Self-as-an-End
SAE Theory of the Company · Paper 0

Theory of the Company and the Tradition: The Price Falls on What Is Done
公司论与传统:价格落在事上

Han Qin (秦汉) · Independent Researcher · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24045743 · Full PDF on Zenodo · CC BY 4.0
Abstract

The Prequel and the six papers of this series have been written. They ask how a company whose consensus includes "a human being is an end" treats its investors, its employees, its users, its partners and the people its acts reach. The answer is gathered into one main line: a person has no equivalent; a company buys what people do, not people; the price falls on what is done, not on the person. This paper lays down no propositions, and changes no sentence of the seven papers. It does four things. First it steps outside the seven papers and has this machine give an account of itself: what it asks and what it does not, how its sentence form and its three layers are arranged, how it divides the work with upstream. Next it interfaces with the tradition, at two depths: the schools whose originals have been examined are carried as far as the examination reaches: Kant, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., Friedman and the Business Roundtable go through all four steps; the Mackey–Friedman debate, Bebchuk and Tallarita, the British Academy's "Future of the Corporation" programme and Ciepley go through all four steps on the abstracts or pages examined; Freeman, and Hart and Zingales, examined only in one sentence or an abstract, go as far as the third step; the schools reached only through secondary material, Coase, Jensen and Meckling, Berle and Means, Anderson and Ferreras, go as far as the common question and the surface of contact. Several differences fall on two lines: how the purpose is formulated and how the line is put into effect; whether the argument relies on "winning." One more lies outside the two lines: where the line comes from. The second half of the main-line sentence this paper reads as having Kant's Academy edition IV 435 on its source side, and it states the distance between this reading and Kant's own line. Finally it settles accounts: how the items handed down from upstream land, what is adjacent and not taken up, what is handed downstream, and the six slots of remainders.

Writing Declaration: This paper was co-drafted with Claude (Anthropic). All intellectual decisions, framework design, and final editorial judgments were made by the author.

Introduction

This paper was written only after the seven papers were finished. A conversation is to be had once one's own object stands: only someone who knows what he himself is saying can tell where what others say differs from it. Each of the seven papers used real cases at the places where its judgments landed; those are facts, not interfacing; how this series interfaces with existing theories of the company has from the start been reserved for this paper.

This paper lays down no propositions, makes no new demands on the reader, and changes no sentence of the seven papers. When it cites this series, it gives the paper and the proposition number; when it cites the schools, it says only what each holds and where, and gives the smallest source that can be examined. The schools are interlocutors, not premises of this series; this paper does not write of this series correcting anyone, nor of anyone anticipating this series. Its structure follows Political Economy Paper 0: the machine's account of itself, method, interfacing school by school, handovers and remainders.

Outside texts are cited in four tiers, following Political Economy Paper 0:

  • Tier A: the sentence and its location have been confirmed in a reliable original; it is quoted as it stands, with the original and the location given;
  • Tier B: the quoted sentence has been examined in the original relied on, but the edition, the exact location or the full text has not yet been confirmed; it is quoted, with what it rests on and what has not been examined noted;
  • Tier C: it rests only on reliable secondary literature; it is only paraphrased, with what it rests on stated, and without quotation marks;
  • Cited at second hand: it rests only on what others have quoted; it follows the text relied on, is marked as cited at second hand, goes as far as the third step, and no objection is drafted;
  • What could not be confirmed is not cited.

Works written in English are quoted as they stand; German is given in my translation, with the original in parentheses. What is examined is the original given in parentheses, or, for works in English, the English as quoted.

§1 What Kind of Machine This Is

§1.1 What It Asks

How a company whose consensus includes "a human being is an end" treats its investors, its employees, its users, its partners and the people its acts reach: the baseline is not crossing the line, not treating anyone as something that can be traded off; the direction is giving conditions, so that the road each of these people goes on is wider; profit is a condition and a return, not the ultimate criterion; and the arrangements that keep this direction are themselves open to questioning.

It does not ask whether companies should exist, which form of ownership is best, or how high profit should be. It writes only about companies oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends; the direction of the Kingdom of Means serves only as a contrast (the Prequel, §6).

§1.2 Sentence Form and the Three Layers

The construct takes the ought, the position takes accountability, the person takes his own law: a company is a construct, and this series writes oughts for it; directors, managers and the CEO are in positions, and the series writes their accountability; employees, users and investors each have their own law, and the series writes no oughts for them.

The three layers are a method: the normative layer gives direction and the baseline; the rule layer only makes suggestions and may give examples; the judgment layer makes clear who decides and who is accountable; there is always a remainder. It judges the operation, not the person; it speaks only of structure, not of right and wrong, which does not mean that there is no right and wrong, but that no moral verdict is passed on a person or a company (the Prequel, §7).

§1.3 The Root and the Main Line

The main-line sentence: a person has no equivalent: a company buys what people do, not people; the price falls on what is done, not on the person.

Each of the seven papers lands it in one place:

  • Investment: shares are not ownership of people (GS1); the baseline is made clear before investment, not weighed in a vote (GS3).
  • Working Together: a company buys what is done, not people (GS5); a way out, a way forward, and a person's own affairs are his to decide (GS6).
  • Service: no locking in, no manipulation, no deception (GS8); health and safety are not traded for profit (GS8a); a model is judged by its execution, not by its name (GS9).
  • Partners: a person has no equivalent, all the way down the chain (GS10).
  • Society: the baseline is not crossing the line; contribution is a direction (GS11).
  • Keeping the Direction: the arrangements that keep the direction do not presuppose consensus (GS12); judging hard times, and answering for the judgment (GS13).

§1.4 The Division of Labor with Upstream

What Institution Theory, Political Economy and its Specialist Paper have already proved, this series does not prove again; it only brings it down to a company's relations with five parties: the interior is drawn by entanglement, in two branches (Institution Theory Z4); a construct's acts cross no line, which is not discounted under any condition (Institution Theory Z9); channels are independent of the party questioned, can be initiated, and initiating them brings no retaliation (Institution Theory Z34); power lies in the position that can mobilize accumulation (Political Economy Paper 1, E2); chokepoints and the sole position of supply at the life-substrate (Paper 2, E7, E11a); checks increase with the power-face, and the three questions (Paper 3, E14, E16); the two gates and exchange outside them (Paper 4, E21–E24); the rate of return is not the ultimate criterion (Paper 5, E28); support does not acquire the authority to decide a person's direction (Paper 6, E37); a way out, a way forward, and a person's own affairs (A Way Out, a Way Forward, E40, E41).

§2 The Method of Interfacing

§2.1 The Four Steps

Each conversation takes four steps: first, a common question that can be examined is sought; next, whether the two speak of the same thing; next, how far agreement goes, and where the two part; last, the strongest objection from the other side is written, with this series' reply. The objection is drafted by this paper, marked as drafted, and as far as possible made to touch the other side's strength.

§2.2 Two Depths

Where the original has been examined, the conversation is carried as far as the examination reaches. Where the full text or the original judgment has been examined, all four steps are taken: Kant, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., Friedman, the Business Roundtable. Where only an abstract, an organization's page or a few passages of a debate's original text have been examined, the four steps are taken on those sentences, and it is stated that beyond them this paper does not answer for the other side: the Mackey–Friedman debate, Bebchuk and Tallarita, the British Academy, Ciepley. Where only one sentence or an abstract has been examined and the material is not enough to draft a strong objection, the conversation goes as far as the third step, and where it stops is noted: Freeman, Hart and Zingales.

Where only secondary material is reached, the conversation goes as far as the common question and the surface of contact: Coase, Jensen and Meckling, Berle and Means, Anderson, Ferreras. In these units, this paper writes what its paraphrase rests on, where the surface of contact lies, and which question is to be decided once the original has been examined; it does not write a settled conclusion of "meeting" or "parting," nor does it use quotation marks.

§2.3 The Differences Fall on Two Lines

Once the conversations are written out, several differences fall on the same two lines. The two lines are this paper's generalization, not any school's own division, nor a classification of all the differences.

The first line: how the purpose is formulated, and how the line is put into effect. The schools dispute both the purpose of the company, "for shareholders," "for stakeholders," "for people and planet," and how purpose is put into effect as incentives, accountability and institutional arrangements. Along this line this paper asks: whatever the formulation of purpose, where is the actual line, who can set questioning in motion, and what efficacy the channel has (Political Economy Paper 5, E27, says that a goal's name and a statement do not by themselves confirm a reading; Paper 3, E16). This is this paper's way of asking; it is not a claim that the other side disputes only names.

The second line: whether the argument relies on "winning." Some defenses say that treating every party well also pays in the long run. The normative layer of this series does not rest its argument on "winning" (the Prequel, §3): the line is a line even when it does not pay.

One point outside the two lines: where the line comes from. At several places where the two part, the difference lies neither in how the purpose is written and put into effect, nor in whether it pays, but in the ground of the line: whether it is investors' preferences and mandate, or something already there before investment and outside any vote. This point is registered in the sixth slot of §7.

§3 The Root: Price and Dignity

§3.1 Kant (A)

The common question. What can be traded off.

The original. The Prequel, §5 cited these sentences. Academy edition IV 434: "In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can have something else put in its place as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity." ("Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist, mithin kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde.") IV 435, lines 7–9, says what it is that has dignity: "Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity." ("Also ist Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, so fern sie derselben fähig ist, dasjenige, was allein Würde hat.") Immediately afterwards: "Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination and humor have an affective price; on the other hand, fidelity in promising and benevolence from principles (not from instinct) have an inner worth." ("Geschicklichkeit und Fleiß im Arbeiten haben einen Marktpreis; Witz, lebhafte Einbildungskraft und Launen einen Affectionspreis; dagegen Treue im Versprechen, Wohlwollen aus Grundsätzen (nicht aus Instinct) haben einen innern Werth.") (my translation; per the Korpora transcription of the Academy edition)

Where they meet. The predicate of "a person has no equivalent" is taken from "kein Äquivalent verstattet" in IV 434; the subject is taken from the sentence at IV 435, lines 7–9: what has dignity is morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality. This series' "person" does not carry the antecedent "insofar as it is capable of morality," and is read as every person (own undertaking). The Second Enlightenment Paper 1 reads the same two pages: "A person has no equivalent: this layer carries on from Kant." (The Second Enlightenment Paper 1, §4) IV 435 then puts market price on "skill and diligence in work." Kant's line runs between a person's talents and a person's morality; this series takes up the distinction between price and dignity and carries it into the relation between a company and labor, reading it as running between what a person does and the person: a company buys what people do, and the price does not fall on the person; how far the authority acquired by employment extends is developed in Paper 2 (own undertaking). This is what "the source side" means; it is not a claim that Kant already wrote the main-line sentence.

Where they part. Kant's Kingdom of Ends is a community of rational beings; this series takes it as a direction, not as a state to be signed off (Institution Theory Z39). A company itself is not a member of the Kingdom of Ends; it has no first person (the Prequel, §1). That a company's assets or shares are priced does not mean that the people in it are priced; to buy or sell a company is not to buy or sell the people in it (Paper 2, GS5, GS6; mergers are handed to a later theory of the market) (own undertaking). Political Economy Paper 0 has already written one place where it departs from Kant: eligibility to vote is not conditioned on economic independence (Political Economy Paper 0, §3.2); this paper points to it and does not rewrite it.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper, from within Kant). By IV 435, what has a market price is skill and diligence, talents in the person himself, not what the person does; the price has already fallen on a part of the person. Your saying "the price does not fall on the person" runs exactly against this sentence.

Reply. This series grants that the line in IV 435 runs between talents and morality. But what IV 435 writes is, in the first place, "im Arbeiten," skill and diligence in work; what this series reads is precisely the use of talents in work: what a company buys is the stretch in which talents are applied to a task, not the talents themselves, still less the person. So what can be adjusted is what people do, posts, working hours, a part of income; the Base Layer is not traded away, and a way out and a way forward are not taken away (Paper 2, GS5, GS6). Time can be sold; the one who sells his time is not thereby bought (own undertaking). This reading stands some distance from Kant's letter: at "what is done," it comes close to "im Arbeiten"; at the subject term, where it drops the antecedent "capable of morality," it stands farther off. This paper registers this as it stands, and does not say that this is what Kant meant.

§4 For Whom a Company Is Run

The Political Economy Specialist Paper handed "for whom a company should be run" to the theory of the company (A Way Out, a Way Forward, "Where This Paper Stops"). This section receives it.

§4.1 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (A)

The original. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of Michigan wrote in 1919: "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes." (Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919); 170 N.W. 668, 684; per the text of the opinion in Harvard Law School's Caselaw Access Project) On the same page it also wrote: "There is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion to be exercised in good faith, the infinite details of business, including the wages which shall be paid to employees, the number of hours they shall work, the conditions under which labor shall be carried on, and the prices for which products shall be offered to the public." And: "it is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others" (ibid., 507).

The common question. For whom directors' powers are used.

Where they meet. Directors' powers are not their own; they are to be used for some end: the position takes accountability. The opinion writes one further layer: directors' discretion lies in the means, and does not extend to changing the end itself. On this point this series runs in the same direction: the direction is not changed by fiduciary positions such as directors and managers on their own (Paper 1, GS3; Paper 6, GS12; own undertaking). Nor does the opinion say that directors may never make a company earn less: wages, hours, labor conditions and prices remain within directors' good-faith discretion.

Where they part. For whom. This series answers "for people": for those who work in the company, for those who invest, for those who use what it makes, for those its acts reach; and it does not rank the parties (the Prequel, §1).

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). By the opinion, conducting a company for the primary purpose of benefiting others is not within the lawful powers of the board. You say that the line is made clear before investment and that investors accepted it; but by this prior acceptance alone, do directors acquire the authority to conduct the company in such a direction?

Reply. This series' line is not a discretion directors exercise under a given end; it is the company's direction itself, made clear before investment (Paper 1, GS3). In a company oriented toward the Kingdom of Ends, investors accepted on putting their money in that profit is a condition and a return, not the ultimate criterion. So guarding the line is not directors changing the end on their own; it is the investors who change the direction, and once they do, the company is out of this series' scope (Paper 1, §3). The layer the opinion asks about is whether directors can change the end on their own, and this series agrees that they cannot (own undertaking). But "made clear before investment" answers only whether directors have changed an existing end on their own; it does not by itself answer whether, in a particular jurisdiction and corporate form, such an end can be lawfully fixed, or what authority directors can acquire. This paper does not derive that legal conclusion from investors' prior acceptance. Existing formulations at the rule layer can serve as examples: under section 172(2) of the UK Companies Act, where the purposes of the company include purposes other than the benefit of its members, directors' duty is read by those purposes; Delaware's public benefit corporation writes a public benefit into its certificate and requires directors to balance among several parties (subsection (1) in Paper 1, §2; public benefit corporations in Paper 1, §3). These two show that the law can permit such a formulation, not that every jurisdiction permits it. There is also a layer that does not depend on direction: the lines that Institution Theory and Political Economy draw for every company are there before the purpose of any one company, and are not cancelled by any one company's purpose clause (the Prequel, §6).

§4.2 Friedman (A)

The original. In The New York Times Magazine of September 13, 1970, Friedman said that a corporate executive is "an employe of the owners of the business," and is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, "which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom"; further down in the same paragraph: "Of course, in some cases his employers may have a different objective." At the end of the article: there is one and only one social responsibility of business, to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits "so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud" (The New York Times Magazine, 1970-09-13, Section SM, p. 17, per the New York Times archive page).

The division of labor with Political Economy Paper 0. There the four steps have already been taken from the economic side: profit stays within the rules of the game; they part over where the boundary comes from (Political Economy Paper 0, §6.2). Here only two points are added from the company side.

Where they meet. "Without deception or fraud": this series says no deception, as agreed (Paper 1, GS2). Nor is this series' line settled by the executive personally: it is made clear before investment (Paper 1, GS3), and is not handed to the executive to choose a social goal for himself.

Where they part. Friedman explains the executive's responsibility by the owners' mandate. This series asks one step further: what authority the control that comes with shares can acquire over the other parties, and what limits it (Paper 1, GS1). Whether the boundary is handed to the rules of the day follows Political Economy Paper 0 and is not rewritten.

The strongest objection from the other side, and the reply. As in Political Economy Paper 0, §6.2; not rewritten.

§4.3 Mackey and Friedman, 2005 (B)

The original. In October 2005, Reason magazine published a debate. Whole Foods' founder Mackey said: "Making high profits is the means to the end of fulfilling Whole Foods' core business mission." Friedman answered: "The differences between John Mackey and me regarding the social responsibility of business are for the most part rhetorical." Speaking of founders setting up donations with their own money, he said: "They were clearly within their rights in doing so." (reason.com, 2005-10-01; the original has been examined; no page numbers)

The common question. Whether profit is a means or an end.

Where they meet (with Mackey). Profit is a condition, not the ultimate criterion (the Prequel, §3; Political Economy Paper 5, E28).

Where they part. After saying that the differences between the two are for the most part rhetorical, Friedman went on: "Strip off the camouflage, and it turns out we are in essential agreement. Moreover, his company, Whole Foods Market, behaves in accordance with the principles I spelled out in my 1970 New York Times Magazine article." In the next paragraph he said: "Had it devoted any significant fraction of its resources to exercising a social responsibility unrelated to the bottom line, it would be out of business by now or would have been taken over." This exchange falls on the second line, and the reading is this paper's (own undertaking): the principle of the 1970 article is increasing profits within the rules of the game; if the reasons for treating every party well are put here, then in the part justified by making money, the two converge. This series' line does not rest on that sentence: the line is a line even when it does not pay (Paper 1, GS3; Paper 3, GS8a). This paper does not say on Mackey's behalf whether he relies on "winning"; it reads only these sentences.

One more thing must be made clear. "Stated in advance and accepted by investors" is not where this series parts from Friedman: further down the same paragraph of the 1970 article he grants that owners may have a different objective, and in 2005 he too said that founders setting up donations with their own money were "clearly within their rights." Where they part is the ground of the line: this series' line is not grounded in investors' preferences or in the outcome of profit (Paper 1, GS3). Investors may change the direction, and once they do, the company leaves this series; what is not cancelled along with it are the lines Institution Theory and Political Economy draw for every company (the Prequel, §6) (own undertaking). This point lies outside the two lines: where the line comes from.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper, on the side of execution). The line is written in the articles, but when it is applied to decision after decision, it is still executives who judge hard times and judge the Base Layer; executive discretion comes back, only under another name.

Reply. That is why Paper 6 does not hand keeping the direction to executives' agreement: the position that judges gives reasons and submits to review, and if the judgment is wrong bears the consequences that correspond to the position (Paper 6, GS13); self-correcting channels are independent of the party questioned, and those who ask are not penalized for asking (Paper 6, GS12). The discretion is still there; the discretion is questioned.

§4.4 Freeman (B)

The original. In chapter 3 of Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Freeman writes that "there are groups and individuals who can affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organization's mission." (Cambridge chapter page; page number not confirmed)

The common question. Who is counted in.

Where they meet. Those affected are brought into consideration ("are affected by").

Where they part (only as far as this one sentence allows). This series examines separately how the people concerned enter into a relation of being inside (the two branches of Institution Theory Z4), and how the difficulty of leaving affects the strength of explanation and of checks (the Prequel, §7). That "who is counted in" and "the degree of a relation of being inside" are questions on the same layer has not been shown; this one sentence is not enough to judge where the two ways of identifying people part, and that is settled once the original book has been examined. Nor does this paper place, on Freeman's behalf, whether what he speaks of is a method of management or a normative baseline.

Having examined only one sentence, this paper drafts no objection.

§4.5 The Business Roundtable, 2019 (A)

The original. On August 19, 2019, the American Business Roundtable issued its Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, signed by 181 CEOs: "While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders." Its five commitments fall on customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders; the item on employees writes "We foster diversity and inclusion, dignity and respect."; and at the end it says: "Each of our stakeholders is essential." (businessroundtable.org)

The common question. To which parties a company has commitments.

Where they meet. The five parties almost coincide with this series' five: investors, employees, users, partners, society. The item on employees writes dignity.

Where they part. Where it lands. In this series, consensus is identified by where it lands: written into the articles and decision procedures, able to be invoked when decisions are made, able to be used to question; where the line is, and whether the channels of questioning have efficacy, are examined by the three questions (the Prequel, §5; Paper 6, GS12). A statement by itself has not yet answered these questions (own undertaking). What is judged is the statement as a document, not the companies that signed it.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). The Prequel counts one sentence said publicly by Barry-Wehmiller's CEO as a landing; why does a statement signed by one hundred and eighty-one CEOs not count?

Reply. Both can be invoked and used to question. Whether either has independent and effective channels of questioning must still be examined for both; the difference already visible here is whether it is tied to a particular decision. Barry-Wehmiller's sentence is tied to the furlough arrangement of 2009; the statement by itself is not tied to any decision. So the Prequel says only that the sentence "becomes one that can be used to question the company," not that it has already answered the three questions; and this paper speaks only of the statement itself, not of the signatory companies all lacking corresponding arrangements.

§4.6 Bebchuk and Tallarita (B)

The original. In The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (2020), Bebchuk and Tallarita conclude: "Stakeholderism, we conclude, is an inadequate and substantially counterproductive approach to addressing stakeholder concerns." "By making corporate leaders less accountable and more insulated from shareholder oversight," it "would impede or delay reforms that could bring real, meaningful protection to stakeholders"; "Stakeholderism should be rejected, including and especially by those who take stakeholder interests seriously." (Cornell Law Review 106, abstract; the body of the article not opened)

The common question. Who questions the company.

Where they meet. Merely handing the various parties to management's discretion leaves them unable to question, which comes to nothing. This is exactly the point of Paper 6: the channels of questioning must be independent of the party questioned (Paper 6, GS12) (own undertaking).

Where they part. Their conclusion is to reject stakeholder governance. This series does not choose a name between "for shareholders" and "for every party" (the first line). Its answer lies in channels: employees' voice (Paper 2, GS7), users being able to refuse and to leave (Paper 3, GS8, GS9), those who ask not being penalized for asking (Paper 6, GS12), the baseline not being weighed in a vote (Paper 1, GS3). Those who ask are not only shareholders. Beyond the abstract, how they design outside protections for the various parties this paper has not examined, and does not write.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). You draw lines for all five parties, but management still carries them out; the more lines, the more management can use one party to block another, and the less it is questioned.

Reply. This series' most direct answer is that lines do not go onto the scale (Paper 1, GS3): lines are not weighed against one another, and management cannot use one party's line to block another's; where one party can be used to block another is only above the line, at the layer where the various parties' interests are traded off, and there the answer is again given by the channels of questioning, examined by the three questions: who can activate it, what efficacy it has, how the party questioned cannot cancel it on its own (Political Economy Paper 3, E16). More lines do not replace the channels of questioning; once channels are set up, whether they have efficacy in conflict must still be examined. Examined in this way, this series' own example shows a gap: the right to sue in a Delaware public benefit corporation is given only to stockholders who meet the threshold (Paper 6, §2).

§4.7 The British Academy, "Future of the Corporation" (B)

The original. In 2019 the British Academy's "Future of the Corporation" programme published its Principles for Purposeful Business: "the purpose of business is to solve the problems of people and planet profitably, and not profit from causing problems." The first of the eight principles is that corporate law should place purpose at its center (thebritishacademy.ac.uk, publication page; the body of the report not opened).

The common question. What a company's purpose is written as.

Where they meet. "Profitably": profit is a condition (the Prequel, §3). "Not profit from causing problems": costs are not pushed onto others (Paper 5, GS11). "Corporate law placing purpose at its center" runs in the same direction as Paper 1's "the baseline is made clear before investment" (Paper 1, GS3).

Where they part. "People and planet": this series says only that a company exists for people. The planet is not a person; the environment comes in through the people the company's acts reach (Paper 1's taking from Patagonia only the structure; Paper 5) (own undertaking). The first line: whatever the purpose is written as, this paper asks where the line is and what efficacy the channels have. This end rests on the organization's page, and does not answer for the complete argument of any author in the programme.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). Not writing the planet lets pass the harms that do not fall on any one person: the disappearance of a species, an uninhabited sea.

Reply. This series comes in only through people: society is identified item by item by "having no way to avoid a given act by exiting" (Paper 5, §1), and the environment comes in through the people the company's acts reach. Harms that do not fall on any one person this series does not cover, and this is registered as it stands in the second slot of §7. How people who come later are counted under "having no way to avoid it by exiting" Paper 5 has not written either, and this is registered in the fourth slot.

§4.8 Hart and Zingales (B)

The original. In the abstract of "Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value" (2017), Hart and Zingales write that "shareholders are prosocial and externalities are not perfectly separable from production decisions"; "We argue that maximization of shareholder welfare is not the same as maximization of market value." (Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting 2(2): 247–274, abstract)

The common question. Whether all investors want is money.

Where they meet. Investors are first of all people, each with ends of his own (Paper 1, §1).

Where they part. They start from investors' welfare; this series' baseline does not come from investors' preferences: it is made clear before investment, outside investors' votes (Paper 1, GS3) (own undertaking). This point lies outside the two lines: where the line comes from. Beyond the abstract, their design has not been examined, and is not written.

Resting only on the abstract, this paper drafts no objection.

§4.9 Where This Section Stops

The schools dispute both purpose and its being put into effect. This series, whatever the purpose is written as, asks where the line is, who can ask, and whether asking has any effect. "For whom a company should be run," handed over by the Specialist Paper, is received here in the part that falls within this series' range and intersects the texts this paper has examined; the British Academy end rests on the organization's text, and does not answer for the complete argument of any one author.

§5 What a Firm Is, and Who Owns It

§5.1 Coase (C)

Paraphrased from the Coase entry in Econlib's Concise Encyclopedia of Economics relied on by Political Economy Paper 0: in "The Nature of the Firm" (1937), Coase asks why firms exist, and the answer is that using the market has costs (Political Economy Paper 0, §5.2). Surface of contact: both ask why firms exist. The Prequel, §1 writes that things several people cannot do each on their own, but can do together, need a construct that can hold resources, enter into agreements and bear consequences. To be decided once the original has been examined: whether this sentence and "using the market has costs" answer the same question; whether "existing for people" is another question.

§5.2 Jensen and Meckling (cited at second hand)

Per Gindis 2020's paraphrase: Jensen and Meckling define the firm as a legal fiction serving as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. No quotation marks are used here. Surface of contact: a company is not a person (the Prequel, §1). To be decided once the original has been examined: whether a nexus of contracts can serve as the address of an ought; this series writes oughts for the construct, and the construct is the address of attribution (Political Economy Paper 1, E2).

§5.3 Berle and Means (C)

As in Political Economy Paper 0, §5.1; not rewritten. The one sentence this series adds there: control is a position, and is subject to checks (Paper 1, GS1). The votes at Crossways are the same example in both series.

§5.4 Ciepley (B)

The original. In the abstract of "Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation" (2013), Ciepley writes: "Corporations are government-like in their powers, and government grants them both their external 'personhood' and their internal governing authority." "They are thus not simply private." Yet "they are privately organized and financed and therefore not simply public."; corporations need to be placed in a separate category, "neither public nor private, but 'corporate'". He also says that "The liberal effort to assimilate them, treating them as contractually constituted associations of private property owners, endows them with rights they ought not have" (American Political Science Review 107(1): 139–158, abstract).

The common question. Where a company's power comes from, and what constrains it.

Where they meet. A company has a power-face, and must be subject to checks (Paper 1, GS1; Paper 4, GS10).

Where they part. Ciepley reads it from the government's grant; this series reads it from the power-face: whether or not there is a grant, wherever the power-face is, the checks go (Political Economy Paper 3, E14) (own undertaking). The two also come close at one point: Political Economy says that the power of capital comes from "the narrative of possession is carried by society, and others register it as possession" (Political Economy Paper 1, E2), which, in its "coming from outside," is close to "grant." This paper has examined only the abstract, and does not settle here how near or far the two are. What rights companies ought to have this series does not enter into.

The strongest objection from the other side (drafted by this paper). Without asking about the grant, one cannot say on what ground a state makes rules for companies.

Reply. That question belongs between states and companies, and is handed to a later theory of the market. This series asks only how one company treats five parties; its oughts for the company do not presuppose whether a state has granted anything, nor does it answer for the state on what ground it makes rules.

§6 The Workplace

§6.1 Anderson (C)

Paraphrased from Princeton University Press's description of the book: Private Government (2017) reads many workplaces as arbitrary private governments, and questions the claim that free markets make workers free. Political Economy Paper 0 also paraphrases, from Estlund's 2018 review: the freedom to quit is not enough to protect employees (Political Economy Paper 0, §5.3). The surface of contact is in Paper 2: being able to leave is the baseline, but being able to leave is not enough, and employees' voice must also be real (Paper 2, GS6, GS7). To be decided once the original has been examined: whether the reading "private government" and this series' "judging practices without characterizing a company" speak on the same layer.

§6.2 Ferreras (C)

Paraphrased from Cambridge University Press's description of the book: Firms as Political Entities (2017) regards the firm as a political entity through "economic bicameralism"; a blurb recorded on the page sums up the proposal as a two-chamber body representing workers and the owners of capital. Surface of contact: "what form workplace democracy takes," handed over by the Specialist Paper. This series leaves the form to the rule layer and requires only that employees' voice be real (Paper 2, GS7); bicameralism is one form that can be chosen. To be decided once the original has been examined: bicameralism's answers to the three questions: who can activate it, what efficacy it has, whether the party questioned can cancel it on its own.

§6.3 Pointers

González-Ricoy: exit is not enough, and regulation cannot be comprehensive either; the Specialist Paper has already compared this (A Way Out, a Way Forward, §3, tier A). Hirschman: as in Political Economy Paper 0, §7.3. Germany's Codetermination Act: Paper 2, §5.

§7 Handovers and Remainders

§7.1 What Upstream Expressly Handed On

Settlement follows Political Economy Paper 0: delivered, publicly reassigned, publicly withdrawn. The table below is the receiving side's own account, not an acceptance made on upstream's behalf.

From What was handed on Settlement Where it lands
Political Economy Paper 0 The design of a company's internal governance Delivered at the normative layer; particular designs publicly reassigned to the rule layer, with this series giving only examples GS1, GS7, GS12
ibid. The two organizational types of Economics P6 Delivered as corroboration; the definition by membership composition stays in the theoretical passages, and in the front text types are identified by consensus and practice The Prequel, §5, §6
ibid. The unfolding at the level of the company of the Corporate Principles in Appendix C of How Is Institution Possible Delivered as examples at the rule layer, bearing no weight; the priority chain is not taken, and the normative layer does not rank The rule layer of each paper
ibid. Labor terms other than non-competes Delivered at the normative layer; wage levels and the statutory procedure for layoffs are not done Paper 2, GS5–GS7
Specialist Paper For whom a company should be run Delivered The Prequel, §1; §4 of this paper
Specialist Paper How authority is divided inside a company Delivered at the normative layer GS1, GS7, GS12
Specialist Paper What form workplace democracy takes Publicly reassigned to the rule layer: only that the voice be real is required GS7; §6 of this paper

§7.2 Adjacent, Not Taken Up

Tax is not within the theory of the company, and is dealt with separately. Competition, mergers, ranking the platform's own offerings first, breakup, and rule-making and enforcement between states and companies are handed to a later theory of the market. Partners in the sense of co-owners and founders are handed to a later specialist paper. Non-profit organizations and foundations as such this series does not write about. What rights companies ought to have (Ciepley's question) is not entered into.

§7.3 Handed Downstream

  • A theory of the market: the identification of chokepoints and competition review; rule-making and enforcement between states and companies.
  • Specialist papers of the theory of the company: founders and co-owners; if written, non-profit organizations and foundations.
  • Tax: if it becomes a series of its own.
  • Specific theories of institutions: recalls, whistleblowing, supply chain due diligence, platform rules, thresholds for donations and for leaving office.

§7.4 Where This Series Stops

Registration is in six slots, following Political Economy Paper 0. What the six slots distinguish is the nature of what was not continued; they are not six blanks that every series is to fill.

The first slot: the remainder this construct itself has left. How hard it is to leave counts only the part that can be examined, and there is no commensurable ruler (the Prequel, §7); at what point a price counts as taking away the Base Layer of the people on the partner's side has no threshold (Paper 4, §2); whether hard times are real: this series provides no uniform procedure for testing the facts, the evidence of hard times must still be examinable, and the determination can be reviewed (Paper 6, GS13).

The second slot: objects adjacent to the jurisdiction. Tax; competition, and states and companies; the rights of companies; harms that do not fall on any one person (§4.7 of this paper).

The third slot: conclusions that have reached their limit. A company has no first person, and writing down a consensus does not make it a good person; the arrangements that keep the direction do not guarantee that it is kept (Paper 6, §4). This is what this layer can give; it is not that a way has not yet been found.

The fourth slot: research candidates. In the channels that keep the direction, who can activate them: how employees, users and society have a share (Paper 6's observation on Delaware §367); how people who come later are counted among those the company's acts reach (§4.7 of this paper); how AI helps users think clearly about what they really want (Economics P6, corroboration); Kant's dignity carries the antecedent "capable of morality," and this series' "person" does not; Kant's line runs between talents and morality, and this series reads it as between what is done and the person; whether these two distances can be shortened from Kant's own text (§3 of this paper).

The fifth slot: handovers whose address is already fixed. A theory of the market; specialist papers of the theory of the company; tax; specific theories of institutions: see §7.3.

The sixth slot: questions that could be seen only against the schools. How the purpose is formulated and how the line is put into effect: the schools dispute both purpose and its being put into effect; this series, whatever the purpose is written as, asks about the line and the channels (the first line). "Winning": if treating every party well is defended by "it also pays," then in that part it converges with the shareholder-primacy end (the second line). Where the line comes from: the points where Friedman, and Hart and Zingales, part from this series lie here, not on the two lines; this series' line is not grounded in investors' preferences or in the outcome of profit (Paper 1, GS3).

Where This Paper Stops

This paper lays down no propositions and has changed no sentence of the seven papers. It has interfaced this series once with existing theories of the company, and registered as it stands to which layer each school was examined: Kant, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., Friedman and the Business Roundtable, examined in the original; the Mackey–Friedman debate, Bebchuk and Tallarita, the British Academy and Ciepley, examined in the debate's original text, an abstract or an organization's page; Freeman, and Hart and Zingales, examined in one sentence or an abstract; Coase, Jensen and Meckling, Berle and Means, Anderson and Ferreras, reached only through secondary material or at second hand.

What it has not done: it has not proved whether stakeholder governance or shareholder primacy is right, and this series does not choose between the two names; it has not given a complete reply to any school, and has not entered into any argument beyond the abstracts; the Berle–Dodd debate of 1931–32, Hansmann's The Ownership of Enterprise, and Blair and Stout's team production theory, this paper has not obtained in the original, and does not cite.

What it leaves: the six slots of §7.

References

All SAE works below are cited by concept DOI, which always resolves to the latest version.

I · This system

Qin, H. (2026). To Whom the Ought Is Addressed (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23269635

Qin, H. (2026). Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23270384

Qin, H. (2026). Open to Questioning (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23271324

Qin, H. (2026). Accumulation (SAE Political Economy, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874138

Qin, H. (2026). Chokepoints (SAE Political Economy, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874140

Qin, H. (2026). Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874142

Qin, H. (2026). Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874146

Qin, H. (2026). Growth (SAE Political Economy, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874150

Qin, H. (2026). Support (SAE Political Economy, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874154

Qin, H. (2026). Political Economy and the Tradition: Accumulated Power (SAE Political Economy, Paper 0) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23874158

Qin, H. (2026). A Way Out, a Way Forward (SAE Political Economy, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24021385

Qin, H. (2026). Kingdom of Ends vs Kingdom of Means: Phase-Transition Acceleration in the Age of AI (SAE Economics, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19396633

Qin, H. (2026). Is It Worth It? (SAE The Second Enlightenment, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24030395

Qin, H. (2026). What a Company Is Not (SAE Theory of the Company, Prequel) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045716

Qin, H. (2026). Investment (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045721

Qin, H. (2026). Working Together (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045723

Qin, H. (2026). Service (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045731

Qin, H. (2026). Partners (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 4) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045733

Qin, H. (2026). Society (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045735

Qin, H. (2026). Keeping the Direction (SAE Theory of the Company, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24045739

II · External works (originals, tier A)

Kant, I. (1903). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785). In Kant's gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. IV, S. 385–463. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Pages cited AA 4:434–435, per the Korpora transcription of the Academy edition: https://korpora.org/kant/aa04/434.html; https://korpora.org/kant/aa04/435.html

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Page cited 204 Mich. at 507; per the text of the opinion in the Caselaw Access Project (Harvard Law School): https://static.case.law/mich/204/cases/0459-01.json

Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. The New York Times Magazine, Section SM, p. 17. https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html

Business Roundtable. (2019, August 19). Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation. https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans

Companies Act 2006 (UK), s.172. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/172 (current text; accessed 2026-11-07)

Delaware Code, Title 8, Chapter 1, Subchapter XV (Public Benefit Corporations), §§362, 365. https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc15/index.html (accessed 2026-11-07)

III · External works (tier B)

Friedman, M., Mackey, J., & Rodgers, T. J. (2005, October 1). Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business. Reason. https://reason.com/2005/10/01/rethinking-the-social-responsi-2/ (the original has been examined; no page numbers)

Bebchuk, L. A., & Tallarita, R. (2020). The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance. Cornell Law Review, 106. (per the abstract on the journal page; the body of the article not opened)

The British Academy. (2019). Principles for Purposeful Business (Future of the Corporation). https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publications/future-of-the-corporation-principles-for-purposeful-business/ (per the organization's page; the body of the report not opened)

Hart, O., & Zingales, L. (2017). Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value. Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 2(2), 247–274. https://hart.scholars.harvard.edu/publications/companies-should-maximize-shareholder-welfare-not-market-value (per the abstract)

Freeman, R. E. (2010). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (reissue), ch. 3. Cambridge University Press. https://cambridge.org/core/books/strategic-management/stakeholder-management-framework-and-philosophy/A5FC17FDDAADAE1777CF66EA217C8567 (per the chapter page; page number not confirmed)

Ciepley, D. (2013). Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation. American Political Science Review, 107(1), 139–158. https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v107y2013i01p139-158_00.html (per the abstract)

IV · External works (tier C and at second hand: the secondary material relied on)

Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. (original not consulted; paraphrased from the Econlib entry relied on by Political Economy Paper 0; tier C)

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. (original not consulted; paraphrased from Gindis 2020; cited at second hand)

Gindis, D. (2020). On the origins, meaning and influence of Jensen and Meckling's definition of the firm. Oxford Economic Papers, 72(4), 966–984. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaa012 (abstract)

Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan. (original not consulted; as in Political Economy Paper 0; tier C)

Anderson, E. (2017). Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don't Talk about It). Princeton University Press. (paraphrased from the publisher's description; tier C)

Ferreras, I. (2017). Firms as Political Entities: Saving Democracy through Economic Bicameralism. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/firms-as-political-entities/BF7F769E2A12B93EAE919F059E077072 (paraphrased from the publisher's description; tier C)

Interfaces

Main upstream: the seven papers (GS1–GS13, with GS8a).

Also used: Institution Theory Z4, Z9, Z34, Z39; Political Economy Paper 1, E2, Paper 2, E7, E11a, Paper 3, E14, E16, Paper 4, E21–E24, Paper 5, E27, E28, Paper 6, E37; Political Economy Paper 0 (§3.2, §5, §6.2, §7.3); A Way Out, a Way Forward, E40, E41 and §3; Economics P6 (corroboration); The Second Enlightenment Paper 1, §4 (continuing the source).

Interfacing: Kant (A); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (A); Friedman 1970 (A); the Business Roundtable 2019 (A); Mackey and Friedman 2005 (B); Bebchuk and Tallarita (B); the British Academy (B); Hart and Zingales (B); Freeman (B); Ciepley (B); Coase, Berle and Means, Anderson, Ferreras (C); Jensen and Meckling (at second hand).

Handed downstream: a theory of the market; specialist papers of the theory of the company; tax (if set up); specific theories of institutions.