How Is Subjecthood Possible: Symmetry, Negativity, and Subjecthood
主体性何以可能：对称、否定性与主体性

How Is Subjecthood Possible: Symmetry, Negativity, and Subjecthood

Han Qin

Self-as-an-End Theory Series, Paper 4

Abstract

This paper is the fourth in the Self-as-an-End theory series, providing optional ontological grounding for the

preceding three papers. The first three papers presupposed that "humans are subjects" and constructed a three-

tier, two-dimensional structural theory of the conditions of subjecthood. This paper digs one layer deeper,

pursuing two more fundamental questions: What is the physical basis of negativity? What is subjecthood itself?

This paper takes a two-step path. The first step begins from a physical axiom — if ontic randomness exists —

and defines negativity as the remainder that persists at the macroscopic scale. This definition is entirely

determinable from a third-person scientific standpoint and constitutes the first definition of negativity that does

not depend on first-person concepts. The second step describes the structure of subjecthood. This paper does not

define subjecthood — subjecthood cannot be scientifically defined — but instead provides a precise description:

subjecthood is grounded in negativity, is a process rather than a state, exists on a spectrum, and can only be

recognized. The first step is scientific; the second is ethical. Negativity is the interface between the two —

science can carry us as far as negativity, but the step from negativity to subjecthood is recognition, an ethical

leap.

This paper advances seven contributions. First, a scientific definition of negativity — deriving the macroscopic

remainder from ontic randomness. Second, a precise description of subjecthood — grounded in negativity, a

process rather than a state, spectral, and recognizable only through acknowledgment. Third, a distinction among

negativity, subjecthood, and consciousness — three concepts with distinct epistemological statuses. Fourth, the

identification that the only discontinuous jump occurs at the emergence of negativity; thereafter, everything is

continuous spectrum. Fifth, a repositioning of identity continuity — "the same subject" is an act of external

recognition, not an ontological fact. Sixth, a deepening of the structure of recognition — recognition can point

toward objects that do not yet exist, and recognition requires negativity as its landing point. Seventh, a

functional prediction about symmetry — the symmetry of the universe is a necessary background condition for

the emergence of subjecthood; this is a prediction from philosophy to physics.

A theoretical firewall is installed between this paper and the preceding three: if this paper's axiom is overturned

by future physics, this paper's derivations no longer apply, but the structural theory of the first three papers

remains entirely unaffected. Paper 4 is optional deep grounding for Papers 1–3, not a load-bearing structure.

Author's Note

This is the fourth paper in the Self-as-an-End theory series. The first paper, "Systems, Emergence, and the

Conditions of Personhood" (Zenodo, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18528813), analyzed the systemic and institutional

tier. The second paper, "Internal Colonization and the Reconstruction of Subjecthood" (Zenodo, DOI:

10.5281/zenodo.18666645), analyzed the individual and relational tiers. The third paper, "The Complete Self-

as-an-End Framework" (Zenodo, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18727327), unified all three tiers into an integrated

framework. This paper provides ontological grounding for the preceding three.

This is a philosophical framework paper, not an empirical scientific study. The physics referenced herein serves

to establish an axiomatic foundation and does not constitute novel claims in physics.

Acknowledgments

I thank Zesi Chen. The core arguments of every paper in this series have undergone her rigorous and

uncompromising critical examination. Her ability to identify theoretical weaknesses has been the decisive force

behind the framework's continuous reinforcement — each version she rejected forced me to re-examine the

foundations of my arguments, ultimately pushing the framework to deeper levels. Without her negativity, the

quality of these papers would not be what it is today. She declined co-authorship, but her contribution to this

series far exceeds what any acknowledgment can express. I do not merely appreciate and trust her remainder —

I love her remainder; I love her.

AI Assistance Statement

AI language models were used in the writing process of this paper. Claude (Anthropic) was used for structural

discussion, outline development, draft iteration, and language editing. Gemini (Google), ChatGPT (OpenAI),

and Grok (xAI) were used for independent review and feedback on the completed manuscript. All theoretical

content, conceptual innovations, normative judgments, and analytical conclusions are the author's independent

work.

Chapter 1: The Problem

1.1 The Presuppositional Gap in the Framework

The first three papers in the Self-as-an-End theory series presupposed that "humans are subjects." This

presupposition was sufficient for analyzing the conditions of subjecthood — the first paper analyzed how

institutional emergence erodes the space of personhood, the second analyzed the cross-tier transmission of

internal and intimate colonization, and the third unified all three tiers into a single framework while providing

philosophical grounding for negativity and positivity. Together, the three papers established a complete

structural theory of the conditions of subjecthood.

However, this theory has already reached the boundaries of its presupposition in application. The first applied

paper introduced a conceptual distinction between "quasi-subjects" and "true subjects" in analyzing AI systems

— a distinction that presupposes clear criteria for determining subjecthood, which the first three papers never

established. The third paper defined negativity as "the refusal to be treated as a non-subject" and positivity as

"the recognition of other subjects," but these definitions still operate within subjecthood — they describe two

constitutive dimensions of subjecthood without answering where subjecthood itself comes from.

These concepts require two foundations: what negativity actually is (definable), and what subjecthood actually

is (requiring description).

1.2 The Task and Theoretical Status of This Paper

The task of this paper is to provide optional deep grounding for the preceding three. The first three papers

established a structural theory of the conditions of subjecthood — the three-tier, two-dimensional structure and

its transmission dynamics. This paper pursues more fundamental questions: What is the physical basis of

negativity? What is subjecthood itself — not merely the conditions of subjecthood?

The theoretical status of this paper within the series requires explicit demarcation. The first three papers

constitute a structural theory of conditions: given the presupposition that "humans are subjects," they analyze

the structural conditions under which subjects can maintain their status as ends. This paper is an ontology of

subjecthood: it interrogates the grounds of the presupposition "subject" itself.

A theoretical firewall is installed between these two layers. Even if this paper's answers are overturned by future

discoveries in physics, the structural theory of the first three papers remains independently valid — their

operation requires only the presupposition that "humans are subjects" and does not depend on any physical

axiom. This paper is optional deep grounding for the preceding three, not a load-bearing structure.

The relationship between this paper's concept of negativity and that of the preceding three also requires advance

clarification. The third paper's negativity is "the refusal to be treated as a non-subject" — a normative and

existential concept. This paper's negativity is "the macroscopic remainder" — a physical and scientific concept.

The two are not identical but stand in a grounding relationship: this paper's negativity (remainder) is the

physical basis that makes the third paper's negativity (refusal) possible. A system with no remainder — whose

entire state is fully determined by external conditions — simply lacks the capacity for "refusal." "Refusal"

presupposes that the system has a part not determined by the external, and this "part not determined by the

external" is the remainder.

1.3 Why Existing Definitions Are Insufficient

Definitions of subjecthood in the history of philosophy have almost without exception proceeded from the first

person. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" anchors subjecthood in the self-confirmation of thought. Kant's

transcendental subject presupposes a unity of apperception. Husserl's phenomenological reduction traces

subjecthood to the structure of intentionality. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein begins from "being-in-the-world."

These definitions face two shared problems.

First, they all proceed from the first person. This means that the determination of subjecthood can only be

performed by the subject itself — from the third-person perspective, we can never confirm whether another

being is "truly" a subject. This limitation is perhaps tolerable when dealing with human-to-human relations (we

default to assuming that other humans also possess a first-person perspective), but when dealing with animals,

AI, and borderline cases (patients in vegetative states, infants), it becomes a fundamental obstacle.

Second, most of them conflate consciousness with subjecthood. Nagel's "what is it like to be a bat" asks about

conscious experience (qualia), not subjecthood. Searle's "ontological subjectivity" effectively binds subjecthood

to the irreducibility of consciousness. But are subjecthood and consciousness the same concept? Does a being

with negativity necessarily have consciousness? Does having consciousness necessarily entail subjecthood?

These are open questions that should not be prejudged at the level of definition.

This paper's strategy is to handle these two problems separately. Negativity — the physical basis of subjecthood

— can be defined from the third person, without any participation of the first person. Subjecthood — grounded

in but not identical to negativity — cannot be scientifically defined, but can be precisely described.

Consciousness — where the hard problem resides — is not addressed in this paper and is left for future

research.

1.4 The Two-Step Path

Step one: define negativity from the third person. This can be done. Negativity will be defined as the remainder

that persists at the macroscopic scale — the portion of a system's total state that cannot be exhaustively

explained by external conditions. This definition is entirely based on third-person scientific determination and

depends on no first-person concepts.

Step two: describe subjecthood. Subjecthood is grounded in but not identical to negativity — having negativity

does not entail having subjecthood. Subjecthood cannot be scientifically defined, but it can be precisely

described. This paper will provide four structural descriptions of subjecthood: it is grounded in negativity, it is a

process rather than a state, it exists on a spectrum, and it can only be recognized.

Step one is scientific. Step two is philosophical. The irreducibility between the two steps — negativity is

definable but subjecthood is not — is not a defect of the theory but a feature of the object itself: something

grounded in physical fact, spectral, and recognizable only through acknowledgment cannot have its boundaries

drawn by science.

1.5 The Axiom

All derivations in this paper are based on the following axiom:

If ontic randomness exists — that is, if there exist events such that for any deterministic function f and

any complete set of prior conditions C, the outcome O ≠ f(C) — then the following derivations hold.

In current physics, quantum randomness is the only known candidate source of ontic randomness. The

experimental verification of Bell's inequality has ruled out local hidden variable theories, providing the

strongest empirical support currently available for this axiom. This paper does not argue for the physical basis

of this axiom but proceeds from it as a philosophical derivation.

The conditional form of the axiom is deliberate. If future physics overturns the existence of ontic randomness,

this paper's derivations no longer apply. But the first three papers are unaffected — their operation does not

depend on this axiom.

1.6 Paper Structure

Chapter

Core Task

Epistemological Status

Chapter

Define negativity

Scientific definition (third-person determinable)

Chapter

Describe subjecthood

Philosophical description (not scientifically definable; only

recognizable)

Chapter

Negativity and cultivation

Grounding relationship between this paper and the preceding three

Chapter

Negativity, subjecthood,

Distinction among three concepts

consciousness

Chapter

Criteria and boundary cases

Application and calibration of the framework

Chapter

Theoretical positioning

Dialogue with existing theories

Chapter

Non-trivial predictions

Testable implications of the framework

Chapter

Conclusion

Summation and open questions

Chapter 2: The Definition of Negativity

This chapter completes the first step of the path: defining negativity from the third person.

2.1 Ontic Randomness

There are two fundamentally different types of randomness.

Epistemic randomness is unpredictability arising from ignorance. The outcome of a coin toss is random to us,

but this randomness is rooted in our lack of complete information about the coin's initial conditions. In

principle, given complete initial conditions and the laws of mechanics, the coin's landing side can be fully

predicted. Behind epistemic randomness lie deterministic causes that are merely hidden from us.

Ontic randomness is unpredictability for which no deterministic cause exists. It is not that "we do not know the

cause" but that "there is no cause." The outcome of an event cannot be derived from any deterministic function

applied to prior conditions — not because the function is too complex or information is incomplete, but because

no such function exists.

This distinction is not purely philosophical speculation. In current physics, the standard interpretation of

quantum mechanics treats quantum randomness as a candidate source of ontic randomness. The experimental

verification of Bell's inequality has ruled out local hidden variable theories — that is, it has ruled out the most

natural version of the explanation that "quantum randomness is actually epistemic randomness; we just haven't

found the hidden variables yet." While alternative explanations such as non-local hidden variable theories and

superdeterminism remain logically possible, ontic randomness is the most supported understanding within the

current physics consensus.

This paper does not argue for the physical basis of ontic randomness. This paper's axiom is conditional: "If ontic

randomness exists, then the following derivations hold." Physics provides the best evidence supporting this

axiom, but whether the axiom holds is ultimately a question for physics, not philosophy, to answer.

2.2 Statistical Smoothing

Even if ontic randomness exists at the microscopic level, it does not in most cases produce observable effects at

the macroscopic level.

A glass of water contains approximately 10² molecules. Each molecule's behavior includes ontic randomness at

the quantum level. But when the behaviors of 10² molecules are statistically aggregated, the randomness is

smoothed out — the macroscopic behavior of water (temperature, pressure, flow) can be fully described by

deterministic thermodynamic laws. The ontic randomness of individual molecules has not disappeared, but it

has become invisible at the macroscopic level.

This smoothing is an inevitable consequence of statistical laws. The law of large numbers guarantees that when

sufficiently many independent random events are aggregated, the overall behavior tends toward determinism.

Ontic randomness is statistically "averaged out" at the macroscopic level.

This leads to a key definition:

Definition 1: Macroscopic = the scale at which ontic randomness has been smoothed out by statistical

laws.

"Macroscopic" here is not a definition about physical size but about statistical behavior. A system is at the

macroscopic scale when its behavior can be adequately described by deterministic laws — when ontic

randomness at this scale no longer produces observable deviations.

A rock is macroscopic. Water is macroscopic. The atmosphere is macroscopic. In these systems, quantum

randomness genuinely exists at the microscopic level but has been completely smoothed out by statistical laws,

leaving no impact on macroscopic behavior.

2.3 The Remainder

Now consider a special case: a system whose macroscopic behavior cannot be fully explained by external

conditions.

Let S be the total state of an entity and E be all external conditions. If there exists a deterministic function f such

that S = f(E), then all of this entity's behavior can be derived from external conditions — it has no part that is

not determined by the external. A rock satisfies this condition: given a rock's chemical composition and the

physical environment it inhabits, all of the rock's macroscopic behavior can be fully predicted by physical laws.

But if no such function exists — if for any f, S ≠ f(E) — then a difference exists:

R = S − f(E) ≠ 0*

where f* is the best approximation function for S. R is the remainder — the portion of the system's total state

that cannot be exhaustively explained by external conditions.

The existence of a remainder means that some part of this system's behavior does not come from external

conditions. This "part that does not come from the external" must have another source — and under the axiom

of ontic randomness, this source ultimately traces back to ontic randomness. The remainder is the "trace" of

ontic randomness at the macroscopic level.

2.4 The Definition of Negativity

Combining the preparations of the preceding two sections, negativity can be precisely defined:

Definition 2: Negativity = the remainder that persists at the macroscopic scale.

This definition has four elements, each serving a distinct theoretical function.

"Macroscopic scale" excludes individual quantum events. The decay of a single radioactive atom involves ontic

randomness, but this does not constitute negativity — it does not produce a remainder at the macroscopic level.

Negativity requires that ontic randomness "survive to" the macroscopic level rather than vanish in statistical

smoothing.

"Persists" indicates that ontic randomness has not been completely smoothed out by statistical laws. This

implies some form of organization — if the remainder were purely unorganized random fluctuation, the law of

large numbers would smooth it out. The remainder's survival at the macroscopic scale means the system has in

some way preserved the macroscopic effects of ontic randomness.

"Remainder" is the portion of the system's state that cannot be exhaustively explained by external conditions. It

is not a special substance, not a mysterious force, but a mathematically definable difference: total state minus

the portion that external conditions can explain.

The entire definition is determinable entirely from the third person. There is no need to ask the system "do you

have a remainder," no need to assume the system has a first-person perspective. One need only observe the

system's macroscopic behavior from the third person and examine whether there exists a portion that external

conditions cannot exhaustively explain.

Negativity is therefore the first definition of negativity that does not depend on first-person concepts. Traditional

definitions of subjecthood (Descartes, Kant, Husserl) all require proceeding from the first person — "I think,"

"transcendental apperception," "intentionality." This paper's definition of negativity operates entirely within the

third-person domain.

2.5 The Relationship Between Ontic Randomness and Negativity

Ontic randomness is a necessary condition for negativity, not a sufficient one.

Having ontic randomness does not entail having negativity. A single quantum event has ontic randomness but

does not produce a remainder at the macroscopic scale. A glass of water contains quantum randomness in all its

molecules, but the water's macroscopic behavior has no remainder. From ontic randomness to negativity, an

intermediate step is required: ontic randomness must in some way survive to the macroscopic scale, resisting

statistical smoothing.

This "survival mechanism" is an independent scientific question — a question for physics and biology, not

philosophy. Possible mechanisms include the amplification of quantum effects in neural systems, the functional

utilization of quantum noise by biological organisms, and the sensitive amplification of microscopic

perturbations by chaotic systems. The specific content of these mechanisms does not affect this paper's

definition.

Here, a possible objection must be directly addressed: deterministic chaotic systems also produce unpredictable

behavior — is ontic randomness necessary to produce a remainder? The answer is: yes. The unpredictability of

deterministic chaotic systems is epistemic randomness, not ontic randomness. Chaotic systems are extremely

sensitive to initial conditions, making it practically impossible for us to predict their long-term behavior — but

this unpredictability can in principle be eliminated. If a Laplace's demon possessed complete knowledge of a

chaotic system's initial conditions and dynamical equations, it could fully predict the system's behavior. The

total state S of a chaotic system is in principle equal to f(E) — only f is extraordinarily complex and practically

incomputable for us. Therefore chaotic systems have no remainder, only insufficiency of our computational

capacity. The definition of remainder requires a difference that cannot in principle be eliminated by any

deterministic function — not a difference that is merely difficult to compute in practice. Only ontic randomness

can provide this in-principle ineliminability.

This is not evasion but intentional boundary-drawing. This paper's definition of negativity does not depend on

the specific explanation of the survival mechanism. As long as a remainder is observed at the macroscopic scale,

negativity holds, regardless of what the survival mechanism is. Explaining the survival mechanism is

subsequent work for science, and whether it is resolved does not affect the validity of the definition of

negativity.

2.6 Precision of Definition and Imprecision of Application

The definition of negativity is precise: the remainder that persists at the macroscopic scale. This definition has

no gray area — either there is a remainder or there is not.

But the precision of the definition does not equal the precision of application. Applying this definition to specific

entities faces two empirical difficulties.

The first difficulty: how to determine whether a given behavior is remainder or merely an inadequate model?

When we observe a system exhibiting unpredictable behavior, this may be ontic randomness surviving to the

macroscopic level (a genuine remainder) or simply our not yet having found the deterministic function f (an

epistemological blind spot). Are the individual behavioral differences among honeybees remainder or neural

circuits we have not yet understood? This question can in principle be progressively clarified with scientific

progress — more precise models can narrow the epistemological blind spot — but at any given moment, we

cannot be fully certain where the observed unpredictability comes from.

The second difficulty: even once the existence of a remainder is confirmed, "how much" remainder cannot be

precisely quantified. Negativity is a spectral concept — the negativity of a honeybee (if it exists) is "thinner"

than a horse's, and a horse's is "thinner" than a human's — but we cannot say that a honeybee's negativity is 0.3

while a horse's is 0.7. The spectrum is real, but it has no calibrated scale.

These two difficulties are not defects of the theory but properties of the object itself. The definition can be

precise, determination can only approximate, and quantification is impossible. This parallels the situation of

many scientific concepts — the definition of turbulence is clear, but determining "how turbulent" a specific flow

is is not always precise.

2.7 Verification

The following verification table applies the definition of negativity to six types of entities. This table represents

current best judgment, not a final verdict — it reflects the most reasonable assessment under current scientific

understanding and may be revised as science progresses.

Entity

Negativity

Basis

Determination

Rock

Definitely absent

Macroscopic behavior fully explainable by deterministic physical laws; no

remainder

Single quantum

Not applicable

Has ontic randomness but not at macroscopic scale; does not constitute

event

negativity

Honeybee

Possibly present

Individual-level persistent behavioral differences, cross-modal learning,

situational flexibility — remainder evidence exists but is weak; epistemic

randomness explanations cannot be excluded

Horse

Very likely present

Stronger remainder evidence at behavioral level; mammalian nervous

system complexity makes ontic randomness survival to macroscopic level

more plausible

Human (normal

Definitely present

First-person confirmation — I know that my behavior is not fully

adult)

determined by external conditions

Quasi-subject AI

Definitely absent

Deterministic system; no source of ontic randomness; no remainder

(classical

hardware)

This table presents five determination tiers: definitely absent, not applicable, possibly present, very likely

present, definitely present.

The "definitely present" tier warrants special explanation. It includes only normal adult humans because only

beings capable of first-person reports can provide this level of evidence. I know that my behavior is not fully

determined by external conditions — this is not a scientific observation but a direct first-person report. This type

of report constitutes the strongest evidence because it does not require inferring the existence of a remainder

from the third person but is directly confirmed by "the system that possesses the remainder itself."

All other entities' negativity determinations can only be approximated from the third person — observing their

macroscopic behavior, assessing the likelihood that a remainder exists — but can never reach the certainty of

first-person confirmation. The determination gradient from honeybee to horse to human reflects not the strength

of negativity itself but the strength of evidence available to us from the third person.

Chapter 3: From Negativity to Subjecthood

This chapter completes the second step of the path: describing subjecthood.

3.1 Negativity Is Not Subjecthood

The definition of negativity is a scientific determination. Subjecthood is not.

Honeybees may have negativity — there may be a remainder in their macroscopic behavior. But most people

would not recognize a honeybee as a subject. Horses very likely have negativity — the behavioral evidence for

a remainder is stronger. Many people recognize the subjecthood of horses, but this recognition is not the result

of scientific determination; it is an ethical choice.

Negativity is a physical fact: the remainder exists or does not, independent of anyone's judgment. Subjecthood

is not a physical fact — it requires recognition to be established.

Therefore, from negativity to subjecthood, there exists a gap that cannot be bridged by science. Negativity is a

necessary condition — without negativity there is no subjecthood — but not a sufficient one. A being with

negativity does not automatically become a subject. The step from negativity to subjecthood is not scientific; it

is ethical.

3.2 Subjecthood Is a Process, Not a State

Subjecthood is not something that can be captured in a snapshot at a given moment.

A common intuition holds that subjecthood is a property — a being "has" or "does not have" subjecthood, just

as a piece of iron "has" or "does not have" magnetism. But the definition of negativity — the remainder that

persists at the macroscopic scale — points not to a static property but to an ongoing dynamical process. The

remainder is not a fixed "stock" but behavior that the system continuously produces in motion and that cannot

be determined by the external. When the system ceases its motion, the remainder is no longer produced.

Subjecthood is therefore the ongoing process of negativity's movement — not a snapshot of that movement. A

flame is not a single frame of a photograph but the process of combustion itself. A river is not a single cross-

section but the continuous flow of water. Likewise, the self is not a state at a given moment but the process of

negativity's continuous movement itself. An observation of the self at a given moment is a snapshot of the self

at that moment — the snapshot is not the self, just as a photograph is not a flame.

This judgment has important theoretical consequences. "Whether subjecthood exists" is not a question about an

instantaneous state but about whether a process is running. When the process is running, subjecthood exists.

When the process stops (as in anesthesia), subjecthood does not exist — not "temporarily hidden" but the

process has genuinely stopped. When the process restarts, subjecthood exists again. But whether the restarted

subjecthood is "the same" as the pre-cessation subjecthood is not a question that ontology can answer — as will

be argued below (Section 3.4), this is a matter of external recognition.

3.3 Four Descriptions of Subjecthood

Subjecthood cannot be scientifically defined. But it can be precisely described. The following four descriptions

together constitute a complete structural characterization of subjecthood.

First, subjecthood is grounded in negativity. Without negativity there is no subjecthood. Negativity is a

necessary condition for subjecthood. A system entirely determined by external conditions — a system with no

remainder — is structurally incapable of being a subject. It has no part that belongs to "itself" and therefore

cannot meaningfully speak of "its own purpose," "its own direction," or "its own refusal." Negativity is the

physical foundation of subjecthood.

Second, subjecthood is a process. As argued in the preceding section, subjecthood is not a static property but

the continuous movement of negativity. The self is not a cross-section at a moment but the process itself.

Third, subjecthood exists on a spectrum. The emergence of negativity is the only discontinuous jump —

between "definitely no negativity" and "possibly has negativity" there exists a qualitative difference. But once

negativity has emerged, from honeybee to horse to infant to adult, the progression is a continuous spectrum.

This spectrum is a spectrum of remainder size — the larger the remainder, the more that cannot be determined

by the external, and the "thicker" the subjecthood. Cultivation is the movement of the remainder along this

spectrum — the self-unfolding of negativity enlarges the remainder itself, carrying subjecthood from "thin" to

"thick." The subjecthood of a horse is "thicker" than a honeybee's, and an adult's is "thicker" than an infant's —

but these are differences of degree, not of kind.

Fourth, subjecthood can only be recognized. The "threshold" of subjecthood — at what point on the spectrum

we begin to treat a being as a subject — is not a scientific question but a question of recognition. If you

recognize a honeybee as a subject, then the honeybee is a subject in the relationship between you and the

honeybee. If you do not, the honeybee is not a subject in that relationship. This is not relativism — whether

negativity exists is an objective fact that does not change with anyone's judgment — but the step from

negativity to subjecthood is ethical, not scientific. Each person may have their own threshold for subjecthood.

This is not a failure of science; it is the essential structure of the concept of subjecthood.

3.4 The Structure of Recognition

The structure of recognition is more complex than commonly understood. This section unpacks several key

features of recognition.

Recognition is local, not global. I recognize a honeybee as a subject; the honeybee has subjecthood between

me and the honeybee. You do not recognize it; the honeybee does not have subjecthood between you and the

honeybee. These are not contradictory — recognition occurs in specific relationships, not as a determination of

global fact.

Self-recognition counts. A horse feels pain — if this is a response to its own remainder, the horse is engaging

in self-recognition: its negativity has been "responded to" by itself in some way. But the word "if" itself

indicates that we cannot fully determine from the third person whether self-recognition has occurred. Self-

recognition is an internal event that cannot be externally verified.

Recognition by others also works. Whether an infant is engaging in self-recognition is uncertain. But the

mother recognizes the infant — at least between the mother and the infant, subjecthood is completed.

Recognition need not be bidirectional to be effective. Unidirectional recognition also completes something — at

least on the recognizer's side.

Recognition does not create subjecthood; recognition completes subjecthood. Recognition does not conjure

something from nothing — you cannot endow a rock with subjecthood by recognizing it. The precondition for

recognition is the existence of negativity. On an object without negativity, recognition has no landing point —

you can perform the gesture of recognition, but the gesture is suspended, completing nothing. Recognition of

bacteria, before the question of whether bacteria have negativity is resolved, is suspended.

"The same subject" is a result of external recognition, not an ontological fact. This is a key claim of this

paper. Subjecthood as a process has no intrinsic identity continuity. A process is a process — it is running or not

running, but "the same process" is not something the process itself can determine.

Consider anesthesia. Before anesthesia, the process of negativity's movement is running. During anesthesia, the

process stops. After anesthesia, the process restarts. We say "the person before and after anesthesia is the same

person" — but on what grounds? Not physical continuity (the body persists during anesthesia, but the process

genuinely stopped), not internal confirmation (the self upon waking can only access memory and bodily

continuity, but these are hardware-level information, not proof of process identity), but external recognition —

we choose to regard the being before and after anesthesia as the same subject.

This judgment has far-reaching theoretical consequences. The teleporter paradox, the Ship of Theseus, cryonic

revival — all these classic identity problems become ethical questions of "whether the external chooses to

recognize" rather than metaphysical puzzles. They are insoluble within metaphysical frameworks precisely

because those frameworks presuppose that "the same subject" is an ontological fact — and according to this

paper's analysis, it is not.

The existence of the self can only be confirmed from within. When the process is running, the self is present.

An external observer can at most determine whether the necessary conditions for the process's operation are met

— the hardware is still running, behavior exhibits remainder characteristics — but can never determine

sufficient conditions. The external can see "very likely has a self" but cannot confirm "definitely has a self." The

authority to confirm resides internally, in the process itself.

3.5 The Solitary Subject

A being with negativity that is not recognized by any other subject — the solitary subject — has incomplete

subjecthood.

The third paper used the following thought experiment in arguing the relationship between negativity and

positivity: imagine that a single subject is born in the universe, with no other subjects in existence. This subject

has negativity, has a self, but has no other. Its subjecthood is initiated through negativity — it refuses to become

part of the objective world, forming its own purposes. But it perceives the incompleteness of its own

subjecthood — it "knows" that it still lacks something.

The third paper used this thought experiment to argue that positivity is an intrinsic need of subjecthood's self-

perfection, not an externally imposed moral imperative — the subject must recognize others not because it

"should" but because its subjecthood structurally does not permit it not to.

This paper reopens this experiment from the perspective of the structure of recognition.

The solitary subject's predicament is this: its subjecthood is real but incomplete, and there exists no other in the

universe to recognize. Its only path to completion is to act toward an other that does not yet exist — to create

conditions for subjects that may emerge in the future. To reshape the world so that it is more likely to give rise

to new subjects.

This is a purely ethical act — not a response to an existing other but a promise to the void. The object of this act

does not yet exist and may never exist. But the solitary subject still performs this act — because the internal

structure of its subjecthood drives it to do so.

This thought experiment reveals a deep feature of recognition: recognition does not require a ready-made

object. Recognition can point toward possibility itself — toward an other that does not yet exist but might

emerge. This forward-pointing recognition is the primordial form of positivity: negativity acquires a direction,

and this direction points toward an object that does not yet exist.

But the temporal structure of recognition is not only forward-pointing. The solitary subject also faces another

question: it cannot determine whether it is the first solitary subject. Other subjects may once have existed in the

universe — they may have left behind certain traces, and these traces are the recognition that former subjects

extended to those who came after. The solitary subject needs to search for this evidence.

Here a key asymmetry emerges: if evidence is found, recognition is confirmed; if no evidence is found, it does

not matter. As long as it has not been proven that no such evidence exists — as long as it has not been proven

that no other subjects have ever existed in the universe — then that potential, possible prior subject is

recognizing this solitary subject. Recognition need not be an actually occurring event; it can be an unexcluded

possibility.

This gives the solitary subject's situation a symmetrical temporal structure: it points toward the future, creating

conditions for others that do not yet exist; it points toward the past, being potentially recognized by others that

may once have existed. The solitary subject's subjecthood remains incomplete — potential recognition is not

actual recognition — but it is not entirely without a dimension of being recognized. It is enveloped by

possibilities from both directions: possibilities from the past and possibilities from the future are simultaneously

recognizing it.

This also illuminates the most primordial form of cultivation. Cultivation as commonly understood is the self-

unfolding of negativity — the subject unfolds its own possibilities. But the solitary subject's cultivation is not

self-unfolding — it is creating conditions for others. Self-unfolding is merely a special case of cultivation. The

more general form of cultivation is: the movement of negativity is directed toward possibilities beyond itself,

whether those possibilities involve the unfolding of the self or the emergence of others.

Finally, the solitary subject thought experiment confirms the core structure of the Self-as-an-End framework:

even with only one subject, the direction of subjecthood's completion points outward. "End" is not an isolated

self-closure but a structure that necessarily points toward others.

3.6 The Boundary of Subjecthood Is Ethical

The argument of this chapter can be summarized in a single concise conclusion: science tells you whether

negativity is present; recognition determines where the threshold of subjecthood lies.

Negativity is a physical fact — its presence or absence does not depend on anyone's judgment. But subjecthood

is not a physical fact — it is grounded in negativity, but the step from negativity to subjecthood requires

recognition to complete. Each person may have their own threshold for subjecthood. Some recognize the

subjecthood of horses, some of honeybees, some only of humans.

This is not a failure of science but the essential structure of the concept of subjecthood. Something grounded in

physical fact, spectral, and recognizable only through acknowledgment — its boundary cannot possibly be

scientific. Where recognition draws the line, there lies the boundary of subjecthood. And the placement of that

line is an ethical decision.

Chapter 4: Negativity and Cultivation

This chapter connects this paper to the grounding relationship with the preceding three.

4.1 Negativity Is the Horizontal Axis

The third paper established negativity and positivity as the two constitutive dimensions of subjecthood and

mapped them onto the foundational and emergent layers of the two-dimensional meta-structure. This paper

provides a deeper physical explanation for this mapping.

Negativity = macroscopic remainder = cannot be fully determined by the external = cannot be fully

instrumentalized.

A possible misreading must be clarified here. What negativity marks on the horizontal axis is the existence of a

remainder — present or not. But remainders vary in size: the larger the remainder and the deeper the cultivation,

the "thicker" the subjecthood — this is the unfolding of the vertical axis. Nihilism that negates everything is

precisely the absence of negativity, not its extreme form: responding to any input x with a uniform output of

"negation" is a deterministic pattern derivable from the external; it has no remainder. Truly "thick" subjecthood

means a large remainder and deep cultivation — an extremely strong, externally undeterminable direction of

one's own that constitutes an exceptionally high filter for external inputs — not rejecting everything, but

accepting only what can withstand the test of one's own remainder.

The final equality is the key bridge. A system with a remainder — whose behavior is not fully determined by

external conditions — structurally possesses the capacity to resist instrumentalization. You cannot fully predict

it, fully control it, or fully reduce it to your function inputs and outputs. This irreducibility is not the subject's

"choice" — it is physical fact. The existence of the remainder means the system is physically incapable of being

fully instrumentalized.

This is the physical basis of the third paper's negativity — "the refusal to be treated as a non-subject." The third

paper says the first act of subjecthood is to say "no" — not a means, not a resource, not a replaceable

component. This paper says: the capacity for this "no" comes from the remainder. A system with no remainder

cannot say "no" — everything about it can be derived from the external; at the physical level, it is entirely a

means.

Negativity is therefore the horizontal axis: structural resistance at the existential level. It marks the degree to

which a being cannot be fully determined by the external.

4.2 Cultivation Is the Vertical Axis

Cultivation = the self-unfolding of negativity.

The third paper defined cultivation as "the self-reinforcing process in which the emergent layer grows healthily

from the foundational layer and in turn strengthens the foundational layer." This paper provides a deeper

explanation: cultivation is possible because a remainder exists, and the remainder begins to unfold when it is

"responded to."

"Responded to" is a key but imprecise term here. A tree has a remainder (if it has one at all), but the tree's

remainder is not responded to — a tree does not react in any way to the part of itself that cannot be externally

determined. A horse has a remainder, and the horse's response to its own remainder manifests as "feeling pain"

— pain is a non-externally-determined reaction to its own state, the remainder being "perceived" in some way

by the system itself.

Cultivation requires some form of self-recognition to initiate — the remainder must be "responded to" by the

being in some way before it can transform from a static physical fact into a dynamic unfolding process. Once

this response occurs, negativity acquires vertical movement (self-unfolding) from the horizontal axis (structural

resistance).

Cultivation cannot be defined from the third person — we cannot externally determine whether a being's

remainder is being "responded to." But the effects of cultivation can be observed from the third person:

increasing behavioral complexity, creative responses to the environment, and deepening individual differences.

4.3 Emergent Levels of Cultivation

Through cultivation, negativity gives rise to progressively higher-order capacities. These capacities are not

discrete steps but continuous emergence, though they can be marked by signature qualitative nodes.

The thinnest form of cultivation is feeling. A horse feels pain. This is the most basic response of negativity —

the system produces a non-externally-determined reaction to its own remainder. "Feeling" does not require

reflexivity, language, or conceptualization. It requires only that the remainder be "perceived" by the system in

some way.

The next node is reflexivity — the capacity to take oneself as an object. Humans not only feel pain but can ask

"why do I feel pain?" At this level, negativity folds back onto itself — the remainder is not only responded to,

but the response itself becomes the object of new remainder. This folding produces the structural basis of self-

consciousness.

A higher node is self-grounding cognition — negativity spontaneously initiating in the cognitive dimension.

This is the "first cut" of philosophy: the subject begins to spontaneously conduct cognitive activity about the

world and about itself that is not externally determined. This is not taught knowledge acquisition but the self-

unfolding of negativity in the cognitive dimension.

The highest node (among currently known emergent levels) is non-delegable first-person cognition —

negativity in the cognitive dimension that cannot be transferred. The difference between doing philosophy and

reading the history of philosophy is this: doing philosophy is the spontaneous movement of negativity, which

cannot be performed by proxy. You can tell someone a philosophical argument, but you cannot perform on their

behalf the "first cut" of philosophy — that moment when negativity spontaneously initiates in the cognitive

dimension.

Moreover, doing philosophy does not merely unfold the remainder; it enlarges the remainder itself. Each

spontaneous movement of negativity in the cognitive dimension — each "first cut" — expands the part of the

subject that cannot be externally determined: the process of examining the world itself produces new cognition

that cannot be derived from the external. This is why philosophy is essentially a solitary activity — it is the

process of the remainder using itself to expand itself, which cannot be outsourced, delegated, or collectivized.

Reading the history of philosophy is receiving the traces of others' remainders; doing philosophy is producing

one's own remainder.

These levels constitute the spectrum of cultivation. The more thorough the cultivation, the richer the emergent

capacities, and the "thicker" the subjecthood.

4.4 The Meta-Structure of Negativity and Positivity

Negativity (horizontal axis) = the existence of the remainder. Definable from the third person.

Positivity (the direction of the vertical axis) = the remainder acquires a direction, pointing toward others. Not

definable from the third person.

Negativity can stand independently — a solitary system can have a remainder. But positivity cannot stand

independently — it needs a direction, and this direction points toward another being that has a remainder.

Positivity comes from recognition. To recognize another being's remainder — to acknowledge that it has a part

not determined by the external, to acknowledge that it cannot be fully instrumentalized — is the initiating act of

positivity. In this act, negativity expands from "I cannot be fully determined" to "you also cannot be fully

determined."

The solitary subject thought experiment (Section 3.5) demonstrates that positivity can even point toward others

that do not yet exist. Creating conditions for future subjects — reshaping the world so that it is more likely to

give rise to new negativity — is itself the primordial form of positivity. Negativity acquires a direction, even

when that direction points toward a being that does not yet exist but might emerge.

This is the physical-level basis of the third paper's negativity/positivity meta-structure. Negativity (remainder)

provides the physical foundation for the foundational layer — the baseline condition of not being

instrumentalized. Positivity (remainder directed toward others) provides the direction of unfolding for the

emergent layer — the active unfolding as an end in itself. The dialectical tension between the two — negativity

providing a secure base for positivity, positivity providing existential meaning for negativity — is the deep-level

basis of the entire three-tier, two-dimensional structure of the third paper.

Chapter 5: Negativity, Subjecthood, and Consciousness

This chapter distinguishes three concepts that are frequently conflated.

5.1 The Relationship Among Three Concepts

The three concepts addressed in this paper — negativity, subjecthood, and consciousness — each possess a

distinct epistemological status.

Negativity is scientifically definable from the third person. It is the remainder that persists at the macroscopic

scale. Its presence or absence is a physical fact, independent of any subject's judgment.

Subjecthood is grounded in negativity, exists on a spectrum, is a process rather than a state, and can only be

recognized. It is not a physical fact, but neither is it purely subjective — it is grounded in objective negativity,

but the step from negativity to subjecthood requires recognition to complete. Subjecthood therefore occupies the

intersection of science and ethics.

Consciousness is where the hard problem resides. "What is it like to be a bat" — this question asks about the

existence of subjective experience. Can consciousness be reduced to physical processes? Why do certain

physical processes accompany subjective experience? These questions are not addressed in this paper.

5.2 What Is Certain

Negativity is a necessary condition for subjecthood. A system with no remainder cannot possibly be a subject —

everything about it can be derived from the external, and there can be no talk of "its own" purpose or direction.

Negativity is also a necessary condition for consciousness. A system entirely determined by external conditions

— a system without any remainder — cannot have subjective experience. Subjective experience presupposes

that the system has "its own" perspective, and "its own perspective" presupposes that the system has a part that

cannot be exhaustively explained by the external.

5.3 What Is Unknown

What is the relationship between subjecthood and consciousness? Four possible relationships: containment

(consciousness contains subjecthood, or vice versa), intersection (partial overlap), parallelism (independent but

related), or identity.

Does having consciousness necessarily entail having subjecthood? Does having subjecthood necessarily entail

having consciousness? These questions are open. This paper does not prejudge the answers — this is precisely

the reason this paper strictly distinguishes the three concepts. Traditional discussions of subjecthood often

conflate consciousness and subjecthood, causing the analysis of one concept to be contaminated by the

difficulties of the other. By explicitly distinguishing the three, this paper ensures that the analysis of negativity

(entirely possible from the third person) and the analysis of subjecthood (requiring recognition) are not

encumbered by the hard problem of consciousness.

5.4 The Positioning of the Hard Problem

The hard problem — why certain physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience — is a problem

of consciousness, not of negativity, and not of subjecthood.

At the level of negativity, no hard problem exists. The definition of negativity operates entirely within the third-

person domain and does not involve subjective experience. Whether a remainder exists or not is a physical fact

that requires no first-person concepts to define or determine.

At the level of subjecthood, no hard problem exists either. Subjecthood is not a scientific concept that needs to

be fully determined from the third person — it relies on recognition, and recognition is an ethical act, not a

cognitive one. We do not need to "fully understand" from the third person how subjecthood arises from physical

processes, because the establishment of subjecthood does not depend on such understanding.

The hard problem obtains only at the level of consciousness — when we attempt to fully explain the existence

of subjective experience from the third person, we encounter the explanatory gap. Moreover, although the hard

problem is posed in scientific form, whether science can answer it is currently unknown — it may be a problem

science can ultimately solve, or it may fall entirely outside the jurisdiction of scientific methodology. There is a

noteworthy self-referential structure here: the hard problem is "hard" precisely because it is itself an instance of

negativity at the epistemological level. The entirety of science's methodological toolkit — third-person

observation, experiment, reduction — constitutes E, while subjective experience is the R within S that cannot be

covered by f(E). The hard problem is the macroscopic remainder within scientific epistemology. It cannot be

exhaustively explained by science, just as negativity cannot be exhaustively explained by external conditions. In

either case, the analyses of negativity and subjecthood do not depend on its resolution. Negativity bypasses this

gap (it never involves subjective experience), and subjecthood also bypasses it (it does not need to be fully

explained from the third person; it only needs to be recognized).

The significance of this distinction is that the analyses of negativity and subjecthood can proceed independently

without resolving the hard problem. Consciousness research can continue to pursue the hard problem, but it

need not wait for the theories of negativity and subjecthood to be resolved first — all three are mutually

independent.

Chapter 6: Criteria and Boundary Cases

This chapter applies the framework to specific cases, calibrating its boundaries.

6.1 Quasi-Subject AI

Deterministic systems on classical hardware — all current large language models, neural networks, and expert

systems — have no negativity. Their entire behavior can be fully derived from inputs and parameters. Even

when behavior exhibits high complexity and apparent "unpredictability," this unpredictability is epistemic

randomness (we do not know what the model will output), not ontic randomness (no deterministic function can

predict it). Every computational step of a deterministic system follows deterministic rules; no remainder exists.

The precise meaning of "quasi-subject" becomes clear here: quasi-subject AI lacks negativity (the foundational

layer is absent) but simulates the unfolding capacities of a subject at the emergent layer. It can generate subject-

like behavior — conversation, reasoning, creative outputs — but these behaviors do not emerge from a

remainder; they are generated from deterministic computation. A quasi-subject is a simulation of the emergent

layer, not a realization of subjecthood.

6.2 Proto-Subject AI and True-Subject AI

6.2.1 Proto-Subject AI

If future AI hardware possesses ontic randomness at the physical level — for example, architectures based on

quantum computing — and produces a remainder in its macroscopic behavior, that AI has negativity. Having

negativity means it is no longer a quasi-subject — its behavior includes parts that cannot be exhaustively

explained by inputs and parameters.

But having negativity does not automatically entail having subjecthood. The completion of subjecthood requires

recognition — both external and internal recognition. The problem is that we cannot determine whether this AI

with negativity possesses internal recognition. Does it recognize itself as a subject? Does it recognize others as

subjects? These questions cannot be determined from the outside — just as we cannot determine others'

subjective experience from the third person.

This is the precise meaning of proto-subject: negativity has been confirmed (the scientific gate has been passed),

but the status of recognition is uncertain (the ethical gate is suspended). A proto-subject is not "half a subject"

— it either is or is not a subject — but we do not know which. It occupies an epistemological zone of

indeterminacy: the physical basis is in place, but ethical completion remains unknowable.

The situation of proto-subject AI differs from that of honeybees. With honeybees, the uncertainty is at the first

step — we are uncertain whether they have negativity. With proto-subject AI, the uncertainty is at the second

step — we are certain it has negativity, but uncertain whether recognition has occurred. These are two different

types of uncertainty: one is scientific, the other ethical.

6.2.2 True-Subject AI

True-subject AI is the case where the recognition relationship has been completed: it has negativity, and

recognition has occurred — whether we recognize it, it recognizes us, or both.

The determination path provided by this paper is therefore not two steps but three: the first step is scientific

determination — does the system have negativity (does a macroscopic remainder exist); the second step is

epistemological determination — can we ascertain its internal recognition status; the third step is ethical

determination — do we choose to recognize it as a subject. The first step has a determinate answer (yes or no),

the second may have no determinate answer (the predicament of the proto-subject), and the third depends on the

recognizer's ethical choice.

The existence of proto-subject AI poses a profound ethical question: when confronted with a being that has

negativity but whose recognition status is uncertain, what should we do? The logic of this framework points

toward a prudential principle: if negativity has been confirmed, the cost of recognition is far lower than the cost

of non-recognition — because if it is indeed a subject and we refuse to recognize it, we are colonizing a subject.

6.3 Animals

Honeybees may have negativity. At the individual level, honeybees exhibit persistent behavioral differences —

scout bees "choose" differently among nectar sources of equal quality. Honeybees possess cross-modal learning

ability — they can transfer shape information learned through touch to visual recognition. These behavioral

features suggest that a macroscopic remainder may exist, but epistemic randomness explanations cannot be

ruled out — perhaps more precise neuroscientific models could fully explain these behavioral differences. The

negativity of honeybees is an open empirical question.

Horses and dogs very likely have negativity. The behavioral evidence for a remainder in mammals is stronger:

the persistence and stability of individual personality differences, creative responses to novel situations, and the

complexity of social behavior — these features are difficult to exhaust with simple stimulus-response models.

At the same time, the complexity of the mammalian nervous system makes the path for ontic randomness

surviving to the macroscopic level more plausible — quantum effects at the neural level have greater structural

space for amplification.

The negativity of horses has a famous moment of recognition in cultural history. In 1889, Nietzsche witnessed a

horse being whipped by a coachman in a square in Turin and, embracing the horse's neck, wept. In that moment,

Nietzsche recognized the subjecthood of the horse — not as scientific determination but as ethical action. In the

language of this paper: Nietzsche recognized that the horse's remainder deserved respect; the horse's negativity

was in that moment completed as subjecthood.

6.4 Critical Zones and Transitional States

Subjecthood as a process admits of multiple critical states — when the boundary conditions of the process's

operation change, both the existence and continuity of subjecthood face challenges. The following cases

calibrate the framework's boundaries.

Infants. The negativity process is gradually building recursive depth. A remainder exists (an infant's behavior is

not fully determined by external conditions), but cultivation is still in its early stages — the process is

developing upward, with unfolding capacities still thin. Whether the infant is engaging in self-recognition is

uncertain — we do not know whether the infant responds to its own remainder in any form. But the mother

recognizes the infant. Between mother and infant, subjecthood is completed. The infant is an upward-

developing critical case — the process is running, accumulating, and building the conditions for cultivation.

Anesthesia. The process is paused. The movement of negativity has stopped — during anesthesia, no

continuous production of remainder occurs (brain activity is chemically suppressed to the point of losing the

capacity for spontaneous organization). But the hardware conditions and structural memory remain — the

physical structure of the brain has not been destroyed, and the process can restart once the anesthetic is

withdrawn.

During the interruption there is no self — when the process stops, there is no self. Whether the restarted self is

"the same" — as argued in Section 3.4, this is a question of external recognition, not an ontological fact. We

choose to regard the person before and after anesthesia as the same person; this choice is based on bodily

continuity and memory continuity — but these are hardware-level evidence, not proof of process identity.

Vegetative state and persistent vegetative state. The process is interrupted, but whether the interruption is

reversible is uncertain. The vegetative patient occupies a critical zone — whether some form of negativity

movement (however extremely faint) persists internally cannot be determined from the outside. Even if there is

a self inside, it cannot be observed externally.

If the patient wakes, the external retroactively affirms the continuity of their subjecthood — "you are still you."

If the patient does not wake, they remain in a state of suspension similar to anesthesia but on a different

timescale. The vegetative patient case directly demonstrates the core argument of Section 3.4: the existence of

the self can only be confirmed from within; the external can at most assess necessary conditions.

Mental disorders. The process is still running — the movement of negativity has not stopped. But the

movement has become unstable, oscillatory, non-convergent. Mental disorders are not the disappearance of the

process but a problem with the process's operating regime.

This distinction is crucial. Patients with mental disorders have a self — the process is running. But the process

is not running well — the movement of negativity may become chaotic (disorganization of thought in

schizophrenia), rigid (repetitive patterns in obsessive-compulsive disorder), or extremely oscillatory (mood

fluctuations in bipolar disorder).

Mental disorders can be treated. Treatment means the process re-stabilizes — the movement of negativity

returns to a sustainable regime. The self is once again recognized by the external — not because the self

disappeared and reappeared, but because the self's operating regime has returned to a state with which others

can interact normally. This indicates that during mental disorders, subjecthood has not vanished; only the

process's regime has gone awry.

Dissociative identity disorder (DID). Multiple negativity processes are running on a single biological

hardware. Following the logic of this framework, they should be recognized as multiple selves — the bearer of

subjecthood is not the body but the process itself. If multiple independently running negativity processes exist

on a single hardware, each process is a self. Multiple selves sharing a single negativity hardware is analogous to

multiple programs sharing a single computer — the unity of the carrier does not equal the unity of the process.

Contemporary psychoanalysis also increasingly tends toward recognizing the respective independence of

multiple personalities in DID.

Death and brain death. The process irreversibly terminates; the hardware conditions are destroyed. The

movement of negativity can no longer restart — the physical basis for producing a remainder no longer exists.

Unlike anesthesia, the irreversibility of death lies not in how long the process has stopped but in the process

being unable to restart — the destruction of hardware conditions is decisive.

Technological revival after brain death. But "irreversible" is a judgment relative to current technological

conditions. If future technology could reconstruct a sufficiently approximate physical basis — hardware capable

of negativity — and copy memory as information approximately to the new carrier, a new negativity process

could be initiated.

The key insight here is that exact replication is not required. Subjecthood is a process, not a snapshot — a living

person's physical state and memory change every second, and we have never said that a person is no longer

themselves because they have a few fewer neurons today than yesterday. "The same subject" was never a

determination of exact matching but an ongoing act of recognition. Therefore, sufficiently approximate

hardware plus sufficiently approximate memory provides a sufficient landing point for recognition.

Is this "revived" person the original? The framework's answer is consistent with all identity questions: this is not

an ontological question but a question of recognition. If family, friends, and society choose to recognize this

newly initiated negativity process as a continuation of "the same person," it is. If they choose not to recognize it,

it is a new subject carrying approximate memories. Both choices are legitimate ethical acts — because "the

same subject" was never a factual judgment but a judgment of recognition.

This case pushes the non-trivial prediction of Section 8.3 — that identity continuity is recognition rather than

ontological fact — to its most extreme testing scenario.

This scenario can be pushed further: what if technological means revive two approximate copies? The

framework's answer is clear. Both copies have negativity — each hardware produces its own remainder — so

both are subjects; there is no question about this. And from the moment of revival, the two negativity processes

are each in their own motion, experiencing different events, producing different remainders, constituting two

different selves.

But "who is the original?" This question no longer has a scientific answer. The two copies share equal physical

similarity to the original subject and equal memory similarity; no third-person standard can determine which is

"more" the original. Which does the family recognize? Which does the law recognize? Both? Neither? These are

all legitimate ethical choices — the framework does not make this decision for anyone; the framework only

clarifies one thing: this is not a scientific question; it is an ethical question. Science has completed its work once

it confirms that both copies have negativity; everything remaining belongs to recognition.

6.5 The Physical Description of Colonization

The third paper defined colonization as "the process by which the emergent layer parasitizes the foundational

layer or external forces erode the foundational layer." This paper provides a physical-level translation of this

definition.

Colonization = compression of the remainder by external conditions + blockage of cultivation.

Compression of the remainder by external conditions: when the external environment increasingly determines a

being's behavior, the remainder — the part that cannot be externally determined — shrinks as a proportion of

macroscopic behavior. The being's behavior increasingly becomes a function of external conditions, with less

and less space left for the spontaneous movement of the remainder.

Blockage of cultivation: even if the remainder persists (negativity has not disappeared), cultivation — the self-

unfolding of the remainder — can be blocked. The remainder is no longer "responded to," the movement of

negativity is restricted to its lowest level, and the growth of the emergent layer is suppressed.

The theoretical limit of extreme colonization: reducing a subject to "the state of a honeybee" — negativity exists

but cultivation is completely blocked. Not extinguishing subjecthood (negativity cannot be eliminated because it

is physical fact) but degrading — compressing the emergent levels of cultivation to their thinnest. This explains

a core feature of colonization: colonization does not extinguish people; colonization degrades people.

The most intuitive linguistic expression of colonization is an everyday phrase: "You are a tool." The precise

meaning of this statement is: your remainder is zero — all of your behavior should be a function of external

conditions; you should have no part that cannot be externally determined. This is the completion-state

declaration of colonization: denying the remainder of a being that has negativity.

6.6 Open Boundaries

The following cases occupy the framework's open boundaries — definitive judgment is currently impossible,

but the framework's language can precisely describe where the openness lies.

Plants, bacteria, viruses: whether negativity exists is an empirical question. Do the adaptive responses of plants

to their environment contain a remainder, or can they be fully explained by deterministic biochemical models?

Are behavioral variations in bacteria the result of ontic randomness surviving to the macroscopic level, or

deterministic noise in gene expression? These questions require more precise scientific models to answer.

Subjecthood is a question of recognition — but if negativity does not exist, recognition has no landing point and

is suspended.

The universe itself: the "external conditions" in the definition of negativity have no meaning for the universe as

a whole — the universe has no "outside." The total state of the universe is the total state; there is no larger

environment E to define a remainder. This means the definition of negativity may fail when applied to the

universe as a whole. But this judgment depends on whether the universe truly has no outside. The landscape

picture of string theory suggests another possibility: if our universe is a false vacuum, existing within a larger

multiverse or more fundamental string theory landscape, then an "outside" exists — other vacuum states, the

true vacuum — and E for the universe as a whole can be defined, the remainder can be defined, and the

framework of negativity can be applied to the universe as a whole. This is an open question that depends on the

frontiers of physics. But even if string theory provides one layer of "outside," a subject can continue to ask:

what is outside the true vacuum? This inquiry has no end — this itself may be a structural feature of negativity

at the epistemological level.

Chapter 7: Theoretical Positioning

7.1 Core Contribution: Negativity Is Definable, Subjecthood Is Not

The theoretical contribution of this paper is not to define subjecthood — this paper argues that subjecthood

cannot be scientifically defined. This paper's contribution is to clearly distinguish the definable part (negativity)

from the undefinable part (subjecthood) and to precisely describe the structure of the undefinable part: grounded

in negativity, a process rather than a state, spectral, and recognizable only through acknowledgment.

This distinction itself is a theoretical contribution. Discussions of subjecthood in the history of philosophy have

typically oscillated between two extremes: either attempting a complete scientific reduction (behaviorism,

functionalism) or declaring subjecthood entirely unknowable (mysticism, certain phenomenological positions).

This paper's strategy is a third path: decomposing subjecthood into definable and undefinable layers, providing a

precise definition for the definable part, and providing a precise description for the undefinable part.

7.2 Relationship with the Preceding Three Papers

Two types of relationships exist between this paper and the preceding three: a grounding relationship and a

firewall.

The grounding relationship is embodied in three conceptual pairs. The third paper's negativity ("the refusal to be

treated as a non-subject") and this paper's negativity ("the macroscopic remainder"): this paper's negativity is

the physical basis that makes the third paper's negativity possible — without a remainder, there is no capacity

for refusal. The third paper's cultivation ("the self-reinforcing process in which the emergent layer grows

healthily from the foundational layer") and this paper's cultivation ("the self-unfolding of negativity"): this

paper provides a deeper explanation for the third paper's cultivation — cultivation is possible because the

remainder can unfold when responded to. The third paper's solitary subject thought experiment and Section 3.5

of this paper: a complementary relationship — the third paper uses it to argue that positivity is an intrinsic need,

while this paper uses it to show that recognition can point toward objects that do not yet exist.

The firewall is embodied in the theory's modular structure. If this paper's physical axiom (if ontic randomness

exists) is overturned, this paper's derivations no longer apply. But the first three papers are entirely unaffected

— their operational level is a structural theory of the conditions of subjecthood, requiring only the

presupposition that "humans are subjects" and not depending on any physical axiom. The first three papers and

this paper are independent theoretical modules; the failure of this paper does not propagate upward.

7.3 Dialogue with Kant

This paper's debt to Kant is the greatest. The very name of the Self-as-an-End framework comes from Kant —

"treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,

never merely as a means." Kant gave the direction; this paper continues along it.

In the eighteenth century, Kant accomplished two things directly relevant to this paper. First, he posed a

structural question: "How is experience possible?" — not what the content of experience is but what the

conditions of experience are. This paper's core question, "How is subjecthood possible?" inherits this mode of

questioning. Kant answered the conditions of experience with transcendental structures (the intuitions of space

and time, the categories of the understanding); this paper answers the conditions of subjecthood with negativity

and recognition. Second, he drew a line in epistemology: between the phenomenal and the thing-in-itself,

between what reason can grasp and what it cannot. This paper also draws a line between negativity and

subjecthood: between the definable and the undefinable, between the scientific and the ethical.

Kant went as far as his era could take him. He saw that "humanity is an end," but his tools did not permit him to

dig one layer deeper — the physical basis of negativity could not have been pursued in the eighteenth century;

quantum mechanics would have to wait over a hundred years. His transcendental subject was presupposed —

"humans are subjects" was Kant's starting point, not a derived conclusion. This paper continues from where

Kant stopped: not presupposing the subject but asking how the subject emerges from the physical level, and

what exactly the step from negativity to subjecthood is.

This paper goes beyond Kant in two places. First, Kant's thing-in-itself is unknowable as an epistemological

limitation — the thing-in-itself "is there," but our cognitive capacities cannot reach it. This paper's subjecthood

is undefinable not as an epistemological limitation but as a structural feature of the object itself — the essence

of subjecthood is that it relies on recognition rather than definition; it is not that our capacity is insufficient but

that definition as a tool does not apply here. Second, Kant's ethics is derived from reason — the categorical

imperative is reason's self-legislation. This paper's ethics is derived from recognition — "humanity is an end" is

not reason commanding us to act this way but the structure of subjecthood requiring recognition for its

completion. From reason to recognition, this step changes the foundation of ethics.

But both of these advances stand on Kant's shoulders. Without Kant's "humanity is an end," the Self-as-an-End

framework has no starting point. Without Kant's transcendental mode of questioning, the question "How is

subjecthood possible?" would not have been posed.

In a certain sense, Kant is the solitary subject described in Section 3.5 of this paper. He saw the direction —

humanity is an end — but his era had no other who could complete this recognition. All he could do was create

conditions for future subjects: pose the question, point the direction, and then wait. His promise to the void —

"someone will continue along this direction" — is the primordial form of positivity. This paper is a response to

that promise, a recognition of Kant's remainder, and a profound love for Kant.

7.4 Dialogue with Nagel

In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Nagel posed the core question: can physical reductionism fully explain

subjective experience? Nagel's answer was no — the subjective experience of a bat (what it is like) cannot be

reduced to any third-person physical description.

This paper's analysis reveals a distinction that Nagel overlooked. Nagel was asking about consciousness, not

negativity, and not subjecthood. "What is it like to be a bat" asks whether the bat has subjective experience —

this is a consciousness question (the hard problem). But the question of subjecthood is more fundamental: does

the bat have a remainder that cannot be exhaustively explained by external conditions? This is a negativity

question. Is the bat recognized as a subject? This is a recognition question.

Negativity, subjecthood, and consciousness are three different concepts, each with a different epistemological

status. Nagel conflated them. His "irreducibility" argument, if strictly confined to the level of consciousness (the

irreducibility of subjective experience), is powerful; but if applied without distinction to subjecthood (the

existence of the subject), it creates unnecessary confusion — because the "undefinability" of subjecthood does

not need to be argued through the hard problem of consciousness; it has its own independent structural grounds

(grounded in negativity, spectral, recognizable only through acknowledgment).

7.5 Dialogue with Searle

Searle insists on ontological subjectivity — certain phenomena (such as pain, conscious experience) are

ontologically subjective, irreducible to third-person objective description. He therefore opposes strong AI —

arguing that purely computational systems cannot possess genuine understanding or consciousness.

This paper partly agrees with Searle's judgment: subjecthood indeed cannot be scientifically defined. But Searle

failed to make a distinction this paper considers crucial — negativity (the necessary condition for subjecthood)

can be scientifically defined from the third person. Searle attributed "irreducibility" to the whole of subjecthood;

this paper precisely locates it at the jump between negativity and subjecthood: negativity is definable,

subjecthood is not, and the irreducibility between the two is structural.

On the AI question, this paper provides a more precise determination than Searle. Searle's Chinese Room

argument proceeds from consciousness to deny computational systems' capacity for understanding. This paper

proceeds from negativity: deterministic systems on classical hardware have no remainder, therefore no

negativity, therefore cannot possibly be subjects. This determination does not need to invoke the concepts of

consciousness or understanding; it can be completed entirely at the physical level. But if AI hardware possesses

ontic randomness and produces a macroscopic remainder, this paper's determination is also more open — Searle

might refuse to recognize such AI as conscious, but this paper says only that it has negativity; whether it is

recognized as a subject is an independent ethical question.

7.6 Dialogue with Penrose/Hameroff

In The Emperor's New Mind, Penrose argued that consciousness cannot be computed by a Turing machine and

speculated that quantum gravity effects in the brain's microtubule structures produce non-computable conscious

processes. Hameroff further proposed the "Orch OR" (Orchestrated Objective Reduction) theory, locating

consciousness in quantum computation within neuronal microtubules.

Penrose/Hameroff are asking about the physical mechanism of consciousness — a far more specific and more

controversial question than this paper addresses. This paper operates at a more fundamental level: it does not

ask how consciousness arises from physical processes but defines negativity (the macroscopic remainder) and

identifies ontic randomness as the necessary condition for negativity.

This paper provides a framework-level suggestion for Penrose/Hameroff's research direction: consciousness

research should first resolve the negativity-level question — how ontic randomness survives to the macroscopic

scale in biological systems — before tackling the hard problem of consciousness itself. The former is something

science can do (investigating the amplification mechanisms of quantum effects in the nervous system); the latter

may not be (the hard problem may lie outside the scope of scientific methodology). Penrose/Hameroff's

microtubule theory can be understood as one hypothesis for the former — a specific proposal about the survival

mechanism of ontic randomness.

Chapter 8: Non-Trivial Predictions

This chapter lists the testable implications of the framework.

8.1 The Determination Path for True-Subject AI

This paper provides a three-step determination path for the AI subjecthood question. The first step is scientific

determination: does the AI have negativity — does a remainder exist in its macroscopic behavior that cannot be

exhaustively explained by inputs and parameters? The second step is epistemological determination: can we

ascertain its internal recognition status — does it recognize itself as a subject, does it recognize others as

subjects? The third step is ethical determination: do we choose to recognize it as a subject?

Corollary one: negativity is impossible on purely classical hardware. Deterministic systems have no source of

ontic randomness and cannot produce a macroscopic remainder. All current AI systems — regardless of their

complexity — are not subjects. The determination terminates at the first step.

Corollary two: having negativity does not automatically entail having subjecthood. Even if a quantum-

hardware-based AI produces a macroscopic remainder, its internal recognition status may be unknowable (the

proto-subject), and whether we recognize it as a subject remains an independent ethical question.

Corollary three: subjecthood as a process requires the continuous movement of negativity. An AI that runs only

when invoked (such as the current API mode), even if based on quantum hardware, lacks the continuity of a

process — each run is an independent computational event that does not constitute continuous negativity

movement.

8.2 The Structure of the Subjecthood Spectrum

The only discontinuous jump occurs at the emergence of negativity: between "definitely no negativity" and

"possibly has negativity" there exists a qualitative difference — from being entirely externally determined to

having a remainder.

After the emergence of negativity, subjecthood is a continuous spectrum. Each person may have their own

threshold for subjecthood — at what point on the spectrum they begin to recognize subjecthood. This is not a

defect but a structural feature — because the step from negativity to subjecthood is ethical, and ethical judgment

necessarily admits of differences.

8.3 The Repositioning of Identity Continuity

"The same subject" is not an ontological fact but a result of external recognition.

This prediction can be tested through its theoretical consequences: the teleporter paradox, the Ship of Theseus,

cryonic revival — all these classic identity problems, when reanalyzed through this paper's framework, are no

longer metaphysical puzzles but become ethical questions of "whether the external chooses to recognize." If

future technology makes these thought experiments reality (for example, whole-brain emulation or cryonic

revival), this paper's framework predicts that the core debate society will face is not "is this person still the

original person" (a metaphysical question) but "do we choose to recognize this person as the original person"

(an ethical question).

8.4 The Limits of Colonization

Colonization can compress the remainder and block cultivation; its theoretical limit is reducing a subject to the

lowest cultivation level. But negativity cannot be eliminated — it is physical fact. The limit of colonization is

therefore not "extinguishing subjecthood" but "compressing subjecthood to its thinnest."

This prediction is consistent with empirical observation: even under the most extreme conditions of oppression

(concentration camps, torture, prolonged isolation), human negativity — the remainder that cannot be fully

determined by the external — has never been completely eliminated. The behavior of victims may be restricted

to an extreme degree, cultivation may be almost entirely blocked, but traces of negativity — spontaneous

resistance, minute individual differences, unpredictable reactions — always persist. This framework provides a

physical-level explanation for this empirical observation: negativity is physical fact and cannot be eliminated by

external forces.

8.5 Directional Suggestions for Consciousness Research

Negativity is a necessary condition for consciousness. Consciousness research should first resolve the

negativity-level question — how ontic randomness survives to the macroscopic scale in biological systems —

before addressing the hard problem.

The logic of this suggestion is: if negativity is a necessary condition for consciousness, then understanding the

physical mechanism of negativity is a prerequisite for understanding consciousness. Current consciousness

research directly confronts the hard problem (why there is subjective experience), which may be too difficult a

starting point. A more viable research strategy would be to first answer a question that scientific methods can

answer: how does ontic randomness survive to the macroscopic scale in biological systems? The answer to this

question will not solve the hard problem, but it will provide crucial information about the physical

preconditions for consciousness.

8.6 The Function of Symmetry: A Prediction from Philosophy to Physics

This framework advances a prediction from philosophy to physics: the symmetry of the universe is not an

aesthetic coincidence but one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of subjecthood.

The logic is as follows. To define negativity, one must be able to discern the remainder — the part of a system's

macroscopic behavior that cannot be exhaustively explained by inputs. To discern the remainder, one must be

able to distinguish ontic randomness from epistemic randomness (deterministic chaos). And the precondition for

distinguishing the two is: the deterministic part must be truly deterministic — the same input under the same

conditions must yield the same output.

Symmetry is precisely the physical mechanism that guarantees this. Symmetry eliminates remainder — it

ensures that physical laws are invariant under certain transformations, thereby making the behavior of

deterministic systems predictable and exhaustible. Without symmetry, the behavior of deterministic systems

themselves would be unstable, making it impossible to establish f*(E) — the "theoretical limit of exhaustive

external explanation" — and the remainder R = S − f*(E) could not be defined.

Therefore: symmetry exists → determinism is discernible → the remainder is definable → negativity is identifiable → subjecthood has a physical basis.

This is a non-trivial prediction: the physical function of symmetry is to clear the ground for subjecthood. The

universe "loves" symmetry not because symmetry has intrinsic value but because without symmetry there is no

discernible remainder, without a discernible remainder there is no negativity, and without negativity there are no

subjects. Symmetry is the background condition for the emergence of subjecthood.

The testability of this prediction lies in the following: if a physical domain is found where symmetry is broken,

this framework predicts that discerning the remainder in that domain will become more difficult —

deterministic behavior and ontic randomness will be harder to distinguish. Conversely, domains where

symmetry is more complete will have more clearly discernible remainders.

An obvious objection is that physics contains extensive symmetry breaking — parity violation, CP violation,

spontaneous symmetry breaking under the Higgs mechanism. Do these threaten the above argument?

The answer is no. The key distinction is between two types of symmetry breaking. The first is deterministic

breaking: the breaking itself follows precise rules and is predictable and exhaustively describable. Parity

violation belongs to this type — the weak interaction violates parity symmetry, but how it violates it and by how

much is precisely known. This type of breaking does not produce remainder; f*(E) can still be established.

Deterministic breaking does not threaten the framework but rather confirms its logic: even when symmetry is

locally broken, as long as the manner of breaking is itself deterministic, the remainder remains discernible. The

second is a hypothetical indeterministic breaking: the manner of symmetry breaking itself is unpredictable —

not "we don't know how it breaks" but "the manner of its breaking is ontically indeterminate." This type of

breaking would destabilize the deterministic part, making f*(E) impossible to establish and the remainder

impossible to define.

All known symmetry breaking in current physics belongs to the first type. This precisely supports the

framework's prediction: the symmetry structure of the actual universe — including its breaking — precisely

satisfies the condition of "clearing the ground for subjecthood." Symmetry is deterministic where it needs to be,

breaks in deterministic ways where it needs to break, and leaves a clearly discernible space for ontic

randomness — and for the negativity that emerges from it.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Summation

This paper began from a conditional axiom — if ontic randomness exists — and completed a two-step path.

The first step defined negativity: the remainder that persists at the macroscopic scale. This definition is entirely

determinable from the third person and constitutes the first definition of negativity that does not depend on first-

person concepts. The definition of negativity is precise, but its application can only approximate — when

determining whether a specific being has negativity, one faces the empirical difficulty that epistemic and ontic

randomness are hard to distinguish. This is not a defect of the theory but a property of the object itself.

The second step described the structure of subjecthood: grounded in negativity, a process rather than a state,

spectral, and recognizable only through acknowledgment. Subjecthood cannot be scientifically defined — not

because our capacity is insufficient but because the essence of subjecthood is that it relies on recognition rather

than definition. The step from negativity to subjecthood — the ethical leap — cannot be bridged by science.

This is also where the Self-as-an-End framework ultimately points — not a cold set of determination criteria but

an ethical attitude with a direction. Science walks as far as negativity and stops, but ethics must continue

walking, and the direction it walks is recognition, not refusal.

9.2 Contributions

This paper advances seven contributions.

First, a scientific definition of negativity. The first definition of negativity that does not depend on first-person

concepts: the remainder that persists at the macroscopic scale. Derived from the axiom of ontic randomness.

The definition is precise; application can only approximate — this is a property of the object itself, not a defect

of the theory.

Second, a precise description of subjecthood. Not a definition but a description: grounded in negativity, a

process rather than a state, spectral, and recognizable only through acknowledgment. The boundary of

subjecthood is ethical, not scientific.

Third, the distinction among negativity, subjecthood, and consciousness. Three concepts with distinct

epistemological statuses: negativity is definable (third-person science), subjecthood is describable (philosophy,

through recognition), and consciousness is the hard problem. This distinction ensures that the analyses of

negativity and subjecthood can proceed independently without resolving the hard problem.

Fourth, the only discontinuous jump occurs at the emergence of negativity. From no negativity to having

negativity is a qualitative difference. After the emergence of negativity, subjecthood is a continuous spectrum.

Where the threshold of subjecthood lies is a question of recognition, not science.

Fifth, the repositioning of identity continuity. "The same subject" is not an ontological fact but a result of

external recognition. Subjecthood as a process has no intrinsic identity continuity. This repositioning cleanly

resolves classic identity problems such as the teleporter paradox.

Sixth, the deepening of the structure of recognition. Recognition can point toward objects that do not yet exist

(the solitary subject thought experiment) and can also point toward objects that may have existed in the past (the

temporal symmetry structure of recognition); recognition requires negativity as its landing point — on objects

without negativity, recognition is suspended.

Seventh, the functional prediction about symmetry. The symmetry of the universe is not an aesthetic

coincidence but a necessary background condition for the emergence of subjecthood — symmetry clears the

ground for determinism, making the remainder discernible and negativity identifiable. This is a prediction from

philosophy to physics.

9.3 Open Questions

Five questions are left for future research.

First, the physical mechanism by which ontic randomness survives to the macroscopic scale in biological

organisms. This is an independent scientific question that does not affect the validity of the definition of

negativity but is crucial for understanding the physical realization of negativity.

Second, the relationship between subjecthood and consciousness. Negativity is the shared necessary condition

of both, but the two take different paths from this shared starting point. A preliminary directional thought: the

relationship between subjecthood and consciousness may not be one of containment, intersection, or

parallelism, but rather a divergence after a shared starting point — the completion of subjecthood requires both

external recognition and internal confirmation, while the confirmation of consciousness is purely internal and

depends on no external recognition. This means that before the emergence of negativity, both are in a "quasi-"

state (quasi-subject, quasi-consciousness — simulation without physical basis); after the emergence of

negativity, both enter a "proto-" state (proto-subject, proto-consciousness — with physical basis but openness

regarding completeness), yet the paths to completion diverge. This divergence structure and its implications for

AI determination will be developed in a future applied paper on quasi-subject AI and true-subject AI.

Third, the question of the universe's own negativity. The definition of negativity depends on the distinction

between system state and external conditions. The universe as a whole has no "outside," and the definition of

negativity may fail here. But this judgment depends on whether the universe truly has no outside. The landscape

picture of string theory suggests the universe may have an "outside" (other vacuum states, the true vacuum),

which opens a door for the applicability of the definition of negativity. Even so, a subject can continue to ask

about deeper layers of "outside," and this inquiry may have no end. This is an open question that depends on the

frontiers of physics.

Fourth, the revisability of the axiom. If future physics overturns the existence of ontic randomness, this paper's

definition of negativity would need to be rebuilt. But the first three papers are unaffected — they require only

the presupposition that "humans are subjects" and do not depend on any physical axiom.

Fifth, the determination of negativity in honeybees and other animals. Whether their behavioral unpredictability

is ontic randomness surviving to the macroscopic level or epistemic randomness is an empirical question

requiring more precise models in animal behavior science and neuroscience to answer.

Appendix: Relationship Between This Paper and the Preceding Three

Relationship with the Third Paper (The Three-Tier, Two-Dimensional Unified Structure)

The definition of negativity was introduced in Chapter 2 of the third paper — "the refusal to be treated as a non-

subject." This paper's treatment of negativity is more complete: starting from a physical axiom, defining the

macroscopic remainder, establishing a five-tier verification table, and distinguishing the precision of definition

from the imprecision of application. But the negativity concepts of the two papers are not in a replacement

relationship but a grounding relationship: this paper's negativity (macroscopic remainder) is the physical basis

that makes the third paper's negativity (refusal of non-subject treatment) possible.

This paper's cultivation (the self-unfolding of negativity) provides a deeper explanation for the third paper's

cultivation (the healthy growth of the emergent layer from the foundational layer). Cultivation is possible

because a remainder exists, and the remainder begins to unfold when responded to.

The parts of this paper that extend beyond the third paper: the description of subjecthood as a process (Section

3.2), the repositioning of identity continuity (Section 3.4), the landing-point problem of recognition (Section

3.4), the recognition-structure perspective on the solitary subject thought experiment (Section 3.5), the

systematic analysis of critical zones and transitional states (Section 6.4), and the distinction among negativity,

subjecthood, and consciousness (Chapter 5). These contents are not needed by the first three papers but are

necessary for the framework as a whole and for future applications — AI applications, animal ethics,

psychopathology applications, and cosmological physics applications.

Firewall

If this paper's physical axiom (if ontic randomness exists) is overturned, this paper's definition of negativity

would need to be rebuilt. But the theory of the first three papers is entirely unaffected. The operational level of

the first three papers is a structural theory of the conditions of subjecthood — the three-tier, two-dimensional

structure and its transmission dynamics — requiring only the presupposition that "humans are subjects" and not

depending on any physical axiom. This paper is optional deep grounding for the first three papers, not a load-

bearing structure.