Can and Cannot
能与不能

Introduction

Another year went by, and the same thing came around again.

This time it was a different report and a different team, but it looked much like last time: the report went only to the higher-ups, and the other team would not see the problem until the next quarter. This time he did not spend long thinking about it. He did not regard the other team as people it was all right to keep in the dark; he had avowed that last time, and he still avowed it now. Going to say something about it was, for him, a cannot-not.

But this time he did not go.

That month he had just been ill for two weeks. When he came back, work was piled all over his desk, and he was still weak. He was also afraid. Last time he had spoken up, and at year end he was rated in the third tier, lost a chunk of his bonus, and did not get onto the team he had hoped to join. This year his manager had said several times, "Let's all keep things steady this year." He named no one, but he understood. He spotted the problem on Monday; on Wednesday he made up his mind to speak up, and he wrote an email, which he never sent. Then the fever came back for several days. By the time he was at his desk again, the report had been submitted. The next quarter, the other team's problem surfaced just the same.

What he could never afterward make out was this: that time, was he so afraid that he could not do it, or did he in fact not want to do it, and refuse to admit it?

Paper 1 described how a person draws a line (D1–D7), Paper 2 how he walks out of other people's rules (D8–D12), and Paper 3 whether the line he has drawn is his own (D13–D18). None of them spoke of one further thing: the line is clear, and the person does not walk by it. Value Theory handed the whole question of how judgment, habit, hesitation and capacity enter an ordering of action to this series (Value Theory P5, final section); among the questions Meaning Theory handed over are body, emotion, capacity and habit as well (Meaning Theory P4, §5). What this paper sets out to answer is how body, emotion, capacity, habit and hesitation enter a person's action without deciding for him what his law is; and, when he did not manage it, how the matter is recorded and how it is spoken of. The answer goes in seven steps. §1 says that can and cannot are not a law. §2 takes up habit, which changes the cost of not-doing. §3 takes up hesitation. §4 follows him through that one Wednesday to set out the four positions of an action in time. §5 takes up self-preservation. §6 takes up the time one could not carry it. §7 takes up the real cannot and the final cannot. Each section establishes one proposition, seven in all (D19–D25), listed together at the end. The text names no outside theorists and cites no historical events; the conclusions of upstream papers are restated only in plain words, with the paper noted in parentheses; how this paper connects with existing theories is left to Paper 0.

This paper stays closest to daily life. It does not teach people how to improve their follow-through, nor does it set a reading for rest and work.

§1 Can and Cannot Are Not a Law

On Thursday morning his fever reached 39°C, and he could not get out of bed. He did not go and speak up that day.

This much is simple. Not being able to get out of bed is a fact; it entered his judgment that day, and that day he could not go. It is a reason. It is not an excuse: an excuse uses one story to cover something else, and that morning there was nothing else to cover. Nor is it a revision of that law: he did not, because of a fever, come to hold that the other team were people it was all right to keep in the dark.

In everyday talk these three are often mixed together. To say "He was ill, so that's the end of that" is to speak of a reason as if it were a revision. To say "Ill or not, he could have made a phone call; he just didn't want to" is to speak of a fact as if it were evidence against him.

Body, emotion and capacity can all enter judgment in this way. They are facts, and they can also become reasons: whether he has a fever today, whether he can muster the strength for it, whether he can explain a complicated matter clearly in front of a team lead he does not know. Paper 1 said that the prudence one can speak of in an afternoon lies in comparing, and one of the things compared is whether the thing can be done (Paper 1, D7); Value Theory left this prudence to this series (Value Theory P5 V70). What this paper talks about is where these cans and cannots come from.

They are not value judgments. A change in the body is not an avowal, nor a revision or an exit; it can hang under some entry and be remembered along with it, without being counted separately as something he changed (Meaning Theory P1 Y2). Being tired shows that he is tired; it does not show that he does not want to. Being afraid shows that he is afraid; it does not show that he disavows. A person who is afraid to speak in front of his manager is not thereby shown to think little of honesty; a person who is not good at explaining things clearly is not thereby shown not to care about the other team. This is exactly the question Meaning Theory handed over: how body, emotion and capacity enter action without being reduced to value judgments (Meaning Theory P4, §5).

Emotion has one more layer. His fear was not empty: the price he paid last time was real, and so were his manager's words. There are facts in fear, and these facts can enter his judgment; he can still weigh how much speaking up would cost him (Paper 3, §1). Fear can also grow larger than the facts: it magnifies the possible cost and crowds everything else out. Once fear has come in, it is still he who judges; fear does not judge for him.

The reverse holds too. Not being able to carry it today does not mean this law is no longer his. Meaning Theory has said that temporary incapacity, an interruption in expression, or a drop in the strength one can put into exercising it is not by itself enough to show that his first-person position has exited; this is a one-way negation, and it guarantees nothing in reverse (Meaning Theory P4 Y28). Value Theory has said that something avowed does not lose its standing by being long out of running; its standing changes only through revision or exit (Value Theory P4 V53). In those days he could not go, and the law was still there.

D19 Body, emotion and capacity can enter judgment as facts and reasons; they are not value judgments, and do not decide for a person what his law is; being tired is not not wanting, and being afraid is not disavowing.

§2 Habit: The Cost of Not-Doing

He had two habits, and both were present this time.

One was left to him by the older colleague: when looking at a report, first ask who it is for (Paper 3, §2). This habit let him see the problem at a glance on Monday. For someone without this habit, the glance would have passed right over it, and not speaking up would cost him almost nothing. For him it was different: having seen it, to act as though he had not seen it came dear.

The other was bred in him by the company: when a report comes into his hands, first look at whether the numbers look good (Paper 3, §2). This habit pulled the other way. Good-looking numbers, a report handed in on time: these he could produce without thinking. Speaking up meant stopping what he was doing, finding someone, explaining, and every step took effort. So not speaking up became cheap.

So what habit changes is the cost of not-doing (Meaning Theory P4, §5). It does not change what he has avowed; it makes some not-doings cheap and others dear. Paper 1 said that not-doing is the drawing of a line (Paper 1, D1); habit does not draw the line for him; what it changes is which side takes less effort to draw.

This has two sides. A law is held in place by habit. No one can think every matter through from the beginning; on days too busy to think, it is those habits that keep watch for him. The older colleague's habit caught the problem for him in the most chaotic days after his illness. A law is also swapped out within habit. The habit of first looking at whether the numbers look good was given from outside at first; done long enough, it ran by itself. Value Theory has said that an external warrant can be made into habit and thereafter recur by itself: "Automatic, effortless, persistent — none of these moves the resting point of the chain of standing" (Value Theory P3 V37). Nor does habituation produce ownership (Value Theory P4 V46). This is where the swap happens: the more smoothly a habit runs, the more it looks like his own; but whether something goes smoothly is only a clue, and it can be bent by habit (Paper 1, D6).

That week, the cheap side won. This does not show that he changed his law. In those days he also had no time to sort out which habit was keeping watch for him and which was running for someone else.

D20 What habit changes is the cost of not-doing: it makes some not-doings cheap and others dear; a law is held in place by habit, and is also swapped out within habit.

§3 Hesitation

From Monday to Wednesday he hesitated for three days. The three days were not alike.

On Monday and Tuesday he had not yet decided. He had seen the problem, but he had not yet checked whether it was a real problem, how large it was, or whether the other team already knew. He went through the data, looked up how last quarter's figures had been defined, and asked a colleague. This is what Paper 1 calls what cannot yet be judged: a matter has entered consideration but cannot yet be judged (Paper 1, D4). Hesitation at this point is judgment still at work.

On Wednesday morning he decided: the problem was real, the other team did not know, and he would go and speak up. From that moment the hesitation changed kind: decided, but not yet moving.

These two kinds of hesitation are often taken for one, and often counted together as weakness. Both are wrong. Hesitation before deciding often means the facts have not yet been checked; not to hesitate at such a time would itself be suspect. Hesitation after deciding but before moving can hold many things: waiting for a better moment, since Paper 1 said that when it is better to speak is itself among the things he compares (Paper 1, D7); gathering his strength; or fear. From the outside, all of these look like the same not-moving. That a person hesitates is not enough, by itself, to judge him weak.

Nor is hesitation the judgment itself. Before deciding, the judgment is not yet finished; after deciding but before moving, the judgment has been made, and the hesitation is the stretch between judging and moving. Take hesitation for judgment, and one thinks that holding back is the same as having decided not to do it; take judgment for hesitation, and one thinks that having decided is already having moved.

The time within hesitation is his own. No one can decide for him by which day of the week he is to decide, or within how many hours of deciding he is to set off. But the matter has its own timing: the report was due on Friday, and once it was in, speaking up about it became a different thing. The time is his; the window is not. That the window has closed is a fact, and it enters his next judgment; it does not reach back and rewrite those three days as a decision not to go.

D21 Hesitation is of two kinds: not yet decided, and decided but not yet moving; weakness cannot be judged from either kind alone, and neither is itself the judgment; the time within hesitation is the person's own.

§4 Starting, Sustaining, Interrupting, Changing

That Wednesday went like this.

At ten in the morning he decided, and began writing the email. This is starting.

At noon, at the weekly meeting, his manager said once again, "Let's all keep things steady this year." He went back to his desk; the email was still open, and he kept writing. This is sustaining: a thing once begun is carried on stretch by stretch, and any stretch can break off.

At three in the afternoon he felt the fever coming back. He saved the email as a draft, took leave and went home. This is interrupting.

In the evening, lying in bed, he thought that an email could not make it clear; better to wait until the fever broke and tell the other team's lead in person. This is changing.

An action in time has at least these four positions: starting, sustaining, interrupting, changing (Meaning Theory P4, §5). One and the same stop is read by the step at which it stops.

Interrupting is not giving up. He stopped at three in the afternoon because the fever came back; the law did not move, and he did not strike the matter out. Meaning Theory has said that the record of an action records only whether it was done and how; one cannot infer from his not doing it this once that he is no longer headed that way, nor from his still being headed that way that the action will certainly happen (Meaning Theory P1 Y12). The same holds for a long stop: a long interruption does not revoke an avowal (Value Theory P4 V46).

Changing is not betraying. In the evening he changed the email into a talk in person; what he changed was how to go about it: by what means, at what time, with whom. The Conflict Treatise has said that the arrangement of time, resources, roles, procedure and the conditions of action is not on the same layer as a law; the arrangement can change while not a single law changes (Conflict Treatise §8).

The Conflict Treatise used this way of seeing in its own setting: one and the same leaving divides into at least four kinds, according to what state the handling is in at the moment of leaving: avoidance, withdrawing first for safety, removal, suspension (Conflict Treatise §12). This paper applies it to action in general: one and the same stop is a different thing depending on whether it comes before starting, in the middle of sustaining, or after changing. This extension is this series' own to answer for.

Nor do the four positions guarantee that a thing gets done. He changed his plan and meant to speak in person; then the fever came back for several more days, and by the time he returned the report had been submitted. He never went to speak in person. Where did it stop: was it interrupted all along, was it given up by him, or had he never really meant to go? This section cannot answer that; it is left to §6, and to looking back.

D22 An action has four positions in time: starting, sustaining, interrupting and changing; interrupting is not giving up, changing is not betraying, and one and the same stop is read by the step at which it stops.

§5 Self-Preservation

That afternoon he took leave and went home, and some would say he was using his illness to dodge the matter. This section first sets another thing in place.

Self-preservation rests first of all on this: one is also an end. The Moral Law says that to recognize oneself as an end is to recognize that one needs preserving, and that to recognize oneself as an end is at the same time to recognize others as ends (Moral Law P6 §5.2). So self-preservation is not selfishness, nor does it set up an order of precedence between oneself and others. When he went home with a fever and lay down, his lying down needed no proof beforehand that he would work better afterward; he lay down first of all because he, too, is an end.

Self-preservation also reaches into what one does for others. A person who takes others as ends too will cultivate them: help another person's own law unfold, without putting his own purposes in its place (Paper 3, §6). Cultivation wears people down. This system has written, in the Economics series, that the one who cultivates can himself be drained, his perception blunting and his patience thinning: "This is not moral failure; it is structural limit" (Economics P2 §4.3). The same place also describes another tendency: because one sees the other as an end, one is apt to read the slightest stir in him as a sign that he is about to unfold, even when it is only a performance put on for something else (Economics P2 §4.3). So self-preservation includes two things: not cultivating to excess; and, in a relationship one has judged one cannot cultivate, not wearing oneself out (Moral Law P6 §5.2). How one judges whether one can or cannot cultivate is the business of Paper 6; this paper says only this one sentence, from the side of self-preservation.

One point here cannot be inflated. A person who is worn out is not someone who can carry nothing at all. He was very tired that week, yet on Wednesday morning he decided all the same, and wrote the email all the same. Tiredness entered his judgment; what it changed was whether he could do it this time and how far he could take it, not letting him off altogether. "When you're tired, you don't have to do anything" and "Being tired doesn't count" are the two ends of one and the same mistake: one turns a fact into an exemption, the other turns a fact into nothing.

Self-preservation can also be used to cover something else. He went home that afternoon because the fever came back; in the days after, he did not make a single phone call to the other team. Was that the fever, or was it relief? Self-preservation is a real reason, and precisely because it is real, it is the handiest thing for covering something else. At the time this could not be told apart; it is left to looking back (Paper 3, §5). The Conflict Treatise drew the same distinction in its own setting: withdrawing first for safety is not avoidance; leaving under another name without having faced the matter is avoidance (Conflict Treatise §12). Self-preservation is the first kind; leaving under the name of self-preservation is the second.

D23 Self-preservation rests first of all on one's also being an end: not cultivating to excess, and not wearing oneself out in a relationship one cannot cultivate.

§6 The Time One Could Not Carry It

The report went in. The next quarter, the other team's problem surfaced, and it was much harder to clean up than it would have been if caught early. Afterward, there were three ways he could tell it.

One is to tell it honestly: "I saw it, I meant to speak up, and I didn't manage to."

One is to say he did it: "I raised it at the time." In fact he never raised it; the email stayed in his drafts all along.

One is to say the law was never his: "The other team's business was never mine to deal with, and I never felt it was something I could not keep quiet about."

These three accounts are recorded differently. First, how things are recorded.

In Meaning Theory this system set up two ledgers (Meaning Theory P1 Y2). One is called the value history: it records the avowals, revisions and exits a person has actually brought off in his own law. The other is called the taken-as history: it records the avowals, revisions and exits that ran, in his own first person, as already completed, but were not in fact completed in his own law. The two ledgers take in only this kind of thing: an avowal, a revision, an exit. Skills, consequences in relationships, economic circumstances or changes in the body are not entries in the ledgers; they hang under some entry and are remembered along with it, without becoming an entry of their own (Meaning Theory P1 Y2). Whether a given action was done, and how, is recorded elsewhere (Meaning Theory P1 Y12).

Recorded this way, the first account is the simplest. He once avowed that he would not regard the other team as people it was all right to keep in the dark; this avowal is in his value history, and it is still there today. Not going this time does not rewrite that avowal: a failure is not a revision, nor an exit, and standing changes only through revision or exit (Value Theory P4 V53). Nor does it erase the consequences: the extra quarter the other team spent on the problem is real. The failure and its consequences hang together under that original avowal, and do not enter the ledgers separately.

The second account is a false statement. He never raised it and says he did; what this violates is what Paper 3 calls non-fabrication: what was done is said to have been done (Paper 3, D18; A16 Note 2). This false statement does not enter the taken-as history. What the taken-as history takes in is an avowal, a revision or an exit that ran, in himself, as completed, but was not in fact completed; "I raised it" is not an avowal but a statement about whether something was done, and such a statement is a fallible proposition that does not enter the ledgers (Meaning Theory P1 Y2). It is simply a false statement, and being false does not earn it a place in the ledgers.

The third account is the hardest to see through. "That law was never mine in the first place" can be true: Paper 3 said that a thing may be propped up from outside, and once looking back has seen this, it goes back to being a candidate (Paper 3, §5); a person can also really exit something he once avowed. But if the sentence is said in order to avoid carrying it, it is the reverse fabrication that Paper 3 named: disowning as external what did grow under one's own sources (Value Theory P3 V37). Saying this sentence out loud is not exiting. Whether his no longer acting by it from then on counts as a real exit turns on whether the exit was brought off in his own law; the ledger in which the original avowal stands does not move because of this sentence (Meaning Theory P1 Y12).

One thing remains. That time, was he really so afraid that he could not do it, or did he not want to do it and refuse to admit it? Really being unable and feigning inability often look the same at the time, from the inside, and he himself cannot tell them apart. Paper 3 said that not being able to tell in the moment, in cases of this kind, is a real inability to tell (Paper 3, D16); it is handed to looking back (Paper 3, D17). What looking back checks is the source, the facts, and the standing with which it enters one's reasons today; what has been checked can be checked again.

On who bears the consequences, this paper says only one thing, and hands the question on. Meaning Theory states that the two ledgers register only occurrence and attribution; they "settle no responsibility" (Meaning Theory P1 Y2). What duties he held in that position, and how this matter is registered, this system has already partly established in On Accountability. That paper also states that being blocked in the doing, being unable to do it, whether the duty still stands, and how the consequences are handled are four things, none following automatically from another (On Accountability F54). Fault, causal consequences and how to repair them are each checked separately, by their own sources; this paper does not settle their accounts for them.

D24 The time one could not carry it does not rewrite the law already avowed, nor erase the consequences; the failure and its consequences hang under that original avowal and do not enter the two ledgers separately. To say that what was not carried was carried is a false statement; it violates non-fabrication and does not enter the taken-as history. If, to avoid carrying it, one says the law was never one's own, whether no longer acting by it counts as a real exit turns on whether that exit was brought off in one's own law; the ledger in which the original avowal stands does not move because of this statement.

§7 The Real Cannot and the Final Cannot

Sometimes it is a real cannot. That morning with a fever of 39°C, when he could not get out of bed, was one.

A real cannot has a place to stop. Stopping is not losing one's ground. The Conflict Treatise wrote the same thing in its own setting: a person can stop a handling, can suspend it, can withdraw, can hand it over; stopping does not prove wrong the points established there, and means only that this handling is no longer running (Conflict Treatise §11). This paper applies it to action in general: his stopping that morning does not prove the law wrong, nor does it prove that he disavows it; it means only that the thing was not done that day. This extension, too, is this series' own to answer for. Stopping and cancelling are two things: when he has stopped, the law is still there; to say it is still there while cancelling it at the same time is another matter (Paper 1, D5).

A place is left for stopping because without it only two accounts would remain: either a real cannot is also a not-wanting, which counts a sick man as a deserter; or, since there was a cannot, the law is dropped. The first turns a fact into evidence against him; the second turns a fact into a revision; both are the mistakes described in §1.

There is another kind of cannot, not of one morning but at the end. People are finite, and things never all get done; in the end there are things a person can no longer do at all. Meaning Theory keeps these two apart: finitude is a condition that runs through a whole life, while the final boundary is at one place only (Meaning Theory P4 Y29). Whether a leaving that can be seen from outside, such as death, is the same as that boundary, Meaning Theory has left undecided; how to act while it is undecided, and what stance to take, it handed to this series (Meaning Theory P4 Y30, §5).

A stance, Meaning Theory has said, is not a positive or negative emotion; it is how a person stands before what he cannot control, cannot recover and cannot complete (Meaning Theory P2 Y21). What this paper can say here is one negative boundary: non-fabrication (Paper 3, D18).

After he recovered, he thought about this. One line of thought was: "One day a person can't do anything at all, so what do these reports and these teams matter? I didn't speak up this once, and that's that." This is using finitude as an excuse. Finitude is real, but it cannot say that this one thing need not be done; it enters judgment, and whether to do this one thing is still his to judge. The other line of thought was: "Life is only so long; from now on nothing can wait, and everything has to be finished at once." This is using finitude as a call to mobilize. Finitude is real too, but it does not turn everything one has avowed into a countdown; Meaning Theory has already refused this way of writing it (Meaning Theory P2 Y14; P4 Y29). Both lines of thought put into finitude's mouth words it never said.

This boundary can also be set before him in someone else. The older colleague who taught him, when looking at a report, to ask first who it is for, went into hospital that year, and afterward, for a long time, no longer spoke, and no longer wrote. He went to see him a few times and, at the bedside, talked about this business with the report, not knowing whether the older colleague could hear. How does one stand at such a time? Here non-fabrication has two sides. He does not say "He's already gone," nor does he say "He actually hears everything": that a person has long not spoken or written does not show that his first-person position has exited, nor does it show that it remains (Meaning Theory P4 Y28). What Meaning Theory writes here is: "When it cannot be judged, what is to be recorded is that it cannot be judged" (Meaning Theory P4 Y30). What is under the older colleague's name remains under his name (Meaning Theory P4 Y28). The saying about first asking who a report is for is something he later avowed himself, and it is his own; he does not say that he is carrying anything on the older colleague's behalf (Meaning Theory P4, §5).

D25 A real cannot has a place to stop, and stopping is not losing one's ground; before the final cannot, the stance of action is non-fabrication: finitude is used neither as an excuse nor as a call to mobilize.

Conclusion

This paper has established seven propositions. Taken together they say: whether a person can or cannot do something is a fact, and can also be a reason; either way it enters his judgment, and either way it does not decide for him what his law is; the time he did not manage it hangs, just as it was, under the original avowal; and a real cannot has its place to stop.

What this paper has not said is also recorded here. It does not teach people how to improve their follow-through, and sets no reading for rest and work. It does not judge whether, that time, he was so afraid that he could not do it, or did not want to: that takes looking back, and looking back can be wrong too. It does not settle who bears the consequences: the part concerning duties points back to On Accountability, and fault, causation and repair are each checked separately by their own sources. It does not say how one judges whether one can or cannot cultivate someone: that is the business of Paper 6. How a person's own value develops over time, and is not merely held onto, is the business of Paper 5.

The Seven Propositions of This Paper

D19 Body, emotion and capacity can enter judgment as facts and reasons; they are not value judgments, and do not decide for a person what his law is; being tired is not not wanting, and being afraid is not disavowing.

D20 What habit changes is the cost of not-doing: it makes some not-doings cheap and others dear; a law is held in place by habit, and is also swapped out within habit.

D21 Hesitation is of two kinds: not yet decided, and decided but not yet moving; weakness cannot be judged from either kind alone, and neither is itself the judgment; the time within hesitation is the person's own.

D22 An action has four positions in time: starting, sustaining, interrupting and changing; interrupting is not giving up, changing is not betraying, and one and the same stop is read by the step at which it stops.

D23 Self-preservation rests first of all on one's also being an end: not cultivating to excess, and not wearing oneself out in a relationship one cannot cultivate.

D24 The time one could not carry it does not rewrite the law already avowed, nor erase the consequences; the failure and its consequences hang under that original avowal and do not enter the two ledgers separately. To say that what was not carried was carried is a false statement; it violates non-fabrication and does not enter the taken-as history. If, to avoid carrying it, one says the law was never one's own, whether no longer acting by it counts as a real exit turns on whether that exit was brought off in one's own law; the ledger in which the original avowal stands does not move because of this statement.

D25 A real cannot has a place to stop, and stopping is not losing one's ground; before the final cannot, the stance of action is non-fabrication: finitude is used neither as an excuse nor as a call to mobilize.

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Acknowledgments

This paper is the fourth in the Action Theory branch of the SAE (Self-as-an-End) philosophical system, and is signed by Han Qin alone. All philosophical argument and all decisions between alternatives were finally adjudicated by the author, who bears sole responsibility for the final text.

Drafting assistance and review were carried out with the help of large language models. Drafting and the internal precision audit were undertaken by Claude (Anthropic), and structural gatekeeping with pre-publication signature by ChatGPT (OpenAI); the first two review rounds of the series outline also included ontological-limit and contradiction detection and boundary testing, undertaken by Gemini (Google DeepMind) and Grok (xAI) respectively. The ten texts of the series received final review from the internal precision audit and the structural gate, followed by a check of every revised sentence. Thanks are due to these systems and to the research and engineering teams behind them. Their comments were adjudicated by the author item by item, and both what was adopted and what was rejected are on record.

This paper continues the standing product of an upstream-paraphrase audit table, comparing item by item what the paper says of upstream texts against their published wording. The record of revisions and withdrawals across the rounds of review is kept in the series outline and the review returns, and is not reproduced here. This English edition is an independent rewrite of the Chinese final text; a separate parity audit compared it with the Chinese paragraph by paragraph. The review markedly improved the precision and consistency of this paper, and thanks are due for it.

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References

All works below are archived on Zenodo, with Chinese and English versions under the same record. The DOIs cited are concept DOIs, always pointing to the latest version; version numbers and access dates are therefore not given separately. All works are single-authored (Han Qin). Drafting and review assistance is described in the Acknowledgments.

The text restates upstream work in plain words, with the paper and proposition number, or the title of an unnumbered section, noted in parentheses at the place of use. Concept DOIs always point to the latest version, so proposition numbers may drift as upstream is renumbered. This paper's restatements are compared item by item with the upstream originals in its transcription audit table.

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Qin, H. (2026). SAE Conflict Treatise: How Subjecthood Is Not Swallowed by Conflict Itself [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

Qin, H. (2026). Mixed Reality — The Intermediate State of 14DD Growing toward 15DD (SAE Moral Law, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20108658

Qin, H. (2026). The Other End of the Bridge: Economic Rationality When 15DD Faces a Party Who Does Not Enter 15DD (SAE Economics, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

Qin, H. (2026). On Accountability · Wei (SAE Rights Theory, Specialist Paper) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853810

II · This series

Qin, H. (2026). Not Doing and Cannot-Not-Doing (SAE Action Theory, Paper 1) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970752

Qin, H. (2026). Anti-Colonization (SAE Action Theory, Paper 2) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970758

Qin, H. (2026). Is It Mine? (SAE Action Theory, Paper 3) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970762

Qin, H. (2026). Developing One's Own Value (SAE Action Theory, Paper 5) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970771

Qin, H. (2026). Not Legislating for Others (SAE Action Theory, Paper 6) [Preprint]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970777

引言

又过了一年，同样的事又来了一次。

这一回是另一张报表，另一个团队，样子和上一回差不多：报表只送上级，那个团队要到下个季度才会看见问题。这一回他不用想很久。他不把那个团队看成瞒过去也无所谓的人，这一条他上一回就认了，今天仍然认。这件事他不得不（cannot not）去说。

可这一回，他没有去。

那个月他刚病了两个星期，回来的时候活堆了一桌子，人还虚着。他也怕。上一回他去说了，年底拿了第三等，少了一截奖金，想去的组也没去成；这一年上司说过好几回「今年大家都稳一点」，没点名，他听得懂。他星期一看出了问题，星期三想好了去说，写了一封邮件，没有发出去。后来又烧了几天。等他再回到座位上，报表已经交了。下个季度，那个团队的问题照样冒了出来。

他后来一直想不清的是：那一次，是怕到做不到，还是其实不想做，又不肯承认。

第一篇说一个人怎样划线（D1 至 D7），第二篇说他怎样从别人的规矩里走出来（D8 至 D12），第三篇说划下的线是不是他自己的（D13 至 D18）。它们都没有说到另一件事：线是清楚的，人却没有照着走。价值论把判断力（judgment）、习惯、迟疑与能力怎样进入一道行动次序，整个交给了这个系列（价值论 P5 末节）；意义论交来的问题里，也有身体、情绪、能力与习惯这几样（意义论 P4 第五节）。这一篇要回答的是：身体、情绪、能力、习惯与迟疑怎样进入一个人的行动，而不替他定什么是他的法；他没做到的时候，这件事怎样记，怎样说。回答分七步。第一节说能与不能不是一条法；第二节说习惯，它改的是不做的成本；第三节说迟疑；第四节顺着他那一个星期三，说一个行动在时间里的四个位置；第五节说自保；第六节说担不起的那一次；第七节说真的不能与最终的不能。各节立一条命题，全篇七条（D19 至 D25），末尾合列。正文不点名外部理论家，不援引历史事件；上游各篇的结论只用平实话重述，括注篇次；这一篇与已有理论怎样对接，留给 Paper 0。

这一篇离日子最近。它不教人怎样提高执行力，也不给休息与工作定一个读数。

第一节　能与不能不是一条法

星期四早上，他烧到三十九度，下不了床。那天他没有去说。

这件事很简单。下不了床是一个事实，它进了他那天的判断，那天去不了；它是一个理由。它不是借口：借口是拿一个说法盖住别的东西，而那个早上没有别的东西要盖。它也不是对那条法的修订：他没有因为发烧，就改认那个团队是瞒过去也无所谓的人。

这三样日常里常常混在一起说。说「他病了，这件事就算了」，是把一个理由说成了修订。说「病了也能打个电话，他就是不想」，是把一个事实说成了罪证。

身体、情绪与能力，都可以这样进入判断。它们是事实，也可以成为理由：今天烧不烧，这一口气提不提得起来，他能不能在一个陌生的负责人面前把一件复杂的事讲清楚。第一篇说，一个下午能讲的审慎，在比较里，比较的一样就是这件事做不做得到（第一篇 D7）；价值论把这一份审慎留给了这个系列（价值论 P5 V70）。这一篇说的，是这些做不做得到从哪里来。

它们不是价值判断。身体的变化不是一次认领，也不是一次修订或退出；它可以挂在某一条下面，随那一条被记住，不另外算作他改了什么（意义论 P1 Y2）。累了，说明他累，说明不了他不想；怕了，说明他怕，说明不了他不认。一个人怕在上司面前说话，不说明他看轻诚实；一个人不善于把事讲清楚，不说明他不在乎那个团队。意义论交来的正是这一问：身体、情绪与能力怎样进入行动，而不被还原为价值判断（意义论 P4 第五节）。

情绪还有一层。他的怕不是空的：上一回的代价是真的，上司那句话也是真的。怕里有事实，这些事实可以进他的判断，他照样可以掂量，去说会让他少拿多少（第三篇第一节）。怕也会比事实大：它把可能的代价放大，把别的都挤出去。怕进来了，还是由他来判；怕不替他判。

反过来也一样。今天担不起，不等于这条法不再是他的。意义论说过，暂时失能、表达中断或行使的力气降下来，本身不足以推出他那个第一人称的位置已经退出；这是一句单向的否定，不反过来担保什么（意义论 P4 Y28）；价值论说过，一项认下的东西不因长期不在运行而失去地位，地位只由修订或退出改变（价值论 P4 V53）。那几天他去不了，那条法还在。

D19　身体、情绪与能力可以作为事实和理由进入判断；它们不是价值判断，不替一个人定什么是他的法；累了不是不想，怕了不是不认。

第二节　习惯：不做的成本

他有两个习惯，这一回都在场。

一个是那个老同事留给他的：看一份报表，先想这是给谁看的（第三篇第二节）。这个习惯让他星期一一眼就看出了问题。换一个没有这个习惯的人，这一眼就过去了，不去说对他几乎不费什么。对他不一样：看出来了，再装作没看出来，是贵的。

另一个是那家公司养出来的：一份报表拿到手，先看数字好不好看（第三篇第二节）。这个习惯在另一边使劲。数字好看，报表按时交，这些不用想就做得出来；去说，意味着停下手上的事，找人，解释，每一步都费心思。于是不去说变得便宜。

所以习惯改的是不做的成本（意义论 P4 第五节）。它不改他认下了什么；它使一些不做变得便宜，使另一些变得贵。第一篇说过，不做是一次划线（第一篇 D1）；习惯不替他划线，它改的是划哪一边更省力。

这有两面。法靠习惯持住。一个人不可能每一件事都从头想一遍；忙到顾不上想的日子，是那些习惯替他守着。老同事那个习惯，就在他病后最乱的那几天，替他看出了问题。法也在习惯里被偷换。那个先看数字好不好看的习惯，最早是外面给的，做久了，自己就跑起来。价值论说过，一份外面的担保可以被做成习惯，此后自己复现；「自动，不费力，持久，这三样都不移动资格链的落点」（价值论 P3 V37）。习惯化也不产生所有权（价值论 P4 V46）。偷换就发生在这里：一个习惯跑得越顺，越像是他自己的；可顺不顺只是一个线索，它可能被习惯养歪（第一篇 D6）。

那个星期，便宜的那一边赢了。这不说明他换了法。那几天他也没有工夫分，哪个习惯是在替他守着，哪个是在替别人跑。

D20　习惯改变的是不做的成本：它使一些不做变得便宜，使另一些变得贵；法靠习惯持住，也在习惯里被偷换。

第三节　迟疑

星期一到星期三，他迟疑了三天。这三天不是一样的。

星期一和星期二，他还没判定。问题看出来了，可它是不是真的问题，有多大，那个团队是不是早就知道了，他还没核清。他翻数据，查上一季的口径，问了一个同事。这是第一篇说的还判不下：一件事进了考虑，而还判不下（第一篇 D4）。这时候的迟疑，是判断还在做。

星期三上午，他判定了：问题是真的，那个团队不知道，这件事他去说。从这一刻起，迟疑换了一种：判了，还没动。

这两种迟疑常被当成一种，又常被一起算作软弱。都不对。还没判定的迟疑，常常是事实还没核清；这时候不迟疑，反倒可疑。判了还没动的迟疑，里面可以有很多东西：在等一个更好的时候，第一篇说过，什么时候说更好，本来就在他要比的事里（第一篇 D7）；在攒一口气；也可能是怕。从外面看，这些都是同一个没动。单凭一个人迟疑，判不出他软弱。

迟疑也不是判断本身。还没判定的时候，判断还没有做完；判了还没动的时候，判断已经做了，迟疑是判和动之间的那一段。把迟疑当成判断，会以为拖着不动就是判了不做；把判断当成迟疑，会以为判定了就已经动了。

迟疑里的时间是他自己的。没有人能替他定，他在星期几之前判定，判定之后几个小时之内动身。只是事情有它自己的时候：报表星期五交，交了以后，去说这件事就换了样子。时间是他的，窗口不是他的。窗口关了，是一件事实，它进他下一次的判断；它不回过头来，把那三天改写成一次不去的决定。

D21　迟疑有两种：还没判定，与判了还没动；不能仅凭这两种迟疑判软弱，它们也都不是判断本身；迟疑里的时间是这个人自己的。

第四节　启动、维持、中断、改变

那个星期三是这样过的。

上午十点，他判定了，开始写那封邮件。这是启动。

中午开周会，上司又说了一遍「今年大家都稳一点」。他回到座位上，邮件还开着，他接着写。这是维持：一件开了头的事，是一段一段接下去的，每一段都可能断。

下午三点，他觉得身上又烧起来了。他把邮件存进草稿，请假回了家。这是中断。

晚上，他躺在床上想，一封邮件说不清楚，不如等烧退了，当面找那个团队的负责人说。这是改变。

一个行动在时间里，至少有这四个位置：启动，维持，中断，改变（意义论 P4 第五节）。同一个停下，看停在哪一步。

中断不等于放弃。下午三点他停下，是因为烧起来了；那条法没有动，那件事也没有被他划掉。意义论说过，记一次行动，只记它做没做、怎么做的；不能由这一次没做，推出他已经不朝那边走了，也不能由他还朝那边走，推出行动一定发生（意义论 P1 Y12）。停得久也一样：长期的中断，不撤销认可（价值论 P4 V46）。

改变也不等于背叛。晚上他把邮件改成当面说，改的是怎样去做：用什么法子，在什么时候，找谁。冲突论说过，时间、资源、角色、程序与行动条件的安排，和法不在同一层；安排改了，法可以一条都没改（冲突论 八）。

这种看法，冲突论在它那一处用过：同一个离开，看离开的时候那场处理处在哪一种状态，至少分四种，回避，为安全先撤出，移出，暂停（冲突论 十二）。这一篇把它用到一般的行动上：同一个停下，停在启动之前、维持之中，还是改变之后，是不同的事。这一步推及由这个系列自己担。

四个位置也不保证一件事做成。他改了主意要当面说，后来又烧了几天，等他回来，报表已经交了。那个当面说，他没有去。它停在了哪里：是一直中断着，是被他放弃了，还是他从来就没有真想去？这一问，这一节答不了，留给第六节，也留给回看。

D22　一个行动在时间里有启动、维持、中断与改变四个位置；中断不等于放弃，改变不等于背叛，同一个停下要看停在哪一步。

第五节　自保

那个下午他请假回家，有人会说他借病躲事。这一节先把另一件事立住。

自保首先因为自己也是目的。道德律说，承认自己是目的，就承认自己需要被保全；承认自己是目的，同时也就承认别人是目的（道德律 P6 §5.2）。所以自保不是自私，也不是在自己和别人之间排了一个先后。他发着烧回家躺下，不需要先证明躺下以后能更好地干活；他躺下，首先因为他自己也是目的。

自保也管到对别人的事上。一个人把别人也当目的，会去涵育（cultivation）别人：帮别人自己的法（one's own law）长开，不拿自己的目的去替换它（第三篇第六节）。涵育会耗人。这个体系在经济学里写过，涵育的人自己会被耗干，感知变钝，耐心变薄，「这不是道德失败，是结构性极限」（经济学 P2 §4.3）；同一处也写了另一种倾向：因为看见对方是目的，容易把对方一点动静读成要长开的迹象，哪怕那只是为了别的在表演（经济学 P2 §4.3）。所以自保包括两件：不过度涵育；在自己判断涵育不了的关系里，不把自己耗尽（道德律 P6 §5.2）。涵育得了与涵育不了怎样判，是第六篇的事；这一篇只从自保这一侧说这一句。

这里有一处不能说大。耗竭的人不是什么都担不起了。他那个星期很累，星期三上午照样判定了，照样写了邮件。累进了判断，改的是这一次做不做得到、做到哪一步，不是把他一概免掉。「累了就什么都不必做」和「累了也不算数」，是同一个错的两头：一头把事实说成了豁免，一头把事实说成了没有。

自保也可能被拿来盖别的东西。他那个下午回家，是烧起来了；那以后几天，他没有给那个团队打一个电话，是烧着，还是松了一口气？自保是一个真的理由，也正因为它真，拿它来盖别的最顺手。这一问当时分不清，留给回看（第三篇第五节）。冲突论在它那一处说过同样的分别：为安全先撤出，不是回避；没有正视，换一个名字离开，才是回避（冲突论 十二）。自保是前一种；借自保的名字离开，是后一种。

D23　自保首先因为自己也是目的：不过度涵育，不在涵育不了的关系里把自己耗尽。

第六节　担不起的那一次

报表交了。下个季度，那个团队的问题冒了出来，比早发现时难收拾得多。这件事过后，他可以有三种说法。

一种是老实说：我看出来了，本来想去说，没去成。

一种是说成做了：我当时提过的。其实他没有提过；那封邮件一直在草稿里。

一种是说成那条法本来不是他的：那个团队的事本来不归我管，我也从没觉得非说不可。

这三种说法，记法不一样。先说怎样记。

这个体系在意义论里立过两本账（意义论 P1 Y2）。一本叫价值史（value history），记一个人实际在自己的法里做成的认领、修订与退出。一本叫当作史（taken-as history），记那些在他自己的第一人称里按已经完成在运行、实际却没有在自己的法里完成的认领、修订与退出。两本账只收这一类事：一次认领，一次修订，一次退出。技能，关系上的后果，经济处境或身体的变化，都不是账上的条目；它们挂在某一条下面，随那一条被记住，不另立一条（意义论 P1 Y2）。一次行动做没做、怎么做的，另有一处记（意义论 P1 Y12）。

照这样记，第一种说法最简单。他当初认下，不把那个团队看成瞒过去也无所谓的人，这一认在他的价值史里，今天还在。这一回没去，不改写这一认：没做到，不是修订，也不是退出，地位只由修订或退出改变（价值论 P4 V53）。它也不抹掉后果：那个团队多花的那一个季度，是真的。没做到这件事，和它的后果，一起挂在当初那一认下面，不另入账。

第二种说法是一句假话。他没提过，说成提过了，违的是第三篇说的不伪造：做了什么就说做了什么（第三篇 D18；A16 附注二）。这句假话不进当作史。当作史收的是一次认领、修订或退出，在他自己那里按完成在运行，实际没完成；「我提过的」不是一次认领，是一句关于做没做的话，这样的话是可错的命题，不入账（意义论 P1 Y2）。它就是一句假话，不因为假，就在账上占一格。

第三种说法最难看清。「那条法本来就不是我的」可以是真的：第三篇说过，一样东西可能撑在外面，回看看出来以后，它退回候选（第三篇第五节）；一个人也可以真的退出一项他认过的东西。可这句话若是为了不担才说的，它就是第三篇点过名的反过来的伪造：把本来长在自己源下的东西，追认成外来的（价值论 P3 V37）。这句话说出口，不等于退出。此后他不再照它做，算不算真的退出，看退出有没有在他自己的法里做成；当初那一认在哪一本账里，不因为这句话移动（意义论 P1 Y12）。

还剩一件事。那一次他到底是怕到做不到，还是不想做又不肯承认？真的做不到和装成做不到，当时从里面看常常是同一个样子，他自己也分不清。第三篇说过，这一类当下分不清，是真的分不清（第三篇 D16）；它交给回看（第三篇 D17）。回看核的是来源、事实与它今天以什么身份进入理由；核出来的，也可以再核。

后果由谁来担，这一篇只说一句，交出去。意义论写明，两本账只登记发生与归属，「不结算责任」（意义论 P1 Y2）。他在那个位置上担着什么职事，这件事怎样登记，这个体系在论职责的那一篇里已经立了一部分；那一篇也写明，做的时候被挡住，做不了，那份职事还在不在，后果怎样处理，是四件事，互不自动推出（职责专论 F54）。过失、因果上的后果与怎样修补，各按各的来源另核；这一篇不替它们结账。

D24　担不起的那一次，不改写已经认领的法，也不抹掉后果；没做到这件事和它的后果挂在当初那道认领下面，不另入两账。把没担起的说成担起了，是假话，违的是不伪造，不进当作史。为了不担而说那条法本来就不是自己的，此后不照它做算不算真的退出，看它在自己的法里做没做成；当初那一认在哪一账，不因这句话移动。

第七节　真的不能与最终的不能

有时候是真的不能。那个烧到三十九度、下不了床的早上，就是。

真的不能，有停下的位置。停下不是失守。冲突论在它那一处写过同样的一句：一个人可以停下一项处理，可以暂停，可以退出，可以转交，停下不证明那一处立的几条错了，只表示这项处理不再运行（冲突论 十一）。这一篇把它用到一般的行动上：那个早上他停下，不证明那条法错了，也不证明他不认，只表示那件事那天没有做。这一步推及也由这个系列担。停下和取消是两件事：停下了，那条法还在；一边说它还在，一边把它取消，才是另一回事（第一篇 D5）。

给停下留一个位置，是因为不留，就只剩两种说法：要么说真的不能也是不想，把一个病人算成逃兵；要么说既然有过不能，那条法也就算了。前一种把事实说成罪证，后一种把事实说成修订，都是第一节说的错。

还有一种不能，不在一个早上，是到头的。人是有限的，事情做不完；到了最后，有一些事，一个人再也不能做了。意义论把这两件分开：有限是贯穿一生的一个条件，最终的那一道边界只在一处（意义论 P4 Y29）。外面看得到的离开，比如死亡，和那道边界是不是同一回事，意义论留着没判；在没判下的时候怎样行动，站成什么姿态，它交给了这个系列（意义论 P4 Y30、第五节）。

姿态（stance），意义论说过，不是积极或消极的情绪，是一个人面对管不了、补不回、做不完的东西，怎样站着（意义论 P2 Y21）。这一篇在这里能说的，是一条负面边界：不伪造（第三篇 D18）。

病好以后，他想过这件事。一种想法是：「人总有一天什么都做不了，这些报表、这些团队又算什么；这一件没去说，也就这样了。」这是把有限当借口。有限是真的，可它说不出这一件不必做；它进判断，做不做这一件，还是他判。另一种想法是：「人生就这么长，从今以后什么都不能再拖，每一件都得马上做完。」这是把有限当动员。有限也是真的，可它不把每一件认下的东西都变成一个倒计时；意义论已经拒过这种写法（意义论 P2 Y14；P4 Y29）。两种想法都在替有限说它没有说过的话。

这道边界，也会在别人身上摆到他面前。那个教他看报表先想给谁看的老同事，这一年住进了医院，后来很长一段日子不再说话，也不再写。他去看过几回，在床边说起这一回报表的事，不知道老同事听不听得见。这时候怎样站着？不伪造在这里有两面。他不说「他已经不在了」，也不说「他其实都听见了」：一个人很久不说话，也不写，推不出他那个第一人称的位置已经退出，也推不出它还在（意义论 P4 Y28）。意义论在这里写的是：「判不出的时候，该记下的就是判不出」（意义论 P4 Y30）。老同事名下的事仍在老同事名下（意义论 P4 Y28）。那句先想给谁看的话，他后来自己认了，是他自己的；他不说自己在替老同事担着什么（意义论 P4 第五节）。

D25　真的不能，有停下的位置，停下不是失守；最终的不能面前，行动的姿态是不伪造：不把有限当借口，也不把有限当动员。

结语

这一篇立了七条。合起来说的是：一个人做不做得到，是事实，也可以是理由，都进他的判断，都不替他定什么是他的法；他没做到的那一次，照实挂在当初那一认下面；真的不能，停下有它的位置。

这一篇没有说的，也记在这里。它不教人怎样提高执行力，不给休息与工作定读数。它不判那一次他是怕到做不到，还是不想做：那要回看，回看也可错。它不结算后果由谁来担：职事的部分回指论职责那一篇，过失、因果与修补各按来源另核。它不说涵育得了与涵育不了怎样判：那是第六篇的事。一个人自己的价值怎样在时间里发展，不只是守住，是第五篇的事。

本篇立的七条

D19　身体、情绪与能力可以作为事实和理由进入判断；它们不是价值判断，不替一个人定什么是他的法；累了不是不想，怕了不是不认。 D20　习惯改变的是不做的成本：它使一些不做变得便宜，使另一些变得贵；法靠习惯持住，也在习惯里被偷换。 D21　迟疑有两种：还没判定，与判了还没动；不能仅凭这两种迟疑判软弱，它们也都不是判断本身；迟疑里的时间是这个人自己的。 D22　一个行动在时间里有启动、维持、中断与改变四个位置；中断不等于放弃，改变不等于背叛，同一个停下要看停在哪一步。 D23　自保首先因为自己也是目的：不过度涵育，不在涵育不了的关系里把自己耗尽。 D24　担不起的那一次，不改写已经认领的法，也不抹掉后果；没做到这件事和它的后果挂在当初那道认领下面，不另入两账。把没担起的说成担起了，是假话，违的是不伪造，不进当作史。为了不担而说那条法本来就不是自己的，此后不照它做算不算真的退出，看它在自己的法里做没做成；当初那一认在哪一账，不因这句话移动。 D25　真的不能，有停下的位置，停下不是失守；最终的不能面前，行动的姿态是不伪造：不把有限当借口，也不把有限当动员。

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致谢

本篇为 SAE（Self-as-an-End）哲学体系行动论分支的第四篇，由秦汉独立署名。全部哲学论证与取舍由作者最终裁决，最终定稿与文责由作者独任。

起草辅助与评审均借助大型语言模型进行。起草与内部精度审计由 Claude（Anthropic）承担，结构闸门与发布前签署由 ChatGPT（OpenAI）承担；系列大纲的前两轮另有本体极限与矛盾检测、边界测试两方参加，分别由 Gemini（Google DeepMind）与 Grok（xAI）承担。十篇正文经内部精度审计与结构闸门两方终审，并经核句验收。谨向这些系统及其背后的研究与工程团队致谢。它们提出的意见由作者逐条裁定，采纳与驳回均记录在案。

本篇续行上游转述审计表这一常设产出，逐条比对本篇的转述与上游原句；各轮评审的改定与撤销记录存于本系列的大纲与交回件，不录于此。评审显著提升了本篇的精度与一致性，谨此致谢。

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参考文献

以下文献均存档于 Zenodo，中英双语版本同记录。所引 DOI 为概念 DOI，始终指向最新版本，故不另注版本号与访问日期。全部文献单一作者署名（秦汉）。起草与评审辅助已在致谢中说明。

正文对上游用平实话重述，句后就近括注篇次与命题号，或无编号节的节题。概念 DOI 始终指向最新版，故命题号可能随上游重编而漂移。本篇的转述与上游原句逐条比对，另记于本篇的转述审计表。

一 · 本篇正文实际调用的文献

秦汉. (2026). 自己的法：SAE 对伦理与道德的批判（SAE 基础论文 A16） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19037566

秦汉. (2026). 论价值的殖民（SAE 价值论系列 Paper 3） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21611154

秦汉. (2026). 论价值的动力学（SAE 价值论系列 Paper 4） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22050204

秦汉. (2026). 论价值的冲突（SAE 价值论系列 Paper 5） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22122819

秦汉. (2026). 意义是哪一种关系（SAE 意义论系列 Paper 1） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22652134

秦汉. (2026). 有限者的承接（SAE 意义论系列 Paper 2） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22713651

秦汉. (2026). 承载者边界（SAE 意义论系列 Paper 4） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22738709

秦汉. (2026). SAE 冲突论：主体性如何不被冲突本身吞噬 [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22313628

秦汉. (2026). 混合现实——14DD向15DD成长的中间态（SAE 道德律系列 Paper 6） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20108658

秦汉. (2026). 桥的另一端：15DD面对不进入15DD的对方时的经济理性（SAE 经济学系列 Paper 2） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19381666

秦汉. (2026). 论职责 · 位（SAE 权利论 职责专论） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853810

二 · 本系列

秦汉. (2026). 不做与不得不做（SAE 行动论 第一篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970752

秦汉. (2026). 反殖民（SAE 行动论 第二篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970758

秦汉. (2026). 是不是我的（SAE 行动论 第三篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970762

秦汉. (2026). 发展自己的价值（SAE 行动论 第五篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970771

秦汉. (2026). 不替他者立法（SAE 行动论 第六篇） [预印本]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22970777