelius records of his teacher Rusticus, "I am indebted to him for being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to me out of his own collection" (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, I.7).

Plato's Socrates says of those who have talked with him: "It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery" (Plato, Theaetetus, 150c–d). That the completion lies with the other is close to this. In the same passage he also says that the triumph of his art is in thoroughly examining whether what the young man's mind brings forth "is a false idol or a noble and true birth": deciding true or false stays in the midwife's hands. This framework does not stop others from judging: another can judge, bring evidence and rebut, which is just what Lyell did with Darwin; taking a norm as one's own law is still done by the person himself.

Fichte wrote in 1796 that the summons to free self-activity is what is called education, and that all individuals must be educated into human beings, or else they would not become human beings (Fichte 1796, §3; cited from Benner 2003). A summons from outside pointing toward his own activity: in this it is close. The level of the question differs here. Fichte asks how a free subject comes to be formed; this paper asks how a single giving leaves the other his own position of avowal. Fichte writes the summons as an indispensable condition of the subject's formation; this paper does not rule on that claim of necessity, and discusses only this: a content, whether it comes from outside or rises from within him, is his only once avowed by him (Value Theory P3, V28).

This framework has an earlier sentence of a similar shape: cultivation is possible because a remainder exists, and the remainder begins to unfold when it is "responded to" (Foundational Paper 4, §5.2). The remainder there means the part of a system that external conditions do not fully determine; the "response" there is a being's response to its own remainder. "Cultivation" there stands on a definition from the physical side, and shares a name with the cultivation of Foundational Paper 3 in two uses (Foundational Paper 4, ch. 5). This paper borrows only its shape: that step lies in himself.

§4 What Is Looked At Is Direction

Cultivation is possible because avowal lies with him. The positions avowal uses are the five in §2: denying, restating, taking apart, looking again in another context, declining; and also interrupting and walking away (Value Theory P3, V28; Rights P6, F26).

This framework sorts external actions by structural effect into three classes: locking, release-ward shaping, and non-shaping action, which neither releases nor locks. The opposite of cultivation is not colonization but locking; the positions cultivation maintains are exactly those colonization seals, each in its own way (Value Theory P3, V42). Colonization is not on this table: it is not a class of action but a state, the constitutive position occupied by an external end (ibid.). Locking speaks of an action, colonization of a state; locking within a single action is not by itself enough to judge that external colonization is established (ibid.).

Cultivation has no clear boundary line; what is looked at is the structural direction. Whether a single act is called cultivation does not matter; what matters is which way it goes. Going toward opening the conditions of his forming, avowing and revising is the direction of cultivation; sealing one of those positions while giving is locking. That those positions are still in his hands is a precondition; merely not sealing them is not enough. Rights has a similar formulation: a questioning that keeps within bounds, crosses nothing and lifts no one up is a limit, and not cultivation, nor a failure of cultivation (Rights P6, F26). There it names questioning directed at others; this paper does not give a name to single acts, and borrows it only for contrast.

The same thing can be given this way or that way. Suppose a supervisor gives a student a book he wrote, and says: read it, and tell me where you disagree. Another supervisor gives the same book and says: hand in a response next week, it counts toward your assessment; write only where the book is right; disagreement, and restating it in other words, do not count. The book is the same. The second supervisor has made the student's accepting the book's conclusions a condition of assessment, and has removed the positions of objecting and restating.

A direction toward opening does not mean everything has to be laid within arm's reach either. Suppose someone gives a friend a book in a foreign language, and the friend cannot read the original. The stretch of translating is one the friend can walk himself: he can look things up, ask someone, or use AI. Action Theory says that cultivation necessarily leaves a blank, and what it leaves is the other's share: whether to avow it, how to judge it, whether to change it, whether to go (Action Theory, Paper 6, D34). Here it is pushed one step further: the stretch he can walk himself can also be left, and need not be paved by the giver. Leaving a blank is not withholding: if one has judged that this share is one's own to give, and the judgment still stands, and one does not give it, that is not doing it (ibid.), as Paper 2 sets out.

Which way a single act goes is decided by what it actually opened or sealed at the time; it can be judged at the time, and is not rewritten by his later success or failure. Deciding it by what came later would be taking results as the criterion (Value Theory P3, V42). This concerns the character of that act itself. Here the character of the act, and when we have enough material to judge it, are spoken of separately; this division is added by this paper. Where material about what was done on that occasion is insufficient, judgment can be deferred; material that comes in later can correct our judgment of that occasion. What is added can only be about what was done at the time, not about how he turned out later; what is corrected is our judgment, not the character of the act.

The Douglass incident has a second half. He writes that the mistress later stopped teaching him, and "finally became even more violent in her opposition than her husband himself"; "Nothing seemed to make her more angry than to see me with a newspaper"; "From this time I was most narrowly watched." He also writes: "All this, however, was too late. The first step had been taken"; in teaching him the alphabet she had given him the inch, and no precaution could prevent him from taking the ell (Douglass 1845, ch. VII).

Teaching the letters gave him a starting point for reading; the later prohibition and watching sealed his road to reading. Which way each went could be seen at the time; that he later became free (ibid., ch. XI) does not go back and judge those sealings to be something else. The inch that had been given could not be taken back by the later sealing; the one who wanted the ell was he.

§5 Three Questions Kept Apart

At this point a single giving meets at least three questions:

  1. Did I take on the direction of cultivation?
  2. What did my act actually open or close?
  3. Did he himself complete that step?

Who bears each question differs. The first is borne by the giver toward himself: when a person is truly taken as an end in a matter, cultivating him is a direction (Action Theory, Paper 6, D33); a person's own posture of cultivation comes from his own law (Political Economy, Paper 6, E38). The second is judged by checkable acts and their structural effects: did that act open or seal his positions (Value Theory P3, V42). The completion of the third can only be done by himself; that step was never in the giver's hands: a person can do everything he can, and the step may still not happen (ibid.).

Who bears which question does not mean whose word counts. The giver can misjudge himself; the other's saying "I have taken it up" does not exempt it from looking back either. Actual effect and the person's own avowal do not vouch for each other (Political Economy, Paper 6, E38). No side's own account settles the other two questions.

If, having looked, he says he does not want it, how the third question is answered depends on where the giving landed (Value Theory P3, V42). If it landed on the occurrence of a specific content, that step is his own acceptance; if he declines, this item has not become his for now. This "no" does not show that the giving was wrong: an incomplete cultivation is not colonization, and the judgment of declining is itself his own. If it landed on a structural opening of dimension, that step is the continuation of valuing, looked at by whether he goes on walking that way later, not by whether he takes the item in front of him. Both branches are answered by him; the giver does not grade them for him. If he takes it up only later, that is a step completed later, and does not rewrite the earlier incompleteness as already complete (the temporal limit in Value Theory P3, V38, extended here).

The three questions do not pass themselves off as one another.

A "yes" to the third does not answer the first two. Douglass took up that road; the master did not thereby become a cultivator. Douglass turned what the prohibition gave away into his own material; this does not rejudge the act of forbidding learning as cultivation.

A "no" to the third does not go back and rejudge the first two. A person opened every position, and the other in the end did not take it up; he colonized no one: an incomplete cultivation is not colonization, and blocked development is not a criterion either (Value Theory P3, V42).

A "yes" to the first does not answer the second. Sincerely wanting someone to grow can still structurally seal his positions: motive does not enter the criterion; cultivation and colonization are both judged by structural effect, and neither asks after the original intention (Value Theory P3, V42). Whether it reached the state of colonization is judged separately.

From outside, what can be read in the Douglass incident is only two things: what several acts did to him, and the words he himself left. What Sophia took on at the time, the material this paper relies on contains no account of her own; this series does not answer for her. Writing only what a person did and what words he left, without saying for him what he thought inside, is also one place where keeping the three questions apart lands; not reading minds has its own ground in the Second Enlightenment, Paper 3.

The incident in the Prequel is divided in the same way. What the one who gave the book took on is his to bear; the book was a condition; the step of having one's view opened lay with the reader.

Keeping the three questions apart does not say they are unrelated. A person who has taken on the direction will look at the second question and care about the third; only what he can bear stops at the second. He cannot guarantee for the other that the third happens, and he does not on that account stop looking back at his own giving.

§6 Where This Paper Stops

This paper has answered only one question: how can something given from outside become his, and what is looked at. There are several things it does not go on to.

Why a person standing here still gives, and what follows if he does not, Paper 2 takes up. How far one's own share is given, how the other's share is not filled in for him, how to take back what was wrongly given, Paper 3. Those who cannot yet say no, and Kant's question, Paper 4.

Whether to give this time, and how, is judgment. How judgment is done belongs to each person; the three things judgment has to take into account and the two that cannot be cancelled have been established in Action Theory, Paper 6 (D34, D35); this series cites them and does not rewrite them.

After avowal, the back-and-forth between two people belongs to the side that writes about what passes between people.

A Few for Oneself

The lines below are only for one's own use, and are not used to measure others.

  • Not taking "he read it" or "he said it was good" as his having taken it up.
  • Not judging for him which of his have-tos is false.
  • Not, while giving, first sealing his positions of denying, restating, taking apart, looking again in another context, declining, and of interrupting and walking away.
  • Not adding disadvantages because he declined, and not carrying this one refusal into unrelated matters by withdrawing support.
  • Not letting his later success or failure stand in for a judgment of the original act itself.

Propositions of This Paper

  • HY1 A content's coming from outside does not on that account make it not his; what rises up from within him is not on that account his either. Whether it is his depends on where avowal is accomplished: provenance does not decide attribution. This does not say that whatever comes from outside will become his, nor does it excuse indoctrination: whether his positions were sealed in the giving is judged separately (HY4).
  • HY2 Avowal contains a negation, his position of saying no to what is brought to him: he can deny, restate, take apart, look again in another context, and he can also decline. This can happen at the moment of receiving, or afterward in looking back; it does not require that he said "no" at the time. Such a negation often falls in rewriting: keeping a part, saying it another way, adding what was not there; taking something up unchanged may also have passed through his own judgment, and rewriting is not the necessary outward look of avowal.
  • HY3 Avowal is something only the person himself can do. What the outside can give is the conditions of forming, avowing and revising: material, language, knowledge, skill; steadiness; the removal of false have-tos; a real response, including the giver's own "no." In removing false have-tos, the negation falls on the giving side's own demands: it says "you need not," not "you should not"; which have-to is false is decided by the other. There is one more thing the outside can keep: not adding a cost to his declining, that is, not adding disadvantages because he declined.
  • HY4 Cultivation has no clear boundary line; what is looked at is the structural direction. Whether a single act is called cultivation does not matter; which way an act goes is decided by what it actually opened or sealed at the time, can be judged at the time, and is not rewritten by his later success or failure; where material about that occasion is insufficient, judgment can be deferred, and material that comes in later about that occasion can correct our judgment (this division is this paper's reading). Going toward opening the conditions of his forming, avowing and revising is the direction of cultivation; sealing, while giving, any one of denying, restating, taking apart, looking again in another context, declining, interrupting and walking away is locking. That these positions are still in his hands is a precondition; merely not sealing them is not enough. The stretch he can walk himself can also be left, and need not be paved by the giver (pushing the blank of Action Theory, Paper 6, D34 one step further: what is left there is the share others may not fill; what is left here is a stretch others could fill but need not). Locking is an action, colonization a state; locking within a single action is not by itself enough to judge external colonization established. An avowal already accomplished cannot be rewritten by later sealing as not having been accomplished.
  • HY5 Three questions are asked separately: did I take on the direction of cultivation; what did my act actually open or close; did he himself complete that step. The first is borne by the giver toward himself; the second is judged by checkable acts and their structural effects; the completion of the third can only be done by the one who receives. No side's own account settles the other two questions, nor is it exempt from looking back because it comes from the person himself. The giver cannot guarantee for the other that the third happens, and does not on that account stop looking back at his own giving. If, having looked, he says he does not want it: where the giving landed on the occurrence of a specific content, this item has not become his for now, and this does not show the giving was wrong; where it landed on a structural opening of dimension, that step is looked at by the continuation of valuing.

Acknowledgments

This paper is Paper 1 of the Cultivation Theory series of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.

The writing and review of this paper were assisted by Anthropic's Claude and OpenAI's ChatGPT. Thanks are due to these companies and to their research and engineering teams.


References

Group I lists works of this system, archived on Zenodo with Chinese and English versions under the same record, all single-authored (Han Qin); DOIs follow those listed at the head of each paper on the author's site. The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the title, paper and proposition number noted in parentheses at the place of use. The Prequel and Papers 2 to 6 in the text are the papers of this series; Paper 3 of Parent-Child Theory is marked with the series name. Kant's works are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition (AA). The original wording, sources and verification status of the historical cases are recorded separately in the case verification table for Cultivation Theory.

I · Works of this system

Qin, H. (2026). The Complete Self-as-an-End Framework (SAE Foundational Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18727326

Qin, H. (2026). How Is Subjecthood Possible: Symmetry, Negativity, and Subjecthood (SAE Foundational Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18777363

Qin, H. (2026). One's Own Law: The SAE Critique of Ethics and Morality [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19037566

Qin, H. (2026). The Other End of the Bridge: Economic Rationality When 15DD Faces a Party Who Does Not Enter 15DD (SAE Economics, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

Qin, H. (2026). Negative Methodology: Via Negativa and the Formal Structure of Exclusion Principles (SAE Methodology, Paper VII) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19481304

Qin, H. (2026). On the Limitation and Violation of Basic Rights (SAE Rights, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21212595

Qin, H. (2026). On the Cultivation and Diachronic Unfolding of Rights (SAE Rights, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21252863

Qin, H. (2026). On the Colonization of Value (SAE Value Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21611154

Qin, H. (2026). Not Legislating for Others (SAE Action Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970777

Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154

Qin, H. (2026). Reading Structure, Not Minds (SAE The Second Enlightenment, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24030401

Qin, H. (2026). Support in the Parent-Child Relation (SAE Parent-Child Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24121541

II · Other works

Benner, D. (2003). Über die Unmöglichkeit, Erziehung allein vom Grundbegriff der ‚Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit' her zu begreifen. Eine Erwiderung auf Alfred Langewand. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 49(2), 290–304. https://doi.org/10.25656/01:3879

Darwin, C. (1887). The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Including an Autobiographical Chapter (F. Darwin, Ed.). London: John Murray.

Douglass, F. (1845). Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself. Boston: Anti-Slavery Office.

Fichte, J. G. (1796). Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre. Jena und Leipzig: Gabler. (The sentence from §3 is cited from Benner 2003; English rendering by the author.)

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