Investment
出资
The Prequel said that a company is not the shareholders' property. This paper asks what an investor is: what he holds, what the company owes him, and what limits his power. Germany's Bosch places about ninety-four percent of its share capital in a foundation, while about ninety-three percent of the voting rights are in the hands of another entity; in 2022 America's Patagonia handed all its voting shares (two percent of the total) to a trust set up to safeguard the company's purpose. The two cases show that earnings and control can be separated. What an investor holds are rights fixed by the class of shares, not ownership of the people in the company; a controlling vote is a position, and whoever holds it is subject to checks (GS1). The company tells investors, employees, users, partners and those who review it one and the same story; returns, information and exit are as agreed; the controlling party does not use control to dominate minority shareholders (GS2). "A person has no equivalent" constrains investors' votes: it is a line, made clear before investment, and not put on the scale of a vote; investors may change the direction, and once they do, the company falls outside this series' scope; whether to lock it in, and how tightly, is left to the rule layer (GS3). Section 172 of the UK Companies Act and Delaware's provisions on public benefit corporations show how the rule layer writes the various parties into directors' considerations and balancing; where this series parts from them is in the line and the scale. How close an investor's relation to the company is falls into degrees by the difficulty of leaving; the harder it is to leave, the more explanation and routes of questioning the company owes him, and the greater his power, the stronger the checks on it (GS4). Finally the paper speaks of direction: investment can also be cultivation, but neither a long term nor a low return proves it on its own. The paper has four propositions (GS1 to GS4), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end.
Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.
Introduction
The Prequel said that a company is not the shareholders' property. What, then, is an investor?
Look first at two ways of separating "the money" from "having the say."
Germany's Bosch says of itself that "Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH holds roughly 94 percent of the share capital of Robert Bosch GmbH," that the founder's family holds about five percent, and that the company holds about one percent itself; "some 93 percent" of the voting rights, however, are held by another entity, Robert Bosch Industrietreuhand KG, and the remaining seven percent or so by the founder's descendants (Bosch US website, "Bosch Group worldwide"). The party that takes most of the earnings does not hold most of the votes.
On September 14, 2022, the American outdoor-gear company Patagonia announced that the Patagonia Purpose Trust holds all of the company's voting shares, two percent of the total, and that a non-profit collective called the Holdfast Collective holds all of the non-voting shares, ninety-eight percent. The company said the trust "exists to create a more permanent legal structure to enshrine Patagonia's purpose and values" (Patagonia press release, 2022-09-14). The party holding only two percent of the shares holds all the voting rights and sets the direction; the earnings are almost entirely on the other side.
These two examples are not meant to show which way of dividing is better; how foundations and non-profit organizations themselves are run is not within this series either, and only the ownership structure on the company side is taken here. What they show is one thing: holding shares can be no more than holding earnings; holding control can involve holding almost no earnings. The sentence "the shareholders are the company's masters" comes apart here.
Accordingly, this paper asks three things: what an investor holds (§1); what the company owes him (§2); what limits his power (§3). §4 says how close an investor's relation to the company is, and §5 speaks of direction.
The reading follows the Prequel: the construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law. A company is a construct; the board and the controlling vote are in positions; investors are people, each with his own law, and this series writes no oughts for them.
§1 What an Investor Holds
This paper speaks mainly of investors who hold shares. Those who lend money to a company also provide capital, but their relation is not defined by a claim on residual earnings; it is read by the terms of the loan, and is not taken up in detail here.
First, something easily overlooked: investors are first of all people, each with ends of his own. Behind shares held on someone's behalf by a construct there are also people. In the Kingdom State set up in this series, on the share register of Crossways Group, a listed company in Apple City, in the spring of Year 21, the Kingdom State Public Employees' Pension Fund held nine percent of the Class A shares; under its mandate agreement with its asset manager, Elmseed Capital, the votes on these shares were cast by Elmseed Capital on its behalf. What is written on the register is a pension fund; behind the fund are the state's civil servants and the teachers of its public schools.
What an investor holds are the rights attached to his shares. There are mainly two: a claim on residual earnings, and a vote on certain matters. Both are fixed by the class of shares and can be arranged separately: Bosch puts the earnings in a foundation and the votes in another entity; Patagonia puts the votes in a trust and gives the earnings to a collective; Mondragon, mentioned in the Prequel, gives capital no vote. Crossways Group's share capital is in two classes: Class A shares carry one vote each, Class B shares five votes each; Class B shares were issued only to the founder's family and are held by the Qiao Family Office, which has twenty percent of the share capital and about fifty-six percent of all the voting power.
However these rights are arranged, none of them is ownership of the people in the company. What shares can buy is a claim on a share of earnings and votes on some matters; they cannot buy the people who work in the company.
What, then, of control? Holding a majority of votes means one can elect directors and set the direction; that is solid power. Political Economy puts the root of this as: "Power lies in the decision position that can mobilize accumulation"; "The position that can mobilize accumulation may be one person, a board, or a coordinated arrangement; nominal holding and mobilization come apart, and how much is held is not how much can be mobilized" (Political Economy Paper 1, E2). At Crossways, the Qiao Family Office holds twenty percent of the shares yet sets Crossways' direction; the pension fund holds nine percent, and its votes are cast by Elmseed. On this one register, holding and mobilizing have come apart.
A controlling vote, then, is a position. A position holds accountability and is also subject to checks; how strong the checks are depends on the power-face: "The larger an economic position's power-face, the stronger the checks on it," and the power-face "is compared by its particular effects: whom it converges, down to which dimension, how many must pass through it, how great the cost of walking away" (Political Economy Paper 3, E14). A position holding fifty-six percent of the voting power sets the direction of a listed company, and the checks on it must be commensurate. Bringing these two propositions down to shares and control is a step of this series (own undertaking).
This series does not judge which way of dividing is best. Foundations holding shares, trusts holding votes, dual-class shares, capital without votes: each has its own reasons and costs, and that is the business of the rule layer. Only one thing is laid down here: control is a position, and a position is subject to checks.
GS1 Shares are not ownership of people. What a shareholding investor holds are rights fixed by the class of shares: a claim on residual earnings and a vote on certain matters, and the two can be held apart; neither shareholding nor control produces ownership of the people in the company. A controlling vote is a position; whoever holds it is subject to checks (per Political Economy E2, E14; own undertaking).
§2 What the Company Owes Investors
The first thing a company owes investors is not to deceive them.
Not deceiving means telling one and the same story. What the company tells investors is the same story it tells employees and users; and also partners (Paper 4) and those who review it (Paper 5). About the same relevant facts, the company's direction and its common commitments, its statements are true and consistent with one another. This does not mean that everyone knows the same amount: the scope of information can differ with accountability, rights and legitimate confidentiality, and what the board can see a front-line employee may not. But differences in scope may not be used to deceive, or to block questioning that ought to be possible. To deceive is to let those who ask get false answers: the route of questioning is nominally still open, but what one gets by asking is not true; Paper 5, §3 reads this layer into the second gate, and here it is extended along the same lines to what a company says to each party (own undertaking). Economics P6 describes how, in organizations oriented toward the Kingdom of Means, one and the same practice shows different faces in different channels; that is a description, and here it serves only as corroboration.
The second is acting as agreed. Returns are given as agreed, information is given as agreed, exit is handled as agreed: the dividend arrangements, the frequency of reports, whether and how shares can be sold, settled at the time of investment, all follow what was settled.
The third is that the controlling party does not use control to dominate minority shareholders. This must be read in two steps.
One step concerns routes of questioning. Political Economy's second gate says that accumulation "may not be converted into a standing in which the party questioned can on its own close off questioning of itself, correction, or necessary delivery" (Political Economy Paper 4, E22). The original speaks of accumulation being converted into a standing that can close off questioning on its own; here it is changed to the controlling party using control to close the routes by which minority shareholders question it (own undertaking). On ordinary matters, the controlling party using its votes to defeat a proposal does not by itself prove that it has closed a route of questioning. The Crossways case calls for a further look. At the general meeting of Year 21 there was a proposal to "reduce Class B shares from five votes per share to two"; about sixty percent of the Class A votes were in favor, and with the Class B votes counted it did not pass. That vote in itself does not prove that every route of questioning has been closed. But what the proposal sought to change were precisely the articles that recognize the five Class B votes; Class B holds about fifty-six percent of the votes, so at the general meeting the route for revising those articles is in the hands of the party being revised. Political Economy Paper 5 read the same event: "the road for revising those five votes may not be held only in the hands of the five votes" (Political Economy Paper 5, §5). This is just what §3 will say: control arrangements themselves must also be questioned. Whether there are other routes of revision elsewhere, the rules of the stock exchange, the state's company law, the courts, the case does not record, and this paper does not add them. Several situations call for examination: the route for revising the terms that recognize a control arrangement lies only in the hands of the controlling party; the controlling party amends the articles so that minority shareholders cannot table proposals, holds back the accounts they want to see, or leaves them, when they ask, with no position bound to answer.
The other step concerns the Base Layer. The first gate says that accumulation is not converted into domination over people's Base Layer, and that money, housing or the manner of paying wages may not be used to place people's ability to leave, refuse or revoke a standing bond under another party's control (Political Economy Paper 4, E21). Only when the controlling party uses control to press on minority shareholders' route of leaving, or on their Base Layer, is it read into this gate. This step comes with conditions: an investment does not necessarily fall on the investor's Base Layer; a person who has put all his savings into one small company and a fund putting small change into a portfolio fall in different places.
What lies outside the two gates is read by Political Economy Paper 3: where the line has not been crossed and the routes are there, whether minority shareholders have actual control over the relevant decisions is examined by the three questions (Political Economy Paper 3, E16; the three questions are set out in Paper 2, §5); the larger the power-face of the controlling position, the stronger the checks (E14).
How the rule layer writes the various parties in can be seen from an example. Section 172(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides: "A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—" (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term; (b) the interests of the company's employees; (c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; (d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment; (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company (Companies Act 2006, s.172(1)). This section writes employees, suppliers and customers, the community and the environment into what directors must consider; item (f) further requires acting fairly as between members. Where it parts from this series is taken up in the next section.
GS2 No deception; as agreed. The company tells investors, employees, users and partners one and the same story, and tells it also to those who review it; returns, information and exit are as agreed; the controlling party does not use control to dominate minority shareholders (per Political Economy E21, E22; own undertaking).
§3 What Limits an Investor's Power
An investor's votes can elect directors, can amend the articles, can decide whether to sell the company. All these are his powers. What limits them?
"A person has no equivalent" constrains investors' votes as well. Capital cannot buy anyone's Base Layer, nor can it buy the channels of questioning. This is no discrimination against investors: as the Prequel said, investors are people too, and "a person has no equivalent" protects them in the same way. Votes can change a company's direction; they cannot change the fact that a person has no equivalent: a company that has changed its direction leaves this series, and the lines drawn for every company are still there (see below).
The baseline is made clear before investment. A company oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends does not take the money first and show its baseline afterwards. It makes clear before investors put money in: here profit is a condition and a return, not the ultimate criterion; there are several lines that are not put to a vote. Having invested, investors have accepted this; those who disagree need not invest, and having invested they can also sell and leave.
Changing the direction. Can investors change it? They can. Investors can use their votes to turn the company into one in which profit is the ultimate criterion. Once they do, the company is no longer oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends and falls outside this series' scope (the Prequel, §6). This series writes no prohibition on changing the direction as such; what it says is that after the change the company is no longer the kind of company the series is writing about. When the change is made, those already inside are still protected by the lines of Institution Theory and Political Economy: changing the direction cannot take away employees' route of leaving, cannot press on users' Base Layer, cannot close the channels that question the company.
Whether to lock it in, and how tightly, is left to the rule layer. Whether the baseline should be locked into the company's structure so that it is hard to change, and how tightly, this series does not settle; it is left to the rule layer. The tendency at the rule layer is to make it hard to change. The earlier examples are each one way of doing it: Bosch and Patagonia separate control from earnings and put the votes in an entity set up to keep the direction; Delaware's public benefit corporation writes something more than investors' pecuniary interest into the corporate form itself: §362(a) requires that it "shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders' pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation," and §365(a) requires the board to manage with the same balancing (Delaware Code, Title 8, §§362(a), 365(a)); the UK's section 172 writes the various parties into directors' considerations.
A lock is itself a control arrangement. The trust or entity that keeps the direction on the company's behalf holds votes, and is likewise a position, subject to checks under §1. Political Economy has already written: "Control arrangements must meet the three conditions of self-chiseling"; "the channel for revising the terms that recognize such an arrangement is not held alone by the party being revised" (Political Economy Paper 5, E30). A tight lock does not mean that the party guarding the lock decides alone how the lock is changed. What is locked in is the baseline; the party guarding the lock is not thereby exempted from being questioned. Who can change the locks at Bosch and Patagonia, and by what procedure, this paper has not examined.
Where this series parts from these rule-layer formulations. What is compared here is only the directors' duties in the two provisions cited. As far as these two provisions go, the statutes are written in terms of "having regard" and "balancing": employees' interests and the impact on the community and the environment are among the things directors must weigh together. In this series, "a person has no equivalent" is a line, and is not put on the scale to be weighed. This sentence has two layers. The layer drawn for every company no vote can touch: a company decision formed by investors' votes is still an act of the company as a construct; a construct's acts cross no line against any internal subject, and Institution Theory Paper 2 writes that this ought "is held to in full," and that it "does not vary with relational thickness and is not discounted under any condition" (Institution Theory Z9). The layer of direction does not go into votes, and the ground for this lies in the definition itself: in a company oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends, "a person has no equivalent" is the lowest common ground of discussion, and to weigh it together with other considerations is to change the direction (own undertaking). Above the line, how the various parties' interests are traded off is where balancing belongs (own undertaking).
The comparison must be stated precisely. Britain and America have other baselines that are not weighed on directors' scales, labor law and safety regulation among them; Delaware's public benefit corporation, under §361, "shall be subject in all respects to the provisions of this chapter, except to the extent this subchapter imposes additional or different requirements." So it cannot be read as though there is only balancing on that side and no line. This series parts from them in only one place: in a company oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends, "a person has no equivalent" is not handed to directors to weigh; it is there before any weighing.
GS3 The baseline is made clear before investment, not weighed in a vote. "A person has no equivalent" constrains investors' votes; it is a line, not one consideration among many. Investors may change the direction; once they do, the company is no longer oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends and falls outside the scope of this series. Whether to lock it in, and how tightly, is left to the rule layer (per Institution Theory Z9; own undertaking).
§4 The Harder It Is to Leave, the Closer to an Internal Subject
This section is about the degree of a relation.
Who is inside a company is first identified by the two branches of the Prequel, §7: those in the entanglement the company handles, and those its acts reach who have no way to avoid it by exiting. The difficulty of leaving does not decide whether a person is protected by the line; what it affects is how much explanation and how many routes of questioning the company owes him (own undertaking).
Investors differ greatly in how hard it is for them to leave. Someone who has bought a single lot of shares on the exchange can sell them tomorrow; someone holding ten percent of the shares must take a lower price when selling, the large sale itself pushes the price down, and the market reads it as a signal; someone who has signed a lock-up cannot sell during the lock-up period. These can be examined: the price cut taken when selling, the signaling effect of a large sale, the lock-up period. The difficulty of leaving counts only these parts that can be examined. Psychological costs also make leaving harder: that a person cannot bear to sell, that he is attached to the company, may well be true; it is only that these cannot be examined, do not enter into the degree, and are his own affair.
The ground for this step lies in the second branch by which Institution Theory draws the interior: it takes "having no way to avoid it by exiting" as the condition for being inside; the difficulty of leaving coming in degrees is this condition coming in degrees (own undertaking). So where a person has invested more and actually finds it harder to exit, he is closer to being an internal subject, and the company owes him more explanation and more routes of questioning. A large shareholder therefore stands in two places at once. He holds greater power, and the checks on him are stronger (§1); he is also someone for whom leaving is harder, and the company owes him more explanation and more routes of questioning. The two do not cancel each other: he may not be given less explanation because he is subject to more checks; nor may the checks on him be relaxed because the company owes him more explanation.
Sometimes the difficulty of leaving is one's own choice. Under Elmseed Capital in the Kingdom State there is Elmseed Long-Term Partners, set up in Year 19, whose investors commit their capital for ten years or more, with no fixed date for exit. They have chosen of their own accord a kind of difficulty in leaving. Under this section, such investors are closer to the company, and the company owes them more explanation and more routes of questioning; the votes they hold are also subject to checks under §1.
GS4 The harder it is to leave, the closer to an internal subject. How close an investor's relation to the company is falls into degrees by the difficulty of leaving, counting only the part that can be examined; the harder it is to leave, the closer he is to an internal subject, and the more explanation and routes of questioning the company owes him (own undertaking); the greater his power, the stronger the checks on it (per Political Economy E14).
§5 Direction: Investment Can Also Be Cultivation
The first four sections spoke of the baseline and checks. This section speaks of direction.
Political Economy has already laid down: "The normative layer is not against the growth of capital; investment can give people conditions: funds, time, the cost of leaving an arrangement, a starting point for setting out on another road." (Political Economy Paper 5, E26) Patient capital, willing to give up part of its return in exchange for time, is creating conditions for others.
Elmseed Long-Term Partners did something of this kind. In the spring of Year 23 it put up the money to pay the liquidated damages under the non-compete for the veteran kiln worker in Bluekiln (the clause he ran into, described in the Prequel, §6), and then invested in the workshop he opened: a thirty percent holding, no directors appointed, only a quarterly report of the accounts; no dividends required, and after ten years the shares can be sold back to the workshop at an agreed price. The partnership's annual report for Year 24 gives its annualized return as four percent, "lower than Elmseed Buyout Fund." In Year 25 the workshop employed twenty-two people, nine of whom had been laid off by Bluekiln Porcelain Works that year.
These two things must be written separately. Long-term funds gave the workshop conditions: it could open, and could get through its first few years. That the workshop later hired people who had been laid off is the workshop's own affair; it cannot be written as low returns having bought these jobs.
The same investment also has other terms: if the founder sells the workshop, the partnership has a right of first refusal; for three years the workshop may not accept other investors. Political Economy has written: "One and the same investor can open a road in one place and hold others' road in another; the two are each read by their own effects." (ibid.) What these terms are is examined separately by their actual effects; they are not exempt from examination because the same investment opened a road elsewhere.
So there is a discipline here: low returns are not taken as evidence of virtue. "Long terms, low returns and not appointing directors do not, each alone, certify cultivation." (ibid.) Whether an investment actually becomes cultivation depends on whether the investee's routes of refusal and change of direction are still there, and whether elevation actually occurs and in whose own law it occurs; it does not depend on how high or low the return is. Nor does a high return prove colonization. Outcomes are not taken as rules.
Returns are given fairly, as agreed. Above the baseline, how much goes to dividends, how much to wages, how much is kept for the company to do more, how it is divided, is a trade-off in the Emergence Layer, left to each company and its rule layer.
Where This Paper Stops
This paper has laid down four propositions: shares are not ownership of people, and control is a position subject to checks (GS1); the company tells each party one and the same story, returns, information and exit are as agreed, and the controlling party does not use control to dominate minority shareholders (GS2); "a person has no equivalent" is made clear before investment and is not weighed in a vote, changing the direction takes a company out of scope, and whether to lock it in is left to the rule layer (GS3); the harder it is to leave, the closer to an internal subject, and the greater the power, the stronger the checks (GS4).
What it has not proved: which form of ownership is best; how the law locking in the baseline should be designed; how many votes it takes for a company to become, or cease to be, a public benefit corporation, which this paper has not examined and does not write. Bosch's foundation and Patagonia's collective were taken only for the ownership structure on the company side; how they themselves are run is not within this series.
Handed to the later papers: "one and the same story" extended to partners and to those who review the company, in Paper 4, §3 and Paper 5, §3; the three questions and independent channels, in Paper 2, §5 and Paper 6, §2; how the arrangements that keep the direction do not presuppose consensus, in Paper 6.
Remainders left: under what conditions a minority shareholder's investment falls on his Base Layer, this paper has given only a direction, not a threshold (§2); of the part of the difficulty of leaving that can be examined, this paper has listed only three items, and other forms of investment have their own, to be examined case by case (§4).
The Four Propositions of This Paper
GS1 Shares are not ownership of people. What a shareholding investor holds are rights fixed by the class of shares: a claim on residual earnings and a vote on certain matters, and the two can be held apart; neither shareholding nor control produces ownership of the people in the company. A controlling vote is a position; whoever holds it is subject to checks (per Political Economy E2, E14; own undertaking).
GS2 No deception; as agreed. The company tells investors, employees, users and partners one and the same story, and tells it also to those who review it; returns, information and exit are as agreed; the controlling party does not use control to dominate minority shareholders (per Political Economy E21, E22; own undertaking).
GS3 The baseline is made clear before investment, not weighed in a vote. "A person has no equivalent" constrains investors' votes; it is a line, not one consideration among many. Investors may change the direction; once they do, the company is no longer oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends and falls outside the scope of this series. Whether to lock it in, and how tightly, is left to the rule layer (per Institution Theory Z9; own undertaking).
GS4 The harder it is to leave, the closer to an internal subject. How close an investor's relation to the company is falls into degrees by the difficulty of leaving, counting only the part that can be examined; the harder it is to leave, the closer he is to an internal subject, and the more explanation and routes of questioning the company owes him (own undertaking); the greater his power, the stronger the checks on it (per Political Economy E14).
References
All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.
I · This system
Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384
Qin, H. (2026). Accumulation (SAE Political Economy, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874138
Qin, H. (2026). Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874142
Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146
Qin, H. (2026). Growth (SAE Political Economy, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874150
Qin, H. (2026). Kingdom of Ends vs Kingdom of Means: Phase-Transition Acceleration in the Age of AI (SAE Economics, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19396633
Qin, H. (2026). What a Company Is Not (SAE Theory of the Company, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045716
II · Statutes (originals, tier A)
Companies Act 2006 (UK), s.172. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/172 (current text; accessed 2026-11-07)
Delaware Code, Title 8, Chapter 1, Subchapter XV (Public Benefit Corporations), §§361, 362, 365. https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc15/index.html (accessed 2026-11-07)
III · Sources of the examples (company accounts, tier B)
Bosch. Bosch Group worldwide. bosch.us (accessed 2026-11-06)
Patagonia. (2022, September 14). [Press release on Patagonia's ownership arrangement]. https://www.patagoniaworks.com/press/2022/9/14/patagonias-next-chapter-earth-is-now-our-only-shareholder
IV · Constructed examples
The Kingdom State, Apple City, Crossways Group, the Kingdom State Public Employees' Pension Fund, Elmseed Capital and Elmseed Long-Term Partners, and the kiln workshop in Bluekiln are carried over from the examples set up in the Political Economy series; they are not real places, companies or terms.
Interfaces
Main upstream: Political Economy Paper 1, E2; Paper 3, E14; Paper 4, E21, E22; Paper 5, E26; Institution Theory Z9.
Also used: Political Economy Paper 5, E30 (a lock is itself a control arrangement); Paper 3, E16 (the three questions, set out in Paper 2, §5); Economics P6 (corroboration).
Examples: Bosch (B); Patagonia (B, structure only); section 172 of the UK Companies Act (A); Delaware public benefit corporations, §§361, 362, 365 (A); Crossways' two share classes, the pension fund's delegated voting and the proposal of Year 21 (constructed); Elmseed Long-Term Partners and the kiln workshop (constructed).
This series: the Prequel (a company is not the shareholders' property; being out of scope does not mean being unconstrained).
Handed to Paper 2: employees.